parent
89d5fd3721
commit
71b730989d
GPG Key ID:
1EC08A25C9DB2503
@ -1 +1 @@
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SOURCES/tigervnc-1.13.1.tar.gz
|
SOURCES/tigervnc-1.14.0.tar.gz
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|
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@ -1 +1 @@
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6f7a23f14833f552c88523da1a5e102f3b8d35c2 SOURCES/tigervnc-1.13.1.tar.gz
|
9e67944113159da85f42c24b43f40b842f23feb3 SOURCES/tigervnc-1.14.0.tar.gz
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@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
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|
From 4f6a3521874da5a67fd746389cfa9b6199eb3582 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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|
From: Pierre Ossman <ossman@cendio.se>
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|
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2024 16:16:08 +0200
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|
Subject: [PATCH] Add missing comma in default security type list
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|
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|
Otherwise it merges with the next entry, removing both of them from the
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|
default list.
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|
---
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|
common/rfb/SecurityClient.cxx | 2 +-
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|
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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|
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|
diff --git a/common/rfb/SecurityClient.cxx b/common/rfb/SecurityClient.cxx
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|
index 12860662f..63e0cadc0 100644
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|
--- a/common/rfb/SecurityClient.cxx
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|
+++ b/common/rfb/SecurityClient.cxx
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|
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ StringParameter SecurityClient::secTypes
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|
"X509Plain,TLSPlain,X509Vnc,TLSVnc,X509None,TLSNone,"
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|
#endif
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|
#ifdef HAVE_NETTLE
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|
- "RA2,RA2_256,RA2ne,RA2ne_256,DH,MSLogonII"
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|
+ "RA2,RA2_256,RA2ne,RA2ne_256,DH,MSLogonII,"
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|
#endif
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|
"VncAuth,None",
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|
ConfViewer);
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
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|
From 6d9017eeb364491cf2acdf1c7e61aee8dd198527 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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|
From: Pierre Ossman <ossman@cendio.se>
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|
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2024 16:15:09 +0200
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|
Subject: [PATCH] Correctly handle ZRLE cursors
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|
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|
Cursor data has a depth of 32 bits and hence cannot use CPIXELs.
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|
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|
This is a regression from baca73d.
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|
---
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|
common/rfb/ZRLEDecoder.cxx | 4 ++--
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|
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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|
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|
diff --git a/common/rfb/ZRLEDecoder.cxx b/common/rfb/ZRLEDecoder.cxx
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|
index 474fd6ca1..e274a697a 100644
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|
--- a/common/rfb/ZRLEDecoder.cxx
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|
+++ b/common/rfb/ZRLEDecoder.cxx
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|
@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ void ZRLEDecoder::zrleDecode(const Rect& r, rdr::InStream* is,
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|
Pixel maxPixel = pf.pixelFromRGB((uint16_t)-1, (uint16_t)-1, (uint16_t)-1);
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|
bool fitsInLS3Bytes = maxPixel < (1<<24);
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|
bool fitsInMS3Bytes = (maxPixel & 0xff) == 0;
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|
- bool isLowCPixel = (sizeof(T) == 4) &&
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|
+ bool isLowCPixel = (sizeof(T) == 4) && (pf.depth <= 24) &&
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|
((fitsInLS3Bytes && pf.isLittleEndian()) ||
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|
(fitsInMS3Bytes && pf.isBigEndian()));
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|
- bool isHighCPixel = (sizeof(T) == 4) &&
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|
+ bool isHighCPixel = (sizeof(T) == 4) && (pf.depth <= 24) &&
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|
((fitsInLS3Bytes && pf.isBigEndian()) ||
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|
(fitsInMS3Bytes && pf.isLittleEndian()));
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|
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@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
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|
From 445e0230cf4e939dcc59caf5d5f001c2f7b04da6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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|
From: Pierre Ossman <ossman@cendio.se>
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|
Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2024 14:24:42 +0200
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|
Subject: [PATCH] Handle existing config directory in vncpasswd
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|
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|
This fixes commit a79c33d.
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|
---
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|
unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx | 6 ++++--
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|
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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|
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|
diff --git a/unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx b/unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx
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|
index 6666955f1..9f794e129 100644
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|
--- a/unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx
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|
+++ b/unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx
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|
@@ -213,8 +213,10 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
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|
exit(1);
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|
}
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|
if (os::mkdir_p(configDir, 0777) == -1) {
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|
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not create VNC config directory: %s\n", strerror(errno));
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|
- exit(1);
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|
+ if (errno != EEXIST) {
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|
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not create VNC config directory: %s\n", strerror(errno));
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|
+ exit(1);
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|
+ }
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|
}
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|
snprintf(fname, sizeof(fname), "%s/passwd", configDir);
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|
}
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
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|
From 4db34f73d461b973867ddaf18bf690219229cd7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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|
From: Carlos Santos <casantos@redhat.com>
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|
Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2024 18:39:59 -0300
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|
Subject: [PATCH] vncsession: use /bin/sh if the user shell is not set
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|
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|
An empty shell field in the password file is valid, although not common.
