MSVSphere Packaging Team
9 months ago
parent
01f4ae740b
commit
ffcfa72f66
@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
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diff --git a/src/anyp/Uri.cc b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
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index 20b9bf1..81ebb18 100644
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--- a/src/anyp/Uri.cc
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+++ b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
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@@ -173,6 +173,10 @@ urlInitialize(void)
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assert(0 == matchDomainName("*.foo.com", ".foo.com", mdnHonorWildcards));
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assert(0 != matchDomainName("*.foo.com", "foo.com", mdnHonorWildcards));
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+ assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", ""));
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+ assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", "", mdnHonorWildcards));
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+ assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", "", mdnRejectSubsubDomains));
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+
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/* more cases? */
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}
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@@ -756,6 +760,8 @@ matchDomainName(const char *h, const char *d, MatchDomainNameFlags flags)
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return -1;
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dl = strlen(d);
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+ if (dl == 0)
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+ return 1;
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/*
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* Start at the ends of the two strings and work towards the
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File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
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From 05f6af2f4c85cc99323cfff6149c3d74af661b6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
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Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2023 08:44:16 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] RFC 9112: Improve HTTP chunked encoding compliance (#1498)
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---
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src/http/one/Parser.cc | 8 +-------
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src/http/one/Parser.h | 4 +---
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src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
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src/parser/Tokenizer.cc | 12 ++++++++++++
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src/parser/Tokenizer.h | 7 +++++++
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5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
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index c78ddd7f0..291ae39f0 100644
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--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
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+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
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@@ -65,16 +65,10 @@ Http::One::Parser::DelimiterCharacters()
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void
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Http::One::Parser::skipLineTerminator(Tokenizer &tok) const
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{
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- if (tok.skip(Http1::CrLf()))
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- return;
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-
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if (Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser && tok.skipOne(CharacterSet::LF))
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return;
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- if (tok.atEnd() || (tok.remaining().length() == 1 && tok.remaining().at(0) == '\r'))
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- throw InsufficientInput();
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-
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- throw TexcHere("garbage instead of CRLF line terminator");
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+ tok.skipRequired("line-terminating CRLF", Http1::CrLf());
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}
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/// all characters except the LF line terminator
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diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
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index f83c01a9a..aab895583 100644
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--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
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+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
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@@ -124,9 +124,7 @@ protected:
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* detect and skip the CRLF or (if tolerant) LF line terminator
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* consume from the tokenizer.
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*
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- * \throws exception on bad or InsuffientInput.
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- * \retval true only if line terminator found.
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- * \retval false incomplete or missing line terminator, need more data.
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+ * \throws exception on bad or InsufficientInput
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*/
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void skipLineTerminator(Tokenizer &) const;
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diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
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index 1434100b6..8bdb65abb 100644
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--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
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+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
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@@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok)
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{
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Must(theChunkSize <= 0); // Should(), really
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+ static const SBuf bannedHexPrefixLower("0x");
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+ static const SBuf bannedHexPrefixUpper("0X");
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+ if (tok.skip(bannedHexPrefixLower) || tok.skip(bannedHexPrefixUpper))
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+ throw TextException("chunk starts with 0x", Here());
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+
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int64_t size = -1;
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if (tok.int64(size, 16, false) && !tok.atEnd()) {
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if (size < 0)
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@@ -121,7 +126,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
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// bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
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try {
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parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
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- skipLineTerminator(tok);
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+ tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
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buf_ = tok.remaining();
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parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
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return true;
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@@ -132,12 +137,14 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
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// other exceptions bubble up to kill message parsing
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}
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-/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 7230 section 4.1.1 and its Errata #4667):
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+/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
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/// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
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void
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-Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &tok)
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+Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
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{
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do {
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+ auto tok = callerTok;
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+
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ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
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if (!tok.skip(';'))
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@@ -145,6 +152,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &tok)
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parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
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buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
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+ callerTok = tok;
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} while (true);
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}
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@@ -158,11 +166,14 @@ Http::One::ChunkExtensionValueParser::Ignore(Tokenizer &tok, const SBuf &extName
