import nss-3.101.0-7.el10

2 months ago · 5b58a79d76
commit 5b58a79d76
57 changed files with 10696 additions and 0 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
 SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
 SOURCES/nss-3.101-with-nspr-4.35.tar.gz
--- a/.nss.metadata
+++ b/.nss.metadata
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
 b5570125fbf6bfb410705706af48217a0817c03a SOURCES/blank-cert9.db
 f9c9568442386da370193474de1b25c3f68cdaf6 SOURCES/blank-key4.db
 592ea337ee2504efb09a21a4593cc1f19e4477c2 SOURCES/nss-3.101-with-nspr-4.35.tar.gz
--- a/SOURCES/cert9.db.xml
+++ b/SOURCES/cert9.db.xml
@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
 <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
 <!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
 <!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
 <!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
 ]>
 <refentry id="cert9.db">
  <refentryinfo>
    <date>&date;</date>
    <title>Network Security Services</title>
    <productname>nss</productname>
    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
  </refentryinfo>
  <refmeta>
    <refentrytitle>cert9.db</refentrytitle>
    <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
  </refmeta>
  <refnamediv>
    <refname>cert9.db</refname>
    <refpurpose>NSS certificate database</refpurpose>
  </refnamediv>
 <refsection id="description">
    <title>Description</title>
    <para><emphasis>cert9.db</emphasis> is an NSS certificate database.</para>
  <para>This certificate database is the sqlite-based shared database with support for concurrent access.
  </para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>Files</title>
    <para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/cert9.db</filename></para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>See also</title>
    <para>pkcs11.txt(5)</para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection id="authors">
    <title>Authors</title>
    <para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat,  Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
    <para>Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
  </refsection>
 <!-- don't change -->
  <refsection id="license">
    <title>LICENSE</title>
    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
    </para>
  </refsection>
 </refentry>
--- a/SOURCES/fips_algorithms.h
+++ b/SOURCES/fips_algorithms.h
@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
 /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
 /*
 * Vendors should replace this header file with the file containing those
 * algorithms which have NIST algorithm Certificates.
 */
 /* handle special cases. Classes require existing code to already be
 * in place for that class */
 typedef enum {
    SFTKFIPSNone = 0,
    SFTKFIPSDH,  /* allow only specific primes */
    SFTKFIPSECC, /* not just keys but specific curves */
    SFTKFIPSAEAD, /* single shot AEAD functions not allowed in FIPS mode */
    SFTKFIPSRSAPSS, /* make sure salt isn't too big */
    SFTKFIPSPBKDF2,  /* handle pbkdf2 FIPS restrictions */
    SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck,  /* check the output of TLS prf functions */
    SFTKFIPSChkHash,  /* make sure the base hash of KDF functions is FIPS */
    SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,  /* make sure the base hash of TLS KDF functions is FIPS */
    SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,  /* make sure the base hash of SP-800-108 KDF functions is FIPS */
 } SFTKFIPSSpecialClass;
 /* set according to your security policy */
 #define SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN  8
 typedef struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList;
 struct SFTKFIPSAlgorithmListStr {
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type;
    CK_MECHANISM_INFO info;
    CK_ULONG step;
    SFTKFIPSSpecialClass special;
    size_t offset;
 };
 SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList sftk_fips_mechs[] = {
 /* A sample set of algorithms to allow basic testing in our continous
 * testing infrastructure. The vendor version should replace this with
 * a version that matches their algorithm testing and security policy */
 /* NOTE, This looks a lot like the PKCS #11 mechanism list in pkcs11.c, it
 * differs in the following ways:
 *    1) the addition of step and class elements to help restrict
 *       the supported key sizes and types.
 *    2) The mechanism flags are restricted to only those that map to
 *       fips approved operations.
 *    3) All key sizes are in bits, independent of mechanism.
 *    4) You can add more then one entry for the same mechanism to handle
 *       multiple descrete keys where the MIN/MAX/STEP semantics doesn't apply
 *       or where different operations have different key requirements.
 * This table does not encode all the modules legal FIPS semantics, only
 * those semantics that might possibly change due to algorithms dropping
 * of the security policy late in the process. */
 /* handy common flag types */
 #define CKF_KPG CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR
 #define CKF_GEN CKF_GENERATE
 #define CKF_SGN (CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY)
 #define CKF_ENC (CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT )
 #define CKF_ECW (CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_DECRYPT | CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
 #define CKF_WRP (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
 #define CKF_KEK (CKF_WRAP | CKF_UNWRAP)
 #define CKF_KEA CKF_DERIVE
 #define CKF_KDF CKF_DERIVE
 #define CKF_HSH CKF_DIGEST
 #define CK_MAX 0xffffffffUL
 /* mechanisms using the same key types share the same key type
 * limits */
 #define RSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
 #define RSA_FB_STEP 1
 #define RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY 1024, 1792 /* min, max */
 #define RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP 256
 #define DSA_FB_KEY 2048, 4096 /* min, max */
 #define DSA_FB_STEP 1024
 #define DH_FB_KEY 2048, 8192 /* min, max */
 #define DH_FB_STEP 1024
 #define EC_FB_KEY 256, 521 /* min, max */
 #define EC_FB_STEP 1       /* key limits handled by special operation */
 #define AES_FB_KEY 128, 256
 #define AES_FB_STEP 64
    { CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    /* -------------- RSA Multipart Signing Operations -------------------- */
    { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
    { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
    { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
    { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_LEGACY_FB_KEY, CKF_VERIFY }, RSA_LEGACY_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
    { CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
    { CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
    { CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
    { CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, { RSA_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, RSA_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSRSAPSS },
    /* -------------------- Diffie Hellman Operations --------------------- */
    { CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
    { CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, { DH_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, DH_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSDH },
    /* -------------------- Elliptic Curve Operations --------------------- */
    { CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KPG }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
    { CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
    { CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_KEA }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
    { CKM_ECDSA_SHA224, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
    { CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
    { CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
    { CKM_ECDSA_SHA512, { EC_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, EC_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSECC },
    /* ------------------------- RC2 Operations --------------------------- */
    /* ------------------------- AES Operations --------------------------- */
    { CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_GEN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_AES_ECB, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_AES_CBC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_AES_CMAC, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_SGN }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_AES_CTS, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_AES_CTR, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ENC }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_AES_GCM, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSAEAD },
    { CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    /* ------------------------- Hashing Operations ----------------------- */
    { CKM_SHA224, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA224_HMAC, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 224, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA256, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA256_HMAC, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 256, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA384, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA384_HMAC, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 384, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA512, { 0, 0, CKF_HSH }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA512_HMAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    /* --------------------- Secret Key Operations ------------------------ */
    { CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    /* ---------------------- SSL/TLS operations ------------------------- */
    { CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, { 384, 384, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, { 384, 384, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck, offsetof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
    { CKM_TLS_MAC, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
        offsetof(CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
    { CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, { 192, 1024, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
        offsetof(CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
    { CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, { 192, 1024, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashTls,
        offsetof(CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
    /* ------------------------- HKDF Operations -------------------------- */
    { CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
        offsetof(CK_HKDF_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
    { CKM_HKDF_DATA, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
        offsetof(CK_HKDF_PARAMS, prfHashMechanism) },
    { CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 160, 224, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, { 256, 512, CKF_GEN }, 128, SFTKFIPSNone },
    /* ------------------ NIST 800-108 Key Derivations  ------------------- */
    { CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
    { CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
    { CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
    /* --------------------IPSEC ----------------------- */
    { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE, { 112, 255 * 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
        offsetof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfMechanism) },
    { CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE, { 112, 64 * 8, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHash,
        offsetof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS, prfMechanism) },
    /* ------------------ PBE Key Derivations  ------------------- */
    { CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2, { 112, 256, CKF_GEN }, 1, SFTKFIPSPBKDF2 },
    /* the deprecated mechanisms, don't use for some reason we are supposed
     * to set the FIPS indicators on these (sigh) */
    { CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD, { AES_FB_KEY, CKF_ECW }, AES_FB_STEP, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256, { 384, 384, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck },
    { CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256, { 112, 512, CKF_SGN }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512, { 1, 128, CKF_DERIVE }, 1, SFTKFIPSNone },
    { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
    { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1, SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
    { CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA, { 112, CK_MAX, CKF_KDF }, 1,  SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800,
        offsetof(CK_SP800_108_KDF_PARAMS, prfType) },
 };
 const int SFTK_NUMBER_FIPS_ALGORITHMS = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sftk_fips_mechs);
--- a/SOURCES/iquote.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/iquote.patch
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
 diff -up nss/coreconf/location.mk.iquote nss/coreconf/location.mk
 --- nss/coreconf/location.mk.iquote	2017-07-27 16:09:32.000000000 +0200
 +++ nss/coreconf/location.mk	2017-09-06 13:23:14.633611555 +0200
@@ -75,4 +75,9 @@ ifndef SQLITE_LIB_NAME
     SQLITE_LIB_NAME = sqlite3
 endif
 +# Prefer in-tree headers over system headers
 +ifdef IN_TREE_FREEBL_HEADERS_FIRST
 +    INCLUDES += -iquote $(DIST)/../public/nss -iquote $(DIST)/../private/nss
 +endif
 +
 MK_LOCATION = included
--- a/SOURCES/key4.db.xml
+++ b/SOURCES/key4.db.xml
@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
 <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
 <!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
 <!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
 <!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
 ]>
 <refentry id="key4.db">
  <refentryinfo>
    <date>&date;</date>
    <title>Network Security Services</title>
    <productname>nss</productname>
    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
  </refentryinfo>
  <refmeta>
    <refentrytitle>key4.db</refentrytitle>
    <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
  </refmeta>
  <refnamediv>
    <refname>key4.db</refname>
    <refpurpose>NSS certificate database</refpurpose>
  </refnamediv>
 <refsection id="description">
    <title>Description</title>
    <para><emphasis>key4.db</emphasis> is an NSS key database.</para>
  <para>This key database is the sqlite-based shared database format with support for concurrent access.
  </para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>Files</title>
    <para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/key4.db</filename></para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>See also</title>
    <para>pkcs11.txt(5)</para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection id="authors">
    <title>Authors</title>
    <para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat,  Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
    <para>Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
  </refsection>
 <!-- don't change -->
  <refsection id="license">
    <title>LICENSE</title>
    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
    </para>
  </refsection>
 </refentry>
--- a/SOURCES/nspr-4.34-fix-coverity-loop-issue.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nspr-4.34-fix-coverity-loop-issue.patch
@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
 diff --git a/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c b/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
 --- a/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
 +++ b/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
@@ -2209,28 +2209,38 @@ PR_GetPrefLoopbackAddrInfo(PRNetAddr *re
         PRBool result_still_empty = PR_TRUE;
         PRADDRINFO *ai = res;
         do {
             PRNetAddr aNetAddr;
             while (ai && ai->ai_addrlen > sizeof(PRNetAddr))
                 ai = ai->ai_next;
 -            if (ai) {
 -                /* copy sockaddr to PRNetAddr */
 -                memcpy(&aNetAddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
 -                aNetAddr.raw.family = ai->ai_addr->sa_family;
 +            if (!ai) {
 +                break;
 +            }
 +
 +            /* copy sockaddr to PRNetAddr */
 +            memcpy(&aNetAddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
 +            aNetAddr.raw.family = ai->ai_addr->sa_family;
 #ifdef _PR_INET6
 -                if (AF_INET6 == aNetAddr.raw.family)
 -                    aNetAddr.raw.family = PR_AF_INET6;
 +            if (AF_INET6 == aNetAddr.raw.family)
 +                aNetAddr.raw.family = PR_AF_INET6;
 #endif
 -                if (ai->ai_addrlen < sizeof(PRNetAddr))
 -                    memset(((char*)result)+ai->ai_addrlen, 0,
 -                           sizeof(PRNetAddr) - ai->ai_addrlen);
 +            if (ai->ai_addrlen < sizeof(PRNetAddr))
 +                memset(((char*)&aNetAddr)+ai->ai_addrlen, 0,
 +                       sizeof(PRNetAddr) - ai->ai_addrlen);
 +
 +            if (result->raw.family == PR_AF_INET) {
 +                aNetAddr.inet.port = htons(port);
             }
 +            else {
 +                aNetAddr.ipv6.port = htons(port);
 +            }
 +
             /* If we obtain more than one result, prefer IPv6. */
             if (result_still_empty || aNetAddr.raw.family == PR_AF_INET6) {
                 memcpy(result, &aNetAddr, sizeof(PRNetAddr));
             }
             result_still_empty = PR_FALSE;
             ai = ai->ai_next;
         }
--- a/SOURCES/nspr-4.34-server-passive.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nspr-4.34-server-passive.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 diff -r c75b4e36b7e8 pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c
 --- a/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c     Wed May 25 23:39:48 2022 +0200
 +++ b/pr/src/misc/prnetdb.c     Tue Jun 14 18:48:03 2022 -0400
@@ -2204,6 +2204,7 @@
     memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
 +    hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
     rv = GETADDRINFO(NULL, tmpBuf, &hints, &res);
     if (rv == 0) {
         PRBool result_still_empty = PR_TRUE;
--- a/SOURCES/nspr-config-pc.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nspr-config-pc.patch
@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
 diff -up nspr/config/nspr-config.in.flags nspr/config/nspr-config.in
 --- nspr/config/nspr-config.in.flags	2013-05-29 13:46:34.147971410 -0700
 +++ nspr/config/nspr-config.in	2013-05-29 14:17:10.990838914 -0700
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ if test -z "$includedir"; then
     includedir=@includedir@
 fi
 if test -z "$libdir"; then
 -    libdir=@libdir@
 +    libdir=`pkg-config --variable=libdir nspr`
 fi
 if test "$echo_prefix" = "yes"; then
@@ -136,12 +136,12 @@ if test "$echo_libs" = "yes"; then
       if test -n "$lib_nspr"; then
 	libdirs="$libdirs -lnspr${major_version}"
       fi
 -      os_ldflags="@LDFLAGS@"
 +      os_ldflags=`pkg-config --variable=ldflags nspr`
       for i in $os_ldflags ; do
 	if echo $i | grep \^-L >/dev/null; then
 	  libdirs="$libdirs $i"
         fi
       done
 -      echo $libdirs @OS_LIBS@
 +      echo $libdirs `pkg-config --variable=os_libs nspr`
 fi      
 diff -up nspr/config/nspr.pc.in.flags nspr/config/nspr.pc.in
 --- nspr/config/nspr.pc.in.flags	2013-05-29 13:48:15.026643570 -0700
 +++ nspr/config/nspr.pc.in	2013-05-29 13:49:47.795202949 -0700
@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ includedir=@includedir@
 Name: NSPR
 Description: The Netscape Portable Runtime
 Version: @MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@.@MOD_MINOR_VERSION@.@MOD_PATCH_VERSION@
 -Libs: -L@libdir@ -lplds@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ -lplc@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ -lnspr@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@
 +Libs: -L@libdir@ -lplds@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ -lplc@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ -lnspr@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@ @OS_LIBS@
 Cflags: -I@includedir@
--- a/SOURCES/nspr-config.xml
+++ b/SOURCES/nspr-config.xml
@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
 <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
 <!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
 <!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
 <!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
 ]>
 <refentry id="nspr-config">
  <refentryinfo>
    <date>&date;</date>
    <title>Netscape Portable Runtime</title>
    <productname>nspr</productname>
    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
  </refentryinfo>
  <refmeta>
    <refentrytitle>nspr-config</refentrytitle>
    <manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
  </refmeta>
  <refnamediv>
    <refname>nspr-config</refname>
    <refpurpose>Return meta information about nspr libraries</refpurpose>
  </refnamediv>
  <refsynopsisdiv>
    <cmdsynopsis>
      <command>nspr-config</command>
      <arg><option>--prefix</option></arg>
      <arg><option>--exec-prefix</option></arg>
      <arg><option>--includedir</option></arg>
      <arg><option>--libs</option></arg>
      <arg><option>--cflags</option></arg>
      <arg><option>--libdir</option></arg>
      <arg><option>--version</option></arg>
    </cmdsynopsis>
  </refsynopsisdiv>
 <refsection id="description">
    <title>Description</title>
    <para><command>nspr-config</command> is a shell script which can be used to obtain gcc options for building client pacakges of nspr.</para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>Options</title>
    <variablelist>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--prefix</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>Returns the top level system directory under which the nspr libraries are installed.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--exec-prefix</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>Returns the top level system directory under which any nspr binaries would be installed.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--includedir</option> <replaceable>count</replaceable></term>
        <listitem><simpara>Returns the path to the directory were the nspr headers are installed.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--version</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>Returns the upstream version of nspr in the form major_version-minor_version-patch_version.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--libs</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>Returns the compiler linking flags.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--cflags</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>Returns the compiler include flags.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--libdir</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>Returns the path to the directory were the nspr libraries are installed.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
    </variablelist>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>Examples</title>
    <para>The following example will query for both include path and linkage flags:
      <programlisting>
        /usr/bin/nspr-config --cflags --libs
      </programlisting>
    </para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>Files</title>
    <para><filename>/usr/bin/nspr-config</filename></para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>See also</title>
    <para>pkg-config(1)</para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection id="authors">
    <title>Authors</title>
    <para>The NSPR liraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat,  Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
    <para>
 	Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.