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|
Use /bin/sh in this case, as documented in the passwd(5) man page, since
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|
the vncserver script requires a non-empty SHELL environment variable.
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|
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|
Fixes issue #1786.
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|
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|
Signed-off-by: Carlos Santos <casantos@redhat.com>
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|
---
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|
unix/vncserver/vncsession.c | 2 +-
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|
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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|
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|
diff --git a/unix/vncserver/vncsession.c b/unix/vncserver/vncsession.c
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|
index 1ee096c7c..98a0432aa 100644
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|
--- a/unix/vncserver/vncsession.c
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|
+++ b/unix/vncserver/vncsession.c
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|
@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ run_script(const char *username, const char *display, char **envp)
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|
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|
// Set up some basic environment for the script
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|
setenv("HOME", pwent->pw_dir, 1);
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|
- setenv("SHELL", pwent->pw_shell, 1);
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|
+ setenv("SHELL", *pwent->pw_shell != '\0' ? pwent->pw_shell : "/bin/sh", 1);
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|
setenv("LOGNAME", pwent->pw_name, 1);
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|
setenv("USER", pwent->pw_name, 1);
|
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|
setenv("USERNAME", pwent->pw_name, 1);
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@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
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From a31ba141824a7649e11f0ef7673718ce559d6337 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
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Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000
|
|
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend
|
|
||||||
|
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||||||
The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at
|
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||||||
least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new
|
|
||||||
part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P
|
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||||||
existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements
|
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||||||
instead of N + P.
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||||||
|
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Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old
|
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values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially
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uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes.
|
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For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would
|
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result in this 8 value array:
|
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[N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P
|
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^OOB write
|
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|
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The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in
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both.
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|
|
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CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153
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|
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
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|
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
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---
|
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Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
|
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randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++--
|
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2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
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|
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diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
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index 6ec419e870..563c4f31a5 100644
|
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--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
|
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+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
|
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@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
|
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XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop);
|
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return BadAlloc;
|
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}
|
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- new_value.size = len;
|
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+ new_value.size = total_len;
|
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new_value.type = type;
|
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new_value.format = format;
|
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||||||
|
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||||||
@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
|
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||||||
case PropModePrepend:
|
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||||||
new_data = new_value.data;
|
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||||||
old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
|
|
||||||
- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
|
|
||||||
+ (len * size_in_bytes));
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
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||||||
if (new_data)
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
|
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||||||
index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644
|
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--- a/randr/rrproperty.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
|
|
||||||
RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop);
|
|
||||||
return BadAlloc;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- new_value.size = len;
|
|
||||||
+ new_value.size = total_len;
|
|
||||||
new_value.type = type;
|
|
||||||
new_value.format = format;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
|
|
||||||
case PropModePrepend:
|
|
||||||
new_data = new_value.data;
|
|
||||||
old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
|
|
||||||
- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
|
|
||||||
+ (len * size_in_bytes));
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (new_data)
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.41.0
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From 004f461c440cb6611eefb48fbbb4fa53a6d49f80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 12:19:45 +1000
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] mi: reset the PointerWindows reference on screen
|
|
||||||
switch
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PointerWindows[] keeps a reference to the last window our sprite
|
|
||||||
entered - changes are usually handled by CheckMotion().
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If we switch between screens via XWarpPointer our
|
|
||||||
dev->spriteInfo->sprite->win is set to the new screen's root window.