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/// Parses a single chunk-ext list element:
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/// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
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void
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-Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &tok)
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+Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &callerTok)
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{
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+ auto tok = callerTok;
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+
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ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: ICAP servers send SP before chunk-ext-name
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const auto extName = tok.prefix("chunk-ext-name", CharacterSet::TCHAR);
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+ callerTok = tok; // in case we determine that this is a valueless chunk-ext
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ParseBws(tok);
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@@ -176,6 +187,8 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &tok)
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customExtensionValueParser->parse(tok, extName);
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else
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ChunkExtensionValueParser::Ignore(tok, extName);
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+
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+ callerTok = tok;
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}
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bool
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@@ -209,7 +222,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok)
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Must(theLeftBodySize == 0); // Should(), really
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try {
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- skipLineTerminator(tok);
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+ tok.skipRequired("chunk CRLF", Http1::CrLf());
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buf_ = tok.remaining(); // parse checkpoint
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theChunkSize = 0; // done with the current chunk
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parsingStage_ = Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK_SZ;
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diff --git a/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc b/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
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index edaffd8d3..15df793b8 100644
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--- a/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
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+++ b/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
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@@ -147,6 +147,18 @@ Parser::Tokenizer::skipAll(const CharacterSet &tokenChars)
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return success(prefixLen);
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}
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+void
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+Parser::Tokenizer::skipRequired(const char *description, const SBuf &tokenToSkip)
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+{
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+ if (skip(tokenToSkip) || tokenToSkip.isEmpty())
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+ return;
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+
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+ if (tokenToSkip.startsWith(buf_))
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+ throw InsufficientInput();
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+
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+ throw TextException(ToSBuf("cannot skip ", description), Here());
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+}
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+
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bool
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Parser::Tokenizer::skipOne(const CharacterSet &chars)
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{
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diff --git a/src/parser/Tokenizer.h b/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
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index 7bae1ccbb..3cfa7dd6c 100644
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--- a/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
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+++ b/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
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@@ -115,6 +115,13 @@ public:
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*/
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SBuf::size_type skipAll(const CharacterSet &discardables);
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+ /** skips a given character sequence (string);
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+ * does nothing if the sequence is empty
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+ *
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+ * \throws exception on mismatching prefix or InsufficientInput
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+ */
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+ void skipRequired(const char *description, const SBuf &tokenToSkip);
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+
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/** Removes a single trailing character from the set.
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*
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* \return whether a character was removed
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--
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2.25.1
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
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From 052cf082b0faaef4eaaa4e94119d7a1437aac4a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: squidadm <squidadm@users.noreply.github.com>
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Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2023 04:50:56 +1300
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Subject: [PATCH] Fix stack buffer overflow when parsing Digest Authorization
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(#1517)
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The bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
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https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/digest-overflow.html
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where it was filed as "Stack Buffer Overflow in Digest Authentication".
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---------
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Co-authored-by: Alex Bason <nonsleepr@gmail.com>
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Co-authored-by: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
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---
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src/auth/digest/Config.cc | 10 +++++++---
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
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index d42831a55..be9f3c433 100644
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--- a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
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+++ b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
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@@ -844,11 +844,15 @@ Auth::Digest::Config::decode(char const *proxy_auth, const HttpRequest *request,
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break;
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case DIGEST_NC:
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- if (value.size() != 8) {
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+ if (value.size() == 8) {
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+ // for historical reasons, the nc value MUST be exactly 8 bytes
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+ static_assert(sizeof(digest_request->nc) == 8 + 1, "bad nc buffer size");
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+ xstrncpy(digest_request->nc, value.rawBuf(), value.size() + 1);
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+ debugs(29, 9, "Found noncecount '" << digest_request->nc << "'");
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+ } else {
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debugs(29, 9, "Invalid nc '" << value << "' in '" << temp << "'");
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+ digest_request->nc[0] = 0;
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}
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- xstrncpy(digest_request->nc, value.rawBuf(), value.size() + 1);
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- debugs(29, 9, "Found noncecount '" << digest_request->nc << "'");
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break;
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case DIGEST_CNONCE:
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--
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2.25.1
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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
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From c67bf049871a49e9871efe50b230a7f37b7039f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
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Date: Thu, 25 May 2023 02:10:28 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] Fix userinfo percent-encoding (#1367)
|
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%X expects an unsigned int, and that is what we were giving it. However,
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to get to the correct unsigned int value from a (signed) char, one has
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to cast to an unsigned char (or equivalent) first.
