SOURCES/squid-5.5-ignore-wsp-after-chunk-size.patch

@@ -1,367 +0,0 @@
-From 8d0ee420a4d91ac7fd97316338f1e28b4b060cbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 19:26:27 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Ignore whitespace chars after chunk-size
-
-Previously (before #1498 change), squid was accepting TE-chunked replies
-with whitespaces after chunk-size and missing chunk-ext data. After
-
-It turned out that replies with such whitespace chars are pretty
-common and other webservers which can act as forward proxies (e.g.
-nginx, httpd...) are accepting them.
-
-This change will allow to proxy chunked responses from origin server,
-which had whitespaces inbetween chunk-size and CRLF.
----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 9cce10fdc91..04753395e16 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
-+        tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
-         parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-
-From 9c8d35f899035fa06021ab3fe6919f892c2f0c6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:06:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Added new argument to Http::One::ParseBws()
-
-Depending on new wsp_only argument in ParseBws() it will be decided
-which set of whitespaces characters will be parsed. If wsp_only is set
-to true, only SP and HTAB chars will be parsed.
-
-Also optimized number of ParseBws calls.
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc          |  4 ++--
- src/http/one/Parser.h           |  3 ++-
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 13 +++++++++----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h  |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index b1908316a0b..01d7e3bc0e8 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
- 
- // BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
- void
--Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
- {
--    const auto count = tok.skipAll(Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
- 
-     if (tok.atEnd())
-         throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index d9a0ac8c273..08200371cd6 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,8 +163,9 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
-+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
--void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
-+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
- 
- /// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
- int ErrorLevel();
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 04753395e16..41e1e5ddaea 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,8 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
--        parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-+        // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
-+        // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
-+        if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
-+            ParseBws(tok, true);
-+
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-         parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
-@@ -140,20 +143,22 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
- 
- /// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
- /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
--void
-+bool
- Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
- {
-+    bool foundChunkExt = false;
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
-         ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
--            return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-+            return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
- 
-         parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
-         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
-         callerTok = tok;
-+        foundChunkExt = true;
-     } while (true);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-index 02eacd1bb89..8c5d4bb4cba 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
- private:
-     bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
--    void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-+    bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-     void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
-     bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
-
-From 81e67f97f9c386bdd0bb4a5e182395c46adb70ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:44:33 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Fix typo in Parser.h
-
----
- src/http/one/Parser.h | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index 08200371cd6..3ef4c5f7752 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
--/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
-+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
- void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
- 
-
-From a0d4fe1794e605f8299a5c118c758a807453f016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 22:39:42 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Bug 5449 is a regression of Bug 4492!
-
-Both bugs deal with "chunk-size SP+ CRLF" use cases. Bug 4492 had _two_
-spaces after chunk-size, which answers one of the PR review questions:
-Should we skip just one space? No, we should not.
-
-The lines moved around in many commits, but I believe this regression
-was introduced in commit 951013d0 because that commit stopped consuming
-partially parsed chunk-ext sequences. That consumption was wrong, but it
-had a positive side effect -- fixing Bug 4492...
----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 10 +++++-----
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 41e1e5ddaea..aa4a840fdcf 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
--        // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
--        if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
--            ParseBws(tok, true);
-+        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
-+        ParseBws(tok, true);
-+
-+        parseChunkExtensions(tok);
- 
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
--        ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
-+        ParseBws(tok);
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
-             return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-
-From f837f5ff61301a17008f16ce1fb793c2abf19786 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:06:42 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fixup: Fewer conditionals/ifs and more explicit spelling
-
-... to draw code reader attention when something unusual is going on.
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc          | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
- src/http/one/Parser.h           | 10 ++++++++--
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 14 ++++++--------
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h  |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index 01d7e3bc0e8..d3937e5e96b 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -271,11 +271,12 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
-     return Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser < 0 ? DBG_IMPORTANT : 5;
- }
- 
--// BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
--void
--Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
-+/// common part of ParseBws() and ParseStrctBws()
-+namespace Http::One {
-+static void
-+ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
- {
--    const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    const auto count = tok.skipAll(bwsChars);
- 
-     if (tok.atEnd())
-         throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
-@@ -290,4 +291,17 @@ Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
- 
-     // success: no more BWS characters expected
- }
-+} // namespace Http::One
-+
-+void
-+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+{
-+    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+{
-+    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+}
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index 3ef4c5f7752..49e399de546 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,9 +163,15 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
--/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
--void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
-+/// \sa WhitespaceCharacters() for the definition of BWS characters
-+/// \sa ParseStrictBws() that avoids WhitespaceCharacters() uncertainties
-+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
-+
-+/// Like ParseBws() but only skips CharacterSet::WSP characters. This variation
-+/// must be used if the next element may start with CR or any other character
-+/// from RelaxedDelimiterCharacters().
-+void ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
- 
- /// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
- int ErrorLevel();
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index aa4a840fdcf..859471b8c77 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
--        ParseBws(tok, true);
--
--        parseChunkExtensions(tok);
-+        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size.
-+        // No ParseBws() here because it may consume CR required further below.
-+        ParseStrictBws(tok);
- 
-+        parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-         parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
-@@ -143,22 +143,20 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
- 
- /// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
- /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
--bool
-+void
- Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
- {
--    bool foundChunkExt = false;
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
-         ParseBws(tok);
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
--            return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-+            return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
- 
-         parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
-         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
-         callerTok = tok;
--        foundChunkExt = true;
-     } while (true);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-index 8c5d4bb4cba..02eacd1bb89 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
- private:
-     bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
--    bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-+    void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-     void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
-     bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
-
-From f79936a234e722adb2dd08f31cf6019d81ee712c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:31:08 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fixup: Deadly typo
-
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index d3937e5e96b..7403a9163a2 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -296,12 +296,12 @@ ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
- void
- Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
- {
--    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
-+    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
- }
- 
- void
- Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
- {
--    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
- }
- 
-

