import openssl-1.1.1k-12.el8_9

c8 imports/c8/openssl-1.1.1k-12.el8_9
MSVSphere Packaging Team 11 months ago
parent 57be30a986
commit 8de9f2d836

@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
From 8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
value even if it is excessively large.
There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a
new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
Service attack.
The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
CVE-2023-3446
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21452)
Upstream-Status: Backport [8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528]
---
crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 6 ++++++
crypto/dh/dh_err.c | 3 ++-
crypto/err/openssl.txt | 3 ++-
include/openssl/dh.h | 3 +++
include/openssl/dherr.h | 3 ++-
5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 4ac169e75c..e5f9dd5030 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -101,6 +101,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
index 7285587b4a..92800d3fcc 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP, 0), "DHparams_print_fp"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, 0),
"dh_builtin_genparams"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK, 0), "DH_check"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, 0), "DH_check_ex"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, 0), "DH_check_params_ex"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, 0), "DH_check_pub_key_ex"},
diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
index 9f91a4a811..c0a3cd720b 100644
--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION:104:SCT_set_version
DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY:102:compute_key
DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP:101:DHparams_print_fp
DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS:106:dh_builtin_genparams
+DH_F_DH_CHECK:126:DH_check
DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX:121:DH_check_ex
DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX:122:DH_check_params_ex
DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX:123:DH_check_pub_key_ex
diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
index 3527540cdd..892e31559d 100644
--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ extern "C" {
# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 32768
+# endif
# define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
# define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048
diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
index 916b3bed0b..528c819856 100644
--- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
+++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
# define DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY 102
# define DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP 101
# define DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS 106
+# define DH_F_DH_CHECK 126
# define DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX 121
# define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX 122
# define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX 123
--
2.41.0

@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
From 91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2023 11:39:41 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is
obviously invalid
If |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q
is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1.
We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that
q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that
q value.
Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value
such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long
computations.
Fixes CVE-2023-3817
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21551)
Upstream-Status: Backport [91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5]
---
crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 2001d2e7cb..9ae96991eb 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int DH_check_ex(const DH *dh)
/* Note: according to documentation - this only checks the params */
int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
{
- int ok = 0, r;
+ int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
@@ -130,7 +130,14 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
if (t2 == NULL)
goto err;
- if (dh->q) {
+ if (dh->q != NULL) {
+ if (BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) > 0)
+ q_good = 1;
+ else
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
+ }
+
+ if (q_good) {
if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)
--
2.41.0

@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
From 0814467cc1b6a2839877277d3efa69cdd4582dd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 09:18:19 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Make DH_check_pub_key() and DH_generate_key() safer yet
We already check for an excessively large P in DH_generate_key(), but not in
DH_check_pub_key(), and none of them check for an excessively large Q.
This change adds all the missing excessive size checks of P and Q.
It's to be noted that behaviours surrounding excessively sized P and Q
differ. DH_check() raises an error on the excessively sized P, but only
sets a flag for the excessively sized Q. This behaviour is mimicked in
DH_check_pub_key().
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22518)
(cherry picked from commit ddeb4b6c6d527e54ce9a99cba785c0f7776e54b6)
Backported-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
---
crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
crypto/dh/dh_err.c | 1 +
crypto/dh/dh_key.c | 10 ++++++++++
crypto/err/openssl.txt | 1 +
include/openssl/dh.h | 6 ++++--
include/openssl/dherr.h | 1 +
6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index ae1b03bc92..424a3bb4cd 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -198,10 +198,27 @@ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
*ret = 0;
+
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (dh->q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) < 0) {
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ /* This may look strange here, but returning 1 after setting ret is
+ * correct. See also the behavior of the pub_key^q == 1 mod p check
+ * further down, which behaves in the same way. */
+ ok = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp == NULL || !BN_set_word(tmp, 1))
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
index 92800d3fcc..b3b1e7a706 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
"parameter encoding error"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR),
"unable to check generator"},
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
index 117f2fa883..9f5e6f6d4c 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
return 0;
}
+ if (dh->q != NULL && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -250,6 +255,12 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
+
+ if (dh->q != NULL && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode()
&& (BN_num_bits(dh->p) < OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) {
diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
index c0a3cd720b..5e0ff47516 100644
--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -2151,6 +2151,7 @@DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET:107:no parameters set
DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE:100:no private value
DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR:105:parameter encoding error
DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR:111:peer key error
+DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE:130:q too large
DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR:113:shared info error
DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR:121:unable to check generator
DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE:102:bad q value
diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
index 6c6ff3636a..b7df43b44f 100644
--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -72,14 +72,16 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
/* #define DH_GENERATOR_3 3 */
# define DH_GENERATOR_5 5
-/* DH_check error codes */
+/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
# define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME 0x01
# define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME 0x02
# define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR 0x04
# define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR 0x08
# define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME 0x10
-# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE 0x20
+# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE 0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE 0x40
+/* DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL is 0x80 upstream */
+# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 0x100 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
/* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL 0x01
diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
index 528c819856..d66c35aa8e 100644
--- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
+++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
# define DH_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD 202
# define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR 105
# define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR 111
+# define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE 130
# define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR 113
# define DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR 121
--
2.41.0

