MSVSphere Packaging Team
1 year ago
parent
106b5ea03e
commit
7e8e523f2b
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
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SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
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SOURCES/blank-key4.db
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SOURCES/blank-key4.db
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SOURCES/nspr-4.34.tar.gz
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SOURCES/nspr-4.35.tar.gz
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SOURCES/nss-3.79.tar.gz
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SOURCES/nss-3.90.tar.gz
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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b5570125fbf6bfb410705706af48217a0817c03a SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
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b5570125fbf6bfb410705706af48217a0817c03a SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
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f9c9568442386da370193474de1b25c3f68cdaf6 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
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f9c9568442386da370193474de1b25c3f68cdaf6 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
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efea1385dc83c55018183257036206b5f2c77c59 SOURCES/nspr-4.34.tar.gz
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71267859a581d61fea8d7d36c25f716750271cac SOURCES/nspr-4.35.tar.gz
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3719dd97c8ec9cb04aa61e6aca41b129b4adc004 SOURCES/nss-3.79.tar.gz
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1e7d2f16655281cfb2972688af1605e0de302481 SOURCES/nss-3.90.tar.gz
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@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
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diff --git a/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c b/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c
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--- a/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c
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+++ b/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c
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@@ -335,35 +335,42 @@
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sec_PKCS12SafeContentsContext *safeContentsCtx =
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(sec_PKCS12SafeContentsContext *)arg;
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SEC_PKCS12DecoderContext *p12dcx;
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SECStatus rv;
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- /* make sure that we are not skipping the current safeBag,
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- * and that there are no errors. If so, just return rather
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- * than continuing to process.
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- */
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- if (!safeContentsCtx || !safeContentsCtx->p12dcx ||
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- safeContentsCtx->p12dcx->error || safeContentsCtx->skipCurrentSafeBag) {
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+ if (!safeContentsCtx || !safeContentsCtx->p12dcx || !safeContentsCtx->currentSafeBagA1Dcx) {
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return;
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}
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p12dcx = safeContentsCtx->p12dcx;
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+ /* make sure that there are no errors and we are not skipping the current safeBag */
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+ if (p12dcx->error || safeContentsCtx->skipCurrentSafeBag) {
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+ goto loser;
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+ }
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+
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rv = SEC_ASN1DecoderUpdate(safeContentsCtx->currentSafeBagA1Dcx, data, len);
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if (rv != SECSuccess) {
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p12dcx->errorValue = PORT_GetError();
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+ p12dcx->error = PR_TRUE;
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+ goto loser;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* The update may have set safeContentsCtx->skipCurrentSafeBag, and we
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+ * may not get another opportunity to clean up the decoder context.
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+ */
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+ if (safeContentsCtx->skipCurrentSafeBag) {
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goto loser;
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}
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return;
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loser:
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- /* set the error, and finish the decoder context. because there
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+ /* Finish the decoder context. Because there
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* is not a way of returning an error message, it may be worth
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* while to do a check higher up and finish any decoding contexts
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* that are still open.
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*/
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- p12dcx->error = PR_TRUE;
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SEC_ASN1DecoderFinish(safeContentsCtx->currentSafeBagA1Dcx);
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safeContentsCtx->currentSafeBagA1Dcx = NULL;
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return;
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}
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diff --git a/lib/pkcs12/p12t.h b/lib/pkcs12/p12t.h
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--- a/lib/pkcs12/p12t.h
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+++ b/lib/pkcs12/p12t.h
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@@ -71,10 +71,11 @@
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SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag;
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sec_PKCS12CertBag *certBag;
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sec_PKCS12CRLBag *crlBag;
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sec_PKCS12SecretBag *secretBag;
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sec_PKCS12SafeContents *safeContents;
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+ SECItem *unknownBag;
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} safeBagContent;
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sec_PKCS12Attribute **attribs;
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/* used locally */
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diff --git a/lib/pkcs12/p12tmpl.c b/lib/pkcs12/p12tmpl.c
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--- a/lib/pkcs12/p12tmpl.c
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+++ b/lib/pkcs12/p12tmpl.c
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@@ -28,16 +28,16 @@
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safeBag = (sec_PKCS12SafeBag *)src_or_dest;
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oiddata = SECOID_FindOID(&safeBag->safeBagType);
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if (oiddata == NULL) {
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- return SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_AnyTemplate);
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+ return SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_PointerToAnyTemplate);
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}
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switch (oiddata->offset) {
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default:
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- theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_AnyTemplate);
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+ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_PointerToAnyTemplate);
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break;
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case SEC_OID_PKCS12_V1_KEY_BAG_ID:
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theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SECKEY_PointerToPrivateKeyInfoTemplate);
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break;
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case SEC_OID_PKCS12_V1_CERT_BAG_ID:
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@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
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diff --git a/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c b/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
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--- a/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
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+++ b/lib/softoken/legacydb/pcertdb.c
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@@ -4272,16 +4272,17 @@ CreateTrust(void)
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{
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NSSLOWCERTTrust *trust = NULL;
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nsslowcert_LockFreeList();
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trust = trustListHead;
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if (trust) {
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trustListCount--;
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trustListHead = trust->next;
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+ trust->next = NULL;
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}
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PORT_Assert(trustListCount >= 0);
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nsslowcert_UnlockFreeList();
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if (trust) {
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return trust;
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}
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return PORT_ZNew(NSSLOWCERTTrust);
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@@ -5155,19 +5156,21 @@ done:
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}
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PRBool
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nsslowcert_hasTrust(NSSLOWCERTCertTrust *trust)
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{
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if (trust == NULL) {
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return PR_FALSE;
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}
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- return !((trust->sslFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN) &&
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- (trust->emailFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN) &&
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- (trust->objectSigningFlags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN));
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+ /* if we only have CERTDB__USER and CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN bits, then
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+ * we don't have a trust record. */
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+ return !(((trust->sslFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0) &&
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+ ((trust->emailFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0) &&
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+ ((trust->objectSigningFlags & ~(CERTDB_USER|CERTDB_TRUSTED_UNKNOWN)) == 0));
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}
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/*
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* This function has the logic that decides if another person's cert and
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* email profile from an S/MIME message should be saved. It can deal with
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* the case when there is no profile.
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*/
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static SECStatus
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diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
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--- a/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
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+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkdb.c
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@@ -119,47 +119,79 @@ sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(CK_ATTRI
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case CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED:
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case CKA_NSS_OVERRIDE_EXTENSIONS:
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return PR_TRUE;
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default:
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break;
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}
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return PR_FALSE;
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}
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-
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/*
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* convert a native ULONG to a database ulong. Database ulong's
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* are all 4 byte big endian values.
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*/
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void
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sftk_ULong2SDBULong(unsigned char *data, CK_ULONG value)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < SDB_ULONG_SIZE; i++) {
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data[i] = (value >> (SDB_ULONG_SIZE - 1 - i) * BBP) & 0xff;
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}
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}
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/*
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* convert a database ulong back to a native ULONG. (reverse of the above
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- * function.
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+ * function).
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*/
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static CK_ULONG
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sftk_SDBULong2ULong(unsigned char *data)
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{
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int i;
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CK_ULONG value = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < SDB_ULONG_SIZE; i++) {
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value |= (((CK_ULONG)data[i]) << (SDB_ULONG_SIZE - 1 - i) * BBP);
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}
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return value;
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}
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+/* certain trust records are default values, which are the values
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+ * returned if the signature check fails anyway.
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+ * In those cases, we can skip the signature check. */
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+PRBool
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+sftkdb_isNullTrust(const CK_ATTRIBUTE *template)
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+{
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+ switch (template->type) {
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+ case CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH:
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+ case CKA_TRUST_CLIENT_AUTH:
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+ case CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION:
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+ case CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING:
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+ if (template->ulValueLen != SDB_ULONG_SIZE) {
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ if (sftk_SDBULong2ULong(template->pValue) ==
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+ CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN) {
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+ return PR_TRUE;
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+ }
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+ break;
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+ case CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED:
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+ if (template->ulValueLen != 1) {
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ if (*((unsigned char *)(template->pValue)) == 0) {
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+ return PR_TRUE;
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+ }
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+ break;
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+ default:
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ return PR_FALSE;
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+}
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+
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/*
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* fix up the input templates. Our fixed up ints are stored in data and must
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* be freed by the caller. The new template must also be freed. If there are no
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* CK_ULONG attributes, the orignal template is passed in as is.
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*/
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static CK_ATTRIBUTE *
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sftkdb_fixupTemplateIn(const CK_ATTRIBUTE *template, int count,
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unsigned char **dataOut, int *dataOutSize)
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@@ -410,17 +442,18 @@ sftkdb_fixupTemplateOut(CK_ATTRIBUTE *te
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}
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/* copy the plain text back into the template */
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PORT_Memcpy(template[i].pValue, plainText->data, plainText->len);
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template[i].ulValueLen = plainText->len;
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SECITEM_ZfreeItem(plainText, PR_TRUE);
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}
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/* make sure signed attributes are valid */
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- if (checkSig && sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(ntemplate[i].type)) {
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+ if (checkSig && sftkdb_isAuthenticatedAttribute(ntemplate[i].type)
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+ && !sftkdb_isNullTrust(&ntemplate[i])) {
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SECStatus rv;
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CK_RV local_crv;
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SECItem signText;
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SECItem plainText;
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unsigned char signData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
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signText.data = signData;
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signText.len = sizeof(signData);
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@@ -2387,16 +2420,18 @@ sftkdb_mergeObject(SFTKDBHandle *handle,
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crv = (*source->sdb_GetAttributeValue)(source, id,
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ptemplate, max_attributes);
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if (crv != CKR_OK) {
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goto loser;
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}
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objectType = sftkdb_getULongFromTemplate(CKA_CLASS, ptemplate,
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max_attributes);
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+/*printf(" - merging object Type 0x%08lx id=0x%08lx updateID=%s\n", objectType, id,
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+ handle->updateID?handle->updateID: "<NULL>");*/
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/*
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* Update Object updates the object template if necessary then returns
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* whether or not we need to actually write the object out to our target
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* database.