|
|
||||||
If there's another window at the cursor location CheckMotion() will
|
|
||||||
trigger the right enter/leave events later. If there is not, it skips
|
|
||||||
that process and we never trigger LeaveWindow() - PointerWindows[] for
|
|
||||||
the device still refers to the previous window.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If that window is destroyed we have a dangling reference that will
|
|
||||||
eventually cause a use-after-free bug when checking the window hierarchy
|
|
||||||
later.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
To trigger this, we require:
|
|
||||||
- two protocol screens
|
|
||||||
- XWarpPointer to the other screen's root window
|
|
||||||
- XDestroyWindow before entering any other window
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This is a niche bug so we hack around it by making sure we reset the
|
|
||||||
PointerWindows[] entry so we cannot have a dangling pointer. This
|
|
||||||
doesn't handle Enter/Leave events correctly but the previous code didn't
|
|
||||||
either.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
CVE-2023-5380, ZDI-CAN-21608
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
|
||||||
Sri working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
dix/enterleave.h | 2 --
|
|
||||||
include/eventstr.h | 3 +++
|
|
||||||
mi/mipointer.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
|
|
||||||
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/dix/enterleave.h b/dix/enterleave.h
|
|
||||||
index 4b833d8a3b..e8af924c68 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/dix/enterleave.h
|
|
||||||
+++ b/dix/enterleave.h
|
|
||||||
@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ extern void DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev,
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
extern void EnterWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win, int mode);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
-extern void LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev);
|
|
||||||
-
|
|
||||||
extern void CoreFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr kbd,
|
|
||||||
int type, int mode, int detail, WindowPtr pWin);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/include/eventstr.h b/include/eventstr.h
|
|
||||||
index bf3b95fe4a..2bae3b0767 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/include/eventstr.h
|
|
||||||
+++ b/include/eventstr.h
|
|
||||||
@@ -296,4 +296,7 @@ union _InternalEvent {
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+extern void
|
|
||||||
+LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev);
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/mi/mipointer.c b/mi/mipointer.c
|
|
||||||
index 75be1aeeb8..b12ae9be1d 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/mi/mipointer.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/mi/mipointer.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -397,8 +397,21 @@ miPointerWarpCursor(DeviceIntPtr pDev, ScreenPtr pScreen, int x, int y)
|
|
||||||
#ifdef PANORAMIX
|
|
||||||
&& noPanoramiXExtension
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
- )
|
|
||||||
- UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen);
|
|
||||||
+ ) {
|
|
||||||
+ DeviceIntPtr master = GetMaster(pDev, MASTER_POINTER);
|
|
||||||
+ /* Hack for CVE-2023-5380: if we're moving
|
|
||||||
+ * screens PointerWindows[] keeps referring to the
|
|
||||||
+ * old window. If that gets destroyed we have a UAF
|
|
||||||
+ * bug later. Only happens when jumping from a window
|
|
||||||
+ * to the root window on the other screen.
|
|
||||||
+ * Enter/Leave events are incorrect for that case but
|
|
||||||
+ * too niche to fix.
|
|
||||||
+ */
|
|
||||||
+ LeaveWindow(pDev);
|
|
||||||
+ if (master)
|
|
||||||
+ LeaveWindow(master);
|
|
||||||
+ UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen);
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/**
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.41.0
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all
|
|
||||||
our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating
|
|
||||||
insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in
|
|
||||||
XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with,
|
|
||||||
leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
|
||||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------
|
|
||||||
dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++
|
|
||||||
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
|
|
||||||
index dcd4efb3bc..54ea11a938 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/Xi/exevents.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (from->button->xkb_acts) {
|
|
||||||
- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) {
|
|
||||||
- to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction));
|
|
||||||
- if (!to->button->xkb_acts)
|
|
||||||
- FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n");
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
+ size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons);
|
|
||||||
+ to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts,
|
|
||||||
+ maxbuttons,
|
|
||||||
+ sizeof(XkbAction));
|
|
||||||
+ memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction));
|
|
||||||
memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
|
|
||||||
- sizeof(XkbAction));
|
|
||||||
+ from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction));
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
else {
|
|
||||||
free(to->button->xkb_acts);
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
|
|
||||||
index b063128df0..3f3224d626 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/dix/devices.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/dix/devices.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -2539,6 +2539,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) {
|
|
||||||
int i;
|
|
||||||
+ int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons;
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
DeviceChangedEvent event = {
|
|
||||||
.header = ET_Internal,
|
|
||||||
.type = ET_DeviceChanged,
|
|
||||||
@@ -2549,6 +2551,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons;
|
|
||||||
+ if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) {
|
|
||||||
+ master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts,
|
|
||||||
+ maxbuttons,
|
|
||||||
+ sizeof(XkbAction));
|
|
||||||
+ memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons],
|
|
||||||
+ 0,
|
|
||||||
+ (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction));
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons *
|
|
||||||
sizeof(Atom));
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
GitLab
|
|
||||||
@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From 3e0222fcae552685d423914a683c1709dc5f6d6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of
|
|
||||||
ProcRRChange*Property
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty.
