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import openssh-8.0p1-24.el8

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i8c-beta changed/i8c-beta/openssh-8.0p1-24.el8
MSVSphere Packaging Team 9 months ago
commit 906d6732b4
95 changed files with 28230 additions and 0 deletions
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3
.gitignore vendored
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
SOURCES/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz
SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2

3
.openssh.metadata
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bed7240bb17840b451b8f8457791c33456814d93 SOURCES/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
756dbb99193f9541c9206a667eaa27b0fa184a4f SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz
a4482a050fdad1d012427e45799564136708cf6b SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2

19
SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info 2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c 2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100
@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
- "Could not grab %s. "
- "A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
- "on your session.", what);
+ "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
+ "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "
+ "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping "
+ "on your session.\n"
+ "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
+ "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));

81
SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c 2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <X11/Xlib.h>
+#include <glib.h>
#include <gtk/gtk.h>
#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
@@ -81,13 +82,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
}
+static void
+move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress)
+{
+ gdouble step;
+ g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
+
+ step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1);
+ gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step);
+ gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
+}
+
static int
passphrase_dialog(char *message)
{
const char *failed;
char *passphrase, *local;
int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
- GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
+ GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
GdkGrabStatus status;
grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
@@ -104,14 +116,32 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
"%s",
message);
+ hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
+ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
+ FALSE, 0);
+ gtk_widget_show(hbox);
+
entry = gtk_entry_new();
gtk_box_pack_start(
- GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), entry,
- FALSE, FALSE, 0);
+ GTK_BOX(hbox), entry,
+ TRUE, FALSE, 0);
+ gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
gtk_widget_show(entry);
+ hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
+ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
+ FALSE, 8);
+ gtk_widget_show(hbox);
+
+ progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
+
+ gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
+ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
+ TRUE, 5);
+ gtk_widget_show(progress);
+
gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
@@ -120,6 +150,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
+ g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
+ G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);

12
SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
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diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
--- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe 2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
+++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c 2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
fdlim_set(maxfd);
fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));

24
SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
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diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man 2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1 2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200
@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information.
.Nm
exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
if an error occurred.
+.Sh IPV6
+IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sftp 1 ,
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
--- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man 2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8 2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200
@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
started last).
The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
.El
+.Sh IPV6
+IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sftp 1 ,

101
SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp 2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c 2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in
struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
{
- AES_KEY aes_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ecbctx;
u_char aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
};
@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char
{
struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
size_t n = 0;
- u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
+ u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
if (len == 0)
return (1);
if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
return (0);
- while ((len--) > 0) {
+ for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) {
+ u_int r,a,b;
+
if (n == 0) {
- AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
- ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ int outl, i, buflen;
+
+ buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf));
+
+ for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
+
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl,
+ ctrbuf, buflen);
}
- *(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
- n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+ memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a));
+ memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b));
+ r = a ^ b;
+ memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r));
+ src += sizeof(a);
+ dest += sizeof(r);
+
+ n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf);
}
+ memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf));
+ memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
return (1);
}
@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co
c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
}
- if (key != NULL)
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &c->aes_ctx);
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx);
+
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+ switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) {
+ case 128:
+ cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
+ break;
+ case 192:
+ cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
+ break;
+ case 256:
+ cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length");
+ }
+ if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL))
+ fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption");
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0);
+ }
if (iv != NULL)
memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
return (1);
@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
free(c);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);

16
SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
index d98fa67..25d347b 100644
--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
@@ -638,7 +638,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
addargs(&alist, "-x");
addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
- addargs(&alist, "-n");
+ if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
+ addargs(&alist, "-t");
+ else
+ addargs(&alist, "-n");
for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
addargs(&alist, "%s",
remote_remote_args.list[j]);

263
SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c 2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
void
log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
{
+ log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
+}
+
+void
+log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
#endif
@@ -273,8 +278,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, Sysl
exit(1);
}
- log_handler = NULL;
- log_handler_ctx = NULL;
+ if (reset_handler) {
+ log_handler = NULL;
+ log_handler_ctx = NULL;
+ }
log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
if (on_stderr)
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h 2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
+void log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
LogLevel log_level_get(void);
int log_change_level(LogLevel);
int log_is_on_stderr(void);
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-23 15:14:33.311168085 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c 2016-12-23 15:16:42.154193100 +0100
@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
+
authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
+
monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
@@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
__func__, level);
- do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
+ do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
sshbuf_free(logmsg);
free(msg);
@@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
+ mon->m_state = "";
+
return mon;
}
void
-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
+monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir)
{
- monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
+ struct stat dev_log_stat;
+ char *dev_log_path;
+ int do_logfds = 0;
+
+ if (chroot_dir != NULL) {
+ xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
+
+ if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
+ debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
+ do_logfds = 1;
+ }
+ free(dev_log_path);
+ }
+ monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds);
}
#ifdef GSSAPI
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot 2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h 2016-12-23 15:16:28.372190424 +0100
@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
int m_log_sendfd;
struct kex **m_pkex;
pid_t m_pid;
+ char *m_state;
};
struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
+void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *);
struct Authctxt;
void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-23 15:14:33.319168086 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2016-12-23 15:18:18.742211853 +0100
@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
static int is_child = 0;
static int in_chroot = 0;
+static int have_dev_log = 1;
/* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
int ret;
const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
char session_type[1024];
+ struct stat dev_log_stat;
if (options.adm_forced_command) {
original_command = command;
@@ -676,6 +678,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
tty += 5;
}
+ if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
+ have_dev_log = 0;
+ }
+
verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
session_type,
tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
@@ -1486,14 +1492,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
* descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later.
*/
endpwent();
-
- /*
- * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
- * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
- * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
- * descriptors open.
- */
- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
}
/*
@@ -1629,8 +1627,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
exit(1);
}
- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-
do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
@@ -1653,9 +1649,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
argv[i] = NULL;
optind = optreset = 1;
__progname = argv[0];
- exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
}
+ /*
+ * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
+ * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
+ * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+ * descriptors open.
+ */
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
fflush(NULL);
/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h 2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
struct passwd;
-int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
+int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c 2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
}
int
-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
{
fd_set *rset, *wset;
int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
}
}
- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
/*
* On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c 2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
return 1;
}
- return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
+ return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
}
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-23 15:14:33.328168088 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 15:14:33.332168088 +0100
@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
}
/* New socket pair */
- monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
+ monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory);
pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
+ close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
+ pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
+
+ if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1)
+ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();

14
SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
--- a/scp.c
+++ a/scp.c
@@ -1084,6 +1084,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
free(vect[0]);
continue;
}
+ if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
+ errno = ENOTDIR;
+ goto bad;
+ }
omode = mode;
mode |= S_IWUSR;
if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) {
--

132
SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
#include "servconf.h"
#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "misc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
@@ -445,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
void
sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
{
- security_context_t *ctx;
+ char *ctx;
if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
return;
@@ -461,6 +462,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
}
}
+void
+sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void)
+{
+ int len;
+ char line[1024], *preauth_context = NULL, *cp, *arg;
+ const char *contexts_path;
+ FILE *contexts_file;
+ struct stat sb;
+
+ contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
+ if (contexts_path == NULL) {
+ debug3("%s: Failed to get the path to SELinux context", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
+ debug("%s: Failed to open SELinux context file", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
+ sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+ logit("%s: SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
+ " and not writable by anyone else", __func__);
+ fclose(contexts_file);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), contexts_file)) {
+ /* Strip trailing whitespace */
+ for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
+ if (strchr(" \t\r\n", line[len]) == NULL)
+ break;
+ line[len] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ if (line[0] == '\0')
+ continue;
+
+ cp = line;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (arg && *arg == '\0')
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+
+ if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ debug("%s: privsep_preauth is empty", __func__);
+ fclose(contexts_file);
+ return;
+ }
+ preauth_context = xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(contexts_file);
+
+ if (preauth_context == NULL) {
+ debug("%s: Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
+ " SELinux context file", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ssh_selinux_change_context(preauth_context);
+ free(preauth_context);
+}
+
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
- debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
+ debug("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
oldctx, newctx);
if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
#endif
#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
demote_sensitive_data();
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
+ sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
#endif
/* Demote the child */

131
SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2016-12-23 15:18:40.628216102 +0100
@@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
FILE *fp;
char file[MAXPATHLEN];
char *line = NULL;
- char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
struct stat st;
struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
int found_principal = 0;
@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
- if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
+ if ( !options.enable_k5users || (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1))) {
return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
k5login_exists);
}
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 15:35:36.354401156 +0100
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ options->enable_k5users = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
@@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
#endif
if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
options->use_kuserok = 1;
+ if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
+ options->enable_k5users = 0;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
sHostKeyAlgorithms,
sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
#endif
{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
goto parse_flag;
+ case sGssEnablek5users:
+ intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case sPermitListen:
case sPermitOpen:
if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users);
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
@@ -2320,6 +2330,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
# endif
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2016-12-23 15:18:40.629216102 +0100
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
int kerberos_unique_ccache; /* If true, the acquired ticket will
* be stored in per-session ccache */
int use_kuserok;
+ int enable_k5users;
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.630216103 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 15:36:21.607408435 +0100
@@ -628,6 +628,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
on logout.
The default is
.Cm yes .
+.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
+Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
+access control. Further details are described in
+.Xr ksu 1 .
+The default is
+.Cm no .
.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will

39
SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts 2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd.c 2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
&option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
- text[0] = '\0';
- for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
- snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
- " %2.2x", opts[i]);
- fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
+ i = 0;
+ do {
+ switch (opts[i]) {
+ case 0:
+ case 1:
+ ++i;
+ break;
+ case 130:
+ case 133:
+ case 134:
+ i += opts[i + 1];
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
+ * source routing options. */
+ text[0] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+ snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+ " %2.2x", opts[i]);
+ fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP options:%.800s",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
+ }
+ } while (i < option_size);
}
return;
#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */

257
SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs 2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100
+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in 2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
XMSS_OBJS=\
ssh-xmss.o \
@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files:
$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
fi
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
--- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs 2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
+++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c 2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+/*
+ *
+ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+void usage(void) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
+ " --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
+ " [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
+ "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
+ "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len)
+{
+ unsigned char *bin;
+ char *p;
+ size_t n = 0;
+ int shift = 4;
+ unsigned char out = 0;
+ unsigned char *optr;
+
+ bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2);
+ optr = bin;
+
+ for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
+ unsigned char c;
+
+ c = *p;
+ if (isspace(c))
+ continue;
+
+ if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
+ c = c - '0';
+ } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
+ c = c - 'A' + 10;
+ } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
+ c = c - 'a' + 10;
+ } else {
+ /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ out |= c << shift;
+ shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
+
+ if (shift) {
+ *(optr++) = out;
+ out = 0;
+ ++n;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *len = n;
+ return bin;
+}
+
+#define READ_CHUNK 4096
+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
+char *read_stdin(void)
+{
+ char *buf;
+ size_t n, total = 0;
+
+ buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
+
+ do {
+ n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
+ if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
+ break;
+
+ total += n;
+ buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
+ } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+int main (int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+
+ const struct sshcipher *c;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
+ char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
+ char *hexkey = NULL;
+ char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
+ char *hexdata = NULL;
+ char *p;
+ int i, r;
+ int encrypt = 1;
+ void *key;
+ size_t keylen;
+ void *iv;
+ size_t ivlen;
+ void *data;
+ size_t datalen;
+ void *outdata;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
+ if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
+ algo = argv[++i];
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
+ hexkey = argv[++i];
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
+ ++i;
+ if (argv[i] == NULL) {
+ usage();
+ }
+ if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
+ encrypt = 1;
+ } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
+ encrypt = 0;
+ } else {
+ usage();
+ }
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
+ hexiv = argv[++i];
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
+ hexdata = argv[++i];
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
+ usage();
+ }
+
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+
+ c = cipher_by_name(algo);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ if (hexdata == NULL) {
+ hexdata = read_stdin();
+ } else {
+ hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
+ }
+
+ key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
+
+ if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
+
+ if (ivlen != 16) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
+
+ if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt)) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_init failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ free(key);
+ free(iv);
+
+ outdata = malloc(datalen);
+ if(outdata == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0)) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_crypt failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ free(data);
+
+ cipher_free(cc);
+
+ for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
+ printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
+ }
+
+ free(outdata);
+
+ printf("\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+

280
SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
index 413b845..54dd383 100644
--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@
#include "ssh-gss.h"
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern ServerOptions options;
#ifdef HEIMDAL
@@ -56,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
# include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
#endif
+/* all commands are allowed by default */
+char **k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL;
+
+static int ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists();
+static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *,
+ int);
+
static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
/* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
@@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
krb5_principal princ;
int retval;
const char *errmsg;
+ int k5login_exists;
if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
return 0;
@@ -99,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
return 0;
}
- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) {
+ /* krb5_kuserok() returns 1 if .k5login DNE and this is self-login.
+ * We have to make sure to check .k5users in that case. */
+ k5login_exists = ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists();
+ /* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
+ * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
+ * to access these files aren't available yet. */
+ if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
retval = 1;
logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+ } else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
+ name, k5login_exists)) {
+ retval = 1;
+ logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
+ "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
+ name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
} else
retval = 0;
@@ -110,6 +133,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
return retval;
}
+/* Test for existence of .k5login.
+ * We need this as part of our .k5users check, because krb5_kuserok()
+ * returns success if .k5login DNE and user is logging in as himself.
+ * With .k5login absent and .k5users present, we don't want absence
+ * of .k5login to authorize self-login. (absence of both is required)
+ * Returns 1 if .k5login is available, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
+{
+ char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+ struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+
+ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
+ return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
+}
+
+/* check .k5users for login or command authorization
+ * Returns 1 if principal is authorized, 0 otherwise.
+ * If principal is authorized, (global) k5users_allowed_cmds may be populated.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
+ const char *luser, int k5login_exists)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char *line = NULL;
+ char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
+ struct stat st;
+ struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+ int found_principal = 0;
+ int ncommands = 0, allcommands = 0;
+ u_long linenum = 0;
+ size_t linesize = 0;
+
+ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ /* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+ if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
+ return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
+ sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
+ (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
+ }
+ if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ int saved_errno = errno;
+ /* 2nd access check to ease debugging if file perms are wrong.
+ * But we don't want to report this if .k5users simply DNE. */
+ if (access(file, F_OK) == 0) {
+ logit("User %s fopen %s failed: %s",
+ pw->pw_name, file, strerror(saved_errno));
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* .k5users must be owned either by the user or by root */
+ if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) == -1) {
+ /* can happen, but very wierd error so report it */
+ logit("User %s fstat %s failed: %s",
+ pw->pw_name, file, strerror(errno));
+ fclose(fp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!(st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0)) {
+ logit("User %s %s is not owned by root or user",
+ pw->pw_name, file);
+ fclose(fp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* .k5users must be a regular file. krb5_kuserok() doesn't do this
+ * check, but we don't want to be deficient if they add a check. */
+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+ logit("User %s %s is not a regular file", pw->pw_name, file);
+ fclose(fp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* file exists; initialize k5users_allowed_cmds (to none!) */
+ k5users_allowed_cmds = xcalloc(++ncommands,
+ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
+
+ /* Check each line. ksu allows unlimited length lines. */
+ while (!allcommands && getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) {
+ linenum++;
+ char *token;
+
+ /* we parse just like ksu, even though we could do better */
+ if ((token = strtok(line, " \t\n")) == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (strcmp(name, token) == 0) {
+ /* we matched on client principal */
+ found_principal = 1;
+ if ((token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n")) == NULL) {
+ /* only shell is allowed */
+ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
+ xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
+ k5users_allowed_cmds =
+ xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
+ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
+ break;
+ }
+ /* process the allowed commands */
+ while (token) {
+ if (strcmp(token, "*") == 0) {
+ allcommands = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
+ xstrdup(token);
+ k5users_allowed_cmds =
+ xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
+ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
+ token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ free(line);
+ if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
+ /* terminate vector */
+ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = NULL;
+ /* if all commands are allowed, free vector */
+ if (allcommands) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < ncommands; i++) {
+ free(k5users_allowed_cmds[i]);
+ }
+ free(k5users_allowed_cmds);
+ k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ return found_principal;
+}
+
/* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
* during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -789,6 +789,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
command = auth_opts->force_command;
forced = "(key-option)";
}
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#ifdef KRB5 /* k5users_allowed_cmds only available w/ GSSAPI+KRB5 */
+ else if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
+ const char *match = command;
+ int allowed = 0, i = 0;
+
+ if (!match)
+ match = s->pw->pw_shell;
+ while (k5users_allowed_cmds[i]) {
+ if (strcmp(match, k5users_allowed_cmds[i++]) == 0) {
+ debug("Allowed command '%.900s'", match);
+ allowed = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!allowed) {
+ debug("command '%.900s' not allowed", match);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
+
s->forced = 0;
if (forced != NULL) {
s->forced = 1;
diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
index 0374c88..509109a 100644
--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
# endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */
# endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+
+/* .k5users support */
+extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
+
#endif /* KRB5 */
/* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
The client tries to authenticate itself using
host-based authentication,
public key authentication,
+GSSAPI authentication,
challenge-response authentication,
or password authentication.
.Pp
@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.k5login
+.It Pa ~/.k5users
+These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
+Further details are described in
+.Xr ksu 1 .
+.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
and authentication information.

485
SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
--- openssh/auth.c.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
+++ openssh/auth.c 2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
@@ -966,6 +966,14 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
_exit(1);
}
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
+ error ("failed to copy environment: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(127);
+ }
+#endif
+
execve(av[0], av, child_env);
error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
_exit(127);
diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
--- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
+++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
+polyinstantiation of home directories and SELinux MLS policy enabled.
+
+To use ssh-keycat, set these options in /etc/ssh/sshd_config file:
+ AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat
+ AuthorizedKeysCommandUser root
+
+Do not forget to enable public key authentication:
+ PubkeyAuthentication yes
+
+
diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
--- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200
+++ openssh/Makefile.in 2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
+SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
+KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
AR=@AR@
AWK=@AWK@
@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
XMSS_OBJS=\
ssh-xmss.o \
@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o
$(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LDAPLIBS)
+ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
+
ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
$(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \
$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
fi
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
#endif
#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern int inetd_flag;
extern int rexeced_flag;
+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+int
+sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
+{
+ static int enabled = -1;
+
+ if (enabled == -1) {
+ enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
+ debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+ }
+
+ return (enabled);
+}
+
/* Send audit message */
static int
sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
@@ -308,7 +322,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
static int
-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
{
const char *reqlvl;
char *role;
@@ -319,16 +333,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
- rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+ rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
use_current = "1";
} else {
use_current = "";
- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
+ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
}
- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
+ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
if (role != NULL)
free(role);
@@ -336,6 +350,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
return rv;
}
+static int
+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+{
+ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
+}
+
+static int
+do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
+{
+ return setenv(name, value, 1);
+}
+
+int
+sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
+{
+ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
+}
+
/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
void
sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
@@ -344,7 +376,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
int r = 0;
security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+ if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
return;
if (options.use_pam) {
@@ -415,7 +447,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
{
security_context_t *ctx;
- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+ if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
return;
if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c
--- openssh/platform.c.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.147849633 +0200
+++ openssh/platform.c 2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p
{
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
/* Cache selinux status for later use */
- (void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
+ (void)sshd_selinux_enabled();
#endif
#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
--- openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
+++ openssh/ssh-keycat.c 2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Written by Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>
+*/
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#define ERR_USAGE 1
+#define ERR_PAM_START 2
+#define ERR_OPEN_SESSION 3
+#define ERR_CLOSE_SESSION 4
+#define ERR_PAM_END 5
+#define ERR_GETPWNAM 6
+#define ERR_MEMORY 7
+#define ERR_OPEN 8
+#define ERR_FILE_MODE 9
+#define ERR_FDOPEN 10
+#define ERR_STAT 11
+#define ERR_WRITE 12
+#define ERR_PAM_PUTENV 13
+#define BUFLEN 4096
+
+/* Just ignore the messages in the conversation function */
+static int
+dummy_conv(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msgm,
+ struct pam_response **response, void *appdata_ptr)
+{
+ struct pam_response *rsp;
+
+ (void)msgm;
+ (void)appdata_ptr;
+
+ if (num_msg <= 0)
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+
+ /* Just allocate the array as empty responses */
+ rsp = calloc (num_msg, sizeof (struct pam_response));
+ if (rsp == NULL)
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+
+ *response = rsp;
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv conv = {
+ dummy_conv,
+ NULL
+};
+
+char *
+make_auth_keys_name(const struct passwd *pwd)
+{
+ char *fname;
+
+ if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.ssh/authorized_keys", pwd->pw_dir) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return fname;
+}
+
+int
+dump_keys(const char *user)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd;
+ int fd = -1;
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ char *fname = NULL;
+ int rv = 0;
+ char buf[BUFLEN];
+ size_t len;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if ((pwd = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
+ return ERR_GETPWNAM;
+ }
+
+ if ((fname = make_auth_keys_name(pwd)) == NULL) {
+ return ERR_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(pwd);
+
+ if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_NOFOLLOW, 0)) < 0) {
+ rv = ERR_OPEN;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
+ rv = ERR_STAT;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode) ||
+ (st.st_uid != pwd->pw_uid && st.st_uid != 0)) {
+ rv = ERR_FILE_MODE;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ unset_nonblock(fd);
+
+ if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
+ rv = ERR_FDOPEN;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ fd = -1;
+
+ while ((len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f)) > 0) {
+ rv = fwrite(buf, 1, len, stdout) != len ? ERR_WRITE : 0;
+ }
+
+fail:
+ if (fd != -1)
+ close(fd);
+ if (f != NULL)
+ fclose(f);
+ free(fname);
+ restore_uid();
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static const char *env_names[] = { "SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED",
+ "SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED",
+ "SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE"
+};
+
+extern char **environ;
+
+int
+set_pam_environment(pam_handle_t *pamh)
+{
+ int i;
+ size_t j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(env_names)/sizeof(env_names[0]); ++j) {
+ int len = strlen(env_names[j]);
+
+ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; ++i) {
+ if (strncmp(env_names[j], environ[i], len) == 0 &&
+ environ[i][len] == '=') {
+ if (pam_putenv(pamh, environ[i]) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ return ERR_PAM_PUTENV;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+ int retval;
+ int ev = 0;
+
+ if (argc != 2) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <user-name>\n", argv[0]);
+ return ERR_USAGE;
+ }
+
+ retval = pam_start("ssh-keycat", argv[1], &conv, &pamh);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ return ERR_PAM_START;
+ }
+
+ ev = set_pam_environment(pamh);
+ if (ev != 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ retval = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ ev = ERR_OPEN_SESSION;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ ev = dump_keys(argv[1]);
+
+ retval = pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ ev = ERR_CLOSE_SESSION;
+ }
+
+finish:
+ retval = pam_end (pamh,retval);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ ev = ERR_PAM_END;
+ }
+ return ev;
+}
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2952,6 +2952,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
PAM_MSG="yes"
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
+ KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
@@ -3105,6 +3106,7 @@
;;
*)
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
+ KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
;;
esac
fi
@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
)
AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
+AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
KRB5_MSG="no"
@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
fi
+if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
+echo " +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
+fi
echo ""