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*/
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if (!handle->updateID) {
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crv = sftkdb_CreateObject(arena, handle, target, &newID,
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@ -1,522 +0,0 @@
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diff --git a/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c b/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
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--- a/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
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+++ b/cmd/bltest/blapitest.c
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@@ -3870,17 +3870,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
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rv = blapi_selftest(modesToTest, numModesToTest, inoff, outoff,
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encrypt, decrypt);
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PORT_Free(cipherInfo);
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return rv == SECSuccess ? 0 : 1;
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}
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/* Do FIPS self-test */
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if (bltest.commands[cmd_FIPS].activated) {
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- CK_RV ckrv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK();
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+ CK_RV ckrv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE);
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fprintf(stdout, "CK_RV: %ld.\n", ckrv);
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PORT_Free(cipherInfo);
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if (ckrv == CKR_OK)
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return SECSuccess;
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return SECFailure;
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}
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/*
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diff --git a/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c b/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
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--- a/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
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+++ b/cmd/pk11mode/pk11mode.c
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@@ -318,23 +318,25 @@ static PRBool verbose = PR_FALSE;
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int
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main(int argc, char **argv)
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{
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CK_C_GetFunctionList pC_GetFunctionList;
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CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFunctionList;
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CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
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CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_NSS initArgs;
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+ CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_NSS initArgsRerun; /* rerun selftests */
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CK_SLOT_ID *pSlotList = NULL;
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CK_TOKEN_INFO tokenInfo;
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CK_ULONG slotID = 0; /* slotID == 0 for FIPSMODE */
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CK_UTF8CHAR *pwd = NULL;
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CK_ULONG pwdLen = 0;
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char *moduleSpec = NULL;
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+ char *moduleSpecRerun = NULL;
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char *configDir = NULL;
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char *dbPrefix = NULL;
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char *disableUnload = NULL;
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PRBool doForkTests = PR_TRUE;
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PLOptStatus os;
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PLOptState *opt = PL_CreateOptState(argc, argv, "nvhf:Fd:p:");
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while (PL_OPT_EOL != (os = PL_GetNextOpt(opt))) {
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@@ -458,18 +460,23 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
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initArgs.CreateMutex = NULL;
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initArgs.DestroyMutex = NULL;
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initArgs.LockMutex = NULL;
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initArgs.UnlockMutex = NULL;
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initArgs.flags = CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK;
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moduleSpec = PR_smprintf("configdir='%s' certPrefix='%s' "
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"keyPrefix='%s' secmod='secmod.db' flags= ",
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configDir, dbPrefix, dbPrefix);
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+ moduleSpecRerun = PR_smprintf("configdir='%s' certPrefix='%s' "
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+ "keyPrefix='%s' secmod='secmod.db' flags=forcePOST ",
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+ configDir, dbPrefix, dbPrefix);
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initArgs.LibraryParameters = (CK_CHAR_PTR *)moduleSpec;
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initArgs.pReserved = NULL;
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+ initArgsRerun = initArgs;
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|
||||||
+ initArgsRerun.LibraryParameters = (CK_CHAR_PTR *)moduleSpecRerun;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*DebugBreak();*/
|
|
||||||
/* FIPSMODE invokes FC_Initialize as pFunctionList->C_Initialize */
|
|
||||||
/* NSS cryptographic module library initialization for the FIPS */
|
|
||||||
/* Approved mode when FC_Initialize is envoked will perfom */
|
|
||||||
/* software integrity test, and power-up self-tests before */
|
|
||||||
/* FC_Initialize returns */
|
|
||||||
crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgs);
|
|
||||||
@@ -705,17 +712,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
||||||
PKM_Error("PKM_HybridMode failed with 0x%08X, %-26s\n", crv,
|
|
||||||
PKM_CK_RVtoStr(crv));
|
|
||||||
goto cleanup;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (doForkTests) {
|
|
||||||
/* testing one more C_Initialize / C_Finalize to exercise getpid()
|
|
||||||
* fork check code */
|
|
||||||
- crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgs);
|
|
||||||
+ crv = pFunctionList->C_Initialize(&initArgsRerun);
|
|
||||||
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
|
|
||||||
PKM_LogIt("C_Initialize succeeded\n");
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
PKM_Error("C_Initialize failed with 0x%08X, %-26s\n", crv,
|
|
||||||
PKM_CK_RVtoStr(crv));
|
|
||||||
goto cleanup;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
crv = pFunctionList->C_Finalize(NULL);
|
|
||||||
@@ -741,16 +748,19 @@ cleanup:
|
|
||||||
free(configDir);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (dbPrefix) {
|
|
||||||
free(dbPrefix);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (moduleSpec) {
|
|
||||||
PR_smprintf_free(moduleSpec);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ if (moduleSpecRerun) {
|
|
||||||
+ PR_smprintf_free(moduleSpecRerun);
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#ifdef _WIN32
|
|
||||||
FreeLibrary(hModule);
|
|
||||||
#else
|
|
||||||
disableUnload = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_DISABLE_UNLOAD");
|
|
||||||
if (!disableUnload) {
|
|
||||||
PR_UnloadLibrary(lib);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/blapii.h b/lib/freebl/blapii.h
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/freebl/blapii.h
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/blapii.h
|
|
||||||
@@ -24,17 +24,17 @@ typedef SECStatus (*freeblAeadFunc)(void
|
|
||||||
void *params, unsigned int paramsLen,
|
|
||||||
const unsigned char *aad, unsigned int aadLen,
|
|
||||||
unsigned int blocksize);
|
|
||||||
typedef void (*freeblDestroyFunc)(void *cx, PRBool freeit);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#ifndef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
|
|
||||||
-SECStatus BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freeblOnly);
|
|
||||||
+SECStatus BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freeblOnly, PRBool rerun);
|
|
||||||
PRBool BL_POSTRan(PRBool freeblOnly);
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#if defined(XP_UNIX) && !defined(NO_FORK_CHECK)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
extern PRBool bl_parentForkedAfterC_Initialize;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#define SKIP_AFTER_FORK(x) \
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/blapit.h b/lib/freebl/blapit.h
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/freebl/blapit.h
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/blapit.h
|
|
||||||
@@ -223,16 +223,21 @@ typedef int __BLAPI_DEPRECATED __attribu
|
|
||||||
*
|
|
||||||
* If we arbitrarily set p = 10^-18 (1 chance in trillion trillion operation)
|
|
||||||
* we get GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS = -(-18)/.301 -1 = 59 (.301 = log10 2)
|
|
||||||
* GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS should be at least 59, call it a round 64. NOTE:
|
|
||||||
* the variable IV size for TLS is 64 bits, which explains why it's not safe
|
|
||||||
* to use a random value for the nonce in TLS. */
|
|
||||||
#define GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS 64
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+/* flag to tell BLAPI_Verify* to rerun the post and integrity tests */
|
|
||||||
+#define BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG '\377' /* 0xff, 255 invalide code for UFT8/ASCII */
|
|
||||||
+#define BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING "\377" /* The above as a C string */
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/***************************************************************************
|
|
||||||
** Opaque objects
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
struct DESContextStr;
|
|
||||||
struct RC2ContextStr;
|
|
||||||
struct RC4ContextStr;
|
|
||||||
struct RC5ContextStr;
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c b/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -2211,29 +2211,37 @@ bl_startup_tests(void)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* this is called from the freebl init entry points that controll access to
|
|
||||||
* all other freebl functions. This prevents freebl from operating if our
|
|
||||||
* power on selftest failed.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
SECStatus
|
|
||||||
-BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freebl_only)
|
|
||||||
+BL_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool freebl_only, PRBool rerun)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
#ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
|
||||||
/* this should only be set on platforms that can't handle one of the INIT
|
|
||||||
* schemes. This code allows those platforms to continue to function,
|
|
||||||
* though they don't meet the strict NIST requirements. If NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
|
||||||
* is not set, and init support has not been properly enabled, freebl
|
|
||||||
* will always fail because of the test below
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
if (!self_tests_freebl_ran) {
|
|
||||||
bl_startup_tests();
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
+ if (rerun) {
|
|
||||||
+ /* reset the flags */
|
|
||||||
+ self_tests_freebl_ran = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ self_tests_freebl_success = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ bl_startup_tests();
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
/* if the general self tests succeeded, we're done */
|
|
||||||
if (self_tests_success) {
|
|
||||||
return SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
/* standalone freebl can initialize */
|
|
||||||
if (freebl_only && self_tests_freebl_success) {
|
|
||||||
return SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c b/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/nsslowhash.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -55,17 +55,17 @@ NSSLOW_Init(void)
|
|
||||||
#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
|
|
||||||
(void)FREEBL_InitStubs();
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#ifndef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
|
|
||||||
/* make sure the FIPS product is installed if we are trying to
|
|
||||||
* go into FIPS mode */
|
|
||||||
if (nsslow_GetFIPSEnabled()) {
|
|
||||||
- if (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
|
|
||||||
post_failed = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
return NULL;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
post_failed = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/freebl/shvfy.c b/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -282,52 +282,62 @@ readItem(PRFileDesc *fd, SECItem *item)
|
|
||||||
PORT_Free(item->data);
|
|
||||||
item->data = NULL;
|
|
||||||
item->len = 0;
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
-static PRBool blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self);
|
|
||||||
+static PRBool blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self, PRBool rerun);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
static PRBool
|
|
||||||
-blapi_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr, PRBool self)
|
|
||||||
+blapi_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr, PRBool self, PRBool rerun)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
PRBool result = PR_FALSE; /* if anything goes wrong,
|
|
||||||
* the signature does not verify */
|
|
||||||
/* find our shared library name */
|
|
||||||
char *shName = PR_GetLibraryFilePathname(name, addr);
|
|
||||||
if (!shName) {
|
|
||||||
goto loser;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- result = blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, self);
|
|
||||||
+ result = blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, self, rerun);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
loser:
|
|
||||||
if (shName != NULL) {
|
|
||||||
PR_Free(shName);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return result;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PRBool
|
|
||||||
BLAPI_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
- return blapi_SHVerify(name, addr, PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
+ PRBool rerun = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ if (name && *name == BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG) {
|
|
||||||
+ name++;
|
|
||||||
+ rerun = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ return blapi_SHVerify(name, addr, PR_FALSE, rerun);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PRBool
|
|
||||||
BLAPI_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
- return blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
+ PRBool rerun = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ if (shName && *shName == BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG) {
|
|
||||||
+ shName++;
|
|
||||||
+ rerun = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ return blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, PR_FALSE, rerun);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
static PRBool
|
|
||||||
-blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self)
|
|
||||||
+blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self, PRBool rerun)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
char *checkName = NULL;
|
|
||||||
PRFileDesc *checkFD = NULL;
|
|
||||||
PRFileDesc *shFD = NULL;
|
|
||||||
void *hashcx = NULL;
|
|
||||||
const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL;
|
|
||||||
SECItem signature = { 0, NULL, 0 };
|
|
||||||
SECItem hash;
|
|
||||||
@@ -346,17 +356,17 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
|
|
||||||
unsigned char hashBuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PORT_Memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
|
|
||||||
hash.data = hashBuf;
|
|
||||||
hash.len = sizeof(hashBuf);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* If our integrity check was never ran or failed, fail any other
|
|
||||||
* integrity checks to prevent any token going into FIPS mode. */
|
|
||||||
- if (!self && (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (!self && (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE, rerun) != SECSuccess)) {
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (!shName) {
|
|
||||||
goto loser;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* figure out the name of our check file */
|
|
||||||
@@ -536,17 +546,17 @@ BLAPI_VerifySelf(const char *name)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
if (name == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* If name is NULL, freebl is statically linked into softoken.