|
|
||||||
See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core
|
|
||||||
protocol and XI.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
|
|
||||||
the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was
|
|
||||||
truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
|
|
||||||
(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
|
|
||||||
finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
|
|
||||||
stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
CVE-2023-XXXXX, ZDI-CAN-22561
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
|
||||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
randr/rrproperty.c | 2 +-
|
|
||||||
randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +-
|
|
||||||
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
|
|
||||||
index 25469f57b2..c4fef8a1f6 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/randr/rrproperty.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client)
|
|
||||||
char format, mode;
|
|
||||||
unsigned long len;
|
|
||||||
int sizeInBytes;
|
|
||||||
- int totalSize;
|
|
||||||
+ uint64_t totalSize;
|
|
||||||
int err;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq);
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
|
|
||||||
index b79c17f9bf..90c5a9a933 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client)
|
|
||||||
char format, mode;
|
|
||||||
unsigned long len;
|
|
||||||
int sizeInBytes;
|
|
||||||
- int totalSize;
|
|
||||||
+ uint64_t totalSize;
|
|
||||||
int err;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq);
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.43.0
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From 77e294797db17845808462b588d4e7a2130196bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:29:49 +1000
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: allocate enough space for logical button maps
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for
|
|
||||||
each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped
|
|
||||||
to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
|
||||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 3 +--
|
|
||||||
dix/enterleave.c | 5 +++--
|
|
||||||
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
|
|
||||||
index 5b77b1a444..2b05ac5f39 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ ProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client)
|
|
||||||
if (pDev->button) {
|
|
||||||
int i;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- rep.buttons_len =
|
|
||||||
- bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(pDev->button->numButtons));
|
|
||||||
+ rep.buttons_len = bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(256)); /* button map up to 255 */
|
|
||||||
rep.length += rep.buttons_len;
|
|
||||||
buttons = calloc(rep.buttons_len, 4);
|
|
||||||
if (!buttons)
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
|
|
||||||
index 867ec74363..ded8679d76 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/dix/enterleave.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -784,8 +784,9 @@ DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail,
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
mouse = IsFloating(dev) ? dev : GetMaster(dev, MASTER_POINTER);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- /* XI 2 event */
|
|
||||||
- btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(mouse->button->numButtons) : 0;
|
|
||||||
+ /* XI 2 event contains the logical button map - maps are CARD8
|
|
||||||
+ * so we need 256 bits for the possibly maximum mapping */
|
|
||||||
+ btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(256) : 0;
|
|
||||||
btlen = bytes_to_int32(btlen);
|
|
||||||
len = sizeof(xXIFocusInEvent) + btlen * 4;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.43.0
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From 45ea0a93934c8a3760a4d68ba4ffc932375f60de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:27:50 +1000
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] dix: Allocate sufficient xEvents for our
|
|
||||||
DeviceStateNotify
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If a device has both a button class and a key class and numButtons is
|
|
||||||
zero, we can get an OOB write due to event under-allocation.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This function seems to assume a device has either keys or buttons, not
|
|
||||||
both. It has two virtually identical code paths, both of which assume
|
|
||||||
they're applying to the first event in the sequence.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
A device with both a key and button class triggered a logic bug - only
|
|
||||||
one xEvent was allocated but the deviceStateNotify pointer was pushed on
|
|
||||||
once per type. So effectively this logic code:
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
int count = 1;
|
|
||||||
if (button && nbuttons > 32) count++;
|
|
||||||
if (key && nbuttons > 0) count++;
|
|
||||||
if (key && nkeys > 32) count++; // this is basically always true
|
|
||||||
// count is at 2 for our keys + zero button device
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
ev = alloc(count * sizeof(xEvent));
|
|
||||||
FixDeviceStateNotify(ev);
|
|
||||||
if (button)
|
|
||||||
FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++);
|
|
||||||
if (key)
|
|
||||||
FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); // santa drops into the wrong chimney here
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If the device has more than 3 valuators, the OOB is pushed back - we're
|
|
||||||
off by one so it will happen when the last deviceValuator event is
|
|
||||||
written instead.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Fix this by allocating the maximum number of events we may allocate.