    </para>
  </refsection>
 <!-- don't change -->
  <refsection id="license">
    <title>LICENSE</title>
    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
    </para>
  </refsection>
 </refentry>
--- a/SOURCES/nspr-gcc-atomics.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nspr-gcc-atomics.patch
@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
 diff -up ./pr/include/md/_linux.h.gcc-atomics ./pr/include/md/_linux.h
 --- ./pr/include/md/_linux.h.gcc-atomics	2022-09-20 11:23:22.008942926 -0700
 +++ ./pr/include/md/_linux.h	2022-09-20 11:34:45.536751340 -0700
@@ -105,6 +105,15 @@
 #endif
 #if defined(__i386__)
 +#if defined(__GNUC__)
 +/* Use GCC built-in functions */
 +#define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
 +#define _MD_INIT_ATOMIC()
 +#define _MD_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(ptr) __sync_add_and_fetch(ptr, 1)
 +#define _MD_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(ptr) __sync_sub_and_fetch(ptr, 1)
 +#define _MD_ATOMIC_ADD(ptr, i) __sync_add_and_fetch(ptr, i)
 +#define _MD_ATOMIC_SET(ptr, nv) __sync_lock_test_and_set(ptr, nv)
 +#else
 #define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
 #define _MD_INIT_ATOMIC()
 extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_AtomicIncrement(PRInt32 *val);
@@ -116,6 +125,7 @@ extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_AtomicAdd(PRInt32
 extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_AtomicSet(PRInt32 *val, PRInt32 newval);
 #define _MD_ATOMIC_SET                _PR_x86_AtomicSet
 #endif
 +#endif
 #if defined(__ia64__)
 #define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
@@ -131,6 +141,15 @@ extern PRInt32 _PR_ia64_AtomicSet(PRInt3
 #endif
 #if defined(__x86_64__)
 +#if defined(__GNUC__)
 +/* Use GCC built-in functions */
 +#define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
 +#define _MD_INIT_ATOMIC()
 +#define _MD_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(ptr) __sync_add_and_fetch(ptr, 1)
 +#define _MD_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(ptr) __sync_sub_and_fetch(ptr, 1)
 +#define _MD_ATOMIC_ADD(ptr, i) __sync_add_and_fetch(ptr, i)
 +#define _MD_ATOMIC_SET(ptr, nv) __sync_lock_test_and_set(ptr, nv)
 +#else
 #define _PR_HAVE_ATOMIC_OPS
 #define _MD_INIT_ATOMIC()
 extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_64_AtomicIncrement(PRInt32 *val);
@@ -142,6 +161,7 @@ extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_64_AtomicAdd(PRIn
 extern PRInt32 _PR_x86_64_AtomicSet(PRInt32 *val, PRInt32 newval);
 #define _MD_ATOMIC_SET                _PR_x86_64_AtomicSet
 #endif
 +#endif
 #if defined(__loongarch__)
 #if defined(__GNUC__)
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-add-certificate-compression-test.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-add-certificate-compression-test.patch
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-add-ems-policy.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-add-ems-policy.patch
@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
 diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.ems ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
 --- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.ems	2024-06-11 13:09:25.956760476 -0700
 +++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2024-06-11 13:09:52.837067481 -0700
@@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ static const oidValDef kxOptList[] = {
     { CIPHER_NAME("ECDHE-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
     { CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-ECDSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
     { CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
 +    { CIPHER_NAME("TLS-REQUIRE-EMS"), SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
 +
 };
 static const oidValDef smimeKxOptList[] = {
 diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h
 --- ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h.add_ems_policy	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/pk11wrap/secmodti.h	2023-06-12 17:18:35.129938514 -0700
@@ -202,4 +202,10 @@ struct PK11GenericObjectStr {
 /* This mask includes all CK_FLAGs with an equivalent CKA_ attribute. */
 #define CKF_KEY_OPERATION_FLAGS 0x000e7b00UL
 +/* this oid value could change values if it's added after other new
 + * upstream oids. We protect applications by hiding the define in a private
 + * header file that only NSS sees. Currently it's only available through
 + * the policy code */
 +#define SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1
 +
 #endif /* _SECMODTI_H_ */
 diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
 --- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.add_ems_policy	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c	2023-06-12 17:18:35.130938525 -0700
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include "pk11func.h"
 #include "secmod.h"
 #include "blapi.h"
 +#include "secmodti.h" /* until SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS is upstream */
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -3480,6 +3481,29 @@ ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *s
     CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
     unsigned int master_params_len;
 +    /* if we are using TLS and we aren't using the extended master secret,
 +     * and SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS policy is true, fail. The caller will
 +     * send and alert (eventually). In the RSA Server case, the alert
 +     * won't happen until Finish time because the upper level code
 +     * can't tell a difference between this failure and an RSA decrypt
 +     * failure, so it will proceed with a faux key */
 +    if (isTLS) {
 +        PRUint32 policy;
 +        SECStatus rv;
 +
 +        /* first fetch the policy for this algorithm */
 +        rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_TLS_REQUIRE_EMS, &policy);
 +        /* we only look at the policy if we can fetch it. */
 +        if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 +            if (policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX) {
 +                /* just set the error, we don't want to map any errors
 +                 * set by NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy here */
 +                PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
 +                return SECFailure;
 +            }
 +        }
 +    }
 +
     if (isTLS12) {
         if (isDH)
             master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
 diff -up ./lib/util/secoid.c.ems ./lib/util/secoid.c
 --- ./lib/util/secoid.c.ems	2024-06-11 13:11:28.078155282 -0700
 +++ ./lib/util/secoid.c	2024-06-11 13:12:58.511188172 -0700
@@ -1890,6 +1890,12 @@ const static SECOidData oids[SEC_OID_TOT
     ODE(SEC_OID_RC2_64_CBC, "RC2-64-CBC", CKM_RC2_CBC, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
     ODE(SEC_OID_RC2_128_CBC, "RC2-128-CBC", CKM_RC2_CBC, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
     ODE(SEC_OID_ECDH_KEA, "ECDH", CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
 +
 +    /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
 +    /* we need it for the policy code.  */
 +    ODE(SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1,
 +        "TLS Require EMS", CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION),
 +
 };
 /* PRIVATE EXTENDED SECOID Table
@@ -2198,6 +2204,10 @@ SECOID_Init(void)
     /* turn off NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL by default */
     xOids[SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY].notPolicyFlags = NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL;
 +    /* turn off TLS REQUIRE EMS by default */
 +    xOids[SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1].notPolicyFlags = ~0;
 +
 +
     envVal = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_HASH_ALG_SUPPORT");
     if (envVal)
 diff -up ./lib/util/secoidt.h.ems ./lib/util/secoidt.h
 --- ./lib/util/secoidt.h.ems	2024-06-11 13:16:13.212411967 -0700
 +++ ./lib/util/secoidt.h	2024-06-11 13:16:48.098810434 -0700
@@ -530,6 +530,9 @@ typedef enum {
     SEC_OID_RC2_64_CBC = 385,
     SEC_OID_RC2_128_CBC = 386,
     SEC_OID_ECDH_KEA = 387,
 +    /* this will change upstream. for now apps shouldn't use it */
 +    /* give it an obscure name here */
 +    SEC_OID_PRIVATE_1 = 388,
     SEC_OID_TOTAL
 } SECOidTag;
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-chacha-timing-fix.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-chacha-timing-fix.patch
@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
 diff --git a/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c b/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
 --- a/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
 +++ b/lib/freebl/chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -213,27 +213,31 @@
 {
 #ifdef NSS_X64
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_AVX2
     if (avx2_support()) {
         Hacl_Chacha20_Vec256_chacha20_encrypt_256(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
 +        return;
     }
 #endif
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_SSE3
     if (ssse3_support() && sse4_1_support() && avx_support()) {
         Hacl_Chacha20_Vec128_chacha20_encrypt_128(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
 +        return;
     }
 #endif
 #elif defined(__powerpc64__) && defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \
     !defined(NSS_DISABLE_ALTIVEC) && !defined(NSS_DISABLE_CRYPTO_VSX)
     if (ppc_crypto_support()) {
         chacha20vsx(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
 -    } else
 +        return;
 +    }
 #endif
     {
         Hacl_Chacha20_chacha20_encrypt(len, output, block, k, nonce, ctr);
 +        return;
     }
 }
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_CHACHAPOLY */
 SECStatus
@@ -449,20 +453,18 @@
             (uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
             (uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
         goto finish;
     }
 #endif
 -
 -    else
 #elif defined(__powerpc64__) && defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \
     !defined(NSS_DISABLE_ALTIVEC) && !defined(NSS_DISABLE_CRYPTO_VSX)
     if (ppc_crypto_support()) {
         Chacha20Poly1305_vsx_aead_encrypt(
             (uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
             (uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
         goto finish;
 -    } else
 +    }
 #endif
     {
         Hacl_Chacha20Poly1305_32_aead_encrypt(
             (uint8_t *)ctx->key, (uint8_t *)nonce, adLen, (uint8_t *)ad, inputLen,
             (uint8_t *)input, output, outTag);
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-disable-ech.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-disable-ech.patch
@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
 diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn
 --- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn.disable_ech	2024-06-12 13:29:17.162207862 -0700
 +++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/manifest.mn	2024-06-12 13:30:25.699047788 -0700
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ CPPSRCS = \
       tls_protect.cc \
       tls_psk_unittest.cc \
       tls_subcerts_unittest.cc \
 -      tls_ech_unittest.cc \
       tls_xyber_unittest.cc \
       $(SSLKEYLOGFILE_FILES) \
       $(NULL)
 diff -up ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.disable_ech ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c
 --- ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c.disable_ech	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/ssl/sslsock.c	2024-06-12 13:29:17.162207862 -0700
@@ -4415,17 +4415,23 @@ ssl_ClearPRCList(PRCList *list, void (*f
 SECStatus
 SSLExp_EnableTls13GreaseEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
 {
 +#ifdef notdef
     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
     if (!ss) {
         return SECFailure;
     }
     ss->opt.enableTls13GreaseEch = enabled;
     return SECSuccess;
 +#else
 +    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
 +    return SECFailure;
 +#endif
 }
 SECStatus
 SSLExp_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint8 size)
 {
 +#ifdef notdef
     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
     if (!ss || size == 0) {
         return SECFailure;
@@ -4439,28 +4445,42 @@ SSLExp_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(PRFileDesc
     ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
     return SECSuccess;
 +#else
 +    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
 +    return SECFailure;
 +#endif
 }
 SECStatus
 SSLExp_EnableTls13BackendEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
 {
 +#ifdef notdef
     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
     if (!ss) {
         return SECFailure;
     }
     ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch = enabled;
     return SECSuccess;
 +#else
 +    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
 +    return SECFailure;
 +#endif
 }
 SECStatus
 SSLExp_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled)
 {
 +#ifdef notdef
     sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
     if (!ss) {
         return SECFailure;
     }
     ss->opt.callExtensionWriterOnEchInner = enabled;
     return SECSuccess;
 +#else
 +    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API);
 +    return SECFailure;
 +#endif
 }
 SECStatus
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-disable-md5.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-disable-md5.patch
@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
 diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_md ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
 --- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.no_md	2024-06-11 12:41:35.054654990 -0700
 +++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2024-06-11 12:46:25.347979894 -0700
@@ -329,14 +329,11 @@ static const oidValDef curveOptList[] =
 static const oidValDef hashOptList[] = {
     /* Hashes */
     { CIPHER_NAME("MD2"), SEC_OID_MD2,
 -      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
 -          NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
 +      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME_LEGACY | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12_DECRYPT },
     { CIPHER_NAME("MD4"), SEC_OID_MD4,
 -      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
 -          NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
 +      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME_LEGACY | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12_DECRYPT },
     { CIPHER_NAME("MD5"), SEC_OID_MD5,
 -      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
 -          NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
 +      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME_LEGACY | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12_DECRYPT },
     { CIPHER_NAME("SHA1"), SEC_OID_SHA1,
       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SMIME |
           NSS_USE_ALG_IN_PKCS12 },
 diff -up ./lib/util/secoid.c.no_md ./lib/util/secoid.c
 diff -r 699541a7793b lib/util/secoid.c
 --- a/lib/util/secoid.c	Tue Jun 16 23:03:22 2020 +0000
 +++ b/lib/util/secoid.c	Thu Jun 25 14:33:09 2020 +0200
@@ -2042,6 +2042,19 @@
             int i;
             for (i = 1; i < SEC_OID_TOTAL; i++) {
 +                switch (i) {
 +                case SEC_OID_MD2:
 +                case SEC_OID_MD4:
 +                case SEC_OID_MD5:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD4_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD2_AND_DES_CBC:
 +                case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC:
 +                    continue;
 +                default:
 +                    break;
 +                }
                 if (oids[i].desc && strstr(arg, oids[i].desc)) {
                     xOids[i].notPolicyFlags = notEnable |
                                               (xOids[i].notPolicyFlags & ~(DEF_FLAGS));
 diff -up ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt.disable_md5_test ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt
 --- ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt.disable_md5_test	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./tests/tools/pkcs12policy.txt	2024-06-19 11:15:46.666728170 -0700
@@ -91,21 +91,21 @@
   0 18 allow_all disallow=rc2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC4 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC SHA-1  disallow rc2 (read), RC4 and RC2
 # integrity policy check the various has based controls.
 #  NOTE: md4, md2, and md5 are turned off by policy by default for encrypting
 -# (decrypting is fine). To be enabled, you must allow=all or allow=mdX on the
 +# (decrypting is fine). To be enabled, you must allow=mdX/pkcs12 on the
 # encryption side. These tests purposefully tests that the default fails to encrypt
 # but succeeds when decrypting.
  27  x allow=tls allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Use default policy with multiple hashes
 -  0  0 allow=all allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all encrypt, use default decrypt with multiple hashes
 -  0  0 allow=all allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all with multiple hashes
 - 28  x disallow=sha1_allow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on write
 +  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=tls PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all encrypt, use default decrypt with multiple hashes
 +  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Allow all with multiple hashes
 + 28  x disallow=sha1_allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on write
  27  x disallow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on write
 - 29  x disallow=sha256_allow=md2 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on write
 -  0 19 allow=all disallow=sha1 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
 -  0 18 allow=all disallow=md2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
 -  0 17 allow=all disallow=sha256 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
 -  0  0 allow=all disallow=md2/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
 -  0  0 allow=all disallow=sha1/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
 -  0  0 allow=all disallow=sha256/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
 + 29  x disallow=sha256_allow=md2/pkcs12 allow=all PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on write
 +  0 19 allow=all:md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha1 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
 +  0 18 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=md2 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
 +  0 17 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha256 PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
 +  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=md2/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow md2 on read
 +  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha1/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha1 on read
 +  0  0 allow=md2/pkcs12 disallow=sha256/pkcs12-encrypt PKCS_#12_V2_PBE_With_SHA-1_And_128_Bit_RC2_CBC PKCS_#5_Password_Based_Encryption_with_MD2_and_DES-CBC SHA-256 Disallow sha256 on read
   0  0 allow=all allow=all AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
  29  x disallow=hmac-sha256 allow=all AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
   0 18 allow=all disallow=hmac-sha256 AES-128-CBC AES-128-CBC HMAC_SHA-256
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-disable_dsa.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-disable_dsa.patch
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-enable-kyber-policy.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-enable-kyber-policy.patch
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
 diff -up ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.enable_kyber_policy ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
 --- ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c.enable_kyber_policy	2024-06-12 14:44:24.680338868 -0700
 +++ ./lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c	2024-06-12 14:44:48.368609356 -0700
@@ -245,7 +245,8 @@ static const oidValDef curveOptList[] =
       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
     { CIPHER_NAME("CURVE25519"), SEC_OID_CURVE25519,
       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
 -    { CIPHER_NAME("XYBER768D00"), SEC_OID_XYBER768D00, 0 },
 +    { CIPHER_NAME("XYBER768D00"), SEC_OID_XYBER768D00, 
 +      NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
     /* ANSI X9.62 named elliptic curves (characteristic two field) */
     { CIPHER_NAME("C2PNB163V1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V1,
       NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-enable-sdb-tests.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-enable-sdb-tests.patch
@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
 diff -up ./tests/cert/cert.sh.no_dbm_tests ./tests/cert/cert.sh
 --- ./tests/cert/cert.sh.no_dbm_tests	2024-06-20 17:08:03.146169243 -0700
 +++ ./tests/cert/cert.sh	2024-06-20 17:08:23.282404259 -0700
@@ -2662,9 +2662,7 @@ cert_test_password
 cert_test_distrust
 cert_test_ocspresp
 cert_test_rsapss
 -if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
 -  cert_test_rsapss_policy
 -fi
 +cert_test_rsapss_policy
 cert_test_token_uri
 if [ -z "$NSS_TEST_DISABLE_CRL" ] ; then
 diff -up ./tests/smime/smime.sh.no_dbm_tests ./tests/smime/smime.sh
 --- ./tests/smime/smime.sh.no_dbm_tests	2024-06-20 17:08:45.147659448 -0700
 +++ ./tests/smime/smime.sh	2024-06-20 17:09:05.313894814 -0700
@@ -872,8 +872,6 @@ smime_init
 smime_main
 smime_data_tb
 smime_p7
 -if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
 -  smime_policy
 -fi
 +smime_policy
 smime_cleanup
 diff -up ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh.no_dbm_tests ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh
 --- ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh.no_dbm_tests	2024-06-20 17:09:28.588166454 -0700
 +++ ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh	2024-06-20 17:09:54.351467232 -0700
@@ -1600,12 +1600,10 @@ ssl_run_tests()
     do
         case "${SSL_TEST}" in
         "policy")
 -            if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
 -                ssl_policy_listsuites
 -                ssl_policy_selfserv
 -                ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp
 -                ssl_policy
 -            fi
 +            ssl_policy_listsuites
 +            ssl_policy_selfserv
 +            ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp
 +            ssl_policy
             ;;
         "crl")
             ssl_crl_ssl
 diff -up ./tests/tools/tools.sh.no_dbm_tests ./tests/tools/tools.sh
 --- ./tests/tools/tools.sh.no_dbm_tests	2024-06-20 17:10:13.828694981 -0700
 +++ ./tests/tools/tools.sh	2024-06-20 17:10:31.051896368 -0700
@@ -584,10 +584,8 @@ tools_p12()
   tools_p12_export_with_invalid_ciphers
   tools_p12_import_old_files
   tools_p12_import_pbmac1_samples
 -  if [ "${TEST_MODE}" = "SHARED_DB" ] ; then
 -    tools_p12_import_rsa_pss_private_key
 -    tools_p12_policy
 -  fi
 +  tools_p12_import_rsa_pss_private_key
 +  tools_p12_policy
 }
 ############################## tools_sign ##############################
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-extend-db-dump-time.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-extend-db-dump-time.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 diff -up ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh.extend ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh
 --- ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh.extend	2023-11-15 13:17:50.651020458 -0800
 +++ ./tests/dbtests/dbtests.sh	2023-11-15 13:18:57.091608850 -0800
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ dbtest_main()
       RARRAY=($dtime)
       TIMEARRAY=(${RARRAY[1]//./ })
       echo "${TIMEARRAY[0]} seconds"
 -      test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt 5
 +      test ${TIMEARRAY[0]} -lt ${NSS_DB_DUMP_TIME-5}
       ret=$?
       html_msg ${ret} 0 "certutil dump keys with explicit default trust flags"
     fi
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fips-indicators.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fips-indicators.patch
@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_indicators	2024-06-12 13:38:15.995811284 -0700
 +++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-06-12 13:41:30.008188930 -0700
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session, C
     context->blockSize = 0;
     context->maxLen = 0;
     context->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(session->slot, pMechanism,
 -                                           operation, key);
 +                                           operation, key, 0);
     *contextPtr = context;
     return CKR_OK;
 }
@@ -4885,7 +4885,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
     crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
     /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated
      * key length against fips requirements */
 -    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
 +    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key, 0);
     session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
@@ -6020,7 +6020,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
         return crv;
     }
     /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
 -    privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
 +    privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey, 0);
     publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
     session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
@@ -7220,6 +7220,10 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
         return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
     }
 +    if (!params->bExpand) {
 +        keySize = hashLen;
 +    }
 +
     /* sourceKey is NULL if we are called from the POST, skip the
      * sensitiveCheck */
     if (sourceKey != NULL) {
@@ -7269,7 +7273,8 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
                     mech.pParameter = params;
                     mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
                     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
 -                                                       CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
 +                                                       CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
 +                                                       keySize);
                 }
                 saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
                 saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
@@ -7336,7 +7341,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
     /* HKDF-Expand */
     if (!params->bExpand) {
         okm = prk;
 -        keySize = genLen = hashLen;
 +        genLen = hashLen;
     } else {
         /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
          * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
@@ -7583,7 +7588,8 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
             return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
         }
     }
 -    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey);
 +    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
 +                                       keySize);
     switch (mechanism) {
         /* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
 --- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips_indicators	2024-06-12 13:38:15.988811198 -0700
 +++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h	2024-06-12 13:38:15.996811296 -0700
@@ -979,7 +979,8 @@ CK_FLAGS sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIB
 /* check the FIPS table to determine if this current operation is allowed by
  * FIPS security policy */
 PRBool sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
 -                            CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source);
 +                            CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op, SFTKObject *source,
 +                            CK_ULONG targetKeySize);
 /* add validation objects to the slot */
 CK_RV sftk_CreateValidationObjects(SFTKSlot *slot);
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_indicators	2024-06-12 13:38:15.990811223 -0700
 +++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2024-06-12 13:38:15.996811296 -0700
@@ -2336,7 +2336,7 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
 static CK_ULONG
 sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
 {
 -    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
 +    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
     CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
@@ -2398,13 +2398,29 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
     return keyLength;
 }
 +PRBool
 +sftk_CheckFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash)
 +{
 +    switch (hash) {
 +        case CKM_SHA256:
 +        case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
 +        case CKM_SHA384:
 +        case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
 +        case CKM_SHA512:
 +        case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
 +            return PR_TRUE;
 +    }
 +    return PR_FALSE;
 +}
 +
 /*
  * handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
  * handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
  * would have to be coded here before they can be added to the table */
 static PRBool
 sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech,
 -                   SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source)
 +                   SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
 +                   CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
 {
     switch (mechInfo->special) {
         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
@@ -2464,10 +2480,15 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
             if (hashObj == NULL) {
                 return PR_FALSE;
             }
 +            /* cap the salt for legacy keys */
 +            if ((keyLength <= 1024) && (pss->sLen > 63)) {
 +                return PR_FALSE;
 +            }
 +            /* cap the salt for based on the hash */
             if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
                 return PR_FALSE;
             }
 -            return PR_TRUE;
 +            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(pss->hashAlg);
         }
         case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
             /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
@@ -2492,6 +2513,13 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
              }
              return PR_TRUE;
         }
 +        /* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
 +        case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
 +            if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
 +                return PR_FALSE;
 +            }
 +            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
 +                        + mechInfo->offset));
         default:
             break;
     }
@@ -2502,7 +2530,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
 PRBool
 sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_MECHANISM *mech, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE op,
 -                     SFTKObject *source)
 +                     SFTKObject *source, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
 {
 #ifndef NSS_HAS_FIPS_INDICATORS
     return PR_FALSE;
@@ -2534,13 +2562,17 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
         SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechs = &sftk_fips_mechs[i];
         /* if we match the number of records exactly, then we are an
          * approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
 -        if (((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
 -             (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
 -             (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
 -             (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
 -             ((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
 +        if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
 +            (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
 +            (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
 +            (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
 +            (((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
 +            ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||
 +             ((targetKeyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
 +             (targetKeyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
 +             ((targetKeyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0)) &&
             ((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
 -             sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source))) {
 +             sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
             return PR_TRUE;
         }
     }
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fips-review.patches
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fips-review.patches
@ -0,0 +1,490 @@
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review ./lib/freebl/dh.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/dh.c	2024-06-12 12:04:10.639360404 -0700
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ cleanup:
 PRBool
 KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, SECItem *subPrime)
 {
 -    mp_int p, q, y, r;
 +    mp_int p, q, y, r, psub1;
     mp_err err;
     int cmp = 1; /* default is false */
     if (!Y || !prime || !subPrime) {
@@ -456,13 +456,30 @@ KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, S
     MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0;
     MP_DIGITS(&y) = 0;
     MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0;
 +    MP_DIGITS(&psub1) = 0;
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&p));
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q));
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&y));
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
 +    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&psub1));
     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*prime, &p);
     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*subPrime, &q);
     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*Y, &y);
 +    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&p, 1, &psub1));
 +    /*
 +     * We check that the public value isn't zero (which isn't in the
 +     * group), one (subgroup of order one) or p-1 (subgroup of order 2). We
 +     * also check that the public value is less than p, to avoid being fooled
 +     * by values like p+1 or 2*p-1.
 +     * This check is required by SP-800-56Ar3. It's also done in derive,
 +     * but this is only called in various FIPS cases, so put it here to help
 +     * reviewers find it.
 +     */
 +    if (mp_cmp_d(&y, 1) <= 0 ||
 +        mp_cmp(&y, &psub1) >= 0) {
 +        err = MP_BADARG;
 +        goto cleanup;
 +    }
     /* compute r = y**q mod p */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&y, &q, &p, &r));
     /* compare to 1 */
@@ -472,6 +489,7 @@ cleanup:
     mp_clear(&q);
     mp_clear(&y);
     mp_clear(&r);
 +    mp_clear(&psub1);
     if (err) {
         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
         return PR_FALSE;
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review	2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
 +++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-06-12 13:06:35.410551333 -0700
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #include "prprf.h"
 #include "prenv.h"
 +#include "prerror.h"
 #define __PASTE(x, y) x##y
 #define BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMech, typeSize) (!pMech->pParameter || pMech->ulParameterLen < typeSize)
@@ -4882,6 +4883,10 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
      * handle the base object stuff
      */
     crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
 +    /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated
 +     * key length against fips requirements */
 +    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
 +    session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
@@ -4889,9 +4894,6 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
     if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
     }
 -    /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
 -     * fips requirements */
 -    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
     if (crv == CKR_OK) {
         *phKey = key->handle;
     }
@@ -5199,60 +5201,68 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
     if (isDerivable) {
         SFTKAttribute *pubAttribute = NULL;
 -        CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKey;
         PRBool isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
 -        CK_RV crv2;
 -        CK_OBJECT_CLASS secret = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
 -        CK_KEY_TYPE generic = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
 -        CK_ULONG keyLen = 128;
 -        CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
 -        CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
 -            { CKA_CLASS, &secret, sizeof(secret) },
 -            { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &generic, sizeof(generic) },
 -            { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &keyLen, sizeof(keyLen) },
 -            { CKA_DERIVE, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue) }
 -        };
 -        CK_ULONG templateCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(template);
 -        CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS ecParams;
 +        NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lowPrivKey = NULL;
 +        ECPrivateKey *ecPriv;
 +        SECItem *lowPubValue = NULL;
 +        SECItem item;
 +        SECStatus rv;
         crv = CKR_OK; /*paranoia, already get's set before we drop to the end */
 -        /* FIPS 140-2 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key.