26
SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
index e93d867..4fc5b3d 100644
--- a/authfile.c
+++ b/authfile.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <grp.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -207,6 +208,13 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (check_ntsec(filename))
#endif
+ if (st.st_mode & 040) {
+ struct group *gr;
+
+ if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid))
+ st.st_mode &= ~040;
+ }
+
if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @");

289
SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c 2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@
extern ServerOptions options;
+int
+ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client,
+ int k5login_exists)
+{
+ if (options.use_kuserok || !k5login_exists)
+ return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
+ else {
+ char kuser[65];
+
+ if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
+ return 0;
+ return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
+ }
+}
+
static int
krb5_init(void *context)
{
@@ -160,8 +175,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
if (problem)
goto out;
- if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
- authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
+ /* Use !options.use_kuserok here to make ssh_krb5_kuserok() not
+ * depend on the existance of .k5login */
+ if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name, !options.use_kuserok)) {
problem = -1;
goto out;
}
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
int);
static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
+extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *, int);
/* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
* Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
*/
+/* The purpose of the function is to find out if a Kerberos principal is
+ * allowed to log in as the given local user. This is a general problem with
+ * Kerberized services because by design the Kerberos principals are
+ * completely independent from the local user names. This is one of the
+ * reasons why Kerberos is working well on different operating systems like
+ * Windows and UNIX/Linux. Nevertheless a relationship between a Kerberos
+ * principal and a local user name must be established because otherwise every
+ * access would be granted for every principal with a valid ticket.
+ *
+ * Since it is a general issue libkrb5 provides some functions for
+ * applications to find out about the relationship between the Kerberos
+ * principal and a local user name. They are krb5_kuserok() and
+ * krb5_aname_to_localname().
+ *
+ * krb5_kuserok() can be used to "Determine if a principal is authorized to
+ * log in as a local user" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this
+ * function). Which is exactly what we are looking for and should be the
+ * preferred choice. It accepts the Kerberos principal and a local user name
+ * and let libkrb5 or its plugins determine if they relate to each other or
+ * not.
+ *
+ * krb5_aname_to_localname() can use used to "Convert a principal name to a
+ * local name" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this function). It
+ * accepts a Kerberos principle and returns a local name and it is up to the
+ * application to do any additional checks. There are two issues using
+ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). First, since POSIX user names are case
+ * sensitive, the calling application in general has no other choice than
+ * doing a case-sensitive string comparison between the name returned by
+ * krb5_aname_to_localname() and the name used at the login prompt. When the
+ * users are provided by a case in-sensitive server, e.g. Active Directory,
+ * this might lead to login failures because the user typing the name at the
+ * login prompt might not be aware of the right case. Another issue might be
+ * caused if there are multiple alias names available for a single user. E.g.
+ * the canonical name of a user is user@group.department.example.com but there
+ * exists a shorter login name, e.g. user@example.com, to safe typing at the
+ * login prompt. Here krb5_aname_to_localname() can only return the canonical
+ * name, but if the short alias is used at the login prompt authentication
+ * will fail as well. All this can be avoided by using krb5_kuserok() and
+ * configuring krb5.conf or using a suitable plugin to meet the needs of the
+ * given environment.
+ *
+ * The Fedora and RHEL version of openssh contain two patches which modify the
+ * access control behavior:
+ * - openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+ * - openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
+ *
+ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch adds a new option KerberosUseKuserok for
+ * sshd_config which controls if krb5_kuserok() is used to check if the
+ * principle is authorized or if krb5_aname_to_localname() should be used.
+ * The reason to add this patch was that krb5_kuserok() by default checks if
+ * a .k5login file exits in the users home-directory. With this the user can
+ * give access to his account for any given principal which might be
+ * in violation with company policies and it would be useful if this can be
+ * rejected. Nevertheless the patch ignores the fact that krb5_kuserok() does
+ * no only check .k5login but other sources as well and checking .k5login can
+ * be disabled for all applications in krb5.conf as well. With this new
+ * option KerberosUseKuserok set to 'no' (and this is the default for RHEL7
+ * and Fedora 21) openssh can only use krb5_aname_to_localname() with the
+ * restrictions mentioned above.
+ *
+ * openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch adds a ksu like behaviour to ssh, i.e. when
+ * using GSSAPI authentication only commands configured in the .k5user can be
+ * executed. Here the wrong assumption that krb5_kuserok() only checks
+ * .k5login is made as well. In contrast ksu checks .k5login directly and
+ * does not use krb5_kuserok() which might be more useful for the given
+ * purpose. Additionally this patch is not synced with
+ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch.
+ *
+ * The current patch tries to restore the usage of krb5_kuserok() so that e.g.
+ * localauth plugins can be used. It does so by adding a forth parameter to
+ * ssh_krb5_kuserok() which indicates whether .k5login exists or not. If it
+ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() is called even if KerberosUseKuserok is set
+ * to 'no' because the intent of the option is to not check .k5login and if it
+ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() returns a result without checking .k5login.
+ * If .k5login does exists and KerberosUseKuserok is 'no' we fall back to
+ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). This is in my point of view an acceptable
+ * limitation and does not break the current behaviour.
+ *
+ * Additionally with this patch ssh_krb5_kuserok() is called in
+ * ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok() instead of only krb5_aname_to_localname() is
+ * neither .k5login nor .k5users exists to allow plugin evaluation via
+ * krb5_kuserok() as well.
+ *
+ * I tried to keep the patch as minimal as possible, nevertheless I see some
+ * areas for improvement which, if they make sense, have to be evaluated
+ * carefully because they might change existing behaviour and cause breaks
+ * during upgrade:
+ * - I wonder if disabling .k5login usage make sense in sshd or if it should
+ * be better disabled globally in krb5.conf
+ * - if really needed openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch should be fixed to really
+ * only disable checking .k5login and maybe .k5users
+ * - the ksu behaviour should be configurable and maybe check the .k5login and
+ * .k5users files directly like ksu itself does
+ * - to make krb5_aname_to_localname() more useful an option for sshd to use
+ * the canonical name (the one returned by getpwnam()) instead of the name
+ * given at the login prompt might be useful */
+
static int
ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
{
@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
* because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
* to access these files aren't available yet. */
- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
+ if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
+ && k5login_exists) {
retval = 1;
logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
- return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
- sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
- (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
+ return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
+ k5login_exists);
}
if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
int saved_errno = errno;
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 15:11:52.278133344 +0100
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ options->use_kuserok = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
#endif
+ if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
+ options->use_kuserok = 1;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
- sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
+ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
#else
{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
#endif
{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
*activep = value;
break;
+ case sKerberosUseKuserok:
+ intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case sPermitListen:
case sPermitOpen:
if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
@@ -2309,6 +2319,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
# endif
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2016-12-23 14:36:07.645465936 +0100
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
* authenticated with Kerberos. */
int kerberos_unique_ccache; /* If true, the acquired ticket will
* be stored in per-session ccache */
+ int use_kuserok;
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.637465940 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 15:14:03.117162222 +0100
@@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
.Cm no
can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
user account.
+.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
+Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
.Cm IPQoS ,
.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
.Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
+.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
.Cm LogLevel ,
.Cm MaxAuthTries ,
.Cm MaxSessions ,
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.631465943 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2016-12-23 14:36:07.646465935 +0100
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
#KerberosTicketCleanup yes
#KerberosGetAFSToken no
+#KerberosUseKuserok yes
# GSSAPI options
GSSAPIAuthentication yes

121
SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux 2016-12-23 18:58:52.972122201 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
#endif
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux 2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
+void
+sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+{
+ security_context_t *ctx;
+
+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+ return;
+
+ if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
+ logit("%s: getexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ /* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
+ if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: setexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ freecon(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
#endif
#endif
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
platform_setusercontext(pw);
- if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
+ if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
(LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
@@ -1361,6 +1361,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ sshd_selinux_copy_context();
+#endif
safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
free(tmp);
free(chroot_path);
@@ -1396,6 +1399,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
permanently_set_uid(pw);
#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (in_chroot == 0)
+ sshd_selinux_copy_context();
+#endif
} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
@@ -1413,9 +1421,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
fprintf(stderr,
"You must change your password now and login again!\n");
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- setexeccon(NULL);
-#endif
#ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
(char *)NULL);
@@ -1625,9 +1630,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
argv[i] = NULL;
optind = optreset = 1;
__progname = argv[0];
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
-#endif
exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
}
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux 2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
+#endif
+
/* Demote the child */
if (privsep_chroot) {
/* Change our root directory */
@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
if (1) {
+#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
+ if (0) {
+ /* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
#else
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
#endif

177
SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-8.0p1/channels.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.coverity 2021-06-21 10:59:17.297473319 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.c 2021-06-21 11:11:32.467290400 +0200
@@ -341,15 +341,15 @@ channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Ch
* restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering
* with other programs that follow.
*/
- if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ if (rfd >= 0 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD;
set_nonblock(rfd);
}
- if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ if (wfd >= 0 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD;
set_nonblock(wfd);
}
- if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ if (efd >= 0 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD;
set_nonblock(efd);
}
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c.coverity 2021-06-21 10:59:17.282473202 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c 2021-06-21 10:59:17.297473319 +0200
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
- while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
;
if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
(tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
- if (tmp1 > 0)
+ if (tmp1 >= 0)
close(tmp1);
- if (tmp2 > 0)
- close(tmp2);
+ /*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
+ close(tmp2);*/
return 0;
}
close(tmp1);
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
u_int16_t *portp;
u_int16_t port;
- socklen_t salen;
+ socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
int i;
if (sa == NULL) {
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.856788681 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
{
if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
- waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+ (void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
}
if (signo)
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep) {
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ /*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
/* increase optional counter */
- if (intptr != NULL)
- *intptr = *intptr + 1;
+ /* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
+ if (intptr != NULL)
+ *intptr = *intptr + 1; */
}
break;
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.902788691 +0100
@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
static void
notify_parent(void)
{
- if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
+ if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
}
static void
notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
{
- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
+ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
}
static void
@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
{
char c;
- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
- while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
+ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
+ while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
}
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__);
goto done;
}
- if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
+ if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
goto done;
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
sanitise_stdfd();
/* drop */
- setegid(getgid());
- setgid(getgid());
+ (void) setegid(getgid());
+ (void) setgid(getgid());
platform_disable_tracing(0); /* strict=no */
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
- if (box != NULL)
+ if (box != NULL) {
ssh_sandbox_child(box);
+ free(box);
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
}
}
+
+ if (fdset != NULL)
+ free(fdset);
}
/*

618
SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs 2015-03-18 11:23:46.346049359 +0100
+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in 2015-03-18 11:24:20.395968445 +0100
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-h
SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
+SSH_CAVS=$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs
SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
XMSS_OBJS=\
ssh-xmss.o \
@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD
ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-cavs.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
@@ -331,6 +335,8 @@ install-files:
fi
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs_driver.pl $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c
--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs 2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c 2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
+ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+ * DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
+{
+ if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
+ return (hex - 48);
+ if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
+ return (hex - 55);
+ if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
+ return (hex - 87);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert hex representation into binary string
+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
+ * @hexlen length of hex
+ * @bin output buffer with binary data
+ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
+ * half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
+ */
+static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
+ unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
+{
+ size_t i = 0;
+ size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
+ bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
+ bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
+ * and convert hex into bin
+ *
+ * Caller must free bin
+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
+ * @hexlen length of hex
+ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
+ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
+ *
+ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
+ */
+static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
+ unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
+{
+ unsigned char *out = NULL;
+ size_t outlen = 0;
+
+ if (!hexlen)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
+
+ out = calloc(1, outlen);
+ if (!out)
+ return -errno;
+
+ hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
+ *bin = out;
+ *binlen = outlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
+ '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
+static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
+ '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
+static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
+{
+ if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
+ return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
+ return 'X';
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert binary string into hex representation
+ * @bin input buffer with binary data
+ * @binlen length of bin
+ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
+ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
+ * twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
+ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
+ */
+static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
+ char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
+{
+ size_t i = 0;
+ size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
+ hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
+ hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
+ }
+}
+
+struct kdf_cavs {
+ unsigned char *K;
+ size_t Klen;
+ unsigned char *H;
+ size_t Hlen;
+ unsigned char *session_id;
+ size_t session_id_len;
+
+ unsigned int iv_len;
+ unsigned int ek_len;
+ unsigned int ik_len;
+};
+
+static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct kex kex;
+ struct sshbuf *Kb = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
+ int mode = 0;
+ struct newkeys *ctoskeys;
+ struct newkeys *stockeys;
+ struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
+
+#define HEXOUTLEN 500
+ char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
+
+ Kbn = BN_new();
+ BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
+ if (!Kbn) {
+ printf("cannot convert K into bignum\n");
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ Kb = sshbuf_new();
+ if (!Kb) {
+ printf("cannot convert K into sshbuf\n");
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sshbuf_put_bignum2(Kb, Kbn);
+
+ kex.session_id = test->session_id;
+ kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
+
+ /* setup kex */
+
+ /* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
+ switch (test->ik_len) {
+ case 20:
+ kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case 32:
+ kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
+ break;
+ case 48:
+ kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
+ break;
+ case 64:
+ kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
+ break;
+ default:
+ printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* implement choose_enc */
+ for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
+ kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
+ if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
+ printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
+ kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
+ kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
+ kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
+ }
+
+ /* implement kex_choose_conf */
+ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
+ if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
+ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
+ if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
+ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
+ if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
+ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
+
+ /* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
+ * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
+ kex.server = 1;
+
+ /* do it */
+ if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){
+ printf("Allocation error\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ssh->kex = &kex;
+ kex_derive_keys(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kb);
+
+ ctoskeys = kex.newkeys[0];
+ stockeys = kex.newkeys[1];
+
+ /* get data */
+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+ bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.iv, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.iv_len,
+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+ printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+ bin2hex(stockeys->enc.iv, (size_t)stockeys->enc.iv_len,
+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+ printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
+
+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+ bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.key_len,
+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+ printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+ bin2hex(stockeys->enc.key, (size_t)stockeys->enc.key_len,
+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+ printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
+
+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+ bin2hex(ctoskeys->mac.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->mac.key_len,
+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+ printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
+ bin2hex(stockeys->mac.key, (size_t)stockeys->mac.key_len,
+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
+ printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
+
+out:
+ if (Kbn)
+ BN_free(Kbn);
+ if (Kb)
+ sshbuf_free(Kb);
+ if (ssh)
+ ssh_packet_close(ssh);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test command example:
+ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
+ *
+ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
+ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
+ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
+ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
+ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
+ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
+ */
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ struct kdf_cavs test;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int opt = 0;
+
+ memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
+ while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
+ {
+ size_t len = 0;
+ switch(opt)
+ {
+ /*
+ * CAVS K is MPINT
+ * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
+ * following transformations already happened):
+ * 1. cut off first four bytes
+ * 2. if most significant bit of value is
+ * 1, prepend 0 byte
+ */
+ case 'K':
+ len = strlen(optarg);
+ ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
+ &test.K, &test.Klen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case 'H':
+ len = strlen(optarg);
+ ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
+ &test.H, &test.Hlen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ len = strlen(optarg);
+ ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
+ &test.session_id,
+ &test.session_id_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+ break;
+ case 'm':
+ test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
+
+out:
+ if (test.session_id)
+ free(test.session_id);
+ if (test.K)
+ free(test.K);
+ if (test.H)
+ free(test.H);
+ return ret;
+
+}
diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs 2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl 2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+#
+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+#
+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+#
+# NO WARRANTY
+#
+# BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
+# FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN
+# OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
+# PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
+# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS
+# TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE
+# PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
+# REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
+#
+# IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
+# WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
+# REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
+# INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
+# OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
+# TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
+# YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
+# PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
+# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+#
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use IPC::Open2;
+
+# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
+# STDOUT
+# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
+# rest: program and args
+# returns: STDOUT of program as string
+sub pipe_through_program($@) {
+ my $in = shift;
+ my @args = @_;
+
+ my ($CO, $CI);
+ my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
+
+ my $out = "";
+ my $len = length($in);
+ my $first = 1;
+ while (1) {
+ my $rin = "";
+ my $win = "";
+ # Output of prog is FD that we read
+ vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
+ # Input of prog is FD that we write
+ # check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
+ # that is to be written to the app
+ if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
+ (vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
+ $first=0;
+ }
+ # Let us wait for 100ms
+ my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
+ if ( $wout ) {
+ my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
+ die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
+ $len -= $written;
+ substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
+ if ($len <= 0) {
+ close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
+ }
+ }
+ if ( $rout ) {
+ my $tmp_out = "";
+ my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
+ $out .= $tmp_out;
+ last if ($bytes_read == 0);
+ }
+ }
+ close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
+ waitpid $pid, 0;
+
+ return $out;
+}
+
+# Parser of CAVS test vector file
+# $1: Test vector file
+# $2: Output file for test results
+# return: nothing
+sub parse($$) {
+ my $infile = shift;
+ my $outfile = shift;
+
+ my $out = "";
+
+ my $K = "";
+ my $H = "";
+ my $session_id = "";
+ my $ivlen = 0;
+ my $eklen = "";
+ my $iklen = "";
+
+ open(IN, "<$infile");
+ while(<IN>) {
+
+ my $line = $_;
+ chomp($line);
+ $line =~ s/\r//;
+
+ if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
+ $iklen = 20;
+ } elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
+ $iklen = 32;
+ } elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
+ $iklen = 48;
+ } elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
+ $iklen = 64;
+ } elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
+ $ivlen = $1;
+ $ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
+ } elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
+ $eklen = $1;
+ $eklen = $eklen / 8;
+ } elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
+ $K = $1;
+ $K = substr($K, 8);
+ $K = "00" . $K;
+ } elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
+ $H = $1;
+ } elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
+ $session_id = $1;
+ }
+ $out .= $line . "\n";
+
+ if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
+ $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
+ $out .= pipe_through_program("", "./ssh-cavs -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
+
+ $K = "";
+ $H = "";
+ $session_id = "";
+ }
+ }
+ close IN;
+ $out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
+ open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
+ print OUT $out;
+ close OUT;
+}
+
+############################################################
+#
+# let us pretend to be C :-)
+sub main() {
+
+ my $infile=$ARGV[0];
+ die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
+
+ my $outfile = $infile;
+ # let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
+ $outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
+ $outfile .= ".rsp";
+ if (-f $outfile) {
+ die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
+ unless unlink($outfile);
+ }
+ print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
+
+ # Do the job
+ parse($infile, $outfile);
+}
+
+###########################################
+# Call it
+main();
+1;

2746
SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-ldap.patch
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

100
SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
--- a/sftp-server.8 2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
+++ b/sftp-server.8 2022-06-20 16:03:47.892540068 +0200
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
.Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
.Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
.Op Fl u Ar umask
+.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms
.Ek
.Nm
.Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@
.Xr umask 2
to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
user's default mask.
+.It Fl m Ar force_file_perms
+Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
+of the default or client requested mode. Numeric values include:
+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc. Using both -m and -u switches makes the
+umask (-u) effective only for newly created directories and explicit mode (-m)
+for newly created files.
.El
.Pp
On some systems,
diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
--- a/sftp-server.c 2022-06-20 16:01:26.183793633 +0200
+++ b/sftp-server.c 2022-06-20 16:02:12.442690608 +0200
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
/* Version of client */
static u_int version;
+/* Force file permissions */
+int permforce = 0;
+long permforcemode;
+
/* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
static int init_done;
@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ mode_t old_umask = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@
debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
+ if (permforce == 1) { /* Force perm if -m is set */
+ mode = permforcemode;
+ old_umask = umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
+ }
logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
if (readonly &&
@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@
}
}
}
+ if (permforce == 1)
+ (void) umask(old_umask); /* restore umask to something sane */
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
@@ -1555,7 +1566,7 @@
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
"[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
- "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
+ "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
" %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
__progname, __progname);
exit(1);
@@ -1581,7 +1592,7 @@
pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
- "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
+ "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'Q':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
@@ -1643,6 +1654,15 @@
fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
break;
+ case 'm':
+ /* Force permissions on file received via sftp */
+ permforce = 1;
+ permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
+ if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 ||
+ *cp != '\0' || (permforcemode == 0 &&
+ errno != 0))
+ fatal("Invalid file mode \"%s\"", optarg);
+ break;
case 'h':
default:
sftp_server_usage();

12
SOURCES/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c
--- openssh/servconf.c.sshdt 2015-06-24 11:42:29.041078704 +0200
+++ openssh/servconf.c 2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200
@@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
- dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
+ dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);

12
SOURCES/openssh-6.9p1-permit-root-login.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
diff -up openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config.root-login openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config.root-login 2015-08-12 11:29:12.919269245 +0200
+++ openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config 2015-08-12 11:31:03.653096466 +0200
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
# Authentication:
#LoginGraceTime 2m
-#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
+PermitRootLogin yes
#StrictModes yes
#MaxAuthTries 6
#MaxSessions 10

