Compare commits
No commits in common. 'i10c-beta' and 'c9' have entirely different histories.
@ -1 +1,2 @@
|
||||
SOURCES/squid-6.10.tar.xz
|
||||
SOURCES/pgp.asc
|
||||
SOURCES/squid-5.5.tar.xz
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1 +1,2 @@
|
||||
70e90865df0e4e9ba7765b622da40bda9bb8fc5d SOURCES/squid-6.10.tar.xz
|
||||
8e3de63f3bef0c9c4edbcfe000c567119f687143 SOURCES/pgp.asc
|
||||
42302bd9b8feff851a41420334cb8eaeab2806ab SOURCES/squid-5.5.tar.xz
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/contrib/url-normalizer.pl b/contrib/url-normalizer.pl
|
||||
index e965e9e..ed5ffcb 100755
|
||||
index 4cb0480..4b89910 100755
|
||||
--- a/contrib/url-normalizer.pl
|
||||
+++ b/contrib/url-normalizer.pl
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
-#!/usr/local/bin/perl -Tw
|
||||
+#!/usr/bin/perl -Tw
|
||||
#
|
||||
# * Copyright (C) 1996-2023 The Squid Software Foundation and contributors
|
||||
# * Copyright (C) 1996-2022 The Squid Software Foundation and contributors
|
||||
# *
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
revno: 14311
|
||||
revision-id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
|
||||
parent: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
revno: 14311
|
||||
revision-id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
|
||||
parent: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
|
||||
fixes bug: http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4323
|
||||
author: Francesco Chemolli <kinkie@squid-cache.org>
|
||||
committer: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
|
||||
branch nick: trunk
|
||||
timestamp: Thu 2015-09-24 06:05:37 -0700
|
||||
message:
|
||||
Bug 4323: Netfilter broken cross-includes with Linux 4.2
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Bazaar merge directive format 2 (Bazaar 0.90)
|
||||
# revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
|
||||
# target_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk/
|
||||
# testament_sha1: c67cfca81040f3845d7c4caf2f40518511f14d0b
|
||||
# timestamp: 2015-09-24 13:06:33 +0000
|
||||
# source_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk
|
||||
# base_revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-\
|
||||
# 6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Begin patch
|
||||
=== modified file 'compat/os/linux.h'
|
||||
--- compat/os/linux.h 2015-01-13 07:25:36 +0000
|
||||
+++ compat/os/linux.h 2015-09-24 13:05:37 +0000
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
+ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
|
||||
+ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
|
||||
+ * aways present in Linux.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
|
||||
+ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
|
||||
+ * to workaround it.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
|
||||
+#include <netinet/in.h>
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
* sys/capability.h is only needed in Linux apparently.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* HACK: LIBCAP_BROKEN Ugly glue to get around linux header madness colliding with glibc
|
||||
fixes bug: http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4323
|
||||
author: Francesco Chemolli <kinkie@squid-cache.org>
|
||||
committer: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
|
||||
branch nick: trunk
|
||||
timestamp: Thu 2015-09-24 06:05:37 -0700
|
||||
message:
|
||||
Bug 4323: Netfilter broken cross-includes with Linux 4.2
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Bazaar merge directive format 2 (Bazaar 0.90)
|
||||
# revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
|
||||
# target_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk/
|
||||
# testament_sha1: c67cfca81040f3845d7c4caf2f40518511f14d0b
|
||||
# timestamp: 2015-09-24 13:06:33 +0000
|
||||
# source_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk
|
||||
# base_revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-\
|
||||
# 6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Begin patch
|
||||
=== modified file 'compat/os/linux.h'
|
||||
--- compat/os/linux.h 2015-01-13 07:25:36 +0000
|
||||
+++ compat/os/linux.h 2015-09-24 13:05:37 +0000
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
+ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
|
||||
+ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
|
||||
+ * aways present in Linux.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
|
||||
+ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
|
||||
+ * to workaround it.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
|
||||
+#include <netinet/in.h>
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
* sys/capability.h is only needed in Linux apparently.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* HACK: LIBCAP_BROKEN Ugly glue to get around linux header madness colliding with glibc
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
||||
From fc01451000eaa5592cd5afbd6aee14e53f7dd2c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Amos Jeffries <amosjeffries@squid-cache.org>
|
||||
Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2020 20:23:10 +1300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Update translations integration
|
||||
|
||||
* Add credits for es-mx translation moderator
|
||||
* Use es-mx for default of all Spanish (Central America) texts
|
||||
* Update translation related .am files
|
||||
---
|
||||
doc/manuals/language.am | 2 +-
|
||||
errors/TRANSLATORS | 1 +
|
||||
errors/aliases | 3 ++-
|
||||
errors/language.am | 3 ++-
|
||||
errors/template.am | 2 +-
|
||||
5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/doc/manuals/language.am b/doc/manuals/language.am
|
||||
index 7670c88380c..f03c4cf71b4 100644
|
||||
--- a/doc/manuals/language.am
|
||||
+++ b/doc/manuals/language.am
|
||||
@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ TRANSLATE_LANGUAGES = \
|
||||
oc.lang \
|
||||
pt.lang \
|
||||
ro.lang \
|
||||
- ru.lang
|
||||
+ ru.lang
|
||||
diff --git a/errors/aliases b/errors/aliases
|
||||
index 36f17f4b80f..cf0116f297d 100644
|
||||
--- a/errors/aliases
|
||||
+++ b/errors/aliases
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ da da-dk
|
||||
de de-at de-ch de-de de-li de-lu
|
||||
el el-gr
|
||||
en en-au en-bz en-ca en-cn en-gb en-ie en-in en-jm en-nz en-ph en-sg en-tt en-uk en-us en-za en-zw
|
||||
-es es-ar es-bo es-cl es-co es-cr es-do es-ec es-es es-gt es-hn es-mx es-ni es-pa es-pe es-pr es-py es-sv es-us es-uy es-ve es-xl
|
||||
+es es-ar es-bo es-cl es-cu es-co es-do es-ec es-es es-pe es-pr es-py es-us es-uy es-ve es-xl spq
|
||||
+es-mx es-bz es-cr es-gt es-hn es-ni es-pa es-sv
|
||||
et et-ee
|
||||
fa fa-fa fa-ir
|
||||
fi fi-fi
|
||||
diff --git a/errors/language.am b/errors/language.am
|
||||
index 12b1b2b3b43..029e8c1eb2f 100644
|
||||
--- a/errors/language.am
|
||||
+++ b/errors/language.am
|
||||
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ TRANSLATE_LANGUAGES = \
|
||||
de.lang \
|
||||
el.lang \
|
||||
en.lang \
|
||||
+ es-mx.lang \
|
||||
es.lang \
|
||||
et.lang \
|
||||
fa.lang \
|
||||
@@ -51,4 +52,4 @@ TRANSLATE_LANGUAGES = \
|
||||
uz.lang \
|
||||
vi.lang \
|
||||
zh-hans.lang \
|
||||
- zh-hant.lang
|
||||
+ zh-hant.lang
|
||||
diff --git a/errors/template.am b/errors/template.am
|
||||
index 6c12781e6f4..715c65aa22b 100644
|
||||
--- a/errors/template.am
|
||||
+++ b/errors/template.am
|
||||
@@ -48,4 +48,4 @@ ERROR_TEMPLATES = \
|
||||
templates/ERR_UNSUP_REQ \
|
||||
templates/ERR_URN_RESOLVE \
|
||||
templates/ERR_WRITE_ERROR \
|
||||
- templates/ERR_ZERO_SIZE_OBJECT
|
||||
+ templates/ERR_ZERO_SIZE_OBJECT
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/src/clients/FtpClient.cc b/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
|
||||
index 747ed35..f2b7126 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
|
||||
@@ -795,7 +795,8 @@ Ftp::Client::connectDataChannel()
|
||||
bool
|
||||
Ftp::Client::openListenSocket()
|
||||
{
|
||||
- return false;
|
||||
+ debugs(9, 3, HERE);
|
||||
+ return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// creates a data channel Comm close callback
|
||||
diff --git a/src/clients/FtpClient.h b/src/clients/FtpClient.h
|
||||
index eb5ea1b..e92c007 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/clients/FtpClient.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/clients/FtpClient.h
|
||||
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ public:
|
||||
bool sendPort();
|
||||
bool sendPassive();
|
||||
void connectDataChannel();
|
||||
- bool openListenSocket();
|
||||
+ virtual bool openListenSocket();
|
||||
void switchTimeoutToDataChannel();
|
||||
|
||||
CtrlChannel ctrl; ///< FTP control channel state
|
||||
diff --git a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
|
||||
index 05db817..2989cd2 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
|
||||
@@ -86,6 +86,13 @@ struct GatewayFlags {
|
||||
class Gateway;
|
||||
typedef void (StateMethod)(Ftp::Gateway *);
|
||||
|
||||
+} // namespace FTP
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static void ftpOpenListenSocket(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState, int fallback);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+namespace Ftp
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+
|
||||
/// FTP Gateway: An FTP client that takes an HTTP request with an ftp:// URI,
|
||||
/// converts it into one or more FTP commands, and then
|
||||
/// converts one or more FTP responses into the final HTTP response.
|
||||
@@ -136,7 +143,11 @@ public:
|
||||
|
||||
/// create a data channel acceptor and start listening.
|
||||
void listenForDataChannel(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &conn);
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ virtual bool openListenSocket() {
|
||||
+ debugs(9, 3, HERE);
|
||||
+ ftpOpenListenSocket(this, 0);
|
||||
+ return Comm::IsConnOpen(data.conn);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
int checkAuth(const HttpHeader * req_hdr);
|
||||
void checkUrlpath();
|
||||
void buildTitleUrl();
|
||||
@@ -1786,6 +1797,7 @@ ftpOpenListenSocket(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState, int fallback)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ftpState->listenForDataChannel(temp);
|
||||
+ ftpState->data.listenConn = temp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void
|
||||
@@ -1821,13 +1833,19 @@ ftpSendPORT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
|
||||
// pull out the internal IP address bytes to send in PORT command...
