MSVSphere Packaging Team
8 months ago
commit
9059706b3f
@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|||||||
|
SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.22.0.tar.gz
|
||||||
@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|||||||
|
4618b82afde56a8177e888c26d336c6f521bed8a SOURCES/opencryptoki-3.22.0.tar.gz
|
||||||
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff -up opencryptoki-3.11.0/configure.ac.me opencryptoki-3.11.0/configure.ac
|
||||||
|
--- opencryptoki-3.11.0/configure.ac.me 2019-01-30 17:10:19.660952694 +0100
|
||||||
|
+++ opencryptoki-3.11.0/configure.ac 2019-01-30 17:13:54.150089964 +0100
|
||||||
|
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ AC_SUBST([OPENLDAP_LIBS])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
dnl Define custom variables
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
-lockdir=$localstatedir/lock/opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
+lockdir=/run/lock/opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
AC_SUBST(lockdir)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
logdir=$localstatedir/log/opencryptoki
|
||||||
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff -up opencryptoki-3.21.0/misc/pkcsslotd.service.in.me opencryptoki-3.21.0/misc/pkcsslotd.service.in
|
||||||
|
--- opencryptoki-3.21.0/misc/pkcsslotd.service.in.me 2023-05-16 20:50:08.128841932 +0200
|
||||||
|
+++ opencryptoki-3.21.0/misc/pkcsslotd.service.in 2023-05-16 21:19:35.208570589 +0200
|
||||||
|
@@ -22,17 +22,17 @@ PrivateUsers=no
|
||||||
|
PrivateNetwork=no
|
||||||
|
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK
|
||||||
|
IPAddressDeny=any
|
||||||
|
-ProtectClock=yes
|
||||||
|
+#ProtectClock=yes
|
||||||
|
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
|
||||||
|
ProtectKernelModules=yes
|
||||||
|
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
|
||||||
|
+#ProtectKernelLogs=yes
|
||||||
|
ProtectControlGroups=yes
|
||||||
|
ProtectHome=yes
|
||||||
|
-ProtectHostname=yes
|
||||||
|
-ProtectProc=default
|
||||||
|
+#ProtectHostname=yes
|
||||||
|
+#ProtectProc=default
|
||||||
|
ProtectSystem=strict
|
||||||
|
-ReadWritePaths=@localstatedir@
|
||||||
|
-ProcSubset=all
|
||||||
|
+ReadWritePaths=@localstatedir@ /run
|
||||||
|
+#ProcSubset=all
|
||||||
|
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
|
||||||
|
RestrictRealtime=yes
|
||||||
|
RestrictNamespaces=yes
|
||||||
@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff -up opencryptoki-3.21.0/Makefile.am.me opencryptoki-3.21.0/Makefile.am
|
||||||
|
--- opencryptoki-3.21.0/Makefile.am.me 2023-05-15 17:01:04.932616030 +0200
|
||||||
|
+++ opencryptoki-3.21.0/Makefile.am 2023-05-15 17:00:45.732131601 +0200
|
||||||
|
@@ -39,15 +39,8 @@ include tools/tools.mk
|
||||||
|
include doc/doc.mk
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
install-data-hook:
|
||||||
|
- getent group $(pkcs_group) > /dev/null || $(GROUPADD) -r $(pkcs_group)
|
||||||
|
- getent passwd $(pkcsslotd_user) >/dev/null || $(USERADD) -r -g $(pkcs_group) -d /run/opencryptoki -s /sbin/nologin -c "Opencryptoki pkcsslotd user" $(pkcsslotd_user)
|
||||||
|
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)/run/opencryptoki/
|
||||||
|
- $(CHOWN) $(pkcsslotd_user):$(pkcs_group) $(DESTDIR)/run/opencryptoki/
|
||||||
|
- $(CHGRP) $(pkcs_group) $(DESTDIR)/run/opencryptoki/
|
||||||
|
- $(CHMOD) 0710 $(DESTDIR)/run/opencryptoki/
|
||||||
|
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(localstatedir)/lib/opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
- $(CHGRP) $(pkcs_group) $(DESTDIR)$(localstatedir)/lib/opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
- $(CHMOD) 0770 $(DESTDIR)$(localstatedir)/lib/opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
if ENABLE_LIBRARY
|
||||||
|
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/opencryptoki/stdll
|
||||||
|
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/pkcs11
|
||||||
|
@@ -100,7 +93,7 @@ if ENABLE_EP11TOK
|
||||||
|
endif
|
||||||
|
if ENABLE_P11SAK
|
||||||
|
test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki || $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki || true
|
||||||
|
- test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/p11sak_defined_attrs.conf || $(INSTALL) -g $(pkcs_group) -m 0640 $(srcdir)/usr/sbin/p11sak/p11sak_defined_attrs.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/p11sak_defined_attrs.conf || true
|
||||||
|
+ test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/p11sak_defined_attrs.conf || $(INSTALL) -m 0640 $(srcdir)/usr/sbin/p11sak/p11sak_defined_attrs.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/p11sak_defined_attrs.conf || true
|
||||||
|
endif
|
||||||
|
if ENABLE_ICATOK
|
||||||
|
cd $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/opencryptoki/stdll && \
|
||||||
|
@@ -151,7 +144,7 @@ endif
|
||||||
|
if ENABLE_DAEMON
|
||||||
|
test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki || $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki || true
|
||||||
|
test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/opencryptoki.conf || $(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/usr/sbin/pkcsslotd/opencryptoki.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/opencryptoki.conf || true
|
||||||
|
- test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/strength.conf || $(INSTALL) -m 640 -o root -g $(pkcs_group) -T $(srcdir)/doc/strength-example.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/strength.conf || true
|
||||||
|
+ test -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/strength.conf || $(INSTALL) -m 640 -o root -T $(srcdir)/doc/strength-example.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/opencryptoki/strength.conf || true
|
||||||
|
endif
|
||||||
|
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)/etc/ld.so.conf.d
|
||||||
|
echo "$(libdir)/opencryptoki" >\
|
||||||
@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
|
|||||||
|
commit f931d6e47bf2fb26aa9cf52e231d13edc1c837a1
|
||||||
|
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||||
|
Date: Tue Dec 12 17:16:56 2023 +0100
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMON: Update rsa_parse_block_type_2() to not leak the message length
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Take the implementation of OpenSSL function RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2()
|
||||||
|
in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c instead of ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(), since
|
||||||
|
the latter leaks the message size.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
|
||||||
|
index 326c5795..7bab1a84 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
|
||||||
|
#include "constant_time.h"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
|
||||||
|
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CK_BBOOL is_rsa_mechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
@@ -293,13 +294,16 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||||
|
CK_BYTE *out_data,
|
||||||
|
CK_ULONG *out_data_len)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
- unsigned int ok = 0, found, zero;
|
||||||
|
- size_t zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen;
|
||||||
|
- size_t i, j;
|
||||||
|
+ int i;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned char *em = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, equals0;
|
||||||
|
+ int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
|
||||||
|
+ int out_len = *out_data_len;
|
||||||
|
+ int rsa_size = in_data_len;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* The implementation of this function is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||||
|
- * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
|
||||||
|
+ * RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
|
||||||
|
* and is slightly modified to fit to the OpenCryptoki environment.
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* The OpenSSL code is licensed under the Apache License 2.0.
|
||||||
|
@@ -324,55 +328,86 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||||
|
* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",
|
||||||
|
* section 7.2.2.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
- if (in_data_len < 11) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (rsa_size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_FUNCTION_FAILED));
|
||||||
|
return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- ok = constant_time_is_zero(in_data[0]);
|
||||||
|
- ok &= constant_time_eq(in_data[1], 2);
|
||||||
|
+ em = malloc(rsa_size);
|
||||||
|
+ if (em == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_HOST_MEMORY));
|
||||||
|
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /* in_data_len is always equal to rsa_size */
|
||||||
|
+ memcpy(em, in_data, rsa_size);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
|
||||||
|
+ good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* scan over padding data */
|
||||||
|
- found = 0;
|
||||||
|
- for (i = 2; i < in_data_len; i++) {
|
||||||
|
- zero = constant_time_is_zero(in_data[i]);
|
||||||
|
+ found_zero_byte = 0;
|
||||||
|
+ for (i = 2; i < rsa_size; i++) {
|
||||||
|
+ equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found & zero, i, zero_index);
|
||||||
|
- found |= zero;
|
||||||
|
+ zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
|
||||||
|
+ i, zero_index);
|
||||||
|
+ found_zero_byte |= equals0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
- * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |enc_msg|.
|
||||||
|
+ * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
|
||||||
|
* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
|
||||||
|
* also fails.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
- ok &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
|
||||||
|
+ good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
|
||||||
|
* but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
msg_index = zero_index + 1;
|
||||||
|
- mlen = in_data_len - msg_index;
|
||||||
|
+ mlen = rsa_size - msg_index;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
- ok &= constant_time_ge(*out_data_len, mlen);
|
||||||
|
+ good &= constant_time_ge(out_len, mlen);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
- * since at this point the |msg_index| does not provide the signal
|
||||||
|
- * indicating if the padding check failed or not, we don't have to worry
|
||||||
|
- * about leaking the length of returned message, we still need to ensure
|
||||||
|
- * that we read contents of both buffers so that cache accesses don't leak
|
||||||
|
- * the value of |good|
|
||||||
|
+ * Move the result in-place by |rsa_size|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen|
|
||||||
|
+ * bytes to the left.
|
||||||
|
+ * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to
|
||||||
|
+ * |out_data|. Otherwise leave |out_data| unchanged.