SOURCES/squid-5.5-large-upload-buffer-dies.patch

@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-From 4d6dd3ddba5e850a42c86d8233735165a371c31c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Sun, 1 Sep 2024 00:39:34 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Bug 5405: Large uploads fill request buffer and die (#1887)
-
-    maybeMakeSpaceAvailable: request buffer full
-    ReadNow: ... size 0, retval 0, errno 0
-    terminateAll: 1/1 after ERR_CLIENT_GONE/WITH_CLIENT
-    %Ss=TCP_MISS_ABORTED
-
-This bug is triggered by a combination of the following two conditions:
-
-* HTTP client upload fills Squid request buffer faster than it is
-  drained by an origin server, cache_peer, or REQMOD service. The buffer
-  accumulates 576 KB (default 512 KB client_request_buffer_max_size + 64
-  KB internal "pipe" buffer).
-
-* The affected server or service consumes a few bytes after the critical
-  accumulation is reached. In other words, the bug cannot be triggered
-  if nothing is consumed after the first condition above is met.
-
-Comm::ReadNow() must not be called with a full buffer: Related
-FD_READ_METHOD() code cannot distinguish "received EOF" from "had no
-buffer space" outcomes. Server::readSomeData() tried to prevent such
-calls, but the corresponding check had two problems:
-
-* The check had an unsigned integer underflow bug[^1] that made it
-  ineffective when inBuf length exceeded Config.maxRequestBufferSize.
-  That length could exceed the limit due to reconfiguration and when
-  inBuf space size first grew outside of maybeMakeSpaceAvailable()
-  protections (e.g., during an inBuf.c_str() call) and then got filled
-  with newly read data. That growth started happening after 2020 commit
-  1dfbca06 optimized SBuf::cow() to merge leading and trailing space.
-  Prior to that commit, Bug 5405 could probably only affect Squid
-  reconfigurations that lower client_request_buffer_max_size.
-
-* The check was separated from the ReadNow() call it was meant to
-  protect. While ConnStateData was waiting for the socket to become
-  ready for reading, various asynchronous events could alter inBuf or
-  Config.maxRequestBufferSize.
-
-This change fixes both problems.
-
-This change also fixes Squid Bug 5214.
-
-[^1]: That underflow bug was probably introduced in 2015 commit 4d1376d7
-while trying to emulate the original "do not read less than two bytes"
-ConnStateData::In::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable() condition. That condition
-itself looks like a leftover from manual zero-terminated input buffer
-days that ended with 2014 commit e7287625. It is now removed.
----
-
-diff --git a/src/servers/Server.cc b/src/servers/Server.cc
-index 70fd10b..dd20619 100644
---- a/src/servers/Server.cc
-+++ b/src/servers/Server.cc
-@@ -83,16 +83,25 @@ Server::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable()
-         debugs(33, 4, "request buffer full: client_request_buffer_max_size=" << Config.maxRequestBufferSize);
- }
- 
-+bool
-+Server::mayBufferMoreRequestBytes() const
-+{
-+    // TODO: Account for bodyPipe buffering as well.
-+    if (inBuf.length() >= Config.maxRequestBufferSize) {
-+        debugs(33, 4, "no: " << inBuf.length() << '-' << Config.maxRequestBufferSize << '=' << (inBuf.length() - Config.maxRequestBufferSize));
-+        return false;
-+    }
-+    debugs(33, 7, "yes: " << Config.maxRequestBufferSize << '-' << inBuf.length() << '=' << (Config.maxRequestBufferSize - inBuf.length()));
-+    return true;
-+}
-+
- void
- Server::readSomeData()
- {
-     if (reading())
-         return;
- 
--    debugs(33, 4, clientConnection << ": reading request...");
--
--    // we can only read if there is more than 1 byte of space free
--    if (Config.maxRequestBufferSize - inBuf.length() < 2)
-+    if (!mayBufferMoreRequestBytes())
-         return;
- 
-     typedef CommCbMemFunT<Server, CommIoCbParams> Dialer;
-@@ -123,7 +132,16 @@ Server::doClientRead(const CommIoCbParams &io)
-      * Plus, it breaks our lame *HalfClosed() detection
-      */
- 
-+    // mayBufferMoreRequestBytes() was true during readSomeData(), but variables
-+    // like Config.maxRequestBufferSize may have changed since that check
-+    if (!mayBufferMoreRequestBytes()) {
-+        // XXX: If we avoid Comm::ReadNow(), we should not Comm::Read() again
-+        // when the wait is over; resume these doClientRead() checks instead.
-+        return; // wait for noteMoreBodySpaceAvailable() or a similar inBuf draining event
-+    }
-     maybeMakeSpaceAvailable();
-+    Assure(inBuf.spaceSize());
-+
-     CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
-     rd.conn = io.conn;
-     switch (Comm::ReadNow(rd, inBuf)) {
-diff --git a/src/servers/Server.h b/src/servers/Server.h
-index ef105f5..6e549b3 100644
---- a/src/servers/Server.h
-+++ b/src/servers/Server.h
-@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ protected:
-     /// abort any pending transactions and prevent new ones (by closing)
-     virtual void terminateAll(const Error &, const LogTagsErrors &) = 0;
- 
-+    /// whether client_request_buffer_max_size allows inBuf.length() increase
-+    bool mayBufferMoreRequestBytes() const;
-+
-     void doClientRead(const CommIoCbParams &io);
-     void clientWriteDone(const CommIoCbParams &io);
- 