|
||||
// source them from the listen_conn->local
|
||||
|
||||
+ struct sockaddr_in addr;
|
||||
+ socklen_t addrlen = sizeof(addr);
|
||||
+ getsockname(ftpState->data.listenConn->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, &addrlen);
|
||||
+ unsigned char port_high = ntohs(addr.sin_port) >> 8;
|
||||
+ unsigned char port_low = ntohs(addr.sin_port) & 0xff;
|
||||
+
|
||||
struct addrinfo *AI = NULL;
|
||||
ftpState->data.listenConn->local.getAddrInfo(AI, AF_INET);
|
||||
unsigned char *addrptr = (unsigned char *) &((struct sockaddr_in*)AI->ai_addr)->sin_addr;
|
||||
- unsigned char *portptr = (unsigned char *) &((struct sockaddr_in*)AI->ai_addr)->sin_port;
|
||||
+ // unsigned char *portptr = (unsigned char *) &((struct sockaddr_in*)AI->ai_addr)->sin_port;
|
||||
snprintf(cbuf, CTRL_BUFLEN, "PORT %d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d\r\n",
|
||||
addrptr[0], addrptr[1], addrptr[2], addrptr[3],
|
||||
- portptr[0], portptr[1]);
|
||||
+ port_high, port_low);
|
||||
ftpState->writeCommand(cbuf);
|
||||
ftpState->state = Ftp::Client::SENT_PORT;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1880,14 +1898,27 @@ ftpSendEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ unsigned int port;
|
||||
+ struct sockaddr_storage addr;
|
||||
+ socklen_t addrlen = sizeof(addr);
|
||||
+ getsockname(ftpState->data.listenConn->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, &addrlen);
|
||||
+ if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET) {
|
||||
+ struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in*) &addr;
|
||||
+ port = ntohs( addr4->sin_port );
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) &addr;
|
||||
+ port = ntohs( addr6->sin6_port );
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
char buf[MAX_IPSTRLEN];
|
||||
|
||||
/* RFC 2428 defines EPRT as IPv6 equivalent to IPv4 PORT command. */
|
||||
/* Which can be used by EITHER protocol. */
|
||||
- snprintf(cbuf, CTRL_BUFLEN, "EPRT |%d|%s|%d|\r\n",
|
||||
+ snprintf(cbuf, CTRL_BUFLEN, "EPRT |%d|%s|%u|\r\n",
|
||||
( ftpState->data.listenConn->local.isIPv6() ? 2 : 1 ),
|
||||
ftpState->data.listenConn->local.toStr(buf,MAX_IPSTRLEN),
|
||||
- ftpState->data.listenConn->local.port() );
|
||||
+ port);
|
||||
|
||||
ftpState->writeCommand(cbuf);
|
||||
ftpState->state = Ftp::Client::SENT_EPRT;
|
||||
@@ -1906,7 +1937,7 @@ ftpReadEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
|
||||
ftpSendPORT(ftpState);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ ftpState->ctrl.message = NULL;
|
||||
ftpRestOrList(ftpState);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/src/ssl/support.cc b/src/ssl/support.cc
|
||||
index 3ad135d..73912ce 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/ssl/support.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/ssl/support.cc
|
||||
@@ -557,7 +557,11 @@ Ssl::VerifyCallbackParameters::At(Security::Connection &sconn)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// "dup" function for SSL_get_ex_new_index("cert_err_check")
|
||||
-#if SQUID_USE_CONST_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_DUP
|
||||
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
|
||||
+static int
|
||||
+ssl_dupAclChecklist(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, void **,
|
||||
+ int, long, void *)
|
||||
+#elif SQUID_USE_CONST_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_DUP
|
||||
static int
|
||||
ssl_dupAclChecklist(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, void *,
|
||||
int, long, void *)
|
||||
diff --git a/src/security/PeerOptions.cc b/src/security/PeerOptions.cc
|
||||
index cf1d4ba..4346ba5 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/security/PeerOptions.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/security/PeerOptions.cc
|
||||
@@ -297,130 +297,130 @@ static struct ssl_option {
|
||||
|
||||
} ssl_options[] = {
|
||||
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
|
||||
{
|
||||
"NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
|
||||
{
|
||||
"SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG", SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
|
||||
{
|
||||
"MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
|
||||
{
|
||||
"SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG", SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
|
||||
{
|
||||
"TLS_D5_BUG", SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
|
||||
{
|
||||
"TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG", SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
|
||||
{
|
||||
"TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_ALL
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_ALL
|
||||
{
|
||||
"ALL", (long)SSL_OP_ALL
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
|
||||
{
|
||||
"SINGLE_DH_USE", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
|
||||
{
|
||||
"EPHEMERAL_RSA", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
|
||||
{
|
||||
"PKCS1_CHECK_1", SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
|
||||
{
|
||||
"PKCS1_CHECK_2", SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
|
||||
{
|
||||
"NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST
|
||||
{
|
||||
"NON_EXPORT_FIRST", SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|
||||
{
|
||||
"CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
|
||||
{
|
||||
"NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
|
||||
{
|
||||
"NO_SSLv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
|
||||
{
|
||||
"NO_TLSv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
|
||||
},
|
||||
#else
|
||||
{ "NO_TLSv1", 0 },
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
|
||||
{
|
||||
"NO_TLSv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
|
||||
},
|
||||
#else
|
||||
{ "NO_TLSv1_1", 0 },
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
|
||||
{
|
||||
"NO_TLSv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
|
||||
},
|
||||
#else
|
||||
{ "NO_TLSv1_2", 0 },
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
|
||||
{
|
||||
"NO_TLSv1_3", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
|
||||
},
|
||||
#else
|
||||
{ "NO_TLSv1_3", 0 },
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
|
||||
{
|
||||
"No_Compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
|
||||
{
|
||||
"NO_TICKET", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
|
||||
},
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
|
||||
{
|
||||
"SINGLE_ECDH_USE", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
|
||||
},
|
||||
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ Security::PeerOptions::parseOptions()
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-#if SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
|
||||
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
|
||||
// compliance with RFC 6176: Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Version 2.0
|
||||
op = op | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc b/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc
|
||||
index 0564380..fcd60b9 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc
|
||||
@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ void commonInit()
|
||||
if (inited)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
+ inited = true;
|
||||
+
|
||||
Mem::Init();
|
||||
|
||||
Config.Store.avgObjectSize = 1024;
|
||||
@@ -109,6 +111,10 @@ void commonInit()
|
||||
Config.Store.objectsPerBucket = 20;
|
||||
|
||||
Config.Store.maxObjectSize = 2048;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Config.memShared.defaultTo(false);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Config.store_dir_select_algorithm = xstrdup("round-robin");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* TODO make this a cbdata class */
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/src/gopher.cc b/src/gopher.cc
|
||||
index 576a3f7..2645b6b 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/gopher.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/gopher.cc
|
||||
@@ -364,7 +364,6 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
|
||||
char *lpos = NULL;
|
||||
char *tline = NULL;
|
||||
LOCAL_ARRAY(char, line, TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
|
||||
- LOCAL_ARRAY(char, tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
|
||||
char *name = NULL;
|
||||
char *selector = NULL;
|
||||
char *host = NULL;
|
||||
@@ -374,7 +373,6 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
|
||||
char gtype;
|
||||
StoreEntry *entry = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
- memset(tmpbuf, '\0', TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
|
||||
memset(line, '\0', TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
entry = gopherState->entry;
|
||||
@@ -409,7 +407,7 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- String outbuf;
|
||||
+ SBuf outbuf;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!gopherState->HTML_header_added) {
|
||||
if (gopherState->conversion == GopherStateData::HTML_CSO_RESULT)
|
||||
@@ -577,34 +575,34 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- memset(tmpbuf, '\0', TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
|
||||
-
|
||||
if ((gtype == GOPHER_TELNET) || (gtype == GOPHER_3270)) {
|
||||
if (strlen(escaped_selector) != 0)
|
||||
- snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"telnet://%s@%s%s%s/\">%s</A>\n",
|
||||
- icon_url, escaped_selector, rfc1738_escape_part(host),
|
||||
- *port ? ":" : "", port, html_quote(name));
|
||||
+ outbuf.appendf("<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"telnet://%s@%s%s%s/\">%s</A>\n",
|
||||
+ icon_url, escaped_selector, rfc1738_escape_part(host),
|
||||
+ *port ? ":" : "", port, html_quote(name));
|
||||
else
|
||||
- snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"telnet://%s%s%s/\">%s</A>\n",
|
||||
- icon_url, rfc1738_escape_part(host), *port ? ":" : "",
|
||||
- port, html_quote(name));
|
||||
+ outbuf.appendf("<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"telnet://%s%s%s/\">%s</A>\n",
|
||||
+ icon_url, rfc1738_escape_part(host), *port ? ":" : "",
|
||||
+ port, html_quote(name));
|
||||
|
||||
} else if (gtype == GOPHER_INFO) {
|
||||
- snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "\t%s\n", html_quote(name));
|
||||
+ outbuf.appendf("\t%s\n", html_quote(name));
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (strncmp(selector, "GET /", 5) == 0) {
|
||||
/* WWW link */
|
||||
- snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"http://%s/%s\">%s</A>\n",
|
||||
- icon_url, host, rfc1738_escape_unescaped(selector + 5), html_quote(name));
|
||||
+ outbuf.appendf("<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"http://%s/%s\">%s</A>\n",
|
||||
+ icon_url, host, rfc1738_escape_unescaped(selector + 5), html_quote(name));
|
||||
+ } else if (gtype == GOPHER_WWW) {
|
||||
+ outbuf.appendf("<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"gopher://%s/%c%s\">%s</A>\n",
|
||||
+ icon_url, rfc1738_escape_unescaped(selector), html_quote(name));
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* Standard link */
|
||||
- snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"gopher://%s/%c%s\">%s</A>\n",
|
||||
- icon_url, host, gtype, escaped_selector, html_quote(name));
|
||||
+ outbuf.appendf("<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"gopher://%s/%c%s\">%s</A>\n",
|
||||
+ icon_url, host, gtype, escaped_selector, html_quote(name));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
safe_free(escaped_selector);
|
||||
- outbuf.append(tmpbuf);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
memset(line, '\0', TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
@@ -637,13 +635,12 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
if (gopherState->cso_recno != recno) {
|
||||
- snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "</PRE><HR noshade size=\"1px\"><H2>Record# %d<br><i>%s</i></H2>\n<PRE>", recno, html_quote(result));
|
||||
+ outbuf.appendf("</PRE><HR noshade size=\"1px\"><H2>Record# %d<br><i>%s</i></H2>\n<PRE>", recno, html_quote(result));
|
||||
gopherState->cso_recno = recno;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
- snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "%s\n", html_quote(result));
|
||||
+ outbuf.appendf("%s\n", html_quote(result));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- outbuf.append(tmpbuf);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
int code;
|
||||
@@ -671,8 +668,7 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
|
||||
|
||||
case 502: { /* Too Many Matches */
|
||||
/* Print the message the server returns */
|
||||
- snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "</PRE><HR noshade size=\"1px\"><H2>%s</H2>\n<PRE>", html_quote(result));
|
||||
- outbuf.append(tmpbuf);
|
||||
+ outbuf.appendf("</PRE><HR noshade size=\"1px\"><H2>%s</H2>\n<PRE>", html_quote(result));
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -688,13 +684,12 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
|
||||
|
||||
} /* while loop */
|
||||
|
||||
- if (outbuf.size() > 0) {
|
||||
- entry->append(outbuf.rawBuf(), outbuf.size());
|
||||
+ if (outbuf.length() > 0) {
|
||||
+ entry->append(outbuf.rawContent(), outbuf.length());
|
||||
/* now let start sending stuff to client */
|
||||
entry->flush();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- outbuf.clean();
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
|
||||
commit 4031c6c2b004190fdffbc19dab7cd0305a2025b7 (refs/remotes/origin/v4, refs/remotes/github/v4, refs/heads/v4)
|
||||
Author: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||||
Date: 2022-08-09 23:34:54 +0000
|
||||
|
||||
Bug 3193 pt2: NTLM decoder truncating strings (#1114)
|
||||
|
||||
The initial bug fix overlooked large 'offset' causing integer
|
||||
wrap to extract a too-short length string.
|
||||
|
||||
Improve debugs and checks sequence to clarify cases and ensure
|
||||
that all are handled correctly.