|
||||||
|
+ * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
|
||||||
|
+ * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
|
||||||
|
+ * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
|
||||||
|
+ * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
|
||||||
|
+ * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
- for (i = msg_index, j = 0; i < in_data_len && j < *out_data_len; i++, j++)
|
||||||
|
- out_data[j] = constant_time_select_8(ok, in_data[i], out_data[j]);
|
||||||
|
+ out_len = constant_time_select_int(
|
||||||
|
+ constant_time_lt(rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, out_len),
|
||||||
|
+ rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE,
|
||||||
|
+ out_len);
|
||||||
|
+ for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE;
|
||||||
|
+ msg_index <<= 1) {
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(
|
||||||
|
+ msg_index & (rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
|
||||||
|
+ for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < rsa_size - msg_index; i++)
|
||||||
|
+ em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
|
||||||
|
+ mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
|
||||||
|
+ out_data[i] = constant_time_select_8(
|
||||||
|
+ mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], out_data[i]);
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(em, rsa_size);
|
||||||
|
+ free(em);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- *out_data_len = j;
|
||||||
|
+ *out_data_len = constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, 0);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- return constant_time_select_int(ok, CKR_OK, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID);
|
||||||
|
+ return constant_time_select_int(good, CKR_OK, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CK_RV rsa_parse_block(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||||
@ -0,0 +1,737 @@
|
|||||||
|
commit 5f1a4f8641306ee192b70c8a32c9ee8a0fe9be5f
|
||||||
|
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||||
|
Date: Mon Jan 15 12:53:37 2024 +0100
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
common: Add support for implicit rejection for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 de-padding
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Implicit rejection returns a pseudo random message in case the RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
|
||||||
|
padding is incorrect, but returns no error. The pseudo random message is based
|
||||||
|
on static secret data (the private exponent) and the provided ciphertext, so
|
||||||
|
that the attacker cannot determine that the returned value is randomly generated
|
||||||
|
instead of the result of decryption and de-padding.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The implicit rejection algorithm is the same as used by OpenSSL.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/COPYRIGHTS b/COPYRIGHTS
|
||||||
|
index 2bb3dffe..21b6b702 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/COPYRIGHTS
|
||||||
|
+++ b/COPYRIGHTS
|
||||||
|
@@ -12,19 +12,29 @@ For code originating from OpenSSL:
|
||||||
|
* Note that in OpenSSL the file crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c does no longer
|
||||||
|
* exist, it was removed with commit https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4209ce68d8fe8b1506494efa03d378d05baf9ff8
|
||||||
|
* - usr/lib/common/constant_time.h: Copied unchanged from OpenSSL from
|
||||||
|
- include/internal/constant_time.h
|
||||||
|
+ * include/internal/constant_time.h
|
||||||
|
* - The implementation of function rsa_parse_block_type_2() in
|
||||||
|
* usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||||
|
* ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
|
||||||
|
* and is slightly modified to fit to the OpenCryptoki environment.
|
||||||
|
* See comment in function rsa_parse_block_type_2() for a list of changes.
|
||||||
|
+ * - The implementation of function openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk() in
|
||||||
|
+ * usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||||
|
+ * derive_kdk() in crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c and is slightly modified to fit to
|
||||||
|
+ * the OpenCryptoki environment. See comment in function
|
||||||
|
+ * openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk() for a list of changes.
|
||||||
|
+ * - The implementation of function openssl_specific_rsa_prf() in
|
||||||
|
+ * usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||||
|
+ * ossl_rsa_prf() in crypto/rsa/rsapk1.c and is slightly modified to fit to
|
||||||
|
+ * the OpenCryptoki environment. See comment in function
|
||||||
|
+ * openssl_specific_rsa_prf() for a list of changes.
|
||||||
|
* - The implementation of function decode_eme_oaep() in
|
||||||
|
* usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||||
|
* RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1() in crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c and is
|
||||||
|
* slightly modified to fit to the OpenCryptoki environment. See comment in
|
||||||
|
* function decode_eme_oaep() for a list of changes.
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
- * Copyright 1999-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||||
|
+ * Copyright 1999-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* The OpenSSL code is licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").
|
||||||
|
* You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the OpenSSL source distribution
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/h_extern.h b/usr/lib/common/h_extern.h
|
||||||
|
index a88b57d0..29496d99 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/usr/lib/common/h_extern.h
|
||||||
|
+++ b/usr/lib/common/h_extern.h
|
||||||
|
@@ -731,7 +731,8 @@ CK_RV rsa_format_block(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||||
|
CK_RV rsa_parse_block(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||||
|
CK_ULONG in_data_len,
|
||||||
|
CK_BYTE *out_data,
|
||||||
|
- CK_ULONG *out_data_len, CK_ULONG type);
|
||||||
|
+ CK_ULONG *out_data_len, CK_ULONG type,
|
||||||
|
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CK_RV get_mgf_mech(CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *mech);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@@ -3179,6 +3180,14 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_hmac_update(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx, CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||||
|
CK_RV openssl_specific_hmac_final(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx, CK_BYTE *signature,
|
||||||
|
CK_ULONG *sig_len, CK_BBOOL sign);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
|
||||||
|
+ const CK_BYTE *in, CK_ULONG inlen,
|
||||||
|
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen);
|
||||||
|
+CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_prf(CK_BYTE *out, CK_ULONG outlen,
|
||||||
|
+ const char *label, CK_ULONG labellen,
|
||||||
|
+ const CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen,
|
||||||
|
+ uint16_t bitlen);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
#include "tok_spec_struct.h"
|
||||||
|
extern token_spec_t token_specific;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
|
||||||
|
index 9983fcb3..da515289 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -1154,6 +1154,7 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_pkcs_decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||||
|
CK_RV rc;
|
||||||
|
CK_BYTE out[MAX_RSA_KEYLEN];
|
||||||
|
CK_ULONG modulus_bytes;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned char kdk[SHA256_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
modulus_bytes = in_data_len;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@@ -1163,7 +1164,16 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_pkcs_decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||||
|
goto done;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, out_data_len, PKCS_BT_2);
|
||||||
|
+ rc = openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk(tokdata, key_obj,
|
||||||
|
+ in_data, in_data_len,
|
||||||
|
+ kdk, sizeof(kdk));
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_DEVEL("openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ goto done;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, out_data_len, PKCS_BT_2,
|
||||||
|
+ kdk, sizeof(kdk));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
done:
|
||||||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out));
|
||||||
|
@@ -1254,7 +1264,7 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_pkcs_verify(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, SESSION *sess,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, &out_data_len,
|
||||||
|
- PKCS_BT_1);
|
||||||
|
+ PKCS_BT_1, NULL, 0);
|
||||||
|
if (rc == CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID));
|
||||||
|
return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
|
||||||
|
@@ -1318,7 +1328,8 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_pkcs_verify_recover(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
|
||||||
|
return rc;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, out_data_len, PKCS_BT_1);
|
||||||
|
+ rc = rsa_parse_block(out, modulus_bytes, out_data, out_data_len, PKCS_BT_1,
|
||||||
|
+ NULL, 0);
|
||||||
|
if (rc == CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID));
|
||||||
|
return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
|
||||||
|
@@ -4983,3 +4994,388 @@ done:
|
||||||
|
ctx->context = NULL;
|
||||||
|
return rv;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+static CK_RV calc_rsa_priv_exp(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
|
||||||
|
+ CK_BYTE *priv_exp, CK_ULONG priv_exp_len)
|
||||||
|
+{
|
||||||
|
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *modulus = NULL, *pub_exp = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *prime1 = NULL, *prime2 = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
|
||||||
|
+ BIGNUM *n, *e, *p, *q, *d;
|
||||||
|
+ CK_RV rc;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ UNUSED(tokdata);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new();
|
||||||
|
+ if (bn_ctx == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_secure_new failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /* Get modulus a BIGNUM */
|
||||||
|
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template, CKA_MODULUS,
|
||||||
|
+ &modulus);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_MODULUS\n");
|
||||||
|
+ goto done;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ n = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
|
||||||
|
+ if (n == NULL ||
|
||||||
|
+ BN_bin2bn(modulus->pValue, modulus->ulValueLen, n) == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get/BN_bin2bn failed for modulus\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto done;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ BN_set_flags(n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /* Get public exponent a BIGNUM */
|
||||||
|
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template,
|
||||||
|
+ CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, &pub_exp);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT\n");
|
||||||
|
+ goto done;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ e = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
|
||||||
|
+ if (e == NULL ||
|
||||||
|
+ BN_bin2bn(pub_exp->pValue, pub_exp->ulValueLen, e) == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get/BN_bin2bn failed for public exponent\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto done;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ BN_set_flags(e, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /* Get prime1 a BIGNUM */
|
||||||
|
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template, CKA_PRIME_1,
|
||||||
|
+ &prime1);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PRIME_1\n");
|
||||||
|
+ goto done;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ p = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
|
||||||
|
+ if (p == NULL ||
|
||||||
|
+ BN_bin2bn(prime1->pValue, prime1->ulValueLen, p) == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get/BN_bin2bn failed for prime1\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto done;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ BN_set_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /* Get prime2 a BIGNUM */
|
||||||
|
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template, CKA_PRIME_2,
|
||||||
|
+ &prime2);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PRIME_2\n");
|
||||||
|
+ goto done;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ q = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
|
||||||
|
+ if (q == NULL ||
|
||||||
|
+ BN_bin2bn(prime2->pValue, prime2->ulValueLen, q) == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get/BN_bin2bn failed for prime2\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto done;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ BN_set_flags(q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ d = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
|
||||||
|
+ if (d == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_CTX_get failed to get d\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto done;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ BN_set_flags(d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /*
|
||||||
|
+ * phi(n) = (p - 1 )(q - 1) = n - p - q + 1
|
||||||
|
+ * d = e ^{-1} mod phi(n).