 -         * The easiest way to do this is to do a derive operation, which checks
 -         * the validity of the key */
 -
 +        /* FIPS 140-3 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key
 +         * by recalculating the public can an compare it to our own public
 +         * key. */
 +        lowPrivKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(privateKey, keyType, &crv);
 +        if (lowPrivKey == NULL) {
 +            return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
 +        }
 +        /* recalculate the public key from the private key */
         switch (keyType) {
 -            case CKK_DH:
 -                mech.mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE;
 -                pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
 -                if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
 -                    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
 -                }
 -                mech.pParameter = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
 -                mech.ulParameterLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
 -                break;
 -            case CKK_EC:
 -                mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
 -                pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
 -                if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
 -                    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
 -                }
 -                ecParams.kdf = CKD_NULL;
 -                ecParams.ulSharedDataLen = 0;
 -                ecParams.pSharedData = NULL;
 -                ecParams.ulPublicDataLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
 -                ecParams.pPublicData = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
 -                mech.pParameter = &ecParams;
 -                mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ecParams);
 -                break;
 -            default:
 -                return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
 +        case CKK_DH:
 +            rv = DH_Derive(&lowPrivKey->u.dh.base, &lowPrivKey->u.dh.prime,
 +                           &lowPrivKey->u.dh.privateValue, &item, 0);
 +            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 +                return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
 +            }
 +            lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&item);
 +            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&item, PR_FALSE);
 +            pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
 +            break;
 +        case CKK_EC:
 +            rv = EC_NewKeyFromSeed(&lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPriv,
 +                                   lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.data,
 +                                   lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.len);
 +            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 +                return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
 +            }
 +            /* make sure it has the same encoding */
 +            if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
 +                lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.type != ec_params_named) {
 +              lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&ecPriv->publicValue);
 +            } else {
 +              lowPubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &ecPriv->publicValue,
 +                                               SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));;
 +            }
 +            pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
 +            /* clear out our generated private key */
 +            PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
 +            break;
 +        default:
 +            return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
         }
 -        crv = NSC_DeriveKey(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle, template, templateCount, &newKey);
 -        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 -            sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
 -            return crv;
 +        /* now compare new public key with our already generated key */
 +        if ((pubAttribute == NULL) || (lowPubValue == NULL) ||
 +            (pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen != lowPubValue->len) ||
 +            (PORT_Memcmp(pubAttribute->attrib.pValue, lowPubValue->data,
 +                        lowPubValue->len) != 0)) {
 +            if (pubAttribute) sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
 +            if (lowPubValue) SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
 +            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
 +            return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
         }
 +        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
 +
         /* FIPS requires full validation, but in fipx mode NSC_Derive
          * only does partial validation with approved primes, now handle
          * full validation */
@@ -5260,44 +5270,78 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
             SECItem pubKey;
             SECItem prime;
             SECItem subPrime;
 +            SECItem base;
 +            SECItem generator;
             const SECItem *subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
             pubKey.data = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
             pubKey.len = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
 -            prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
 -            prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
 +            base.data = prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
 +            base.len = prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
             crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
             if (crv != CKR_OK) {
                 goto done;
             }
 -            crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
 +            crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &base, privateKey, CKA_BASE);
 +            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 +                goto done;
 +            }
             /* we ignore the return code an only look at the length */
 -            if (subPrime.len == 0) {
 -                /* subprime not supplied, In this case look it up.
 -                 * This only works with approved primes, but in FIPS mode
 -                 * that's the only kine of prime that will get here */
 -                subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, isFIPS);
 -                if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
 -                    crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
 +            /* do we have a known prime ? */
 +            subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, &generator, isFIPS);
 +            if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
 +                if (subPrime.len == 0) {
 +                    /* if not a known prime, subprime must be supplied */
 +                    crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 +                    goto done;
 +                } else {
 +                    /* not a known prime, check for primality of prime
 +                     * and subPrime */
 +                    if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&prime)) {
 +                        crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 +                        goto done;
 +                    }
 +                    if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&subPrime)) {
 +                        crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 +                        goto done;
 +                    }
 +                    /* if we aren't using a defined group, make sure base is in the
 +                     * subgroup. If it's not, then our key could fail or succeed sometimes.
 +                     * This makes the failure reliable */
 +                    if (!KEA_Verify(&base, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
 +                        crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 +                    }
 +                }
 +                subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
 +            } else {
 +                /* we're using a known group, make sure we are using the known generator for that group */
 +                if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&generator, &base) != 0) {
 +                    crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
                     goto done;
                 }
 +                if (subPrime.len != 0) {
 +                    /* we have a known prime and a supplied subPrime,
 +                     * make sure the subPrime matches the subPrime for
 +                     * the known Prime */
 +                     if (SECITEM_CompareItem(subPrimePtr, &subPrime) != 0) {
 +                        crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 +                        goto done;
 +                     }
 +                 }
             }
             if (!KEA_Verify(&pubKey, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
 -                crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
 +                crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
             }
         done:
 +            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&base, PR_FALSE);
             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&subPrime, PR_FALSE);
             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&prime, PR_FALSE);
         }
         /* clean up before we return */
         sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
 -        crv2 = NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, newKey);
         if (crv != CKR_OK) {
             return crv;
         }
 -        if (crv2 != CKR_OK) {
 -            return crv2;
 -        }
     }
     return CKR_OK;
@@ -5925,8 +5969,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
      * created and linked.
      */
     crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey, session);
 -    sftk_FreeSession(session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 +        sftk_FreeSession(session);
         sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
         sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
@@ -5968,6 +6012,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 +        sftk_FreeSession(session);
         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
         sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
@@ -5977,6 +6022,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
     /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
     privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
     publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
 +    session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
 +    sftk_FreeSession(session);
     *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
     *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
@@ -8610,7 +8657,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
             /* if the prime is an approved prime, we can skip all the other
              * checks. */
 -            subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, isFIPS);
 +            subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, NULL, isFIPS);
             if (subPrime == NULL) {
                 SECItem dhSubPrime;
                 /* If the caller set the subprime value, it means that
@@ -8792,6 +8839,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
                 secretlen = tmp.len;
             } else {
                 secretlen = keySize;
 +                key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
                 crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
                                           &tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
                                           mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
 --- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review	2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
 +++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h	2024-06-12 12:04:10.640360416 -0700
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ char **NSC_ModuleDBFunc(unsigned long fu
 /* dh verify functions */
 /* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes, and if so return
  * it's subprime value */
 -const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS);
 +const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *generator, PRBool isFIPS);
 /* check if dhSubPrime claims dhPrime is a safe prime. */
 SECStatus sftk_IsSafePrime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *dhSubPrime, PRBool *isSafe);
 /* map an operation Attribute to a Mechanism flag */
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review	2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
 +++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2024-06-12 12:04:10.640360416 -0700
@@ -2409,15 +2409,27 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
     switch (mechInfo->special) {
         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
             SECItem dhPrime;
 +            SECItem dhBase;
 +            SECItem dhGenerator;
 +            PRBool val = PR_FALSE;
             const SECItem *dhSubPrime;
             CK_RV crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime,
                                                source, CKA_PRIME);
             if (crv != CKR_OK) {
                 return PR_FALSE;
             }
 -            dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, PR_TRUE);
 +            crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhBase, source, CKA_BASE);
 +            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 +                return PR_FALSE;
 +            }
 +            dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, &dhGenerator, PR_TRUE);
 +            val = (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
 +            if (val && (SECITEM_CompareItem(&dhBase, &dhGenerator) != 0)) {
 +                val = PR_FALSE;
 +            }
             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
 -            return (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
 +            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhBase, PR_FALSE);
 +            return val;
         }
         case SFTKFIPSNone:
             return PR_FALSE;
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c	2024-06-12 12:04:10.641360427 -0700
@@ -6726,11 +6726,20 @@ static const SECItem subprime_tls_8192 =
                                            (unsigned char *)subprime_tls_8192_data,
                                            sizeof(subprime_tls_8192_data) };
 +/* generator for all the groups is 2 */
 +static const unsigned char generator_2_data[] = { 2 };
 +
 +
 +static const SECItem generator_2 =
 +    { siBuffer,
 +      (unsigned char *)generator_2_data,
 +      sizeof(generator_2_data) };
 +
 /*
  * verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes
  */
 const SECItem *
 -sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS)
 +sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *g, PRBool isFIPS)
 {
     /* use the length to decide which primes to check */
     switch (dhPrime->len) {
@@ -6741,56 +6750,67 @@ sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PR
             }
             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_1536,
                             sizeof(prime_ike_1536)) == 0) {
 +                if (g) *g = generator_2;
                 return &subprime_ike_1536;
             }
             break;
         case 2048 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_2048,
                             sizeof(prime_tls_2048)) == 0) {
 +                if (g) *g = generator_2;
                 return &subprime_tls_2048;
             }
             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_2048,
                             sizeof(prime_ike_2048)) == 0) {
 +                if (g) *g = generator_2;
                 return &subprime_ike_2048;
             }
             break;
         case 3072 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_3072,
                             sizeof(prime_tls_3072)) == 0) {
 +                if (g) *g = generator_2;
                 return &subprime_tls_3072;
             }
             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_3072,
                             sizeof(prime_ike_3072)) == 0) {
 +                if (g) *g = generator_2;
                 return &subprime_ike_3072;
             }
             break;
         case 4096 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_4096,
                             sizeof(prime_tls_4096)) == 0) {
 +                if (g) *g = generator_2;
                 return &subprime_tls_4096;
             }
             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_4096,
                             sizeof(prime_ike_4096)) == 0) {
 +                if (g) *g = generator_2;
                 return &subprime_ike_4096;
             }
             break;
         case 6144 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_6144,
                             sizeof(prime_tls_6144)) == 0) {
 +                if (g) *g = generator_2;
                 return &subprime_tls_6144;
             }
             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_6144,
                             sizeof(prime_ike_6144)) == 0) {
 +                if (g) *g = generator_2;
                 return &subprime_ike_6144;
             }
             break;
         case 8192 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_8192,
                             sizeof(prime_tls_8192)) == 0) {
 +                if (g) *g = generator_2;
                 return &subprime_tls_8192;
             }
             if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_8192,
                             sizeof(prime_ike_8192)) == 0) {
 +                if (g) *g = generator_2;
                 return &subprime_ike_8192;
             }
             break;
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c	2024-06-12 12:04:10.641360427 -0700
@@ -516,6 +516,11 @@ sftk_ike_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
             goto fail;
         }
     } else {
 +        /* ikev1 isn't validated, if we use this function in ikev1 mode,
 +         * mark the resulting key as not FIPS */
 +        if (!params->bRekey) {
 +            outKey->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
 +        }
         crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
                        inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
         if (crv != CKR_OK) {
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-cavs-test.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-cavs-test.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 diff -up ./tests/fips/cavs_scripts/validate1.sh.fix_cavs ./tests/fips/cavs_scripts/validate1.sh
 --- ./tests/fips/cavs_scripts/validate1.sh.fix_cavs	2024-09-12 14:39:41.421586862 -0700
 +++ ./tests/fips/cavs_scripts/validate1.sh	2024-09-12 14:39:55.036747283 -0700
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ name=`basename $request .req`
 echo ">>>>>  $name"
 sed -e 's;
;;g' -e 's;	; ;g' -e '/^#/d' $extraneous_response ${TESTDIR}/resp/${name}.rsp > /tmp/y1
 # if we didn't generate any output, flag that as an error
 -size=`sum /tmp/y1 | awk '{ print $NF }'`
 +size=`sum /tmp/y1 | awk '{ print $1 }'`
 if [ $size -eq 0 ]; then
    echo "${TESTDIR}/resp/${name}.rsp: empty"
    exit 1;
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-cms-abi-break.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-cms-abi-break.patch
@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
 diff -up ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c
 --- ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c.restore_abi	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/smime/cmsasn1.c	2024-09-06 18:05:27.808338289 -0700
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static const SEC_ASN1Template NSSCMSKeyA
     { SEC_ASN1_OPTIONAL | SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | SEC_ASN1_EXPLICIT |
           SEC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | SEC_ASN1_XTRN | 1,
       offsetof(NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientInfo, ukm),
 -      SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_OctetStringTemplate) },
 +      SEC_ASN1_SUB(SEC_PointerToOctetStringTemplate) },
     { SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN,
       offsetof(NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientInfo, keyEncAlg),
       SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
 diff -up ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h
 --- ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h.restore_abi	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/smime/cmslocal.h	2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ NSS_CMSUtil_DecryptSymKey_RSA_OAEP(SECKE
 extern SECStatus
 NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArenaPool *poolp, CERTCertificate *cert, PK11SymKey *key,
 -                                 SECItem *encKey, PRBool genUkm, SECItem *ukm,
 +                                 SECItem *encKey, PRBool genUkm, SECItem **ukm,
                                  SECAlgorithmID *keyEncAlg, SECItem *originatorPubKey, void *wincx);
 PK11SymKey *
 diff -up ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c
 --- ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c.restore_abi	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/smime/cmspubkey.c	2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
@@ -292,9 +292,15 @@ Create_ECC_CMS_SharedInfo(PLArenaPool *p
     unsigned char suppPubInfo[4] = { 0 };
     SI.keyInfo = keyInfo;
 -    SI.entityUInfo.type = ukm->type;
 -    SI.entityUInfo.data = ukm->data;
 -    SI.entityUInfo.len = ukm->len;
 +    if (ukm) {
 +        SI.entityUInfo.type = ukm->type;
 +        SI.entityUInfo.data = ukm->data;
 +        SI.entityUInfo.len = ukm->len;
 +    } else {
 +        SI.entityUInfo.type = siBuffer;
 +        SI.entityUInfo.data = NULL;
 +        SI.entityUInfo.len = 0;
 +    }
     SI.suppPubInfo.type = siBuffer;
     SI.suppPubInfo.data = suppPubInfo;
@@ -322,7 +328,7 @@ Create_ECC_CMS_SharedInfo(PLArenaPool *p
 SECStatus
 NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArenaPool *poolp, CERTCertificate *cert,
                                  PK11SymKey *bulkkey, SECItem *encKey,
 -                                 PRBool genUkm, SECItem *ukm,
 +                                 PRBool genUkm, SECItem **ukmp,
                                  SECAlgorithmID *keyEncAlg, SECItem *pubKey,
                                  void *wincx)
 {
@@ -337,10 +343,11 @@ NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArena
     SECAlgorithmID keyWrapAlg;
     SECOidTag keyEncAlgtag;
     SECItem keyWrapAlg_params, *keyEncAlg_params, *SharedInfo;
 +    SECItem *ukm = *ukmp;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE keyDerivationType, keyWrapMech;
     CK_ULONG kdf;
 -    if (genUkm && (ukm->len != 0 || ukm->data != NULL)) {
 +    if (genUkm && (ukm != NULL)) {
         PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
         return SECFailure;
     }
@@ -427,17 +434,17 @@ NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESECDH(PLArena
      * contain 512 bits for Diffie-Hellman key agreement. */
     if (genUkm) {
 -        ukm->type = siBuffer;
 -        ukm->len = 64;
 -        ukm->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, ukm->len);
 -
 -        if (ukm->data == NULL) {
 +        ukm = SECITEM_AllocItem(poolp, NULL, 64);
 +        if (ukm == NULL) {
             goto loser;
         }
 +        ukm->type = siBuffer;
 +
         rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(ukm->data, ukm->len);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             goto loser;
         }
 +        *ukmp = ukm; /* return it */
     }
     SharedInfo = Create_ECC_CMS_SharedInfo(poolp, &keyWrapAlg,
 diff -up ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c
 --- ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c.restore_abi	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/smime/cmsrecinfo.c	2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ NSS_CMSRecipientInfo_UnwrapBulkKey(NSSCM
             parameters = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg.parameters);
             enckey = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys[subIndex]->encKey);
             oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey);
 -            ukm = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.ukm);
 +            ukm = ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.ukm;
             break;
         case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KEK:
             algid = &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.keyEncAlg);
 diff -up ./lib/smime/cmst.h.restore_abi ./lib/smime/cmst.h
 --- ./lib/smime/cmst.h.restore_abi	2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/smime/cmst.h	2024-09-06 18:04:47.647863624 -0700
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ typedef struct NSSCMSRecipientEncryptedK
 struct NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientInfoStr {
     SECItem version;
     NSSCMSOriginatorIdentifierOrKey originatorIdentifierOrKey;
 -    SECItem ukm; /* optional */
 +    SECItem *ukm; /* optional */
     SECAlgorithmID keyEncAlg;
     NSSCMSRecipientEncryptedKey **recipientEncryptedKeys;
 };
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-missing-size-checks.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-missing-size-checks.patch
@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
 diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
 --- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
 +++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
@@ -371,16 +371,21 @@ static void GenerateWeakRsaKey(ScopedSEC
 // Fail to connect with a weak RSA key.
 TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
   Reset(kPssDelegatorId);
   EnsureTlsSetup();
   static const SSLSignatureScheme kSchemes[] = {ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
                                                 ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256};
   client_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
   server_->SetSignatureSchemes(kSchemes, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kSchemes));
 +  PRInt32 keySizeFlags;
 +  ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &keySizeFlags));
 +  // turn off the signing key sizes so we actually test the ssl tests
 +  ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
 +            NSS_OptionSet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG ));
 #if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
   // save the MIN POLICY length.
   PRInt32 minRsa;
   ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minRsa));
 #if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS >= 2048
   ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess,
             NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS + 1024));
@@ -408,16 +413,17 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectTls13, DCWeakKey) {
   client_->EnableDelegatedCredentials();
   auto cfilter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionCapture>(
       client_, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn);
   ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertInsufficientSecurity);
 #if RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS > RSA_WEAK_KEY
   ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, minRsa));
 #endif
 +  ASSERT_EQ(SECSuccess, NSS_OptionSet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, keySizeFlags));
 }
 class ReplaceDCSigScheme : public TlsHandshakeFilter {
  public:
   ReplaceDCSigScheme(const std::shared_ptr<TlsAgent>& a)
       : TlsHandshakeFilter(a, {ssl_hs_certificate_verify}) {}
  protected:
 diff --git a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
 --- a/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
 +++ b/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
@@ -1134,22 +1134,31 @@ SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(const SE
         return 0;
     }
     /* interpret modulus length as key strength */
     switch (privk->keyType) {
         case rsaKey:
         case rsaPssKey:
         case rsaOaepKey:
 -            /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
 -             * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary */
 -            bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
 -            if (bitSize == -1) {
 -                bitSize = 0;
 +            rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
 +                                    CKA_MODULUS, NULL, &params);
 +            if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
 +                /* some tokens don't export CKA_MODULUS on the private key,
 +                 * PK11_SignatureLen works around this if necessary. This
 +                 * method is less percise because it returns bytes instead
 +                 * bits, so we only do it if we can't get the modulus */
 +                bitSize = PK11_SignatureLen((SECKEYPrivateKey *)privk) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
 +                if (bitSize == -1) {
 +                    return 0;
 +                }
 +                return bitSize;
             }
 +            bitSize = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&params);
 +            PORT_Free(params.data);
             return bitSize;
         case dsaKey:
         case fortezzaKey:
         case dhKey:
         case keaKey:
             rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(privk->pkcs11Slot, privk->pkcs11ID,
                                     CKA_PRIME, NULL, &params);
             if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (params.data == NULL)) {
 diff --git a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
 --- a/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
 +++ b/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
@@ -1277,27 +1277,39 @@ ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(SSL3Hashes *h
             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
             goto done;
     }
     PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
     if (useRsaPss || hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
         CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType);
         int signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key);
 +        PRInt32 optval;
         SECItem *params = NULL;
         CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams;
         SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer,
                                   (unsigned char *)&pssParams,
                                   sizeof(pssParams) };
         if (signatureLen <= 0) {
             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
             goto done;
         }
 +        /* since we are calling PK11_SignWithMechanism directly, we need to check the
 +         * key policy ourselves (which is already checked in SGN_Digest */
 +        rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
 +        if ((rv == SECSuccess) &&
 +            ((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG)) {
 +            rv = SECKEY_EnforceKeySize(key->keyType, SECKEY_PrivateKeyStrengthInBits(key),
 +                                       SEC_ERROR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
 +            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 +                goto done; /* error code already set */
 +            }
 +        }
         buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen;
         buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
         if (!buf->data)
             goto done; /* error code was set. */
         if (useRsaPss) {
             pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-md5-decode.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-md5-decode.patch
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
 diff --git a/lib/util/nsshash.c b/lib/util/nsshash.c
 --- a/lib/util/nsshash.c
 +++ b/lib/util/nsshash.c
@@ -102,16 +102,19 @@ HASH_GetHashOidTagByHashType(HASH_HashTy
 SECOidTag
 HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(SECOidTag hmacOid)
 {
     SECOidTag hashOid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
     switch (hmacOid) {
         /* no oid exists for HMAC_MD2 */
         /* NSS does not define a oid for HMAC_MD4 */
 +        case SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5:
 +            hashOid = SEC_OID_MD5;
 +            break;
         case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1:
             hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA1;
             break;
         case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA224:
             hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA224;
             break;
         case SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256:
             hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA256;
@@ -145,16 +148,19 @@ HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(SECOidTag
 SECOidTag
 HASH_GetHMACOidTagByHashOidTag(SECOidTag hashOid)
 {
     SECOidTag hmacOid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
     switch (hashOid) {
         /* no oid exists for HMAC_MD2 */
         /* NSS does not define a oid for HMAC_MD4 */
 +        case SEC_OID_MD5:
 +            hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5;
 +            break;
         case SEC_OID_SHA1:
             hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1;
             break;
         case SEC_OID_SHA224:
             hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA224;
             break;
         case SEC_OID_SHA256:
             hmacOid = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256;
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-pbkdf1-encoding.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-pkcs12-pbkdf1-encoding.patch
@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
 diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
 --- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
 +++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c
@@ -1710,20 +1710,26 @@ PK11_ParamToAlgid(SECOidTag algTag, SECI
         case CKM_BATON_ECB96:
         case CKM_BATON_CBC128:
         case CKM_BATON_COUNTER:
         case CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE:
         case CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128:
         case CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128:
         case CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER:
         case CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE:
 -            newParams = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, param,
 -                                           SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
 -            if (newParams == NULL)
 -                break;
 +            /* if no parameters have been supplied, then encode a NULL params
 +             */
 +            if (param && param->len > 0) {
 +                newParams = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, param,
 +                                               SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
 +                if (newParams == NULL)
 +                    break;
 +            } else {
 +                newParams = NULL;
 +            }
             rv = SECSuccess;
             break;
     }
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         if (newParams)
             SECITEM_FreeItem(newParams, PR_TRUE);
         return rv;
 diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
 --- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
 +++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pbe.c
@@ -765,45 +765,53 @@ sec_pkcs5CreateAlgorithmID(SECOidTag alg
          * algorithm is). We use choose this algorithm oid based on the
          * cipherAlgorithm to determine what this should be (MAC1 or PBES2).
