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10
.gitignore vendored

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
SOURCES/cjs-module-lexer-1.2.2.tar.gz SOURCES/cjs-module-lexer-1.2.2.tar.gz
SOURCES/icu4c-71_1-src.tgz SOURCES/icu4c-73_2-src.tgz
SOURCES/node-v16.20.2-stripped.tar.gz SOURCES/node-v20.5.1-stripped.tar.gz
SOURCES/undici-5.20.0.tar.gz SOURCES/undici-5.22.1.tar.gz
SOURCES/wasi-sdk-wasi-sdk-11.tar.gz SOURCES/wasi-sdk-11.0-linux.tar.gz
SOURCES/wasi-sdk-wasi-sdk-14.tar.gz SOURCES/wasi-sdk-14.0-linux.tar.gz

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
b0a91341ecf6c68a9d59a1c57d000fbbcc771679 SOURCES/cjs-module-lexer-1.2.2.tar.gz b0a91341ecf6c68a9d59a1c57d000fbbcc771679 SOURCES/cjs-module-lexer-1.2.2.tar.gz
406b0c8635288b772913b6ff646451e69748878a SOURCES/icu4c-71_1-src.tgz 3d94969b097189bf5479c312d9593d2d252f5a73 SOURCES/icu4c-73_2-src.tgz
0024086ed6090aaea422fb2bd329f898bf924df6 SOURCES/node-v16.20.2-stripped.tar.gz ff25b892461bb3d6b359dec449e9ef86dd87115c SOURCES/node-v20.5.1-stripped.tar.gz
0b3e890fd45200fb3a2fdc14408cc51e23990480 SOURCES/undici-5.20.0.tar.gz 616384b209d651b7cb7b41a8a7752eb2e923806a SOURCES/undici-5.22.1.tar.gz
8979d177dd62e3b167a6fd7dc7185adb0128c439 SOURCES/wasi-sdk-wasi-sdk-11.tar.gz ff114dd45b4efeeae7afe4621bfc6f886a475b4b SOURCES/wasi-sdk-11.0-linux.tar.gz
900a50a32f0079d53c299db92b88bb3c5d2022b8 SOURCES/wasi-sdk-wasi-sdk-14.tar.gz c29e21be754c26cac4bf99848c5b1f4e8564e248 SOURCES/wasi-sdk-14.0-linux.tar.gz

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From 6c80c1956373978489a297a630f4f50222c47775 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From c73e0892eb1d0aa2df805618c019dc5c96b79705 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build> From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 13:12:35 +0200 Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 13:12:35 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Disable running gyp on shared deps Subject: [PATCH] Disable running gyp on shared deps
@ -6,21 +6,50 @@ Subject: [PATCH] Disable running gyp on shared deps
Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build> Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
--- ---
Makefile | 2 +- Makefile | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) node.gyp | 17 -----------------
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index ef3eda2..8b52a4f 100644 index 0be0659..3c44201 100644
--- a/Makefile --- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile +++ b/Makefile
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ with-code-cache test-code-cache: @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ with-code-cache test-code-cache:
$(warning '$@' target is a noop) $(warning '$@' target is a noop)
out/Makefile: config.gypi common.gypi node.gyp \ out/Makefile: config.gypi common.gypi node.gyp \
- deps/uv/uv.gyp deps/llhttp/llhttp.gyp deps/zlib/zlib.gyp \ - deps/uv/uv.gyp deps/llhttp/llhttp.gyp deps/zlib/zlib.gyp \
+ deps/llhttp/llhttp.gyp \ + deps/llhttp/llhttp.gyp \
deps/simdutf/simdutf.gyp deps/ada/ada.gyp \
tools/v8_gypfiles/toolchain.gypi tools/v8_gypfiles/features.gypi \ tools/v8_gypfiles/toolchain.gypi tools/v8_gypfiles/features.gypi \
tools/v8_gypfiles/inspector.gypi tools/v8_gypfiles/v8.gyp tools/v8_gypfiles/inspector.gypi tools/v8_gypfiles/v8.gyp
$(PYTHON) tools/gyp_node.py -f make diff --git a/node.gyp b/node.gyp
index cf52281..c33b57b 100644
--- a/node.gyp
+++ b/node.gyp
@@ -430,23 +430,6 @@
],
},
],
- }, {
- 'variables': {
- 'opensslconfig_internal': '<(obj_dir)/deps/openssl/openssl.cnf',
- 'opensslconfig': './deps/openssl/nodejs-openssl.cnf',
- },
- 'actions': [
- {
- 'action_name': 'reset_openssl_cnf',
- 'inputs': [ '<(opensslconfig)', ],
- 'outputs': [ '<(opensslconfig_internal)', ],
- 'action': [
- '<(python)', 'tools/copyfile.py',
- '<(opensslconfig)',
- '<(opensslconfig_internal)',
- ],
- },
- ],
}],
],
}, # node_core_target_name
-- --
2.44.0 2.41.0

@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
From b7d979b5f7d28114050d1cdc43f39e6e83bd80d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Honza Horak <hhorak@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2023 13:52:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] disable fips options
Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
---
src/crypto/crypto_util.cc | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_util.cc b/src/crypto/crypto_util.cc
index 59ae7f8..7343396 100644
--- a/src/crypto/crypto_util.cc
+++ b/src/crypto/crypto_util.cc
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ bool ProcessFipsOptions() {
/* Override FIPS settings in configuration file, if needed. */
if (per_process::cli_options->enable_fips_crypto ||
per_process::cli_options->force_fips_crypto) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Using options related to FIPS is not recommended, configure FIPS in openssl instead. See https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/9/html/security_hardening/assembly_installing-the-system-in-fips-mode_security-hardening for more details.\n");