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+ if (BN_copy(d, n) == NULL ||
|
||||||
|
+ BN_sub(d, d, p) == 0 ||
|
||||||
|
+ BN_sub(d, d, q) == 0 ||
|
||||||
|
+ BN_add_word(d, 1) == 0 ||
|
||||||
|
+ BN_mod_inverse(d, e, d, bn_ctx) == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to calculate private key part d\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto done;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ if (BN_bn2binpad(d, priv_exp, priv_exp_len) <= 0) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("BN_bn2binpad failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto done;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+done:
|
||||||
|
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ return rc;
|
||||||
|
+}
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
|
||||||
|
+ const CK_BYTE *in, CK_ULONG inlen,
|
||||||
|
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen)
|
||||||
|
+{
|
||||||
|
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *priv_exp_attr = NULL, *modulus = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ CK_BYTE *priv_exp = NULL, *buf = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ size_t md_len;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned char d_hash[SHA256_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
|
||||||
|
+ CK_RV rc;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /*
|
||||||
|
+ * The implementation of this function is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||||
|
+ * derive_kdk() in crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c and is slightly modified to fit to
|
||||||
|
+ * the OpenCryptoki environment.
|
||||||
|
+ * Changes include:
|
||||||
|
+ * - Different variable and define names.
|
||||||
|
+ * - Usage of TRACE_ERROR to report errors and issue debug messages.
|
||||||
|
+ * - Different return codes.
|
||||||
|
+ * - Different code to get the private key component 'd'.
|
||||||
|
+ * - Use of the EVP APIs instead of the internal APIs for Digest and HMAC
|
||||||
|
+ * operations.
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ if (kdklen != SHA256_HASH_SIZE) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("KDK length is wrong\n");
|
||||||
|
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template, CKA_MODULUS,
|
||||||
|
+ &modulus);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_MODULUS\n");
|
||||||
|
+ return rc;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ buf = calloc(1, modulus->ulValueLen);
|
||||||
|
+ if (buf == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to allocate a buffer for private exponent\n");
|
||||||
|
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template,
|
||||||
|
+ CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, &priv_exp_attr);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT\n");
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ if (priv_exp_attr == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ rc = calc_rsa_priv_exp(tokdata, key_obj, buf, modulus->ulValueLen);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("calc_rsa_priv_exp failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ priv_exp = buf;
|
||||||
|
+ } else {
|
||||||
|
+ if (priv_exp_attr->ulValueLen < modulus->ulValueLen) {
|
||||||
|
+ memcpy(buf + modulus->ulValueLen - priv_exp_attr->ulValueLen,
|
||||||
|
+ priv_exp_attr->pValue, priv_exp_attr->ulValueLen);
|
||||||
|
+ priv_exp = buf;
|
||||||
|
+ } else {
|
||||||
|
+ priv_exp = (CK_BYTE *)priv_exp_attr->pValue +
|
||||||
|
+ priv_exp_attr->ulValueLen - modulus->ulValueLen;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /*
|
||||||
|
+ * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
|
||||||
|
+ * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
|
||||||
|
+ * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
|
||||||
|
+ * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
|
||||||
|
+ * synthetically generated, which means that the padding check failed
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+ md = EVP_sha256();
|
||||||
|
+ if (md == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_sha256 failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ if (EVP_Digest(priv_exp, modulus->ulValueLen, d_hash, NULL,
|
||||||
|
+ md, NULL) <= 0) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_Digest failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, d_hash, sizeof(d_hash));
|
||||||
|
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
||||||
|
+ if (mdctx == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_MD_CTX_create() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mdctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) != 1) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignInit failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ if (inlen < modulus->ulValueLen) {
|
||||||
|
+ memset(buf, 0, modulus->ulValueLen - inlen);
|
||||||
|
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, buf, modulus->ulValueLen - inlen)!= 1) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, in, inlen) != 1) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ md_len = kdklen;
|
||||||
|
+ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, kdk, &md_len) != 1 ||
|
||||||
|
+ md_len != kdklen) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignFinal failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+out:
|
||||||
|
+ if (buf != NULL)
|
||||||
|
+ free(buf);
|
||||||
|
+ if (pkey != NULL)
|
||||||
|
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mdctx != NULL)
|
||||||
|
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ return rc;
|
||||||
|
+}
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_prf(CK_BYTE *out, CK_ULONG outlen,
|
||||||
|
+ const char *label, CK_ULONG labellen,
|
||||||
|
+ const CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen,
|
||||||
|
+ uint16_t bitlen)
|
||||||
|
+{
|
||||||
|
+ CK_RV rc;
|
||||||
|
+ CK_ULONG pos;
|
||||||
|
+ uint16_t iter = 0;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned char be_iter[sizeof(iter)];
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned char be_bitlen[sizeof(bitlen)];
|
||||||
|
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned char hmac_out[SHA256_HASH_SIZE];
|
||||||
|
+ size_t md_len;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /*
|
||||||
|
+ * The implementation of this function is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||||
|
+ * ossl_rsa_prf() in crypto/rsa/rsapk1.c and is slightly modified to fit to
|
||||||
|
+ * the providers environment.
|
||||||
|
+ * Changes include:
|
||||||
|
+ * - Different variable and define names.
|
||||||
|
+ * - Usage of TRACE_ERROR report errors and issue debug messages.
|
||||||
|
+ * - Different return codes.
|
||||||
|
+ * - Use of the EVP API instead of the internal APIs for HMAC operations.
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ if (kdklen != SHA256_HASH_SIZE) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("invalid kdklen\n");
|
||||||
|
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ if (outlen * 8 != bitlen) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("invalid outlen\n");
|
||||||
|
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ be_bitlen[0] = (bitlen >> 8) & 0xff;
|
||||||
|
+ be_bitlen[1] = bitlen & 0xff;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, kdk, kdklen);
|
||||||
|
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
||||||
|
+ if (mdctx == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_MD_CTX_create() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /*
|
||||||
|
+ * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
|
||||||
|
+ * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
|
||||||
|
+ * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
|
||||||
|
+ * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
|
||||||
|
+ * synthetically generated, which means that the padding check failed
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+ for (pos = 0; pos < outlen; pos += SHA256_HASH_SIZE, iter++) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mdctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) != 1) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignInit failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ be_iter[0] = (iter >> 8) & 0xff;
|
||||||
|
+ be_iter[1] = iter & 0xff;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, be_iter, sizeof(be_iter)) != 1) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, (unsigned char *)label, labellen) != 1) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, be_bitlen, sizeof(be_bitlen)) != 1) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignUpdate failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /*
|
||||||
|
+ * HMAC_Final requires the output buffer to fit the whole MAC
|
||||||
|
+ * value, so we need to use the intermediate buffer for the last
|
||||||
|
+ * unaligned block
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+ md_len = SHA256_HASH_SIZE;
|
||||||
|
+ if (pos + SHA256_HASH_SIZE > outlen) {
|
||||||
|
+ md_len = sizeof(hmac_out);
|
||||||
|
+ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, hmac_out, &md_len) != 1) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignFinal failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ memcpy(out + pos, hmac_out, outlen - pos);
|
||||||
|
+ } else {
|
||||||
|
+ md_len = outlen - pos;
|
||||||
|
+ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, out + pos, &md_len) != 1) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("EVP_DigestSignFinal failed\n");
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+out:
|
||||||
|
+ if (pkey != NULL)
|
||||||
|
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mdctx != NULL)
|
||||||
|
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ return rc;
|
||||||
|
+}
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
|
||||||
|
index 7bab1a84..7dc9589a 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_rsa.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -289,21 +289,34 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_1(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||||
|
return rc;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+#define MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES 128
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||||
|
CK_ULONG in_data_len,
|
||||||
|
CK_BYTE *out_data,
|
||||||
|
- CK_ULONG *out_data_len)
|
||||||
|
+ CK_ULONG *out_data_len,
|
||||||
|
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
- int i;
|
||||||
|
- unsigned char *em = NULL;
|
||||||
|
- unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, equals0;
|
||||||
|
- int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
|
||||||
|
- int out_len = *out_data_len;
|
||||||
|
- int rsa_size = in_data_len;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned int good = 0, found_zero_byte, equals0;
|
||||||
|
+ size_t zero_index = 0, msg_index;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned char *synthetic = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ int synthetic_length;
|
||||||
|
+ uint16_t len_candidate;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned char candidate_lengths[MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate)];
|
||||||
|
+ uint16_t len_mask;
|
||||||
|
+ uint16_t max_sep_offset;
|
||||||
|
+ int synth_msg_index = 0;
|
||||||
|
+ size_t i, j;
|
||||||
|
+ CK_RV rc;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ if (kdk == NULL || kdklen == 0) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_ARGUMENTS_BAD));
|
||||||
|
+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* The implementation of this function is copied from OpenSSL's function
|
||||||
|
- * RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
|
||||||
|
+ * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() in crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
|
||||||
|
* and is slightly modified to fit to the OpenCryptoki environment.