          */
         if (algorithm == SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2) {
             /* choose mac or pbes */
             algorithm = sec_pkcs5v2_get_pbe(cipherAlgorithm);
         }
 +        SECOidTag hashAlg = HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(cipherAlgorithm);
 +
         /* set the PKCS5v2 specific parameters */
         if (keyLength == 0) {
 -            SECOidTag hashAlg = HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(cipherAlgorithm);
             if (hashAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
                 keyLength = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashAlg);
             } else {
                 keyLength = sec_pkcs5v2_default_key_length(cipherAlgorithm);
             }
             if (keyLength <= 0) {
                 goto loser;
             }
         }
         /* currently SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 is the default */
         if (prfAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
             prfAlg = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1;
         }
 -        /* build the PKCS5v2 cipher algorithm id */
 -        cipherParams = pk11_GenerateNewParamWithKeyLen(
 -            PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(cipherAlgorithm), keyLength);
 -        if (!cipherParams) {
 -            goto loser;
 +        /* build the PKCS5v2 cipher algorithm id, if cipher
 +         * is an HMAC, the cipherParams should be NULL */
 +        if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
 +            cipherParams = pk11_GenerateNewParamWithKeyLen(
 +                PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(cipherAlgorithm), keyLength);
 +            if (!cipherParams) {
 +                goto loser;
 +            }
 +        } else {
 +            cipherParams = NULL;
         }
         PORT_Memset(&pbeV2_param, 0, sizeof(pbeV2_param));
         rv = PK11_ParamToAlgid(cipherAlgorithm, cipherParams,
                                poolp, &pbeV2_param.cipherAlgId);
 -        SECITEM_FreeItem(cipherParams, PR_TRUE);
 +        if (cipherParams) {
 +            SECITEM_FreeItem(cipherParams, PR_TRUE);
 +        }
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             goto loser;
         }
     }
     /* generate the parameter */
     pbe_param = sec_pkcs5_create_pbe_parameter(pbeAlgorithm, salt, iteration,
                                                keyLength, prfAlg);
 diff --git a/lib/util/secalgid.c b/lib/util/secalgid.c
 --- a/lib/util/secalgid.c
 +++ b/lib/util/secalgid.c
@@ -50,17 +50,18 @@ SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(PLArenaPool *arena
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &id->algorithm, &oiddata->oid))
         return SECFailure;
     if ((secoid_IsRSAPKCS1(which)) ||
 -        (HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(which) != HASH_AlgNULL)) {
 +        (HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(which) != HASH_AlgNULL) /* ||
 +        (HASH_GetHashOidTagByHMACOidTag(which) != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) */) {
         add_null_param = PR_TRUE;
     } else {
         add_null_param = PR_FALSE;
     }
     if (params) {
         /*
          * I am specifically *not* enforcing the following assertion
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-rsa-policy-test.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-fix-rsa-policy-test.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 diff -up ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.fix_rsa_policy ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt
 --- ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt.fix_rsa_policy	2024-06-21 11:08:01.765937907 -0700
 +++ ./tests/ssl/sslpolicy.txt	2024-06-21 11:08:55.598540079 -0700
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@
   0 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=dsa Disallow DSA Signatures Explicitly
   1 noECC  SSL3   d    disallow=rsa-pkcs Disallow RSA PKCS 1 Signatures Explicitly
   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-verify Restrict RSA keys on signature verification
 -  1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
 +  0 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-sign Restrict RSA keys on signing
   1 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=16384:key-size-flags=key-size-ssl Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
   0 noECC  SSL3   d    allow=rsa-min=1023 Restrict RSA keys when used in SSL
 # test default settings
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-long-pwd-fix.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-long-pwd-fix.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 diff -up ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.long_pw_fix ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c
 --- ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c.long_pw_fix	2024-09-06 17:58:39.905517185 -0700
 +++ ./lib/pkcs12/p12local.c	2024-09-06 17:59:19.568985976 -0700
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ sec_pkcs12_integrity_key(PK11SlotInfo *s
         *hmacMech = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(hmacAlg);
         /* pkcs12v2 hmac uses UTF8 rather than unicode */
         if (!sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(NULL, &utf8Pw, pwitem,
 -                                                PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
 +                                                PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
             return NULL;
         }
         symKey = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, prfAlgid, &utf8Pw, PR_FALSE, pwarg);
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.101-skip-ocsp-if-not-connected.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.101-skip-ocsp-if-not-connected.patch
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
 diff -up ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh.disable_ocsp_policy ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh
 --- ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh.disable_ocsp_policy	2024-07-05 14:18:03.985453657 -0700
 +++ ./tests/ssl/ssl.sh	2024-07-05 14:21:59.308250122 -0700
@@ -968,6 +968,18 @@ ssl_policy_pkix_ocsp()
   #verbose="-v"
   html_head "Check that OCSP doesn't break if we disable sha1 $NORM_EXT - server $SERVER_MODE/client $CLIENT_MODE"
 +  # if we are running on a build machine that can't tolerate external
 +  # references don't run.
 +  vfyserv -o wrong.host.badssl.com -d ${P_R_SERVERDIR} > ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/vfy2.out 2>&1
 +  RET=$? ; cat "${P_R_SERVERDIR}/vfy2.out" 
 +  # 5961 reset by peer
 +  grep 5961 ${P_R_SERVERDIR}/vfy2.out
 +  GRET=$?  ; echo "OCSP: RET=$RET GRET=$GRET"
 +  if [ $RET -ne 0 -o $GRET -eq 0  ]; then
 +      echo "$SCRIPTNAME: skipping Check that OCSP doesn't break if we disable sha1 $NORM_EXT - server $SERVER_MODE/client $CLIENT_MODE - can't reach external servers"
 +      return 0
 +  fi
 +
   PKIX_SAVE=${NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY-"unset"}
   unset NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX_VERIFY
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.71-camellia-pkcs12-doc.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.71-camellia-pkcs12-doc.patch
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
 diff -up ./doc/pk12util.xml.camellia ./doc/pk12util.xml
 --- ./doc/pk12util.xml.camellia	2022-01-26 09:46:39.794919455 -0800
 +++ ./doc/pk12util.xml	2022-01-26 09:54:58.277019760 -0800
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ Certificate    Friendly Name: Thawte Fre
   <refsection id="encryption">
     <title>Password Encryption</title>
 -    <para>PKCS #12 provides for not only the protection of the private keys but also the certificate and meta-data associated with the keys. Password-based encryption is used to protect private keys on export to a PKCS #12 file and, optionally, the associated certificates. If no algorithm is specified, the tool defaults to using PKCS #12 SHA-1 and 3-key triple DES for private key encryption. When not in FIPS mode, PKCS #12 SHA-1 and 40-bit RC4 is used for certificate encryption. When in FIPS mode, there is no certificate encryption. If certificate encryption is not wanted, specify <userinput>"NONE"</userinput> as the argument of the <option>-C</option> option.</para>
 +    <para>PKCS #12 provides for not only the protection of the private keys but also the certificate and meta-data associated with the keys. Password-based encryption is used to protect private keys on export to a PKCS #12 file and, optionally, the associated certificates. If no algorithm is specified, the tool defaults to using AES-256-CBC for private key encryption and AES-128-CBC for certificate encryption. If certificate encryption is not wanted, specify <userinput>"NONE"</userinput> as the argument of the <option>-C</option> option.</para>
     <para>The private key is always protected with strong encryption by default.</para>
     <para>Several types of ciphers are supported.</para>
     <variablelist>
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ Certificate    Friendly Name: Thawte Fre
         <listitem>
 	  <itemizedlist>
 	    <listitem><para>PBES2 with AES-CBC-Pad as underlying encryption scheme (<userinput>"AES-128-CBC"</userinput>, <userinput>"AES-192-CBC"</userinput>, and <userinput>"AES-256-CBC"</userinput>)</para></listitem>
 +	    <listitem><para>PBES2 with CAMELLIA-CBC-Pad as underlying encryption scheme (<userinput>"CAMELLIA-128-CBC"</userinput>, <userinput>"CAMELLIA-192-CBC"</userinput>, and <userinput>"CAMELLIA-256-CBC"</userinput>)</para></listitem>
 	  </itemizedlist>
         </listitem>
       </varlistentry>
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.71-fix-lto-gtests.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.71-fix-lto-gtests.patch
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
 diff --git a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
 --- a/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
 +++ b/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_subcerts_unittest.cc
@@ -15,13 +15,22 @@
 #include "gtest_utils.h"
 #include "tls_agent.h"
 #include "tls_connect.h"
 +#define LTO
 namespace nss_test {
 +#ifndef LTO
 +// sigh this construction breaks LTO
 const std::string kEcdsaDelegatorId = TlsAgent::kDelegatorEcdsa256;
 const std::string kRsaeDelegatorId = TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsae2048;
 const std::string kPssDelegatorId = TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsaPss2048;
 const std::string kDCId = TlsAgent::kServerEcdsa256;
 +#else
 +#define kEcdsaDelegatorId TlsAgent::kDelegatorEcdsa256
 +#define kRsaeDelegatorId TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsae2048
 +#define kPssDelegatorId TlsAgent::kDelegatorRsaPss2048
 +#define kDCId  TlsAgent::kServerEcdsa256
 +#endif
 const SSLSignatureScheme kDCScheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256;
 const PRUint32 kDCValidFor = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 /* 1 week (seconds) */;
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.79-distrusted-certs.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.79-distrusted-certs.patch
@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
 # HG changeset patch
 # User John M. Schanck <jschanck@mozilla.com>
 # Date 1648094761 0
 #      Thu Mar 24 04:06:01 2022 +0000
 # Node ID b722e523d66297fe4bc1fac0ebb06203138eccbb
 # Parent  853b64626b19a46f41f4ba9c684490dc15923c94
 Bug 1751305 - Remove expired explicitly distrusted certificates from certdata.txt. r=KathleenWilson
 Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D141919
 diff --git a/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt b/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
 --- a/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
 +++ b/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt
@@ -7663,197 +7663,16 @@ CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 \377\377
 END
 CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 #
 -# Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
 -#
 -# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
 -# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
 -# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
 -# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
 -# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
 -# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
 -# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
 -CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_CERTIFICATE
 -CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
 -CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
 -CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE CKC_X_509
 -CKA_SUBJECT MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
 -\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
 -\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
 -\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
 -\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
 -\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
 -END
 -CKA_ID UTF8 "0"
 -CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
 -\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
 -\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
 -\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
 -\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
 -\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
 -END
 -CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\002\004\017\377\377\377
 -END
 -CKA_VALUE MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\060\202\006\225\060\202\004\175\240\003\002\001\002\002\004\017
 -\377\377\377\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\013
 -\005\000\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116
 -\114\061\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151
 -\116\157\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003
 -\125\004\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120
 -\113\111\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162
 -\147\141\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\036
 -\027\015\061\060\060\065\061\062\060\070\065\061\063\071\132\027
 -\015\062\060\060\063\062\063\060\071\065\060\060\065\132\060\132
 -\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\027\060
 -\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141
 -\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004\003\014
 -\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111\157\166
 -\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141\156\151
 -\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062\060\202\002\042\060\015
 -\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\001\001\005\000\003\202\002
 -\017\000\060\202\002\012\002\202\002\001\000\261\023\031\017\047
 -\346\154\324\125\206\113\320\354\211\212\105\221\170\254\107\275
 -\107\053\344\374\105\353\117\264\046\163\133\067\323\303\177\366
 -\343\336\327\243\370\055\150\305\010\076\113\224\326\344\207\045
 -\066\153\204\265\030\164\363\050\130\163\057\233\152\317\274\004
 -\036\366\336\335\257\374\113\252\365\333\146\142\045\001\045\202
 -\336\362\227\132\020\156\335\135\251\042\261\004\251\043\163\072
 -\370\161\255\035\317\204\104\353\107\321\257\155\310\174\050\253
 -\307\362\067\172\164\137\137\305\002\024\212\243\132\343\033\154
 -\001\343\135\216\331\150\326\364\011\033\062\334\221\265\054\365
 -\040\353\214\003\155\046\111\270\223\304\205\135\330\322\233\257
 -\126\152\314\005\063\314\240\102\236\064\125\104\234\153\240\324
 -\022\320\053\124\315\267\211\015\345\366\353\350\373\205\001\063
 -\117\172\153\361\235\162\063\226\016\367\262\204\245\245\047\304
 -\047\361\121\163\051\167\272\147\156\376\114\334\264\342\241\241
 -\201\057\071\111\215\103\070\023\316\320\245\134\302\207\072\000
 -\147\145\102\043\361\066\131\012\035\243\121\310\274\243\224\052
 -\061\337\343\074\362\235\032\074\004\260\357\261\012\060\023\163
 -\266\327\363\243\114\001\165\024\205\170\300\327\212\071\130\205
 -\120\372\056\346\305\276\317\213\077\257\217\066\324\045\011\055
 -\322\017\254\162\223\362\277\213\324\120\263\371\025\120\233\231
 -\365\024\331\373\213\221\243\062\046\046\240\370\337\073\140\201
 -\206\203\171\133\053\353\023\075\051\072\301\155\335\275\236\216
 -\207\326\112\256\064\227\005\356\024\246\366\334\070\176\112\351
 -\044\124\007\075\227\150\067\106\153\015\307\250\041\257\023\124
 -\344\011\152\361\115\106\012\311\135\373\233\117\275\336\373\267
 -\124\313\270\070\234\247\071\373\152\055\300\173\215\253\245\247
 -\127\354\112\222\212\063\305\341\040\134\163\330\220\222\053\200
 -\325\017\206\030\151\174\071\117\204\206\274\367\114\133\363\325
 -\264\312\240\302\360\067\042\312\171\122\037\123\346\252\363\220
 -\260\073\335\362\050\375\254\353\305\006\044\240\311\324\057\017
 -\130\375\265\236\354\017\317\262\131\320\242\004\172\070\152\256
 -\162\373\275\360\045\142\224\011\247\005\013\002\003\001\000\001
 -\243\202\001\141\060\202\001\135\060\110\006\003\125\035\040\004
 -\101\060\077\060\075\006\004\125\035\040\000\060\065\060\063\006
 -\010\053\006\001\005\005\007\002\001\026\047\150\164\164\160\072
 -\057\057\167\167\167\056\144\151\147\151\156\157\164\141\162\056
 -\156\154\057\143\160\163\057\160\153\151\157\166\145\162\150\145
 -\151\144\060\017\006\003\125\035\023\001\001\377\004\005\060\003
 -\001\001\377\060\016\006\003\125\035\017\001\001\377\004\004\003
 -\002\001\006\060\201\205\006\003\125\035\043\004\176\060\174\200
 -\024\071\020\213\111\222\134\333\141\022\040\315\111\235\032\216
 -\332\234\147\100\271\241\136\244\134\060\132\061\013\060\011\006
 -\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061\036\060\034\006\003\125\004
 -\012\014\025\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
 -\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\061\053\060\051\006\003\125\004
 -\003\014\042\123\164\141\141\164\040\144\145\162\040\116\145\144
 -\145\162\154\141\156\144\145\156\040\122\157\157\164\040\103\101
 -\040\055\040\107\062\202\004\000\230\226\364\060\111\006\003\125
 -\035\037\004\102\060\100\060\076\240\074\240\072\206\070\150\164
 -\164\160\072\057\057\143\162\154\056\160\153\151\157\166\145\162
 -\150\145\151\144\056\156\154\057\104\157\155\117\162\147\141\156
 -\151\163\141\164\151\145\114\141\164\145\163\164\103\122\114\055
 -\107\062\056\143\162\154\060\035\006\003\125\035\016\004\026\004
 -\024\274\135\224\073\331\253\173\003\045\163\141\302\333\055\356
 -\374\253\217\145\241\060\015\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001
 -\001\013\005\000\003\202\002\001\000\217\374\055\114\267\331\055
 -\325\037\275\357\313\364\267\150\027\165\235\116\325\367\335\234
 -\361\052\046\355\237\242\266\034\003\325\123\263\354\010\317\064
 -\342\343\303\364\265\026\057\310\303\276\327\323\163\253\000\066
 -\371\032\112\176\326\143\351\136\106\272\245\266\216\025\267\243
 -\052\330\103\035\357\135\310\037\201\205\263\213\367\377\074\364
 -\331\364\106\010\077\234\274\035\240\331\250\114\315\045\122\116
 -\012\261\040\367\037\351\103\331\124\106\201\023\232\300\136\164
 -\154\052\230\062\352\374\167\273\015\245\242\061\230\042\176\174
 -\174\347\332\244\255\354\267\056\032\031\161\370\110\120\332\103
 -\217\054\204\335\301\100\047\343\265\360\025\116\226\324\370\134
 -\343\206\051\106\053\327\073\007\353\070\177\310\206\127\227\323
 -\357\052\063\304\027\120\325\144\151\153\053\153\105\136\135\057
 -\027\312\132\116\317\303\327\071\074\365\073\237\106\271\233\347
 -\016\111\227\235\326\325\343\033\017\352\217\001\116\232\023\224
 -\131\012\002\007\110\113\032\140\253\177\117\355\013\330\125\015
 -\150\157\125\234\151\145\025\102\354\300\334\335\154\254\303\026
 -\316\013\035\126\233\244\304\304\322\056\340\017\342\104\047\053
 -\120\151\244\334\142\350\212\041\051\102\154\314\000\072\226\166
 -\233\357\100\300\244\136\167\204\062\154\046\052\071\146\256\135
 -\343\271\271\262\054\150\037\036\232\220\003\071\360\252\263\244
 -\314\111\213\030\064\351\067\311\173\051\307\204\174\157\104\025
 -\057\354\141\131\004\311\105\313\242\326\122\242\174\177\051\222
 -\326\112\305\213\102\250\324\376\352\330\307\207\043\030\344\235
 -\172\175\163\100\122\230\240\256\156\343\005\077\005\017\340\245
 -\306\155\115\355\203\067\210\234\307\363\334\102\232\152\266\327
 -\041\111\066\167\362\357\030\117\305\160\331\236\351\336\267\053
 -\213\364\274\176\050\337\015\100\311\205\134\256\235\305\061\377
 -\320\134\016\265\250\176\360\351\057\272\257\210\256\345\265\321
 -\130\245\257\234\161\247\051\001\220\203\151\067\202\005\272\374
 -\011\301\010\156\214\170\073\303\063\002\200\077\104\205\010\035
 -\337\125\126\010\255\054\205\055\135\261\003\341\256\252\164\305
 -\244\363\116\272\067\230\173\202\271
 -END
 -
 -# Trust for Certificate "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
 -# Issuer: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
 -# Serial Number: 268435455 (0xfffffff)
 -# Subject: CN=DigiNotar PKIoverheid CA Organisatie - G2,O=DigiNotar B.V.,C=NL
 -# Not Valid Before: Wed May 12 08:51:39 2010
 -# Not Valid After : Mon Mar 23 09:50:05 2020
 -# Fingerprint (MD5): 2E:61:A2:D1:78:CE:EE:BF:59:33:B0:23:14:0F:94:1C
 -# Fingerprint (SHA1): D5:F2:57:A9:BF:2D:D0:3F:8B:46:57:F9:2B:C9:A4:C6:92:E1:42:42
 -CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
 -CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
 -CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -CKA_LABEL UTF8 "Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2"
 -CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\325\362\127\251\277\055\320\077\213\106\127\371\053\311\244\306
 -\222\341\102\102
 -END
 -CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\056\141\242\321\170\316\356\277\131\063\260\043\024\017\224\034
 -END
 -CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\060\132\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\116\114\061
 -\027\060\025\006\003\125\004\012\014\016\104\151\147\151\116\157
 -\164\141\162\040\102\056\126\056\061\062\060\060\006\003\125\004
 -\003\014\051\104\151\147\151\116\157\164\141\162\040\120\113\111
 -\157\166\145\162\150\145\151\144\040\103\101\040\117\162\147\141
 -\156\151\163\141\164\151\145\040\055\040\107\062
 -END
 -CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\002\004\017\377\377\377
 -END
 -CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -
 -#
 # Certificate "Security Communication RootCA2"
 #
 # Issuer: OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
 # Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
 # Subject: OU=Security Communication RootCA2,O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.",C=JP
 # Not Valid Before: Fri May 29 05:00:39 2009
 # Not Valid After : Tue May 29 05:00:39 2029
 # Fingerprint (SHA-256): 51:3B:2C:EC:B8:10:D4:CD:E5:DD:85:39:1A:DF:C6:C2:DD:60:D8:7B:B7:36:D2:B5:21:48:4A:A4:7A:0E:BE:F6
@@ -8337,78 +8156,16 @@ END
 CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 \002\001\000
 END
 CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
 CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
 CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
 CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
 -# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
 -# Serial Number: 1800000005 (0x6b49d205)
 -# Not Before: Apr  7 15:37:15 2011 GMT
 -# Not After : Apr  4 15:37:15 2021 GMT
 -CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
 -CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
 -CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 1 issued by Trustwave"
 -CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