|
|
||||||
* softoken will call BLAPI_SHVerify next to verify itself.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- return blapi_SHVerify(name, (PRFuncPtr)decodeInt, PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
+ return blapi_SHVerify(name, (PRFuncPtr)decodeInt, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#else /* NSS_FIPS_DISABLED */
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PRBool
|
|
||||||
BLAPI_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fipstest.c b/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/fipstest.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -684,22 +684,25 @@ sftk_fips_HKDF_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
static PRBool sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
static PRBool sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* This function is called at dll load time, the code tha makes this
|
|
||||||
* happen is platform specific on defined above.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
-static void
|
|
||||||
-sftk_startup_tests(void)
|
|
||||||
+void sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PRBool rerun)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
SECStatus rv;
|
|
||||||
- const char *libraryName = SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
|
|
||||||
-
|
|
||||||
+ /*const char *nlibraryName = SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
|
|
||||||
+ const char *rlibraryName = BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME; */
|
|
||||||
+ const char *libraryName = rerun ?
|
|
||||||
+ BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG_STRING SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME :
|
|
||||||
+ SOFTOKEN_LIB_NAME;
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
PORT_Assert(!sftk_self_tests_ran);
|
|
||||||
PORT_Assert(!sftk_self_tests_success);
|
|
||||||
sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE; /* just in case */
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* need to initiallize the oid library before the RSA tests */
|
|
||||||
rv = SECOID_Init();
|
|
||||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
@@ -746,35 +749,46 @@ sftk_startup_tests(void)
|
|
||||||
rv = sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests();
|
|
||||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
return;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
sftk_self_tests_success = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+static void
|
|
||||||
+sftk_startup_tests(void)
|
|
||||||
+{
|
|
||||||
+ sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PR_FALSE);
|
|
||||||
+}
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* this is called from nsc_Common_Initizialize entry points that gates access
|
|
||||||
* to * all other pkcs11 functions. This prevents softoken operation if our
|
|
||||||
* power on selftest failed.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
CK_RV
|
|
||||||
-sftk_FIPSEntryOK()
|
|
||||||
+sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool rerun)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
#ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
|
||||||
/* this should only be set on platforms that can't handle one of the INIT
|
|
||||||
* schemes. This code allows those platforms to continue to function,
|
|
||||||
* though they don't meet the strict NIST requirements. If NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
|
|
||||||
* is not set, and init support has not been properly enabled, softken
|
|
||||||
* will always fail because of the test below
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
if (!sftk_self_tests_ran) {
|
|
||||||
sftk_startup_tests();
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
+ if (rerun) {
|
|
||||||
+ sftk_self_tests_ran = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ sftk_self_tests_success = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ sftk_startup_tests_with_rerun(PR_TRUE);
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
if (!sftk_self_tests_success) {
|
|
||||||
return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return CKR_OK;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
#else
|
|
||||||
#include "pkcs11t.h"
|
|
||||||
CK_RV
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c b/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/fipstokn.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -524,25 +524,32 @@ fc_log_init_error(CK_RV crv)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* FC_Initialize initializes the PKCS #11 library. */
|
|
||||||
CK_RV
|
|
||||||
FC_Initialize(CK_VOID_PTR pReserved)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
const char *envp;
|
|
||||||
CK_RV crv;
|
|
||||||
+ PRBool rerun;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if ((envp = PR_GetEnv("NSS_ENABLE_AUDIT")) != NULL) {
|
|
||||||
sftk_audit_enabled = (atoi(envp) == 1);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+ /* if we have the forcePOST flag on, rerun the integrity checks */
|
|
||||||
+ /* we need to know this before we fully parse the arguments in
|
|
||||||
+ * nsc_CommonInitialize, so read it now */
|
|
||||||
+ rerun = sftk_RawArgHasFlag("flags", "forcePost", pReserved);
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/* At this point we should have already done post and integrity checks.
|
|
||||||
* if we haven't, it probably means the FIPS product has not been installed
|
|
||||||
- * or the tests failed. Don't let an application try to enter FIPS mode */
|
|
||||||
- crv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK();
|
|
||||||
+ * or the tests failed. Don't let an application try to enter FIPS mode. This
|
|
||||||
+ * also forces the tests to be rerun if forcePOST is set. */
|
|
||||||
+ crv = sftk_FIPSEntryOK(rerun);
|
|
||||||
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
|
||||||
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
fc_log_init_error(crv);
|
|
||||||
return crv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
sftk_ForkReset(pReserved, &crv);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
|
||||||
@@ -869,16 +869,17 @@ extern CK_RV sftk_MechAllowsOperation(CK
|
|
||||||
* acquiring a reference to the keydb from the slot */
|
|
||||||
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *sftk_FindKeyByPublicKey(SFTKSlot *slot, SECItem *dbKey);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* parameter parsing functions
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
CK_RV sftk_parseParameters(char *param, sftk_parameters *parsed, PRBool isFIPS);
|
|
||||||
void sftk_freeParams(sftk_parameters *params);
|
|
||||||
+PRBool sftk_RawArgHasFlag(const char *entry, const char *flag, const void *pReserved);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* narrow objects
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
SFTKSessionObject *sftk_narrowToSessionObject(SFTKObject *);
|
|
||||||
SFTKTokenObject *sftk_narrowToTokenObject(SFTKObject *);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c b/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/sftkpars.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -244,8 +244,21 @@ sftk_freeParams(sftk_parameters *params)
|
|
||||||
FREE_CLEAR(params->configdir);
|
|
||||||
FREE_CLEAR(params->secmodName);
|
|
||||||
FREE_CLEAR(params->man);
|
|
||||||
FREE_CLEAR(params->libdes);
|
|
||||||
FREE_CLEAR(params->tokens);
|
|
||||||
FREE_CLEAR(params->updatedir);
|
|
||||||
FREE_CLEAR(params->updateID);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+PRBool
|
|
||||||
+sftk_RawArgHasFlag(const char *entry, const char *flag, const void *pReserved)
|
|
||||||
+{
|
|
||||||
+ CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS *init_args = (CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS *)pReserved;
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ /* if we don't have any params, the flag isn't set */
|
|
||||||
+ if ((!init_args || !init_args->LibraryParameters)) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ return NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag(entry, flag, (const char *)init_args->LibraryParameters);
|
|
||||||
+}
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/softoken.h b/lib/softoken/softoken.h
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/softoken/softoken.h
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/softoken.h
|
|
||||||
@@ -52,17 +52,17 @@ extern unsigned char *CBC_PadBuffer(PLAr
|
|
||||||
unsigned int inlen, unsigned int *outlen,
|
|
||||||
int blockSize);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/****************************************/
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
** Power-Up selftests are required for FIPS.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
/* make sure Power-up selftests have been run. */
|
|
||||||
-extern CK_RV sftk_FIPSEntryOK(void);
|
|
||||||
+extern CK_RV sftk_FIPSEntryOK(PRBool rerun);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
** make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
unsigned long sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
** FIPS 140-2 auditing
|
|
||||||
@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff --git a/lib/ssl/authcert.c b/lib/ssl/authcert.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/ssl/authcert.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/ssl/authcert.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -201,16 +201,19 @@ NSS_GetClientAuthData(void *arg,
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* otherwise look through the cache based on usage
|
|
||||||
* if chosenNickname is set, we ignore the expiration date */
|
|
||||||
if (certList == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
certList = CERT_FindUserCertsByUsage(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
|
|
||||||
certUsageSSLClient,
|
|
||||||
PR_FALSE, chosenNickName == NULL,
|
|
||||||
pw_arg);
|
|
||||||
+ if (certList == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
/* filter only the certs that meet the nickname requirements */
|
|
||||||
if (chosenNickName) {
|
|
||||||
rv = CERT_FilterCertListByNickname(certList, chosenNickName,
|
|
||||||
pw_arg);
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
int nnames = 0;
|
|
||||||
char **names = ssl_DistNamesToStrings(caNames, &nnames);
|
|
||||||
rv = CERT_FilterCertListByCANames(certList, nnames, names,
|
|
||||||
@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -565,17 +565,17 @@ struct KDFCacheItemStr {
|
|
||||||
int iterations;
|
|
||||||
int keyLen;
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
typedef struct KDFCacheItemStr KDFCacheItem;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* Bug 1606992 - Cache the hash result for the common case that we're
|
|
||||||
* asked to repeatedly compute the key for the same password item,
|
|
||||||
* hash, iterations and salt. */
|
|
||||||
-#define KDF2_CACHE_COUNT 3
|
|
||||||
+#define KDF2_CACHE_COUNT 150
|
|
||||||
static struct {
|
|
||||||
PZLock *lock;
|
|
||||||
struct {
|
|
||||||
KDFCacheItem common;
|
|
||||||
int ivLen;
|
|
||||||
PRBool faulty3DES;
|
|
||||||
} cacheKDF1;
|
|
||||||
struct {
|
|
||||||
@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.fix_null_password ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.fix_null_password 2022-07-20 14:15:45.081009438 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c 2022-07-20 14:19:40.856546963 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -968,15 +968,14 @@ sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(PLAre
|
|
||||||
if (zeroTerm) {
|
|
||||||
/* unicode adds two nulls at the end */
|
|
||||||
if (toUnicode) {
|
|
||||||
- if ((dest->len >= 2) &&