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* The OpenSSL code is licensed under the Apache License 2.0.
|
||||||
|
@@ -328,27 +341,67 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||||
|
* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",
|
||||||
|
* section 7.2.2.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
- if (rsa_size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (in_data_len < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_FUNCTION_FAILED));
|
||||||
|
return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- em = malloc(rsa_size);
|
||||||
|
- if (em == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
- TRACE_DEVEL("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_HOST_MEMORY));
|
||||||
|
+ /* Generate a random message to return in case the padding checks fail. */
|
||||||
|
+ synthetic = calloc(1, in_data_len);
|
||||||
|
+ if (synthetic == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("Failed to allocate synthetic buffer");
|
||||||
|
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- /* in_data_len is always equal to rsa_size */
|
||||||
|
- memcpy(em, in_data, rsa_size);
|
||||||
|
+ rc = openssl_specific_rsa_prf(synthetic, in_data_len, "message", 7,
|
||||||
|
+ kdk, kdklen, in_data_len * 8);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /* decide how long the random message should be */
|
||||||
|
+ rc = openssl_specific_rsa_prf(candidate_lengths,
|
||||||
|
+ sizeof(candidate_lengths),
|
||||||
|
+ "length", 6, kdk, kdklen,
|
||||||
|
+ MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES *
|
||||||
|
+ sizeof(len_candidate) * 8);
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||||
|
+ goto out;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
|
||||||
|
- good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
|
||||||
|
+ /*
|
||||||
|
+ * max message size is the size of the modulus size minus 2 bytes for
|
||||||
|
+ * version and padding type and a minimum of 8 bytes padding
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+ len_mask = max_sep_offset = in_data_len - 2 - 8;
|
||||||
|
+ /*
|
||||||
|
+ * we want a mask so let's propagate the high bit to all positions less
|
||||||
|
+ * significant than it
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 1;
|
||||||
|
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 2;
|
||||||
|
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 4;
|
||||||
|
+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 8;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ synthetic_length = 0;
|
||||||
|
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * (int)sizeof(len_candidate);
|
||||||
|
+ i += sizeof(len_candidate)) {
|
||||||
|
+ len_candidate = (candidate_lengths[i] << 8) |
|
||||||
|
+ candidate_lengths[i + 1];
|
||||||
|
+ len_candidate &= len_mask;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ synthetic_length = constant_time_select_int(
|
||||||
|
+ constant_time_lt(len_candidate, max_sep_offset),
|
||||||
|
+ len_candidate, synthetic_length);
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ synth_msg_index = in_data_len - synthetic_length;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(in_data[0]);
|
||||||
|
+ good &= constant_time_eq(in_data[1], 2);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* scan over padding data */
|
||||||
|
found_zero_byte = 0;
|
||||||
|
- for (i = 2; i < rsa_size; i++) {
|
||||||
|
- equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
|
||||||
|
+ for (i = 2; i < in_data_len; i++) {
|
||||||
|
+ equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(in_data[i]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
|
||||||
|
i, zero_index);
|
||||||
|
@@ -356,7 +409,7 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
- * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
|
||||||
|
+ * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |in_data|.
|
||||||
|
* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
|
||||||
|
* also fails.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
@@ -367,53 +420,41 @@ static CK_RV rsa_parse_block_type_2(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||||
|
* but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
msg_index = zero_index + 1;
|
||||||
|
- mlen = rsa_size - msg_index;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
- * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
|
||||||
|
+ * old code returned an error in case the decrypted message wouldn't fit
|
||||||
|
+ * into the |out_data|, since that would leak information, return the
|
||||||
|
+ * synthetic message instead
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
- good &= constant_time_ge(out_len, mlen);
|
||||||
|
+ good &= constant_time_ge(*out_data_len, in_data_len - msg_index);
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, synth_msg_index);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
- * Move the result in-place by |rsa_size|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen|
|
||||||
|
- * bytes to the left.
|
||||||
|
- * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to
|
||||||
|
- * |out_data|. Otherwise leave |out_data| unchanged.
|
||||||
|
- * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
|
||||||
|
- * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
|
||||||
|
- * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
|
||||||
|
- * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
|
||||||
|
- * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
|
||||||
|
+ * since at this point the |msg_index| does not provide the signal
|
||||||
|
+ * indicating if the padding check failed or not, we don't have to worry
|
||||||
|
+ * about leaking the length of returned message, we still need to ensure
|
||||||
|
+ * that we read contents of both buffers so that cache accesses don't leak
|
||||||
|
+ * the value of |good|
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
- out_len = constant_time_select_int(
|
||||||
|
- constant_time_lt(rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, out_len),
|
||||||
|
- rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE,
|
||||||
|
- out_len);
|
||||||
|
- for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE;
|
||||||
|
- msg_index <<= 1) {
|
||||||
|
- mask = ~constant_time_eq(
|
||||||
|
- msg_index & (rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
|
||||||
|
- for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < rsa_size - msg_index; i++)
|
||||||
|
- em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
|
||||||
|
- }
|
||||||
|
- for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
|
||||||
|
- mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
|
||||||
|
- out_data[i] = constant_time_select_8(
|
||||||
|
- mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], out_data[i]);
|
||||||
|
- }
|
||||||
|
+ for (i = msg_index, j = 0; i < in_data_len && j < *out_data_len;
|
||||||
|
+ i++, j++)
|
||||||
|
+ out_data[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, in_data[i], synthetic[i]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- OPENSSL_cleanse(em, rsa_size);
|
||||||
|
- free(em);
|
||||||
|
+ *out_data_len = j;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- *out_data_len = constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, 0);
|
||||||
|
+out:
|
||||||
|
+ if (synthetic != NULL)
|
||||||
|
+ free(synthetic);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- return constant_time_select_int(good, CKR_OK, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID);
|
||||||
|
+ return rc;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CK_RV rsa_parse_block(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||||
|
CK_ULONG in_data_len,
|
||||||
|
CK_BYTE *out_data,
|
||||||
|
- CK_ULONG *out_data_len, CK_ULONG type)
|
||||||
|
+ CK_ULONG *out_data_len, CK_ULONG type,
|
||||||
|
+ CK_BYTE *kdk, CK_ULONG kdklen)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
switch (type) {
|
||||||
|
case PKCS_BT_1:
|
||||||
|
@@ -421,7 +462,7 @@ CK_RV rsa_parse_block(CK_BYTE *in_data,
|
||||||
|
out_data, out_data_len);
|
||||||
|
case PKCS_BT_2:
|
||||||
|
return rsa_parse_block_type_2(in_data, in_data_len,
|
||||||
|
- out_data, out_data_len);
|
||||||
|
+ out_data, out_data_len, kdk, kdklen);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
||||||
@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
|
|||||||
|
commit e2b496f58a84c2f537667655fe08a0d4923f0c70
|
||||||
|
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||||
|
Date: Fri Jan 12 09:36:27 2024 +0100
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Constant time fixes for C_Decrypt return code handling
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Return code handling of C_Decrypt, C_DecryptUpdate, and C_DecryptFinal must
|
||||||
|
be performed in a constant time manner for RSA mechanisms. Otherwise it
|
||||||
|
may cause a timing side channel that may be used to perform a Bleichenbacher
|
||||||
|
style attack.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Handling of error situations with CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or size-query calls,
|
||||||
|
where the output buffer is NULL and the required size of the output buffer
|
||||||
|
is to be returned, do not need to be performed in constant time, since
|
||||||
|
these cases are shortcut anyway, and the result is only dependent on the
|
||||||
|
modulus size of the RSA key (which is public information anyway).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/new_host.c b/usr/lib/common/new_host.c
|
||||||
|
index 8a1e8723..bbb0f601 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/usr/lib/common/new_host.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/usr/lib/common/new_host.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
|
||||||
|
#include "trace.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "slotmgr.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "attributes.h"
|
||||||
|
+#include "constant_time.h"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#include "../api/apiproto.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "../api/policy.h"
|
||||||
|
@@ -2345,6 +2346,7 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||||
|
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||||
|
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||||
|
@@ -2377,11 +2379,19 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
rc = decr_mgr_decrypt(tokdata, sess, length_only, &sess->decr_ctx,
|
||||||
|
pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, pData,
|
||||||
|
pulDataLen);
|
||||||
|
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||||
|
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||||
|
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask)
|
||||||
|
TRACE_DEVEL("decr_mgr_decrypt() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
done:
|
||||||
|
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
|
||||||
|
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask) {
|
||||||
|
if (sess)
|
||||||
|
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
@@ -2404,6 +2414,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||||
|
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||||
|
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||||
|
@@ -2436,11 +2447,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
rc = decr_mgr_decrypt_update(tokdata, sess, length_only,
|
||||||
|
&sess->decr_ctx, pEncryptedPart,
|
||||||
|
ulEncryptedPartLen, pPart, pulPartLen);
|
||||||
|
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||||
|
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||||
|
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask)
|
||||||
|
TRACE_DEVEL("decr_mgr_decrypt_update() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
done:
|
||||||
|
- if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && sess != NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ /* (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask) {
|
||||||
|
if (sess)
|
||||||
|
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
@@ -2462,6 +2480,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||||
|
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||||
|
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||||
|
@@ -2493,11 +2512,19 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
rc = decr_mgr_decrypt_final(tokdata, sess, length_only, &sess->decr_ctx,
|
||||||
|
pLastPart, pulLastPartLen);
|
||||||
|
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||||
|
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||||
|
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask)
|
||||||
|
TRACE_DEVEL("decr_mgr_decrypt_final() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
done:
|
||||||
|
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
|
||||||
|
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask) {
|
||||||
|
if (sess)
|
||||||
|
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||||
|
index 073b349f..6d08b95e 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/ep11_specific.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -9552,10 +9552,12 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_decrypt_final(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||||
|
rc = constant_time_select(constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK),
|
||||||
|
ep11_error_to_pkcs11_error(rc, session),
|
||||||
|
rc);
|
||||||
|
- if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
- TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||||
|
- } else {
|
||||||
|
- TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||||
|
+ if (!is_rsa_mechanism(ctx->mech.mechanism)) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||||
|
+ } else {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
done:
|
||||||
|
@@ -9611,10 +9613,12 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||||
|
rc = constant_time_select(constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK),
|
||||||