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl Name: openssl
Version: 1.1.1k Version: 1.1.1k
Release: 9%{?dist} Release: 12%{?dist}
Epoch: 1 Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below. # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@ -92,6 +92,13 @@ Patch101: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4304-RSA-oracle.patch
Patch102: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4450-PEM-bio.patch Patch102: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2022-4450-PEM-bio.patch
Patch103: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0215-BIO-UAF.patch Patch103: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0215-BIO-UAF.patch
Patch104: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0286-X400.patch Patch104: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-0286-X400.patch
# OpenSSL 1.1.1v CVEs
Patch105: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3446.patch
Patch106: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-3817.patch
Patch107: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-5678.patch
# Backport from OpenSSL 3.2/RHEL 9
# Proper fix for CVE-2020-25659
Patch108: openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch
License: OpenSSL and ASL 2.0 License: OpenSSL and ASL 2.0
URL: http://www.openssl.org/ URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@ -221,6 +228,10 @@ cp %{SOURCE13} test/
%patch102 -p1 -b .cve-2022-4450 %patch102 -p1 -b .cve-2022-4450
%patch103 -p1 -b .cve-2023-0215 %patch103 -p1 -b .cve-2023-0215
%patch104 -p1 -b .cve-2023-0286 %patch104 -p1 -b .cve-2023-0286
%patch105 -p1 -b .cve-2023-3446
%patch106 -p1 -b .cve-2023-3817
%patch107 -p1 -b .cve-2023-5678
%patch108 -p1 -b .pkcs15imprejection
%build %build
# Figure out which flags we want to use. # Figure out which flags we want to use.
@ -504,6 +515,22 @@ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%changelog %changelog
* Thu Nov 30 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-12
- Backport implicit rejection mechanism for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 to RHEL-8 series
(a proper fix for CVE-2020-25659)
Resolves: RHEL-17696
* Wed Nov 15 2023 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-11
- Fix CVE-2023-5678: Generating excessively long X9.42 DH keys or checking
excessively long X9.42 DH keys or parameters may be very slow
Resolves: RHEL-16538
* Thu Oct 19 2023 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-10
- Fix CVE-2023-3446: Excessive time spent checking DH keys and parameters
Resolves: RHEL-14245
- Fix CVE-2023-3817: Excessive time spent checking DH q parameter value
Resolves: RHEL-14239
* Wed Feb 08 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-9 * Wed Feb 08 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-9
- Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption - Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption
Resolves: CVE-2022-4304 Resolves: CVE-2022-4304

Loading…
Cancel
Save