|
|
||||||
- (dest->data[dest->len - 1] || dest->data[dest->len - 2])) {
|
|
||||||
+ if ((dest->len < 2) || dest->data[dest->len - 1] || dest->data[dest->len - 2]) {
|
|
||||||
/* we've already allocated space for these new NULLs */
|
|
||||||
PORT_Assert(dest->len + 2 <= bufferSize);
|
|
||||||
dest->len += 2;
|
|
||||||
dest->data[dest->len - 1] = dest->data[dest->len - 2] = 0;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
/* ascii/utf-8 adds just 1 */
|
|
||||||
- } else if ((dest->len >= 1) && dest->data[dest->len - 1]) {
|
|
||||||
+ } else if (!dest->len || dest->data[dest->len - 1]) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_Assert(dest->len + 1 <= bufferSize);
|
|
||||||
dest->len++;
|
|
||||||
dest->data[dest->len - 1] = 0;
|
|
||||||
@ -1,672 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff -up ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c.signature-policy ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./cmd/crmftest/testcrmf.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.916905015 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
|
|
||||||
#include "sechash.h"
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
-#define MAX_KEY_LEN 512
|
|
||||||
+#define MAX_KEY_LEN 1024
|
|
||||||
#define PATH_LEN 150
|
|
||||||
#define BUFF_SIZE 150
|
|
||||||
#define UID_BITS 800
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc.signature-policy ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc
|
|
||||||
--- ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./gtests/pk11_gtest/pk11_rsapkcs1_unittest.cc 2022-06-21 09:16:23.916905015 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
|
|
||||||
#include "secerr.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "sechash.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "pk11_signature_test.h"
|
|
||||||
+#include "blapit.h"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#include "testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha224-vectors.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha256-vectors.h"
|
|
||||||
@@ -109,7 +110,11 @@ class Pkcs11RsaPkcs1WycheproofTest
|
|
||||||
* Use 6 as the invalid value since modLen % 16 must be zero.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, Pkcs1MinimumPadding) {
|
|
||||||
- const size_t kRsaShortKeyBits = 736;
|
|
||||||
+#define RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH 736
|
|
||||||
+/* if our minimum supported key length is big enough to handle
|
|
||||||
+ * our largest Hash function, we can't test a short length */
|
|
||||||
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS < RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH
|
|
||||||
+ const size_t kRsaShortKeyBits = RSA_SHORT_KEY_LENGTH;
|
|
||||||
const size_t kRsaKeyBits = 752;
|
|
||||||
static const std::vector<uint8_t> kMsg{'T', 'E', 'S', 'T'};
|
|
||||||
static const std::vector<uint8_t> kSha512DigestInfo{
|
|
||||||
@@ -209,6 +214,9 @@ TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, Pkcs1MinimumPadding)
|
|
||||||
SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512,
|
|
||||||
nullptr);
|
|
||||||
EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
|
|
||||||
+#else
|
|
||||||
+ GTEST_SKIP();
|
|
||||||
+#endif
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
TEST(RsaPkcs1Test, RequireNullParameter) {
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc.signature-policy ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
|
|
||||||
--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc.signature-policy 2022-06-21 09:16:23.901904919 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc 2022-06-21 09:19:12.482981408 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
|
|
||||||
#include "prtime.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "secerr.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "ssl.h"
|
|
||||||
+#include "nss.h"
|
|
||||||
+#include "blapit.h"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#include "gtest_utils.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "tls_agent.h"
|
|
||||||
@@ -357,9 +359,14 @@ static void GenerateWeakRsaKey(ScopedSEC
|
|
||||||
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
|
|
||||||
ASSERT_TRUE(slot);
|
|
||||||
PK11RSAGenParams rsaparams;
|
|
||||||
- // The absolute minimum size of RSA key that we can use with SHA-256 is
|
|
||||||
- // 256bit (hash) + 256bit (salt) + 8 (start byte) + 8 (end byte) = 528.
|
|
||||||
+// The absolute minimum size of RSA key that we can use with SHA-256 is
|
|
||||||
+// 256bit (hash) + 256bit (salt) + 8 (start byte) + 8 (end byte) = 528.
|
|
||||||
+#define RSA_WEAK_KEY 528
|
|
||||||
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS < RSA_WEAK_KEY
|
|
||||||
rsaparams.keySizeInBits = 528;
|
|
||||||
+#else
|
|
||||||
+ rsaparams.keySizeInBits = RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1;
|
|
||||||
+#endif
|
|
||||||
rsaparams.pe = 65537;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Bug 1012786: PK11_GenerateKeyPair can fail if there is insufficient
|
|
||||||
@@ -399,6 +406,18 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
|
|
||||||
ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256};
|
|
||||||
client_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
|
|
||||||
server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
|
|
||||||
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
|
|
||||||
+ // save the MIN POLICY length.
|
|
||||||
+ PRInt32 minRsa;
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minRsa));
|
|
||||||
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS >= 2048
|
|
||||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
|
|
||||||
+ NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1024));
|
|
||||||
+#else
|
|
||||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, 2048));
|
|
||||||
+#endif
|
|
||||||
+#endif
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey dc_priv;
|
|
||||||
ScopedSECKEYPublicKey dc_pub;
|
|
||||||
@@ -421,6 +440,9 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
|
|
||||||
auto cfilter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionCapture>(
|
|
||||||
client_, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn);
|
|
||||||
ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertInsufficientSecurity);
|
|
||||||
+#if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
|
|
||||||
+ ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, minRsa));
|
|
||||||
+#endif
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
class ReplaceDCSigScheme : public TlsHandshakeFilter {
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h.signature-policy ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/keyhi.h 2022-06-21 09:16:23.917905021 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ extern unsigned SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength
|
|
||||||
extern unsigned SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
+** Return the strength of the private key in bits
|
|
||||||
+*/
|
|
||||||
+extern unsigned SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPrivateKey *privk);
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+/*
|
|
||||||
** Return the length of the signature in bytes
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
extern unsigned SECKEY_SignatureLen(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk);
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h.signature-policy ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/keyi.h 2022-06-21 09:16:23.917905021 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#ifndef _KEYI_H_
|
|
||||||
#define _KEYI_H_
|
|
||||||
+#include "secerr.h"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
|
|
||||||
/* NSS private functions */
|
|
||||||
@@ -36,6 +37,9 @@ SECStatus sec_DecodeRSAPSSParamsToMechan
|
|
||||||
const SECItem *params,
|
|
||||||
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *mech);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+/* make sure the key length matches the policy for keyType */
|
|
||||||
+SECStatus seckey_EnforceKeySize(KeyType keyType, unsigned keyLength,
|
|
||||||
+ SECErrorCodes error);
|
|
||||||
SEC_END_PROTOS
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#endif /* _KEYHI_H_ */
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c.signature-policy ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/seckey.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.917905021 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
|
|
||||||
#include "secdig.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "prtime.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "keyi.h"
|
|
||||||
+#include "nss.h"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate)
|
|
||||||
SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SEC_IntegerTemplate)
|
|
||||||
@@ -1042,6 +1043,62 @@ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(const SEC
|
|
||||||
return bitSize;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+unsigned
|
|
||||||
+SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SECKEYPrivateKey *privk)
|
|
||||||
+{
|
|
||||||
+ unsigned bitSize = 0;
|
|
||||||
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attribute = CKT_INVALID_TYPE;
|
|
||||||
+ SECItem params;
|
|
||||||
+ SECStatus rv;
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ if (!privk) {
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
|
||||||
+ return 0;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ /* interpret modulus length as key strength */
|
|
||||||
+ switch (privk->keyType) {
|
|
||||||
+ case rsaKey:
|
|
||||||
+ case rsaPssKey:
|
|
||||||
+ case rsaOaepKey:
|
|
||||||
+ /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
|
|
||||||
+ * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary */
|
|
||||||
+ bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
|
|
||||||
+ if (bitSize == -1) {
|
|
||||||
+ bitSize = 0;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ return bitSize;
|
|
||||||
+ case dsaKey:
|
|
||||||
+ case fortezzaKey:
|
|
||||||
+ case dhKey:
|
|
||||||
+ case keaKey:
|
|
||||||
+ attribute = CKA_PRIME;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ case ecKey:
|
|
||||||
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
|
|
||||||
+ CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, ¶ms);
|
|
||||||
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
|
|
||||||
+ return 0;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ bitSize = SECKEY_ECParamsToKeySize(¶ms);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_Free(params.data);
|
|
||||||
+ return bitSize;
|
|
||||||
+ default:
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
|
||||||
+ return 0;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_Assert(attribute != CKT_INVALID_TYPE);
|
|
||||||
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
|
|
||||||
+ attribute, NULL, ¶ms);
|
|
||||||
+ if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
|
||||||
+ return 0;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ bitSize = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(¶ms);
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_Free(params.data);
|
|
||||||
+ return bitSize;
|
|
||||||
+}
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/* returns signature length in bytes (not bits) */
|
|
||||||
unsigned
|
|
||||||
SECKEY_SignatureLen(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk)
|
|
||||||
@@ -1212,6 +1269,51 @@ SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(const SECKEYPublicK
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
+ * Check that a given key meets the policy limits for the given key
|
|
||||||
+ * size.
