parent
11bceceea3
commit
e113654f2b
@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
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Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Add test for open redirect issue
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Backported from upstream:
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- https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/commit/b56245730e
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---
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tornado/test/web_test.py | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/tornado/test/web_test.py b/tornado/test/web_test.py
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index 5490ba2..c641ca1 100644
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--- a/tornado/test/web_test.py
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+++ b/tornado/test/web_test.py
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@@ -1426,6 +1426,35 @@ class StaticDefaultFilenameTest(WebTestCase):
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self.assertTrue(response.headers["Location"].endswith("/static/dir/"))
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+class StaticDefaultFilenameRootTest(WebTestCase):
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+ def get_app_kwargs(self):
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+ return dict(
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+ static_path=os.path.abspath(relpath("static")),
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+ static_handler_args=dict(default_filename="index.html"),
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+ static_url_prefix="/",
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+ )
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+
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+ def get_handlers(self):
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+ return []
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+
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+ def get_http_client(self):
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+ # simple_httpclient only: curl doesn't let you send a request starting
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+ # with two slashes.
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+ return SimpleAsyncHTTPClient()
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+
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+ def test_no_open_redirect(self):
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+ # This test verifies that the open redirect that affected some configurations
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+ # prior to Tornado 6.3.2 is no longer possible. The vulnerability required
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+ # a static_url_prefix of "/" and a default_filename (any value) to be set.
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+ # The absolute server-side path to the static directory must also be known.
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+ with ExpectLog(gen_log, ".*cannot redirect path with two initial slashes"):
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+ response = self.fetch(
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+ f"//evil.com/../{os.path.dirname(__file__)}/static/dir",
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+ follow_redirects=False,
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+ )
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+ self.assertEqual(response.code, 403)
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+
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+
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class StaticFileWithPathTest(WebTestCase):
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def get_app_kwargs(self):
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return dict(
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@@ -2837,7 +2866,7 @@ class XSRFTest(SimpleHandlerTestCase):
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body=b"",
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headers=dict(
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{"X-Xsrftoken": self.xsrf_token}, # type: ignore
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- **self.cookie_headers()
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+ **self.cookie_headers(),
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),
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)
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self.assertEqual(response.code, 200)
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--
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2.39.3
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From bcae82a6dd7bfed280559c8920dd89d4a48fa021 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Ben Darnell <ben@bendarnell.com>
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Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 06:39:23 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 2/2] [PATCH] web: Fix an open redirect in StaticFileHandler
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Under some configurations the default_filename redirect could be exploited
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to redirect to an attacker-controlled site. This change refuses to redirect
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to URLs that could be misinterpreted.
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A test case for the specific vulnerable configuration will follow after the
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patch has been available.
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Originally from upstream:
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- https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/commit/8f35b31ab
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---
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tornado/web.py | 9 +++++++++
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1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/tornado/web.py b/tornado/web.py
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index 546e6ec..8410880 100644
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--- a/tornado/web.py
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+++ b/tornado/web.py
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@@ -2771,6 +2771,15 @@ class StaticFileHandler(RequestHandler):
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# but there is some prefix to the path that was already
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# trimmed by the routing
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if not self.request.path.endswith("/"):
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+ if self.request.path.startswith("//"):
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+ # A redirect with two initial slashes is a "protocol-relative" URL.
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+ # This means the next path segment is treated as a hostname instead
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+ # of a part of the path, making this effectively an open redirect.
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+ # Reject paths starting with two slashes to prevent this.
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+ # This is only reachable under certain configurations.
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+ raise HTTPError(
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+ 403, "cannot redirect path with two initial slashes"
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+ )
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self.redirect(self.request.path + "/", permanent=True)
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return None
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absolute_path = os.path.join(absolute_path, self.default_filename)
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--
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2.39.3
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Loading…
Reference in new issue