187
SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race 2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2016-12-23 16:35:52.697685772 +0100
@@ -1107,4 +1107,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
+
+int mm_forward_audit_messages(int fdin)
+{
+ u_char buf[4];
+ u_int blen, msg_len;
+ struct sshbuf *m;
+ int r, ret = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ do {
+ blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
+ break;
+ if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
+ error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ msg_len = get_u32(buf);
+ if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
+ fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
+ error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__);
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen ||
+ atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
+ error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__);
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } while (1);
+ sshbuf_free(m);
+ return ret;
+}
+void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int fd)
+{
+ pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
+}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race 2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h 2016-12-23 16:35:52.698685772 +0100
@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+int mm_forward_audit_messages(int);
+void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int);
#endif
struct Session;
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race 2016-12-23 16:35:52.695685771 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2016-12-23 16:37:26.339730596 +0100
@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
login_cap_t *lc;
#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+int paudit[2];
+#endif
+
static int is_child = 0;
static int in_chroot = 0;
static int have_dev_log = 1;
@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
return 1;
}
+void child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh);
+
#define USE_PIPES 1
/*
* This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This
@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
close(err[0]);
#endif
+ child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
+
/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
do_child(ssh, s, command);
/* NOTREACHED */
@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
+ /* Do this early, so we will not block large MOTDs */
+ child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
+
/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
do_login(ssh, s, command);
@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
}
if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
+ if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
+ fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
#endif
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
*/
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ close(paudit[1]);
+ if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
+ * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
+ * because the messages might get mixed up.
+ * Continue after the pipe gets closed (all messages sent).
+ */
+ ret = mm_forward_audit_messages(paudit[0]);
+ }
+ close(paudit[0]);
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
return ret;
}
@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
endpwent();
}
+void
+child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ int pparent = paudit[1];
+ close(paudit[0]);
+ /* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
+ if (use_privsep)
+ mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
+#endif
+
+ /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
+ /*
+ * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
+ * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
+ * which we can't do using one-way pipe.
+ */
+ packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
+ /* XXX this will clean the rest but should not audit anymore */
+ /* packet_clear_keys(ssh); */
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /* Notify parent that we are done */
+ close(pparent);
+#endif
+}
+
/*
* Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
* environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
@@ -1554,13 +1608,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
- /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
- destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
- ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
- /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
- monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
- packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
-
/* Force a password change */
if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
do_setusercontext(pw);

86
SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
--- a/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/auth-krb5.c
@@ -375,5 +375,21 @@ cleanup:
return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
}
}
+
+/*
+ * Reads k5login_directory option from the krb5.conf
+ */
+krb5_error_code
+ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx, char **k5login_directory) {
+ profile_t p;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "k5login_directory", NULL, NULL,
+ k5login_directory);
+}
#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
#endif /* KRB5 */
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -222,5 +222,7 @@ int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
#include <krb5.h>
krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx,
+ char **k5login_directory);
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
{
char file[MAXPATHLEN];
struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+ char *k5login_directory = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
+ debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret);
+ if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
+ /* If not set, the library will look for k5login
+ * files in the user's home directory, with the filename .k5login.
+ */
+ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
+ } else {
+ /* If set, the library will look for a local user's k5login file
+ * within the named directory, with a filename corresponding to the
+ * local username.
+ */
+ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s%s%s", k5login_directory,
+ k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
+ pw->pw_name);
+ }
+ debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file);
- snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
}
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
Further details are described in
.Xr ksu 1 .
+The location of the k5login file depends on the configuration option
+.Cm k5login_directory
+in the
+.Xr krb5.conf 5 .
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration

52
SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open.
All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new
sshd process to handle a new client connection is
spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem
without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the
files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the
closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop.
Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
---
openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
+#ifdef __s390__
+ {
+ /*
+ * the filedescriptors used to communicate with
+ * the device drivers to provide hardware support
+ * should survive. HF <freude@de.ibm.com>
+ */
+ char fpath[PATH_MAX], lpath[PATH_MAX];
+ len = snprintf(fpath, sizeof(fpath), "%s/%s",
+ fdpath, dent->d_name);
+ if (len > 0 && (size_t)len <= sizeof(fpath)) {
+ len = readlink(fpath, lpath, sizeof(lpath));
+ if (len > 0) {
+ lpath[len] = 0;
+ if (strstr(lpath, "dev/z90crypt")
+ || strstr(lpath, "dev/zcrypt")
+ || strstr(lpath, "dev/prandom")
+ || strstr(lpath, "dev/shm/icastats"))
+ fd = -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ (void) close((int) fd);
+ }
+#else
(void) close((int) fd);
+#endif
}
(void) closedir(dirp);
} else

53
SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
--- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c 2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200
@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
}
static int
-connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
+connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname, int len)
{
int sock;
struct sockaddr_un addr;
+ if (len <= 0)
+ return -1;
sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sock < 0)
error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
+ if (len > sizeof addr.sun_path)
+ len = sizeof addr.sun_path;
+ memcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, len);
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof addr - (sizeof addr.sun_path - len) ) == 0)
return sock;
close(sock);
- error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int
connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
{
char buf[1024];
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
- return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
+ int len, ret;
+ len = snprintf(buf + 1, sizeof (buf) - 1, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
+#ifdef linux
+ /* try abstract socket first */
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf, len + 1)) >= 0)
+ return ret;
+#endif
+ if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf + 1, len)) >= 0)
+ return ret;
+ error("connect %.100s: %.100s", buf + 1, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
}
#ifdef __APPLE__

213
SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c 2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*"
/* -- X11 forwarding */
-/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
-#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000
+/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
+#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
/* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
*/
int
x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
- int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection,
+ int x11_use_localhost, int x11_max_displays, int single_connection,
u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
{
Channel *nc = NULL;
@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
if (chanids == NULL)
return -1;
+ /* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
+ x11_max_displays = x11_max_displays + x11_display_offset;
+
for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
- display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
+ display_number < x11_max_displays;
display_number++) {
- port = 6000 + display_number;
+ port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number;
+ if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */
+ break;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
if (num_socks > 0)
break;
}
- if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
+ if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) {
error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
return -1;
}
@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
/* Connect it to the display. */
if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
- 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
continue;
}
@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
if (!ai) {
- error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
- 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+ X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
set_nodelay(sock);
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h 2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int permitopen_port(const char *);
void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
-int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 15:47:27.320519121 +0100
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->print_lastlog = -1;
options->x11_forwarding = -1;
options->x11_display_offset = -1;
+ options->x11_max_displays = -1;
options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
options->permit_tty = -1;
options->permit_user_rc = -1;
@@ -243,6 +244,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
options->x11_forwarding = 0;
if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
options->x11_display_offset = 10;
+ if (options->x11_max_displays == -1)
+ options->x11_max_displays = DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS;
if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
- sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+ sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
@@ -540,6 +543,7 @@ static struct {
{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "x11maxdisplays", sX11MaxDisplays, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1316,6 +1320,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
*intptr = value;
break;
+ case sX11MaxDisplays:
+ intptr = &options->x11_max_displays;
+ goto parse_int;
+
case sX11UseLocalhost:
intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
goto parse_flag;
@@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(x11_max_displays);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
@@ -2315,6 +2324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
#endif
dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
+ dump_cfg_int(sX11MaxDisplays, o->x11_max_displays);
dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2016-12-23 15:46:32.140506636 +0100
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
#define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */
#define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */
+#define DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
/* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
#define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp"
@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct {
int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start
* searching at */
+ int x11_max_displays; /* Number of displays to search */
int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */
int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.136506636 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
@@ -2518,8 +2518,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
return 0;
}
if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
- options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
- &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
+ options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
+ s->single_connection, &s->display_number,
+ &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
return 0;
}
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
.Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
+.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
.Cm X11Forwarding
and
.Cm X11UseLocalHost .
@@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
X11 forwarding.
This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
The default is 10.
+.It Cm X11MaxDisplays
+Specifies the maximum number of displays available for
+.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
+X11 forwarding.
+This prevents sshd from exhausting local ports.
+The default is 1000.
.It Cm X11Forwarding
Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
The argument must be

98
SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
systemd stuff
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+# Check whether user wants systemd support
+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
+ [ --with-systemd Enable systemd support],
+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
+ if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
+ if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
+ SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
+ SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
+ SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ fi
+ fi
+ fi ]
+)
+
+
# Looking for programs, paths and files
PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
+echo " systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e0d4923
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/sshd.service
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenSSH server daemon
+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
+After=network.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=notify
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
+KillMode=process
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartPreventExitStatus=255
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
#include <prot.h>
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
+#endif
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
}
}
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
+ /* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
+ sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
+#endif
+
/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
&newsock, config_s);

146
SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
this is only need on s390 architecture.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
#ifdef __NR_exit_group
SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
#endif
+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_futex
SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
#endif
@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
#endif
+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_getuid
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
#endif
--
1.9.1
getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
#ifdef __NR_getpid
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_getrandom
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
#endif
-- 1.9.1
The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
index e86aa2c..98062f1 100644
--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
+ /* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
#endif
#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
/*
--
1.9.1
diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox 2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100
+++ openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2017-12-12 13:59:14.842784083 +0100
@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_gettid
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_getrandom
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
#endif
From ef34ea4521b042dd8a9c4c7455f5d1a8f8ee5bb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:11:15 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] allow s390 specific ioctl for ecc hardware support
Adding another s390 specific ioctl to be able to support ECC hardware acceleration
to the sandbox seccomp filter rules.
Now the ibmca openssl engine provides elliptic curve cryptography support with the
help of libica and CCA crypto cards. This is done via jet another ioctl call to the zcrypt
device driver and so there is a need to enable this on the openssl sandbox.
Code is s390 specific and has been tested, verified and reviewed.
Please note that I am also the originator of the previous changes in that area.
I posted these changes to Eduardo and he forwarded the patches to the openssl
community.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
---
sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
index 5edbc6946..56eb9317f 100644
--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSECSENDCPRB),
#endif
#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
/*

2318
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271
SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c 2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_char *session_id2;
extern u_int session_id2_len;
+extern int inetd_flag;
+extern int rexeced_flag;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
static char *
format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
ac, av, &f,
- SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
+ SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
@@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
ac, av, &f,
- SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
+ SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
diff -up openssh/auth.c.refactor openssh/auth.c
--- openssh/auth.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
+++ openssh/auth.c 2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
*/
pid_t
subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
- int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
+ int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, int inetd,
+ void *the_authctxt)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
struct stat st;
@@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
}
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
+ if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
error ("failed to copy environment: %s",
strerror(errno));
_exit(127);
diff -up openssh/auth.h.refactor openssh/auth.h
--- openssh/auth.h.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
+++ openssh/auth.h 2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE (1<<1) /* Redirect stdout */
#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD (1<<2) /* Discard stderr */
pid_t subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
- const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
+ const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags, int, void *);
int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const ch
int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
-void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
-int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
#endif
diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-extern int inetd_flag;
-extern int rexeced_flag;
-
/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
int
sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
@@ -223,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con
}
static void
-ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level,
+ Authctxt *the_authctxt)
{
*role = NULL;
*level = NULL;
@@ -241,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role,
/* Return the default security context for the given username */
static int
-sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
- security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
+sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, security_context_t *default_sc,
+ security_context_t *user_sc, int inetd, Authctxt *the_authctxt)
{
char *sename, *lvl;
char *role;
@@ -250,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
int r = 0;
context_t con = NULL;
- ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
if (r == 0) {
/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
- if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ if (inetd) {
security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
@@ -333,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
static int
-sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
+sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *), int inetd,
+ Authctxt *the_authctxt)
{
const char *reqlvl;
char *role;
@@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
- ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
- if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ if (inetd) {
use_current = "1";
} else {
use_current = "";
@@ -362,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
}
static int
-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(int inetd,
+ int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), Authctxt *the_authctxt)
{
- return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
+ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(pam_setenv, inetd, the_authctxt);
}
static int
@@ -374,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
}
int
-sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
+sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
{
- return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
+ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv, inetd, authctxt);
}
/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
void
-sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, int inetd,
+ int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), void *the_authctxt, int use_pam)
{
security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
int r = 0;
security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
return;
- if (options.use_pam) {
+ if (use_pam) {
/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
- if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
+ if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
switch (security_getenforce()) {
case -1:
fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
- r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
+ r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
if (r >= 0) {
r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
if (r < 0) {
diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
--- openssh/platform.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
+++ openssh/platform.c 2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
extern int use_privsep;
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int inetd_flag;
+extern int rexeced_flag;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
void
platform_pre_listen(void)
@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
}
#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
+ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
+ options.use_pam);
#endif
}
diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd.c 2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
static int test_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
-static int inetd_flag = 0;
+int inetd_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
static int saved_argc;
/* re-exec */
-static int rexeced_flag = 0;
+int rexeced_flag = 0;
static int rexec_flag = 1;
static int rexec_argc = 0;
static char **rexec_argv;
@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
}
#endif
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
+ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
+ options.use_pam);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam) {

569
SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,569 @@
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips 2019-03-11 17:06:37.519877082 +0100
+++ openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c 2019-03-11 17:06:37.620878031 +0100
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
- EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
+ EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
#endif
return (&aes_ctr);
}
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c.fips 2019-03-11 17:06:37.523877120 +0100
+++ openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c 2019-03-11 17:06:37.620878031 +0100
@@ -2014,7 +2014,8 @@ key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct
{
const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key);
const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL ?
- options.hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG;
+ options.hostkeyalgorithms : (FIPS_mode() ?
+ KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
return 0;
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/dh.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/dh.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/dh.c.fips 2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-7.9p1/dh.c 2019-03-11 17:08:11.769763057 +0100
@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
struct dhgroup dhg;
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ verbose("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
+ " Falling back to known groups.");
+ return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
+ }
+
if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) {
logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
_PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno));
@@ -489,4 +495,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
return 8192;
}
+/*
+ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
+ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
+ */
+int
+dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
+{
+ const BIGNUM *p, *g;
+ const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
+ DH *known = NULL;
+ int bits = 0, rv = 0;
+
+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
+ bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+
+ if (bits <= 3072) {
+ known = dh_new_group14();
+ } else if (bits <= 6144) {
+ known = dh_new_group16();
+ } else {
+ known = dh_new_group18();
+ }
+
+ DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
+
+ if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
+ rv = 1;
+ }
+
+ DH_free(known);
+ return rv;
+}
+
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/dh.h.fips openssh-7.9p1/dh.h
--- openssh-7.9p1/dh.h.fips 2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-7.9p1/dh.h 2019-03-11 17:08:18.718828381 +0100
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ DH *dh_new_group_fallback(int);
int dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
int dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
+int dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
u_int dh_estimate(int);
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/kex.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/kex.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/kex.c.fips 2019-03-11 17:06:37.614877975 +0100
+++ openssh-7.9p1/kex.c 2019-03-11 17:06:37.621878041 +0100
@@ -175,7 +196,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
- error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
+ else
+ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
free(s);
return 0;
}
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c.fips 2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c 2019-03-11 17:06:37.621878041 +0100
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -118,6 +119,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
+ if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h
--- openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h.fips 2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h 2019-03-11 17:06:37.621878041 +0100
@@ -116,6 +116,16 @@
"rsa-sha2-256," \
"ssh-rsa"
+#define KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG \
+ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
+ "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
+ "rsa-sha2-512," \
+ "rsa-sha2-256," \
+ "ssh-rsa"
+
/* the actual algorithms */
#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
@@ -139,6 +147,38 @@
#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
+#define KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
+ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
+ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" \
+ AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
+ KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
+ KEX_SHA2_METHODS \
+ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
+# define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
+ "hmac-sha1," \
+ "hmac-sha2-256," \
+ "hmac-sha2-512," \
+ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
+ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
+ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
+#else
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
+# else
+# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
+# endif
+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
+ "hmac-sha1"
+#endif
+
/* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
#define SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c.fips 2019-03-11 17:06:37.601877853 +0100
+++ openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c 2019-03-11 17:06:37.622878050 +0100
@@ -2178,18 +2178,19 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
-#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, fips_defaults, all) \
do { \
if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
- defaults, all)) != 0) \
+ (FIPS_mode() ? fips_defaults : defaults), \
+ all)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
} while (0)
- ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
- ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
- ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
- ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
+ ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+ ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_CLIENT_MAC, KEX_FIPS_MAC, all_mac);
+ ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_CLIENT_KEX, KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS, all_kex);
+ ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_sig);
#undef ASSEMBLE
free(all_cipher);
free(all_mac);
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips 2019-03-11 17:06:37.586877712 +0100
+++ openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2019-03-11 17:06:37.622878050 +0100
@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
#ifdef __NR_open
SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_socket
+ SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_openat
SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
#endif
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.fips 2019-03-11 17:06:37.568877543 +0100
+++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c 2019-03-11 17:06:37.622878050 +0100
@@ -209,18 +209,19 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
-#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, fips_defaults, all) \
do { \
- if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
+ if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, (FIPS_mode() \
+ ? fips_defaults : defaults), all)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
} while (0)
- ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
- ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
- ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
- ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
+ ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+ ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, KEX_FIPS_MAC, all_mac);
+ ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS, all_kex);
+ ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_sig);
#undef ASSEMBLE
free(all_cipher);
free(all_mac);
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c.fips 2019-03-11 17:06:37.602877862 +0100
+++ openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c 2019-03-11 17:06:37.623878060 +0100
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#endif
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
@@ -1283,6 +1294,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
dump_client_config(&options, host);
exit(0);
}
+
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ debug("FIPS mode initialized");
+ }
if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips 2019-03-11 17:06:37.580877655 +0100
+++ openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c 2019-03-11 17:06:37.623878060 +0100
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
#include <vis.h>
#endif
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -148,7 +150,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
* Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys
* while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible.
*/
- oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+ oavail = avail = xstrdup((FIPS_mode()
+ ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG));
maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
first = xmalloc(maxlen);
last = xmalloc(maxlen);
@@ -229,14 +232,16 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) {
all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
if (kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms,
- KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key) != 0)
+ (FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG),
+ all_key) != 0)
fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
free(all_key);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
} else {
/* Enforce default */
- options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+ options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup((FIPS_mode()
+ ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG));
/* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
compat_pkalg_proposal(
@@ -201,35 +201,40 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
if (options.gss_keyex) {
- /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
- * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
- orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-
- if (options.gss_server_identity) {
- gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
- } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
- gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
- /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
- * and can not use DNS on that socket */
- if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
- gss_host = xstrdup(host);
- }
- } else {
- gss_host = xstrdup(host);
- }
-
- gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
- options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
- if (gss) {
- debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
- xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
- "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-
- /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
- * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
- orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
- xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
- "%s,null", orig);
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
+ options.gss_keyex = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+ } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+ gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
+ /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
+ * and can not use DNS on that socket */
+ if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
+ gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+ }
+ } else {
+ gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+ }
+
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+ options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+ if (gss) {
+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+
+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ "%s,null", orig);
+ }
}
}
#endif
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c.fips 2019-03-11 17:06:37.617878003 +0100
+++ openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c 2019-03-11 17:06:37.624878069 +0100
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
@@ -1581,6 +1584,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
saved_argc = ac;
rexec_argc = ac;
@@ -2036,6 +2051,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ debug("FIPS mode initialized");
+ }
+
/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
unmounted if desired. */
if (chdir("/") == -1)
@@ -2412,10 +2431,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
orig = NULL;
- if (options.gss_keyex)
- gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
- else
- gss = NULL;
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
+ options.gss_keyex = 0;
+ } else {
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+ }
+ }
if (gss && orig)
xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c.fips 2019-03-11 17:06:37.617878003 +0100
+++ openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c 2019-03-11 17:06:37.624878069 +0100
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#endif
#include "crypto_api.h"
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshkey-xmss.h"
#include "match.h"
+#include "log.h"
#include "xmss_fast.h"
@@ -392,7 +394,8 @@ sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
{
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
u_char *sig = NULL;
- int ret, slen, len;
+ int ret, slen;
+ size_t len;
if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -411,9 +414,10 @@ sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto error;
}
- if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
- EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
- EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
+ NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1 ||
+ EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, sig, &len) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto error;
}
@@ -440,12 +444,13 @@ sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
- if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
+ NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
+ EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto done;
}
- ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
+ ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen);
switch (ret) {
case 1:
ret = 0;
@@ -1514,6 +1516,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
}
if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
!RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips 2019-03-11 17:06:37.590877750 +0100
+++ openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c 2019-03-11 17:06:37.625878079 +0100
@@ -230,6 +230,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS;
if (*bitsp > maxbits)
fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits);
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ if (type == KEY_DSA)
+ fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ if (type == KEY_ED25519)
+ fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ }
switch (type) {
case KEY_DSA:
if (*bitsp != 1024)
@@ -1029,9 +1035,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
first = 1;
printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
}
+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
+
+ /* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
+ if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
+ logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
+ key_types[i].key_type_display);
+ goto next;
+ }
+
printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
fflush(stdout);
- type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s",
prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.xxx openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.xxx 2023-10-30 13:01:59.150952364 +0100
+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config 2023-10-30 13:02:56.662231354 +0100
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+#In FIPS mode Ed25519 keys are not supported, please comment out the next line
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
# Ciphers and keying