|
ep11_error_to_pkcs11_error(rc, session),
|
||||||
|
rc);
|
||||||
|
- if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
- TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||||
|
- } else {
|
||||||
|
- TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||||
|
+ if (!is_rsa_mechanism(ctx->mech.mechanism)) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||||
|
+ } else {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
done:
|
||||||
|
@@ -9676,10 +9680,12 @@ CK_RV ep11tok_decrypt_update(STDLL_TokData_t * tokdata, SESSION * session,
|
||||||
|
rc = constant_time_select(constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK),
|
||||||
|
ep11_error_to_pkcs11_error(rc, session),
|
||||||
|
rc);
|
||||||
|
- if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
- TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||||
|
- } else {
|
||||||
|
- TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||||
|
+ if (!is_rsa_mechanism(ctx->mech.mechanism)) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK) {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_ERROR("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||||
|
+ } else {
|
||||||
|
+ TRACE_INFO("%s rc=0x%lx\n", __func__, rc);
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
done:
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||||
|
index 55e34c18..299a1d3c 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/usr/lib/ep11_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
|
||||||
|
#include "slotmgr.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "attributes.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "ep11_specific.h"
|
||||||
|
+#include "constant_time.h"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#include "../api/apiproto.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "../api/policy.h"
|
||||||
|
@@ -2466,6 +2467,7 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||||
|
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||||
|
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||||
|
@@ -2513,17 +2515,29 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
length_only, sess->decr_ctx.key,
|
||||||
|
pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
|
||||||
|
pData, pulDataLen);
|
||||||
|
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||||
|
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||||
|
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask)
|
||||||
|
TRACE_DEVEL("ep11tok_decrypt_single() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
rc = ep11tok_decrypt(tokdata, sess, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
|
||||||
|
pData, pulDataLen);
|
||||||
|
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||||
|
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||||
|
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask)
|
||||||
|
TRACE_DEVEL("ep11tok_decrypt() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
done:
|
||||||
|
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
|
||||||
|
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask) {
|
||||||
|
if (sess)
|
||||||
|
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
@@ -2545,6 +2559,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||||
|
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||||
|
@@ -2596,11 +2611,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
rc = ep11tok_decrypt_update(tokdata, sess, pEncryptedPart,
|
||||||
|
ulEncryptedPartLen, pPart, pulPartLen);
|
||||||
|
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||||
|
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||||
|
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask)
|
||||||
|
TRACE_DEVEL("ep11tok_decrypt_update() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
done:
|
||||||
|
- if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && sess != NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ /* (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask) {
|
||||||
|
if (sess)
|
||||||
|
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
@@ -2622,6 +2644,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||||
|
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||||
|
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||||
|
@@ -2670,10 +2693,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
rc = ep11tok_decrypt_final(tokdata, sess, pLastPart, pulLastPartLen);
|
||||||
|
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||||
|
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||||
|
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask)
|
||||||
|
TRACE_DEVEL("ep11tok_decrypt_final() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
done:
|
||||||
|
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
|
||||||
|
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask) {
|
||||||
|
if (sess)
|
||||||
|
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/usr/lib/icsf_stdll/new_host.c b/usr/lib/icsf_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||||
|
index 6c419750..d8064559 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/usr/lib/icsf_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/usr/lib/icsf_stdll/new_host.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
|
||||||
|
#include "slotmgr.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "attributes.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "icsf_specific.h"
|
||||||
|
+#include "constant_time.h"
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
#include "../api/apiproto.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "../api/policy.h"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@@ -1768,6 +1770,7 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||||
|
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||||
|
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||||
|
@@ -1801,11 +1804,19 @@ CK_RV SC_Decrypt(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
rc = icsftok_decrypt(tokdata, sess, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
|
||||||
|
pData, pulDataLen);
|
||||||
|
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||||
|
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||||
|
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask)
|
||||||
|
TRACE_DEVEL("icsftok_decrypt() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
done:
|
||||||
|
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
|
||||||
|
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask) {
|
||||||
|
if (sess)
|
||||||
|
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
@@ -1827,6 +1838,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||||
|
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||||
|
@@ -1857,11 +1869,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptUpdate(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
rc = icsftok_decrypt_update(tokdata, sess, pEncryptedPart,
|
||||||
|
ulEncryptedPartLen, pPart, pulPartLen);
|
||||||
|
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||||
|
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||||
|
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask)
|
||||||
|
TRACE_DEVEL("icsftok_decrypt_update() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
done:
|
||||||
|
- if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && sess != NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ /* (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask) {
|
||||||
|
if (sess)
|
||||||
|
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
@@ -1883,6 +1902,7 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
SESSION *sess = NULL;
|
||||||
|
CK_BBOOL length_only = FALSE;
|
||||||
|
CK_RV rc = CKR_OK;
|
||||||
|
+ unsigned int mask;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (tokdata->initialized == FALSE) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED));
|
||||||
|
@@ -1915,10 +1935,18 @@ CK_RV SC_DecryptFinal(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, ST_SESSION_HANDLE *sSession,
|
||||||
|
length_only = TRUE;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
rc = icsftok_decrypt_final(tokdata, sess, pLastPart, pulLastPartLen);
|
||||||
|
- if (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK)
|
||||||
|
+ /* (!is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism) && rc != CKR_OK) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(
|
||||||
|
+ is_rsa_mechanism(sess->decr_ctx.mech.mechanism));
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask)
|
||||||
|
TRACE_DEVEL("icsftok_decrypt_final() failed.\n");
|
||||||
|
done:
|
||||||
|
- if (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) {
|
||||||
|
+ /* (rc != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL && (rc != CKR_OK || length_only != TRUE)) */
|
||||||
|
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_OK);
|
||||||
|
+ mask |= constant_time_is_zero(length_only);
|
||||||
|
+ mask &= ~constant_time_eq(rc, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||||
|
+ if (mask) {
|
||||||
|
if (sess)
|
||||||
|
decr_mgr_cleanup(tokdata, sess, &sess->decr_ctx);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
|||||||
|
commit d756ba1ec270a289950e66398c7e8be59c4a594d
|
||||||
|
Author: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||||
|
Date: Fri Feb 9 14:07:34 2024 +0100
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMON: Fix implicit rejection with RSA keys with empty CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
An RSA key object that has no CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT may either don't have that
|
||||||
|
attribute at all, or may have an empty CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT attribute.
|
||||||
|
Both situations should be handed the same, and the private exponent of the
|
||||||
|
key needs to be calculated from the other key components.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note that RSA key objects generated with a current soft or ICA token will
|
||||||
|
always have a valid CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT attribute, since this is provided
|
||||||
|
during key generation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
|
||||||
|
index da515289..14c82e2d 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/usr/lib/common/mech_openssl.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -5160,7 +5160,8 @@ CK_RV openssl_specific_rsa_derive_kdk(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata, OBJECT *key_obj,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
rc = template_attribute_get_non_empty(key_obj->template,
|
||||||
|
CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, &priv_exp_attr);
|
||||||
|
- if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (rc != CKR_OK && rc != CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE &&
|
||||||
|
+ rc != CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID) {
|
||||||
|
TRACE_ERROR("Failed to get CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT\n");
|
||||||
|
goto out;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@ -0,0 +1,783 @@
|
|||||||
|
Name: opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
Summary: Implementation of the PKCS#11 (Cryptoki) specification v3.0
|
||||||
|
Version: 3.22.0
|
||||||
|
Release: 3%{?dist}
|
||||||
|
License: CPL
|
||||||
|
Group: System Environment/Base
|
||||||
|
URL: https://github.com/opencryptoki/opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
Source0: https://github.com/opencryptoki/%{name}/archive/v%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
|
||||||
|
# bz#1373833, change tmpfiles snippets from /var/lock/* to /run/lock/*
|
||||||
|
Patch1: opencryptoki-3.11.0-lockdir.patch
|
||||||
|
# add missing p11sak_defined_attrs.conf
|
||||||
|
Patch2: opencryptoki-3.21.0-p11sak.patch
|
||||||
|
# comment some unsupported sandbox options and add /run to ReadWritePaths to exclude
|
||||||
|
# /run directory from being made read-only on rhel8
|
||||||
|
Patch3: opencryptoki-3.21-sandboxing.patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# upstream patches
|
||||||
|
# CVE-2024-0914 opencryptoki: timing side-channel in handling of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padded ciphertexts
|
||||||
|
Patch20: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part1.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch21: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part2.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch22: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part3.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch23: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part4.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch24: opencryptoki-CVE-2024-0914-part5.patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Requires(pre): coreutils diffutils
|
||||||
|
Requires: (selinux-policy >= 3.14.3-121 if selinux-policy-targeted)
|
||||||
|
BuildRequires: gcc
|
||||||
|
BuildRequires: gcc-c++
|
||||||
|
BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.1.1
|
||||||
|
BuildRequires: trousers-devel
|
||||||
|
BuildRequires: openldap-devel
|
||||||
|
BuildRequires: autoconf automake libtool
|
||||||
|
BuildRequires: bison flex
|
||||||
|
BuildRequires: systemd-devel
|
||||||
|
BuildRequires: libcap-devel
|
||||||
|
BuildRequires: expect
|
||||||
|
BuildRequires: make
|
||||||
|
%ifarch s390 s390x
|
||||||
|
BuildRequires: libica-devel >= 3.3
|
||||||
|
%endif
|
||||||
|
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Requires: %{name}(token)
|
||||||
|
Requires(post): systemd
|
||||||
|
Requires(preun): systemd
|
||||||
|
Requires(postun): systemd
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%description
|
||||||
|
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
|
||||||
|
cryptographic hardware, such as IBM 4764 and 4765 crypto cards, and the
|
||||||
|
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip. Opencryptoki also brings a software
|
||||||
|
token implementation that can be used without any cryptographic
|
||||||
|
hardware.