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/ntlmauth/ntlmauth.cc b/lib/ntlmauth/ntlmauth.cc
|
||||
index 5d9637290..f00fd51f8 100644
|
||||
--- a/lib/ntlmauth/ntlmauth.cc
|
||||
+++ b/lib/ntlmauth/ntlmauth.cc
|
||||
@@ -107,10 +107,19 @@ ntlm_fetch_string(const ntlmhdr *packet, const int32_t packet_size, const strhdr
|
||||
int32_t o = le32toh(str->offset);
|
||||
// debug("ntlm_fetch_string(plength=%d,l=%d,o=%d)\n",packet_size,l,o);
|
||||
|
||||
- if (l < 0 || l > NTLM_MAX_FIELD_LENGTH || o + l > packet_size || o == 0) {
|
||||
- debug("ntlm_fetch_string: insane data (pkt-sz: %d, fetch len: %d, offset: %d)\n", packet_size,l,o);
|
||||
+ if (l < 0 || l > NTLM_MAX_FIELD_LENGTH) {
|
||||
+ debug("ntlm_fetch_string: insane string length (pkt-sz: %d, fetch len: %d, offset: %d)\n", packet_size,l,o);
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ else if (o <= 0 || o > packet_size) {
|
||||
+ debug("ntlm_fetch_string: insane string offset (pkt-sz: %d, fetch len: %d, offset: %d)\n", packet_size,l,o);
|
||||
+ return rv;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ else if (l > packet_size - o) {
|
||||
+ debug("ntlm_fetch_string: truncated string data (pkt-sz: %d, fetch len: %d, offset: %d)\n", packet_size,l,o);
|
||||
+ return rv;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
rv.str = (char *)packet + o;
|
||||
rv.l = 0;
|
||||
if ((flags & NTLM_NEGOTIATE_ASCII) == 0) {
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/src/anyp/Uri.cc b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
|
||||
index 20b9bf1..81ebb18 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/anyp/Uri.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
|
||||
@@ -173,6 +173,10 @@ urlInitialize(void)
|
||||
assert(0 == matchDomainName("*.foo.com", ".foo.com", mdnHonorWildcards));
|
||||
assert(0 != matchDomainName("*.foo.com", "foo.com", mdnHonorWildcards));
|
||||
|
||||
+ assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", ""));
|
||||
+ assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", "", mdnHonorWildcards));
|
||||
+ assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", "", mdnRejectSubsubDomains));
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* more cases? */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -756,6 +760,8 @@ matchDomainName(const char *h, const char *d, MatchDomainNameFlags flags)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
dl = strlen(d);
|
||||
+ if (dl == 0)
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Start at the ends of the two strings and work towards the
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
|
||||
From 05f6af2f4c85cc99323cfff6149c3d74af661b6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2023 08:44:16 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] RFC 9112: Improve HTTP chunked encoding compliance (#1498)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/http/one/Parser.cc | 8 +-------
|
||||
src/http/one/Parser.h | 4 +---
|
||||
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
|
||||
src/parser/Tokenizer.cc | 12 ++++++++++++
|
||||
src/parser/Tokenizer.h | 7 +++++++
|
||||
5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
|
||||
index c78ddd7f0..291ae39f0 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
|
||||
@@ -65,16 +65,10 @@ Http::One::Parser::DelimiterCharacters()
|
||||
void
|
||||
Http::One::Parser::skipLineTerminator(Tokenizer &tok) const
|
||||
{
|
||||
- if (tok.skip(Http1::CrLf()))
|
||||
- return;
|
||||
-
|
||||
if (Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser && tok.skipOne(CharacterSet::LF))
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (tok.atEnd() || (tok.remaining().length() == 1 && tok.remaining().at(0) == '\r'))
|
||||
- throw InsufficientInput();
|
||||
-
|
||||
- throw TexcHere("garbage instead of CRLF line terminator");
|
||||
+ tok.skipRequired("line-terminating CRLF", Http1::CrLf());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// all characters except the LF line terminator
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
|
||||
index f83c01a9a..aab895583 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
|
||||
@@ -124,9 +124,7 @@ protected:
|
||||
* detect and skip the CRLF or (if tolerant) LF line terminator
|
||||
* consume from the tokenizer.
|
||||
*
|
||||
- * \throws exception on bad or InsuffientInput.
|
||||
- * \retval true only if line terminator found.
|
||||
- * \retval false incomplete or missing line terminator, need more data.
|
||||
+ * \throws exception on bad or InsufficientInput
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void skipLineTerminator(Tokenizer &) const;
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
index 1434100b6..8bdb65abb 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
@@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
{
|
||||
Must(theChunkSize <= 0); // Should(), really
|
||||
|
||||
+ static const SBuf bannedHexPrefixLower("0x");
|
||||
+ static const SBuf bannedHexPrefixUpper("0X");
|
||||
+ if (tok.skip(bannedHexPrefixLower) || tok.skip(bannedHexPrefixUpper))
|
||||
+ throw TextException("chunk starts with 0x", Here());
|
||||
+
|
||||
int64_t size = -1;
|
||||
if (tok.int64(size, 16, false) && !tok.atEnd()) {
|
||||
if (size < 0)
|
||||
@@ -121,7 +126,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
// bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
|
||||
try {
|
||||
parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
|
||||
- skipLineTerminator(tok);
|
||||
+ tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
|
||||
buf_ = tok.remaining();
|
||||
parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
@@ -132,12 +137,14 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
// other exceptions bubble up to kill message parsing
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 7230 section 4.1.1 and its Errata #4667):
|
||||
+/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
|
||||
/// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
|
||||
void
|
||||
-Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
+Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
|
||||
{
|
||||
do {
|
||||
+ auto tok = callerTok;
|
||||
+
|
||||
ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
|
||||
|
||||
if (!tok.skip(';'))
|
||||
@@ -145,6 +152,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
|
||||
parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
|
||||
buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
|
||||
+ callerTok = tok;
|
||||
} while (true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -158,11 +166,14 @@ Http::One::ChunkExtensionValueParser::Ignore(Tokenizer &tok, const SBuf &extName
|
||||
/// Parses a single chunk-ext list element:
|
||||
/// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
|
||||
void
|
||||
-Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
+Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &callerTok)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ auto tok = callerTok;
|
||||
+
|
||||
ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: ICAP servers send SP before chunk-ext-name
|
||||
|
||||
const auto extName = tok.prefix("chunk-ext-name", CharacterSet::TCHAR);
|
||||
+ callerTok = tok; // in case we determine that this is a valueless chunk-ext
|
||||
|
||||
ParseBws(tok);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -176,6 +187,8 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
customExtensionValueParser->parse(tok, extName);
|
||||
else
|
||||
ChunkExtensionValueParser::Ignore(tok, extName);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ callerTok = tok;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool
|
||||
@@ -209,7 +222,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
Must(theLeftBodySize == 0); // Should(), really
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
- skipLineTerminator(tok);
|
||||
+ tok.skipRequired("chunk CRLF", Http1::CrLf());
|
||||
buf_ = tok.remaining(); // parse checkpoint
|
||||
theChunkSize = 0; // done with the current chunk
|
||||
parsingStage_ = Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK_SZ;
|
||||
diff --git a/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc b/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
|
||||
index edaffd8d3..15df793b8 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
|
||||
@@ -147,6 +147,18 @@ Parser::Tokenizer::skipAll(const CharacterSet &tokenChars)
|
||||
return success(prefixLen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+void
|
||||
+Parser::Tokenizer::skipRequired(const char *description, const SBuf &tokenToSkip)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ if (skip(tokenToSkip) || tokenToSkip.isEmpty())
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (tokenToSkip.startsWith(buf_))
|
||||
+ throw InsufficientInput();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ throw TextException(ToSBuf("cannot skip ", description), Here());
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
bool
|
||||
Parser::Tokenizer::skipOne(const CharacterSet &chars)
|
||||
{
|
||||
diff --git a/src/parser/Tokenizer.h b/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
|
||||
index 7bae1ccbb..3cfa7dd6c 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
|
||||
@@ -115,6 +115,13 @@ public:
|
||||
*/
|
||||
SBuf::size_type skipAll(const CharacterSet &discardables);
|
||||
|
||||
+ /** skips a given character sequence (string);
|
||||
+ * does nothing if the sequence is empty
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * \throws exception on mismatching prefix or InsufficientInput
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ void skipRequired(const char *description, const SBuf &tokenToSkip);
|
||||
+
|
||||
/** Removes a single trailing character from the set.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \return whether a character was removed
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.25.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
||||
From 052cf082b0faaef4eaaa4e94119d7a1437aac4a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: squidadm <squidadm@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2023 04:50:56 +1300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Fix stack buffer overflow when parsing Digest Authorization
|
||||
(#1517)
|
||||
|
||||
The bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
|
||||
https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/digest-overflow.html
|
||||
where it was filed as "Stack Buffer Overflow in Digest Authentication".
|
||||
|
||||
---------
|
||||
|
||||
Co-authored-by: Alex Bason <nonsleepr@gmail.com>
|
||||
Co-authored-by: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/auth/digest/Config.cc | 10 +++++++---
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
|
||||
index d42831a55..be9f3c433 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
|
||||
@@ -844,11 +844,15 @@ Auth::Digest::Config::decode(char const *proxy_auth, const HttpRequest *request,
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case DIGEST_NC:
|
||||
- if (value.size() != 8) {
|
||||
+ if (value.size() == 8) {
|
||||
+ // for historical reasons, the nc value MUST be exactly 8 bytes
|
||||
+ static_assert(sizeof(digest_request->nc) == 8 + 1, "bad nc buffer size");
|
||||
+ xstrncpy(digest_request->nc, value.rawBuf(), value.size() + 1);
|
||||
+ debugs(29, 9, "Found noncecount '" << digest_request->nc << "'");
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
debugs(29, 9, "Invalid nc '" << value << "' in '" << temp << "'");
|
||||
+ digest_request->nc[0] = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- xstrncpy(digest_request->nc, value.rawBuf(), value.size() + 1);
|
||||
- debugs(29, 9, "Found noncecount '" << digest_request->nc << "'");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case DIGEST_CNONCE:
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.25.1
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
|
||||
From c67bf049871a49e9871efe50b230a7f37b7039f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 25 May 2023 02:10:28 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Fix userinfo percent-encoding (#1367)
|
||||
|
||||
%X expects an unsigned int, and that is what we were giving it. However,
|
||||
to get to the correct unsigned int value from a (signed) char, one has
|
||||
to cast to an unsigned char (or equivalent) first.
|
||||
|
||||
Broken since inception in commit 7b75100.
|
||||
|
||||
Also adjusted similar (commented out) ext_edirectory_userip_acl code.