646
SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,646 @@
diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
--- a/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/auth-krb5.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <krb5.h>
+#include <profile.h>
extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
#endif
krb5_error_code problem;
krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
- int len;
+ char *ticket_name = NULL;
char *client, *platform_client;
const char *errmsg;
@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
goto out;
}
- problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env);
if (problem)
goto out;
@@ -172,21 +174,20 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
if (problem)
goto out;
- problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
+ problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
&creds);
if (problem)
goto out;
#endif
- authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ problem = krb5_cc_get_full_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &ticket_name);
- len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
- authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
- snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
- authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+ authctxt->krb5_ccname = xstrdup(ticket_name);
+ krb5_free_string(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket_name);
#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
+ if (options.use_pam && authctxt->krb5_set_env)
do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
#endif
@@ -222,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
void
krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
+ struct stat krb5_ccname_stat;
+ char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end;
+
debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
- krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ krb5_context ctx = authctxt->krb5_ctx;
+ krb5_cccol_cursor cursor;
+ krb5_ccache ccache;
+ int ret;
+
+ krb5_cc_destroy(ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
+
+ ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_new(ctx, &cursor);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_next(ctx, cursor, &ccache);
+ if (ret == 0 && ccache != NULL) {
+ /* There is at least one other ccache in collection
+ * we can switch to */
+ krb5_cc_switch(ctx, ccache);
+ } else if (authctxt->krb5_ccname != NULL) {
+ /* Clean up the collection too */
+ strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10);
+ krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1;
+ *krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) {
+
+ strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary");
+
+ if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) {
+ if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) {
+ krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/');
+ *krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0';
+ if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1)
+ debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s",
+ krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ else
+ debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s",
+ krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ krb5_cccol_cursor_free(ctx, &cursor);
}
+out:
if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
@@ -237,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
}
}
-#ifndef HEIMDAL
+
+#if !defined(HEIMDAL)
+int
+ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
+ char *src, *old;
+ va_list ap;
+ int i;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ if (i == -1 || src == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ old = *dsc;
+
+ i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
+ if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
+ free(src);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ free(old);
+ free(src);
+
+ return i;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
+ char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
+
+ debug3("%s: called, template = %s", __func__, template);
+ if (template == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template);
+ r = xstrdup("");
+
+ while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) {
+
+ *p_n++ = '\0';
+ if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 ||
+ strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) {
+ p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
+ if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1)
+ goto cleanup;
+ continue;
+ }
+ else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) {
+ p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
+ if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1)
+ goto cleanup;
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
+ *p_o = '\0';
+ debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
+ /* unknown token, fallback to the default */
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ *result = r;
+ free(tmp_template);
+ return 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ free(r);
+ free(tmp_template);
+ return -1;
+}
+
krb5_error_code
-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
- char ccname[40];
+ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
+ profile_t p;
+ int ret = 0;
+ char *value = NULL;
+
+ debug3("%s: called", __func__);
+ ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value);
+ if (ret || !value)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
+
+ debug3("%s: returning with ccname = %s", __func__, *ccname);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
+ int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
+ char *ccname = NULL;
mode_t old_umask;
+ char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL;
- ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
- if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
- return ENOMEM;
-
- old_umask = umask(0177);
- tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- oerrno = errno;
- umask(old_umask);
- if (tmpfd == -1) {
- logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
- return oerrno;
- }
+ debug3("%s: called", __func__);
+ if (need_environment)
+ *need_environment = 0;
+ ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
+ if (ret || !ccname || options.kerberos_unique_ccache) {
+ /* Otherwise, go with the old method */
+ if (ccname)
+ free(ccname);
+ ccname = NULL;
+
+ ret = asprintf(&ccname,
+ "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ENOMEM;
- if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
+ old_umask = umask(0177);
+ tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
oerrno = errno;
- logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ umask(old_umask);
+ if (tmpfd == -1) {
+ logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ return oerrno;
+ }
+
+ if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ close(tmpfd);
+ return oerrno;
+ }
+ /* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
+ if (need_environment)
+ *need_environment = 1;
close(tmpfd);
- return oerrno;
}
- close(tmpfd);
- return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ debug3("%s: setting default ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
+ /* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
+ ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if ((colon = strstr(ccname, ":")) != NULL) {
+ type_len = colon - ccname;
+ type = malloc((type_len + 1) * sizeof(char));
+ if (type == NULL)
+ return ENOMEM;
+ strncpy(type, ccname, type_len);
+ type[type_len] = 0;
+ } else {
+ type = strdup(ccname);
+ }
+
+ /* If we have a credential cache from krb5.conf, we need to switch
+ * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
+ */
+ if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
+ debug3("%s: calling cc_new_unique(%s)", __func__, ccname);
+ ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
+ free(type);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ debug3("%s: calling cc_switch()", __func__);
+ return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
+ * it is already unique from above or the type does not support
+ * collections
+ */
+ free(type);
+ debug3("%s: calling cc_resolve(%s)", __func__, ccname);
+ return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
}
#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
#endif /* KRB5 */
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index 29491df9..fdab5040 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
krb5_principal krb5_user;
char *krb5_ticket_file;
char *krb5_ccname;
+ int krb5_set_env;
#endif
struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
@@ -243,6 +244,6 @@ int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
#include <krb5.h>
-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
#endif
#endif
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name 2019-03-01 15:17:42.708611802 +0100
+++ openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
/* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
* during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
-static void
+static int
ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
{
krb5_ccache ccache;
@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
const char *errmsg;
+ int set_env = 0;
if (client->creds == NULL) {
debug("No credentials stored");
- return;
+ return 0;
}
if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
- return;
+ return 0;
#ifdef HEIMDAL
# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
# endif
krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
- return;
+ return 0;
}
#else
- if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
+ if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, &ccache, &set_env)) != 0) {
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
- logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ logit("ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg);
krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
- return;
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
- return;
+ return 0;
}
if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
- return;
+ return 0;
}
krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
client->creds, ccache))) {
logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
- return;
+ return 0;
}
new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
-
- client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
-#ifdef USE_CCAPI
- xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
- client->store.filename = NULL;
-#else
- if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
- new_ccname++;
xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
- if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
- char *p;
- p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
- if (p)
- *p = '\0';
+
+ if (set_env) {
+ client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
}
if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
-#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
+ if (options.use_pam && set_env)
do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
#endif
@@ -361,7 +355,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
client->store.data = krb_context;
- return;
+ return set_env;
}
int
diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
index 6cae720e..16e55cbc 100644
--- a/gss-serv.c
+++ b/gss-serv.c
@@ -320,13 +320,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
}
/* As user */
-void
+int
ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
{
if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
- (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
} else
debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
+
+ return 0;
}
/* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the childs environment based
@@ -498,9 +500,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
char *envstr;
#endif
- if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
- gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
- gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
+ if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
return;
ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name 2019-03-01 15:17:42.704611768 +0100
+++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c 2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+ options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1;
options->gss_authentication=-1;
options->gss_keyex = -1;
options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
@@ -315,6 +316,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+ if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1)
+ options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
@@ -447,7 +450,8 @@ typedef enum {
sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
- sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
+ sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
@@ -526,11 +530,13 @@ static struct {
#else
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
+ { "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1437,6 +1443,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
goto parse_flag;
+ case sKerberosUniqueCCache:
+ intptr = &options->kerberos_unique_ccache;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case sGssAuthentication:
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
@@ -2507,6 +2517,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
# ifdef USE_AFS
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
# endif
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef struct {
* file on logout. */
int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
* authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ int kerberos_unique_ccache; /* If true, the acquired ticket will
+ * be stored in per-session ccache */
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1033,7 +1033,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
* the childs environment as they see fit
*/
- ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
+ if (s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
+ ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
#endif
/* Set basic environment. */
@@ -1105,7 +1106,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
}
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
- if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
+ if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname && s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
#endif
diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
index 6593e422..245178af 100644
--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
- void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
} ssh_gssapi_mech;
@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
#ifdef GSSAPI
if (options.gss_authentication) {
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+ authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
restore_uid();
}
#endif
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -860,6 +860,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
file on logout.
The default is
.Cm yes .
+.It Cm KerberosUniqueCCache
+Specifies whether to store the acquired tickets in the per-session credential
+cache under /tmp/ or whether to use per-user credential cache as configured in
+.Pa /etc/krb5.conf .
+The default value
+.Cm no
+can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
+user account.
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.

164
SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
diff -up openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config
--- openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config.redhat 2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config 2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200
@@ -44,3 +44,8 @@
# VisualHostKey no
# ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
# RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+#
+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
+# To modify the system-wide ssh configuration, create a *.conf file under
+# /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/ which will be automatically included below
+Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
diff -up openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat
--- openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat.redhat 2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200
+++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat 2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
+# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
+Match final all
+ # Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined:
+ Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config
+
+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+
+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
+# mode correctly we set this to yes.
+ ForwardX11Trusted yes
+
+# Send locale-related environment variables
+ SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
+ SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+ SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
+ SendEnv XMODIFIERS
+
+# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
+# Host *.local
+# CheckHostIP no
diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0
--- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0.redhat 2018-04-02 07:39:27.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0 2018-07-03 10:44:06.523245133 +0200
@@ -872,9 +872,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
- sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
- LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The
- default is AUTH.
+ sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
+ LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+ The default is AUTH.
TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5.redhat 2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5 2018-07-03 10:44:06.523245133 +0200
@@ -1461,7 +1461,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
.It Cm SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
.Xr sshd 8 .
-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is AUTH.
.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.redhat 2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config 2018-07-03 10:45:16.950782466 +0200
@@ -10,20 +10,31 @@
# possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the
# default value.
+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
+# SELinux about this change.
+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
+#
#Port 22
#AddressFamily any
#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
#ListenAddress ::
-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
# Ciphers and keying
#RekeyLimit default none
+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
+# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect here.
+# They will be overridden by command-line options passed to the server
+# on command line.
+# Please, check manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
+
# Logging
#SyslogFacility AUTH
+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
#LogLevel INFO
# Authentication:
@@ -56,9 +70,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
#PasswordAuthentication yes
#PermitEmptyPasswords no
+PasswordAuthentication yes
# Change to no to disable s/key passwords
#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
# Kerberos options
#KerberosAuthentication no
@@ -67,8 +83,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
#KerberosGetAFSToken no
# GSSAPI options
-#GSSAPIAuthentication no
-#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
@@ -79,16 +95,20 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
-#UsePAM no
+UsePAM yes
#AllowAgentForwarding yes
#AllowTcpForwarding yes
#GatewayPorts no
-#X11Forwarding no
+X11Forwarding yes
#X11DisplayOffset 10
#X11UseLocalhost yes
#PermitTTY yes
-#PrintMotd yes
+
+# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
+# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
+PrintMotd no
+
#PrintLastLog yes
#TCPKeepAlive yes
#PermitUserEnvironment no
@@ -106,6 +126,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
# no default banner path
#Banner none
+# Accept locale-related environment variables
+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
+
# override default of no subsystems
Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server

26
SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1701,6 +1701,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
cfg, NULL);
+ /* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
+ if (! options.use_pam)
+ logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several problems.");
+
/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
fill_default_server_options(&options);
diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several
+# problems.
UsePAM yes
#AllowAgentForwarding yes

885
SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,885 @@
diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
--- openssh/auth2.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/auth2.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.815430916 +0200
@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Authmethod *m = NULL;
char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ char *role = NULL;
+#endif
int r, authenticated = 0;
double tstart = monotime_double();
@@ -268,6 +271,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
+ *role++ = 0;
+#endif
+
if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
*style++ = 0;
@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
- if (use_privsep)
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
+#endif
+ if (use_privsep) {
mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ mm_inform_authrole(role);
+#endif
+ }
userauth_banner(ssh);
if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
--- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/auth2-gss.c 2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
int r, authenticated = 0;
+ char *micuser;
struct sshbuf *b;
gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
const char *displayname;
@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mic.value = p;
mic.length = len;
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (authctxt->role && authctxt->role[0] != 0)
+ xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
+ else
+#endif
+ micuser = authctxt->user;
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service,
"gssapi-with-mic");
if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
sshbuf_free(b);
+ if (micuser != authctxt->user)
+ free(micuser);
free(mic.value);
if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
--- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
/* reconstruct packet */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ (authctxt->role
+ ? ( (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '/') != 0) ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role))) != 0)
+ : (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0) ||
+#else
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
+#endif
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c 2018-08-22 11:17:07.331483958 +0200
@@ -169,9 +169,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
goto done;
}
/* reconstruct packet */
- xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
- authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "",
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ authctxt->role ? "/" : "",
+ authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : ""
+#else
+ "", ""
+#endif
+ );
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
diff -up openssh/auth.h.role-mls openssh/auth.h
--- openssh/auth.h.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/auth.h 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
char *service;
struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
char *style;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ char *role;
+#endif
/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */
diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
--- openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/auth-pam.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
* during the ssh authentication process.
*/
int
-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
{
int ret = 1;
#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
--- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/auth-pam.h 2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
void do_pam_setcred(int );
void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
void free_pam_environment(char **);
diff -up openssh/configure.ac.role-mls openssh/configure.ac
--- openssh/configure.ac.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/configure.ac 2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
@@ -4241,10 +4241,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
],
AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library]))
- SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level])
- LIBS="$save_LIBS"
fi ]
)
AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
--- openssh/misc.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/misc.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ char *
colon(char *cp)
{
int flag = 0;
+ int start = 1;
if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */
return NULL;
@@ -557,6 +558,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
return (cp);
if (*cp == '/')
return NULL;
+ if (start) {
+ /* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
+ if (*cp == '/')
+ return (0);
+ if (*cp != '.')
+ start = 0;
+ }
}
return NULL;
}
diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
--- openssh/monitor.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/monitor.c 2018-08-22 11:19:56.006844867 +0200
@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, struct sshbuf *)
int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+#endif
int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -189,6 +192,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
+#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
#ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -796,6 +802,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, struct ss
/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
+#endif
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
#ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -842,6 +851,26 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, struct sshb
return found;
}
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int
+mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+ int r;
+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug3("%s: role=%s", __func__, authctxt->role);
+
+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+ free(authctxt->role);
+ authctxt->role = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
int
mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
@@ -1218,7 +1247,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
{
struct sshbuf *b;
const u_char *p;
- char *userstyle, *cp;
+ char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
size_t len;
u_char type;
int r, fail = 0;
@@ -1251,6 +1280,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
+ *s = '\0';
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
@@ -1286,7 +1317,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
{
struct sshbuf *b;
const u_char *p;
- char *cp, *userstyle;
+ char *cp, *s, *userstyle;
size_t len;
int r, fail = 0;
u_char type;
@@ -1308,6 +1339,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
+ *s = '\0';
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
--- openssh/monitor.h.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/monitor.h 2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
+#endif
+
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.c 2018-08-22 11:21:47.938747968 +0200
@@ -390,6 +390,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
sshbuf_free(m);
}
+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+void
+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct sshbuf *m;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m);
+
+ sshbuf_free(m);
+}
+#endif
+
/* Do the password authentication */
int
mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h 2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int compat);
void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
+#endif
struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS= port-aix.o \
port-linux.o \
port-solaris.o \
port-net.o \
- port-uw.o
+ port-uw.o \
+ port-linux-sshd.o
.c.o:
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
@@ -100,37 +100,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
return sc;
}
-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
-void
-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-{
- security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
-
- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
- return;
-
- debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
-
- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
- switch (security_getenforce()) {
- case -1:
- fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
- case 0:
- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
- "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
- }
- }
- if (user_ctx != NULL)
- freecon(user_ctx);
-
- debug3("%s: done", __func__);
-}
-
/* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
void
ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
@@ -145,7 +114,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+ if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
+ error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+
+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
#endif
#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support for sshd at present
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/context.h>
+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+#include <libaudit.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+extern int inetd_flag;
+extern int rexeced_flag;
+
+/* Send audit message */
+static int
+sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
+ security_context_t selected_context)
+{
+ int rc=0;
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+ char *msg = NULL;
+ int audit_fd = audit_open();
+ security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
+ security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
+ rc = -1;
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ error("Error connecting to audit system.");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
+ error("Error translating default context.");
+ default_raw = NULL;
+ }
+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
+ error("Error translating selected context.");
+ selected_raw = NULL;
+ }
+ if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
+ default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
+ selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
+ error("Error allocating memory.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
+ msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
+ error("Error sending audit message.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+ out:
+ free(msg);
+ freecon(default_raw);
+ freecon(selected_raw);
+ close(audit_fd);
+#endif
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
+{
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ int retval;
+ access_vector_t bit;
+ security_class_t class;
+
+ debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
+ class = string_to_security_class("context");
+ if (!class) {
+ error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ bit = string_to_av_perm(class, "contains");
+ if (!bit) {
+ error("string_to_av_perm failed to translate av perm contains");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, class, bit, &avd);
+ if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
+ security_context_t *sc) {
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+ if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
+ /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his
+ allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
+ range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
+#endif
+ if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
+ *sc = NULL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+ }
+#endif
+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
+ context_t con;
+ char *type=NULL;
+ if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
+ error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
+ role);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ con = context_new(*sc);
+ if (!con) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ context_role_set(con, role);
+ context_type_set(con, type);
+ freecon(*sc);
+ *sc = strdup(context_str(con));
+ context_free(con);
+ if (!*sc)
+ return -1;
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+ if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
+ /* verify that the requested range is obtained */
+ context_t con;
+ security_context_t obtained_raw;
+ security_context_t requested_raw;
+ con = context_new(*sc);
+ if (!con) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ context_range_set(con, lvl);
+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
+ context_free(con);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
+ freecon(obtained_raw);
+ context_free(con);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
+ obtained_raw, requested_raw);
+ if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
+ /* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
+ freecon(requested_raw);
+ freecon(obtained_raw);
+ freecon(*sc);
+ *sc = strdup(context_str(con));
+ context_free(con);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ freecon(requested_raw);
+ freecon(obtained_raw);
+ context_free(con);
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+ out:
+ freecon(*sc);
+ *sc = NULL;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
+{
+ *role = NULL;
+ *level = NULL;
+ if (the_authctxt) {
+ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
+ char *slash;
+ *role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
+ if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
+ *slash = '\0';
+ *level = slash + 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return the default security context for the given username */
+static int
+sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
+{
+ char *sename, *lvl;
+ char *role;
+ const char *reqlvl;
+ int r = 0;
+ context_t con = NULL;
+
+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+ if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
+ sename = NULL;
+ lvl = NULL;
+ }
+#else
+ sename = pwname;
+ lvl = "";
+#endif
+
+ if (r == 0) {
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
+#else
+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (r == 0) {
+ /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
+
+ if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
+ fatal("failed to allocate security context");
+
+ if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
+ fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
+ reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
+ freecon(sshdsc);
+ if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
+ /* we actually don't change level */
+ reqlvl = "";
+
+ debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
+
+ }
+
+ if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
+ r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
+
+ if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
+ security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
+ if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
+ default_level_sc = *default_sc;
+ }
+ /* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
+ if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
+ logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
+ } else {
+ r = -1;
+ error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
+ }
+ if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
+ freecon(default_level_sc);
+ }
+ } else {
+ *user_sc = *default_sc;
+ }
+ }
+ if (r != 0) {
+ error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+ "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+ free(sename);
+ free(lvl);
+#endif
+
+ if (role != NULL)
+ free(role);
+ if (con)
+ context_free(con);
+
+ return (r);
+}
+
+/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
+static int
+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+{
+ const char *reqlvl;
+ char *role;
+ char *use_current;
+ int rv;
+
+ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+
+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+
+ rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+
+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ use_current = "1";
+ } else {
+ use_current = "";
+ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
+ }
+
+ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
+
+ if (role != NULL)
+ free(role);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+void
+sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+{
+ security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+ int r = 0;
+ security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+ return;
+
+ if (options.use_pam) {
+ /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
+ if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
+ switch (security_getenforce()) {
+ case -1:
+ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ case 0:
+ error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
+ __func__);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
+ __func__);
+ }
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+
+ r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
+ else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ if (user_ctx == NULL) {
+ user_ctx = default_ctx;
+ }
+ if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
+ /* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
+ a failure */
+ sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
+ }
+ if (r < 0) {
+ switch (security_getenforce()) {
+ case -1:
+ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ case 0:
+ error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
+ __func__);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
+ __func__);
+ }
+ }
+ if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
+ freecon(user_ctx);
+ if (default_ctx != NULL)
+ freecon(default_ctx);
+
+ debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+#endif
+#endif
+
diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
--- openssh/platform.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/platform.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
}
#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
#endif
}
diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
restore_uid();
}
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_setcred(1);

16
SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
index 60682c68..9344806e 100644
--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
@@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv)
addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
- addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
+ addargs(&alist,
+ /* IPv6 address needs to be enclosed with sqare brackets */
+ strchr(host, ':') != NULL ? "%s%s[%s]:%s" : "%s%s%s:%s",
tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
thost, targ);
if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)

42
SOURCES/openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
diff -up openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.ssh-copy-id openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
--- openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.ssh-copy-id 2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id 2019-01-23 20:49:30.513393667 +0100
@@ -112,7 +112,8 @@ do
usage
}
- OPT= OPTARG=
+ OPT=
+ OPTARG=
# implement something like getopt to avoid Solaris pain
case "$1" in
-i?*|-o?*|-p?*)
@@ -185,8 +185,8 @@
usage
fi
-# drop trailing colon
-USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed 's/:$//')
+# don't drop trailing colon because it can be a valid ipv6 address
+USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1")
# tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS
SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'"
# and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options)
@@ -261,7 +262,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
fi
if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then
printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n' "$0" >&2
- printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' "$0" >&2
+ printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' >&2
exit 0
fi
printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
@@ -296,7 +297,7 @@ case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
# in ssh below - to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
# 'cd' to be at $HOME; add a newline if it's missing; and all on one line, because tcsh.
[ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \
- ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && { [ -z "'`tail -1c .ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null`'" ] || echo >> .ssh/authorized_keys ; } && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \
+ ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && { [ -z "'`tail -1c .ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null`'" ] || echo >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1; } && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \
|| exit 1
ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
;;

20
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-avoidkillall.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
index b66037f1..54538ff9 100644
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -220,9 +220,12 @@ static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
static void
killchild(int signo)
{
- if (sshpid > 1) {
- kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
- waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ pid = sshpid;
+ if (pid > 1) {
+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+ (void)waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
}
_exit(1);

13
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-bigsshdconfig.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
diff --git a/msg.c b/msg.c
index 99c25cd2..574a566e 100644
--- a/msg.c
+++ b/msg.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ ssh_msg_recv(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
return (-1);
}
msg_len = get_u32(buf);
- if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
+ if (msg_len > sshbuf_max_size(m)) {
error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
return (-1);
}

33
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-channel-limits.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.channel-limits openssh-8.0p1/channels.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.channel-limits 2021-03-16 12:17:58.905576511 +0100
+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.c 2021-03-16 12:17:58.925576667 +0100
@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
u_int i, found;
Channel *c;
+ int r;
/* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
@@ -383,6 +384,8 @@ channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype
(c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_set_max_size(c->input, CHAN_INPUT_MAX)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_set_max_size: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN;
channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0);
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.channel-limits openssh-8.0p1/channels.h
--- openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.channel-limits 2021-03-16 12:17:58.868576223 +0100
+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.h 2021-03-16 12:17:58.907576527 +0100
@@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ struct Channel {
/* Read buffer size */
#define CHAN_RBUF (16*1024)
+/* Maximum channel input buffer size */
+#define CHAN_INPUT_MAX (16*1024*1024)
+
/* Hard limit on number of channels */
#define CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS (16*1024)