|
|
||||||
Note that the current behavior is not protocol-correct anyway, this
|
|
||||||
patch fixes only the allocation issue.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Note that this issue does not trigger if the device has at least one
|
|
||||||
button. While the server does not prevent a button class with zero
|
|
||||||
buttons, it is very unlikely.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
|
||||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++---
|
|
||||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
|
|
||||||
index ded8679d76..17964b00a4 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/dix/enterleave.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static void
|
|
||||||
DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
int evcount = 1;
|
|
||||||
- deviceStateNotify *ev, *sev;
|
|
||||||
+ deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
|
|
||||||
+ deviceStateNotify *ev;
|
|
||||||
deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
|
|
||||||
deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- sev = ev = xallocarray(evcount, sizeof(xEvent));
|
|
||||||
+ ev = sev;
|
|
||||||
FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (b != NULL) {
|
|
||||||
@@ -770,7 +771,6 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
|
|
||||||
DeviceStateNotifyMask, NullGrab);
|
|
||||||
- free(sev);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
void
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.43.0
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From 4c7a16b089b721b9c07f4ed593deba4f22158dbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 12:26:20 +1000
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/2] dix: fix DeviceStateNotify event calculation
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The previous code only made sense if one considers buttons and keys to
|
|
||||||
be mutually exclusive on a device. That is not necessarily true, causing
|
|
||||||
a number of issues.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This function allocates and fills in the number of xEvents we need to
|
|
||||||
send the device state down the wire. This is split across multiple
|
|
||||||
32-byte devices including one deviceStateNotify event and optional
|
|
||||||
deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify and (possibly multiple)
|
|
||||||
deviceValuator events.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The previous behavior would instead compose a sequence
|
|
||||||
of [state, buttonstate, state, keystate, valuator...]. This is not
|
|
||||||
protocol correct, and on top of that made the code extremely convoluted.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Fix this by streamlining: add both button and key into the deviceStateNotify
|
|
||||||
and then append the key state and button state, followed by the
|
|
||||||
valuators. Finally, the deviceValuator events contain up to 6 valuators
|
|
||||||
per event but we only ever sent through 3 at a time. Let's double that
|
|
||||||
troughput.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
|
||||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
dix/enterleave.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
|
|
||||||
1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
|
|
||||||
index 17964b00a4..7b7ba1098b 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/dix/enterleave.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -615,9 +615,15 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
ev->type = DeviceValuator;
|
|
||||||
ev->deviceid = dev->id;
|
|
||||||
- ev->num_valuators = nval < 3 ? nval : 3;
|
|
||||||
+ ev->num_valuators = nval < 6 ? nval : 6;
|
|
||||||
ev->first_valuator = first;
|
|
||||||
switch (ev->num_valuators) {
|
|
||||||
+ case 6:
|
|
||||||
+ ev->valuator5 = v->axisVal[first + 5];
|
|
||||||
+ case 5:
|
|
||||||
+ ev->valuator4 = v->axisVal[first + 4];
|
|
||||||
+ case 4:
|
|
||||||
+ ev->valuator3 = v->axisVal[first + 3];
|
|
||||||
case 3:
|
|
||||||
ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2];
|
|
||||||
case 2:
|
|
||||||
@@ -626,7 +632,6 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
|
|
||||||
ev->valuator0 = v->axisVal[first];
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- first += ev->num_valuators;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
static void
|
|
||||||
@@ -646,7 +651,7 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
|
|
||||||
ev->num_buttons = b->numButtons;
|
|
||||||
memcpy((char *) ev->buttons, (char *) b->down, 4);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- else if (k) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (k) {
|
|
||||||
ev->classes_reported |= (1 << KeyClass);
|
|
||||||
ev->num_keys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code -
|
|
||||||
k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
|
|
||||||
@@ -670,15 +675,26 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
-
|
|
||||||
+/**
|
|
||||||
+ * The device state notify event is split across multiple 32-byte events.
|
|
||||||
+ * The first one contains the first 32 button state bits, the first 32
|
|
||||||
+ * key state bits, and the first 3 valuator values.
|
|
||||||
+ *
|
|
||||||
+ * If a device has more than that, the server sends out:
|
|
||||||
+ * - one deviceButtonStateNotify for buttons 32 and above
|
|
||||||
+ * - one deviceKeyStateNotify for keys 32 and above
|
|
||||||
+ * - one deviceValuator event per 6 valuators above valuator 4
|
|
||||||
+ *
|
|
||||||
+ * All events but the last one have the deviceid binary ORed with MORE_EVENTS,
|
|
||||||
+ */
|
|
||||||
static void
|
|
||||||
DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
+ /* deviceStateNotify, deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify
|
|
||||||
+ * and one deviceValuator for each 6 valuators */
|
|
||||||
+ deviceStateNotify sev[3 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 6)/6];
|
|
||||||
int evcount = 1;
|
|
||||||
- deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
|
|
||||||
- deviceStateNotify *ev;
|
|
||||||
- deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
|
|
||||||
- deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
|
|
||||||
+ deviceStateNotify *ev = sev;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
KeyClassPtr k;
|
|
||||||
ButtonClassPtr b;
|
|
||||||
@@ -691,82 +707,49 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if ((b = dev->button) != NULL) {
|
|
||||||
nbuttons = b->numButtons;
|
|
||||||
- if (nbuttons > 32)
|
|
||||||
+ if (nbuttons > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
|
|
||||||
evcount++;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if ((k = dev->key) != NULL) {
|
|
||||||
nkeys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
|
|
||||||
- if (nkeys > 32)
|
|
||||||
+ if (nkeys > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