|
|
||||||
+ */
|
|
||||||
+SECStatus
|
|
||||||
+seckey_EnforceKeySize(KeyType keyType, unsigned keyLength, SECErrorCodes error)
|
|
||||||
+{
|
|
||||||
+ PRInt32 opt = -1;
|
|
||||||
+ PRInt32 optVal;
|
|
||||||
+ SECStatus rv;
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ switch (keyType) {
|
|
||||||
+ case rsaKey:
|
|
||||||
+ case rsaPssKey:
|
|
||||||
+ case rsaOaepKey:
|
|
||||||
+ opt = NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ case dsaKey:
|
|
||||||
+ case fortezzaKey:
|
|
||||||
+ opt = NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ case dhKey:
|
|
||||||
+ case keaKey:
|
|
||||||
+ opt = NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ case ecKey:
|
|
||||||
+ opt = NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ case nullKey:
|
|
||||||
+ default:
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
|
||||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_Assert(opt != -1);
|
|
||||||
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(opt, &optVal);
|
|
||||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
+ return rv;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ if (optVal < keyLength) {
|
|
||||||
+ PORT_SetError(error);
|
|
||||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ return SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
+}
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+/*
|
|
||||||
* Use the private key to find a public key handle. The handle will be on
|
|
||||||
* the same slot as the private key.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c.signature-policy ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/secsign.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.917905021 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
|
|
||||||
#include "pk11func.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "secerr.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "keyi.h"
|
|
||||||
+#include "nss.h"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
struct SGNContextStr {
|
|
||||||
SECOidTag signalg;
|
|
||||||
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ sgn_NewContext(SECOidTag alg, SECItem *p
|
|
||||||
SECOidTag hashalg, signalg;
|
|
||||||
KeyType keyType;
|
|
||||||
PRUint32 policyFlags;
|
|
||||||
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
|
|
||||||
SECStatus rv;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* OK, map a PKCS #7 hash and encrypt algorithm into
|
|
||||||
@@ -56,6 +58,16 @@ sgn_NewContext(SECOidTag alg, SECItem *p
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
|
|
||||||
return NULL;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) {
|
|
||||||
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType,
|
|
||||||
+ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(key),
|
|
||||||
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
|
|
||||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
+ return NULL;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
/* check the policy on the hash algorithm */
|
|
||||||
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashalg, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
|
|
||||||
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
|
|
||||||
@@ -467,9 +479,20 @@ SGN_Digest(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
|
|
||||||
SGNDigestInfo *di = 0;
|
|
||||||
SECOidTag enctag;
|
|
||||||
PRUint32 policyFlags;
|
|
||||||
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
result->data = 0;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) {
|
|
||||||
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(privKey->keyType,
|
|
||||||
+ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(privKey),
|
|
||||||
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
|
|
||||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
/* check the policy on the hash algorithm */
|
|
||||||
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(algtag, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
|
|
||||||
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c.signature-policy ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
|
|
||||||
#include "secdig.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "secerr.h"
|
|
||||||
#include "keyi.h"
|
|
||||||
+#include "nss.h"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
** Recover the DigestInfo from an RSA PKCS#1 signature.
|
|
||||||
@@ -467,6 +468,7 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey
|
|
||||||
unsigned int sigLen;
|
|
||||||
KeyType type;
|
|
||||||
PRUint32 policyFlags;
|
|
||||||
+ PRInt32 optFlags;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* make sure the encryption algorithm matches the key type */
|
|
||||||
/* RSA-PSS algorithm can be used with both rsaKey and rsaPssKey */
|
|
||||||
@@ -476,7 +478,16 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_KEYALG_MISMATCH);
|
|
||||||
return NULL;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
-
|
|
||||||
+ if (NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optFlags) != SECFailure) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (optFlags & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG) {
|
|
||||||
+ rv = seckey_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType,
|
|
||||||
+ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(key),
|
|
||||||
+ SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
|
|
||||||
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
+ return NULL;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
/* check the policy on the encryption algorithm */
|
|
||||||
if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(encAlg, &policyFlags) == SECFailure) ||
|
|
||||||
!(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE)) {
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.signature-policy ./lib/freebl/blapit.h
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/freebl/blapit.h.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/freebl/blapit.h 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ typedef int __BLAPI_DEPRECATED __attribu
|
|
||||||
* These values come from the initial key size limits from the PKCS #11
|
|
||||||
* module. They may be arbitrarily adjusted to any value freebl supports.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
-#define RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 128
|
|
||||||
+#define RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1023 /* 128 */
|
|
||||||
#define RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
|
|
||||||
#define RSA_MAX_EXPONENT_BITS 64
|
|
||||||
#define DH_MIN_P_BITS 128
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/nss/nss.h.signature-policy ./lib/nss/nss.h
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/nss/nss.h.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/nss/nss.h 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -302,6 +302,28 @@ SECStatus NSS_UnregisterShutdown(NSS_Shu
|
|
||||||
#define NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS 0x00d /* lock default values */
|
|
||||||
#define NSS_DEFAULT_SSL_LOCK 1 /* lock the ssl default values */
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+/* NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY controls what kinds of operations are subject to
|
|
||||||
+ * the NSS_XXX_MIN_KEY_SIZE values.
|
|
||||||
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS sets and clears all the flags to the input
|
|
||||||
+ * value
|
|
||||||
+ * On get it returns all the flags
|
|
||||||
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS sets only the flags=1 in theinput value and
|
|
||||||
+ * does not affect the other flags
|
|
||||||
+ * On get it returns all the flags
|
|
||||||
+ * NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS clears only the flags=1 in the input
|
|
||||||
+ * value and does not affect the other flags
|
|
||||||
+ * On get it returns all the compliment of all the flags
|
|
||||||
+ * (cleared flags == 1) */
|
|
||||||
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS 0x00e
|
|
||||||
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS 0x00f
|
|
||||||
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS 0x010
|
|
||||||
+/* currently defined flags */
|
|
||||||
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG 1
|
|
||||||
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG 2
|
|
||||||
+#define NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG 4
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+#define NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE 0x011
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* Set and get global options for the NSS library.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c.signature-policy ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/nss/nssoptions.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ struct nssOps {
|
|
||||||
PRInt32 dtlsVersionMaxPolicy;
|
|
||||||
PRInt32 pkcs12DecodeForceUnicode;
|
|
||||||
PRInt32 defaultLocks;
|
|
||||||
+ PRInt32 keySizePolicyFlags;
|
|
||||||
+ PRInt32 eccMinKeySize;
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
static struct nssOps nss_ops = {
|
|
||||||
@@ -37,7 +39,9 @@ static struct nssOps nss_ops = {
|
|
||||||
1,
|
|
||||||
0xffff,
|
|
||||||
PR_FALSE,
|
|
||||||
- 0
|
|
||||||
+ 0,
|
|
||||||
+ NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG,
|
|
||||||
+ SSL_ECC_MIN_CURVE_BITS
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SECStatus
|
|
||||||
@@ -78,6 +82,18 @@ NSS_OptionSet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 val
|
|
||||||
case NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS:
|
|
||||||
nss_ops.defaultLocks = value;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS:
|
|
||||||
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags = value;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS:
|
|
||||||
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags |= value;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS:
|
|
||||||
+ nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags &= ~value;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ case NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE:
|
|
||||||
+ nss_ops.eccMinKeySize = value;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
default:
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
|
||||||
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
@@ -119,6 +135,16 @@ NSS_OptionGet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 *va
|
|
||||||
case NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS:
|
|
||||||
*value = nss_ops.defaultLocks;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS:
|
|
||||||
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SET_FLAGS:
|
|
||||||
+ *value = nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ case NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_CLEAR_FLAGS:
|
|
||||||
+ *value = ~nss_ops.keySizePolicyFlags;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ case NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE:
|
|
||||||
+ *value = nss_ops.eccMinKeySize;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
default:
|
|
||||||
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h.signature-policy ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/nss/nssoptions.h 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -18,3 +18,5 @@
|
|
||||||
* happens because NSS used to count bit lengths incorrectly. */
|
|
||||||
#define SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS 1023
|
|
||||||
#define SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS 1023
|
|
||||||
+/* not really used by SSL, but define it here for consistency */
|
|
||||||
+#define SSL_ECC_MIN_CURVE_BITS 256
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c.signature-policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11kea.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -78,15 +78,14 @@ pk11_KeyExchange(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_
|
|
||||||
if (privKeyHandle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
|
|
||||||
PK11RSAGenParams rsaParams;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- if (symKeyLength > 53) /* bytes */ {
|
|
||||||
- /* we'd have to generate an RSA key pair > 512 bits long,
|
|
||||||
+ if (symKeyLength > 120) /* bytes */ {
|
|
||||||
+ /* we'd have to generate an RSA key pair > 1024 bits long,
|
|
||||||