|
||||||
|
This package contains the Slot Daemon (pkcsslotd) and general utilities.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%package libs
|
||||||
|
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||||
|
Summary: The run-time libraries for opencryptoki package
|
||||||
|
Requires(pre): shadow-utils
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%description libs
|
||||||
|
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
|
||||||
|
cryptographic hardware, such as IBM 4764 and 4765 crypto cards, and the
|
||||||
|
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip. Opencryptoki also brings a software
|
||||||
|
token implementation that can be used without any cryptographic
|
||||||
|
hardware.
|
||||||
|
This package contains the PKCS#11 library implementation, and requires
|
||||||
|
at least one token implementation (packaged separately) to be fully
|
||||||
|
functional.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%package devel
|
||||||
|
Group: Development/Libraries
|
||||||
|
Summary: Development files for openCryptoki
|
||||||
|
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%description devel
|
||||||
|
This package contains the development header files for building
|
||||||
|
opencryptoki and PKCS#11 based applications
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%package swtok
|
||||||
|
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||||
|
Summary: The software token implementation for opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Provides: %{name}(token)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%description swtok
|
||||||
|
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
|
||||||
|
cryptographic hardware, such as IBM 4764 and 4765 crypto cards, and the
|
||||||
|
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip. Opencryptoki also brings a software
|
||||||
|
token implementation that can be used without any cryptographic
|
||||||
|
hardware.
|
||||||
|
This package brings the software token implementation to use opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
without any specific cryptographic hardware.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%package tpmtok
|
||||||
|
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||||
|
Summary: Trusted Platform Module (TPM) device support for opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Provides: %{name}(token)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%description tpmtok
|
||||||
|
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
|
||||||
|
cryptographic hardware, such as IBM 4764 and 4765 crypto cards, and the
|
||||||
|
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip. Opencryptoki also brings a software
|
||||||
|
token implementation that can be used without any cryptographic
|
||||||
|
hardware.
|
||||||
|
This package brings the necessary libraries and files to support
|
||||||
|
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) devices in the opencryptoki stack.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%package icsftok
|
||||||
|
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||||
|
Summary: ICSF token support for opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Provides: %{name}(token)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%description icsftok
|
||||||
|
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
|
||||||
|
cryptographic hardware, such as IBM 4764 and 4765 crypto cards, and the
|
||||||
|
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip. Opencryptoki also brings a software
|
||||||
|
token implementation that can be used without any cryptographic
|
||||||
|
hardware.
|
||||||
|
This package brings the necessary libraries and files to support
|
||||||
|
ICSF token in the opencryptoki stack.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%ifarch s390 s390x
|
||||||
|
%package icatok
|
||||||
|
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||||
|
Summary: ICA cryptographic devices (clear-key) support for opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Provides: %{name}(token)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%description icatok
|
||||||
|
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
|
||||||
|
cryptographic hardware, such as IBM 4764 and 4765 crypto cards, and the
|
||||||
|
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip. Opencryptoki also brings a software
|
||||||
|
token implementation that can be used without any cryptographic
|
||||||
|
hardware.
|
||||||
|
This package brings the necessary libraries and files to support ICA
|
||||||
|
devices in the opencryptoki stack. ICA is an interface to IBM
|
||||||
|
cryptographic hardware such as IBM 4764 or 4765 that uses the
|
||||||
|
"accelerator" or "clear-key" path.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%package ccatok
|
||||||
|
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||||
|
Summary: CCA cryptographic devices (secure-key) support for opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Provides: %{name}(token)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%description ccatok
|
||||||
|
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
|
||||||
|
cryptographic hardware, such as IBM 4764 and 4765 crypto cards, and the
|
||||||
|
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip. Opencryptoki also brings a software
|
||||||
|
token implementation that can be used without any cryptographic
|
||||||
|
hardware.
|
||||||
|
This package brings the necessary libraries and files to support CCA
|
||||||
|
devices in the opencryptoki stack. CCA is an interface to IBM
|
||||||
|
cryptographic hardware such as IBM 4764 or 4765 that uses the
|
||||||
|
"co-processor" or "secure-key" path.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%package ep11tok
|
||||||
|
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||||
|
Summary: CCA cryptographic devices (secure-key) support for opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
Requires(pre): %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||||
|
Provides: %{name}(token)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%description ep11tok
|
||||||
|
Opencryptoki implements the PKCS#11 specification v2.20 for a set of
|
||||||
|
cryptographic hardware, such as IBM 4764 and 4765 crypto cards, and the
|
||||||
|
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip. Opencryptoki also brings a software
|
||||||
|
token implementation that can be used without any cryptographic
|
||||||
|
hardware.
|
||||||
|
This package brings the necessary libraries and files to support EP11
|
||||||
|
tokens in the opencryptoki stack. The EP11 token is a token that uses
|
||||||
|
the IBM Crypto Express adapters (starting with Crypto Express 4S adapters)
|
||||||
|
configured with Enterprise PKCS#11 (EP11) firmware.
|
||||||
|
%endif
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%prep
|
||||||
|
%autosetup -p1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%build
|
||||||
|
./bootstrap.sh
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%configure --with-systemd=%{_unitdir} \
|
||||||
|
--with-pkcsslotd-user=pkcsslotd --with-pkcs-group=pkcs11 \
|
||||||
|
%ifarch s390 s390x
|
||||||
|
--enable-icatok --enable-ccatok --enable-ep11tok --enable-pkcsep11_migrate
|
||||||
|
%else
|
||||||
|
--disable-icatok --disable-ccatok --disable-ep11tok --disable-pkcsep11_migrate --disable-pkcscca_migrate
|
||||||
|
%endif
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
make %{?_smp_mflags} CHGRP=/bin/true
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%install
|
||||||
|
make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT CHGRP=/bin/true
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Remove unwanted cruft
|
||||||
|
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/%{name}/*.la
|
||||||
|
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/%{name}/stdll/*.la
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%post libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%post swtok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%post tpmtok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%post icsftok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%ifarch s390 s390x
|
||||||
|
%post icatok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%post ccatok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%post ep11tok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%endif
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%postun swtok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%postun tpmtok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%postun icsftok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%ifarch s390 s390x
|
||||||
|
%postun icatok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%postun ccatok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%postun ep11tok -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||||
|
%endif
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%pre
|
||||||
|
# don't touch opencryptoki.conf even if it is unchanged due to new tokversion
|
||||||
|
# backup config file
|
||||||
|
%global cfile /etc/opencryptoki/opencryptoki.conf
|
||||||
|
%global csuffix .rpmsave.XyoP
|
||||||
|
if test $1 -gt 1 && test -f %{cfile} ; then
|
||||||
|
cp -p %{cfile} %{cfile}%{csuffix}
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%pre libs
|
||||||
|
getent group pkcs11 >/dev/null || groupadd -r pkcs11
|
||||||
|
getent passwd pkcsslotd >/dev/null || useradd -r -g pkcs11 -d /run/opencryptoki -s /sbin/nologin -c "Opencryptoki pkcsslotd user" pkcsslotd
|
||||||
|
exit 0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%post
|
||||||
|
# restore the config file from %pre
|
||||||
|
if test $1 -gt 1 && test -f %{cfile} ; then
|
||||||
|
if ( ! cmp -s %{cfile} %{cfile}%{csuffix} ) ; then
|
||||||
|
cp -p %{cfile} %{cfile}.rpmnew
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
cp -p %{cfile}%{csuffix} %{cfile} && rm -f %{cfile}%{csuffix}
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%systemd_post pkcsslotd.service
|
||||||
|
if test $1 -eq 1; then
|
||||||
|
%tmpfiles_create
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%preun
|
||||||
|
%systemd_preun pkcsslotd.service
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%postun
|
||||||
|
%systemd_postun_with_restart pkcsslotd.service
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%triggerun -- opencryptoki < 3.21.0-1
|
||||||
|
/usr/bin/systemctl daemon-reload
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%files
|
||||||
|
%doc ChangeLog FAQ README.md
|
||||||
|
%doc doc/opencryptoki-howto.md
|
||||||
|
%doc doc/README.token_data
|
||||||
|
%doc %{_docdir}/%{name}/*.conf
|
||||||
|
%dir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}
|
||||||
|
%verify(not md5 size mtime) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/%{name}.conf
|
||||||
|
%attr(0640, root, pkcs11) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/p11sak_defined_attrs.conf
|
||||||
|
%attr(0640, root, pkcs11) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/strength.conf
|
||||||
|
%{_tmpfilesdir}/%{name}.conf
|
||||||
|
%{_unitdir}/pkcsslotd.service
|
||||||
|
%{_sbindir}/p11sak
|
||||||
|
%{_sbindir}/pkcstok_migrate
|
||||||
|
%{_sbindir}/pkcsconf
|
||||||
|
%{_sbindir}/pkcsslotd
|
||||||
|
%{_sbindir}/pkcsstats
|
||||||
|
%{_sbindir}/pkcshsm_mk_change
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man1/p11sak.1*
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man1/pkcstok_migrate.1*
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man1/pkcsconf.1*
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man1/pkcsstats.1*
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man1/pkcshsm_mk_change.1*
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man5/policy.conf.5*
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man5/strength.conf.5*
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man5/%{name}.conf.5*
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man5/p11sak_defined_attrs.conf.5*
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man7/%{name}.7*
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man8/pkcsslotd.8*
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/methods
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/pkcs11/methods
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/HSM_MK_CHANGE
|
||||||
|
%ghost %dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_rundir}/lock/%{name}
|
||||||
|
%ghost %dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_rundir}/lock/%{name}/*
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(710,pkcsslotd,pkcs11) /run/%{name}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%files libs
|
||||||
|
%license LICENSE
|
||||||
|
%{_sysconfdir}/ld.so.conf.d/*
|
||||||
|
# Unversioned .so symlinks usually belong to -devel packages, but opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