|
|
||||||
evcount++;
|
|
||||||
- if (nbuttons > 0) {
|
|
||||||
- evcount++;
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if ((v = dev->valuator) != NULL) {
|
|
||||||
nval = v->numAxes;
|
|
||||||
-
|
|
||||||
- if (nval > 3)
|
|
||||||
- evcount++;
|
|
||||||
- if (nval > 6) {
|
|
||||||
- if (!(k && b))
|
|
||||||
- evcount++;
|
|
||||||
- if (nval > 9)
|
|
||||||
- evcount += ((nval - 7) / 3);
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
+ /* first three are encoded in deviceStateNotify, then
|
|
||||||
+ * it's 6 per deviceValuator event */
|
|
||||||
+ evcount += ((nval - 3) + 6)/6;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- ev = sev;
|
|
||||||
- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
|
|
||||||
+ BUG_RETURN(evcount <= ARRAY_SIZE(sev));
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- if (b != NULL) {
|
|
||||||
- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, b, v, first);
|
|
||||||
- first += 3;
|
|
||||||
- nval -= 3;
|
|
||||||
- if (nbuttons > 32) {
|
|
||||||
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
|
||||||
- bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ev++;
|
|
||||||
- bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
|
|
||||||
- bev->deviceid = dev->id;
|
|
||||||
- memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
|
|
||||||
- DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
- if (nval > 0) {
|
|
||||||
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
|
||||||
- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
|
|
||||||
- first += 3;
|
|
||||||
- nval -= 3;
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
+ FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, k, b, v, first);
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ if (b != NULL && nbuttons > 32) {
|
|
||||||
+ deviceButtonStateNotify *bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ++ev;
|
|
||||||
+ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
|
||||||
+ bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
|
|
||||||
+ bev->deviceid = dev->id;
|
|
||||||
+ memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
|
|
||||||
+ DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- if (k != NULL) {
|
|
||||||
- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, k, NULL, v, first);
|
|
||||||
- first += 3;
|
|
||||||
- nval -= 3;
|
|
||||||
- if (nkeys > 32) {
|
|
||||||
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
|
||||||
- kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ev++;
|
|
||||||
- kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
|
|
||||||
- kev->deviceid = dev->id;
|
|
||||||
- memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
- if (nval > 0) {
|
|
||||||
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
|
||||||
- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
|
|
||||||
- first += 3;
|
|
||||||
- nval -= 3;
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
+ if (k != NULL && nkeys > 32) {
|
|
||||||
+ deviceKeyStateNotify *kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ++ev;
|
|
||||||
+ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
|
||||||
+ kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
|
|
||||||
+ kev->deviceid = dev->id;
|
|
||||||
+ memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+ first = 3;
|
|
||||||
+ nval -= 3;
|
|
||||||
while (nval > 0) {
|
|
||||||
- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, NULL, v, first);
|
|
||||||
- first += 3;
|
|
||||||
- nval -= 3;
|
|
||||||
- if (nval > 0) {
|
|
||||||
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
|
||||||
- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
|
|
||||||
- first += 3;
|
|
||||||
- nval -= 3;
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
+ ev->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
|
||||||
+ FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ++ev, v, first);
|
|
||||||
+ first += 6;
|
|
||||||
+ nval -= 6;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.43.0
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From 061eb684996627347acdf87ec11d108cedee71b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 13:48:10 +1000
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: when creating a new ButtonClass, set the number
|
|
||||||
of buttons
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
There's a racy sequence where a master device may copy the button class
|
|
||||||
from the slave, without ever initializing numButtons. This leads to a
|
|
||||||
device with zero buttons but a button class which is invalid.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Let's copy the numButtons value from the source - by definition if we
|
|
||||||
don't have a button class yet we do not have any other slave devices
|
|
||||||
with more than this number of buttons anyway.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
|
||||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
Xi/exevents.c | 1 +
|
|
||||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
|
|
||||||
index 54ea11a938..e161714682 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/Xi/exevents.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
|
|
||||||
to->button = calloc(1, sizeof(ButtonClassRec));
|
|
||||||
if (!to->button)
|
|
||||||
FatalError("[Xi] no memory for class shift.\n");
|
|
||||||
+ to->button->numButtons = from->button->numButtons;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
else
|
|
||||||
classes->button = NULL;
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.43.0
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From a483b5c7724469309e3df427730cbb8b805b9c9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:01:24 +1000
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: flush hierarchy events after adding/removing
|
|
||||||
master devices
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The `XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent()` function allocates space to store up
|
|
||||||
to `MAXDEVICES` (256) `xXIHierarchyInfo` structures in `info`.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If a device with a given ID was removed and a new device with the same
|
|
||||||
ID added both in the same operation, the single device ID will lead to
|
|
||||||
two info structures being written to `info`.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Since this case can occur for every device ID at once, a total of two
|
|
||||||
times `MAXDEVICES` info structures might be written to the allocation.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
To avoid it, once one add/remove master is processed, send out the
|
|
||||||
device hierarchy event for the current state and continue. That event
|
|
||||||
thus only ever has exactly one of either added/removed in it (and
|
|
||||||
optionally slave attached/detached).