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc | 2 +-
|
||||
src/anyp/Uri.cc | 2 +-
|
||||
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc b/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
|
||||
index dbc20ae54..9028d1562 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
|
||||
@@ -1612,7 +1612,7 @@ MainSafe(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
/* BINARY DEBUGGING *
|
||||
local_printfx("while() -> bufa[%" PRIuSIZE "]: %s", k, bufa);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < k; ++i)
|
||||
- local_printfx("%02X", bufa[i]);
|
||||
+ local_printfx("%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(static_cast<unsigned char>(bufa[i])));
|
||||
local_printfx("\n");
|
||||
* BINARY DEBUGGING */
|
||||
/* Check for CRLF */
|
||||
diff --git a/src/anyp/Uri.cc b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
|
||||
index a6a5d5d9e..3d19188e9 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/anyp/Uri.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ AnyP::Uri::Encode(const SBuf &buf, const CharacterSet &ignore)
|
||||
while (!tk.atEnd()) {
|
||||
// TODO: Add Tokenizer::parseOne(void).
|
||||
const auto ch = tk.remaining()[0];
|
||||
- output.appendf("%%%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(ch)); // TODO: Optimize using a table
|
||||
+ output.appendf("%%%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(static_cast<unsigned char>(ch))); // TODO: Optimize using a table
|
||||
(void)tk.skip(ch);
|
||||
|
||||
if (tk.prefix(goodSection, ignore))
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.25.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
commit 77b3fb4df0f126784d5fd4967c28ed40eb8d521b
|
||||
Author: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed Oct 25 19:41:45 2023 +0000
|
||||
|
||||
RFC 1123: Fix date parsing (#1538)
|
||||
|
||||
The bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
|
||||
https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/datetime-overflow.html
|
||||
where it was filed as "1-Byte Buffer OverRead in RFC 1123 date/time
|
||||
Handling".
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/rfc1123.c b/lib/rfc1123.c
|
||||
index e5bf9a4d7..cb484cc00 100644
|
||||
--- a/lib/rfc1123.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/rfc1123.c
|
||||
@@ -50,7 +50,13 @@ make_month(const char *s)
|
||||
char month[3];
|
||||
|
||||
month[0] = xtoupper(*s);
|
||||
+ if (!month[0])
|
||||
+ return -1; // protects *(s + 1) below
|
||||
+
|
||||
month[1] = xtolower(*(s + 1));
|
||||
+ if (!month[1])
|
||||
+ return -1; // protects *(s + 2) below
|
||||
+
|
||||
month[2] = xtolower(*(s + 2));
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 12; i++)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/src/ipc.cc b/src/ipc.cc
|
||||
index 42e11e6..a68e623 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/ipc.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/ipc.cc
|
||||
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
|
||||
#include "SquidConfig.h"
|
||||
#include "SquidIpc.h"
|
||||
#include "tools.h"
|
||||
+#include <cstdlib>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#if HAVE_UNISTD_H
|
||||
+#include <unistd.h>
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
|
||||
static const char *hello_string = "hi there\n";
|
||||
#ifndef HELLO_BUF_SZ
|
||||
@@ -365,6 +370,22 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
PutEnvironment();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // A dup(2) wrapper that reports and exits the process on errors. The
|
||||
+ // exiting logic is only suitable for this child process context.
|
||||
+ const auto dupOrExit = [prog,name](const int oldFd) {
|
||||
+ const auto newFd = dup(oldFd);
|
||||
+ if (newFd < 0) {
|
||||
+ const auto savedErrno = errno;
|
||||
+ debugs(54, DBG_CRITICAL, "ERROR: Helper process initialization failure: " << name <<
|
||||
+ Debug::Extra << "helper (CHILD) PID: " << getpid() <<
|
||||
+ Debug::Extra << "helper program name: " << prog <<
|
||||
+ Debug::Extra << "dup(2) system call error for FD " << oldFd << ": " << xstrerr(savedErrno));
|
||||
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return newFd;
|
||||
+ };
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This double-dup stuff avoids problems when one of
|
||||
* crfd, cwfd, or debug_log are in the rage 0-2.
|
||||
@@ -372,17 +393,16 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
|
||||
|
||||
do {
|
||||
/* First make sure 0-2 is occupied by something. Gets cleaned up later */
|
||||
- x = dup(crfd);
|
||||
- assert(x > -1);
|
||||
- } while (x < 3 && x > -1);
|
||||
+ x = dupOrExit(crfd);
|
||||
+ } while (x < 3);
|
||||
|
||||
close(x);
|
||||
|
||||
- t1 = dup(crfd);
|
||||
+ t1 = dupOrExit(crfd);
|
||||
|
||||
- t2 = dup(cwfd);
|
||||
+ t2 = dupOrExit(cwfd);
|
||||
|
||||
- t3 = dup(fileno(debug_log));
|
||||
+ t3 = dupOrExit(fileno(debug_log));
|
||||
|
||||
assert(t1 > 2 && t2 > 2 && t3 > 2);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/src/ClientRequestContext.h b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
|
||||
index 55a7a43..94a8700 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/ClientRequestContext.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
|
||||
@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ public:
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
ErrorState *error; ///< saved error page for centralized/delayed processing
|
||||
bool readNextRequest; ///< whether Squid should read after error handling
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
|
||||
+ size_t currentXffHopNumber = 0; ///< number of X-Forwarded-For header values processed so far
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* SQUID_CLIENTREQUESTCONTEXT_H */
|
||||
diff --git a/src/client_side_request.cc b/src/client_side_request.cc
|
||||
index f44849e..c7c09d4 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/client_side_request.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/client_side_request.cc
|
||||
@@ -80,6 +80,11 @@
|
||||
static const char *const crlf = "\r\n";
|
||||
|
||||
#if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#if !defined(SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX)
|
||||
+#define SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX 64
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
static void clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(Acl::Answer answer, void *data);
|
||||
#endif /* FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR */
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -485,8 +490,16 @@ clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(Acl::Answer answer, void *data)
|
||||
/* override the default src_addr tested if we have to go deeper than one level into XFF */
|
||||
Filled(calloutContext->acl_checklist)->src_addr = request->indirect_client_addr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- calloutContext->acl_checklist->nonBlockingCheck(clientFollowXForwardedForCheck, data);
|
||||
- return;
|
||||
+ if (++calloutContext->currentXffHopNumber < SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX) {
|
||||
+ calloutContext->acl_checklist->nonBlockingCheck(clientFollowXForwardedForCheck, data);
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ const auto headerName = Http::HeaderLookupTable.lookup(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR).name;
|
||||
+ debugs(28, DBG_CRITICAL, "ERROR: Ignoring trailing " << headerName << " addresses" <<
|
||||
+ Debug::Extra << "addresses allowed by follow_x_forwarded_for: " << calloutContext->currentXffHopNumber <<
|
||||
+ Debug::Extra << "last/accepted address: " << request->indirect_client_addr <<
|
||||
+ Debug::Extra << "ignored trailing addresses: " << request->x_forwarded_for_iterator);
|
||||
+ // fall through to resume clientAccessCheck() processing
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
commit 8fcff9c09824b18628f010d26a04247f6a6cbcb8
|
||||
Author: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
|
||||
Date: Sun Nov 12 09:33:20 2023 +0000
|
||||
|
||||
Do not update StoreEntry expiration after errorAppendEntry() (#1580)
|
||||
|
||||
errorAppendEntry() is responsible for setting entry expiration times,
|
||||
which it does by calling StoreEntry::storeErrorResponse() that calls
|
||||
StoreEntry::negativeCache().
|
||||
|
||||
This change was triggered by a vulnerability report by Joshua Rogers at
|
||||
https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/cache-uaf.html where
|
||||
it was filed as "Use-After-Free in Cache Manager Errors". The reported
|
||||
"use after free" vulnerability was unknowingly addressed by 2022 commit
|
||||
1fa761a that removed excessively long "reentrant" store_client calls
|
||||
responsible for the disappearance of the properly locked StoreEntry in
|
||||
this (and probably other) contexts.
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/cache_manager.cc b/src/cache_manager.cc
|
||||
index 61c7f65be..65bf22dd0 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/cache_manager.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/cache_manager.cc
|
||||
@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ CacheManager::start(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &client, HttpRequest *request,
|
||||
err->url = xstrdup(entry->url());
|
||||
err->detailError(new ExceptionErrorDetail(Here().id()));
|
||||
errorAppendEntry(entry, err);
|
||||
- entry->expires = squid_curtime;
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
|
||||
index 98e3969..8b55bf3 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/http.cc
|
||||
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
|
||||
#include "rfc1738.h"
|
||||
#include "SquidConfig.h"
|
||||
#include "SquidTime.h"
|
||||
+#include "SquidMath.h"
|
||||
#include "StatCounters.h"
|
||||
#include "Store.h"
|
||||
#include "StrList.h"
|
||||
@@ -1235,18 +1236,26 @@ HttpStateData::readReply(const CommIoCbParams &io)
|
||||
* Plus, it breaks our lame *HalfClosed() detection
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
- Must(maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(true));
|
||||
- CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
|
||||
- rd.conn = io.conn;
|
||||
- rd.size = entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, inBuf.spaceSize()));
|
||||
+ const auto moreDataPermission = canBufferMoreReplyBytes();
|
||||
+ if (!moreDataPermission) {
|
||||
+ abortTransaction("ready to read required data, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ const auto readSizeMax = maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(moreDataPermission.value());
|
||||
+ // TODO: Move this logic inside maybeMakeSpaceAvailable():
|
||||
+ const auto readSizeWanted = readSizeMax ? entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, readSizeMax)) : 0;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (rd.size <= 0) {
|
||||
+ if (readSizeWanted <= 0) {
|
||||
assert(entry->mem_obj);
|
||||
AsyncCall::Pointer nilCall;
|
||||
entry->mem_obj->delayRead(DeferredRead(readDelayed, this, CommRead(io.conn, NULL, 0, nilCall)));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
|
||||
+ rd.conn = io.conn;
|
||||
+ rd.size = readSizeWanted;
|
||||
switch (Comm::ReadNow(rd, inBuf)) {
|
||||
case Comm::INPROGRESS:
|
||||
if (inBuf.isEmpty())
|
||||
@@ -1617,8 +1626,10 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
|
||||
if (!Comm::IsConnOpen(serverConnection) || fd_table[serverConnection->fd].closing())
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(false))
|
||||
+ if (!canBufferMoreReplyBytes()) {
|
||||
+ abortTransaction("more response bytes required, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
// XXX: get rid of the do_next_read flag
|
||||
// check for the proper reasons preventing read(2)
|
||||
@@ -1636,40 +1647,78 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
|
||||
Comm::Read(serverConnection, call);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-bool
|
||||
-HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool doGrow)
|
||||
+/// Desired inBuf capacity based on various capacity preferences/limits:
|
||||
+/// * a smaller buffer may not hold enough for look-ahead header/body parsers;
|
||||
+/// * a smaller buffer may result in inefficient tiny network reads;
|
||||
+/// * a bigger buffer may waste memory;
|
||||
+/// * a bigger buffer may exceed SBuf storage capabilities (SBuf::maxSize);
|
||||
+size_t
|
||||
+HttpStateData::calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const
|
||||
{
|
||||
- // how much we are allowed to buffer
|
||||
- const int limitBuffer = (flags.headers_parsed ? Config.readAheadGap : Config.maxReplyHeaderSize);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (limitBuffer < 0 || inBuf.length() >= (SBuf::size_type)limitBuffer) {
|
||||
- // when buffer is at or over limit already
|
||||
- debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << limitBuffer << ". buffer has (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
|
||||
- debugs(11, DBG_DATA, "buffer has {" << inBuf << "}");
|
||||
- // Process next response from buffer
|
||||
- processReply();
|
||||
- return false;
|
||||
+ if (!flags.headers_parsed)
|
||||
+ return Config.maxReplyHeaderSize;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // XXX: Our inBuf is not used to maintain the read-ahead gap, and using
|
||||
+ // Config.readAheadGap like this creates huge read buffers for large
|
||||
+ // read_ahead_gap values. TODO: Switch to using tcp_recv_bufsize as the
|
||||
+ // primary read buffer capacity factor.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // TODO: Cannot reuse throwing NaturalCast() here. Consider removing
|
||||
+ // .value() dereference in NaturalCast() or add/use NaturalCastOrMax().
|
||||
+ const auto configurationPreferences = NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).value_or(SBuf::maxSize);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // TODO: Honor TeChunkedParser look-ahead and trailer parsing requirements
|
||||
+ // (when explicit configurationPreferences are set too low).
