MSVSphere Packaging Team
9 months ago
parent
abfb21c150
commit
1b1a6ca326
@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
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From a31ba141824a7649e11f0ef7673718ce559d6337 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend
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The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at
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least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new
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part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P
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existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements
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instead of N + P.
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Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old
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values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially
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uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes.
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For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would
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result in this 8 value array:
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[N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P
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^OOB write
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The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in
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both.
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CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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---
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Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
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randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++--
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2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
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index 6ec419e870..563c4f31a5 100644
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--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
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+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
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@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
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XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop);
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return BadAlloc;
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}
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- new_value.size = len;
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+ new_value.size = total_len;
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new_value.type = type;
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new_value.format = format;
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@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
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case PropModePrepend:
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new_data = new_value.data;
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old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
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- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
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+ (len * size_in_bytes));
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break;
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}
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if (new_data)
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diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
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index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644
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--- a/randr/rrproperty.c
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+++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
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@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
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RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop);
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return BadAlloc;
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}
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- new_value.size = len;
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+ new_value.size = total_len;
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new_value.type = type;
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new_value.format = format;
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@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
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case PropModePrepend:
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new_data = new_value.data;
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old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
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- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
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+ (len * size_in_bytes));
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break;
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}
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if (new_data)
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--
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2.41.0
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@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
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From 004f461c440cb6611eefb48fbbb4fa53a6d49f80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 12:19:45 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] mi: reset the PointerWindows reference on screen
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switch
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PointerWindows[] keeps a reference to the last window our sprite
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entered - changes are usually handled by CheckMotion().
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If we switch between screens via XWarpPointer our
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dev->spriteInfo->sprite->win is set to the new screen's root window.
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If there's another window at the cursor location CheckMotion() will
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trigger the right enter/leave events later. If there is not, it skips
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that process and we never trigger LeaveWindow() - PointerWindows[] for
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the device still refers to the previous window.
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If that window is destroyed we have a dangling reference that will
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eventually cause a use-after-free bug when checking the window hierarchy
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later.
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To trigger this, we require:
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- two protocol screens
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- XWarpPointer to the other screen's root window
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- XDestroyWindow before entering any other window
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This is a niche bug so we hack around it by making sure we reset the
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PointerWindows[] entry so we cannot have a dangling pointer. This
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doesn't handle Enter/Leave events correctly but the previous code didn't
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either.
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CVE-2023-5380, ZDI-CAN-21608
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Sri working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
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---
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dix/enterleave.h | 2 --
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include/eventstr.h | 3 +++
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mi/mipointer.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
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3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/dix/enterleave.h b/dix/enterleave.h
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index 4b833d8a3b..e8af924c68 100644
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--- a/dix/enterleave.h
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+++ b/dix/enterleave.h
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@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ extern void DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev,
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extern void EnterWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win, int mode);
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-extern void LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev);
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-
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extern void CoreFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr kbd,
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int type, int mode, int detail, WindowPtr pWin);
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diff --git a/include/eventstr.h b/include/eventstr.h
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index bf3b95fe4a..2bae3b0767 100644
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--- a/include/eventstr.h
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+++ b/include/eventstr.h
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@@ -296,4 +296,7 @@ union _InternalEvent {
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#endif
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};
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+extern void
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+LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev);
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+
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#endif
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diff --git a/mi/mipointer.c b/mi/mipointer.c
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index 75be1aeeb8..b12ae9be1d 100644
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--- a/mi/mipointer.c
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+++ b/mi/mipointer.c
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@@ -397,8 +397,21 @@ miPointerWarpCursor(DeviceIntPtr pDev, ScreenPtr pScreen, int x, int y)
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#ifdef PANORAMIX
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&& noPanoramiXExtension
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#endif
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- )
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- UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen);
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+ ) {
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+ DeviceIntPtr master = GetMaster(pDev, MASTER_POINTER);
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+ /* Hack for CVE-2023-5380: if we're moving
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+ * screens PointerWindows[] keeps referring to the
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+ * old window. If that gets destroyed we have a UAF
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+ * bug later. Only happens when jumping from a window
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+ * to the root window on the other screen.
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+ * Enter/Leave events are incorrect for that case but
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+ * too niche to fix.
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+ */
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+ LeaveWindow(pDev);
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+ if (master)
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+ LeaveWindow(master);
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+ UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen);
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+ }
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}
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/**
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--
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2.41.0
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@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
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From 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons
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button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all
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our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating
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insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in
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XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with,
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leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies.
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CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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---
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Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------
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dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++
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2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
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index dcd4efb3bc..54ea11a938 100644
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--- a/Xi/exevents.c
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+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
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@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
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}
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if (from->button->xkb_acts) {
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- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) {
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- to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction));
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- if (!to->button->xkb_acts)
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- FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n");
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- }
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+ size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons);
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+ to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts,
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+ maxbuttons,
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+ sizeof(XkbAction));
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+ memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction));
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memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
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- sizeof(XkbAction));
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+ from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction));
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}
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else {
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free(to->button->xkb_acts);
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diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
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index b063128df0..3f3224d626 100644
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--- a/dix/devices.c
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+++ b/dix/devices.c
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@@ -2539,6 +2539,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
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if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) {
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int i;
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+ int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons;
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+
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DeviceChangedEvent event = {
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.header = ET_Internal,
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.type = ET_DeviceChanged,
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@@ -2549,6 +2551,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
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};
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master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons;
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+ if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) {
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+ master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts,
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+ maxbuttons,
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+ sizeof(XkbAction));
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+ memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons],
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+ 0,
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+ (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction));
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+ }
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memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons *
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sizeof(Atom));
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--
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GitLab
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@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
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From 3e0222fcae552685d423914a683c1709dc5f6d6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of
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ProcRRChange*Property
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Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty.
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See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core
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protocol and XI.
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This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
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Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
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the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was
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truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
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The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
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(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
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finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
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stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB.
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CVE-2023-XXXXX, ZDI-CAN-22561
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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---
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randr/rrproperty.c | 2 +-
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randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +-
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2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
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index 25469f57b2..c4fef8a1f6 100644
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--- a/randr/rrproperty.c
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+++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
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@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client)
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char format, mode;
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unsigned long len;
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int sizeInBytes;
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- int totalSize;
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+ uint64_t totalSize;
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int err;
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REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq);
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diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
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index b79c17f9bf..90c5a9a933 100644
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--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
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+++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
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@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client)
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char format, mode;
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unsigned long len;
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int sizeInBytes;
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- int totalSize;
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+ uint64_t totalSize;
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int err;
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REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq);
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--
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2.43.0
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