 -\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
 -\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
 -\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
 -\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
 -\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
 -\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
 -\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
 -\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
 -\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
 -\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
 -END
 -CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\002\004\153\111\322\005
 -END
 -CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -
 -# Explicitly Distrust "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave", Bug 724929
 -# Issuer: E=ca@trustwave.com,CN="Trustwave Organization Issuing CA, Level 2",O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.",L=Chicago,ST=Illinois,C=US
 -# Serial Number: 1800000006 (0x6b49d206)
 -# Not Before: Apr 18 21:09:30 2011 GMT
 -# Not After : Apr 15 21:09:30 2021 GMT
 -CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
 -CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
 -CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -CKA_LABEL UTF8 "MITM subCA 2 issued by Trustwave"
 -CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\060\201\253\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\125\123
 -\061\021\060\017\006\003\125\004\010\023\010\111\154\154\151\156
 -\157\151\163\061\020\060\016\006\003\125\004\007\023\007\103\150
 -\151\143\141\147\157\061\041\060\037\006\003\125\004\012\023\030
 -\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\110\157\154\144\151\156
 -\147\163\054\040\111\156\143\056\061\063\060\061\006\003\125\004
 -\003\023\052\124\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\040\117\162\147
 -\141\156\151\172\141\164\151\157\156\040\111\163\163\165\151\156
 -\147\040\103\101\054\040\114\145\166\145\154\040\062\061\037\060
 -\035\006\011\052\206\110\206\367\015\001\011\001\026\020\143\141
 -\100\164\162\165\163\164\167\141\166\145\056\143\157\155
 -END
 -CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\002\004\153\111\322\006
 -END
 -CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -
 #
 # Certificate "Actalis Authentication Root CA"
 #
 # Issuer: CN=Actalis Authentication Root CA,O=Actalis S.p.A./03358520967,L=Milan,C=IT
 # Serial Number:57:0a:11:97:42:c4:e3:cc
 # Subject: CN=Actalis Authentication Root CA,O=Actalis S.p.A./03358520967,L=Milan,C=IT
 # Not Valid Before: Thu Sep 22 11:22:02 2011
 # Not Valid After : Sun Sep 22 11:22:02 2030
@@ -9042,84 +8799,16 @@ END
 CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 \002\001\001
 END
 CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
 CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
 CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
 CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1", Bug 825022
 -# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
 -# Serial Number: 2087 (0x827)
 -# Subject: CN=*.EGO.GOV.TR,OU=EGO BILGI ISLEM,O=EGO,L=ANKARA,ST=ANKARA,C=TR
 -# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
 -# Not Valid After : Tue Jul 06 07:07:51 2021
 -# Fingerprint (MD5): F8:F5:25:FF:0C:31:CF:85:E1:0C:86:17:C1:CE:1F:8E
 -# Fingerprint (SHA1): C6:9F:28:C8:25:13:9E:65:A6:46:C4:34:AC:A5:A1:D2:00:29:5D:B1
 -CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
 -CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
 -CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 1"
 -CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
 -\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
 -\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
 -\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
 -\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
 -\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
 -\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
 -\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
 -\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
 -\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
 -\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
 -END
 -CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\002\002\010\047
 -END
 -CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -
 -# Explicitly Distrust "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2", Bug 825022
 -# Issuer: O=T..RKTRUST Bilgi ..leti..im ve Bili..im G..venli..i Hizmetleri A...,C=TR,CN=T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmetleri
 -# Serial Number: 2148 (0x864)
 -# Subject: E=ileti@kktcmerkezbankasi.org,CN=e-islem.kktcmerkezbankasi.org,O=KKTC Merkez Bankasi,L=Lefkosa,ST=Lefkosa,C=TR
 -# Not Valid Before: Mon Aug 08 07:07:51 2011
 -# Not Valid After : Thu Aug 05 07:07:51 2021
 -# Fingerprint (MD5): BF:C3:EC:AD:0F:42:4F:B4:B5:38:DB:35:BF:AD:84:A2
 -# Fingerprint (SHA1): F9:2B:E5:26:6C:C0:5D:B2:DC:0D:C3:F2:DC:74:E0:2D:EF:D9:49:CB
 -CKA_CLASS CK_OBJECT_CLASS CKO_NSS_TRUST
 -CKA_TOKEN CK_BBOOL CK_TRUE
 -CKA_PRIVATE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -CKA_MODIFIABLE CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -CKA_LABEL UTF8 "TURKTRUST Mis-issued Intermediate CA 2"
 -CKA_ISSUER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\060\201\254\061\075\060\073\006\003\125\004\003\014\064\124\303
 -\234\122\113\124\122\125\123\124\040\105\154\145\153\164\162\157
 -\156\151\153\040\123\165\156\165\143\165\040\123\145\162\164\151
 -\146\151\153\141\163\304\261\040\110\151\172\155\145\164\154\145
 -\162\151\061\013\060\011\006\003\125\004\006\023\002\124\122\061
 -\136\060\134\006\003\125\004\012\014\125\124\303\234\122\113\124
 -\122\125\123\124\040\102\151\154\147\151\040\304\260\154\145\164
 -\151\305\237\151\155\040\166\145\040\102\151\154\151\305\237\151
 -\155\040\107\303\274\166\145\156\154\151\304\237\151\040\110\151
 -\172\155\145\164\154\145\162\151\040\101\056\305\236\056\040\050
 -\143\051\040\113\141\163\304\261\155\040\040\062\060\060\065
 -END
 -CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER MULTILINE_OCTAL
 -\002\002\010\144
 -END
 -CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING CK_TRUST CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
 -CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED CK_BBOOL CK_FALSE
 -
 #
 # Certificate "D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009"
 #
 # Issuer: CN=D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009,O=D-Trust GmbH,C=DE
 # Serial Number: 623603 (0x983f3)
 # Subject: CN=D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009,O=D-Trust GmbH,C=DE
 # Not Valid Before: Thu Nov 05 08:35:58 2009
 # Not Valid After : Mon Nov 05 08:35:58 2029
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.79-fips.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.79-fips.patch
@ -0,0 +1,578 @@
 diff --git a/lib/freebl/config.mk b/lib/freebl/config.mk
 --- a/lib/freebl/config.mk
 +++ b/lib/freebl/config.mk
@@ -85,9 +85,13 @@ EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += \
 	$(NULL)
 endif
 endif
 ifeq ($(OS_ARCH), Darwin)
 EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += -dylib_file @executable_path/libplc4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplc4.dylib -dylib_file @executable_path/libplds4.dylib:$(DIST)/lib/libplds4.dylib
 endif
 +ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
 +DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
 endif
 +
 +endif
 diff --git a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
 --- a/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
 +++ b/lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
@@ -20,53 +20,110 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
     if (!numBytes) {
         /* error is set */
         return;
     }
     RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
     PORT_Memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
 }
 +#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
 +#include <sys/random.h>
 +#include "prinit.h"
 +
 +static int rng_grndFlags= 0;
 +static PRCallOnceType rng_KernelFips;
 +
 +static PRStatus
 +rng_getKernelFips()
 +{
 +#ifdef LINUX
 +    FILE *f;
 +    char d;
 +    size_t size;
 +
 +    f = fopen("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", "r");
 +    if (!f)
 +        return PR_FAILURE;
 +
 +    size = fread(&d, 1, 1, f);
 +    fclose(f);
 +    if (size != 1)
 +        return PR_SUCCESS;
 +    if (d != '1')
 +        return PR_SUCCESS;
 +    /* if the kernel is in FIPS mode, set the GRND_RANDOM flag */
 +    rng_grndFlags = GRND_RANDOM;
 +#endif /* LINUX */
 +    return PR_SUCCESS;
 +}
 +#endif
 +
 size_t
 RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
 {
 +    size_t fileBytes = 0;
 +    unsigned char *buffer = dest;
 +#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
     int fd;
     int bytes;
 -    size_t fileBytes = 0;
 -    unsigned char *buffer = dest;
 +#else
 +    PR_CallOnce(&rng_KernelFips, rng_getKernelFips);
 +#endif
 #if defined(__OpenBSD__) || (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || (defined(LINUX) && defined(__GLIBC__) && ((__GLIBC__ > 2) || ((__GLIBC__ == 2) && (__GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 25))))
     int result;
 -
     while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
         size_t getBytes = maxLen - fileBytes;
         if (getBytes > GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES) {
             getBytes = GETENTROPY_MAX_BYTES;
         }
 +#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
 +        /* FIP 140-3 requires full kernel reseeding for chained entropy sources
 +         * so we need to use getrandom with GRND_RANDOM.
 +         * getrandom returns -1 on failure, otherwise returns
 +         * the number of bytes, which can be less than getBytes */
 +        result = getrandom(buffer, getBytes, rng_grndFlags);
 +        if (result < 0) {
 +            break;
 +        }
 +        fileBytes += result;
 +        buffer += result;
 +#else
 +        /* get entropy returns 0 on success and always return
 +         * getBytes on success */
         result = getentropy(buffer, getBytes);
         if (result == 0) { /* success */
             fileBytes += getBytes;
             buffer += getBytes;
         } else {
             break;
         }
 +#endif
     }
     if (fileBytes == maxLen) { /* success */
         return maxLen;
     }
 +#ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
 +    /* in FIPS 104-3 we don't fallback, just fail */
 +    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
 +    return 0;
 +#else
     /* If we failed with an error other than ENOSYS, it means the destination
      * buffer is not writeable. We don't need to try writing to it again. */
     if (errno != ENOSYS) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
         return 0;
     }
 +#endif /*!NSS_FIPS_140_3 */
 +#endif /* platorm has getentropy */
 +#ifndef NSS_FIPS_140_3
     /* ENOSYS means the kernel doesn't support getentropy()/getrandom().
      * Reset the number of bytes to get and fall back to /dev/urandom. */
     fileBytes = 0;
 -#endif
     fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
     if (fd < 0) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
         return 0;
     }
     while (fileBytes < maxLen) {
         bytes = read(fd, buffer, maxLen - fileBytes);
         if (bytes <= 0) {
@@ -76,9 +133,10 @@ RNG_SystemRNG(void *dest, size_t maxLen)
         buffer += bytes;
     }
     (void)close(fd);
     if (fileBytes != maxLen) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
         return 0;
     }
     return fileBytes;
 +#endif
 }
 diff --git a/lib/softoken/config.mk b/lib/softoken/config.mk
 --- a/lib/softoken/config.mk
 +++ b/lib/softoken/config.mk
@@ -58,8 +58,12 @@ endif
 ifdef NSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
 DEFINES += -DNSS_ENABLE_FIPS_INDICATORS
 endif
 ifdef NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID
 DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID=\"${NSS_FIPS_MODULE_ID}\"
 endif
 +ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
 +DEFINES += -DNSS_FIPS_140_3
 +endif
 +
 diff --git a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
 --- a/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
 +++ b/lib/softoken/lowpbe.c
@@ -1766,16 +1766,20 @@ sftk_fips_pbkdf_PowerUpSelfTests(void)
     unsigned char iteration_count = 5;
     unsigned char keyLen = 64;
     char *inKeyData = TEST_KEY;
 -    static const unsigned char saltData[] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 };
 +    static const unsigned char saltData[] = {
 +        0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
 +        0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
 +    };
 +
     static const unsigned char pbkdf_known_answer[] = {
 -        0x31, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x39, 0x9f, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x29,
 -        0x68, 0xac, 0xf2, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x9c,
 -        0x28, 0x59, 0x8b, 0x5c, 0xd8, 0xd4, 0x02, 0x37,
 -        0x18, 0x22, 0xc1, 0x92, 0xd0, 0xfa, 0x72, 0x90,
 -        0x2c, 0x8d, 0x19, 0xd4, 0x56, 0xfb, 0x16, 0xfa,
 -        0x8d, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x33, 0xd1, 0x5f, 0x17, 0xb1,
 -        0x22, 0xd9, 0x9c, 0xaf, 0x5e, 0x3f, 0xf3, 0x66,
 -        0xc6, 0x14, 0xfe, 0x83, 0xfa, 0x1a, 0x2a, 0xc5
 +        0x73, 0x8c, 0xfa, 0x02, 0xe8, 0xdb, 0x43, 0xe4,
 +        0x99, 0xc5, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0x8e, 0x3e, 0x7b,
 +        0xc4, 0xda, 0x22, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0xae, 0x23, 0x7a,
 +        0x21, 0x27, 0xbd, 0xcc, 0x78, 0xc4, 0xe6, 0xc5,
 +        0x33, 0x38, 0x35, 0xe0, 0x68, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x06,
 +        0xad, 0xaf, 0x7f, 0xd7, 0x3f, 0x0e, 0xc0, 0x90,
 +        0x17, 0x97, 0x73, 0x75, 0x7b, 0x88, 0x49, 0xd8,
 +        0x6f, 0x78, 0x5a, 0xde, 0x50, 0x20, 0x55, 0x33
     };
     sftk_PBELockInit();
 diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
 --- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
 +++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
@@ -4609,16 +4609,17 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
         goto loser;
     }
     /* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS);
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE);
 +
     /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
     key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
     switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
         case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
         case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
         case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
         case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
             checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
@@ -4812,16 +4813,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
     crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
     }
     if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
     }
 +    /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
 +     * fips requirements */
 +    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
     if (crv == CKR_OK) {
         *phKey = key->handle;
     }
 loser:
     PORT_Memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf);
     sftk_FreeObject(key);
     return crv;
 }
@@ -5780,16 +5784,19 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
         sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
         NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
         sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
         return crv;
     }
 +    /* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
 +    privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
 +    publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
     *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
     *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
     sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
     sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
@@ -6990,16 +6997,17 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
     }
     /* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
     if (params->bExtract) {
         CK_BYTE *salt;
         CK_ULONG saltLen;
         HMACContext *hmac;
         unsigned int bufLen;
 +        SFTKSource saltKeySource = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
         switch (params->ulSaltType) {
             case CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL:
                 saltLen = hashLen;
                 salt = hashbuf;
                 memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
                 break;
             case CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA:
@@ -7026,29 +7034,54 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
                 if (isFIPS && (key->isFIPS == 0) && (saltKey->isFIPS == 1)) {
                     CK_MECHANISM mech;
                     mech.mechanism = CKM_HKDF_DERIVE;
                     mech.pParameter = params;
                     mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
                     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
                                                        CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
                 }
 +                saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
                 saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
                 if (saltKey_att == NULL) {
                     sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
                     return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
                 }
                 /* save the resulting salt */
                 salt = saltKey_att->attrib.pValue;
                 saltLen = saltKey_att->attrib.ulValueLen;
                 break;
             default:
                 return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
                 break;
         }
 +        /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
 +         * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
 +        if (isFIPS && key && sourceKey) {
 +            PRBool fipsOK = PR_FALSE;
 +            /* case one: mix the kea with a previous or default
 +             * salt */
 +            if ((sourceKey->source == SFTK_SOURCE_KEA) &&
 +                (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
 +                (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
 +                fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
 +            }
 +            /* case two: restart, remix the previous secret as a salt */
 +            if ((sourceKey->objclass == CKO_DATA) &&
 +                (NSS_SecureMemcmpZero(sourceKeyBytes, sourceKeyLen) == 0) &&
 +                (sourceKeyLen == rawHash->length) &&
 +                (saltKeySource == SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND) &&
 +                (saltLen == rawHash->length)) {
 +                fipsOK = PR_TRUE;
 +            }
 +            if (!fipsOK) {
 +                key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
 +            }
 +        }
 +        if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT;
         hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
         if (saltKey_att) {
             sftk_FreeAttribute(saltKey_att);
         }
         if (saltKey) {
             sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
         }
@@ -7076,16 +7109,40 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
         /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
          * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
          * key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
          */
         HMACContext *hmac;
         CK_BYTE bi;
         unsigned iterations;
 +        /* only TLS style usage is FIPS approved,
 +         * turn off the FIPS indicator for other usages */
 +        if (isFIPS && key && key->isFIPS && sourceKey) {
 +            unsigned char *info=&params->pInfo[3];
 +            /* only one case,
 +             *  1) Expand only
 +             *  2) with a key whose source was
 +             *  SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND or SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
 +             *  3) source key length == rawHash->length
 +             *  4) Info has tls or dtls
 +             * If any of those conditions aren't met, then we turn
 +             * off the fips indicator */
 +            if (params->bExtract ||
 +               ((sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT) &&
 +                (sourceKey->source != SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND)) ||
 +               (sourceKeyLen != rawHash->length) ||
 +               (params->ulInfoLen < 7) ||
 +               ((PORT_Memcmp(info,"tls",3) != 0) &&
 +               (PORT_Memcmp(info,"dtls",4) != 0))) {
 +               key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
 +            }
 +        }
 +        if (key) key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND;
 +
         genLen = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen);
         iterations = genLen / hashLen;
         if (genLen > sizeof(keyBlock)) {
             keyBlockAlloc = PORT_Alloc(genLen);
             if (keyBlockAlloc == NULL) {
                 return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
             }
@@ -8434,16 +8491,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
             /* calculate private value - oct */
             rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
             SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhValue, PR_FALSE);
             if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 +                key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
                 sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
                 SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&derived, PR_FALSE);
                 crv = CKR_OK;
             } else
                 crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
             break;
         }
@@ -8564,16 +8622,17 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
                     }
                     PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize - secretlen], secret, secretlen);
                     secret = keyData;
                 } else {
                     secret += (secretlen - keySize);
                 }
                 secretlen = keySize;
             }
 +            key->source = SFTK_SOURCE_KEA;
             sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
             PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
             if (keyData) {
                 PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
             }
             break;
 diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
 --- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
 +++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
@@ -147,16 +147,26 @@ typedef enum {
  */
 typedef enum {
     SFTK_DestroyFailure,
     SFTK_Destroyed,
     SFTK_Busy
 } SFTKFreeStatus;
 /*
 + * Source of various objects
 + */
 +typedef enum {
 +    SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT=0,
 +    SFTK_SOURCE_KEA,
 +    SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXPAND,
 +    SFTK_SOURCE_HKDF_EXTRACT
 +} SFTKSource;
 +
 +/*
  * attribute values of an object.