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return std::min<size_t>(configurationPreferences, SBuf::maxSize);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/// The maximum number of virgin reply bytes we may buffer before we violate
|
||||
+/// the currently configured response buffering limits.
|
||||
+/// \retval std::nullopt means that no more virgin response bytes can be read
|
||||
+/// \retval 0 means that more virgin response bytes may be read later
|
||||
+/// \retval >0 is the number of bytes that can be read now (subject to other constraints)
|
||||
+std::optional<size_t>
|
||||
+HttpStateData::canBufferMoreReplyBytes() const
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+#if USE_ADAPTATION
|
||||
+ // If we do not check this now, we may say the final "no" prematurely below
|
||||
+ // because inBuf.length() will decrease as adaptation drains buffered bytes.
|
||||
+ if (responseBodyBuffer) {
|
||||
+ debugs(11, 3, "yes, but waiting for adaptation to drain read buffer");
|
||||
+ return 0; // yes, we may be able to buffer more (but later)
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ const auto maxCapacity = calcReadBufferCapacityLimit();
|
||||
+ if (inBuf.length() >= maxCapacity) {
|
||||
+ debugs(11, 3, "no, due to a full buffer: " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize() << "; limit: " << maxCapacity);
|
||||
+ return std::nullopt; // no, configuration prohibits buffering more
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ const auto maxReadSize = maxCapacity - inBuf.length(); // positive
|
||||
+ debugs(11, 7, "yes, may read up to " << maxReadSize << " into " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize());
|
||||
+ return maxReadSize; // yes, can read up to this many bytes (subject to other constraints)
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/// prepare read buffer for reading
|
||||
+/// \return the maximum number of bytes the caller should attempt to read
|
||||
+/// \retval 0 means that the caller should delay reading
|
||||
+size_t
|
||||
+HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(const size_t maxReadSize)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
// how much we want to read
|
||||
- const size_t read_size = calcBufferSpaceToReserve(inBuf.spaceSize(), (limitBuffer - inBuf.length()));
|
||||
+ const size_t read_size = calcBufferSpaceToReserve(inBuf.spaceSize(), maxReadSize);
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!read_size) {
|
||||
+ if (read_size < 2) {
|
||||
debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << read_size << " into buffer (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
|
||||
- return false;
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- // just report whether we could grow or not, do not actually do it
|
||||
- if (doGrow)
|
||||
- return (read_size >= 2);
|
||||
-
|
||||
// we may need to grow the buffer
|
||||
inBuf.reserveSpace(read_size);
|
||||
- debugs(11, 8, (!flags.do_next_read ? "will not" : "may") <<
|
||||
- " read up to " << read_size << " bytes info buf(" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() <<
|
||||
- ") from " << serverConnection);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- return (inBuf.spaceSize() >= 2); // only read if there is 1+ bytes of space available
|
||||
+ debugs(11, 7, "may read up to " << read_size << " bytes info buffer (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
|
||||
+ return read_size;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// called after writing the very last request byte (body, last-chunk, etc)
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http.h b/src/http.h
|
||||
index e70cd7e..f7ed40d 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/http.h
|
||||
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
|
||||
#include "http/StateFlags.h"
|
||||
#include "sbuf/SBuf.h"
|
||||
|
||||
+#include <optional>
|
||||
+
|
||||
class FwdState;
|
||||
class HttpHeader;
|
||||
class String;
|
||||
@@ -112,16 +114,9 @@ private:
|
||||
|
||||
void abortTransaction(const char *reason) { abortAll(reason); } // abnormal termination
|
||||
|
||||
- /**
|
||||
- * determine if read buffer can have space made available
|
||||
- * for a read.
|
||||
- *
|
||||
- * \param grow whether to actually expand the buffer
|
||||
- *
|
||||
- * \return whether the buffer can be grown to provide space
|
||||
- * regardless of whether the grow actually happened.
|
||||
- */
|
||||
- bool maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool grow);
|
||||
+ size_t calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const;
|
||||
+ std::optional<size_t> canBufferMoreReplyBytes() const;
|
||||
+ size_t maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(size_t maxReadSize);
|
||||
|
||||
// consuming request body
|
||||
virtual void handleMoreRequestBodyAvailable();
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/src/SquidString.h b/src/SquidString.h
|
||||
index e36cd27..ea613ad 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/SquidString.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/SquidString.h
|
||||
@@ -140,7 +140,16 @@ private:
|
||||
|
||||
size_type len_ = 0; /* current length */
|
||||
|
||||
- static const size_type SizeMax_ = 65535; ///< 64K limit protects some fixed-size buffers
|
||||
+ /// An earlier 64KB limit was meant to protect some fixed-size buffers, but
|
||||
+ /// (a) we do not know where those buffers are (or whether they still exist)
|
||||
+ /// (b) too many String users unknowingly exceeded that limit and asserted.
|
||||
+ /// We are now using a larger limit to reduce the number of (b) cases,
|
||||
+ /// especially cases where "compact" lists of items grow 50% in size when we
|
||||
+ /// convert them to canonical form. The new limit is selected to withstand
|
||||
+ /// concatenation and ~50% expansion of two HTTP headers limited by default
|
||||
+ /// request_header_max_size and reply_header_max_size settings.
|
||||
+ static const size_type SizeMax_ = 3*64*1024 - 1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/// returns true after increasing the first argument by extra if the sum does not exceed SizeMax_
|
||||
static bool SafeAdd(size_type &base, size_type extra) { if (extra <= SizeMax_ && base <= SizeMax_ - extra) { base += extra; return true; } return false; }
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/cache_cf.cc b/src/cache_cf.cc
|
||||
index cb746dc..c4ade96 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/cache_cf.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/cache_cf.cc
|
||||
@@ -950,6 +950,18 @@ configDoConfigure(void)
|
||||
(uint32_t)Config.maxRequestBufferSize, (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestHeaderSize);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ // Warn about the dangers of exceeding String limits when manipulating HTTP
|
||||
+ // headers. Technically, we do not concatenate _requests_, so we could relax
|
||||
+ // their check, but we keep the two checks the same for simplicity sake.
|
||||
+ const auto safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax = (String::SizeMaxXXX()+1)/3;
|
||||
+ // TODO: static_assert(safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax >= 64*1024); // no WARNINGs for default settings
|
||||
+ if (Config.maxRequestHeaderSize > safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax)
|
||||
+ debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "WARNING: Increasing request_header_max_size beyond " << safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax <<
|
||||
+ " bytes makes Squid more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks; configured value: " << Config.maxRequestHeaderSize << " bytes");
|
||||
+ if (Config.maxReplyHeaderSize > safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax)
|
||||
+ debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "WARNING: Increasing reply_header_max_size beyond " << safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax <<
|
||||
+ " bytes makes Squid more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks; configured value: " << Config.maxReplyHeaderSize << " bytes");
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Disable client side request pipelining if client_persistent_connections OFF.
|
||||
* Waste of resources queueing any pipelined requests when the first will close the connection.
|
||||
diff --git a/src/cf.data.pre b/src/cf.data.pre
|
||||
index 67a66b0..61a66f1 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/cf.data.pre
|
||||
+++ b/src/cf.data.pre
|
||||
@@ -6489,11 +6489,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
|
||||
DEFAULT: 64 KB
|
||||
LOC: Config.maxRequestHeaderSize
|
||||
DOC_START
|
||||
- This specifies the maximum size for HTTP headers in a request.
|
||||
- Request headers are usually relatively small (about 512 bytes).
|
||||
- Placing a limit on the request header size will catch certain
|
||||
- bugs (for example with persistent connections) and possibly
|
||||
- buffer-overflow or denial-of-service attacks.
|
||||
+ This directives limits the header size of a received HTTP request
|
||||
+ (including request-line). Increasing this limit beyond its 64 KB default
|
||||
+ exposes certain old Squid code to various denial-of-service attacks. This
|
||||
+ limit also applies to received FTP commands.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ This limit has no direct affect on Squid memory consumption.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Squid does not check this limit when sending requests.
|
||||
DOC_END
|
||||
|
||||
NAME: reply_header_max_size
|
||||
@@ -6502,11 +6505,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
|
||||
DEFAULT: 64 KB
|
||||
LOC: Config.maxReplyHeaderSize
|
||||
DOC_START
|
||||
- This specifies the maximum size for HTTP headers in a reply.
|
||||
- Reply headers are usually relatively small (about 512 bytes).
|
||||
- Placing a limit on the reply header size will catch certain
|
||||
- bugs (for example with persistent connections) and possibly
|
||||
- buffer-overflow or denial-of-service attacks.
|
||||
+ This directives limits the header size of a received HTTP response
|
||||
+ (including status-line). Increasing this limit beyond its 64 KB default
|
||||
+ exposes certain old Squid code to various denial-of-service attacks. This
|
||||
+ limit also applies to FTP command responses.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Squid also checks this limit when loading hit responses from disk cache.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Squid does not check this limit when sending responses.
|
||||
DOC_END
|
||||
|
||||
NAME: request_body_max_size
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
|
||||
index 7c9ae70..98e3969 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/http.cc
|
||||
@@ -1926,8 +1926,9 @@ HttpStateData::httpBuildRequestHeader(HttpRequest * request,
|
||||
|
||||
String strFwd = hdr_in->getList(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR);
|
||||
|
||||
- // if we cannot double strFwd size, then it grew past 50% of the limit
|
||||
- if (!strFwd.canGrowBy(strFwd.size())) {
|
||||
+ // Detect unreasonably long header values. And paranoidly check String
|
||||
+ // limits: a String ought to accommodate two reasonable-length values.
|
||||
+ if (strFwd.size() > 32*1024 || !strFwd.canGrowBy(strFwd.size())) {
|
||||
// There is probably a forwarding loop with Via detection disabled.
|
||||
// If we do nothing, String will assert on overflow soon.
|
||||
// TODO: Terminate all transactions with huge XFF?