+ return false;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
OSSL_PROVIDER* fips_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(nullptr, "fips");
if (fips_provider == nullptr)
--
2.44.0

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

@ -1,581 +0,0 @@
From fb8b050abf63459eb83cad4d4bf695c56db2790a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Honza Horak <hhorak@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2024 15:21:35 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2024-22019
Resolves: RHEL-28064
This is a combination of the upstream commit from v18:
https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/911cb33cdadab57a75f97186290ea8f3903a6171
and necessary rebase of llhttp from 6.0.11 to 6.1.0 that has the needed
chunk features.
Original patch:
> From 11bd886e0a4eadd7e55502758fff6486a3fa3a4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Paolo Insogna <paolo@cowtech.it>
> Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 18:10:04 +0100
> Subject: [PATCH] http: add maximum chunk extension size
>
> Cherry-picked from v18 patch:
> https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/911cb33cdadab57a75f97186290ea8f3903a6171
>
> PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/520
> Refs: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/518
> CVE-ID: CVE-2024-22019
Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
---
deps/llhttp/.gitignore | 1 +
deps/llhttp/CMakeLists.txt | 2 +-
deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h | 7 +-
deps/llhttp/src/api.c | 7 +
deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c | 122 ++++++++++++++--
doc/api/errors.md | 12 ++
lib/_http_server.js | 9 ++
src/node_http_parser.cc | 20 ++-
.../test-http-chunk-extensions-limit.js | 131 ++++++++++++++++++
tools/update-llhttp.sh | 2 +-
10 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 deps/llhttp/.gitignore
create mode 100644 test/parallel/test-http-chunk-extensions-limit.js
diff --git a/deps/llhttp/.gitignore b/deps/llhttp/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98438a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/deps/llhttp/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+libllhttp.pc
diff --git a/deps/llhttp/CMakeLists.txt b/deps/llhttp/CMakeLists.txt
index d038203..747564a 100644
--- a/deps/llhttp/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/deps/llhttp/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.5.1)
cmake_policy(SET CMP0069 NEW)
-project(llhttp VERSION 6.0.11)
+project(llhttp VERSION 6.1.0)
include(GNUInstallDirs)
set(CMAKE_C_STANDARD 99)
diff --git a/deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h b/deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h
index 2da66f1..78f27ab 100644
--- a/deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h
+++ b/deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
#define INCLUDE_LLHTTP_H_
#define LLHTTP_VERSION_MAJOR 6
-#define LLHTTP_VERSION_MINOR 0
-#define LLHTTP_VERSION_PATCH 11
+#define LLHTTP_VERSION_MINOR 1
+#define LLHTTP_VERSION_PATCH 0
#ifndef LLHTTP_STRICT_MODE
# define LLHTTP_STRICT_MODE 0
@@ -348,6 +348,9 @@ struct llhttp_settings_s {
*/
llhttp_cb on_headers_complete;
+ /* Possible return values 0, -1, HPE_USER */
+ llhttp_data_cb on_chunk_parameters;
+
/* Possible return values 0, -1, HPE_USER */
llhttp_data_cb on_body;
diff --git a/deps/llhttp/src/api.c b/deps/llhttp/src/api.c
index c4ce197..d3065b3 100644
--- a/deps/llhttp/src/api.c
+++ b/deps/llhttp/src/api.c
@@ -355,6 +355,13 @@ int llhttp__on_chunk_header(llhttp_t* s, const char* p, const char* endp) {
}
+int llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(llhttp_t* s, const char* p, const char* endp) {
+ int err;
+ SPAN_CALLBACK_MAYBE(s, on_chunk_parameters, p, endp - p);
+ return err;
+}
+
+
int llhttp__on_chunk_complete(llhttp_t* s, const char* p, const char* endp) {
int err;
CALLBACK_MAYBE(s, on_chunk_complete);
diff --git a/deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c b/deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c
index 5e7c5d1..46f86a0 100644
--- a/deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c
+++ b/deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c
@@ -340,6 +340,8 @@ enum llparse_state_e {
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_is_equal_content_length,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_digit,
@@ -539,6 +541,10 @@ int llhttp__on_body(
llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
const unsigned char* endp);
+int llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(
+ llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp);
+
int llhttp__on_status(
llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
const unsigned char* endp);
@@ -1226,8 +1232,7 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