  */
 struct SFTKAttributeStr {
     SFTKAttribute *next;
     SFTKAttribute *prev;
     PRBool freeAttr;
     PRBool freeData;
     /*must be called handle to make sftkqueue_find work */
@@ -189,16 +199,17 @@ struct SFTKObjectStr {
     CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass;
     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle;
     int refCount;
     PZLock *refLock;
     SFTKSlot *slot;
     void *objectInfo;
     SFTKFree infoFree;
     PRBool isFIPS;
 +    SFTKSource source;
 };
 struct SFTKTokenObjectStr {
     SFTKObject obj;
     SECItem dbKey;
 };
 struct SFTKSessionObjectStr {
 diff --git a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
 --- a/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
 +++ b/lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
@@ -1090,16 +1090,17 @@ sftk_NewObject(SFTKSlot *slot)
         sessObject->attrList[i].freeData = PR_FALSE;
     }
     sessObject->optimizeSpace = slot->optimizeSpace;
     object->handle = 0;
     object->next = object->prev = NULL;
     object->slot = slot;
     object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
 +    object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
     object->refCount = 1;
     sessObject->sessionList.next = NULL;
     sessObject->sessionList.prev = NULL;
     sessObject->sessionList.parent = object;
     sessObject->session = NULL;
     sessObject->wasDerived = PR_FALSE;
     if (!hasLocks)
@@ -1674,16 +1675,17 @@ fail:
 CK_RV
 sftk_CopyObject(SFTKObject *destObject, SFTKObject *srcObject)
 {
     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
     SFTKSessionObject *src_so = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(srcObject);
     unsigned int i;
     destObject->isFIPS = srcObject->isFIPS;
 +    destObject->source = srcObject->source;
     if (src_so == NULL) {
         return sftk_CopyTokenObject(destObject, srcObject);
     }
     PZ_Lock(src_so->attributeLock);
     for (i = 0; i < src_so->hashSize; i++) {
         attribute = src_so->head[i];
         do {
@@ -2059,16 +2061,17 @@ sftk_NewTokenObject(SFTKSlot *slot, SECI
     /* every object must have a class, if we can't get it, the object
      * doesn't exist */
     crv = handleToClass(slot, handle, &object->objclass);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
         goto loser;
     }
     object->slot = slot;
     object->isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
 +    object->source = SFTK_SOURCE_DEFAULT;
     object->objectInfo = NULL;
     object->infoFree = NULL;
     if (!hasLocks) {
         object->refLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockRefLock);
     }
     if (object->refLock == NULL) {
         goto loser;
     }
@@ -2225,16 +2228,25 @@ sftk_AttributeToFlags(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE 
             break;
         case CKA_DERIVE:
             flags = CKF_DERIVE;
             break;
         /* fake attribute to select digesting */
         case CKA_DIGEST:
             flags = CKF_DIGEST;
             break;
 +        /* fake attribute to select key gen */
 +         case CKA_NSS_GENERATE:
 +            flags = CKF_GENERATE;
 +            break;
 +        /* fake attribute to select key pair gen */
 +        case CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR:
 +            flags = CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR;
 +            break;
 +        /* fake attributes to to handle MESSAGE* flags */
         case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
             flags = CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT;
             break;
         case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
             flags = CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT;
             break;
         case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
             flags = CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN;
@@ -2278,17 +2290,17 @@ sftk_quickGetECCCurveOid(SFTKObject *sou
 }
 /* This function currently only returns valid lengths for
  * FIPS approved ECC curves. If we want to make this generic
  * in the future, that Curve determination can be done in
  * the sftk_handleSpecial. Since it's currently only used
  * in FIPS indicators, it's currently only compiled with
  * the FIPS indicator code */
 -static int
 +static CK_ULONG
 sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
 {
     CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyAttribute;
     CK_ULONG keyLength = 0;
     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
     CK_RV crv;
 diff --git a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
 --- a/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
 +++ b/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
@@ -58,16 +58,18 @@
 /*
  * NSS-defined certificate types
  *
  */
 #define CKC_NSS (CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
 /* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */
 #define CKA_DIGEST 0x81000000L
 +#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE 0x81000001L
 +#define CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x81000002L
 #define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE 0x82000000L
 #define CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK 0xff000000L
 #define CKA_FLAGS_ONLY 0 /* CKA_CLASS */
 /*
  * NSS-defined object attributes
  *
  */
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.90-aes-gmc-indicator.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.90-aes-gmc-indicator.patch
@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
 diff --git a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
 --- a/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
 +++ b/lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
@@ -146,16 +146,38 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, contextType, PR_TRUE, NULL);
     if (crv != CKR_OK)
         return crv;
 +    if (context->isFIPS && (contextType == SFTK_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT)) {
 +        if ((pParameter == NULL) || (ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS))) {
 +            context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
 +        } else {
 +            CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
 +            switch (p->ivGenerator) {
 +                case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
 +                    context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
 +                    break;
 +                case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
 +                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
 +                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
 +                    }
 +                    break;
 +                default:
 +                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits < 32)) {
 +                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
 +                    }
 +            }
 +        }
 +    }
 +
     if (!pOuttext) {
         *pulOuttextLen = ulIntextLen;
         return CKR_OK;
     }
     rv = (*context->aeadUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pOuttext, &outlen,
                                 maxout, pIntext, ulIntextLen,
                                 pParameter, ulParameterLen,
                                 pAssociatedData, ulAssociatedDataLen);
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.90-dh-test-update.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.90-dh-test-update.patch
@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c.dh_test ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c.dh_test	2024-01-18 08:34:45.936944401 -0800
 +++ ./lib/freebl/fipsfreebl.c	2024-01-18 09:20:57.555980326 -0800
@@ -1816,38 +1816,39 @@ freebl_fips_DH_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
 {
     /* DH Known P (2048-bits) */
     static const PRUint8 dh_known_P[] = {
 -        0xc2, 0x79, 0xbb, 0x76, 0x32, 0x0d, 0x43, 0xfd,
 -        0x1b, 0x8c, 0xa2, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xdd, 0x6d, 0xef,
 -        0xf8, 0x1a, 0xd9, 0xc1, 0xa2, 0xf5, 0x73, 0x2b,
 -        0xdb, 0x1a, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x90, 0xeb, 0xe7, 0x8e,
 -        0x5f, 0x5c, 0x6b, 0xb6, 0x61, 0x89, 0xd1, 0x03,
 -        0xb0, 0x5f, 0x91, 0xe4, 0xd2, 0x82, 0x90, 0xfc,
 -        0x3c, 0x49, 0x69, 0x59, 0xc1, 0x51, 0x6a, 0x85,
 -        0x71, 0xe7, 0x5d, 0x72, 0x5a, 0x45, 0xad, 0x01,
 -        0x6f, 0x82, 0xae, 0xec, 0x91, 0x08, 0x2e, 0x7c,
 -        0x64, 0x93, 0x46, 0x1c, 0x68, 0xef, 0xc2, 0x03,
 -        0x28, 0x1d, 0x75, 0x3a, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x46, 0xf0,
 -        0xc9, 0xdb, 0x99, 0x95, 0x13, 0x66, 0x4d, 0xd5,
 -        0x1a, 0x78, 0x92, 0x51, 0x89, 0x72, 0x28, 0x7f,
 -        0x20, 0x70, 0x41, 0x49, 0xa2, 0x86, 0xe9, 0xf9,
 -        0x78, 0x5f, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x5d, 0xfa, 0xdb, 0x57,
 -        0xd4, 0x71, 0xdf, 0x66, 0xe3, 0x9e, 0x88, 0x70,
 -        0xa4, 0x21, 0x44, 0x6a, 0xc7, 0xae, 0x30, 0x2c,
 -        0x9c, 0x1f, 0x91, 0x57, 0xc8, 0x24, 0x34, 0x2d,
 -        0x7a, 0x4a, 0x43, 0xc2, 0x5f, 0xab, 0x64, 0x2e,
 -        0xaa, 0x28, 0x32, 0x95, 0x42, 0x7b, 0xa0, 0xcc,
 -        0xdf, 0xfd, 0x22, 0xc8, 0x56, 0x84, 0xc1, 0x62,
 -        0x15, 0xb2, 0x77, 0x86, 0x81, 0xfc, 0xa5, 0x12,
 -        0x3c, 0xca, 0x28, 0x17, 0x8f, 0x03, 0x16, 0x6e,
 -        0xb8, 0x24, 0xfa, 0x1b, 0x15, 0x02, 0xfd, 0x8b,
 -        0xb6, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0xf7, 0x47, 0x41, 0xc5, 0x2b,
 -        0x37, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0x68, 0xda, 0x1c, 0x55,
 -        0x44, 0xc3, 0xee, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x07, 0x11, 0x3b,
 -        0x5f, 0x00, 0x84, 0xb4, 0xc4, 0xe4, 0xa7, 0x97,
 -        0x29, 0xf8, 0xce, 0xab, 0xfc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x34,
 -        0xe4, 0xc7, 0x81, 0x52, 0x32, 0x0e, 0x27, 0x3c,
 -        0xa6, 0x70, 0x3f, 0x4a, 0x54, 0xda, 0xdd, 0x60,
 -        0x26, 0xb3, 0x6e, 0x45, 0x26, 0x19, 0x41, 0x6f
 +        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
 +        0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A,
 +        0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1,
 +        0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95,
 +        0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB,
 +        0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9,
 +        0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8,
 +        0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A,
 +        0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61,
 +        0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0,
 +        0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3,
 +        0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35,
 +        0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77,
 +        0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72,
 +        0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35,
 +        0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A,
 +        0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61,
 +        0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB,
 +        0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68,
 +        0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4,
 +        0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19,
 +        0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70,
 +        0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC,
 +        0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61,
 +        0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF,
 +        0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83,
 +        0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73,
 +        0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05,
 +        0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2,
 +        0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA,
 +        0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x97,
 +        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
 +
     };
     static const PRUint8 dh_known_Y_1[] = {
@@ -1893,10 +1894,10 @@ freebl_fips_DH_PowerUpSelfTest(void)
     };
     static const PRUint8 dh_known_hash_result[] = {
 -        0x93, 0xa2, 0x89, 0x1c, 0x8a, 0xc3, 0x70, 0xbf,
 -        0xa7, 0xdf, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0x82, 0xfb, 0x87, 0x81,
 -        0x09, 0x47, 0xf3, 0x9f, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x4f, 0x3f,
 -        0x8e, 0x5e, 0x06, 0xca, 0x30, 0xa7, 0xaf, 0x10
 +        0x40, 0xe3, 0x7a, 0x34, 0x83, 0x2d, 0x94, 0x57,
 +        0x99, 0x3d, 0x66, 0xec, 0x54, 0xdf, 0x82, 0x4a,
 +        0x37, 0x0d, 0xf9, 0x01, 0xb3, 0xbc, 0x54, 0xe5,
 +        0x5e, 0x63, 0xd3, 0x46, 0x4e, 0xa3, 0xe2, 0x8a
     };
     /* DH variables. */
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-indicators2.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-indicators2.patch
@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips_2	2024-01-19 09:21:19.632889660 -0800
 +++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2024-01-19 09:22:18.541471306 -0800
@@ -7090,7 +7090,7 @@ sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_
                     mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
                     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
                                                        CKA_DERIVE, saltKey,
 -                                                       keySize);
 +                                                       keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
                 }
                 saltKeySource = saltKey->source;
                 saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
@@ -7404,7 +7404,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
         }
     }
     key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey,
 -                                       keySize);
 +                                       keySize*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE);
     switch (mechanism) {
         /* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips_2	2024-01-19 09:21:19.633889670 -0800
 +++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2024-01-19 09:28:00.082843565 -0800
@@ -2393,20 +2393,43 @@ sftk_getKeyLength(SFTKObject *source)
 }
 PRBool
 -sftk_CheckFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash)
 +sftk_checkFIPSHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hash, PRBool allowSmall, PRBool allowCMAC)
 {
     switch (hash) {
 +        case CKM_AES_CMAC:
 +            return allowCMAC;
 +        case CKM_SHA_1:
 +        case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
 +        case CKM_SHA224:
 +        case CKM_SHA224_HMAC:
 +            return allowSmall;
         case CKM_SHA256:
 -        case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
 +        case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
         case CKM_SHA384:
 -        case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
 +        case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
         case CKM_SHA512:
 -        case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
 +        case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
             return PR_TRUE;
     }
     return PR_FALSE;
 }
 +PRBool
 +sftk_checkKeyLength(CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG min,
 +                    CK_ULONG max, CK_ULONG step)
 +{
 +     if (keyLength > max) {
 +         return PR_FALSE;
 +     }
 +     if (keyLength < min ) {
 +         return PR_FALSE;
 +     }
 +     if (((keyLength - min) % step) != 0) {
 +         return PR_FALSE;
 +     }
 +     return PR_TRUE;
 +}
 +
 /*
  * handle specialized FIPS semantics that are too complicated to
  * handle with just a table. NOTE: this means any additional semantics
@@ -2416,6 +2439,8 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
                    SFTKFIPSAlgorithmList *mechInfo, SFTKObject *source,
                    CK_ULONG keyLength, CK_ULONG targetKeyLength)
 {
 +    PRBool allowSmall = PR_FALSE;
 +    PRBool allowCMAC = PR_FALSE;
     switch (mechInfo->special) {
         case SFTKFIPSDH: {
             SECItem dhPrime;
@@ -2482,7 +2507,11 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
             if (pss->sLen > hashObj->length) {
                 return PR_FALSE;
             }
 -            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(pss->hashAlg);
 +            /* Our code makes sure pss->hashAlg matches the explicit
 +             * hash in the mechanism, and only mechanisms with approved
 +             * hashes are included, so no need to check pss->hashAlg
 +             * here */
 +            return PR_TRUE;
         }
         case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
             /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
@@ -2508,12 +2537,28 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
              return PR_TRUE;
         }
         /* check the hash mechanisms to make sure they themselves are FIPS */
 +        case SFTKFIPSChkHashSp800:
 +             allowCMAC = PR_TRUE;
         case SFTKFIPSChkHash:
 +             allowSmall = PR_TRUE;
 +        case SFTKFIPSChkHashTls:
             if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
                 return PR_FALSE;
             }
 -            return sftk_CheckFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
 -                        + mechInfo->offset));
 +            return sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
 +                        + mechInfo->offset), allowSmall, allowCMAC);
 +        case SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck:
 +            if (mech->mechanism != CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) {
 +                /* unless the mechnism has a built-in hash, check the hash */
 +                if (mech->ulParameterLen < mechInfo->offset +sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
 +                    return PR_FALSE;
 +                }
 +                if (!sftk_checkFIPSHash(*(CK_ULONG *)(((char *)mech->pParameter)
 +                        + mechInfo->offset), PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE)) {
 +                    return PR_FALSE;
 +                }
 +            }
 +            return sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, 112, 512, 1);
         default:
             break;
     }
@@ -2558,13 +2603,11 @@ sftk_operationIsFIPS(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_
          * approved algorithm in the approved mode with an approved key */
         if ((mech->mechanism == mechs->type) &&
             (opFlags == (mechs->info.flags & opFlags)) &&
 -            (keyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
 -            (keyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
 -            (((keyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0) &&
 -            ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||
 -             ((targetKeyLength <= mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize) &&
 -             (targetKeyLength >= mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) &&
 -             ((targetKeyLength - mechs->info.ulMinKeySize) % mechs->step) == 0)) &&
 +            sftk_checkKeyLength(keyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
 +                                mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step) &&
 +            ((targetKeyLength == 0) ||  (mechs->special == SFTKFIPSTlsKeyCheck)
 +             || sftk_checkKeyLength(targetKeyLength, mechs->info.ulMinKeySize,
 +                                mechs->info.ulMaxKeySize, mechs->step)) &&
             ((mechs->special == SFTKFIPSNone) ||
              sftk_handleSpecial(slot, mech, mechs, source, keyLength, targetKeyLength))) {
             return PR_TRUE;
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c.fips_2 ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c.fips_2	2024-01-19 09:21:19.634889680 -0800
 +++ ./lib/softoken/sftkmessage.c	2024-01-19 09:22:18.541471306 -0800
@@ -157,16 +157,25 @@ sftk_CryptMessage(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSes
         } else {
             CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *p = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)pParameter;
             switch (p->ivGenerator) {
 +                default:
                 case CKG_NO_GENERATE:
                     context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
                     break;
                 case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
 -                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
 +                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
 +                        (p->ulIvFixedBits != 0)) {
                         context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
                     }
                     break;
 -                default:
 -                    if ((p->ulIvLen < 12) || (p->ulIvFixedBits < 32)) {
 +                case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR:
 +                    if ((p->ulIvLen != 96/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) ||
 +                        (p->ulIvFixedBits != 32)) {
 +                        context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
 +                    }
 +                    break;
 +                case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER:
 +                    if ((p->ulIvFixedBits < 32) ||
 +                       ((p->ulIvLen*PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - p->ulIvFixedBits) < 32)) {
                         context->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
                     }
             }
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-safe-memset.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.90-fips-safe-memset.patch
@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/aeskeywrap.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ AESKeyWrap_EncryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
         PORT_Memcpy(iv + AES_KEY_WRAP_BLOCK_SIZE, input, inputLen);
         rv = AES_Encrypt(&cx->aescx, output, pOutputLen, maxOutputLen, iv,
                          outLen);
 -        PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
 +        PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
         return rv;
     }
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ AESKeyWrap_EncryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
     PORT_ZFree(newBuf, paddedInputLen);
     /* a little overkill, we only need to clear out the length, but this
      * is easier to verify we got it all */
 -    PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
     return rv;
 }
@@ -631,12 +631,12 @@ AESKeyWrap_DecryptKWP(AESKeyWrapContext
 loser:
     /* if we failed, make sure we don't return any data to the user */
     if ((rv != SECSuccess) && (output == newBuf)) {
 -        PORT_Memset(newBuf, 0, paddedLen);
 +        PORT_SafeZero(newBuf, paddedLen);
     }
     /* clear out CSP sensitive data from the heap and stack */
     if (allocBuf) {
         PORT_ZFree(allocBuf, paddedLen);
     }
 -    PORT_Memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(iv, sizeof(iv));
     return rv;
 }
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/blapii.h.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/blapii.h
 --- ./lib/freebl/blapii.h.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/blapii.h	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
@@ -101,10 +101,10 @@ PRBool ppc_crypto_support();
 #ifdef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
 #define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)
 #else
 -#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)                    \
 -    {                                                    \
 -        volatile char _stkclr[stack_size];               \
 -        PORT_Memset((void *)&_stkclr[0], 0, stack_size); \
 +#define BLAPI_CLEAR_STACK(stack_size)                   \
 +    {                                                   \
 +        volatile char _stkclr[stack_size];              \
 +        PORT_SafeZero((void *)&_stkclr[0], stack_size); \
     }
 #endif
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/drbg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/drbg.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/drbg.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/drbg.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ prng_initEntropy(void)
     SHA256_Update(&ctx, block, sizeof(block));
     SHA256_End(&ctx, globalrng->previousEntropyHash, NULL,
                sizeof(globalrng->previousEntropyHash));
 -    PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof(block));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(block, sizeof(block));
     SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE);
     return PR_SUCCESS;
 }
@@ -246,8 +246,8 @@ prng_getEntropy(PRUint8 *buffer, size_t
     }
 out:
 -    PORT_Memset(hash, 0, sizeof hash);
 -    PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof block);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(hash, sizeof hash);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(block, sizeof block);
     return rv;
 }
@@ -393,8 +393,8 @@ prng_Hashgen(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *r
         PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(data, (sizeof data) - 1, carry);
         SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE);
     }
 -    PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof data);
 -    PORT_Memset(thisHash, 0, sizeof thisHash);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(data, sizeof data);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(thisHash, sizeof thisHash);
 }
 /*
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ prng_generateNewBytes(RNGContext *rng,
     PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(rng->reseed_counter, (sizeof rng->reseed_counter) - 1, carry);
     /* if the prng failed, don't return any output, signal softoken */
 -    PORT_Memset(H, 0, sizeof H);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(H, sizeof H);
     if (!rng->isValid) {
         PORT_Memset(returned_bytes, 0, no_of_returned_bytes);
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/dsa.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/dsa.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/dsa.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/dsa.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
     err = MP_OKAY;
     signature->len = dsa_signature_len;
 cleanup:
 -    PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(localDigestData, DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN);
     mp_clear(&p);
     mp_clear(&q);
     mp_clear(&g);
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ DSA_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
         rv = dsa_SignDigest(key, signature, digest, kSeed);
     } while (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM &&
              --retries > 0);
 -    PORT_Memset(kSeed, 0, sizeof kSeed);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(kSeed, sizeof kSeed);
     return rv;
 }
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ DSA_VerifyDigest(DSAPublicKey *key, cons
         verified = SECSuccess; /* Signature verified. */
     }
 cleanup:
 -    PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, sizeof localDigestData);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(localDigestData, sizeof localDigestData);
     mp_clear(&p);
     mp_clear(&q);
     mp_clear(&g);
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/gcm.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/gcm.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/gcm.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/gcm.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ gcmHash_Final(gcmHashContext *ghash, uns
     rv = SECSuccess;
 cleanup:
 -    PORT_Memset(T, 0, sizeof(T));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(T, sizeof(T));
     return rv;
 }
@@ -596,15 +596,15 @@ GCM_CreateContext(void *context, freeblC
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         goto loser;
     }
 -    PORT_Memset(H, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(H, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
     gcm->ctr_context_init = PR_TRUE;
     return gcm;
 loser:
 -    PORT_Memset(H, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(H, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
     if (ghash && ghash->mem) {
         void *mem = ghash->mem;
 -        PORT_Memset(ghash, 0, sizeof(gcmHashContext));
 +        PORT_SafeZero(ghash, sizeof(gcmHashContext));
         PORT_Free(mem);
     }
     if (gcm) {
@@ -682,11 +682,11 @@ gcm_InitCounter(GCMContext *gcm, const u
         goto loser;
     }
 -    PORT_Memset(&ctrParams, 0, sizeof ctrParams);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(&ctrParams, sizeof ctrParams);
     return SECSuccess;
 loser:
 -    PORT_Memset(&ctrParams, 0, sizeof ctrParams);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(&ctrParams, sizeof ctrParams);
     if (freeCtr) {
         CTR_DestroyContext(&gcm->ctr_context, PR_FALSE);
     }
@@ -866,10 +866,10 @@ GCM_DecryptUpdate(GCMContext *gcm, unsig
     if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(tag, intag, tagBytes) != 0) {
         /* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
 -        PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
 +        PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
         return SECFailure;
     }
 -    PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
     /* finish the decryption */
     return CTR_Update(&gcm->ctr_context, outbuf, outlen, maxout,
                       inbuf, inlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
@@ -1159,10 +1159,10 @@ GCM_DecryptAEAD(GCMContext *gcm, unsigne
         /* force a CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID error at in softoken */
         CTR_DestroyContext(&gcm->ctr_context, PR_FALSE);
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
 -        PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
 +        PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
         return SECFailure;
     }
 -    PORT_Memset(tag, 0, sizeof(tag));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(tag, sizeof(tag));
     /* finish the decryption */
     rv = CTR_Update(&gcm->ctr_context, outbuf, outlen, maxout,
                     inbuf, inlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/hmacct.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
@@ -274,10 +274,10 @@ MAC(unsigned char *mdOut,
     hashObj->end(mdState, mdOut, mdOutLen, mdOutMax);
     hashObj->destroy(mdState, PR_TRUE);
 -    PORT_Memset(lengthBytes, 0, sizeof lengthBytes);
 -    PORT_Memset(hmacPad, 0, sizeof hmacPad);
 -    PORT_Memset(firstBlock, 0, sizeof firstBlock);
 -    PORT_Memset(macOut, 0, sizeof macOut);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(lengthBytes, sizeof lengthBytes);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(hmacPad, sizeof hmacPad);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(firstBlock, sizeof firstBlock);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(macOut, sizeof macOut);
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/intel-gcm-wrap.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ intel_aes_gcmInitCounter(intel_AES_GCMCo
 void
 intel_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(intel_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
 {
 -    PORT_Memset(gcm, 0, sizeof(intel_AES_GCMContext));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(gcm, sizeof(intel_AES_GCMContext));
     if (freeit) {
         PORT_Free(gcm);
     }
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/ppc-gcm-wrap.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ ppc_aes_gcmInitCounter(ppc_AES_GCMContex
 void
 ppc_AES_GCM_DestroyContext(ppc_AES_GCMContext *gcm, PRBool freeit)
 {
 -    PORT_Memset(gcm, 0, sizeof(ppc_AES_GCMContext));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(gcm, sizeof(ppc_AES_GCMContext));
     if (freeit) {
         PORT_Free(gcm);
     }
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/pqg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/pqg.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/pqg.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/pqg.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.246388369 -0800
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ cleanup:
     mp_clear(&a);
     mp_clear(&z);
     mp_clear(&two_length_minus_1);
 -    PORT_Memset(x, 0, sizeof(x));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(x, sizeof(x));
     if (err) {
         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
         rv = SECFailure;
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ cleanup:
     mp_clear(&c);
     mp_clear(&c0);
     mp_clear(&one);
 -    PORT_Memset(x, 0, sizeof(x));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(x, sizeof(x));
     if (err) {
         MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
         rv = SECFailure;
@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ makePfromQandSeed(
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&c, 1, &c)); /* c -= 1       */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub(&X, &c, P));   /* P = X - c    */
 cleanup:
 -    PORT_Memset(V_j, 0, sizeof V_j);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(V_j, sizeof V_j);
     mp_clear(&W);
     mp_clear(&X);
     mp_clear(&c);
@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ makeGfromIndex(HASH_HashType hashtype,
 /* step 11.