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/lib/libTrie/TrieNode.cc b/lib/libTrie/TrieNode.cc
|
||||
index b379856..5d87279 100644
|
||||
--- a/lib/libTrie/TrieNode.cc
|
||||
+++ b/lib/libTrie/TrieNode.cc
|
||||
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ TrieNode::add(char const *aString, size_t theLength, void *privatedata, TrieChar
|
||||
/* We trust that privatedata and existant keys have already been checked */
|
||||
|
||||
if (theLength) {
|
||||
- int index = transform ? (*transform)(*aString): *aString;
|
||||
+ const unsigned char index = transform ? (*transform)(*aString): *aString;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!internal[index])
|
||||
internal[index] = new TrieNode;
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
|
||||
From 8d0ee420a4d91ac7fd97316338f1e28b4b060cbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 19:26:27 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Ignore whitespace chars after chunk-size
|
||||
|
||||
Previously (before #1498 change), squid was accepting TE-chunked replies
|
||||
with whitespaces after chunk-size and missing chunk-ext data. After
|
||||
|
||||
It turned out that replies with such whitespace chars are pretty
|
||||
common and other webservers which can act as forward proxies (e.g.
|
||||
nginx, httpd...) are accepting them.
|
||||
|
||||
This change will allow to proxy chunked responses from origin server,
|
||||
which had whitespaces inbetween chunk-size and CRLF.
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
index 9cce10fdc91..04753395e16 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
// Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
|
||||
// bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
|
||||
try {
|
||||
+ tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
|
||||
parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
|
||||
tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
|
||||
buf_ = tok.remaining();
|
||||
|
||||
From 9c8d35f899035fa06021ab3fe6919f892c2f0c6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:06:31 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Added new argument to Http::One::ParseBws()
|
||||
|
||||
Depending on new wsp_only argument in ParseBws() it will be decided
|
||||
which set of whitespaces characters will be parsed. If wsp_only is set
|
||||
to true, only SP and HTAB chars will be parsed.
|
||||
|
||||
Also optimized number of ParseBws calls.
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/http/one/Parser.cc | 4 ++--
|
||||
src/http/one/Parser.h | 3 ++-
|
||||
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 13 +++++++++----
|
||||
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h | 2 +-
|
||||
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
|
||||
index b1908316a0b..01d7e3bc0e8 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
|
||||
@@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
|
||||
|
||||
// BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
|
||||
void
|
||||
-Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- const auto count = tok.skipAll(Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
|
||||
+ const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
|
||||
|
||||
if (tok.atEnd())
|
||||
throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
|
||||
index d9a0ac8c273..08200371cd6 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
|
||||
@@ -163,8 +163,9 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
|
||||
+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
|
||||
/// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
|
||||
-void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
|
||||
+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
|
||||
|
||||
/// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
|
||||
int ErrorLevel();
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
index 04753395e16..41e1e5ddaea 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
@@ -125,8 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
// Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
|
||||
// bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
|
||||
try {
|
||||
- tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
|
||||
- parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
|
||||
+ // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
|
||||
+ // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
|
||||
+ if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
|
||||
+ ParseBws(tok, true);
|
||||
+
|
||||
tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
|
||||
buf_ = tok.remaining();
|
||||
parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
|
||||
@@ -140,20 +143,22 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
|
||||
/// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
|
||||
-void
|
||||
+bool
|
||||
Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ bool foundChunkExt = false;
|
||||
do {
|
||||
auto tok = callerTok;
|
||||
|
||||
ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
|
||||
|
||||
if (!tok.skip(';'))
|
||||
- return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
|
||||
+ return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
|
||||
|
||||
parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
|
||||
buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
|
||||
callerTok = tok;
|
||||
+ foundChunkExt = true;
|
||||
} while (true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
|
||||
index 02eacd1bb89..8c5d4bb4cba 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
|
||||
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
|
||||
private:
|
||||
bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
|
||||
bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
|
||||
- void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
|
||||
+ bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
|
||||
void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
|
||||
bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
|
||||
bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
|
||||
|
||||
From 81e67f97f9c386bdd0bb4a5e182395c46adb70ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:44:33 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Fix typo in Parser.h
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/http/one/Parser.h | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
|
||||
index 08200371cd6..3ef4c5f7752 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
|
||||
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
|
||||
-/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
|
||||
+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
|
||||
/// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
|
||||
void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
From a0d4fe1794e605f8299a5c118c758a807453f016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 22:39:42 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Bug 5449 is a regression of Bug 4492!
|
||||
|
||||
Both bugs deal with "chunk-size SP+ CRLF" use cases. Bug 4492 had _two_
|
||||
spaces after chunk-size, which answers one of the PR review questions:
|
||||
Should we skip just one space? No, we should not.
|
||||
|
||||
The lines moved around in many commits, but I believe this regression
|
||||
was introduced in commit 951013d0 because that commit stopped consuming
|
||||
partially parsed chunk-ext sequences. That consumption was wrong, but it
|
||||
had a positive side effect -- fixing Bug 4492...
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 10 +++++-----
|
||||
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
index 41e1e5ddaea..aa4a840fdcf 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
// Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
|
||||
// bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
|
||||
try {
|
||||
- // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
|
||||
- // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
|
||||
- if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
|
||||
- ParseBws(tok, true);
|
||||
+ // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
|
||||
+ ParseBws(tok, true);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ parseChunkExtensions(tok);
|
||||
|
||||
tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
|
||||
buf_ = tok.remaining();
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
|
||||
do {
|
||||
auto tok = callerTok;
|
||||
|
||||
- ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
|
||||
+ ParseBws(tok);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!tok.skip(';'))
|
||||
return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
|
||||
|
||||
From f837f5ff61301a17008f16ce1fb793c2abf19786 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:06:42 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fixup: Fewer conditionals/ifs and more explicit spelling
|
||||
|
||||
... to draw code reader attention when something unusual is going on.
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/http/one/Parser.cc | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
|
||||
src/http/one/Parser.h | 10 ++++++++--
|
||||
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 14 ++++++--------
|
||||
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h | 2 +-
|
||||
4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
|
||||
index 01d7e3bc0e8..d3937e5e96b 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
|
||||
@@ -271,11 +271,12 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
|
||||
return Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser < 0 ? DBG_IMPORTANT : 5;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-// BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
|
||||
-void
|
||||
-Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
|
||||
+/// common part of ParseBws() and ParseStrctBws()
|
||||
+namespace Http::One {
|
||||
+static void
|
||||
+ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
|
||||
+ const auto count = tok.skipAll(bwsChars);
|
||||
|
||||
if (tok.atEnd())
|
||||
throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
|
||||
@@ -290,4 +291,17 @@ Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
|
||||
|
||||
// success: no more BWS characters expected
|
||||
}
|
||||
+} // namespace Http::One
|
||||
+
|
||||
+void
|
||||
+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+void
|
||||
+Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
|
||||
+}
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
|
||||
index 3ef4c5f7752..49e399de546 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
|
||||
@@ -163,9 +163,15 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
|
||||
-/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
|
||||
/// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
|
||||
-void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
|
||||
+/// \sa WhitespaceCharacters() for the definition of BWS characters
|
||||
+/// \sa ParseStrictBws() that avoids WhitespaceCharacters() uncertainties
|
||||
+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/// Like ParseBws() but only skips CharacterSet::WSP characters. This variation
|
||||
+/// must be used if the next element may start with CR or any other character
|
||||
+/// from RelaxedDelimiterCharacters().
|
||||
+void ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
|
||||
|
||||
/// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
|
||||
int ErrorLevel();
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
index aa4a840fdcf..859471b8c77 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
|
||||
@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
// Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
|
||||
// bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
|
||||
try {
|
||||
- // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
|
||||
- ParseBws(tok, true);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- parseChunkExtensions(tok);
|
||||
+ // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size.
|
||||
+ // No ParseBws() here because it may consume CR required further below.
|
||||
+ ParseStrictBws(tok);
|
||||
|
||||
+ parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
|
||||
tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
|
||||
buf_ = tok.remaining();
|
||||
parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
|
||||
@@ -143,22 +143,20 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
|
||||
/// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
|
||||
-bool
|
||||
+void
|
||||
Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- bool foundChunkExt = false;
|
||||
do {
|
||||
auto tok = callerTok;
|
||||
|
||||
ParseBws(tok);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!tok.skip(';'))
|
||||
- return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
|
||||
+ return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
|
||||
|
||||
parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
|
||||
buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
|
||||
callerTok = tok;
|
||||
- foundChunkExt = true;
|
||||
} while (true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
|
||||
index 8c5d4bb4cba..02eacd1bb89 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
|
||||
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
|
||||
private:
|
||||
bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
|
||||
bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
|
||||
- bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
|
||||
+ void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
|
||||
void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
|
||||
bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
|
||||
bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
|
||||
|
||||
From f79936a234e722adb2dd08f31cf6019d81ee712c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:31:08 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fixup: Deadly typo
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/http/one/Parser.cc | 4 ++--
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
|
||||
index d3937e5e96b..7403a9163a2 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
|
||||
@@ -296,12 +296,12 @@ ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
|
||||
void
|
||||
Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
|
||||
+ ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void
|
||||
Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
|
||||
+ ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
|
||||
commit c54122584d175cf1d292b239a5b70f2d1aa77c3a
|
||||
Author: Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon Dec 5 15:03:07 2022 +0100
|
||||
|
||||
Backport adding IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT flag to outgoing connections
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/comm.cc b/src/comm.cc
|
||||
index b4818f3..b18d175 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/comm.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/comm.cc
|
||||
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
static IOCB commHalfClosedReader;
|
||||
+static int comm_openex(int sock_type, int proto, Ip::Address &, int flags, const char *note);
|
||||
static void comm_init_opened(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &conn, const char *note, struct addrinfo *AI);
|
||||
static int comm_apply_flags(int new_socket, Ip::Address &addr, int flags, struct addrinfo *AI);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ static EVH commHalfClosedCheck;
|
||||
static void commPlanHalfClosedCheck();
|
||||
|
||||
static Comm::Flag commBind(int s, struct addrinfo &);
|
||||
+static void commSetBindAddressNoPort(int);
|
||||
static void commSetReuseAddr(int);
|
||||
static void commSetNoLinger(int);
|
||||
#ifdef TCP_NODELAY
|
||||
@@ -202,6 +204,22 @@ comm_local_port(int fd)
|
||||
return F->local_addr.port();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/// sets the IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT socket option to optimize ephemeral port
|
||||
+/// reuse by outgoing TCP connections that must bind(2) to a source IP address
|
||||
+static void
|
||||
+commSetBindAddressNoPort(const int fd)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+#if defined(IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT)
|
||||
+ int flag = 1;
|
||||
+ if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT, reinterpret_cast<char*>(&flag), sizeof(flag)) < 0) {
|
||||
+ const auto savedErrno = errno;
|
||||
+ debugs(50, DBG_IMPORTANT, "ERROR: setsockopt(IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT) failure: " << xstrerr(savedErrno));
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ (void)fd;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
static Comm::Flag
|
||||
commBind(int s, struct addrinfo &inaddr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -228,6 +246,10 @@ comm_open(int sock_type,
|
||||
int flags,
|
||||
const char *note)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ // assume zero-port callers do not need to know the assigned port right away
|
||||
+ if (sock_type == SOCK_STREAM && addr.port() == 0 && ((flags & COMM_DOBIND) || !addr.isAnyAddr()))
|
||||
+ flags |= COMM_DOBIND_PORT_LATER;
|
||||
+
|
||||
return comm_openex(sock_type, proto, addr, flags, note);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -329,7 +351,7 @@ comm_set_transparent(int fd)
|
||||
* Create a socket. Default is blocking, stream (TCP) socket. IO_TYPE
|
||||
* is OR of flags specified in defines.h:COMM_*
|
||||
*/
|
||||
-int
|
||||
+static int
|
||||
comm_openex(int sock_type,
|
||||
int proto,
|
||||
Ip::Address &addr,
|
||||
@@ -488,6 +510,9 @@ comm_apply_flags(int new_socket,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
+ if ((flags & COMM_DOBIND_PORT_LATER))
|
||||
+ commSetBindAddressNoPort(new_socket);
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (commBind(new_socket, *AI) != Comm::OK) {
|
||||
comm_close(new_socket);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
diff --git a/src/comm.h b/src/comm.h
|
||||
index 5a1a7c2..a9f33db 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/comm.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/comm.h
|
||||
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ void comm_import_opened(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &, const char *note, struc
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Open a port specially bound for listening or sending through a specific port.