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Broken since inception in commit 7b75100.
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Also adjusted similar (commented out) ext_edirectory_userip_acl code.
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---
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src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc | 2 +-
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src/anyp/Uri.cc | 2 +-
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2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc b/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
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index dbc20ae54..9028d1562 100644
|
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--- a/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
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+++ b/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
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@@ -1612,7 +1612,7 @@ MainSafe(int argc, char **argv)
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/* BINARY DEBUGGING *
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local_printfx("while() -> bufa[%" PRIuSIZE "]: %s", k, bufa);
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for (i = 0; i < k; ++i)
|
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- local_printfx("%02X", bufa[i]);
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+ local_printfx("%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(static_cast<unsigned char>(bufa[i])));
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local_printfx("\n");
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* BINARY DEBUGGING */
|
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/* Check for CRLF */
|
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diff --git a/src/anyp/Uri.cc b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
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index a6a5d5d9e..3d19188e9 100644
|
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--- a/src/anyp/Uri.cc
|
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+++ b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
|
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@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ AnyP::Uri::Encode(const SBuf &buf, const CharacterSet &ignore)
|
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while (!tk.atEnd()) {
|
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// TODO: Add Tokenizer::parseOne(void).
|
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const auto ch = tk.remaining()[0];
|
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- output.appendf("%%%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(ch)); // TODO: Optimize using a table
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+ output.appendf("%%%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(static_cast<unsigned char>(ch))); // TODO: Optimize using a table
|
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(void)tk.skip(ch);
|
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|
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if (tk.prefix(goodSection, ignore))
|
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--
|
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2.25.1
|
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|
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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
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commit 77b3fb4df0f126784d5fd4967c28ed40eb8d521b
|
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Author: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
|
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Date: Wed Oct 25 19:41:45 2023 +0000
|
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|
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RFC 1123: Fix date parsing (#1538)
|
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|
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The bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
|
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https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/datetime-overflow.html
|
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where it was filed as "1-Byte Buffer OverRead in RFC 1123 date/time
|
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Handling".
|
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|
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diff --git a/lib/rfc1123.c b/lib/rfc1123.c
|
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index e5bf9a4d7..cb484cc00 100644
|
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--- a/lib/rfc1123.c
|
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+++ b/lib/rfc1123.c
|
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@@ -50,7 +50,13 @@ make_month(const char *s)
|
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char month[3];
|
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|
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month[0] = xtoupper(*s);
|
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+ if (!month[0])
|
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+ return -1; // protects *(s + 1) below
|
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+
|
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month[1] = xtolower(*(s + 1));
|
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+ if (!month[1])
|
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+ return -1; // protects *(s + 2) below
|
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+
|
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month[2] = xtolower(*(s + 2));
|
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|
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for (i = 0; i < 12; i++)
|
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|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
|
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diff --git a/src/ipc.cc b/src/ipc.cc
|
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index 42e11e6..a68e623 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/ipc.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/ipc.cc
|
||||
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
|
||||
#include "SquidConfig.h"
|
||||
#include "SquidIpc.h"
|
||||
#include "tools.h"
|
||||
+#include <cstdlib>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#if HAVE_UNISTD_H
|
||||
+#include <unistd.h>
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
|
||||
static const char *hello_string = "hi there\n";
|
||||
#ifndef HELLO_BUF_SZ
|
||||
@@ -365,6 +370,22 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
PutEnvironment();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // A dup(2) wrapper that reports and exits the process on errors. The
|
||||
+ // exiting logic is only suitable for this child process context.
