MSVSphere Packaging Team
2 months ago
parent
80d8cd46d8
commit
552c48d5d7
GPG Key ID:
B2B0B9F29E528FE8
@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
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From 4d6dd3ddba5e850a42c86d8233735165a371c31c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
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Date: Sun, 1 Sep 2024 00:39:34 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] Bug 5405: Large uploads fill request buffer and die (#1887)
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maybeMakeSpaceAvailable: request buffer full
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ReadNow: ... size 0, retval 0, errno 0
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terminateAll: 1/1 after ERR_CLIENT_GONE/WITH_CLIENT
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%Ss=TCP_MISS_ABORTED
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This bug is triggered by a combination of the following two conditions:
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* HTTP client upload fills Squid request buffer faster than it is
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drained by an origin server, cache_peer, or REQMOD service. The buffer
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accumulates 576 KB (default 512 KB client_request_buffer_max_size + 64
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KB internal "pipe" buffer).
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* The affected server or service consumes a few bytes after the critical
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accumulation is reached. In other words, the bug cannot be triggered
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if nothing is consumed after the first condition above is met.
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Comm::ReadNow() must not be called with a full buffer: Related
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FD_READ_METHOD() code cannot distinguish "received EOF" from "had no
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buffer space" outcomes. Server::readSomeData() tried to prevent such
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calls, but the corresponding check had two problems:
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* The check had an unsigned integer underflow bug[^1] that made it
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ineffective when inBuf length exceeded Config.maxRequestBufferSize.
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That length could exceed the limit due to reconfiguration and when
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inBuf space size first grew outside of maybeMakeSpaceAvailable()
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protections (e.g., during an inBuf.c_str() call) and then got filled
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with newly read data. That growth started happening after 2020 commit
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1dfbca06 optimized SBuf::cow() to merge leading and trailing space.
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Prior to that commit, Bug 5405 could probably only affect Squid
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reconfigurations that lower client_request_buffer_max_size.
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* The check was separated from the ReadNow() call it was meant to
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protect. While ConnStateData was waiting for the socket to become
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ready for reading, various asynchronous events could alter inBuf or
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Config.maxRequestBufferSize.
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This change fixes both problems.
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This change also fixes Squid Bug 5214.
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[^1]: That underflow bug was probably introduced in 2015 commit 4d1376d7
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while trying to emulate the original "do not read less than two bytes"
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ConnStateData::In::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable() condition. That condition
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itself looks like a leftover from manual zero-terminated input buffer
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days that ended with 2014 commit e7287625. It is now removed.
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---
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diff --git a/src/servers/Server.cc b/src/servers/Server.cc
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index 70fd10b..dd20619 100644
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--- a/src/servers/Server.cc
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+++ b/src/servers/Server.cc
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@@ -83,16 +83,25 @@ Server::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable()
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debugs(33, 4, "request buffer full: client_request_buffer_max_size=" << Config.maxRequestBufferSize);
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}
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+bool
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+Server::mayBufferMoreRequestBytes() const
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+{
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+ // TODO: Account for bodyPipe buffering as well.
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+ if (inBuf.length() >= Config.maxRequestBufferSize) {
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+ debugs(33, 4, "no: " << inBuf.length() << '-' << Config.maxRequestBufferSize << '=' << (inBuf.length() - Config.maxRequestBufferSize));
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ debugs(33, 7, "yes: " << Config.maxRequestBufferSize << '-' << inBuf.length() << '=' << (Config.maxRequestBufferSize - inBuf.length()));
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+ return true;
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+}
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+
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void
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Server::readSomeData()
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{
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if (reading())
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return;
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- debugs(33, 4, clientConnection << ": reading request...");
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-
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- // we can only read if there is more than 1 byte of space free
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- if (Config.maxRequestBufferSize - inBuf.length() < 2)
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+ if (!mayBufferMoreRequestBytes())
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return;
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typedef CommCbMemFunT<Server, CommIoCbParams> Dialer;
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@@ -123,7 +132,16 @@ Server::doClientRead(const CommIoCbParams &io)
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* Plus, it breaks our lame *HalfClosed() detection
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*/
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+ // mayBufferMoreRequestBytes() was true during readSomeData(), but variables
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+ // like Config.maxRequestBufferSize may have changed since that check
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+ if (!mayBufferMoreRequestBytes()) {
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+ // XXX: If we avoid Comm::ReadNow(), we should not Comm::Read() again
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+ // when the wait is over; resume these doClientRead() checks instead.
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+ return; // wait for noteMoreBodySpaceAvailable() or a similar inBuf draining event
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+ }
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maybeMakeSpaceAvailable();
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+ Assure(inBuf.spaceSize());
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+
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CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
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rd.conn = io.conn;
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switch (Comm::ReadNow(rd, inBuf)) {
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diff --git a/src/servers/Server.h b/src/servers/Server.h
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index ef105f5..6e549b3 100644
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--- a/src/servers/Server.h
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+++ b/src/servers/Server.h
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@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ protected:
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/// abort any pending transactions and prevent new ones (by closing)
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virtual void terminateAll(const Error &, const LogTagsErrors &) = 0;
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+ /// whether client_request_buffer_max_size allows inBuf.length() increase
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+ bool mayBufferMoreRequestBytes() const;
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+
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void doClientRead(const CommIoCbParams &io);
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void clientWriteDone(const CommIoCbParams &io);
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