      * return valid G */
 cleanup:
 -    PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(data, sizeof(data));
     if (hashcx) {
         hashobj->destroy(hashcx, PR_TRUE);
     }
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/rijndael.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ AES_DestroyContext(AESContext *cx, PRBoo
         cx->worker_cx = NULL;
         cx->destroy = NULL;
     }
 -    PORT_Memset(cx, 0, sizeof(AESContext));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(cx, sizeof(AESContext));
     if (freeit) {
         PORT_Free(mem);
     } else {
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/rsa.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rsa.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/rsa.c.safe_zero	2023-11-22 14:41:24.066840894 -0800
 +++ ./lib/freebl/rsa.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
@@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ rsa_build_from_primes(const mp_int *p, c
     /* 2.  Compute phi = (p-1)*(q-1) */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(p, 1, &psub1));
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(q, 1, &qsub1));
 +    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_lcm(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi));
     if (needPublicExponent || needPrivateExponent) {
 -        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_lcm(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi));
         /* 3.  Compute d = e**-1 mod(phi) */
         /*     or      e = d**-1 mod(phi) as necessary */
         if (needPublicExponent) {
@@ -165,6 +165,15 @@ rsa_build_from_primes(const mp_int *p, c
         goto cleanup;
     }
 +    /* make sure we weren't passed in a d or e = 1 mod phi */
 +    /* just need to check d, because if one is = 1 mod phi, they both are */
 +    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &phi, &tmp));
 +    if (mp_cmp_d(&tmp, 2) <= 0) {
 +        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 +        rv = SECFailure;
 +        goto cleanup;
 +    }
 +
     /* 4.  Compute exponent1 = d mod (p-1) */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(d, &psub1, &tmp));
     MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&tmp, &key->exponent1, key->arena);
@@ -1152,6 +1161,8 @@ rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTCheckedPubKey(RSAPriv
     /* Perform a public key operation v = m ** e mod n */
     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(m, &e, &n, &v));
     if (mp_cmp(&v, c) != 0) {
 +        /* this error triggers a fips fatal error lock */
 +        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
         rv = SECFailure;
     }
 cleanup:
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
@@ -977,14 +977,14 @@ rsa_GetHMACContext(const SECHashObject *
     /* now create the hmac key */
     hmac = HMAC_Create(hash, keyHash, keyLen, PR_TRUE);
     if (hmac == NULL) {
 -        PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
 +        PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
         return NULL;
     }
     HMAC_Begin(hmac);
     HMAC_Update(hmac, input, inputLen);
     rv = HMAC_Finish(hmac, keyHash, &keyLen, sizeof(keyHash));
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 -        PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
 +        PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
         HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
         return NULL;
     }
@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ rsa_GetHMACContext(const SECHashObject *
      * reuse the original context allocated above so we don't
      * need to allocate and free another one */
     rv = HMAC_ReInit(hmac, hash, keyHash, keyLen, PR_TRUE);
 -    PORT_Memset(keyHash, 0, sizeof(keyHash));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(keyHash, sizeof(keyHash));
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
         return NULL;
@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ rsa_HMACPrf(HMACContext *hmac, const cha
             return rv;
         }
         PORT_Memcpy(output, hmacLast, left);
 -        PORT_Memset(hmacLast, 0, sizeof(hmacLast));
 +        PORT_SafeZero(hmacLast, sizeof(hmacLast));
     }
     return rv;
 }
@@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ rsa_GetErrorLength(HMACContext *hmac, in
         outLength = PORT_CT_SEL(PORT_CT_LT(candidate, maxLegalLen),
                                 candidate, outLength);
     }
 -    PORT_Memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(out, sizeof(out));
     return outLength;
 }
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/shvfy.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyDSACheck(PRFileDesc *shFD,
     /* verify the hash against the check file */
     rv = DSA_VerifyDigest(key, signature, &hash);
 -    PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(hashBuf, sizeof hashBuf);
     return (rv == SECSuccess) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
 }
 #endif
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyHMACCheck(PRFileDesc *shFD
     if (rv == SECSuccess) {
         result = SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(signature, &hash);
     }
 -    PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(hashBuf, sizeof hashBuf);
     return result;
 }
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
 #ifndef NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
     DSAPublicKey key;
 -    PORT_Memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(&key, sizeof(key));
 #endif
     /* If our integrity check was never ran or failed, fail any other
@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, P
     shFD = NULL;
 loser:
 -    PORT_Memset(&header, 0, sizeof header);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(&header, sizeof header);
     if (checkName != NULL) {
         PORT_Free(checkName);
     }
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/tlsprfalg.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ loser:
     /* clear out state so it's not left on the stack */
     if (cx)
         HMAC_Destroy(cx, PR_TRUE);
 -    PORT_Memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
 -    PORT_Memset(outbuf, 0, sizeof(outbuf));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(state, sizeof(state));
 +    PORT_SafeZero(outbuf, sizeof(outbuf));
     return rv;
 }
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c.safe_zero ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c
 --- ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c.safe_zero	2023-11-22 14:42:24.247388378 -0800
 +++ ./lib/freebl/unix_urandom.c	2023-11-22 14:44:15.519400684 -0800
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(void)
         return;
     }
     RNG_RandomUpdate(bytes, numBytes);
 -    PORT_Memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes);
 +    PORT_SafeZero(bytes, sizeof bytes);
 }
 #ifdef NSS_FIPS_140_3
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.safe_zero ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.safe_zero	2023-11-22 14:41:24.069840921 -0800
 +++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c	2023-11-22 14:42:24.248388387 -0800
@@ -5092,7 +5092,7 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
         if ((signature_length >= pairwise_digest_length) &&
             (PORT_Memcmp(known_digest, signature + (signature_length - pairwise_digest_length), pairwise_digest_length) == 0)) {
             PORT_Free(signature);
 -            return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
 +            return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
         }
         /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */
 diff -up ./lib/util/secport.h.safe_zero ./lib/util/secport.h
 --- ./lib/util/secport.h.safe_zero	2023-06-04 01:42:53.000000000 -0700
 +++ ./lib/util/secport.h	2023-11-22 14:42:24.248388387 -0800
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 +/* ask for Annex K for memset_s. will set the appropriate #define
 + * if Annex K is supported */
 +#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -182,6 +185,39 @@ SEC_END_PROTOS
 #endif /*SUNOS4*/
 #define PORT_Memset memset
 +/* there are cases where the compiler optimizes away our attempt to clear
 + * out our stack variables. There are multiple solutions for this problem,
 + * but they aren't universally accepted on all platforms. This attempts
 + * to select the best solution available given our os, compilier, and libc */
 +#ifdef __STDC_LIB_EXT1__
 +/* if the os implements C11 annex K, use memset_s */
 +#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) memset_s(p, n, 0, n)
 +#else
 +#ifdef XP_WIN
 +/* windows has a secure zero funtion */
 +#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) SecureZeroMemory(p, n)
 +#else
 +/* _DEFAULT_SORUCE  == BSD source in GCC based environments
 + * if other environmens support explicit_bzero, their defines
 + * should be added here */
 +#if defined(_DEFAULT_SOURCE) || defined(_BSD_SOURCE)
 +#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n) explicit_bzero(p, n)
 +#else
 +/* if the os doesn't support one of the above, but does support
 + * memset_explicit, you can add the definition for memset with the
 + * appropriate define check here */
 +/* define an explicitly implementated Safe zero if the OS
 + * doesn't provide one */
 +#define PORT_SafeZero(p, n)                                \
 +    if (p != NULL) {                                       \
 +        volatile unsigned char *__vl = (unsigned char *)p; \
 +        size_t __nl = n;                                   \
 +        while (__nl--) *__vl++ = 0;                        \
 +    }
 +#endif /* no explicit_bzero */
 +#endif /* no windows SecureZeroMemory */
 +#endif /* no memset_s */
 +
 #define PORT_Strcasecmp PL_strcasecmp
 #define PORT_Strcat strcat
 #define PORT_Strchr strchr
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.90-pbkdf2-indicator.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.90-pbkdf2-indicator.patch
@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.pkcs12_indicator ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
 --- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.pkcs12_indicator	2023-08-03 10:50:37.067109367 -0700
 +++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c	2023-08-03 11:41:55.641541953 -0700
@@ -2429,7 +2429,7 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
             return PR_FALSE;
         case SFTKFIPSECC:
             /* we've already handled the curve selection in the 'getlength'
 -          * function */
 +             * function */
             return PR_TRUE;
         case SFTKFIPSAEAD: {
             if (mech->ulParameterLen == 0) {
@@ -2463,6 +2463,29 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
             }
             return PR_TRUE;
         }
 +        case SFTKFIPSPBKDF2: {
 +            /* PBKDF2 must have the following addition restrictions
 +             * (independent of keysize).
 +             *    1. iteration count must be at least 1000.
 +             *    2. salt must be at least 128 bits (16 bytes).
 +             *    3. password must match the length specified in the SP
 +             */
 +             CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkdf2 = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)
 +                                                    mech->pParameter;
 +             if (mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof(*pbkdf2)) {
 +                 return PR_FALSE;
 +             }
 +             if (pbkdf2->iterations < 1000) {
 +                 return PR_FALSE;
 +             }
 +             if (pbkdf2->ulSaltSourceDataLen < 16) {
 +                 return PR_FALSE;
 +             }
 +             if (*(pbkdf2->ulPasswordLen) < SFTKFIPS_PBKDF2_MIN_PW_LEN) {
 +                 return PR_FALSE;
 +             }
 +             return PR_TRUE;
 +        }
         default:
             break;
     }
--- a/SOURCES/nss-3.90-ppc_no_init.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.90-ppc_no_init.patch
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
 diff -up ./lib/freebl/Makefile.ppc_no_init ./lib/freebl/Makefile
 --- ./lib/freebl/Makefile.ppc_no_init	2024-06-03 14:12:24.216755903 -0700
 +++ ./lib/freebl/Makefile	2024-06-03 14:11:36.464234903 -0700
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ endif
 ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
     EXTRA_SRCS += gcm-ppc.c
 ifdef USE_64
 -    DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
 +#    DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
     PPC_ABI := $(shell $(CC) -dM -E - < /dev/null | awk '$$2 == "_CALL_ELF" {print $$3}')
     ifeq ($(PPC_ABI),2)
         ASFILES += sha512-p8.s
 diff -up ./lib/softoken/Makefile.ppc_no_init ./lib/softoken/Makefile
 --- ./lib/softoken/Makefile.ppc_no_init	2024-06-03 14:12:44.664979003 -0700
 +++ ./lib/softoken/Makefile	2024-06-03 14:10:26.703473806 -0700
@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@ include $(CORE_DEPTH)/coreconf/config.mk
 ifdef NSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
     DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
 endif
 -ifeq ($(OS_TARGET),Linux)
 -ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
 -ifdef USE_64
 -    DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
 -endif # USE_64
 -endif # ppc
 -endif # Linux
 +#ifeq ($(OS_TARGET),Linux)
 +#ifeq ($(CPU_ARCH),ppc)
 +#ifdef USE_64
 +#    DEFINES += -DNSS_NO_INIT_SUPPORT
 +#endif # USE_64
 +#endif # ppc
 +#endif # Linux
 #######################################################################
--- a/SOURCES/nss-config.in
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-config.in
@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 prefix=@prefix@
 major_version=@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@
 minor_version=@MOD_MINOR_VERSION@
 patch_version=@MOD_PATCH_VERSION@
 usage()
 {
 	cat <<EOF
 Usage: nss-config [OPTIONS] [LIBRARIES]
 Options:
 	[--prefix[=DIR]]
 	[--exec-prefix[=DIR]]
 	[--includedir[=DIR]]
 	[--libdir[=DIR]]
 	[--version]
 	[--libs]
 	[--cflags]
 Dynamic Libraries:
 	nss
 	nssutil
 	ssl
 	smime
 EOF
 	exit $1
 }
 if test $# -eq 0; then
 	usage 1 1>&2
 fi
 lib_ssl=yes
 lib_smime=yes
 lib_nss=yes
 lib_nssutil=yes
 while test $# -gt 0; do
  case "$1" in
  -*=*) optarg=`echo "$1" | sed 's/[-_a-zA-Z0-9]*=//'` ;;
  *) optarg= ;;
  esac
  case $1 in
    --prefix=*)
      prefix=$optarg
      ;;
    --prefix)
      echo_prefix=yes
      ;;
    --exec-prefix=*)
      exec_prefix=$optarg
      ;;
    --exec-prefix)
      echo_exec_prefix=yes
      ;;
    --includedir=*)
      includedir=$optarg
      ;;
    --includedir)
      echo_includedir=yes
      ;;
    --libdir=*)
      libdir=$optarg
      ;;
    --libdir)
      echo_libdir=yes
      ;;
    --version)
      echo ${major_version}.${minor_version}.${patch_version}
      ;;
    --cflags)
      echo_cflags=yes
      ;;
    --libs)
      echo_libs=yes
      ;;
    ssl)
      lib_ssl=yes
      ;;
    smime)
      lib_smime=yes
      ;;
    nss)
      lib_nss=yes
      ;;
    nssutil)
      lib_nssutil=yes
      ;;
    *)
      usage 1 1>&2
      ;;
  esac
  shift
 done
 # Set variables that may be dependent upon other variables
 if test -z "$exec_prefix"; then
    exec_prefix=`pkg-config --variable=exec_prefix nss`
 fi
 if test -z "$includedir"; then
    includedir=`pkg-config --variable=includedir nss`
 fi
 if test -z "$libdir"; then
    libdir=`pkg-config --variable=libdir nss`
 fi
 if test "$echo_prefix" = "yes"; then
    echo $prefix
 fi
 if test "$echo_exec_prefix" = "yes"; then
    echo $exec_prefix
 fi
 if test "$echo_includedir" = "yes"; then
    echo $includedir
 fi
 if test "$echo_libdir" = "yes"; then
    echo $libdir
 fi
 if test "$echo_cflags" = "yes"; then
    echo -I$includedir
 fi
 if test "$echo_libs" = "yes"; then
      libdirs="-Wl,-rpath-link,$libdir -L$libdir"
      if test -n "$lib_ssl"; then
 	libdirs="$libdirs -lssl${major_version}"
      fi
      if test -n "$lib_smime"; then
 	libdirs="$libdirs -lsmime${major_version}"
      fi
      if test -n "$lib_nss"; then
 	libdirs="$libdirs -lnss${major_version}"
      fi
      if test -n "$lib_nssutil"; then
 	libdirs="$libdirs -lnssutil${major_version}"
      fi
      echo $libdirs
 fi      
--- a/SOURCES/nss-config.xml
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-config.xml
@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
 <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
 <!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
 <!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
 <!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
 ]>
 <refentry id="nss-config">
  <refentryinfo>
    <date>&date;</date>
    <title>Network Security Services</title>
    <productname>nss</productname>
    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
  </refentryinfo>
  <refmeta>
    <refentrytitle>nss-config</refentrytitle>
    <manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
  </refmeta>
  <refnamediv>
    <refname>nss-config</refname>
    <refpurpose>Return meta information about nss libraries</refpurpose>
  </refnamediv>
  <refsynopsisdiv>
    <cmdsynopsis>
      <command>nss-config</command>
      <arg><option>--prefix</option></arg>
      <arg><option>--exec-prefix</option></arg>
      <arg><option>--includedir</option></arg>
      <arg><option>--libs</option></arg>
      <arg><option>--cflags</option></arg>
      <arg><option>--libdir</option></arg>
      <arg><option>--version</option></arg>
    </cmdsynopsis>
  </refsynopsisdiv>
 <refsection id="description">
    <title>Description</title>
    <para><command>nss-config</command> is a shell scrip
    tool which can be used to obtain gcc options for building client pacakges of nspt. </para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>Options</title>
    <variablelist>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--prefix</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>Returns the top level system directory under which the nss libraries are installed.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--exec-prefix</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>returns the top level system directory under which any nss binaries would be installed.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--includedir</option> <replaceable>count</replaceable></term>
        <listitem><simpara>returns the path to the directory were the nss libraries are installed.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--version</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>returns the upstream version of nss in the form major_version-minor_version-patch_version.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--libs</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>returns the compiler linking flags.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--cflags</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>returns the compiler include flags.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>--libdir</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>returns the path to the directory were the nss libraries are installed.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
    </variablelist>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>Examples</title>
    <para>The following example will query for both include path and linkage flags:
      <programlisting>
        /usr/bin/nss-config --cflags --libs
      </programlisting>
    </para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>Files</title>
    <para><filename>/usr/bin/nss-config</filename></para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>See also</title>
    <para>pkg-config(1)</para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection id="authors">
    <title>Authors</title>
    <para>The nss liraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat,  Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
    <para>
 	Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.
    </para>
  </refsection>
 <!-- don't change -->
  <refsection id="license">
    <title>LICENSE</title>
    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
    </para>
  </refsection>
 </refentry>
--- a/SOURCES/nss-dso-ldflags.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-dso-ldflags.patch
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
 Index: nss/coreconf/Linux.mk
 ===================================================================
 --- nss.orig/coreconf/Linux.mk
 +++ nss/coreconf/Linux.mk
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ ifdef USE_PTHREADS
 endif
 DSO_CFLAGS		= -fPIC
 -DSO_LDOPTS		= -shared $(ARCHFLAG) -Wl,--gc-sections
 +DSO_LDOPTS		= -shared $(ARCHFLAG) -Wl,--gc-sections $(DSO_LDFLAGS)
 # The linker on Red Hat Linux 7.2 and RHEL 2.1 (GNU ld version 2.11.90.0.8)
 # incorrectly reports undefined references in the libraries we link with, so
 # we don't use -z defs there.
--- a/SOURCES/nss-no-dbm-man-page.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-no-dbm-man-page.patch
@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
 diff -up ./doc/certutil.xml.no-dbm ./doc/certutil.xml
 --- ./doc/certutil.xml.no-dbm	2021-05-29 10:26:21.853386165 -0700
 +++ ./doc/certutil.xml	2021-05-29 10:31:15.057058619 -0700
@@ -205,8 +205,7 @@ If this option is not used, the validity
           <para><command>certutil</command> supports two types of databases: the legacy security databases (<filename>cert8.db</filename>, <filename>key3.db</filename>, and <filename>secmod.db</filename>) and new SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). </para>
           <para>NSS recognizes the following prefixes:</para>
           <itemizedlist>
 -            <listitem><para><command>sql:</command> requests the newer database</para></listitem>
 -	    <listitem><para><command>dbm:</command> requests the legacy database</para></listitem>
 +            <listitem><para><command>sql:</command> requests the sql-lite database</para></listitem>
           </itemizedlist>
           <para>If no prefix is specified the default type is retrieved from NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE. If NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE is not set then <command>sql:</command> is the default.</para>
         </listitem>
@@ -1205,17 +1204,9 @@ BerkeleyDB. These new databases provide
 	</listitem>
 </itemizedlist>
 -<para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. The shared database type is preferred; the legacy format is included for backward compatibility.</para>
 +<para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. </para>
 -<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.
 -Using the legacy databases must be manually specified by using the <command>dbm:</command> prefix with the given security directory. For example:</para>
 -
 -<programlisting>$ certutil -L -d dbm:/home/my/sharednssdb</programlisting>
 -
 -<para>To set the legacy database type as the default type for the tools, set the <envar>NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE</envar> environment variable to <envar>dbm</envar>:</para>
 -<programlisting>export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"</programlisting>
 -
 -<para>This line can be set added to the <filename>~/.bashrc</filename> file to make the change permanent.</para>
 +<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.</para>
 <itemizedlist>
 	<listitem>
 diff -up ./doc/modutil.xml.no-dbm ./doc/modutil.xml
 --- ./doc/modutil.xml.no-dbm	2021-05-29 10:26:21.854386171 -0700
 +++ ./doc/modutil.xml	2021-05-29 10:28:23.293078869 -0700
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
       <varlistentry>
         <term>-dbdir directory</term>
 	  <listitem><para>Specify the database directory in which to access or create security module database files.</para>
 -	<para><command>modutil</command> supports two types of databases: the legacy security databases (<filename>cert8.db</filename>, <filename>key3.db</filename>, and <filename>secmod.db</filename>) and SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). If the prefix <command>dbm:</command> is not used, then the tool assumes that the given databases are in SQLite format.</para></listitem>
 +	<para><command>modutil</command> supports SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). </para></listitem>
       </varlistentry>
       <varlistentry>
@@ -689,15 +689,7 @@ BerkleyDB. These new databases provide m
 <para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. The shared database type is preferred; the legacy format is included for backward compatibility.</para>
 -<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.