}
case 2: {
- p++;
- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
}
default: {
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_10;
@@ -1236,6 +1241,34 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
/* UNREACHABLE */;
abort();
}
+ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters:
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters: {
+ if (p == endp) {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
+ }
+ state->_span_pos0 = (void*) p;
+ state->_span_cb0 = llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows:
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows: {
+ if (p == endp) {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
+ }
+ switch (*p) {
+ case ' ': {
+ p++;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
+ }
+ default: {
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise:
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise: {
if (p == endp) {
@@ -1246,13 +1279,9 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
p++;
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
}
- case ' ': {
- p++;
- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
- }
case ';': {
p++;
- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
}
default: {
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_11;
@@ -6074,6 +6103,24 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
/* UNREACHABLE */;
abort();
}
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters: {
+ const unsigned char* start;
+ int err;
+
+ start = state->_span_pos0;
+ state->_span_pos0 = NULL;
+ err = llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(state, start, p);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ state->error = err;
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
+ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
+ return s_error;
+ }
+ p++;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_10: {
state->error = 0x2;
state->reason = "Invalid character in chunk parameters";
@@ -8441,6 +8488,8 @@ enum llparse_state_e {
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_is_equal_content_length,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_digit,
@@ -8635,6 +8684,10 @@ int llhttp__on_body(
llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
const unsigned char* endp);
+int llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(
+ llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp);
+
int llhttp__on_status(
llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
const unsigned char* endp);
@@ -9299,8 +9352,7 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
}
case 2: {
- p++;
- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
}
default: {
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_6;
@@ -9309,6 +9361,34 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
/* UNREACHABLE */;
abort();
}
+ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters:
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters: {
+ if (p == endp) {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
+ }
+ state->_span_pos0 = (void*) p;
+ state->_span_cb0 = llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows:
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows: {
+ if (p == endp) {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
+ }
+ switch (*p) {
+ case ' ': {
+ p++;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
+ }
+ default: {
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise:
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise: {
if (p == endp) {
@@ -9319,13 +9399,9 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
p++;
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
}
- case ' ': {
- p++;
- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
- }
case ';': {
p++;
- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
}
default: {
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_7;
@@ -13951,6 +14027,24 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
/* UNREACHABLE */;
abort();
}
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters: {
+ const unsigned char* start;
+ int err;
+
+ start = state->_span_pos0;
+ state->_span_pos0 = NULL;
+ err = llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(state, start, p);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ state->error = err;
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
+ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
+ return s_error;
+ }
+ p++;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_6: {
state->error = 0x2;
state->reason = "Invalid character in chunk parameters";
diff --git a/doc/api/errors.md b/doc/api/errors.md
index dcf8744..a76bfe5 100644
--- a/doc/api/errors.md
+++ b/doc/api/errors.md
@@ -3043,6 +3043,18 @@ malconfigured clients, if more than 8 KiB of HTTP header data is received then
HTTP parsing will abort without a request or response object being created, and
an `Error` with this code will be emitted.