SPECS/squid.spec

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Name:     squid
 Version:  5.5
-Release:  14%{?dist}.3
+Release:  14%{?dist}
 Summary:  The Squid proxy caching server
 Epoch:    7
 # See CREDITS for breakdown of non GPLv2+ code
@@ -48,8 +48,6 @@ Patch208: squid-5.1-test-store-cppsuite.patch
 Patch209: squid-5.5-halfclosed.patch
 # https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-30352
 Patch210: squid-5.5-ipv6-crash.patch
-# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-12356
-Patch211: squid-5.5-large-upload-buffer-dies.patch
 
 # Security patches
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2100721
@@ -82,9 +80,6 @@ Patch513: squid-5.5-CVE-2024-25111.patch
 Patch514: squid-5.5-CVE-2024-37894.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2260051
 Patch515: squid-5.5-CVE-2024-23638.patch
-# Regression caused by squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46846.patch
-# Upstream PR: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/pull/1914
-Patch516: squid-5.5-ignore-wsp-after-chunk-size.patch
 
 # cache_swap.sh
 Requires: bash gawk
@@ -102,6 +97,8 @@ BuildRequires: openssl-devel
 BuildRequires: krb5-devel
 # time_quota requires TrivialDB
 BuildRequires: libtdb-devel
+# ESI support requires Expat & libxml2
+BuildRequires: expat-devel libxml2-devel
 # TPROXY requires libcap, and also increases security somewhat
 BuildRequires: libcap-devel
 # eCAP support
@@ -158,7 +155,6 @@ lookup program (dnsserver), a program for retrieving FTP data
 %patch208 -p1 -b .test-store-cpp
 %patch209 -p1 -b .halfclosed
 %patch210 -p1 -b .ipv6-crash
-%patch211 -p1 -b .large-upload-buffer-dies
 
 %patch501 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-46784
 %patch502 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-41318
@@ -175,7 +171,6 @@ lookup program (dnsserver), a program for retrieving FTP data
 %patch513 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25111
 %patch514 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-37894
 %patch515 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-23638
-%patch516 -p1 -b .ignore-wsp-chunk-sz
 
 
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1679526
@@ -219,7 +214,7 @@ sed -i 's|@SYSCONFDIR@/squid.conf.documented|%{_pkgdocdir}/squid.conf.documented
    --enable-storeio="aufs,diskd,ufs,rock" \
    --enable-diskio \
    --enable-wccpv2 \
-   --disable-esi \
+   --enable-esi \
    --enable-ecap \
    --with-aio \
    --with-default-user="squid" \
@@ -403,18 +398,6 @@ fi
 
 
 %changelog
-* Thu Nov 07 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-14.3
-- Disable ESI support
-- Resolves: RHEL-65076 - CVE-2024-45802 squid: Denial of Service processing ESI
-  response content
-
-* Wed Oct 23 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-14.2
-- Resolves: RHEL-64425 TCP_MISS_ABORTED/100 erros when uploading
-
-* Mon Oct 14 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-14.1
-- Resolves: RHEL-62332 - (Regression) Transfer-encoding:chunked data is not sent
-  to the client in its complementary
-
 * Mon Jul 01 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-14
 - Resolves: RHEL-45057 - squid: Out-of-bounds write error may lead to Denial of 
   Service (CVE-2024-37894)