28
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-client_alive_count_max.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
index e16eabe2..a8c99e2e 100644
--- a/serverloop.c
+++ b/serverloop.c
@@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
int r, channel_id;
/* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
- if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
+ if (options.client_alive_count_max > 0 &&
+ ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
options.client_alive_count_max) {
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
logit("Timeout, client not responding from %s", remote_id);
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index d47cb0d2..2cddbd59 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -519,6 +519,9 @@ is set to 15, and
.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+Setting a zero
+.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+disables connection termination.
.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
from the client,

424
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5
--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies 2020-03-24 17:32:54.821789205 +0100
+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5 2020-03-24 17:59:58.174122920 +0100
@@ -357,17 +357,17 @@ or
.Qq *.c.example.com
domains.
.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
by certificate authorities (CAs).
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
-.Ed
-.Pp
.Xr ssh 1
will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
specified.
+.Pp
.It Cm CertificateFile
Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
@@ -420,16 +420,21 @@ If the option is set to
.Cm no ,
the check will not be executed.
.It Cm Ciphers
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
.Pp
The supported ciphers are:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
@@ -445,13 +450,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
.Ed
.Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
-.Ed
-.Pp
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
.It Cm ClearAllForwardings
@@ -800,6 +798,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
The default is
.Dq no .
.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
key exchange. Possible values are
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
@@ -812,9 +815,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
gss-curve25519-sha256-
.Ed
.Pp
-The default is
-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
+.Pp
.It Cm HashKnownHosts
Indicates that
.Xr ssh 1
@@ -1114,26 +1115,21 @@ it may be zero or more of:
and
.Cm pam .
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
Alternately if the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
-diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
-.Ed
+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
.Pp
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q kex .
@@ -1193,33 +1189,29 @@ The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
.It Cm MACs
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
in order of preference.
The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
.Pp
The algorithms that contain
.Qq -etm
calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
These are considered safer and their use recommended.
.Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
-.Ed
-.Pp
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q mac .
.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
@@ -1352,27 +1344,21 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
as a comma-separated list of patterns.
Alternately if the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
+character, then the key types after it will be appended to the built-in default
instead of replacing it.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
-.Ed
+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q key .
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies 2020-03-24 17:32:54.802788908 +0100
+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5 2020-03-24 17:54:13.347740176 +0100
@@ -383,16 +383,16 @@ If the argument is
then no banner is displayed.
By default, no banner is displayed.
.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
by certificate authorities (CAs).
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
-.Ed
-.Pp
Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
public key or host-based authentication.
+.Pp
.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
PAM or through authentication styles supported in
@@ -454,16 +454,21 @@ The default is
indicating not to
.Xr chroot 2 .
.It Cm Ciphers
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the ciphers allowed.
Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
.Pp
The supported ciphers are:
.Pp
@@ -490,13 +495,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
.El
.Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
-.Ed
-.Pp
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
@@ -688,6 +686,11 @@ For this to work
.Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
key exchange. Possible values are
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
@@ -700,8 +703,6 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
gss-curve25519-sha256-
.Ed
.Pp
-The default is
-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
@@ -791,19 +791,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable.
.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the host key algorithms
that the server offers.
-The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
-.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q key .
@@ -922,16 +916,21 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
Alternately if the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
The supported algorithms are:
.Pp
.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
@@ -961,15 +960,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp384
ecdh-sha2-nistp521
.El
.Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
-.Ed
-.Pp
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q kex .
.It Cm ListenAddress
@@ -1038,17 +1028,22 @@ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
.It Cm MACs
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
.Pp
The algorithms that contain
.Qq -etm
@@ -1091,15 +1086,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
umac-128-etm@openssh.com
.El
.Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
-.Ed
-.Pp
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q mac .
.It Cm Match
@@ -1446,27 +1432,21 @@ or equivalent.)
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
as a list of comma-separated patterns.
Alternately if the specified value begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+character, then the specified key types will be appended to the built-in default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified value begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
-.Ed
+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q key .

25
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policy-doc.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
diff --color -ru a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
--- a/sshd.8 2022-05-31 13:39:10.231843926 +0200
+++ b/sshd.8 2022-05-31 14:34:01.460815420 +0200
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
.Xr sshd_config 5 ) ;
command-line options override values specified in the
configuration file.
+This mechanism is used by systemd to apply system-wide crypto-policies to ssh server.
.Nm
rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
.Dv SIGHUP ,
@@ -207,6 +208,13 @@
rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
.Fl C
options.
+The configuration does not contain the system-wide crypto-policy configuration.
+To show the most accurate runtime configuration, use:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+source /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
+source /etc/sysconfig/sshd
+sshd -T $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY
+.Ed
.It Fl t
Test mode.
Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.

127
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-cve-2020-14145.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c.cve-2020-14145 openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c.cve-2020-14145 2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c 2021-05-17 16:53:38.694577251 +0200
@@ -409,6 +409,18 @@ lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct ho
found) == HOST_FOUND);
}
+int
+lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int want_marker)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+ if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker == (HostkeyMarker)want_marker)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int
write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip,
const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h.cve-2020-14145 openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h
--- openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h.cve-2020-14145 2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h 2021-05-17 16:53:38.694577251 +0200
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct
const struct hostkey_entry **);
int lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int,
const struct hostkey_entry **);
+int lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, int);
int hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, struct sshkey *);
int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *,
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.cve-2020-14145 openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.cve-2020-14145 2021-05-17 16:53:38.610576561 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c 2021-05-17 16:54:58.169230103 +0200
@@ -98,12 +98,25 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *
return 0;
}
+/* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */
+static char *
+first_alg(const char *algs)
+{
+ char *ret, *cp;
+
+ ret = xstrdup(algs);
+ if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL)
+ *cp = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
static char *
order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
{
- char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret;
+ char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL;
+ char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL;
size_t maxlen;
- struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
+ struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL;
int ktype;
u_int i;
@@ -115,6 +128,26 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]);
+ /*
+ * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best
+ * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is.
+ * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a
+ * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to
+ * plain keys if necessary.
+ */
+ best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
+ sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)), NULL)) {
+ debug3("%s: have matching best-preference key type %s, "
+ "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", __func__, best);
+ ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys
+ * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible.
+ */
oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
first = xmalloc(maxlen);
@@ -131,11 +164,23 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg);
+ /*
+ * If we have a @cert-authority marker in known_hosts then
+ * prefer all certificate algorithms.
+ */
+ if (sshkey_type_is_cert(ktype) &&
+ lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, MRK_CA)) {
+ ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* If the key appears in known_hosts then prefer it */
if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
- sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL))
+ sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL)) {
ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
- else
- ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Otherwise, put it last */
+ ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
}
#undef ALG_APPEND
xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first,
@@ -143,6 +188,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
if (*first != '\0')
debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first);
+ out:
+ free(best);
free(first);
free(last);
free(hostname);

302
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-entropy.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
diff --git a/entropy.c b/entropy.c
index 2d483b3..b361a04 100644
--- a/entropy.c
+++ b/entropy.c
@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+#ifdef __linux__
+ linux_seed();
+#endif /* __linux__ */
if (RAND_status() != 1)
fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
index b912dbe..9206337 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o di
port-solaris.o \
port-net.o \
port-uw.o \
+ port-linux-prng.o \
port-linux-sshd.o
.c.o:
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy 2016-12-23 18:34:27.747753563 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2016-12-23 18:34:27.769753570 +0100
@@ -34,4 +34,6 @@ void oom_adjust_restore(void);
void oom_adjust_setup(void);
#endif
+void linux_seed(void);
+
#endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92a617c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 - 2020 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+ * Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <sys/random.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+void
+linux_seed(void)
+{
+ char *env = NULL;
+ size_t randlen = 14, left;
+ unsigned int flags = 0;
+ unsigned char buf[256], *p;
+
+ env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG");
+ if (env && strcmp(env, "0") != 0) {
+ size_t ienv = atoi(env);
+
+ /* Max on buffer length */
+ if (ienv > sizeof(buf))
+ ienv = sizeof(buf);
+ /* Minimum is always 14 B */
+ if (ienv > randlen)
+ randlen = ienv;
+ flags = GRND_RANDOM;
+ }
+
+ errno = 0;
+ left = randlen;
+ p = buf;
+ do {
+ ssize_t len = getrandom(p, left, flags);
+ if (len == -1) {
+ if (errno != EINTR) {
+ if (flags) {
+ /* With the variable present, this is fatal error */
+ fatal("Failed to seed from getrandom: %s", strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise we log the issue drop out from here */
+ debug("Failed to seed from getrandom: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (len > 0) {
+ left -= len;
+ p += len;
+ }
+ } while (left > 0);
+
+ RAND_seed(buf, randlen);
+}
diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
index 4812448..16305bf 100644
--- a/ssh-add.1
+++ b/ssh-add.1
@@ -161,6 +161,22 @@ to make this work.)
Identifies the path of a
.Ux Ns -domain
socket used to communicate with the agent.
+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm getrandom(1)
+without any specific flags.
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm getrandom(1)
+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 14 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
index 281ecbd..1a9a635 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/ssh-agent.1
@@ -201,6 +201,26 @@ sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm getrandom(1)
+without any specific flags.
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm getrandom(1)
+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 14 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index 12e00d4..1b51a4a 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -832,6 +832,26 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
The file format is described in
.Xr moduli 5 .
.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm getrandom(1)
+without any specific flags.
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm getrandom(1)
+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 14 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
diff --git a/ssh-keysign.8 b/ssh-keysign.8
index 69d0829..02d79f8 100644
--- a/ssh-keysign.8
+++ b/ssh-keysign.8
@@ -80,6 +80,26 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
information corresponding with the private keys above.
.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm getrandom(1)
+without any specific flags.
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm getrandom(1)
+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 14 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index 929904b..f65e42f 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -1309,6 +1309,25 @@ For more information, see the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"
+.Pp
+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm getrandom(1)
+without any specific flags.
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm getrandom(1)
+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 14 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.rhosts
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index c2c237f..058d37a 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -951,6 +951,26 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
started last).
The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm getrandom(1)
+without any specific flags.
+If the
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm getrandom(1)
+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
+Minimum is 14 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+.El
.Sh IPV6
IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
.Sh SEE ALSO

3971
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

27
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-ipv6-process.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
index 04881c83..03c7a5c7 100644
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -2527,12 +2527,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
port = tmp;
break;
default:
+ /* Try with user, host and path. */
if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host,
- &file1) == -1) {
- /* Treat as a plain hostname. */
- host = xstrdup(*argv);
- host = cleanhostname(host);
- }
+ &file1) == 0)
+ break;
+ /* Try with user and host. */
+ if (parse_user_host_port(*argv, &user, &host, NULL)
+ == 0)
+ break;
+ /* Treat as a plain hostname. */
+ host = xstrdup(*argv);
+ host = cleanhostname(host);
break;
}
file2 = *(argv + 1);

107
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-sha2.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
From 4a41d245d6b13bd3882c8dc058dbd2e2b39a9f67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 00:27:04 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] upstream: when signing a certificate with an RSA key, default
to
a safe signature algorithm (rsa-sha-512) if not is explicitly specified by
the user; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e05f638f0be6c0266e1d3d799716b461011e83a9
---
ssh-keygen.c | 14 +++++++++-----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 564c3c481..f2192edb9 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1788,10 +1788,14 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, const char *ca_key_path, int prefer_agent,
}
free(tmp);
- if (key_type_name != NULL &&
- sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) {
- fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
- sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
+ if (key_type_name != NULL) {
+ if (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) {
+ fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
+ }
+ } else if (ca->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ /* Default to a good signature algorithm */
+ key_type_name = "rsa-sha2-512";
}
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
From 476e3551b2952ef73acc43d995e832539bf9bc4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 00:20:35 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] upstream: When signing certificates with an RSA key, default
to
using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm. Certificates signed by RSA keys
will therefore be incompatible with OpenSSH < 7.2 unless the default is
overridden.
Document the ability of the ssh-keygen -t flag to override the
signature algorithm when signing certificates, and the new default.
ok deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 400c9c15013978204c2cb80f294b03ae4cfc8b95
---
ssh-keygen.1 | 13 +++++++++++--
sshkey.c | 9 ++++++++-
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index f29774249..673bf6e2f 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: March 5 2019 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: May 20 2019 $
.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -577,6 +577,15 @@ The possible values are
.Dq ed25519 ,
or
.Dq rsa .
+.Pp
+This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type when
+signing certificates using a RSA CA key.
+The available RSA signature variants are
+.Dq ssh-rsa
+(SHA1 signatures, not recommended),
+.Dq rsa-sha2-256
+.Dq rsa-sha2-512
+(the default).
.It Fl U
When used in combination with
.Fl s ,
diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
index 9849cb237..379a579cf 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -2528,6 +2528,13 @@ sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
strcmp(alg, k->cert->signature_type) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ /*
+ * If no signing algorithm or signature_type was specified and we're
+ * using a RSA key, then default to a good signature algorithm.
+ */
+ if (alg == NULL && ca->type == KEY_RSA)
+ alg = "rsa-sha2-512";
+
if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;

12
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol 2021-03-18 17:41:34.472404994 +0100
+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c 2021-03-18 17:41:55.255538761 +0100
@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
lnum++;
cp = line;
- cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
+ cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
/* Trim leading space and comments */
cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')

33
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keyscan-rsa-sha2.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 7250879c72d28275a53f2f220e49646c3e42ef18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2019 04:08:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] upstream: include SHA2-variant RSA key algorithms in KEX
proposal;
allows ssh-keyscan to harvest keys from servers that disable olde SHA1
ssh-rsa. bz#3029 from Jakub Jelen
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f95ebf76a150c2f727ca4780fb2599d50bbab7a
---
ssh-keyscan.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
index d95ba1b37..d383b57b9 100644
--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -233,7 +233,12 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
break;
case KT_RSA:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
- "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-rsa";
+ "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
+ "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
+ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
+ "rsa-sha2-512,"
+ "rsa-sha2-256,"
+ "ssh-rsa";
break;
case KT_ED25519:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?

720
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,720 @@
From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures
---
digest-openssl.c | 16 ++++
digest.h | 6 ++
ssh-dss.c | 65 ++++++++++------
ssh-ecdsa.c | 69 ++++++++++-------
ssh-rsa.c | 193 +++++++++--------------------------------------
sshkey.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
sshkey.h | 4 +
7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
--- a/digest-openssl.c
+++ b/digest-openssl.c
@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
{ -1, NULL, 0, NULL },
};
+const EVP_MD *
+ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type)
+{
+ switch (digest_type) {
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+ return EVP_sha1();
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+ return EVP_sha256();
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
+ return EVP_sha384();
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+ return EVP_sha512();
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
static const struct ssh_digest *
ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
{
diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644
--- a/digest.h
+++ b/digest.h
@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
struct sshbuf;
struct ssh_digest_ctx;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
+const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
+#endif
+
/* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
--- a/ssh-dss.c
+++ b/ssh-dss.c
@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int
ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
- size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
+ u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
+ size_t rlen, slen;
+ int len;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ u_char *sigb = NULL;
+ const u_char *psig = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (lenp != NULL)
@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if (dlen == 0)
- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
+ data, datalen);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (ret < 0) {
goto out;
+ }
- if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
+ psig = sigb;
+ if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
+ free(sigb);
+ sigb = NULL;
DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
*lenp = len;
ret = 0;
out:
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ free(sigb);
DSA_SIG_free(sig);
sshbuf_free(b);
return ret;
@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
- size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
+ u_char *sigblob = NULL;
+ size_t len, slen;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *ktype = NULL;
+ u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if (dlen == 0)
- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* fetch signature */
if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
}
sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- /* sha1 the data */
- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
-
- switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
- case 1:
- ret = 0;
- break;
- case 0:
- ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ }
+ if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
- default:
+ }
+ psig = sigb;
+ if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
+ sigb, slen);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
out:
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ free(sigb);
DSA_SIG_free(sig);
BN_clear_free(sig_r);
BN_clear_free(sig_s);
diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
--- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
+++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int
ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *psig;
const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
int hash_alg;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- size_t len, dlen;
+ int len;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
- (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+ if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
+ datalen);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (ret < 0) {
goto out;
+ }
- if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
+ psig = sigb;
+ if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
-
if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
*lenp = len;
ret = 0;
out:
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ free(sigb);
sshbuf_free(b);
sshbuf_free(bb);
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
- int hash_alg;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- size_t dlen;
+ int hash_alg, len;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
char *ktype = NULL;
+ unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
- (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+ if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* fetch signature */
@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
}
sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ /* Figure out the length */
+ if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ psig = sigb;
+ if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
+ }
- switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
- case 1:
- ret = 0;
- break;
- case 0:
- ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
goto out;
- default:
- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
+ ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
out:
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ free(sigb);
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
sshbuf_free(b);
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
--- a/ssh-rsa.c
+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
static const char *
rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
return -1;
}
-static int
-rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
-{
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
- return NID_sha1;
- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
- return NID_sha256;
- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
- return NID_sha512;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
int
ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
{
@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int
ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
{
- const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
- size_t slen = 0;
- u_int dlen, len;
- int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ u_char *sig = NULL;
+ int len, slen = 0;
+ int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
else
hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident);
+
if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
- return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
- if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-
- /* hash the data */
- nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
- if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
- goto out;
+ if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
+ datalen);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (ret < 0) {
goto out;
}
- if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
if (len < slen) {
size_t diff = slen - len;
memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
+
/* encode signature */
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
*lenp = len;
ret = 0;
out:
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
freezero(sig, slen);
sshbuf_free(b);
return ret;
@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
const char *alg)
{
- const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
char *sigtype = NULL;
int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen;
+ size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+ if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
len = modlen;
}
- if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
- goto out;
+ ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
- key->rsa);
out:
freezero(sigblob, len);
free(sigtype);
@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
return ret;
}
-/*
- * See:
- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
- */
-
-/*
- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
- * oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
- */
-static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
- 0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
- 0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
- 0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
- 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
- 0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
-};
-
-/*
- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
- * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
- * id-sha256(1) }
- */
-static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
- 0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
- 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
- 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
- 0x04, 0x20 /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
-};
-
-/*
- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
- * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
- * id-sha256(3) }
- */
-static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
- 0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
- 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
- 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
- 0x04, 0x40 /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
-};
-
static int
-rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
+openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
- switch (hash_alg) {
- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
- *oidp = id_sha1;
- *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
- break;
- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
- *oidp = id_sha256;
- *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
- break;
- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
- *oidp = id_sha512;
- *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
- break;
- default:
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- }
- return 0;
-}
+ size_t rsasize = 0;
+ const RSA *rsa;
+ int ret;
-static int
-openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
- u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
-{
- size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
- int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
- const u_char *oid = NULL;
- u_char *decrypted = NULL;
-
- if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
- return ret;
- ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
- if (hashlen != hlen) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto done;
- }
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto done;
}
- if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto done;
- }
- if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- goto done;
- }
- if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- goto done;
- }
- oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
- hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
- if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
- goto done;
- }
- ret = 0;
+
+ ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen,
+ sigbuf, siglen);
+
done:
- freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
return ret;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type)
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+int
+sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
+ int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ u_char *sig = NULL;
+ int ret, slen, len;
+
+ if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+
+ slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ len = slen;
+ if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ *sigp = sig;
+ *lenp = len;
+ /* Now owned by the caller */
+ sig = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+
+error:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ free(sig);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
+ size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 1:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ break;
+ }
+
+done:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
int
sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
index a91e60436..270901a87 100644
--- a/sshkey.h
+++ b/sshkey.h
@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
char *sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
+int sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
+ int *, const u_char *, size_t);
+int sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
+ size_t, u_char *, int);
int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);

137
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
commit 2c3ef499bfffce3cfd315edeebf202850ba4e00a
Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Tue Apr 16 15:35:18 2019 +0200
Use the new OpenSSL KDF
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 2a455e4e..e01c3d43 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2712,6 +2712,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
HMAC_CTX_init \
RSA_generate_key_ex \
RSA_get_default_method \
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id \
])
# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
+# include <openssl/kdf.h>
+# endif
#endif
#include "ssh.h"
@@ -942,6 +945,95 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
return r;
}
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
+static const EVP_MD *
+digest_to_md(int digest_type)
+{
+ switch (digest_type) {
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+ return EVP_sha1();
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+ return EVP_sha256();
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
+ return EVP_sha384();
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+ return EVP_sha512();
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+ const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ u_char *key = NULL;
+ int r, key_len;
+
+ if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
+ if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
+ if (!ctx) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg));
+ if (r != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
+ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret));
+ if (r != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, hash, hashlen);
+ if (r != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE, id);
+ if (r != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
+ kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
+ if (r != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len);
+ if (r != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
+ dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
+#endif
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ r = 0;
+
+out:
+ free (key);
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ return r;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
static int
derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
@@ -1004,6 +1096,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
return r;
}
+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID */
#define NKEYS 6
int