|
||||
+ const auto dupOrExit = [prog,name](const int oldFd) {
|
||||
+ const auto newFd = dup(oldFd);
|
||||
+ if (newFd < 0) {
|
||||
+ const auto savedErrno = errno;
|
||||
+ debugs(54, DBG_CRITICAL, "ERROR: Helper process initialization failure: " << name <<
|
||||
+ Debug::Extra << "helper (CHILD) PID: " << getpid() <<
|
||||
+ Debug::Extra << "helper program name: " << prog <<
|
||||
+ Debug::Extra << "dup(2) system call error for FD " << oldFd << ": " << xstrerr(savedErrno));
|
||||
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return newFd;
|
||||
+ };
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This double-dup stuff avoids problems when one of
|
||||
* crfd, cwfd, or debug_log are in the rage 0-2.
|
||||
@@ -372,17 +393,16 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
|
||||
|
||||
do {
|
||||
/* First make sure 0-2 is occupied by something. Gets cleaned up later */
|
||||
- x = dup(crfd);
|
||||
- assert(x > -1);
|
||||
- } while (x < 3 && x > -1);
|
||||
+ x = dupOrExit(crfd);
|
||||
+ } while (x < 3);
|
||||
|
||||
close(x);
|
||||
|
||||
- t1 = dup(crfd);
|
||||
+ t1 = dupOrExit(crfd);
|
||||
|
||||
- t2 = dup(cwfd);
|
||||
+ t2 = dupOrExit(cwfd);
|
||||
|
||||
- t3 = dup(fileno(debug_log));
|
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+ t3 = dupOrExit(fileno(debug_log));
|
||||
|
||||
assert(t1 > 2 && t2 > 2 && t3 > 2);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/src/ClientRequestContext.h b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
|
||||
index 55a7a43..94a8700 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/ClientRequestContext.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
|
||||
@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ public:
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
ErrorState *error; ///< saved error page for centralized/delayed processing
|
||||
bool readNextRequest; ///< whether Squid should read after error handling
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
|
||||
+ size_t currentXffHopNumber = 0; ///< number of X-Forwarded-For header values processed so far
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* SQUID_CLIENTREQUESTCONTEXT_H */
|
||||
diff --git a/src/client_side_request.cc b/src/client_side_request.cc
|
||||
index f44849e..c7c09d4 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/client_side_request.cc
|
||||
+++ b/src/client_side_request.cc
|
||||
@@ -80,6 +80,11 @@
|
||||
static const char *const crlf = "\r\n";
|
||||
|
||||
#if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#if !defined(SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX)
|
||||
+#define SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX 64
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
static void clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(Acl::Answer answer, void *data);
|
||||
#endif /* FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR */
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -485,8 +490,16 @@ clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(Acl::Answer answer, void *data)
|
||||
/* override the default src_addr tested if we have to go deeper than one level into XFF */
|
||||
Filled(calloutContext->acl_checklist)->src_addr = request->indirect_client_addr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- calloutContext->acl_checklist->nonBlockingCheck(clientFollowXForwardedForCheck, data);
|
||||
- return;
|
||||
+ if (++calloutContext->currentXffHopNumber < SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX) {
|
||||
+ calloutContext->acl_checklist->nonBlockingCheck(clientFollowXForwardedForCheck, data);
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ const auto headerName = Http::HeaderLookupTable.lookup(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR).name;
|
||||
+ debugs(28, DBG_CRITICAL, "ERROR: Ignoring trailing " << headerName << " addresses" <<
|
||||
+ Debug::Extra << "addresses allowed by follow_x_forwarded_for: " << calloutContext->currentXffHopNumber <<
|
||||
+ Debug::Extra << "last/accepted address: " << request->indirect_client_addr <<
|
||||
+ Debug::Extra << "ignored trailing addresses: " << request->x_forwarded_for_iterator);
|
||||
+ // fall through to resume clientAccessCheck() processing
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
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Reference in new issue