** and that's too costly. Don't even try.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CANNOT_MOVE_SENSITIVE_KEY);
|
|
||||||
goto rsa_failed;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- rsaParams.keySizeInBits =
|
|
||||||
- (symKeyLength > 21 || symKeyLength == 0) ? 512 : 256;
|
|
||||||
+ rsaParams.keySizeInBits = 1024;
|
|
||||||
rsaParams.pe = 0x10001;
|
|
||||||
privKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPair(slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN,
|
|
||||||
&rsaParams, &pubKey, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE, symKey->cx);
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.signature-policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.signature-policy 2022-06-21 09:16:23.898904900 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.918905028 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -430,12 +430,21 @@ static const optionFreeDef sslOptList[]
|
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("DTLS1.3"), 0x304 },
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+static const optionFreeDef keySizeFlagsList[] = {
|
|
||||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-SSL"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG },
|
|
||||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-SIGN"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG },
|
|
||||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-VERIFY"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG },
|
|
||||||
+};
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
static const optionFreeDef freeOptList[] = {
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* Restrictions for asymetric keys */
|
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("RSA-MIN"), NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
|
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("DH-MIN"), NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
|
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("DSA-MIN"), NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
|
|
||||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECC-MIN"), NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
|
|
||||||
+ /* what operations doe the key size apply to */
|
|
||||||
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-FLAGS"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS },
|
|
||||||
/* constraints on SSL Protocols */
|
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("TLS-VERSION-MIN"), NSS_TLS_VERSION_MIN_POLICY },
|
|
||||||
{ CIPHER_NAME("TLS-VERSION-MAX"), NSS_TLS_VERSION_MAX_POLICY },
|
|
||||||
@@ -543,6 +552,7 @@ secmod_getPolicyOptValue(const char *pol
|
|
||||||
*result = val;
|
|
||||||
return SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ /* handle any ssl strings */
|
|
||||||
for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sslOptList); i++) {
|
|
||||||
if (policyValueLength == sslOptList[i].name_size &&
|
|
||||||
PORT_Strncasecmp(sslOptList[i].name, policyValue,
|
|
||||||
@@ -551,7 +561,29 @@ secmod_getPolicyOptValue(const char *pol
|
|
||||||
return SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
+ /* handle key_size flags. Each flag represents a bit, which
|
|
||||||
+ * gets or'd together. They can be separated by , | or + */
|
|
||||||
+ val = 0;
|
|
||||||
+ while (*policyValue) {
|
|
||||||
+ PRBool found = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(keySizeFlagsList); i++) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (PORT_Strncasecmp(keySizeFlagsList[i].name, policyValue,
|
|
||||||
+ keySizeFlagsList[i].name_size) == 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ val |= keySizeFlagsList[i].option;
|
|
||||||
+ found = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
+ policyValue += keySizeFlagsList[i].name_size;
|
|
||||||
+ break;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ if (!found) {
|
|
||||||
+ return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ if (*policyValue == ',' || *policyValue == '|' || *policyValue == '+') {
|
|
||||||
+ policyValue++;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ *result = val;
|
|
||||||
+ return SECSuccess;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* Policy operations:
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.signature-policy ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
|
||||||
--- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2022-06-21 09:16:23.920905040 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -7409,6 +7409,8 @@ ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket
|
|
||||||
unsigned dh_p_bits;
|
|
||||||
unsigned dh_g_bits;
|
|
||||||
PRInt32 minDH;
|
|
||||||
+ PRInt32 optval;
|
|
||||||
+ PRBool usePolicyLength = PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SSL3Hashes hashes;
|
|
||||||
SECItem signature = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
|
||||||
@@ -7419,8 +7421,13 @@ ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket
|
|
||||||
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
goto loser; /* malformed. */
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
|
|
||||||
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
+ usePolicyLength = (PRBool)((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG);
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH);
|
|
||||||
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH)
|
|
||||||
+ : SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
if (rv != SECSuccess || minDH <= 0) {
|
|
||||||
minDH = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -11411,13 +11418,20 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
|
|
||||||
SECStatus rv;
|
|
||||||
PRUint32 minKey;
|
|
||||||
PRInt32 optval;
|
|
||||||
+ PRBool usePolicyLength = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
|
|
||||||
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
|
||||||
+ usePolicyLength = (PRBool)((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG);
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
ss->sec.authKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey);
|
|
||||||
switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey)) {
|
|
||||||
case rsaKey:
|
|
||||||
case rsaPssKey:
|
|
||||||
case rsaOaepKey:
|
|
||||||
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
|
|
||||||
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
|
|
||||||
+ : SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
|
|
||||||
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
@@ -11426,7 +11440,8 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
case dsaKey:
|
|
||||||
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
|
|
||||||
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
|
|
||||||
+ : SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
|
|
||||||
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
@@ -11435,7 +11450,8 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
case dhKey:
|
|
||||||
- rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval);
|
|
||||||
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
|
|
||||||
+ : SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
|
|
||||||
minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
@@ -11444,9 +11460,15 @@ ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
case ecKey:
|
|
||||||
- /* Don't check EC strength here on the understanding that we only
|
|
||||||
- * support curves we like. */
|
|
||||||
- minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
|
|
||||||
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
|
|
||||||
+ : SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
|
|
||||||
+ minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
|
|
||||||
+ } else {
|
|
||||||
+ /* Don't check EC strength here on the understanding that we
|
|
||||||
+ * only support curves we like. */
|
|
||||||
+ minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
default:
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt.signature-policy ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt
|
|
||||||
--- ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./tests/policy/crypto-policy.txt 2022-06-21 09:16:23.920905040 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
|
|
||||||
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA1:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP256R1:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:aes256-cbc:camellia256-cbc:aes128-gcm:aes128-cbc:camellia128-cbc:SHA256:SHA384:SHA512:SHA1:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.0:dtls-version-min=dtls1.0:DH-MIN=1023:DSA-MIN=2048:RSA-MIN=2048 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Standard policy
|
|
||||||
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA1:HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP256R1:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:aes256-cbc:camellia256-cbc:aes128-gcm:aes128-cbc:camellia128-cbc:des-ede3-cbc:rc4:SHA256:SHA384:SHA512:SHA1:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:DHE-DSS:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.0:dtls-version-min=tls1.0:DH-MIN=1023:DSA-MIN=1023:RSA-MIN=1023 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Legacy policy
|
|
||||||
0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072 NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Reduced policy
|
|
||||||
+0 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072:KEY-SIZE-FLAGS=KEY-SIZE-SSL,KEY-SIZE-SIGN,KEY-SIZE-VERIFY NSS-POLICY-INFO.*LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY Valid key size
|
|
||||||
+2 disallow=ALL_allow=HMAC-SHA256:HMAC-SHA384:HMAC-SHA512:SECP384R1:SECP521R1:aes256-gcm:chacha20-poly1305:SHA384:SHA512:ECDHE-RSA:ECDHE-ECDSA:RSA:DHE-RSA:rsa-pkcs:rsa-pss:ecdsa:tls-version-min=tls1.2:dtls-version-min=dtls1.2:DH-MIN=3072:DSA-MIN=3072:RSA-MIN=3072:KEY-SIZE-FLAGS=UNKNOWN,KEY-SIZE-SIGN,KEY-SIZE-VERIFY NSS-POLICY-FAIL.*unknown.* Invalid key size
|
|
||||||
2 disallow=ALL_allow=dtls-version-min=:dtls-version-max= NSS-POLICY-FAIL Missing value
|
|
||||||
2 disallow=ALL_allow=RSA-MIN=whatever NSS-POLICY-FAIL Invalid value
|
|
||||||
2 disallow=ALL_allow=flower NSS-POLICY-FAIL Invalid identifier
|
|
||||||
diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.signature-policy ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
|
|
||||||
--- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.signature-policy 2022-05-26 02:54:33.000000000 -0700
|
|
||||||
+++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt 2022-06-21 09:16:23.920905040 -0700
|
|
||||||
@@ -194,6 +194,10 @@
|
|
||||||
1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=all_allow=md2/all:md4/all:md5/all:sha1/all:sha256/all:sha384/all:sha512/all:rsa-pkcs/all:rsa-pss/all:ecdsa/all:dsa/all:hmac-sha1/all:hmac-sha224/all:hmac-sha256/all:hmac-sha384/all:hmac-sha512/all:hmac-md5/all:camellia128-cbc/all:camellia192-cbc/all:camellia256-cbc/all:seed-cbc/all:des-ede3-cbc/all:des-40-cbc/all:des-cbc/all:null-cipher/all:rc2/all:rc4/all:idea/all:rsa/all:rsa-export/all:dhe-rsa/all:dhe-dss/all:ecdhe-ecdsa/all:ecdhe-rsa/all:ecdh-ecdsa/all:ecdh-rsa/all:tls-version-min=tls1.0:tls-version-max=tls1.2 Disallow Version Implicitly
|
|
||||||
0 noECC SSL3 d disallow=dsa Disallow DSA Signatures Explicitly
|
|
||||||
1 noECC SSL3 d disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
|
|
||||||
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
|
|
||||||
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
|
|
||||||
+ 1 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
|
|
||||||
+ 0 noECC SSL3 d allow=rsa-min=1023 Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
|
|
||||||
# test default settings
|
|
||||||
# NOTE: tstclient will attempt to overide the defaults, so we detect we
|
|
||||||
# were successful by locking in our settings
|
|
||||||
@ -1,397 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -232,57 +232,26 @@ NSC_DestroyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
|
|
||||||
* be in the data base.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
status = sftk_FreeObject(object);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return (status != SFTK_DestroyFailure) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
- ************** Crypto Functions: Utilities ************************
|
|
||||||
- */
|
|
||||||
-/*
|
|
||||||
- * Utility function for converting PSS/OAEP parameter types into
|
|
||||||
- * HASH_HashTypes. Note: Only SHA family functions are defined in RFC 3447.