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
|
||||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
|
|
||||||
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
|
|
||||||
index 01eb7a8af4..67eedddec6 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -340,6 +340,11 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
|
||||||
size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */
|
|
||||||
int rc = Success;
|
|
||||||
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
|
|
||||||
+ enum {
|
|
||||||
+ NO_CHANGE,
|
|
||||||
+ FLUSH,
|
|
||||||
+ CHANGED,
|
|
||||||
+ } changes = NO_CHANGE;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
|
|
||||||
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
|
|
||||||
@@ -389,8 +394,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
|
||||||
rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
|
|
||||||
if (rc != Success)
|
|
||||||
goto unwind;
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
+ changes = FLUSH;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
case XIRemoveMaster:
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
|
|
||||||
@@ -399,8 +405,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
|
||||||
rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
|
|
||||||
if (rc != Success)
|
|
||||||
goto unwind;
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
+ changes = FLUSH;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
case XIDetachSlave:
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
|
|
||||||
@@ -409,8 +416,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
|
||||||
rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
|
|
||||||
if (rc != Success)
|
|
||||||
goto unwind;
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
+ changes = CHANGED;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
case XIAttachSlave:
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
|
|
||||||
@@ -495,16 +503,25 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
|
||||||
rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
|
|
||||||
if (rc != Success)
|
|
||||||
goto unwind;
|
|
||||||
+ changes = CHANGED;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ default:
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+ if (changes == FLUSH) {
|
|
||||||
+ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
|
|
||||||
+ memset(flags, 0, sizeof(flags));
|
|
||||||
+ changes = NO_CHANGE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
len -= any->length * 4;
|
|
||||||
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
unwind:
|
|
||||||
-
|
|
||||||
- XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
|
|
||||||
+ if (changes != NO_CHANGE)
|
|
||||||
+ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
|
|
||||||
return rc;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.43.0
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From 4e0e99ef60f07757756913221847a26c71afc3e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= <jexposit@redhat.com>
|
|
||||||
Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 18:28:31 +0100
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH] Xi: do not keep linked list pointer during recursion
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The `DisableDevice()` function is called whenever an enabled device
|
|
||||||
is disabled and it moves the device from the `inputInfo.devices` linked
|
|
||||||
list to the `inputInfo.off_devices` linked list.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
However, its link/unlink operation has an issue during the recursive
|
|
||||||
call to `DisableDevice()` due to the `prev` pointer pointing to a
|
|
||||||
removed device.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This issue leads to a length mismatch between the total number of
|
|
||||||
devices and the number of device in the list, leading to a heap
|
|
||||||
overflow and, possibly, to local privilege escalation.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Simplify the code that checked whether the device passed to
|
|
||||||
`DisableDevice()` was in `inputInfo.devices` or not and find the
|
|
||||||
previous device after the recursion.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
|
||||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
dix/devices.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
|
|
||||||
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
|
|
||||||
index 3f3224d62..3a64d8702 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/dix/devices.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/dix/devices.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -451,14 +451,20 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
DeviceIntPtr *prev, other;
|
|
||||||
BOOL enabled;
|
|
||||||
+ BOOL dev_in_devices_list = FALSE;
|
|
||||||
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (!dev->enabled)
|
|
||||||
return TRUE;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
|
|
||||||
- *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
|
|
||||||
- if (*prev != dev)
|
|
||||||
+ for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (other == dev) {
|
|
||||||
+ dev_in_devices_list = TRUE;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ if (!dev_in_devices_list)
|
|
||||||
return FALSE;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
TouchEndPhysicallyActiveTouches(dev);
|
|
||||||
@@ -509,6 +515,9 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
|
|
||||||
LeaveWindow(dev);
|
|
||||||
SetFocusOut(dev);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+ for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
|
|
||||||
+ *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
*prev = dev->next;
|
|
||||||
dev->next = inputInfo.off_devices;
|
|
||||||
inputInfo.off_devices = dev;
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.43.0
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From 1a5e3c3e68d4f965077ea6a40ba57cc0d5a4e8cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 09:40:27 +1000
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: when disabling a master, float disabled slaved
|
|
||||||
devices too
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Disabling a master device floats all slave devices but we didn't do this
|
|
||||||
to already-disabled slave devices. As a result those devices kept their
|
|
||||||
reference to the master device resulting in access to already freed
|
|
||||||
memory if the master device was removed before the corresponding slave
|
|
||||||
device.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
And to match this behavior, also forcibly reset that pointer during
|
|
||||||
CloseDownDevices().