 -Using the legacy databases must be manually specified by using the <command>dbm:</command> prefix with the given security directory. For example:</para>
 -
 -<programlisting>modutil -create -dbdir dbm:/home/my/sharednssdb</programlisting>
 -
 -<para>To set the legacy database type as the default type for the tools, set the <envar>NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE</envar> environment variable to <envar>dbm</envar>:</para>
 -<programlisting>export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"</programlisting>
 -
 -<para>This line can be added to the <filename>~/.bashrc</filename> file to make the change permanent for the user.</para>
 +<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.  </para> 
 <itemizedlist>
 	<listitem>
 diff -up ./doc/pk12util.xml.no-dbm ./doc/pk12util.xml
 --- ./doc/pk12util.xml.no-dbm	2021-05-29 10:26:21.854386171 -0700
 +++ ./doc/pk12util.xml	2021-05-29 10:28:23.293078869 -0700
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
       <varlistentry>
         <term>-d directory</term>
         <listitem><para>Specify the database directory into which to import to or export from certificates and keys.</para>
 -	<para><command>pk12util</command> supports two types of databases: the legacy security databases (<filename>cert8.db</filename>, <filename>key3.db</filename>, and <filename>secmod.db</filename>) and new SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). If the prefix <command>dbm:</command> is not used, then the tool assumes that the given databases are in the SQLite format.</para></listitem>
 +	<para><command>pk12util</command> supports SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). </para></listitem>
       </varlistentry>
       <varlistentry>
@@ -394,15 +394,7 @@ BerkleyDB. These new databases provide m
 <para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. The shared database type is preferred; the legacy format is included for backward compatibility.</para>
 -<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type
 -Using the legacy databases must be manually specified by using the <command>dbm:</command> prefix with the given security directory. For example:</para>
 -
 -<programlisting># pk12util -i /tmp/cert-files/users.p12 -d dbm:/home/my/sharednssdb</programlisting>
 -
 -<para>To set the legacy database type as the default type for the tools, set the <envar>NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE</envar> environment variable to <envar>dbm</envar>:</para>
 -<programlisting>export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"</programlisting>
 -
 -<para>This line can be set added to the <filename>~/.bashrc</filename> file to make the change permanent.</para>
 +<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.  </para>
 <itemizedlist>
 	<listitem>
 diff -up ./doc/signver.xml.no-dbm ./doc/signver.xml
 --- ./doc/signver.xml.no-dbm	2021-05-29 10:26:21.854386171 -0700
 +++ ./doc/signver.xml	2021-05-29 10:28:23.293078869 -0700
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
       <varlistentry>
         <term>-d <emphasis>directory</emphasis></term>
         <listitem><para>Specify the database directory which contains the certificates and keys.</para>
 -	<para><command>signver</command> supports two types of databases: the legacy security databases (<filename>cert8.db</filename>, <filename>key3.db</filename>, and <filename>secmod.db</filename>) and new SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). If the prefix <command>dbm:</command> is not used, then the tool assumes that the given databases are in the SQLite format.</para></listitem>
 +	<para><command>signver</command> supports SQLite databases (<filename>cert9.db</filename>, <filename>key4.db</filename>, and <filename>pkcs11.txt</filename>). </para></listitem>
       </varlistentry>
       <varlistentry>
         <term>-a</term>
@@ -155,15 +155,7 @@ BerkleyDB. These new databases provide m
 <para>Because the SQLite databases are designed to be shared, these are the <emphasis>shared</emphasis> database type. The shared database type is preferred; the legacy format is included for backward compatibility.</para>
 -<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type
 -Using the legacy databases must be manually specified by using the <command>dbm:</command> prefix with the given security directory. For example:</para>
 -
 -<programlisting># signver -A -s <replaceable>signature</replaceable> -d dbm:/home/my/sharednssdb</programlisting>
 -
 -<para>To set the legacy database type as the default type for the tools, set the <envar>NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE</envar> environment variable to <envar>dbm</envar>:</para>
 -<programlisting>export NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE="dbm"</programlisting>
 -
 -<para>This line can be added to the <filename>~/.bashrc</filename> file to make the change permanent for the user.</para>
 +<para>By default, the tools (<command>certutil</command>, <command>pk12util</command>, <command>modutil</command>) assume that the given security databases use the SQLite type.</para>
 <itemizedlist>
 	<listitem>
--- a/SOURCES/nss-signtool-format.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-signtool-format.patch
@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
 diff --git a/cmd/modutil/install.c b/cmd/modutil/install.c
 --- a/cmd/modutil/install.c
 +++ b/cmd/modutil/install.c
@@ -825,17 +825,20 @@ rm_dash_r(char *path)
         dir = PR_OpenDir(path);
         if (!dir) {
             return -1;
         }
         /* Recursively delete all entries in the directory */
         while ((entry = PR_ReadDir(dir, PR_SKIP_BOTH)) != NULL) {
 -            snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", path, entry->name);
 +            if (snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", path, entry->name) >= sizeof(filename)) {
 +                PR_CloseDir(dir);
 +                return -1;
 +            }
             if (rm_dash_r(filename)) {
                 PR_CloseDir(dir);
                 return -1;
             }
         }
         if (PR_CloseDir(dir) != PR_SUCCESS) {
             return -1;
 diff --git a/cmd/signtool/util.c b/cmd/signtool/util.c
 --- a/cmd/signtool/util.c
 +++ b/cmd/signtool/util.c
@@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ rm_dash_r(char *path)
         /* Recursively delete all entries in the directory */
         while ((entry = PR_ReadDir(dir, PR_SKIP_BOTH)) != NULL) {
             snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", path, entry->name);
 +            if (snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", path, entry->name
 +) >= sizeof(filename)) {
 +                errorCount++;
 +                PR_CloseDir(dir);
 +                return -1;
 +            }
             if (rm_dash_r(filename)) {
                 PR_CloseDir(dir);
                 return -1;
 diff --git a/lib/libpkix/pkix/util/pkix_list.c b/lib/libpkix/pkix/util/pkix_list.c
 --- a/lib/libpkix/pkix/util/pkix_list.c
 +++ b/lib/libpkix/pkix/util/pkix_list.c
@@ -1530,17 +1530,17 @@ cleanup:
  */
 PKIX_Error *
 PKIX_List_SetItem(
         PKIX_List *list,
         PKIX_UInt32 index,
         PKIX_PL_Object *item,
         void *plContext)
 {
 -        PKIX_List *element;
 +        PKIX_List *element = NULL;
         PKIX_ENTER(LIST, "PKIX_List_SetItem");
         PKIX_NULLCHECK_ONE(list);
         if (list->immutable){
                 PKIX_ERROR(PKIX_OPERATIONNOTPERMITTEDONIMMUTABLELIST);
         }
 diff --git a/lib/libpkix/pkix_pl_nss/system/pkix_pl_oid.c b/lib/libpkix/pkix_pl_nss/system/pkix_pl_oid.c
 --- a/lib/libpkix/pkix_pl_nss/system/pkix_pl_oid.c
 +++ b/lib/libpkix/pkix_pl_nss/system/pkix_pl_oid.c
@@ -102,17 +102,17 @@ cleanup:
  */
 static PKIX_Error *
 pkix_pl_OID_Equals(
         PKIX_PL_Object *first,
         PKIX_PL_Object *second,
         PKIX_Boolean *pResult,
         void *plContext)
 {
 -        PKIX_Int32 cmpResult;
 +        PKIX_Int32 cmpResult = 0;
         PKIX_ENTER(OID, "pkix_pl_OID_Equals");
         PKIX_NULLCHECK_THREE(first, second, pResult);
         PKIX_CHECK(pkix_pl_OID_Comparator
                     (first, second, &cmpResult, plContext),
                     PKIX_OIDCOMPARATORFAILED);
--- a/SOURCES/nss-softokn-config.in
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-softokn-config.in
@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 prefix=@prefix@
 major_version=@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@
 minor_version=@MOD_MINOR_VERSION@
 patch_version=@MOD_PATCH_VERSION@
 usage()
 {
 	cat <<EOF
 Usage: nss-softokn-config [OPTIONS] [LIBRARIES]
 Options:
 	[--prefix[=DIR]]
 	[--exec-prefix[=DIR]]
 	[--includedir[=DIR]]
 	[--libdir[=DIR]]
 	[--version]
 	[--libs]
 	[--cflags]
 Dynamic Libraries:
 	softokn3 - Requires full dynamic linking
 	freebl3  - for internal use only (and glibc for self-integrity check)
 	nssdbm3  - for internal use only
 Dymamically linked
 EOF
 	exit $1
 }
 if test $# -eq 0; then
 	usage 1 1>&2
 fi
 while test $# -gt 0; do
  case "$1" in
  -*=*) optarg=`echo "$1" | sed 's/[-_a-zA-Z0-9]*=//'` ;;
  *) optarg= ;;
  esac
  case $1 in
    --prefix=*)
      prefix=$optarg
      ;;
    --prefix)
      echo_prefix=yes
      ;;
    --exec-prefix=*)
      exec_prefix=$optarg
      ;;
    --exec-prefix)
      echo_exec_prefix=yes
      ;;
    --includedir=*)
      includedir=$optarg
      ;;
    --includedir)
      echo_includedir=yes
      ;;
    --libdir=*)
      libdir=$optarg
      ;;
    --libdir)
      echo_libdir=yes
      ;;
    --version)
      echo ${major_version}.${minor_version}.${patch_version}
      ;;
    --cflags)
      echo_cflags=yes
      ;;
    --libs)
      echo_libs=yes
      ;;
    *)
      usage 1 1>&2
      ;;
  esac
  shift
 done
 # Set variables that may be dependent upon other variables
 if test -z "$exec_prefix"; then
    exec_prefix=`pkg-config --variable=exec_prefix nss-softokn`
 fi
 if test -z "$includedir"; then
    includedir=`pkg-config --variable=includedir nss-softokn`
 fi
 if test -z "$libdir"; then
    libdir=`pkg-config --variable=libdir nss-softokn`
 fi
 if test "$echo_prefix" = "yes"; then
    echo $prefix
 fi
 if test "$echo_exec_prefix" = "yes"; then
    echo $exec_prefix
 fi
 if test "$echo_includedir" = "yes"; then
    echo $includedir
 fi
 if test "$echo_libdir" = "yes"; then
    echo $libdir
 fi
 if test "$echo_cflags" = "yes"; then
    echo -I$includedir
 fi
 if test "$echo_libs" = "yes"; then
      libdirs="-Wl,-rpath-link,$libdir -L$libdir"
      echo $libdirs
 fi
--- a/SOURCES/nss-softokn-dracut-module-setup.sh
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-softokn-dracut-module-setup.sh
@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 # -*- mode: shell-script; indent-tabs-mode: nil; sh-basic-offset: 4; -*-
 # ex: ts=8 sw=4 sts=4 et filetype=sh
 check() {
    return 255
 }
 depends() {
    return 0
 }
 install() {
    local _dir
    inst_libdir_file libfreeblpriv3.so libfreeblpriv3.chk \
        libfreebl3.so
 }
--- a/SOURCES/nss-softokn-dracut.conf
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-softokn-dracut.conf
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
 # turn on nss-softokn module
 add_dracutmodules+=" nss-softokn "
--- a/SOURCES/nss-softokn.pc.in
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-softokn.pc.in
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
 prefix=%prefix%
 exec_prefix=%exec_prefix%
 libdir=%libdir%
 includedir=%includedir%
 Name: NSS-SOFTOKN
 Description: Network Security Services Softoken PKCS #11 Module
 Version: %SOFTOKEN_VERSION%
 Requires: nspr >= %NSPR_VERSION%, nss-util >= %NSSUTIL_VERSION%
 Libs: -L${libdir} -lfreebl3 -lnssdbm3 -lsoftokn3
 Cflags: -I${includedir}
--- a/SOURCES/nss-util-config.in
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-util-config.in
@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 prefix=@prefix@
 major_version=@MOD_MAJOR_VERSION@
 minor_version=@MOD_MINOR_VERSION@
 patch_version=@MOD_PATCH_VERSION@
 usage()
 {
 	cat <<EOF
 Usage: nss-util-config [OPTIONS] [LIBRARIES]
 Options:
 	[--prefix[=DIR]]
 	[--exec-prefix[=DIR]]
 	[--includedir[=DIR]]
 	[--libdir[=DIR]]
 	[--version]
 	[--libs]
 	[--cflags]
 Dynamic Libraries:
 	nssutil
 EOF
 	exit $1
 }
 if test $# -eq 0; then
 	usage 1 1>&2
 fi
 lib_nssutil=yes
 while test $# -gt 0; do
  case "$1" in
  -*=*) optarg=`echo "$1" | sed 's/[-_a-zA-Z0-9]*=//'` ;;
  *) optarg= ;;
  esac
  case $1 in
    --prefix=*)
      prefix=$optarg
      ;;
    --prefix)
      echo_prefix=yes
      ;;
    --exec-prefix=*)
      exec_prefix=$optarg
      ;;
    --exec-prefix)
      echo_exec_prefix=yes
      ;;
    --includedir=*)
      includedir=$optarg
      ;;
    --includedir)
      echo_includedir=yes
      ;;
    --libdir=*)
      libdir=$optarg
      ;;
    --libdir)
      echo_libdir=yes
      ;;
    --version)
      echo ${major_version}.${minor_version}.${patch_version}
      ;;
    --cflags)
      echo_cflags=yes
      ;;
    --libs)
      echo_libs=yes
      ;;
    *)
      usage 1 1>&2
      ;;
  esac
  shift
 done
 # Set variables that may be dependent upon other variables
 if test -z "$exec_prefix"; then
    exec_prefix=`pkg-config --variable=exec_prefix nss-util`
 fi
 if test -z "$includedir"; then
    includedir=`pkg-config --variable=includedir nss-util`
 fi
 if test -z "$libdir"; then
    libdir=`pkg-config --variable=libdir nss-util`
 fi
 if test "$echo_prefix" = "yes"; then
    echo $prefix
 fi
 if test "$echo_exec_prefix" = "yes"; then
    echo $exec_prefix
 fi
 if test "$echo_includedir" = "yes"; then
    echo $includedir
 fi
 if test "$echo_libdir" = "yes"; then
    echo $libdir
 fi
 if test "$echo_cflags" = "yes"; then
    echo -I$includedir
 fi
 if test "$echo_libs" = "yes"; then
      libdirs="-Wl,-rpath-link,$libdir -L$libdir"
      if test -n "$lib_nssutil"; then
 	libdirs="$libdirs -lnssutil${major_version}"
      fi
      echo $libdirs
 fi
--- a/SOURCES/nss-util.pc.in
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-util.pc.in
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
 prefix=%prefix%
 exec_prefix=%exec_prefix%
 libdir=%libdir%
 includedir=%includedir%
 Name: NSS-UTIL
 Description: Network Security Services Utility Library
 Version: %NSSUTIL_VERSION%
 Requires: nspr >= %NSPR_VERSION%
 Libs: -L${libdir} -lnssutil3
 Cflags: -I${includedir}
--- a/SOURCES/nss.pc.in
+++ b/SOURCES/nss.pc.in
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
 prefix=%prefix%
 exec_prefix=%exec_prefix%
 libdir=%libdir%
 includedir=%includedir%
 Name: NSS
 Description: Network Security Services
 Version: %NSS_VERSION%
 Requires: nspr >= %NSPR_VERSION%, nss-util >= %NSSUTIL_VERSION%
 Libs: -L${libdir} -lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3
 Cflags: -I${includedir}
--- a/SOURCES/pkcs11.txt.xml
+++ b/SOURCES/pkcs11.txt.xml
@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
 <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
 <!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
 <!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
 <!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
 ]>
 <refentry id="pkcs11.txt">
  <refentryinfo>
    <date>&date;</date>
    <title>Network Security Services</title>
    <productname>nss</productname>
    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
  </refentryinfo>
  <refmeta>
    <refentrytitle>pkcs11.txt</refentrytitle>
    <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
  </refmeta>
  <refnamediv>
    <refname>pkcs11.txt</refname>
    <refpurpose>NSS PKCS #11 module configuration file</refpurpose>
  </refnamediv>
  <refsection id="description">
    <title>Description</title>
    <para>
 The pkcs11.txt file is used to configure initialization parameters for the nss security module and optionally other pkcs #11 modules.
    </para>
    <para>
 For full documentation visit <ulink url="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/PKCS11_Module_Specs">PKCS #11 Module Specs</ulink>.
    </para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>Files</title>
    <para><filename>/etc/pki/nssdb/pkcs11.txt</filename></para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection id="authors">
    <title>Authors</title>
    <para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat,  Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
    <para>Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
  </refsection>
 <!-- don't change -->
  <refsection id="license">
    <title>LICENSE</title>
    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
    </para>
  </refsection>
 </refentry>
--- a/SOURCES/setup-nsssysinit.sh
+++ b/SOURCES/setup-nsssysinit.sh
@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 #
 # Turns on or off the nss-sysinit module db by editing the
 # global PKCS #11 congiguration file. Displays the status.
 #
 # This script can be invoked by the user as super user.
 # It is invoked at nss-sysinit post install time with argument on.
 #
 usage()
 {
  cat <<EOF
 Usage: setup-nsssysinit [on|off]
  on     - turns on nsssysinit
  off    - turns off nsssysinit
  status - reports whether nsssysinit is turned on or off
 EOF
  exit $1
 }
 # validate
 if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then
  usage 1 1>&2
 fi
 # the system-wide configuration file
 p11conf="/etc/pki/nssdb/pkcs11.txt"
 # must exist, otherwise report it and exit with failure
 if [ ! -f $p11conf ]; then
  echo "Could not find ${p11conf}"
  exit 1
 fi
 # check if nsssysinit is currently enabled or disabled
 sysinit_enabled()
 {
  grep -q '^library=libnsssysinit' ${p11conf}
 }
 umask 022
 case "$1" in
  on | ON )
    if sysinit_enabled; then 
      exit 0 
    fi
    cat ${p11conf} | \
    sed -e 's/^library=$/library=libnsssysinit.so/' \
        -e '/^NSS/s/\(Flags=internal\)\(,[^m]\)/\1,moduleDBOnly\2/' > \
        ${p11conf}.on
    mv ${p11conf}.on ${p11conf}
    ;;
  off | OFF )
    if ! sysinit_enabled; then
      exit 0
    fi
    cat ${p11conf} | \
    sed -e 's/^library=libnsssysinit.so/library=/' \
        -e '/^NSS/s/Flags=internal,moduleDBOnly/Flags=internal/' > \
        ${p11conf}.off
    mv ${p11conf}.off ${p11conf}
    ;;
  status )
    echo -n 'NSS sysinit is '
    sysinit_enabled && echo 'enabled' || echo 'disabled'
    ;;
  * )
    usage 1 1>&2
    ;;
 esac
--- a/SOURCES/setup-nsssysinit.xml
+++ b/SOURCES/setup-nsssysinit.xml
@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
 <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
 <!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.2//EN"
  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.2/docbookx.dtd" [
 <!ENTITY date SYSTEM "date.xml">
 <!ENTITY version SYSTEM "version.xml">
 ]>
 <refentry id="setup-nsssysinit">
  <refentryinfo>
    <date>&date;</date>
    <title>Network Security Services</title>
    <productname>nss</productname>
    <productnumber>&version;</productnumber>
  </refentryinfo>
  <refmeta>
    <refentrytitle>setup-nsssysinit</refentrytitle>
    <manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
  </refmeta>
  <refnamediv>
    <refname>setup-nsssysinit</refname>
    <refpurpose>Query or enable the nss-sysinit module</refpurpose>
  </refnamediv>
  <refsynopsisdiv>
    <cmdsynopsis>
      <command>setup-nsssysinit</command>
      <arg><option>on</option></arg>
      <arg><option>off</option></arg>
      <arg><option>status</option></arg>
    </cmdsynopsis>
  </refsynopsisdiv>
 <refsection id="description">
    <title>Description</title>
    <para><command>setup-nsssysinit</command> is a shell script to query the status of the nss-sysinit module and when run with root priviledge it can enable or disable it. </para>
  <para>Turns on or off the nss-sysinit module db by editing the global PKCS #11 configuration file. Displays the status. This script can be invoked by the user as super user. It is invoked at nss-sysinit post install time with argument on.
  </para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>Options</title>
    <variablelist>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>on</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>Turn on nss-sysinit.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>off</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>Turn on nss-sysinit.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
        <term><option>status</option></term>
        <listitem><simpara>returns whether nss-syinit is enabled or not.</simpara></listitem>
      </varlistentry>
    </variablelist>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>Examples</title>
    <para>The following example will query for the status of nss-sysinit:
      <programlisting>
        /usr/bin/setup-nsssysinit status
      </programlisting>
    </para>
    <para>The following example, when run as superuser, will turn on nss-sysinit:
      <programlisting>
        /usr/bin/setup-nsssysinit on
      </programlisting>
    </para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>Files</title>
    <para><filename>/usr/bin/setup-nsssysinit</filename></para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection>
    <title>See also</title>
    <para>pkg-config(1)</para>
  </refsection>
  <refsection id="authors">
    <title>Authors</title>
    <para>The nss libraries were written and maintained by developers with Netscape, Red Hat,  Sun, Oracle, Mozilla, and Google.</para>
    <para>Authors: Elio Maldonado &lt;emaldona@redhat.com>.</para>
  </refsection>
 <!-- don't change -->
  <refsection id="license">
    <title>LICENSE</title>
    <para>Licensed under the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.  If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
    </para>
  </refsection>
 </refentry>
--- a/SOURCES/system-pkcs11.txt
+++ b/SOURCES/system-pkcs11.txt
@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
 library=libnsssysinit.so
 name=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module
 parameters=configdir='sql:/etc/pki/nssdb'  certPrefix='' keyPrefix='' secmod='secmod.db' flags= updatedir='' updateCertPrefix='' updateKeyPrefix='' updateid='' updateTokenDescription='' 
 NSS=Flags=internal,moduleDBOnly,critical trustOrder=75 cipherOrder=100 slotParams=(1={slotFlags=[RSA,DSA,DH,RC2,RC4,DES,RANDOM,SHA1,MD5,MD2,SSL,TLS,AES,Camellia,SEED,SHA256,SHA512] askpw=any timeout=30})
--- a/SPECS/nss.spec
+++ b/SPECS/nss.spec
		`@ -0,0 +1,3 @@`
							`# turn on nss-softokn module`

							`add_dracutmodules+=" nss-softokn "`