# needs them in the main package, because:
|
||||||
|
# documentation suggests that programs should dlopen "PKCS11_API.so".
|
||||||
|
%dir %{_libdir}/opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/libopencryptoki.*
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/PKCS11_API.so
|
||||||
|
%dir %{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll
|
||||||
|
%dir %{_libdir}/pkcs11
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/pkcs11/libopencryptoki.so
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/pkcs11/stdll
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_localstatedir}/log/opencryptoki
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%files devel
|
||||||
|
%{_includedir}/%{name}/
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/%{name}.pc
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%files swtok
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_sw.*
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/PKCS11_SW.so
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/swtok/
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/swtok/TOK_OBJ/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%files tpmtok
|
||||||
|
%doc doc/README.tpm_stdll
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_tpm.*
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/PKCS11_TPM.so
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/tpm/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%files icsftok
|
||||||
|
%doc doc/README.icsf_stdll
|
||||||
|
%{_sbindir}/pkcsicsf
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man1/pkcsicsf.1*
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_icsf.*
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/PKCS11_ICSF.so
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/icsf/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%ifarch s390 s390x
|
||||||
|
%files icatok
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_ica.*
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/PKCS11_ICA.so
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/lite/
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/lite/TOK_OBJ/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%files ccatok
|
||||||
|
%doc doc/README.cca_stdll
|
||||||
|
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/ccatok.conf
|
||||||
|
%{_sbindir}/pkcscca
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man1/pkcscca.1*
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_cca.*
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/PKCS11_CCA.so
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/ccatok/
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/ccatok/TOK_OBJ/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%files ep11tok
|
||||||
|
%doc doc/README.ep11_stdll
|
||||||
|
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/ep11tok.conf
|
||||||
|
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}/ep11cpfilter.conf
|
||||||
|
%{_sbindir}/pkcsep11_migrate
|
||||||
|
%{_sbindir}/pkcsep11_session
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man1/pkcsep11_migrate.1*
|
||||||
|
%{_mandir}/man1/pkcsep11_session.1*
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/libpkcs11_ep11.*
|
||||||
|
%{_libdir}/opencryptoki/stdll/PKCS11_EP11.so
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/ep11tok/
|
||||||
|
%dir %attr(770,root,pkcs11) %{_sharedstatedir}/%{name}/ep11tok/TOK_OBJ/
|
||||||
|
%endif
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
%changelog
|
||||||
|
* Fri Mar 29 2024 MSVSphere Packaging Team <packager@msvsphere-os.ru> - 3.22.0-3
|
||||||
|
- Rebuilt for MSVSphere 8.10 beta
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Feb 16 2024 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.22.0-3
|
||||||
|
- Fix implicit rejection with RSA keys with empty CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT
|
||||||
|
Related: RHEL-22791
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Feb 08 2024 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.22.0-2
|
||||||
|
- timing side-channel in handling of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padded ciphertexts (Marvin)
|
||||||
|
Resolves: RHEL-22791
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Nov 23 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.22.0-1
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: RHEL-11413, update to 3.22.0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jul 18 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-9
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2223588, FTBFS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jul 18 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-8
|
||||||
|
- Related: #2222595, add triggerun to reload daemon
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Jul 14 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-7
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2222595, p11sak tool: slot option does not accept argument 0 for slot index 0
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2222594, p11sak fails as soon as there reside non-key objects
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jul 04 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-6
|
||||||
|
- add workaround for segfault in PEM_write_bio() on OpenSSL 1.1.1
|
||||||
|
Related: #2159741
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jun 13 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-5
|
||||||
|
- add requirement on selinux-policy >= 3.14.3-121 for pkcsslotd policy sandboxing
|
||||||
|
Related: #2159697
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu May 25 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-4
|
||||||
|
- add verify attributes for opencryptoki.conf to ignore the verification
|
||||||
|
Related: #2159697
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon May 22 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-3
|
||||||
|
- pkcsstats: Fix handling of user name
|
||||||
|
- p11sak: Fix user confirmation prompt behavior when stdin is closed
|
||||||
|
Related: #2159697
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue May 16 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-2
|
||||||
|
- add missing /var/lib/opencryptoki/HSM_MK_CHANGE
|
||||||
|
- disable unsupported sandbox options and add /run to ReadWritePaths to exclude
|
||||||
|
/run directory from being made read-only on rhel8
|
||||||
|
Related: #2159697
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon May 15 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.21.0-1
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1984865, ep11 and cca: support concurrent HSM master key changes
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2110500, ep11 token: PKCS #11 3.0 - support AES_XTS
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2111011, cca token: protected key support
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2159697, update to 3.21.0
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2159740, pkcsslotd hardening
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2159741, p11sak support Dilithium and Kyber keys
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2159742, ica and soft tokens: PKCS #11 3.0 - support AES_XTS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Jan 30 2023 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.19.0-2
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2043856, Support of ep11 token for new IBM Z Hardware (IBM z16)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Nov 01 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.19.0-1
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2126612, opencryptoki fails after generating > 500 RSA keys
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2110315, rebase to 3.19.0
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2110990, openCryptoki key generation with expected MKVP only on CCA and EP11 tokens
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2110477, openCryptoki ep11 token: master key consistency
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1984871, openCryptoki ep11 token: vendor specific key derivation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Aug 01 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-3
|
||||||
|
- Related: #2043854, do not touch opencryptoki.conf if it is in place already and even if it is unchanged
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2112785, EP11: Fix C_GetMechanismList returning CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jun 07 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-2
|
||||||
|
- Related: #2043854, fix json output
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue May 24 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.18.0-1
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2043845, rebase to 3.18.0
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2043854, add crypto counters
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2043855, support crypto profiles
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Apr 15 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-4
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2066762, Dilithium support not available
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Jan 17 2022 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-3
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #2040677, API: Unlock GlobMutex if user and group check fails
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Nov 09 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-2
|
||||||
|
- Related: #1984993, add missing p11sak_defined_attrs.conf
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Oct 19 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.17.0-1
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1984993, rebase to 3.17.0
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1984870, openCryptoki key management tool
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Sep 13 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-6
|
||||||
|
- Fix: Could not open /run/lock/opencryptoki/LCK..APIlock
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Aug 19 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-5
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1987256, pkcstok_migrate leaves options with multiple strings in opencryptoki.conf options without double-quotes
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Jul 16 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-4
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1964304, Fix detection if pkcsslotd is still running
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jun 15 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-3
|
||||||
|
- Related: #1919223, add conditional requirement
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Jun 11 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-2
|
||||||
|
- Related: #1919223, add requirement on selinux-policy >= 3.14.3-70 for using ipsec
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jun 01 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.16.0-1
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1919223, rebase to 3.16.0
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1922195, Event Notification Support
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1959936, Soft token does not check if an EC key is valid
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1851104, import and export of secure key objects
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1851106, openCryptoki ep11 token: protected key support
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1851107, openCryptoki ep11 token: support attribute bound keys
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Feb 12 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-5
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1928120, Fix problem with C_Get/SetOperationState and digest contexts
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Feb 12 2021 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-4
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1927745, pkcscca migration fails with usr/sb2 is not a valid slot ID
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Nov 26 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-3
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1902022
|
||||||
|
Fix compiling with c++
|
||||||
|
Added error message handling for p11sak remove-key command
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Nov 26 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-2
|
||||||
|
- Related: #1847433, Added error message handling for p11sak remove-key command
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Nov 02 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.1-1
|
||||||
|
- Related: #1847433
|
||||||
|
upstream fixes:
|
||||||
|
- Free generated key in all error cases
|
||||||
|
- CCA: Zeroize key buffer to avoid CCA 8/32 error
|
||||||
|
- Do not delete the map-btree entry if destroying an object is not allowed
|
||||||
|
- Remove now unused header timeb.h
|
||||||
|
- TESTCASES: Use FIPS conforming keys for 3DES CBC-MAC test vectors
|
||||||
|
- Fix buffer overrun in C_CopyObject
|
||||||
|
- TPM: Fix double free in openssl_gen_key
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Oct 19 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.15.0-1
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1847433, rebase to 3.15.0
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1851105, PKCS #11 3.0 - baseline provider support
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1851108, openCryptoki ep11 token: enhanced functionality
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1851109, openCryptoki key management tool: key deletion function
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Jul 06 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-5
|
||||||
|
- Related: #1853420, more fixes
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Jul 03 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-4
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1853420, endian issue
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Jun 15 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-3
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1780294, PIN conversion tool
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue May 26 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-2
|
||||||
|
- Related: #1780293, fix regression, segfault in C_SetPin
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue May 19 2020 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.14.0-1
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1723863 - ep11 token: Enhanced Support
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1780285 - ep11 token: Support for new IBM Z hardware z15