|
||||
- * This is a wrapper providing IPv4/IPv6 failover around comm_openex().
|
||||
* Please use for all listening sockets and bind() outbound sockets.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* It will open a socket bound for:
|
||||
@@ -59,7 +58,6 @@ void comm_import_opened(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &, const char *note, struc
|
||||
int comm_open_listener(int sock_type, int proto, Ip::Address &addr, int flags, const char *note);
|
||||
void comm_open_listener(int sock_type, int proto, Comm::ConnectionPointer &conn, const char *note);
|
||||
|
||||
-int comm_openex(int, int, Ip::Address &, int, const char *);
|
||||
unsigned short comm_local_port(int fd);
|
||||
|
||||
int comm_udp_sendto(int sock, const Ip::Address &to, const void *buf, int buflen);
|
||||
diff --git a/src/comm/ConnOpener.cc b/src/comm/ConnOpener.cc
|
||||
index 19c1237..79fa2ed 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/comm/ConnOpener.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/comm/ConnOpener.cc
|
||||
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ Comm::ConnOpener::createFd()
|
||||
if (callback_ == NULL || callback_->canceled())
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
- temporaryFd_ = comm_openex(SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP, conn_->local, conn_->flags, host_);
|
||||
+ temporaryFd_ = comm_open(SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP, conn_->local, conn_->flags, host_);
|
||||
if (temporaryFd_ < 0) {
|
||||
sendAnswer(Comm::ERR_CONNECT, 0, "Comm::ConnOpener::createFd");
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
diff --git a/src/comm/Connection.h b/src/comm/Connection.h
|
||||
index 40c2249..2641f4e 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/comm/Connection.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/comm/Connection.h
|
||||
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ namespace Comm
|
||||
#define COMM_REUSEPORT 0x40 //< needs SO_REUSEPORT
|
||||
/// not registered with Comm and not owned by any connection-closing code
|
||||
#define COMM_ORPHANED 0x40
|
||||
+/// Internal Comm optimization: Keep the source port unassigned until connect(2)
|
||||
+#define COMM_DOBIND_PORT_LATER 0x100
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Store data about the physical and logical attributes of a connection.
|
||||
diff --git a/src/ipc.cc b/src/ipc.cc
|
||||
index 45cab52..42e11e6 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/ipc.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/ipc.cc
|
||||
@@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
|
||||
} else void(0)
|
||||
|
||||
if (type == IPC_TCP_SOCKET) {
|
||||
- crfd = cwfd = comm_open(SOCK_STREAM,
|
||||
+ crfd = cwfd = comm_open_listener(SOCK_STREAM,
|
||||
0,
|
||||
local_addr,
|
||||
COMM_NOCLOEXEC,
|
||||
name);
|
||||
- prfd = pwfd = comm_open(SOCK_STREAM,
|
||||
+ prfd = pwfd = comm_open_listener(SOCK_STREAM,
|
||||
0, /* protocol */
|
||||
local_addr,
|
||||
0, /* blocking */
|
||||
diff --git a/src/tests/stub_comm.cc b/src/tests/stub_comm.cc
|
||||
index a1d33d6..bf4bea6 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/tests/stub_comm.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/tests/stub_comm.cc
|
||||
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ int comm_open_uds(int sock_type, int proto, struct sockaddr_un* addr, int flags)
|
||||
void comm_import_opened(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &, const char *note, struct addrinfo *AI) STUB
|
||||
int comm_open_listener(int sock_type, int proto, Ip::Address &addr, int flags, const char *note) STUB_RETVAL(-1)
|
||||
void comm_open_listener(int sock_type, int proto, Comm::ConnectionPointer &conn, const char *note) STUB
|
||||
-int comm_openex(int, int, Ip::Address &, int, tos_t tos, nfmark_t nfmark, const char *) STUB_RETVAL(-1)
|
||||
unsigned short comm_local_port(int fd) STUB_RETVAL(0)
|
||||
int comm_udp_sendto(int sock, const Ip::Address &to, const void *buf, int buflen) STUB_RETVAL(-1)
|
||||
void commCallCloseHandlers(int fd) STUB
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
|
||||
From a0a9e6dc69d0c7b9ba237702b4c5020abc7ad1f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
|
||||
Date: Sat, 4 Nov 2023 00:30:42 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Bug 5154: Do not open IPv6 sockets when IPv6 is disabled
|
||||
(#1567)
|
||||
|
||||
... but allow basic IPv6 manipulations like getSockAddr().
|
||||
|
||||
Address.cc:663 getAddrInfo() assertion failed: false
|
||||
|
||||
Squids receives IPv6 addresses from traffic, configuration, or
|
||||
hard-coded constants even when ./configured with --disable-ipv6 or when
|
||||
IPv6 support was automatically disabled at startup after failing IPv6
|
||||
tests. To handle IPv6 correctly, such Squids must support basic IPv6
|
||||
operations like recognizing an IPv6 address in a request-target or
|
||||
reporting an unsolicited IPv6 DNS record. At least for now, such Squids
|
||||
must also correctly parse configuration-related IPv6 addresses.
|
||||
|
||||
All those activities rely on various low-level operations like filling
|
||||
addrinfo structure with IP address information. Since 2012 commit
|
||||
c5fbbc7, Ip::Address::getAddrInfo() was failing for IPv6 addresses when
|
||||
Ip::EnableIpv6 was falsy. That change correctly recognized[^1] the need
|
||||
for such Squids to handle IPv6, but to support basic operations, we need
|
||||
to reject IPv6 addresses at a higher level and without asserting.
|
||||
|
||||
That high-level rejection work is ongoing, but initial attempts have
|
||||
exposed difficult problems that will take time to address. For now, we
|
||||
just avoid the assertion while protecting IPv6-disabled Squid from
|
||||
listening on or opening connections to IPv6 addresses. Since Squid
|
||||
already expects (and usually correctly handles) socket opening failures,
|
||||
disabling those operations is better than failing in low-level IP
|
||||
manipulation code.
|
||||
|
||||
The overall IPv6 posture of IPv6-disabled Squids that lack http_access
|
||||
or other rules to deny IPv6 requests will change: This fix exposes more
|
||||
of IPv6-disabled Squid code to IPv6 addresses. It is possible that such
|
||||
exposure will make some IPv6 resources inside Squid (e.g., a previously
|
||||
cached HTTP response) accessible to external requests. Squids will not
|
||||
open or accept IPv6 connections but may forward requests with raw IPv6
|
||||
targets to IPv4 cache_peers. Whether these and similar behavior changes
|
||||
are going to be permanent is open for debate, but even if they are
|
||||
temporary, they are arguably better than the corresponding assertions.
|
||||
|
||||
These changes do not effect IPv6-enabled Squids.
|
||||
|
||||
The assertion in IPv6-disabled Squid was reported by Joshua Rogers at
|
||||
https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/ipv6-assert.html where
|
||||
it was filed as "Assertion on IPv6 Host Requests with --disable-ipv6".
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: https://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3593#c1
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/comm.cc | 6 ++++++
|
||||
src/ip/Address.cc | 2 +-
|
||||
src/ip/Intercept.cc | 8 ++++++++
|
||||
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/comm.cc b/src/comm.cc
|
||||
index 4659955b011..271ba04d4da 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/comm.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/comm.cc
|
||||
@@ -344,6 +344,12 @@ comm_openex(int sock_type,
|
||||
/* Create socket for accepting new connections. */
|
||||
++ statCounter.syscalls.sock.sockets;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (!Ip::EnableIpv6 && addr.isIPv6()) {
|
||||
+ debugs(50, 2, "refusing to open an IPv6 socket when IPv6 support is disabled: " << addr);
|
||||
+ errno = ENOTSUP;
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Setup the socket addrinfo details for use */
|
||||
addr.getAddrInfo(AI);
|
||||
AI->ai_socktype = sock_type;
|
||||
diff --git a/src/ip/Address.cc b/src/ip/Address.cc
|
||||
index b6f810bfc25..ae6db37da5e 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/ip/Address.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/ip/Address.cc
|
||||
@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ Ip::Address::getAddrInfo(struct addrinfo *&dst, int force) const
|
||||
&& dst->ai_protocol == 0)
|
||||
dst->ai_protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (force == AF_INET6 || (force == AF_UNSPEC && Ip::EnableIpv6 && isIPv6()) ) {
|
||||
+ if (force == AF_INET6 || (force == AF_UNSPEC && isIPv6()) ) {
|
||||
dst->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr*)new sockaddr_in6;
|
||||
|
||||
memset(dst->ai_addr,0,sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
|
||||
diff --git a/src/ip/Intercept.cc b/src/ip/Intercept.cc
|
||||
index 1a5e2d15af1..a8522efaac0 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/ip/Intercept.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/ip/Intercept.cc
|
||||
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
|
||||
#include "comm/Connection.h"
|
||||
#include "fde.h"
|
||||
#include "ip/Intercept.h"
|
||||
+#include "ip/tools.h"
|
||||
#include "src/tools.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include <cerrno>
|
||||
@@ -430,6 +431,13 @@ Ip::Intercept::ProbeForTproxy(Ip::Address &test)
|
||||
|
||||
debugs(3, 3, "Detect TPROXY support on port " << test);
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (!Ip::EnableIpv6 && test.isIPv6() && !test.setIPv4()) {
|
||||
+ debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "Cannot use TPROXY for " << test << " because IPv6 support is disabled");
|
||||
+ if (doneSuid)
|
||||
+ leave_suid();
|
||||
+ return false;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
int tos = 1;
|
||||
int tmp_sock = -1;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
|
||||
From 4d6dd3ddba5e850a42c86d8233735165a371c31c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
|
||||
Date: Sun, 1 Sep 2024 00:39:34 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Bug 5405: Large uploads fill request buffer and die (#1887)
|
||||
|
||||
maybeMakeSpaceAvailable: request buffer full
|
||||
ReadNow: ... size 0, retval 0, errno 0
|
||||
terminateAll: 1/1 after ERR_CLIENT_GONE/WITH_CLIENT
|
||||
%Ss=TCP_MISS_ABORTED
|
||||
|
||||
This bug is triggered by a combination of the following two conditions:
|
||||
|
||||
* HTTP client upload fills Squid request buffer faster than it is
|
||||
drained by an origin server, cache_peer, or REQMOD service. The buffer
|
||||
accumulates 576 KB (default 512 KB client_request_buffer_max_size + 64
|
||||
KB internal "pipe" buffer).