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Related to CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
dix/devices.c | 12 ++++++++++++
|
|
||||||
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
|
|
||||||
index c7fa8fad69..87f4d4a213 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/dix/devices.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/dix/devices.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -482,6 +482,13 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
|
|
||||||
flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ for (other = inputInfo.off_devices; other; other = other->next) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (!IsMaster(other) && GetMaster(other, MASTER_ATTACHED) == dev) {
|
|
||||||
+ AttachDevice(NULL, other, NULL);
|
|
||||||
+ flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
else {
|
|
||||||
for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
|
|
||||||
@@ -1088,6 +1095,11 @@ CloseDownDevices(void)
|
|
||||||
dev->master = NULL;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+ for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (!IsMaster(dev) && !IsFloating(dev))
|
|
||||||
+ dev->master = NULL;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.devices);
|
|
||||||
CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.off_devices);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.43.0
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From 1801fe0ac3926882d47d7e1ad6c0518a2cdffd41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
|
|
||||||
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2021 18:11:07 +0200
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH] dix: Fix use after free in input device shutdown
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This fixes access to freed heap memory via dev->master. E.g. when
|
|
||||||
running BarrierNotify.ReceivesNotifyEvents/7 test from
|
|
||||||
xorg-integration-tests:
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
==24736==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address
|
|
||||||
0x619000065020 at pc 0x55c450e2b9cf bp 0x7fffc532fd20 sp 0x7fffc532fd10
|
|
||||||
READ of size 4 at 0x619000065020 thread T0
|
|
||||||
#0 0x55c450e2b9ce in GetMaster ../../../dix/devices.c:2722
|
|
||||||
#1 0x55c450e9d035 in IsFloating ../../../dix/events.c:346
|
|
||||||
#2 0x55c4513209c6 in GetDeviceUse ../../../Xi/xiquerydevice.c:525
|
|
||||||
../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:95
|
|
||||||
#4 0x55c450e3455c in RemoveDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1204
|
|
||||||
../../../hw/xfree86/common/xf86Xinput.c:1142
|
|
||||||
#6 0x55c450e17b04 in CloseDeviceList ../../../dix/devices.c:1038
|
|
||||||
#7 0x55c450e1de85 in CloseDownDevices ../../../dix/devices.c:1068
|
|
||||||
#8 0x55c450e837ef in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:302
|
|
||||||
#9 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34
|
|
||||||
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564)
|
|
||||||
#11 0x55c450d0113d in _start (/usr/lib/xorg/Xorg+0x117713d)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
0x619000065020 is located 160 bytes inside of 912-byte region
|
|
||||||
[0x619000064f80,0x619000065310)
|
|
||||||
freed by thread T0 here:
|
|
||||||
(/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10d7cf)
|
|
||||||
#1 0x55c450e19f1c in CloseDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1014
|
|
||||||
#2 0x55c450e343a4 in RemoveDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1186
|
|
||||||
../../../hw/xfree86/common/xf86Xinput.c:1142
|
|
||||||
#4 0x55c450e17b04 in CloseDeviceList ../../../dix/devices.c:1038
|
|
||||||
#5 0x55c450e1de85 in CloseDownDevices ../../../dix/devices.c:1068
|
|
||||||
#6 0x55c450e837ef in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:302
|
|
||||||
#7 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34
|
|
||||||
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
previously allocated by thread T0 here:
|
|
||||||
(/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10ddc6)
|
|
||||||
#1 0x55c450e1c57b in AddInputDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:259
|
|
||||||
#2 0x55c450e34840 in AllocDevicePair ../../../dix/devices.c:2755
|
|
||||||
#3 0x55c45130318f in add_master ../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:152
|
|
||||||
../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:465
|
|
||||||
#5 0x55c4512cb9f5 in ProcIDispatch ../../../Xi/extinit.c:390
|
|
||||||
#6 0x55c450e6a92b in Dispatch ../../../dix/dispatch.c:551
|
|
||||||
#7 0x55c450e834b7 in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:272
|
|
||||||
#8 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34
|
|
||||||
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The problem is caused by dev->master being not reset when disabling the
|
|
||||||
device, which then causes dangling pointer when the master device itself
|
|
||||||
is being deleted when exiting whole server.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Note that RecalculateMasterButtons() requires dev->master to be still
|
|
||||||
valid, so we can reset it only at the end of function.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
dix/devices.c | 1 +
|
|
||||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
|
|
||||||
index e62c34c55..5f9ce1678 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/dix/devices.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/dix/devices.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
RecalculateMasterButtons(dev);
|
|
||||||
+ dev->master = NULL;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.43.0
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in new issue