324
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-pem.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
From eb0d8e708a1f958aecd2d6e2ff2450af488d4c2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 13:16:29 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] upstream: support PKCS8 as an optional format for storage of
private keys, enabled via "ssh-keygen -m PKCS8" on operations that save
private keys to disk.
The OpenSSH native key format remains the default, but PKCS8 is a
superior format to PEM if interoperability with non-OpenSSH software
is required, as it may use a less terrible KDF (IIRC PEM uses a single
round of MD5 as a KDF).
adapted from patch by Jakub Jelen via bz3013; ok markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 027824e3bc0b1c243dc5188504526d73a55accb1
---
authfile.c | 6 ++--
ssh-keygen.1 | 9 +++---
ssh-keygen.c | 25 +++++++++--------
sshkey.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
sshkey.h | 11 ++++++--
5 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
index 2166c1689..851c1a8a1 100644
--- a/authfile.c
+++ b/authfile.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename)
int
sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
- int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
+ int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
{
struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
int r;
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
- force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0)
+ format, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
goto out;
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index f42127c60..8184a1797 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -419,11 +419,12 @@ The supported key formats are:
.Dq RFC4716
(RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
.Dq PKCS8
-(PEM PKCS8 public key)
+(PKCS8 public or private key)
or
.Dq PEM
(PEM public key).
-The default conversion format is
+By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its own
+format, but when converting public keys for export the default format is
.Dq RFC4716 .
Setting a format of
.Dq PEM
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index b019a02ff..5dcad1f61 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -147,11 +147,11 @@ static char *key_type_name = NULL;
/* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */
static char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
-/* Use new OpenSSH private key format when writing SSH2 keys instead of PEM */
-static int use_new_format = 1;
+/* Format for writing private keys */
+static int private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH;
/* Cipher for new-format private keys */
-static char *new_format_cipher = NULL;
+static char *openssh_format_cipher = NULL;
/*
* Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys /
@@ -1048,7 +1048,8 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name,
hostname);
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "",
- comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
+ rounds)) != 0) {
error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
prv_tmp, ssh_err(r));
goto failnext;
@@ -1391,7 +1392,7 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
- comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
@@ -1480,7 +1481,7 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment)
}
if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS &&
- !use_new_format) {
+ private_key_format != SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH) {
error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in "
"the new format (-o).");
explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
@@ -1514,7 +1515,8 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment)
/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
- new_comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ new_comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
+ rounds)) != 0) {
error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
@@ -2525,11 +2527,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
}
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) {
convert_format = FMT_PKCS8;
+ private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8;
break;
}
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) {
convert_format = FMT_PEM;
- use_new_format = 0;
+ private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM;
break;
}
fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg);
@@ -2567,7 +2570,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
add_cert_option(optarg);
break;
case 'Z':
- new_format_cipher = optarg;
+ openssh_format_cipher = optarg;
break;
case 'C':
identity_comment = optarg;
@@ -2912,7 +2915,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
/* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
- comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
index 6b5ff0485..a0cea9257 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -3975,10 +3975,10 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-/* convert SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */
+/* convert SSH v2 key to PEM or PKCS#8 format */
static int
-sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
- const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
+sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
+ int format, const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
{
int success, r;
int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase);
@@ -3988,26 +3988,46 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL;
char *bptr;
BIO *bio = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
if (len > 0 && len <= 4)
return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT;
- if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 && (pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
- success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
- cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
+ success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ } else {
+ success = EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa);
+ }
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
- success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
- cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
+ success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ } else {
+ success = EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa);
+ }
break;
#endif
case KEY_RSA:
- success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
- cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
+ success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ } else {
+ success = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa);
+ }
break;
default:
success = 0;
@@ -4023,6 +4040,13 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8) {
+ if ((success = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bio, pkey, cipher,
+ passphrase, len, NULL, NULL)) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
@@ -4035,6 +4059,7 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
BIO_free(bio);
return r;
}
@@ -4046,29 +4071,38 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
int
sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
- int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
+ int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
{
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_RSA:
- if (force_new_format) {
- return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
- comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
- }
- return sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(key, blob,
- passphrase, comment);
+ break; /* see below */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
- comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
+ comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ switch (format) {
+ case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH:
+ return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
+ comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
+ case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM:
+ case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8:
+ return sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(key, blob,
+ format, passphrase, comment);
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
}
diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
index 41d159a1b..d30a69cc9 100644
--- a/sshkey.h
+++ b/sshkey.h
@@ -88,6 +88,13 @@ enum sshkey_serialize_rep {
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO = 254,
};
+/* Private key disk formats */
+enum sshkey_private_format {
+ SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH = 0,
+ SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM = 1,
+ SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 = 2,
+};
+
/* key is stored in external hardware */
#define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001
@@ -221,7 +228,7 @@ int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp);
/* private key file format parsing and serialisation */
int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
- int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds);
+ int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds);
int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,

3140
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

44
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors 2021-03-31 17:03:15.618592347 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c 2021-03-31 17:06:58.115220014 +0200
@@ -511,7 +511,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
goto auth_fail;
if (!do_pam_account()) {
- sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+ /* Preserve PAM_PERM_DENIED and PAM_USER_UNKNOWN.
+ * Backward compatibility for other errors. */
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_PERM_DENIED
+ && sshpam_err != PAM_USER_UNKNOWN)
+ sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
goto auth_fail;
}
if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
@@ -568,8 +572,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
- if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
- ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer);
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_PERM_DENIED
+ || sshpam_err == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN
+ || sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer);
else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
else
@@ -856,10 +862,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
plen++;
free(msg);
break;
+ case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
+ case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
+ sshpam_account_status = 0;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
case PAM_MAXTRIES:
- if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
- sshpam_account_status = 0;
if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
/* FALLTHROUGH */

33
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-proxyjump-loops.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From de1f3564cd85915b3002859873a37cb8d31ac9ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "dtucker@openbsd.org" <dtucker@openbsd.org>
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2020 08:49:49 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Detect and prevent simple configuration loops when
using
ProxyJump. bz#3057, ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 077d21c564c886c98309d871ed6f8ef267b9f037
---
ssh.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 15aee569e..a983a108b 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -1208,6 +1208,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
char port_s[8];
const char *sshbin = argv0;
+ int port = options.port, jumpport = options.jump_port;
+
+ if (port <= 0)
+ port = default_ssh_port();
+ if (jumpport <= 0)
+ jumpport = default_ssh_port();
+ if (strcmp(options.jump_host, host) == 0 && port == jumpport)
+ fatal("jumphost loop via %s", options.jump_host);
/*
* Try to use SSH indicated by argv[0], but fall back to

44
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-rdomain.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
commit 5481d0b4036b33b92c372ee36258ed11bff57d5d
Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Thu Feb 27 10:07:33 2020 +0100
Mark the RDomain configuration option unsupported on non-openbsd builds
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index db80e943..153d2525 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -698,7 +698,11 @@ static struct {
{ "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL },
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
+#else
+ { "rdomain", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+#endif
{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
@@ -2841,7 +2845,9 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
o->hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types ?
o->pubkey_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain);
+#endif
/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 5dca8981..766e9b90 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -1542,6 +1542,7 @@ will be bound to this
If the routing domain is set to
.Cm \&%D ,
then the domain in which the incoming connection was received will be applied.
+This feature is available on OpenBSD only.
.It Cm SetEnv
Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child sessions started
by

311
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/channels.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.restore-nonblock 2021-06-21 10:44:26.380559612 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.c 2021-06-21 10:48:47.754579151 +0200
@@ -333,7 +333,27 @@ channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Ch
#endif
/* enable nonblocking mode */
- if (nonblock) {
+ c->restore_block = 0;
+ if (nonblock == CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO) {
+ /*
+ * Special handling for stdio file descriptors: do not set
+ * non-blocking mode if they are TTYs. Otherwise prepare to
+ * restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering
+ * with other programs that follow.
+ */
+ if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD;
+ set_nonblock(rfd);
+ }
+ if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD;
+ set_nonblock(wfd);
+ }
+ if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD;
+ set_nonblock(efd);
+ }
+ } else if (nonblock) {
if (rfd != -1)
set_nonblock(rfd);
if (wfd != -1)
@@ -422,17 +442,23 @@ channel_find_maxfd(struct ssh_channels *
}
int
-channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, int *fdp)
+channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int *fdp)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
- int ret = 0, fd = *fdp;
+ int ret, fd = *fdp;
- if (fd != -1) {
- ret = close(fd);
- *fdp = -1;
- if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
- channel_find_maxfd(sc);
- }
+ if (fd == -1)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((*fdp == c->rfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD) != 0) ||
+ (*fdp == c->wfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD) != 0) ||
+ (*fdp == c->efd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD) != 0))
+ (void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, 0); /* restore blocking */
+
+ ret = close(fd);
+ *fdp = -1;
+ if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
+ channel_find_maxfd(sc);
return ret;
}
@@ -442,13 +468,13 @@ channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Chann
{
int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd;
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
if (rfd != sock)
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd);
if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd)
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd);
if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
}
static void
@@ -681,7 +707,7 @@ channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh)
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
channel_free(ssh, c);
break;
}
@@ -1487,7 +1513,8 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct
Channel *
channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh,
- const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out)
+ const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect,
+ int in, int out, int nonblock)
{
Channel *c;
@@ -1495,7 +1522,7 @@ channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ss
c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out,
-1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0);
+ 0, "stdio-forward", nonblock);
c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
c->host_port = port_to_connect;
@@ -1650,7 +1677,7 @@ channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ss
if (c->single_connection) {
oerrno = errno;
debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener.");
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
errno = oerrno;
}
@@ -2087,7 +2114,7 @@ channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh
return 1;
if (len <= 0) {
debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd);
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
@@ -2119,7 +2146,7 @@ channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh,
if (len <= 0) {
debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d",
c->self, c->efd);
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
} else {
if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) {
debug3("channel %d: discard efd",
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/channels.h
--- openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.restore-nonblock 2021-06-21 10:44:26.380559612 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.h 2021-06-21 10:44:26.387559665 +0200
@@ -63,6 +63,16 @@
#define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1
+/* nonblocking flags for channel_new */
+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_LEAVE 0 /* don't modify non-blocking state */
+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_SET 1 /* set non-blocking state */
+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO 2 /* set non-blocking and restore on close */
+
+/* c->restore_block mask flags */
+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD 0x01
+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD 0x02
+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD 0x04
+
/* TCP forwarding */
#define FORWARD_DENY 0
#define FORWARD_REMOTE (1)
@@ -131,6 +141,7 @@ struct Channel {
* to a matching pre-select handler.
* this way post-select handlers are not
* accidentally called if a FD gets reused */
+ int restore_block; /* fd mask to restore blocking status */
struct sshbuf *input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over
* encrypted connection */
struct sshbuf *output; /* data received over encrypted connection for
@@ -258,7 +269,7 @@ void channel_register_filter(struct ssh
void channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int,
channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *);
void channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int);
-int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, int *);
+int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, Channel *, int *);
void channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *);
/* mux proxy support */
@@ -305,7 +316,7 @@ Channel *channel_connect_to_port(struct
char *, char *, int *, const char **);
Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *);
Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*,
- u_short, int, int);
+ u_short, int, int, int);
Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *,
u_short, char *, char *);
Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *,
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c.restore-nonblock 2021-06-21 10:44:26.290558923 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c 2021-06-21 10:44:26.387559665 +0200
@@ -1436,14 +1436,6 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pt
if (have_pty)
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
- /* restore blocking io */
- if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
- unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
- if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
- unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
- if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
- unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
-
/*
* If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote
* exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/mux.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/mux.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/mux.c.restore-nonblock 2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/mux.c 2021-06-21 10:50:51.007537336 +0200
@@ -454,14 +454,6 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ss
if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1)
error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
- if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
- if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
- if (!isatty(new_fd[2]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[2]);
-
window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
if (cctx->want_tty) {
@@ -471,7 +463,7 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ss
nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING,
new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax,
- CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
+ CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */
c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */
@@ -1033,13 +1025,8 @@ mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh
}
}
- /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
- if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
- if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
-
- nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
+ nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1],
+ CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
free(chost);
nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c.restore-nonblock 2021-06-21 10:44:26.388559673 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c 2021-06-21 10:52:42.685405537 +0200
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *ssh, Cha
strerror(errno));
}
} else {
- if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd) < 0) {
+ if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd) < 0) {
logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
"fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
c->self, __func__, c->wfd, c->istate, c->ostate,
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *ssh, Chan
strerror(errno));
}
} else {
- if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd) < 0) {
+ if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd) < 0) {
logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
"fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
c->self, __func__, c->rfd, c->istate, c->ostate,
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *
debug2("channel %d: %s (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
c->self, __func__, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd,
channel_format_extended_usage(c));
- if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd) < 0) {
+ if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd) < 0) {
logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
"extended fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
c->self, __func__, c->efd, c->istate, c->ostate,
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.restore-nonblock 2021-06-21 10:44:26.389559681 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c 2021-06-21 10:54:47.651377045 +0200
@@ -1709,7 +1709,8 @@ ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ss
(out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) < 0)
fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed");
if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host,
- options.stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL)
+ options.stdio_forward_port, in, out,
+ CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__);
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0);
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL);
@@ -1862,14 +1863,6 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0)
fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
- /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
- if (!isatty(in))
- set_nonblock(in);
- if (!isatty(out))
- set_nonblock(out);
- if (!isatty(err))
- set_nonblock(err);
-
window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
if (tty_flag) {
@@ -1879,7 +1872,7 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
c = channel_new(ssh,
"session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
- "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
+ "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
debug3("%s: channel_new: %d", __func__, c->self);

61
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-scp-tests.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
diff --git a/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
index 59f1ff63..dd48a482 100644
--- a/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
+++ b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
@@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ badserver_4)
echo "C755 2 file"
echo "X"
;;
+badserver_5)
+ echo "D0555 0 "
+ echo "X"
+ ;;
+badserver_6)
+ echo "D0555 0 ."
+ echo "X"
+ ;;
+badserver_7)
+ echo "C0755 2 extrafile"
+ echo "X"
+ ;;
*)
set -- $arg
shift
diff --git a/regress/scp.sh b/regress/scp.sh
index 57cc7706..104c89e1 100644
--- a/regress/scp.sh
+++ b/regress/scp.sh
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
scpclean() {
rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2}
mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+ chmod 755 ${DIR} ${DIR2}
}
verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to local file"
@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ]; then
$SUDO rm ${DIR2}/copy
fi
-for i in 0 1 2 3 4; do
+for i in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7; do
verbose "$tid: disallow bad server #$i"
SCPTESTMODE=badserver_$i
export DIR SCPTESTMODE
@@ -113,6 +114,15 @@ for i in 0 1 2 3 4; do
scpclean
$SCP -r $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
[ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation outside of subdir"
+
+ scpclean
+ $SCP -pr $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+ [ ! -w ${DIR2} ] && fail "allows target root attribute change"
+
+ scpclean
+ $SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+ [ -e ${DIR2}/extrafile ] && fail "allows extranous object creation"
+ rm -f ${DIR2}/extrafile
done
verbose "$tid: detect non-directory target"

273
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sftp-realpath.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
diff --color -ruN a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
--- a/Makefile.in 2022-06-23 11:31:10.168186838 +0200
+++ b/Makefile.in 2022-06-23 11:32:19.146513347 +0200
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o \
sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o
@@ -217,8 +217,8 @@
ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
- $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
diff --color -ruN a/sftp-realpath.c b/sftp-realpath.c
--- a/sftp-realpath.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ b/sftp-realpath.c 2022-06-23 11:35:33.193244873 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-realpath.c,v 1.2 2021/09/02 21:03:54 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik@iclub.nsu.ru>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior written
+ * permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX
+# define SYMLOOP_MAX 32
+#endif
+
+/* XXX rewrite sftp-server to use POSIX realpath and remove this hack */
+
+char *sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
+
+/*
+ * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]);
+ *
+ * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
+ * components. Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
+ * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
+ */
+char *
+sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved)
+{
+ struct stat sb;
+ char *p, *q, *s;
+ size_t left_len, resolved_len;
+ unsigned symlinks;
+ int serrno, slen, mem_allocated;
+ char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX];
+
+ if (path[0] == '\0') {
+ errno = ENOENT;
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ serrno = errno;
+
+ if (resolved == NULL) {
+ resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX);
+ if (resolved == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ mem_allocated = 1;
+ } else
+ mem_allocated = 0;
+
+ symlinks = 0;
+ if (path[0] == '/') {
+ resolved[0] = '/';
+ resolved[1] = '\0';
+ if (path[1] == '\0')
+ return (resolved);
+ resolved_len = 1;
+ left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left));
+ } else {
+ if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) {
+ if (mem_allocated)
+ free(resolved);
+ else
+ strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ resolved_len = strlen(resolved);
+ left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left));
+ }
+ if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Iterate over path components in `left'.
+ */
+ while (left_len != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Extract the next path component and adjust `left'
+ * and its length.
+ */
+ p = strchr(left, '/');
+ s = p ? p : left + left_len;
+ if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(next_token, left, s - left);
+ next_token[s - left] = '\0';
+ left_len -= s - left;
+ if (p != NULL)
+ memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1);
+ if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') {
+ if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ resolved[resolved_len++] = '/';
+ resolved[resolved_len] = '\0';
+ }
+ if (next_token[0] == '\0')
+ continue;
+ else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0)
+ continue;
+ else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Strip the last path component except when we have
+ * single "/"
+ */
+ if (resolved_len > 1) {
+ resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+ q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+ *q = '\0';
+ resolved_len = q - resolved;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If
+ * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if
+ * there are no more path components left.
+ */
+ resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX);
+ if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) {
+ if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) {
+ errno = serrno;
+ return (resolved);
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
+ if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) {
+ errno = ELOOP;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1);
+ if (slen < 0)
+ goto err;
+ symlink[slen] = '\0';
+ if (symlink[0] == '/') {
+ resolved[1] = 0;
+ resolved_len = 1;
+ } else if (resolved_len > 1) {
+ /* Strip the last path component. */
+ resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+ q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+ *q = '\0';
+ resolved_len = q - resolved;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If there are any path components left, then
+ * append them to symlink. The result is placed
+ * in `left'.
+ */
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') {
+ if (slen + 1 >=
+ (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ symlink[slen] = '/';
+ symlink[slen + 1] = 0;
+ }
+ left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(symlink));
+ if (left_len >= sizeof(symlink)) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname
+ * is a single "/".
+ */
+ if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/')
+ resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+ return (resolved);
+
+err:
+ if (mem_allocated)
+ free(resolved);
+ return (NULL);
+}
diff --color -ruN a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
--- a/sftp-server.c 2022-06-23 11:31:10.147186434 +0200
+++ b/sftp-server.c 2022-06-23 11:32:19.147513366 +0200
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
#include "sftp.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
+char *sftp_realpath(const char *, char *); /* sftp-realpath.c */
+
/* Our verbosity */
static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
@@ -1185,7 +1187,7 @@
}
debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
- if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
+ if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
} else {
Stat s;

16
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sftp-timespeccmp.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c.original openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c.original 2020-12-22 17:05:02.105698989 +0900
+++ openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c 2020-12-22 17:05:42.922035780 +0900
@@ -937,7 +937,11 @@ sglob_comp(const void *aa, const void *b
return (rmul * strcmp(ap, bp));
else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) {
#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM)
- return (rmul * timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <));
+ if (timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <)){
+ return rmul;
+ } else {
+ return -rmul;
+ }
#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME)
return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_mtime, bs->st_mtime));
#else

97
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sshd_config.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index ffac5d2c..340045b2 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
return -1;
}
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
@@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
"line %d", ci->user, arg, line);
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
result = 0;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->host == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
@@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
"%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line);
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->address == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
return -1;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){
- if (ci == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
@@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
arg);
return -1;
}
- if (ci == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
@@ -1138,10 +1138,12 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
else
result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "rdomain") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL || ci->rdomain == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->rdomain == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
+ if (ci->rdomain == NULL)
+ match_test_missing_fatal("RDomain", "rdomain");
if (match_pattern_list(ci->rdomain, arg, 0) != 1)
result = 0;
else
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 54e0a8d8..5483da05 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -221,6 +221,8 @@ struct connection_info {
const char *laddress; /* local address */
int lport; /* local port */
const char *rdomain; /* routing domain if available */
+ int test; /* test mode, allow some attributes to be
+ * unspecified */
};
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index cbd3bce9..1fcde502 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1843,6 +1843,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
*/
if (connection_info == NULL)
connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
+ connection_info->test = 1;
parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
dump_config(&options);
}