|
||||
|
||||
* The affected server or service consumes a few bytes after the critical
|
||||
accumulation is reached. In other words, the bug cannot be triggered
|
||||
if nothing is consumed after the first condition above is met.
|
||||
|
||||
Comm::ReadNow() must not be called with a full buffer: Related
|
||||
FD_READ_METHOD() code cannot distinguish "received EOF" from "had no
|
||||
buffer space" outcomes. Server::readSomeData() tried to prevent such
|
||||
calls, but the corresponding check had two problems:
|
||||
|
||||
* The check had an unsigned integer underflow bug[^1] that made it
|
||||
ineffective when inBuf length exceeded Config.maxRequestBufferSize.
|
||||
That length could exceed the limit due to reconfiguration and when
|
||||
inBuf space size first grew outside of maybeMakeSpaceAvailable()
|
||||
protections (e.g., during an inBuf.c_str() call) and then got filled
|
||||
with newly read data. That growth started happening after 2020 commit
|
||||
1dfbca06 optimized SBuf::cow() to merge leading and trailing space.
|
||||
Prior to that commit, Bug 5405 could probably only affect Squid
|
||||
reconfigurations that lower client_request_buffer_max_size.
|
||||
|
||||
* The check was separated from the ReadNow() call it was meant to
|
||||
protect. While ConnStateData was waiting for the socket to become
|
||||
ready for reading, various asynchronous events could alter inBuf or
|
||||
Config.maxRequestBufferSize.
|
||||
|
||||
This change fixes both problems.
|
||||
|
||||
This change also fixes Squid Bug 5214.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: That underflow bug was probably introduced in 2015 commit 4d1376d7
|
||||
while trying to emulate the original "do not read less than two bytes"
|
||||
ConnStateData::In::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable() condition. That condition
|
||||
itself looks like a leftover from manual zero-terminated input buffer
|
||||
days that ended with 2014 commit e7287625. It is now removed.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/servers/Server.cc b/src/servers/Server.cc
|
||||
index 70fd10b..dd20619 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/servers/Server.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/servers/Server.cc
|
||||
@@ -83,16 +83,25 @@ Server::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable()
|
||||
debugs(33, 4, "request buffer full: client_request_buffer_max_size=" << Config.maxRequestBufferSize);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+bool
|
||||
+Server::mayBufferMoreRequestBytes() const
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ // TODO: Account for bodyPipe buffering as well.
|
||||
+ if (inBuf.length() >= Config.maxRequestBufferSize) {
|
||||
+ debugs(33, 4, "no: " << inBuf.length() << '-' << Config.maxRequestBufferSize << '=' << (inBuf.length() - Config.maxRequestBufferSize));
|
||||
+ return false;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ debugs(33, 7, "yes: " << Config.maxRequestBufferSize << '-' << inBuf.length() << '=' << (Config.maxRequestBufferSize - inBuf.length()));
|
||||
+ return true;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
void
|
||||
Server::readSomeData()
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (reading())
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
- debugs(33, 4, clientConnection << ": reading request...");
|
||||
-
|
||||
- // we can only read if there is more than 1 byte of space free
|
||||
- if (Config.maxRequestBufferSize - inBuf.length() < 2)
|
||||
+ if (!mayBufferMoreRequestBytes())
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
typedef CommCbMemFunT<Server, CommIoCbParams> Dialer;
|
||||
@@ -123,7 +132,16 @@ Server::doClientRead(const CommIoCbParams &io)
|
||||
* Plus, it breaks our lame *HalfClosed() detection
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
+ // mayBufferMoreRequestBytes() was true during readSomeData(), but variables
|
||||
+ // like Config.maxRequestBufferSize may have changed since that check
|
||||
+ if (!mayBufferMoreRequestBytes()) {
|
||||
+ // XXX: If we avoid Comm::ReadNow(), we should not Comm::Read() again
|
||||
+ // when the wait is over; resume these doClientRead() checks instead.
|
||||
+ return; // wait for noteMoreBodySpaceAvailable() or a similar inBuf draining event
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
maybeMakeSpaceAvailable();
|
||||
+ Assure(inBuf.spaceSize());
|
||||
+
|
||||
CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
|
||||
rd.conn = io.conn;
|
||||
switch (Comm::ReadNow(rd, inBuf)) {
|
||||
diff --git a/src/servers/Server.h b/src/servers/Server.h
|
||||
index ef105f5..6e549b3 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/servers/Server.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/servers/Server.h
|
||||
@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ protected:
|
||||
/// abort any pending transactions and prevent new ones (by closing)
|
||||
virtual void terminateAll(const Error &, const LogTagsErrors &) = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
+ /// whether client_request_buffer_max_size allows inBuf.length() increase
|
||||
+ bool mayBufferMoreRequestBytes() const;
|
||||
+
|
||||
void doClientRead(const CommIoCbParams &io);
|
||||
void clientWriteDone(const CommIoCbParams &io);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
|
||||
File: squid-5.5.tar.xz
|
||||
Date: Wed 13 Apr 2022 08:45:42 UTC
|
||||
Size: 2565732
|
||||
MD5 : 83ccc2d86ca0966e3555a3b78f5afd14
|
||||
SHA1: 42302bd9b8feff851a41420334cb8eaeab2806ab
|
||||
Key : CD6DBF8EF3B17D3E <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
|
||||
B068 84ED B779 C89B 044E 64E3 CD6D BF8E F3B1 7D3E
|
||||
keyring = http://www.squid-cache.org/pgp.asc
|
||||
keyserver = pool.sks-keyservers.net
|
||||
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
||||
|
||||
iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEsGiE7bd5yJsETmTjzW2/jvOxfT4FAmJWjb4ACgkQzW2/jvOx
|
||||
fT7t0A/9GjAdINfSP4gQyUr+Uvakz9O6fA9Jo3F30VafYimrSGm+VdGWntTsrOaP
|
||||
VcsCdG3/Dvrhnqtu9+hwfKKQ61lmmUC7KVycx3whEUepQbZu5kd05csD7nwQ+AFe
|
||||
7eJr0IwbRI4XdUhNW4AB52i/+hpHs/YSrSokumx5NVhwAUvT81TToUNzUjfKuXyy
|
||||
U+w6GQ9kJbVW1UgFYZGZdJwCmD5Z7fNdUllKZhLj4I5GZ+5Zz5+lJP3ZBC6qavde
|
||||
34hbpHbt+/lqz337eNoxwlyPNKPDiGIUEY9T4cdzA0BiLggTmlukDFErlYuHgCMX
|
||||
BmQ9elJtdRaCD2YD+U1H9J+2wqt9O01gdyFU1V3RnNLZphgWur9X808rujuE46+Q
|
||||
sxyV6SjeBh6Xs/I7wA9utX0pbVD+nLvna6Be49M1yAghBwTjiYN9fGC3ufj4St3k
|
||||
PCvkTkBUOop3m4aBCRtUVO6w4Y/YmF71qAHIiSLe1i6xoztEDTVI0CA+vfrwwu2G
|
||||
rFP5wuKsaYfBjkhQw4Jv6X30vnnOVqlxITGXcOnPXrHoD5KuYXv/Xsobqf8XsFdl
|
||||
3qyXUe8lSI5idCg+Ajj9m0IqGWA50iFBs28Ca7GDacl9KApGn4O7kPLQY+7nN5cz
|
||||
Nv3k8lYPh4KvRI1b2hcuoe3K63rEzty0e2vqG9zqxkpxOt20E/U=
|
||||
=9xr/
|
||||
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
||||
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/errors/aliases b/errors/aliases
|
||||
index c256106..38c123a 100644
|
||||
--- a/errors/aliases
|
||||
+++ b/errors/aliases
|
||||
@@ -14,8 +14,7 @@ da da-dk
|
||||
de de-at de-ch de-de de-li de-lu
|
||||
el el-gr
|
||||
en en-au en-bz en-ca en-cn en-gb en-ie en-in en-jm en-nz en-ph en-sg en-tt en-uk en-us en-za en-zw
|
||||
-es es-ar es-bo es-cl es-cu es-co es-do es-ec es-es es-pe es-pr es-py es-us es-uy es-ve es-xl spq
|
||||
-es-mx es-bz es-cr es-gt es-hn es-ni es-pa es-sv
|
||||
+es es-ar es-bo es-cl es-co es-cr es-do es-ec es-es es-gt es-hn es-mx es-ni es-pa es-pe es-pr es-py es-sv es-us es-uy es-ve es-xl
|
||||
et et-ee
|
||||
fa fa-fa fa-ir
|
||||
fi fi-fi
|
||||
diff --git a/errors/language.am b/errors/language.am
|
||||
index a437d17..f2fe463 100644
|
||||
--- a/errors/language.am
|
||||
+++ b/errors/language.am
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ LANGUAGE_FILES = \
|
||||
de.lang \
|
||||
el.lang \
|
||||
en.lang \
|
||||
- es-mx.lang \
|
||||
es.lang \
|
||||
et.lang \
|
||||
fa.lang \
|
||||
@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
|
||||
File: squid-6.10.tar.xz
|
||||
Date: Sat Jun 8 02:53:29 PM UTC 2024
|
||||
Size: 2558208
|
||||
MD5 : 86deefa7282c4388be95260aa4d4cf6a
|
||||
SHA1: 70e90865df0e4e9ba7765b622da40bda9bb8fc5d
|
||||
Key : 29B4B1F7CE03D1B1DED22F3028F85029FEF6E865 <kinkie@squid-cache.org>
|
||||
29B4 B1F7 CE03 D1B1 DED2 2F30 28F8 5029 FEF6 E865
|
||||
sub cv25519 2021-05-15 [E]
|
||||
keyring = http://www.squid-cache.org/pgp.asc
|
||||
keyserver = pool.sks-keyservers.net
|
||||
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
||||
|
||||
iHUEABYKAB0WIQQptLH3zgPRsd7SLzAo+FAp/vboZQUCZmRwewAKCRAo+FAp/vbo
|
||||
ZZV0AP0WDdXJFarEEYCSXSv/zT1l0FrI8jLQCT3Rsp6nTbWxfwD/VYmUMDetPLPJ
|
||||
GYHJNrRm7OceMQcsqhQIz6X71SR9AQs=
|
||||
=4HPC
|
||||
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in new issue