|
|
||||||
- */
|
|
||||||
-static HASH_HashType
|
|
||||||
-GetHashTypeFromMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
|
|
||||||
-{
|
|
||||||
- switch (mech) {
|
|
||||||
- case CKM_SHA_1:
|
|
||||||
- case CKG_MGF1_SHA1:
|
|
||||||
- return HASH_AlgSHA1;
|
|
||||||
- case CKM_SHA224:
|
|
||||||
- case CKG_MGF1_SHA224:
|
|
||||||
- return HASH_AlgSHA224;
|
|
||||||
- case CKM_SHA256:
|
|
||||||
- case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
|
|
||||||
- return HASH_AlgSHA256;
|
|
||||||
- case CKM_SHA384:
|
|
||||||
- case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
|
|
||||||
- return HASH_AlgSHA384;
|
|
||||||
- case CKM_SHA512:
|
|
||||||
- case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
|
|
||||||
- return HASH_AlgSHA512;
|
|
||||||
- default:
|
|
||||||
- return HASH_AlgNULL;
|
|
||||||
- }
|
|
||||||
-}
|
|
||||||
-
|
|
||||||
-/*
|
|
||||||
* Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of PSS parameters
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
static PRBool
|
|
||||||
sftk_ValidatePssParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
if (!params) {
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
- if (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL ||
|
|
||||||
- GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL ||
|
|
||||||
+ sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) {
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of OAEP parameters
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
@@ -293,18 +262,18 @@ sftk_ValidateOaepParams(const CK_RSA_PKC
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
/* The requirements of ulSourceLen/pSourceData come from PKCS #11, which
|
|
||||||
* state:
|
|
||||||
* If the parameter is empty, pSourceData must be NULL and
|
|
||||||
* ulSourceDataLen must be zero.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
if (params->source != CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED ||
|
|
||||||
- (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
|
|
||||||
- (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
|
|
||||||
+ (sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
|
|
||||||
+ (sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
|
|
||||||
(params->ulSourceDataLen == 0 && params->pSourceData != NULL) ||
|
|
||||||
(params->ulSourceDataLen != 0 && params->pSourceData == NULL)) {
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
@@ -606,18 +575,18 @@ sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPInfo *info,
|
|
||||||
HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PORT_Assert(info->key.pub->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
|
||||||
if (info->key.pub->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params.hashAlg);
|
|
||||||
- maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params.mgf);
|
|
||||||
+ hashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params.hashAlg);
|
|
||||||
+ maskHashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params.mgf);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return RSA_EncryptOAEP(&info->key.pub->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
|
|
||||||
(const unsigned char *)info->params.pSourceData,
|
|
||||||
info->params.ulSourceDataLen, NULL, 0,
|
|
||||||
output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
static SECStatus
|
|
||||||
@@ -630,18 +599,18 @@ sftk_RSADecryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPInfo *info,
|
|
||||||
HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PORT_Assert(info->key.priv->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
|
||||||
if (info->key.priv->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params.hashAlg);
|
|
||||||
- maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params.mgf);
|
|
||||||
+ hashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params.hashAlg);
|
|
||||||
+ maskHashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params.mgf);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
rv = RSA_DecryptOAEP(&info->key.priv->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
|
|
||||||
(const unsigned char *)info->params.pSourceData,
|
|
||||||
info->params.ulSourceDataLen,
|
|
||||||
output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
|
|
||||||
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
|
||||||
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -2646,18 +2615,18 @@ sftk_RSASignPSS(SFTKPSSSignInfo *info, u
|
|
||||||
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = &info->params;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
|
||||||
if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
|
|
||||||
- maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
|
|
||||||
+ hashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
|
|
||||||
+ maskHashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
rv = RSA_SignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg, NULL,
|
|
||||||
params->sLen, sig, sigLen, maxLen, hash, hashLen);
|
|
||||||
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
|
||||||
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return rv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -3021,17 +2990,17 @@ NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
|
||||||
tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgNULL;
|
|
||||||
if (tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength != 12) {
|
|
||||||
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
/* The hash function for the TLS 1.2 PRF */
|
|
||||||
tlsPrfHash =
|
|
||||||
- GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_mac_params->prfHashMechanism);
|
|
||||||
+ sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_mac_params->prfHashMechanism);
|
|
||||||
if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL ||
|
|
||||||
tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength < 12) {
|
|
||||||
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (tls12_mac_params->ulServerOrClient == 1) {
|
|
||||||
label = "server finished";
|
|
||||||
@@ -3539,18 +3508,18 @@ sftk_RSACheckSignPSS(SFTKPSSVerifyInfo *
|
|
||||||
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = &info->params;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
|
||||||
if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
|
||||||
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
|
||||||
return SECFailure;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
|
|
||||||
- maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
|
|
||||||
+ hashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
|
|
||||||
+ maskHashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return RSA_CheckSignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
|
|
||||||
params->sLen, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* NSC_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation,
|
|
||||||
* where the signature is an appendix to the data,
|
|
||||||
* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA) */
|
|
||||||
@@ -6951,17 +6920,17 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
|
|
||||||
unsigned genLen = 0;
|
|
||||||
unsigned char hashbuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
|
|
||||||
unsigned char keyBlock[9 * SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
|
|
||||||
unsigned char *keyBlockAlloc = NULL; /* allocated keyBlock */
|
|
||||||
unsigned char *keyBlockData = keyBlock; /* pointer to current keyBlock */
|
|
||||||
const unsigned char *prk; /* psuedo-random key */
|
|
||||||
CK_ULONG prkLen;
|
|
||||||
const unsigned char *okm; /* output keying material */
|
|
||||||
- HASH_HashType hashType = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->prfHashMechanism);
|
|
||||||
+ HASH_HashType hashType = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->prfHashMechanism);
|
|
||||||
SFTKObject *saltKey = NULL;
|
|
||||||
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* Spec says it should be the base hash, but also accept the HMAC */
|
|
||||||
if (hashType == HASH_AlgNULL) {
|
|
||||||
hashType = sftk_HMACMechanismToHash(params->prfHashMechanism);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
rawHash = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hashType);
|
|
||||||
@@ -7389,17 +7358,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
|
||||||
if ((mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) ||
|
|
||||||
(mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) {
|
|
||||||
if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS))) {
|
|
||||||
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *tls12_master =
|
|
||||||
(CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
|
||||||
- tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_master->prfHashMechanism);
|
|
||||||
+ tlsPrfHash = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_master->prfHashMechanism);
|
|
||||||
if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
|
|
||||||
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
} else if ((mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256) ||
|
|
||||||
(mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256)) {
|
|
||||||
tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgSHA256;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -7607,17 +7576,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "extended master secret",
|
|
||||||
&seed, &master, isFIPS);
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
const SECHashObject *hashObj;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(ems_params->prfHashMechanism);
|
|
||||||
+ tlsPrfHash = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(ems_params->prfHashMechanism);
|
|
||||||
if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
|
|
||||||
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(tlsPrfHash);
|
|
||||||
if (seed.len != hashObj->length) {
|
|
||||||
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
|
||||||
@@ -7665,17 +7634,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) {
|
|
||||||
if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS))) {
|
|
||||||
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *tls12_keys =
|
|
||||||
(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
|
||||||
- tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_keys->prfHashMechanism);
|
|
||||||
+ tlsPrfHash = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_keys->prfHashMechanism);
|
|
||||||
if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
|
|
||||||
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
} else if (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) {
|
|
||||||
tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgSHA256;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
|
|
||||||
@@ -908,16 +908,19 @@ sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *sftk_HMACConsta
|
|
||||||
sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(
|
|
||||||
CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech, SFTKObject *key);
|
|
||||||
void sftk_HMACConstantTime_Update(void *pctx, const void *data, unsigned int len);
|
|
||||||
void sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_Update(void *pctx, const void *data, unsigned int len);
|
|
||||||
void sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash(
|
|
||||||
void *pctx, void *out, unsigned int *outLength, unsigned int maxLength);
|
|
||||||
void sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext(void *pctx, PRBool);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+/* Crypto Utilities */
|
|
||||||
+HASH_HashType sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech);
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/****************************************
|
|
||||||
* implement TLS Pseudo Random Function (PRF)
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
extern CK_RV
|
|
||||||
sftk_TLSPRFInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,
|
|
||||||
SFTKObject *key,
|
|
||||||
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type,
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
|
||||||
--- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -95,16 +95,17 @@ CK_RV
|
|
||||||
sftk_MapVerifyError(int error)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
CK_RV crv = sftk_MapCryptError(error);
|
|
||||||
if (crv == CKR_DEVICE_ERROR)
|
|
||||||
crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
|
|
||||||
return crv;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* ******************** Attribute Utilities *******************************
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/*
|
|
||||||
* create a new attribute with type, value, and length. Space is allocated
|
|
||||||
* to hold value.
|
|
||||||
*/
|
|
||||||
@@ -2243,17 +2244,49 @@ sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE
|
|
||||||
flags = CKF_MESSAGE_VERIFY;
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
default:
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return flags;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
+/*
|
|
||||||
+ * ******************** Hash Utilities **************************
|
|
||||||
+ */
|
|
||||||
+/*
|
|
||||||
+ * Utility function for converting PSS/OAEP parameter types into
|
|
||||||
+ * HASH_HashTypes. Note: Only SHA family functions are defined in RFC 3447.
|
|
||||||
+ */
|
|
||||||
+HASH_HashType
|
|
||||||
+sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
|
|
||||||
+{
|
|
||||||
+ switch (mech) {
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA_1:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA1:
|
|
||||||
+ return HASH_AlgSHA1;
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA224:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA224:
|
|
||||||
+ return HASH_AlgSHA224;
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA256:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
|
|
||||||
+ return HASH_AlgSHA256;
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA384:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
|
|
||||||
+ return HASH_AlgSHA384;
|
|
||||||
+ case CKM_SHA512:
|
|
||||||
+ case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
|
|
||||||
+ return HASH_AlgSHA512;
|
|
||||||
+ default:
|
|
||||||
+ return HASH_AlgNULL;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+}
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
#ifdef NSS_HAS_FIPS_INDICATORS
|
|
||||||
+/**************** FIPS Indicator Utilities *************************/
|
|
||||||
/* sigh, we probably need a version of this in secutil so that both
|
|
||||||
* softoken and NSS can use it */
|
|
||||||
static SECOidTag
|
|
||||||
sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *source)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
SFTKAttribute *attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(source, CKA_EC_PARAMS);
|
|
||||||
unsigned char *encoded;
|
|
||||||
int len;
|
|
||||||
@@ -2379,16 +2412,39 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
|
||||||
if (mech->ulParameterLen == 0) {
|
|
||||||
/* AEAD ciphers are only in FIPS mode if we are using the
|
|
||||||
* MESSAGE interface. This takes an empty parameter
|
|
||||||
* in the init function */
|
|
||||||
return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+ case SFTKFIPSRSAPSS: {
|
|
||||||
+ /* PSS salt must not be greater than the length of the
|
|
||||||
+ * underlying hash. We verify that the underlying hash of the
|
|
||||||
+ * parameters matches Hash of the combined hash mechanisms, so
|
|
||||||
+ * we don't need to look at the specific PSS mechanism */
|
|
||||||
+ CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *pss = (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)
|
|
||||||
+ mech->pParameter;
|
|
||||||
+ const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL;
|
|
||||||
+ if (mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof(*pss)) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ /* we use the existing hash utilities to find the length of
|
|
||||||
+ * the hash */
|
|
||||||
+ hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(
|
|
||||||
+ pss->hashAlg));
|
|
||||||
+ if (hashObj == NULL) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
default:
|
|
||||||
break;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
/* if we didn't understand the special processing, mark it non-fips */
|
|
||||||
return PR_FALSE;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
#endif
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/freebl/Makefile b/lib/freebl/Makefile
|
||||||
|
index 74e8e65..8995752 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/freebl/Makefile
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/freebl/Makefile
|
||||||
|
@@ -568,7 +568,6 @@ ifneq ($(shell $(CC) -? 2>&1 >/dev/null </dev/null | sed -e 's/:.*//;1q'),lcc)
|
||||||
|
HAVE_INT128_SUPPORT = 1
|
||||||
|
DEFINES += -DHAVE_INT128_SUPPORT
|
||||||
|
else ifeq (1,$(CC_IS_GCC))
|
||||||
|
- SUPPORTS_VALE_CURVE25519 = 1
|
||||||
|
ifneq (,$(filter 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9,$(word 1,$(GCC_VERSION)).$(word 2,$(GCC_VERSION))))
|
||||||
|
HAVE_INT128_SUPPORT = 1
|
||||||
|
DEFINES += -DHAVE_INT128_SUPPORT
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp b/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp
|
||||||
|
index 65f9a80..23940ef 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp
|
||||||
|
@@ -866,12 +866,6 @@
|
||||||
|
}],
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
}],
|
||||||
|
- [ 'supports_vale_curve25519==1', {
|
||||||
|
- 'defines': [
|
||||||
|
- # The Makefile does version-tests on GCC, but we're not doing that here.