805
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sshd_include.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,805 @@
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/auth.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/auth.c.sshdinclude 2021-10-20 15:18:49.740331098 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/auth.c 2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct include_list includes;
extern int use_privsep;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
@@ -573,7 +574,7 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
ci->user = user;
- parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
+ parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
log_change_level(options.log_level);
process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.sshdinclude 2021-10-20 15:21:43.541848103 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c 2021-10-20 15:22:06.302046768 +0200
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
static void
rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum)
{
- int i, j;
+ int i, j, onum_send_env = options->num_send_env;
char *cp;
/* Remove an environment variable */
@@ -734,6 +734,11 @@ rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg
options->num_send_env--;
/* NB. don't increment i */
}
+ if (onum_send_env != options->num_send_env) {
+ options->send_env = xrecallocarray(options->send_env,
+ onum_send_env, options->num_send_env,
+ sizeof(*options->send_env));
+ }
}
/*
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile
--- openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile.sshdinclude 2021-10-20 15:18:49.742331115 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile 2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ LTESTS= connect \
principals-command \
cert-file \
cfginclude \
+ servcfginclude \
allow-deny-users \
authinfo
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* au
sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \
ssh_proxy_envpass sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config_minimal \
- sshd_config.orig sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
+ sshd_config.* sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \
t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \
t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh
--- openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh.sshdinclude 2021-10-20 15:18:49.744331132 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh 2021-10-20 15:22:06.303046777 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="server config include"
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Match host a
+ Banner /aa
+
+Match host b
+ Banner /bb
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+Match host c
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+ Banner /cc
+
+Match host m
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+Match Host d
+ Banner /dd
+
+Match Host e
+ Banner /ee
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+Match Host f
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+ Banner /ff
+
+Match Host n
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.0 << _EOF
+Match host xxxxxx
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.1 << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Banner /aaa
+
+Match host b
+ Banner /bbb
+
+Match host c
+ Banner /ccc
+
+Match Host d
+ Banner /ddd
+
+Match Host e
+ Banner /eee
+
+Match Host f
+ Banner /fff
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Banner /aaaa
+
+Match host b
+ Banner /bbbb
+
+Match host c
+ Banner /cccc
+
+Match Host d
+ Banner /dddd
+
+Match Host e
+ Banner /eeee
+
+Match Host f
+ Banner /ffff
+
+Match all
+ Banner /xxxx
+_EOF
+
+trial() {
+ _host="$1"
+ _exp="$2"
+ _desc="$3"
+ test -z "$_desc" && _desc="test match"
+ trace "$_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
+ ${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
+ -C "host=$_host,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out ||
+ fatal "ssh config parse failed: $_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
+ _got=`grep -i '^banner ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+ if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
+ fail "$desc_ host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
+ fi
+}
+
+trial a /aa
+trial b /bb
+trial c /ccc
+trial d /dd
+trial e /ee
+trial f /fff
+trial m /xxxx
+trial n /xxxx
+trial x none
+
+# Prepare an included config with an error.
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.3 << _EOF
+Banner xxxx
+ Junk
+_EOF
+
+trace "disallow invalid config host=a"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
+ -C "host=a,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
+
+trace "disallow invalid config host=x"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
+ -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+Banner /aa
+_EOF
+
+trial a /aa "missing include non-fatal"
+
+# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
+Match host x
+_EOF
+
+trial a /aa "included file does not affect match state"
+
+# Ensure the empty include directive is not accepted
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
+Include
+_EOF
+
+trace "disallow invalid with no argument"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x -T \
+ -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "sshd allowed Include with no argument"
+
+# Ensure the Include before any Match block works as expected (bug #3122)
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+Banner /xx
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
+Match host a
+ Banner /aaaa
+_EOF
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Banner /aa
+_EOF
+
+trace "Include before match blocks"
+trial a /aa "included file before match blocks is properly evaluated"
+
+# Port in included file is correctly interpretted (bug #3169)
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
+Port 7722
+_EOF
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+_EOF
+
+trace "Port after included files"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
+ -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out || \
+ fail "failed to parse Port after included files"
+_port=`grep -i '^port ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+if test "x7722" != "x$_port" ; then
+ fail "The Port in included file was intertepretted wrongly. Expected 7722, got $_port"
+fi
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* $OBJ/sshd_config.out
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh
--- openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshdinclude 2021-10-20 15:18:49.746331150 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh 2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
REAL_SSH="$SSH"
+REAL_SSHD="$SSHD"
SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP"
# Some test data. We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it.
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.sshdinclude 2021-10-20 15:18:49.748331167 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c 2021-10-20 15:22:06.303046777 +0200
@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
#include <util.h>
#endif
+#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+# include <glob.h>
+#else
+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
+#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -70,6 +75,9 @@ static void add_listen_addr(ServerOption
const char *, int);
static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
const char *, int);
+static void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options,
+ const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth);
/* Use of privilege separation or not */
extern int use_privsep;
@@ -528,7 +536,7 @@ typedef enum {
sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- sHostCertificate,
+ sHostCertificate, sInclude,
sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
@@ -540,9 +548,11 @@ typedef enum {
sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
-#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
-#define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */
-#define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of config */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */
+#define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+#define SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH 0x04 /* Match never matches; internal only */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY 0x08 /* Match only in conditional blocks; internal only */
/* Textual representation of the tokens. */
static struct {
@@ -687,6 +697,7 @@ static struct {
{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -1259,13 +1270,14 @@ static const struct multistate multistat
{ NULL, -1 }
};
-int
-process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+static int
+process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
- struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo, int *inc_flags, int depth,
+ struct include_list *includes)
{
char ch, *cp, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p;
- int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port;
+ int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port, oactive, r, found;
SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
ServerOpCodes opcode;
@@ -1274,6 +1286,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
long long val64;
const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
const char *errstr;
+ struct include_item *item;
+ glob_t gbuf;
/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
@@ -1300,7 +1314,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
cmdline = 1;
activep = &cmdline;
}
- if (*activep && opcode != sMatch)
+ if (*activep && opcode != sMatch && opcode != sInclude)
debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
if (connectinfo == NULL) {
@@ -1980,15 +1994,112 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
*intptr = value;
break;
+ case sInclude:
+ if (cmdline) {
+ fatal("Include directive not supported as a "
+ "command-line option");
+ }
+ value = 0;
+ while ((arg2 = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg2 != '\0') {
+ value++;
+ found = 0;
+ if (*arg2 != '/' && *arg2 != '~') {
+ xasprintf(&arg, "%s/%s", SSHDIR, arg2);
+ } else
+ arg = xstrdup(arg2);
+
+ /*
+ * Don't let included files clobber the containing
+ * file's Match state.
+ */
+ oactive = *activep;
+
+ /* consult cache of include files */
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(item, includes, entry) {
+ if (strcmp(item->selector, arg) != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (item->filename != NULL) {
+ parse_server_config_depth(options,
+ item->filename, item->contents,
+ includes, connectinfo,
+ (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
+ ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
+ ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
+ activep, depth + 1);
+ }
+ found = 1;
+ *activep = oactive;
+ }
+ if (found != 0) {
+ free(arg);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* requested glob was not in cache */
+ debug2("%s line %d: new include %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if ((r = glob(arg, 0, NULL, &gbuf)) != 0) {
+ if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: include \"%s\" "
+ "glob failed", filename,
+ linenum, arg);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If no entry matched then record a
+ * placeholder to skip later glob calls.
+ */
+ debug2("%s line %d: no match for %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+ item->selector = strdup(arg);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes,
+ item, entry);
+ }
+ if (gbuf.gl_pathc > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: too many glob results", __func__);
+ for (n = 0; n < (int)gbuf.gl_pathc; n++) {
+ debug2("%s line %d: including %s",
+ filename, linenum, gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
+ item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+ item->selector = strdup(arg);
+ item->filename = strdup(gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
+ if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed",
+ __func__);
+ }
+ load_server_config(item->filename,
+ item->contents);
+ parse_server_config_depth(options,
+ item->filename, item->contents,
+ includes, connectinfo,
+ (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
+ ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
+ ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
+ activep, depth + 1);
+ *activep = oactive;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry);
+ }
+ globfree(&gbuf);
+ free(arg);
+ }
+ if (value == 0) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: Include missing filename argument",
+ filename, linenum);
+ }
+ break;
+
case sMatch:
if (cmdline)
fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
"option");
- value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo);
+ value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum,
+ (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? NULL : connectinfo));
if (value < 0)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
linenum);
- *activep = value;
+ *activep = (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
+ /* The MATCH_ONLY is applicable only until the first match block */
+ *inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY;
break;
case sKerberosUseKuserok:
@@ -2275,6 +2386,18 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
return 0;
}
+int
+process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo, struct include_list *includes)
+{
+ int inc_flags = 0;
+
+ return process_server_config_line_depth(options, line, filename,
+ linenum, activep, connectinfo, &inc_flags, 0, includes);
+}
+
+
/* Reads the server configuration file. */
void
@@ -2313,12 +2436,13 @@ load_server_config(const char *filename,
void
parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options,
- struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+ struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
{
ServerOptions mo;
initialize_server_options(&mo);
- parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, connectinfo);
+ parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, includes,
+ connectinfo);
copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0);
}
@@ -2464,28 +2588,44 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
#undef M_CP_STROPT
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
-void
-parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
- struct sshbuf *conf, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+#define SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16
+static void
+parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
+ struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth)
{
- int active, linenum, bad_options = 0;
+ int linenum, bad_options = 0;
char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
- debug2("%s: config %s len %zu", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf));
+ if (depth < 0 || depth > SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
+ fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
+
+ debug2("%s: config %s len %zu%s", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf),
+ (flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? " [checking syntax only]" : ""));
if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
- active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
linenum = 1;
while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
- if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename,
- linenum++, &active, connectinfo) != 0)
+ if (process_server_config_line_depth(options, cp,
+ filename, linenum++, activep, connectinfo, &flags,
+ depth, includes) != 0)
bad_options++;
}
free(obuf);
if (bad_options > 0)
fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
filename, bad_options);
+}
+
+void
+parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
+ struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+{
+ int active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
+ parse_server_config_depth(options, filename, conf, includes,
+ connectinfo, (connectinfo ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : 0), &active, 0);
process_queued_listen_addrs(options);
}
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h
--- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h.sshdinclude 2021-10-20 15:18:49.750331185 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h 2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
#ifndef SERVCONF_H
#define SERVCONF_H
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
#define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */
#define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */
@@ -234,6 +236,15 @@ struct connection_info {
* unspecified */
};
+/* List of included files for re-exec from the parsed configuration */
+struct include_item {
+ char *selector;
+ char *filename;
+ struct sshbuf *contents;
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(include_item) entry;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
+
/*
* These are string config options that must be copied between the
@@ -273,12 +284,13 @@ struct connection_info *get_connection_i
void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
- int *, struct connection_info *);
+ int *, struct connection_info *, struct include_list *includes);
void process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options);
void load_server_config(const char *, struct sshbuf *);
void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, struct sshbuf *,
- struct connection_info *);
-void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, struct connection_info *);
+ struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
+void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *,
+ struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *);
int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *);
void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int);
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.sshdinclude 2021-10-20 15:18:49.754331220 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5 2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
@@ -825,7 +825,20 @@ during
and use only the system-wide known hosts file
.Pa /etc/ssh/known_hosts .
The default is
-.Cm no .
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm Include
+Include the specified configuration file(s).
+Multiple path names may be specified and each pathname may contain
+.Xr glob 7
+wildcards.
+Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
+.Pa /etc/ssh .
+A
+.Cm Include
+directive may appear inside a
+.Cm Match
+block
+to perform conditional inclusion.
.It Cm IPQoS
Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection.
Accepted values are
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.sshdinclude 2021-10-20 15:18:49.752331202 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c 2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
@@ -257,6 +257,9 @@ struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
/* sshd_config buffer */
struct sshbuf *cfg;
+/* Included files from the configuration file */
+struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
+
/* message to be displayed after login */
struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
@@ -927,30 +930,45 @@ usage(void)
static void
send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
- struct sshbuf *m;
+ struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL;
+ struct include_item *item = NULL;
int r;
debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %zu", __func__, fd,
sshbuf_len(conf));
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+ /* pack includes into a string */
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(item, &includes, entry) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->selector)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->filename)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+
/*
* Protocol from reexec master to child:
* string configuration
- * string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
+ * string included_files[] {
+ * string selector
+ * string filename
+ * string contents
+ * }
+ * string rng_seed (if required)
*/
- if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
rexec_send_rng_seed(m);
#endif
-
if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
+ sshbuf_free(inc);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
@@ -958,14 +976,15 @@ send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *
static void
recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
- struct sshbuf *m;
+ struct sshbuf *m, *inc;
u_char *cp, ver;
size_t len;
int r;
+ struct include_item *item;
debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
- if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1)
fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
@@ -973,14 +992,28 @@ recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ver != 0)
fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
rexec_recv_rng_seed(m);
#endif
+ if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) {
+ item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+ if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry);
+ }
+
free(cp);
sshbuf_free(m);
@@ -1661,7 +1694,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
case 'o':
line = xstrdup(optarg);
if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
- "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+ "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0)
exit(1);
free(line);
break;
@@ -1692,7 +1725,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
- log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
+ log_stderr || !inetd_flag || debug_flag);
/*
* Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
@@ -1725,12 +1758,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
*/
(void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1);
}
- }
- else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
+ } else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg);
parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- cfg, NULL);
+ cfg, &includes, NULL);
/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
if (! options.use_pam)
@@ -1946,7 +1978,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (connection_info == NULL)
connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
connection_info->test = 1;
- parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
+ parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info);
dump_config(&options);
}
diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c.stringb openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c.stringb 2022-12-21 12:18:43.274799163 +0100
+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c 2022-12-21 12:19:19.758081516 +0100
@@ -371,6 +371,9 @@ sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, c
int
sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
{
+ if (v == NULL)
+ return sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0);
+
return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
}

30
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
@@ -3933,16 +3933,26 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
sock_set_v6only(sock);
if (x11_use_localhost)
set_reuseaddr(sock);
if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
port, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
+
+ /* do not remove successfully opened
+ * sockets if the request failed because
+ * the protocol IPv4/6 is not available
+ * (e.g. IPv6 may be disabled while being
+ * supported)
+ */
+ if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno)
+ continue;
+
for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
close(socks[n]);
num_socks = 0;
break;
}
socks[num_socks++] = sock;
if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
break;

14
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz.asc
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
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iQHDBAABCgAdFiEEWcIRjtIG2SfmZ+vj0+X1a22SDTAFAly3ro8ACgkQ0+X1a22S
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JDACoUFnbJsNgiQBaYpO7bOnf3Vw5Oui1gPeKnQ76KQsXDwD/N/0wLUf55+XdNJ6
tcgm6/x1W4b8bWje5bcS3qhxv6t/hSL/OxusA8zoNmnTD5XMg6QtJ0Rp9ZHPriCJ
C4eCPdHfmyHCr1IATMX9+n5CO5JUPexaDjQug7k/Z1XA/UlwVfRRs1JMpviBodC+
ZUOuk9tH11RKSBcUeR3Ef4iaR3FchryyyBZUZdYBkmDrnHrYpUK5ifdHT+ZXdzPl
laX03Kz094LqrP6L3lafk6b1PKOVjKwx1vM5fhnv+pfx4dmao9BwZMuIq6Fa5uMX
w2oHGhlIDmeT66Yny5d0APn2wCewyYUGPanSZY/HolHAPs+doOBgI361kMAR9J3e
Ii3VKhIdE8i4K3fC19uDkf7xL8UVvRVXjgM7i+GNndh1ou/vDYxmEAsW9IR/D3XC
HM/jMdq+UewAiRG46aI5rsi/A8J8/A==
=YtoH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

166
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
diff --color -ru a/kex.c b/kex.c
--- a/kex.c 2022-06-23 10:25:29.529922670 +0200
+++ b/kex.c 2022-06-23 10:26:12.911762100 +0200
@@ -906,6 +906,18 @@
return (1);
}
+/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+static int
+has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+{
+ char *cp;
+
+ if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ free(cp);
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int
kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
{
@@ -941,6 +953,16 @@
free(ext);
}
+ /* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
+ if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
+ if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
+ kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED;
+ if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
+ kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED;
+ }
+
/* Algorithm Negotiation */
if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
diff --color -ru a/kex.h b/kex.h
--- a/kex.h 2022-06-23 10:25:29.511922322 +0200
+++ b/kex.h 2022-06-23 10:26:12.902761926 +0200
@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@
#define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001
#define KEX_INITIAL 0x0002
+#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED 0x0008 /* only set in server for now */
+#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED 0x0010 /* only set in server for now */
struct sshenc {
char *name;
diff --color -ru a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
--- a/serverloop.c 2022-06-23 10:25:29.537922825 +0200
+++ b/serverloop.c 2022-06-23 10:26:12.918762235 +0200
@@ -736,16 +736,17 @@
struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
- int r, ndx, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype, success = 0;
+ int r, ndx, success = 0;
const u_char *blob;
+ const char *sigalg, *kex_rsa_sigalg = NULL;
u_char *sig = 0;
size_t blen, slen;
if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
-
- kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
- sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
+ if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
+ ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
+ kex_rsa_sigalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
sshkey_free(key);
key = NULL;
@@ -780,16 +781,24 @@
* For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
* during KEX to the default (SHA1).
*/
- use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
- sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA;
+ sigalg = NULL;
+ if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
+ if (kex_rsa_sigalg != NULL)
+ sigalg = kex_rsa_sigalg;
+ else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED)
+ sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
+ else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
+ sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ }
+ debug3("%s: sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s", __func__,
+ sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf,
ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
- sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf),
- use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL)) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), sigalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
diff --color -ru a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
--- a/sshkey.c 2022-06-23 10:25:29.532922728 +0200
+++ b/sshkey.c 2022-06-23 10:26:12.914762158 +0200
@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@
struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf,
struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert);
-static int get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep);
/* Supported key types */
struct keytype {
@@ -2092,7 +2091,8 @@
if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig, slen, &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
+ if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, slen,
+ &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Success */
@@ -2394,8 +2394,8 @@
return r;
}
-static int
-get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
+int
+sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
{
int r;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
@@ -2477,7 +2477,7 @@
return 0;
if ((expected_alg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(requested_alg)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if ((r = get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
return r;
r = strcmp(expected_alg, sigtype) == 0;
free(sigtype);
@@ -2739,7 +2739,7 @@
sshbuf_len(cert), alg, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check and update signature_type against what was actually used */
- if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
+ if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
goto out;
if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
diff --color -ru a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
--- a/sshkey.h 2022-06-23 10:25:29.521922515 +0200
+++ b/sshkey.h 2022-06-23 10:26:12.907762022 +0200
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@
const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
int sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
const char *sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *);
+int sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, char **);
/* for debug */
void sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);

46
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h
--- openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp 2021-09-16 11:37:57.240171687 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h 2021-09-16 11:42:29.183427917 +0200
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key"
#define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
#define _PATH_DH_MODULI SSHDIR "/moduli"
+#define _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH SSHDIR "/disable_scp"
#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
#define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/ssh"
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp 2021-09-16 12:09:02.646714578 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.1 2021-09-16 12:26:49.978628226 +0200
@@ -278,6 +278,13 @@ to print debugging messages about their
This is helpful in
debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
.El
+.Pp
+Usage of SCP protocol can be blocked by creating a world-readable
+.Ar /etc/ssh/disable_scp
+file. If this file exists, when SCP protocol is in use (either remotely or
+via the
+.Fl O
+option), the program will exit.
.Sh EXIT STATUS
.Ex -std scp
.Sh SEE ALSO
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp 2021-09-16 11:42:56.013650519 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c 2021-09-16 11:53:03.249713836 +0200
@@ -596,6 +596,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
+ {
+ FILE *f = fopen(_PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH, "r");
+ if (f != NULL) {
+ fclose(f);
+ fatal("SCP protocol is forbidden via %s", _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH);
+ }
+ }
+
if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);

25
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
#include <login.h>
#endif
@@ -2695,6 +2696,12 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
}
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ if (geteuid() == 0 &&
+ initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
+ error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
+ pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,

32
SOURCES/openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
index d29a03b4..d7283136 100644
--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -490,6 +490,15 @@ congreet(int s)
return;
}
+ /*
+ * Read the server banner as per RFC4253 section 4.2. The "SSH-"
+ * protocol identification string may be preceeded by an arbitarily
+ * large banner which we must read and ignore. Loop while reading
+ * newline-terminated lines until we have one starting with "SSH-".
+ * The ID string cannot be longer than 255 characters although the
+ * preceeding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded
+ * in multiple iterations of the outer loop).
+ */
for (;;) {
memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
@@ -517,6 +526,11 @@ congreet(int s)
conrecycle(s);
return;
}
+ if (cp >= buf + sizeof(buf)) {
+ error("%s: greeting exceeds allowable length", c->c_name);
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
confree(s);

17
SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
index 6be647ec..ebddf6c3 100644
--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
@@ -1537,10 +1537,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
goto fail;
}
- if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
- error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
- goto fail;
- }
+ if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
+ fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
p->module->handle = handle;
/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */

33
SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
diff -u -p -r1.166 auth2.c
--- a/auth2.c 8 Mar 2023 04:43:12 -0000 1.166
+++ b/auth2.c 28 Aug 2023 08:32:44 -0000
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_
}
#define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005
+#define MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 5.0
static double
user_specific_delay(const char *user)
{
@@ -233,6 +234,12 @@ ensure_minimum_time_since(double start,
struct timespec ts;
double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain;
+ if (elapsed > MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS) {
+ debug3("elapsed %0.3lfms exceeded the max delay "
+ "requested %0.3lfms)", elapsed*1000, req*1000);
+ return;
+ }
+
/* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */
while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0)
seconds *= 2;
@@ -317,7 +324,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
authenticated = m->userauth(ssh);
}
- if (!authctxt->authenticated)
+ if (!authctxt->authenticated && strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);

447
SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,447 @@
diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
index d453c779..ded935eb 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL
+++ b/PROTOCOL
@@ -137,6 +137,32 @@ than as a named global or channel request to allow pings with very
described at:
http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
+1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
+
+OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
+a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
+RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
+initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
+"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
+may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
+are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
+if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
+
+When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
+name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
+the the protocol:
+
+a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
+ out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
+ connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT.
+ Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages
+ that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as
+ SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE.
+b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
+ packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the
+ duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
+ SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
+
2. Connection protocol changes
2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index aa5e792d..d478ff6e 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
#endif
/* prototype */
-static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
+static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
return 1;
}
+/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+static int
+has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+{
+ char *cp;
+
+ if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ free(cp);
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
* Caller must free returned string.
@@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
char *
kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
{
- char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
+ char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
size_t len;
if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
@@ -201,10 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
}
strlcpy(ret, a, len);
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
- free(m);
+ if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
continue; /* Algorithm already present */
- }
if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
free(tmp);
@@ -466,7 +485,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
- error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+ /* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */
+ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
+ "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
+ }
+ error("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
@@ -548,6 +572,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
return r;
+ if (ninfo >= 1024) {
+ error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected "
+ "<=1024, received %u", ninfo);
+ return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
+ }
for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
@@ -681,7 +705,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
if (kex == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
@@ -717,7 +741,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
- if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
+ if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0)
return r;
if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
@@ -981,20 +1005,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
return (1);
}
-/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
static int
-has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
{
- char *cp;
-
- if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
- return 0;
- free(cp);
- return 1;
+ return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
}
static int
-kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
struct newkeys *newkeys;
@@ -1019,13 +1037,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
sprop=peer;
}
- /* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
- if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
- char *ext;
-
- ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
- kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
- free(ext);
+ /* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */
+ if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+ if (kex->server) {
+ kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c");
+ kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
+ "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
+ } else {
+ kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
+ "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
+ }
+ if (kex->kex_strict) {
+ debug3("will use strict KEX ordering");
+ if (seq != 0)
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+ "strict KEX violation: "
+ "KEXINIT was not the first packet");
+ }
}
/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index 5f7ef784..272ebb43 100644
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct kex {
u_int kex_type;
char *server_sig_algs;
int ext_info_c;
+ int kex_strict;
struct sshbuf *my;
struct sshbuf *peer;
struct sshbuf *client_version;
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index 52017def..beb214f9 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1207,8 +1207,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
#endif
/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
- if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
+ if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) {
+ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number "
+ "wrapped during initial key exchange");
+ }
logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
+ }
if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
@@ -1216,6 +1221,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
state->p_send.bytes += len;
sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+ debug("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
+ state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
+ }
+
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
@@ -1344,8 +1354,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
for (;;) {
/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
- r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
- if (r != 0)
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0)
break;
/* If we got a packet, return it. */
if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
@@ -1629,10 +1615,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
+
if (seqnr_p != NULL)
*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
- if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
+ if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) {
+ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number "
+ "wrapped during initial key exchange");
+ }
logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
+ }
if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
@@ -1698,6 +1690,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
#endif
/* reset for next packet */
state->packlen = 0;
+ if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+ debug("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
+ state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
+ }
/* do we need to rekey? */
if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
@@ -1720,10 +1716,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
if (r != 0)
return r;
- if (*typep) {
- state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
- DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
+ if (*typep == 0) {
+ /* no message ready */
+ return 0;
}
+ state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+ DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
+
+ /* Always process disconnect messages */
+ if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+ do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+ reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+ "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+ "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+ free(msg);
+ return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial
+ * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed
+ * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate
+ * protocol errors.
+ */
+ if (ssh->kex != NULL &&
+ (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict)
+ return 0;
+ /* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */
switch (*typep) {
case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
@@ -1738,19 +1763,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
free(msg);
break;
- case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
- return r;
- /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
- do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
- reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
- "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
- "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
- free(msg);
- return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
return r;
@@ -2242,6 +2254,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
@@ -2404,6 +2417,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
@@ -2732,6 +2746,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
+ debug2("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index df6caf81..0cccbcc4 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
xxx_host = host;
xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
- if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
+ if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
+ "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
@@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
};
static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@@ -472,7 +471,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */
pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
@@ -531,12 +530,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
-input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
-}
-
void
userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
{
@@ -615,6 +608,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
free(authctxt->methoddata);
authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error);
return 0;
}
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict 2023-11-27 13:19:18.855433602 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c 2023-11-27 13:28:10.441325314 +0100
@@ -2531,10 +2531,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
struct kex *kex;
+ char *cp;
int r;
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
- options.kex_algorithms);
+ if ((cp = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
+ "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+ fatal("kex_names_cat");
+
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(cp);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
@@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
if (gss && orig)
xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
else if (gss)
- newstr = gss;
+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
else if (orig)
newstr = orig;
@@ -2650,6 +2654,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
#endif
+ free(cp);
debug("KEX done");
}