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1780293 - rebase to 3.14.0
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1800549 - key management tool: list keys function
|
||||||
|
-Resolves: #1800555 - key management tool: random key generation function
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Dec 13 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.12.1-2
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1782445, EP11: Fix EC-uncompress buffer length
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Nov 28 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.12.1-1
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1777313, rebase to 3.12.1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Nov 12 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.12.0-1
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1726243, rebase to 3.12.0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Aug 26 2019 Dan Horák <dhorak@redhat.com> - 3.11.1-2
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1739433, ICA HW token missing after the package update
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon May 06 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.11.1-1
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1706140, rebase to 3.11.1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Mar 26 2019 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.11.0-3
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1667941, 3des tests failures due to FIPS incompatible test scenarios
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1651731, ep11 token: enhanced IBM z14 functions
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1651732, ep11 token: support m_*Single functions from ep11 lib
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1525407, use CPACF hashes in ep11 token
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1651238, rebase to 3.11.0
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1682530, gating
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Dec 14 2018 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.10.0-3
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1657683, can't establish libica token in FIPS mode
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1652856, EP11 token fails when using Strict-Session mode or VHSM-Mode
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Oct 25 2018 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> - 3.10.0-2
|
||||||
|
- Resolves: #1602641, covscan
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jun 12 2018 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.10.0-1
|
||||||
|
- Rebase to 3.10.0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Feb 23 2018 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.9.0-1
|
||||||
|
- Rebase to 3.9.0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Feb 08 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.8.2-3
|
||||||
|
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_28_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Nov 24 2017 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.8.2-2
|
||||||
|
- use upstream tmpfiles config
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Nov 23 2017 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.8.2-1
|
||||||
|
- Rebase to 3.8.2 (#1512678)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Aug 03 2017 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.7.0-3
|
||||||
|
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_27_Binutils_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Jul 27 2017 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.7.0-2
|
||||||
|
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_27_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Wed May 17 2017 Sinny Kumari <sinny@redhat.com> - 3.7.0-1
|
||||||
|
- Rebase to 3.7.0
|
||||||
|
- Added libitm-devel as BuildRequires
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Apr 03 2017 Sinny Kumari <sinny@redhat.com> - 3.6.2-1
|
||||||
|
- Rebase to 3.6.2
|
||||||
|
- RHBZ#1424017 - opencryptoki: FTBFS in rawhide
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Sat Feb 11 2017 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.5.1-2
|
||||||
|
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_26_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Sep 01 2016 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 3.5.1-1
|
||||||
|
- New upstream release
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue May 03 2016 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 3.5-1
|
||||||
|
- New upstream release
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Feb 04 2016 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.4.1-2
|
||||||
|
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_24_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Dec 07 2015 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> 3.4.1-1
|
||||||
|
- New bugfix upstream release
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Wed Nov 18 2015 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> 3.4-1
|
||||||
|
- New upstream release
|
||||||
|
- Adding post-release patch fixing compile warnings
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Aug 27 2015 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> 3.3-1.1
|
||||||
|
- New upstream release
|
||||||
|
- Correct dependencies for group creation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Wed Jun 17 2015 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 3.2-4
|
||||||
|
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_23_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu May 07 2015 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> 3.2-3
|
||||||
|
- Few more undefined symbols fixed for s390(x) specific targets
|
||||||
|
- Do not require --no-undefined, because s390(x) requires some
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon May 04 2015 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> 3.2-2
|
||||||
|
- Fix missing sources and libraries in makefiles causing undefined symbols (#1193560)
|
||||||
|
- Make inline function compatible for GCC5
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Wed Sep 10 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com> 3.2-1
|
||||||
|
- new upstream release 3.2
|
||||||
|
- add new sub-package opencryptoki-ep11tok on s390x
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Sun Aug 17 2014 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 3.1-2
|
||||||
|
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_22_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Jul 24 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com> 3.1-1
|
||||||
|
- new upstream release 3.1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Sat Jun 07 2014 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 3.0-11
|
||||||
|
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Feb 17 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com> 3.0-10
|
||||||
|
- create the right lock directory for cca tokens (#1054442)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Wed Jan 29 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com> 3.0-9
|
||||||
|
- use Requires(pre): opencryptoki-libs for subpackages
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Jan 20 2014 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.0-8
|
||||||
|
- include token specific directories (#1013017, #1045775, #1054442)
|
||||||
|
- fix pkcsconf crash for non-root users (#10054661)
|
||||||
|
- the libs subpackage must care of creating the pkcs11 group, it's the first to be installed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Dec 03 2013 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.0-7
|
||||||
|
- fix build with -Werror=format-security (#1037228)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Nov 22 2013 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.0-6
|
||||||
|
- apply post-3.0 fixes (#1033284)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Nov 19 2013 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.0-5
|
||||||
|
- update opencryptoki man page (#1001729)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Aug 23 2013 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.0-4
|
||||||
|
- update unit file (#995002)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Sat Aug 03 2013 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 3.0-3
|
||||||
|
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_20_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jul 23 2013 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.0-2
|
||||||
|
- update pkcsconf man page (#948460)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Jul 22 2013 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 3.0-1
|
||||||
|
- new upstream release 3.0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jun 25 2013 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 2.4.3.1-1
|
||||||
|
- new upstream release 2.4.3.1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri May 03 2013 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 2.4.3-1
|
||||||
|
- new upstream release 2.4.3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Apr 04 2013 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 2.4.2-4
|
||||||
|
- enable hardened build
|
||||||
|
- switch to systemd macros in scriptlets (#850240)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Jan 28 2013 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 2.4.2-3
|
||||||
|
- add virtual opencryptoki(token) Provides to token modules and as Requires
|
||||||
|
to main package (#904986)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Jul 20 2012 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.4.2-2
|
||||||
|
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_18_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Jun 21 2012 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 2.4.2-1
|
||||||
|
- new upstream release 2.4.2
|
||||||
|
- add pkcs_slot man page
|
||||||
|
- don't add root to the pkcs11 group
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Jun 11 2012 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 2.4.1-2
|
||||||
|
- fix unresolved symbols in TPM module (#830129)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Sat Feb 25 2012 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 2.4.1-1
|
||||||
|
- new upstream release 2.4.1
|
||||||
|
- convert from initscript to systemd unit
|
||||||
|
- import fixes from RHEL-6 about root's group membership (#732756, #730903)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Jan 13 2012 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.4-2
|
||||||
|
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_17_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Jul 07 2011 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 2.4-1
|
||||||
|
- new upstream release 2.4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Feb 08 2011 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.3.3-2
|
||||||
|
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_15_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Jan 17 2011 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> 2.3.3-1
|
||||||
|
- new upstream release 2.3.3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Nov 09 2010 Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> 2.3.2-2
|
||||||
|
- Apply Obsoletes to package names, not provides.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Sep 14 2010 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> 2.3.2-1
|
||||||
|
- new upstream release 2.3.2
|
||||||
|
- put STDLLs in separate packages to match upstream package design
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Thu Jul 08 2010 Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> 2.3.1-7
|
||||||
|
- Move the LICENSE file to the -libs subpackage.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jun 29 2010 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> 2.3.1-6
|
||||||
|
- rebuilt with CCA enabled (#604287)
|
||||||
|
- fixed issues from #546274
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Apr 30 2010 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> 2.3.1-5
|
||||||
|
- fixed one more issue in the initscript (#547324)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Apr 26 2010 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> 2.3.1-4
|
||||||
|
- fixed pidfile creating and usage (#547324)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Feb 08 2010 Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> 2.3.1-3
|
||||||
|
- Also list 'reload' and 'force-reload' in "Usage: ...".
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Feb 08 2010 Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> 2.3.1-2
|
||||||
|
- Support 'force-reload' in the initscript.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Wed Jan 27 2010 Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> 2.3.1-1
|
||||||
|
- New upstream release 2.3.1.
|
||||||
|
- opencryptoki-2.3.0-fix-nss-breakage.patch was merged.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Jan 22 2010 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> 2.3.0-5
|
||||||
|
- made pkcsslotd initscript LSB compliant (#522149)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Mon Sep 07 2009 Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> 2.3.0-4
|
||||||
|
- Added opencryptoki-2.3.0-fix-nss-breakage.patch on upstream request.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Aug 21 2009 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2.3.0-3
|
||||||
|
- rebuilt with new openssl
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Sun Aug 16 2009 Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> 2.3.0-2
|
||||||
|
- Require libica-2.0.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Fri Aug 07 2009 Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> 2.3.0-1
|
||||||
|
- New upstream release 2.3.0:
|
||||||
|
- adds support for RSA 4096 bit keys in the ICA token.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jul 21 2009 Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> - 2.2.8-5
|
||||||
|
- Require arch-specific dependency on -libs.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jul 21 2009 Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> - 2.2.8-4
|
||||||
|
- Return support for crypto hw on s390.
|
||||||
|
- Renamed to opencryptoki.
|
||||||
|
- Simplified multilib by putting libs in subpackage as suggested by Dan Horák.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* Tue Jul 21 2009 Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> - 2.2.8-2
|
||||||
|
- Fedora package based on RHEL-5 package.
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in new issue