|
||||||
|
- 'HACL_CAN_COMPILE_INLINE_ASM',
|
||||||
|
- ],
|
||||||
|
- }],
|
||||||
|
[ 'OS=="linux" or OS=="android"', {
|
||||||
|
'conditions': [
|
||||||
|
[ 'target_arch=="x64"', {
|
||||||
|
@@ -934,11 +928,6 @@
|
||||||
|
'variables': {
|
||||||
|
'module': 'nss',
|
||||||
|
'conditions': [
|
||||||
|
- [ 'target_arch=="x64" and cc_is_gcc==1', {
|
||||||
|
- 'supports_vale_curve25519%': 1,
|
||||||
|
- }, {
|
||||||
|
- 'supports_vale_curve25519%': 0,
|
||||||
|
- }],
|
||||||
|
[ 'target_arch=="x64" or target_arch=="arm64" or target_arch=="aarch64"', {
|
||||||
|
'have_int128_support%': 1,
|
||||||
|
}, {
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi b/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
|
||||||
|
index d198c44..34b6b3c 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/freebl/freebl_base.gypi
|
||||||
|
@@ -151,11 +151,6 @@
|
||||||
|
'ecl/curve25519_32.c',
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
}],
|
||||||
|
- ['supports_vale_curve25519==1', {
|
||||||
|
- 'sources': [
|
||||||
|
- 'verified/Hacl_Curve25519_64.c',
|
||||||
|
- ],
|
||||||
|
- }],
|
||||||
|
['(target_arch!="ppc64" and target_arch!="ppc64le") or disable_altivec==1', {
|
||||||
|
'sources': [
|
||||||
|
# Gyp does not support per-file cflags, so working around like this.
|
||||||
@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.add_ems_policy 2023-06-12 15:37:49.292905411 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c 2023-06-12 17:18:35.129938514 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -389,6 +389,8 @@ static const oidValDef kxOptList[] = {
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("ECDHE-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-ECDSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
|
||||||
|
{ CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
|
||||||
|
+ /* not really a key exchange, but it's the closest fit */
|
||||||
|
+ { CIPHER_NAME("TLS-REQUIRE-EMS"), SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h 2023-06-12 17:18:35.129938514 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -202,4 +202,10 @@ struct PK11GenericObjectStr {
|
||||||
|
/* This mask includes all CK_FLAGs with an equivalent CKA_ attribute. */
|
||||||
|
#define CKF_KEY_OPERATION_FLAGS 0x000e7b00UL
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+/* this oid value could change values if it's added after other new
|
||||||
|
+ * upstream oids. We protect applications by hiding the define in a private
|
||||||
|
+ * header file that only NSS sees. Currently it's only available through
|
||||||
|
+ * the policy code */
|
||||||
|
+#define SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
#endif /* _SECMODTI_H_ */
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy 2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2023-06-12 17:18:35.130938525 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
|
||||||
|
#include "pk11func.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "secmod.h"
|
||||||
|
#include "blapi.h"
|
||||||
|
+#include "secmodti.h" /* until SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS is upstream */
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@@ -3480,6 +3481,29 @@ ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *s
|
||||||
|
CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
|
||||||
|
unsigned int master_params_len;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+ /* if we are using TLS and we aren't using the extended master secret,
|
||||||
|
+ * and SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS policy is true, fail. The caller will
|
||||||
|
+ * send and alert (eventually). In the RSA Server case, the alert
|
||||||
|
+ * won't happen until Finish time because the upper level code
|
||||||
|
+ * can't tell a difference between this failure and an RSA decrypt
|
||||||
|
+ * failure, so it will proceed with a faux key */
|
||||||
|
+ if (isTLS) {
|
||||||
|
+ PRUint32 policy;
|
||||||
|
+ SECStatus rv;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /* first fetch the policy for this algorithm */
|
||||||
|
+ rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, &policy);
|
||||||
|
+ /* we only look at the policy if we can fetch it. */
|
||||||
|
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX) {
|
||||||
|
+ /* just set the error, we don't want to map any errors
|
||||||
|
+ * set by NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy here */
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
|
||||||
|
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
if (isTLS12) {
|
||||||
|
if (isDH)
|
||||||
|
master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/util/secoid.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/util/secoid.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/util/secoid.c.add_ems_policy 2023-06-12 15:37:49.293905422 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/util/secoid.c 2023-06-12 17:20:29.498142775 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -1795,6 +1795,11 @@ const static SECOidData oids[SEC_OID_TOT
|
||||||
|
SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_USER,
|
||||||
|
"IPsec User",
|
||||||
|
CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
|
||||||
|
+ /* we need it for the policy code. */
|
||||||
|
+ ODE(SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1,
|
||||||
|
+ "TLS Require EMS", CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* PRIVATE EXTENDED SECOID Table
|
||||||
|
@@ -2095,6 +2100,8 @@ SECOID_Init(void)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/* turn off NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL by default */
|
||||||
|
xOids[SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY].notPolicyFlags = NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL;
|
||||||
|
+ /* turn off TLS REQUIRE EMS by default */
|
||||||
|
+ xOids[SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1].notPolicyFlags = ~0;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
envVal = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_HASH_ALG_SUPPORT");
|
||||||
|
if (envVal)
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/util/secoidt.h.add_ems_policy ./lib/util/secoidt.h
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/util/secoidt.h.add_ems_policy 2023-06-12 17:18:35.131938535 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/util/secoidt.h 2023-06-12 17:21:49.675987022 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -501,6 +501,9 @@ typedef enum {
|
||||||
|
SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_END = 361,
|
||||||
|
SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_TUNNEL = 362,
|
||||||
|
SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_IPSEC_USER = 363,
|
||||||
|
+ /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
|
||||||
|
+ /* give it an obscure name here */
|
||||||
|
+ SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1 = 372,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SEC_OID_TOTAL
|
||||||
|
} SECOidTag;
|
||||||
@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff --git a/lib/ssl/sslsock.c b/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
|
||||||
|
--- a/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -4394,62 +4394,82 @@ ssl_ClearPRCList(PRCList *list, void (*f
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
PORT_Free(cursor);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SECStatus
|
||||||
|
SSLExp_EnableTls13GreaseEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
+#ifdef notdef
|
||||||
|
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
|
||||||
|
if (!ss) {
|
||||||
|
return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
ss->opt.enableTls13GreaseEch = enabled;
|
||||||
|
return SECSuccess;
|
||||||
|
+#else
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
|
||||||
|
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
+#endif
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SECStatus
|
||||||
|
SSLExp_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint8 size)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
+#ifdef notdef
|
||||||
|
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
|
||||||
|
if (!ss || size == 0) {
|
||||||
|
return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
|
||||||
|
ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchSize = size;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
|
||||||
|
ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return SECSuccess;
|
||||||
|
+#else
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
|
||||||
|
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
+#endif
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SECStatus
|
||||||
|
SSLExp_EnableTls13BackendEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
+#ifdef notdef
|
||||||
|
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
|
||||||
|
if (!ss) {
|
||||||
|
return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch = enabled;
|
||||||
|
return SECSuccess;
|
||||||
|
+#else
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
|
||||||
|
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
+#endif
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SECStatus
|
||||||
|
SSLExp_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
+#ifdef notdef
|
||||||
|
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
|
||||||
|
if (!ss) {
|
||||||
|
return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
ss->opt.callExtensionWriterOnEchInner = enabled;
|
||||||
|
return SECSuccess;
|
||||||
|
+#else
|
||||||
|
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
|
||||||
|
+ return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
+#endif
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SECStatus
|
||||||
|
SSLExp_SetDtls13VersionWorkaround(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
|
||||||
|
if (!ss) {
|
||||||
|
return SECFailure;
|
||||||
|
diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
|
||||||
|
--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech 2023-06-21 19:02:02.160400997 +0200
|
||||||
|
+++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn 2023-06-21 19:02:18.226618324 +0200
|
||||||
|
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ CPPSRCS = \
|
||||||
|
tls_filter.cc \
|
||||||
|
tls_protect.cc \
|
||||||
|
tls_psk_unittest.cc \
|
||||||
|
- tls_ech_unittest.cc \
|
||||||
|
$(SSLKEYLOGFILE_FILES) \
|
||||||
|
$(NULL)
|
||||||
@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
|||||||
|
diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.pkcs12_indicator ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
|
||||||
|
--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.pkcs12_indicator 2023-08-03 10:50:37.067109367 -0700
|
||||||
|
+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c 2023-08-03 11:41:55.641541953 -0700
|
||||||
|
@@ -2429,7 +2429,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
||||||
|
return PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
case SFTKFIPSECC:
|
||||||
|
/* we've already handled the curve selection in the 'getlength'
|
||||||
|
- * function */
|
||||||
|
+ * function */
|
||||||
|
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
case SFTKFIPSAEAD: {
|
||||||
|
if (mech->ulParameterLen == 0) {
|
||||||
|
@@ -2463,6 +2463,29 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
+ case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
|
||||||
|
+ /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
|
||||||
|
+ * (independent of keysize).
|
||||||
|
+ * 1. iteration count must be at least 1000.
|
||||||
|
+ * 2. salt must be at least 128 bits (16 bytes).
|
||||||
|
+ * 3. password must match the length specified in the SP
|
||||||
|
+ */
|
||||||
|
+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkdf2 = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)
|
||||||
|
+ mech->pParameter;
|
||||||
|
+ if (mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof(*pbkdf2)) {
|
||||||
|
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ if (pbkdf2->iterations < 1000) {
|
||||||
|
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ if (pbkdf2->ulSaltSourceDataLen < 16) {
|
||||||
|
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ if (*(pbkdf2->ulPasswordLen) < SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN) {
|
||||||
|
+ return PR_FALSE;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ return PR_TRUE;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
default:
|
||||||
|
break;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in new issue