57
SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 35c48e62..48d93ddf 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -626,6 +626,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
}
}
+static int
+valid_hostname(const char *s)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (*s == '-')
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+ if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
+ isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+valid_ruser(const char *s)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (*s == '-')
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+ if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
+ if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
+ return 0;
+ /* Disallow \ in last position */
+ if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Main program for the ssh client.
*/
@@ -1118,6 +1153,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (!host)
usage();
+ if (!valid_hostname(host))
+ fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
+ if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
+ fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
host_arg = xstrdup(host);
/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */

37
SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
authfd.c
authfd.h
atomicio.c
atomicio.h
bufaux.c
bufbn.c
buffer.h
buffer.c
cleanup.c
cipher.h
compat.h
defines.h
entropy.c
entropy.h
fatal.c
includes.h
kex.h
key.c
key.h
log.c
log.h
match.h
misc.c
misc.h
pathnames.h
platform.h
rsa.h
ssh-dss.c
ssh-rsa.c
ssh.h
ssh2.h
uidswap.c
uidswap.h
uuencode.c
uuencode.h
xmalloc.c
xmalloc.h

939
SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,939 @@
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c 2018-08-24 10:22:56.281930322 +0200
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
* or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
*/
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -65,8 +66,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
case EOF:
case '\0':
if (len > 0) {
- argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
- argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
+ argv = xreallocarray(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
+ argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
len = 0;
@@ -105,9 +106,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)
- pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]);
+ free(argv[i]);
- pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv);
+ free(argv);
return;
}
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-compat 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h 2018-08-24 10:18:05.009393312 +0200
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include <stdio.h>
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
struct identity {
TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
AuthenticationConnection *ac; /* set if agent supports key */
- Key *key; /* public/private key */
+ struct sshkey *key; /* public/private key */
char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */
int tried;
int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat 2018-08-24 10:18:05.007393297 +0200
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2018-08-24 10:18:32.937612513 +0200
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
#include "get_command_line.h"
extern char **environ;
+#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101
+
/*
* Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user
* A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary
@@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
if (count == 0)
return NULL;
- buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
+ buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");
strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);
@@ -87,21 +89,25 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
}
void
-agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)
+agent_action(struct sshbuf **buf, char ** action, size_t count)
{
size_t i;
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf);
+ int r;
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count);
+ if ((*buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*buf, count)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*buf, action[i])) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
-void
-pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
+static void
+pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(struct sshbuf ** session_id2, const char * user,
const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
{
u_char *cookie = NULL;
@@ -114,22 +116,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
char ** reported_argv = NULL;
size_t count = 0;
char * action_logbuf = NULL;
- Buffer action_agentbuf;
+ struct sshbuf *action_agentbuf = NULL;
uint8_t free_logbuf = 0;
char * retc;
int32_t reti;
+ int r;
- rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
+ rnd = arc4random();
cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);
while (cookie_len < 16) {
cookie_len += 16; /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */
}
- cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
+ cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len);
for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0) {
- rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
+ rnd = arc4random();
}
cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
rnd >>= 8;
@@ -139,12 +141,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
if (count > 0) {
free_logbuf = 1;
action_logbuf = log_action(reported_argv, count);
- agent_action(&action_agentbuf, reported_argv, count);
+ agent_action(&action_agentbuf, reported_argv, count);
pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(reported_argv, count);
}
else {
action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
+ if ((action_agentbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) /* stays empty, means unavailable */
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
}
/*
@@ -161,35 +163,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
time(&ts);
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2);
+ if ((*session_id2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
- if(retc)
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
- else
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(*session_id2, cookie, cookie_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, user)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, ruser)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, servicename)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (retc) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, pwd)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(*session_id2, action_agentbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (free_logbuf) {
- pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf);
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
+ free(action_logbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf);
}
- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
- if(reti >= 0)
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
- else
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
+ /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
+ if (reti >= 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(cookie);
return;
@@ -278,7 +280,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
auth->fd = sock;
- buffer_init(&auth->identities);
+ if ((auth->identities = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
auth->howmany = 0;
return auth;
@@ -287,43 +289,42 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
int
pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
{
- Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
+ struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
Identity *id;
- Key *key;
+ struct sshkey *key;
AuthenticationConnection *ac;
char *comment;
uint8_t retval = 0;
uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
- pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+ verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2))
{
if(key != NULL) {
- id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
id->key = key;
id->filename = comment;
id->ac = ac;
- if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
+ if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
retval = 1;
}
- pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
- pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
- pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
+ free(id->filename);
+ key_free(id->key);
+ free(id);
if(retval == 1)
break;
}
}
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2);
+ sshbuf_free(session_id2);
ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
}
else {
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
+ verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
}
- /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */
EVP_cleanup();
return retval;
}
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat 2018-08-24 10:18:05.008393305 +0200
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c 2018-08-24 10:18:05.009393312 +0200
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
* a patch 8-)
*/
#if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
- __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename);
+ __progname = xstrdup(servicename);
#endif
for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {
@@ -130,11 +130,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
#endif
}
- pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
+ log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user);
pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr);
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
+ verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
if(ruser_ptr) {
strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
@@ -149,12 +149,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
#ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {
strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );
- pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
+ verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
} else
#endif
{
if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) {
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
+ verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
goto cleanexit;
}
strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
@@ -163,11 +163,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
/* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */
if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
+ verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
goto cleanexit;
}
if( ! getpwnam(user) ) {
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
+ verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
goto cleanexit;
}
@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
*/
parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
} else {
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
- authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+ verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+ authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
}
/*
@@ -187,19 +187,19 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
*/
if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+ verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
/*
* this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
*/
if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
- pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+ logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
} else {
- pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+ logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
}
} else {
- pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
+ logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
}
cleanexit:
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c 2018-08-24 10:18:05.009393312 +0200
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "secure_filename.h"
-#include "identity.h"
#include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
extern char *authorized_keys_file;
@@ -117,12 +116,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
} else {
slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/');
if(!slash_ptr)
- pamsshagentauth_fatal
+ fatal
("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1))
- pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
+ fatal("Username too long");
strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
@@ -130,11 +129,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
}
authorized_keys_file =
- pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
+ tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file,
sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
- pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file) /* when we
+ free(authorized_keys_file) /* when we
percent_expand
later, we'd step
on this, so free
@@ -150,13 +149,13 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, "."));
#endif
authorized_keys_file =
- pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
+ percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname,
"f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
}
int
-pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)
+pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
{
return
pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h 2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
#define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
#include "identity.h"
-int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *);
+int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, struct sshkey *);
void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
#endif
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c 2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
@@ -45,44 +45,46 @@
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "secure_filename.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
-
-#include "identity.h"
+#include <unistd.h>
/* return 1 if user allows given key */
/* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */
static int
-pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key)
+pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, struct sshkey * key)
{
- char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+ char *line = NULL;
int found_key = 0;
u_long linenum = 0;
- Key *found;
+ struct sshkey *found;
char *fp;
+ size_t linesize = 0;
found_key = 0;
- found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type);
+ found = sshkey_new(key->type);
- while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
+ while ((getline(&line, &linesize, f)) != -1) {
char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */
+ linenum++;
/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
continue;
- if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+ if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
/* no key? check if there are options for this key */
int quoted = 0;
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
+ verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
/* key_options = cp; */
for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
@@ -92,26 +94,27 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
}
/* Skip remaining whitespace. */
for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
- if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
+ if(sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
+ verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
/* still no key? advance to next line */
continue;
}
}
- if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) {
+ if(sshkey_equal(found, key)) {
found_key = 1;
- pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
+ logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
linenum);
- fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
- pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);
- pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp);
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+ logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
+ sshkey_type(found), fp);
+ free(fp);
break;
}
}
- pamsshagentauth_key_free(found);
+ free(line);
+ sshkey_free(found);
if(!found_key)
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found");
+ verbose("key not found");
return found_key;
}
@@ -120,19 +123,19 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
int
-pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key * key, char *file)
+pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey * key, char *file)
{
FILE *f;
int found_key = 0;
struct stat st;
- char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+ char buf[256];
/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
+ verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
/* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file);
+ verbose("File not found: %s", file);
return 0;
}
@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
fclose(f);
- pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
+ logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
return 0;
}
@@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
int
pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command,
char *authorized_keys_command_user,
- struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key)
+ struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey * key)
{
FILE *f;
int ok, found_key = 0;
@@ -187,44 +190,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
else {
pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);
if(pw == NULL) {
- pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
+ error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
}
- pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
- pamsshagentauth_logerror
+ error
("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path
(authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
- pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
+ error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
goto out;
}
/* open the pipe and read the keys */
if(pipe(p) != 0) {
- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
- pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
+ debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);
/*
* Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
* run cleanup_exit() code.
*/
- pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
+ restore_uid();
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1: /* error */
- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(p[0]);
close(p[1]);
return 0;
@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
/* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */
if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+ error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1
|| dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
#if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
@@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
#else
if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
#endif
- pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
+ error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
#else
if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
#endif
- pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
+ error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
@@ -270,18 +273,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
/* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we
should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */
- pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
_exit(127);
default: /* parent */
break;
}
- pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
close(p[1]);
if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(p[0]);
/* Don't leave zombie child */
while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
@@ -292,22 +295,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if(errno != EINTR) {
- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
+ error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
}
if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
- pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
goto out;
} else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
- pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
goto out;
}
found_key = ok;
out:
- pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
+ restore_uid();
return found_key;
}
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h 2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
#define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
#include "identity.h"
-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *);
-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *);
+int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, char *);
+int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *);
#endif
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c 2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
#include "misc.h"
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
int comparehome = 0;
struct stat st;
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
+ verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
return -1;
}
- pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+ strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
+ verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
- pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
+ verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
buf);
break;
}
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c 2018-08-24 10:22:13.202657025 +0200
@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "secure_filename.h"
@@ -48,54 +48,59 @@
#include "identity.h"
#include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST 54
+
/* extern u_char *session_id2;
extern uint8_t session_id_len;
*/
int
-userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2)
+userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, struct sshbuf * session_id2)
{
- Buffer b = { 0 };
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *pkalg = NULL;
u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
- u_int blen = 0, slen = 0;
+ size_t blen = 0, slen = 0;
- int authenticated = 0;
+ int r, authenticated = 0;
- pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
+ pkalg = (char *) sshkey_ssh_name(id->key);
/* first test if this key is even allowed */
if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))
- goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+ goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
- if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
- goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+ if(sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) != 0)
+ goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
/* construct packet to sign and test */
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST);
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ruser)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0)
+ if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
goto user_auth_clean_exit;
/* test for correct signature */
- if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
+ if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) == 0)
authenticated = 1;
user_auth_clean_exit:
/* if(&b != NULL) */
- pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer:
if(sig != NULL)
- pamsshagentauth_xfree(sig);
+ free(sig);
if(pkblob != NULL)
- pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
+ free(pkblob);
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
return authenticated;
}
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h 2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
#ifndef _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
#define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
-#include <identity.h>
-int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, Buffer *);
+#include "identity.h"
+int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c.psaa-compat 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c 2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_uudecode(const char *src
/* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
*p = '\0';
len = pamsshagentauth___b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
- pamsshagentauth_xfree(encoded);
+ xfree(encoded);
return len;
}
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
return;
}
- buf = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(2*len);
+ buf = malloc(2*len);
n = pamsshagentauth_uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
}
if (i % 70 != 69)
fprintf(fp, "\n");
- pamsshagentauth_xfree(buf);
+ free(buf);
}

20
SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
@@ -158,11 +158,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user,
int
pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
{
+ struct passwd *pw;
return
- pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
- key, authorized_keys_file)
- || pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key,
- authorized_keys_file)
+ ( (pw = getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)) &&
+ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
+ || ((pw = getpwuid(0)) &&
+ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
|| pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command,
authorized_keys_command_user,
getpwnam(ruser), key);

37
SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid 2017-02-07 15:41:53.172334151 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2017-02-07 15:41:53.174334149 +0100
@@ -238,17 +238,26 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
}
errno = 0;
- seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
- above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
+ /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
+ above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
+ if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
close(sock);
- if(errno == EACCES)
- fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
+ error("seteuid(%lu) failed with error: %s",
+ (unsigned long) uid, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
+ close(sock);
+ sock = -1;
+ if(errno == EACCES)
+ fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
+ }
- seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
-
+ /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
+ if (0 != seteuid(0)) {
+ fatal("setuid(0) failed with error: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
return sock;
}

21
SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
--- openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility 2014-03-31 19:35:17.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c 2016-01-22 15:22:40.984469774 +0100
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ char *__progname;
extern char *__progname;
#endif
-PAM_EXTERN int
+PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
{
char **argv_ptr;
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ cleanexit:
}
-PAM_EXTERN int
+PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
{
UNUSED(pamh);

96
SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h 2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
typedef struct identity Identity;
typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+typedef struct {
+ int fd;
+ struct sshbuf *identities;
+ int howmany;
+} AuthenticationConnection;
+
struct identity {
TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
AuthenticationConnection *ac; /* set if agent supports key */
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent 2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "ssh2.h"
@@ -291,36 +292,43 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
{
struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
Identity *id;
- struct sshkey *key;
AuthenticationConnection *ac;
- char *comment;
uint8_t retval = 0;
uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
+ struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
+ int r;
+ unsigned int i;
OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
- for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2))
- {
- if(key != NULL) {
+ if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(ac->fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
+ fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
+ "protocol %d: %s\n", 2, ssh_err(r));
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++)
+ {
+ if (idlist->keys[i] != NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
- id->key = key;
- id->filename = comment;
+ id->key = idlist->keys[i];
+ id->filename = idlist->comments[i];
id->ac = ac;
if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
retval = 1;
}
- free(id->filename);
- key_free(id->key);
free(id);
if(retval == 1)
break;
- }
- }
+ }
+ }
- sshbuf_free(session_id2);
- ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
+ sshbuf_free(session_id2);
+ ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
+ }
+ ssh_close_authentication_socket(ac->fd);
+ free(ac);
}
else {
verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent 2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c 2017-09-27 14:25:49.422739032 +0200
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
+ if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
goto user_auth_clean_exit;
/* test for correct signature */

196
SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2017-02-07 14:29:41.626116675 +0100
@@ -43,12 +43,31 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
#include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
#include "identity.h"
#include "get_command_line.h"
extern char **environ;
+/*
+ * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user
+ * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary
+ * to drop effective UID when connecting to the socket.
+ *
+ * If the cause of error is EACCES, because we verified we would not have that
+ * problem initially, we can safely assume that somebody is attempting to find a
+ * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated.
+ */
+
static char *
log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
{
@@ -85,7 +104,7 @@ void
pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
{
- char *cookie = NULL;
+ u_char *cookie = NULL;
uint8_t i = 0;
uint32_t rnd = 0;
uint8_t cookie_len;
@@ -112,7 +131,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
if (i % 4 == 0) {
rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
}
- cookie[i] = (char) rnd;
+ cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
rnd >>= 8;
}
@@ -177,6 +196,86 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
}
int
+ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid)
+{
+ const char *authsocket;
+ int sock;
+ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+ struct stat sock_st;
+
+ authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+ if (!authsocket)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Advisory only; seteuid ensures no race condition; but will only log if we see EACCES */
+ if( stat(authsocket,&sock_st) == 0) {
+ if(uid != 0 && sock_st.st_uid != uid) {
+ fatal("uid %lu attempted to open an agent socket owned by uid %lu", (unsigned long) uid, (unsigned long) sock_st.st_uid);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ensures that the EACCES tested for below can _only_ happen if somebody
+ * is attempting to race the stat above to bypass authentication.
+ */
+ if( (sock_st.st_mode & S_IWUSR) != S_IWUSR || (sock_st.st_mode & S_IRUSR) != S_IRUSR) {
+ error("ssh-agent socket has incorrect permissions for owner");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
+
+ sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* close on exec */
+ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
+ close(sock);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ errno = 0;
+ seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
+ above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
+ close(sock);
+ if(errno == EACCES)
+ fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
+
+ return sock;
+}
+
+AuthenticationConnection *
+ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid_t uid)
+{
+ AuthenticationConnection *auth;
+ int sock;
+
+ sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid);
+
+ /*
+ * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection. This happens if we
+ * exited due to a timeout.
+ */
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
+ auth->fd = sock;
+ buffer_init(&auth->identities);
+ auth->howmany = 0;
+
+ return auth;
+}
+
+int
pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
{
Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
@@ -190,7 +289,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
- if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) {
+ if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2))
{
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in
--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in 2017-02-07 14:40:14.407566921 +0100
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ PATHS=
CC=@CC@
LD=@LD@
CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
LIBS=@LIBS@
AR=@AR@
AWK=@AWK@
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
PERL=@PERL@
SED=@SED@
ENT=@ENT@
-LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bu
ED25519OBJS=ed25519-donna/ed25519.o
-PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o
+PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o secure_filename.o
MANPAGES_IN = pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
.c.o:
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
-LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
+LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
$(LIBCOMPAT): always
(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
always:
-pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
- $(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam
+pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o
+ $(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o $(LIBS) -lpam
$(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8

8
SOURCES/ssh-keycat.pam
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
#%PAM-1.0
# pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule
session required pam_selinux.so close
session required pam_loginuid.so
# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context
session required pam_selinux.so open env_params
session required pam_namespace.so

40
SOURCES/sshd-keygen
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@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Create the host keys for the OpenSSH server.
KEYTYPE=$1
case $KEYTYPE in
"dsa") ;& # disabled in FIPS
"ed25519")
FIPS=/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
if [[ -r "$FIPS" && $(cat $FIPS) == "1" ]]; then
exit 0
fi ;;
"rsa") ;; # always ok
"ecdsa") ;;
*) # wrong argument
exit 12 ;;
esac
KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_${KEYTYPE}_key
KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen
if [[ ! -x $KEYGEN ]]; then
exit 13
fi
# remove old keys
rm -f $KEY{,.pub}
# create new keys
if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
exit 1
fi
# sanitize permissions
/usr/bin/chgrp ssh_keys $KEY
/usr/bin/chmod 640 $KEY
/usr/bin/chmod 644 $KEY.pub
if [[ -x /usr/sbin/restorecon ]]; then
/usr/sbin/restorecon $KEY{,.pub}
fi
exit 0

5
SOURCES/sshd-keygen.target
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
[Unit]
Wants=sshd-keygen@rsa.service
Wants=sshd-keygen@ecdsa.service
Wants=sshd-keygen@ed25519.service
PartOf=sshd.service

11
SOURCES/sshd-keygen@.service
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@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
[Unit]
Description=OpenSSH %i Server Key Generation
ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_%i_key
[Service]
Type=oneshot
EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
ExecStart=/usr/libexec/openssh/sshd-keygen %i
[Install]
WantedBy=sshd-keygen.target

17
SOURCES/sshd.pam
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@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
#%PAM-1.0
auth substack password-auth
auth include postlogin
account required pam_sepermit.so
account required pam_nologin.so
account include password-auth
password include password-auth
# pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule
session required pam_selinux.so close
session required pam_loginuid.so
# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context
session required pam_selinux.so open env_params
session required pam_namespace.so
session optional pam_keyinit.so force revoke
session optional pam_motd.so
session include password-auth
session include postlogin

18
SOURCES/sshd.service
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@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
[Unit]
Description=OpenSSH server daemon
Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
After=network.target sshd-keygen.target
Wants=sshd-keygen.target
[Service]
Type=notify
EnvironmentFile=-/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY
ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
KillMode=process
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=42s
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

11
SOURCES/sshd.socket
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@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
[Unit]
Description=OpenSSH Server Socket
Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
Conflicts=sshd.service
[Socket]
ListenStream=22
Accept=yes
[Install]
WantedBy=sockets.target

17
SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig
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@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
# Configuration file for the sshd service.
# The server keys are automatically generated if they are missing.
# To change the automatic creation, adjust sshd.service options for
# example using systemctl enable sshd-keygen@dsa.service to allow creation
# of DSA key or systemctl mask sshd-keygen@rsa.service to disable RSA key
# creation.
# Do not change this option unless you have hardware random
# generator and you REALLY know what you are doing
SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=0
# SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=1
# System-wide crypto policy:
# To opt-out, uncomment the following line
# CRYPTO_POLICY=

1
SOURCES/sshd.tmpfiles
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@ -0,0 +1 @@
d /var/empty/sshd 711 root root -

11
SOURCES/sshd@.service
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@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
[Unit]
Description=OpenSSH per-connection server daemon
Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
Wants=sshd-keygen.target
After=sshd-keygen.target
[Service]
EnvironmentFile=-/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY
StandardInput=socket

3018
SPECS/openssh.spec
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