+<a id="HPE_CHUNK_EXTENSIONS_OVERFLOW"></a>
+
+### `HPE_CHUNK_EXTENSIONS_OVERFLOW`
+
+<!-- YAML
+added: REPLACEME
+-->
+
+Too much data was received for a chunk extensions. In order to protect against
+malicious or malconfigured clients, if more than 16 KiB of data is received
+then an `Error` with this code will be emitted.
+
<a id="HPE_UNEXPECTED_CONTENT_LENGTH"></a>
### `HPE_UNEXPECTED_CONTENT_LENGTH`
diff --git a/lib/_http_server.js b/lib/_http_server.js
index 4e23266..325bce6 100644
--- a/lib/_http_server.js
+++ b/lib/_http_server.js
@@ -706,6 +706,12 @@ const requestHeaderFieldsTooLargeResponse = Buffer.from(
`HTTP/1.1 431 ${STATUS_CODES[431]}\r\n` +
'Connection: close\r\n\r\n', 'ascii'
);
+
+const requestChunkExtensionsTooLargeResponse = Buffer.from(
+ `HTTP/1.1 413 ${STATUS_CODES[413]}\r\n` +
+ 'Connection: close\r\n\r\n', 'ascii',
+);
+
function socketOnError(e) {
// Ignore further errors
this.removeListener('error', socketOnError);
@@ -719,6 +725,9 @@ function socketOnError(e) {
case 'HPE_HEADER_OVERFLOW':
response = requestHeaderFieldsTooLargeResponse;
break;
+ case 'HPE_CHUNK_EXTENSIONS_OVERFLOW':
+ response = requestChunkExtensionsTooLargeResponse;
+ break;
case 'ERR_HTTP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT':
response = requestTimeoutResponse;
break;
diff --git a/src/node_http_parser.cc b/src/node_http_parser.cc
index 74f3248..b92e848 100644
--- a/src/node_http_parser.cc
+++ b/src/node_http_parser.cc
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ const uint32_t kOnExecute = 5;
const uint32_t kOnTimeout = 6;
// Any more fields than this will be flushed into JS
const size_t kMaxHeaderFieldsCount = 32;
+// Maximum size of chunk extensions
+const size_t kMaxChunkExtensionsSize = 16384;
const uint32_t kLenientNone = 0;
const uint32_t kLenientHeaders = 1 << 0;
@@ -206,6 +208,7 @@ class Parser : public AsyncWrap, public StreamListener {
int on_message_begin() {
num_fields_ = num_values_ = 0;
+ chunk_extensions_nread_ = 0;
url_.Reset();
status_message_.Reset();
header_parsing_start_time_ = uv_hrtime();
@@ -443,9 +446,22 @@ class Parser : public AsyncWrap, public StreamListener {
return 0;
}
- // Reset nread for the next chunk
+ int on_chunk_extension(const char* at, size_t length) {
+ chunk_extensions_nread_ += length;
+
+ if (chunk_extensions_nread_ > kMaxChunkExtensionsSize) {
+ llhttp_set_error_reason(&parser_,
+ "HPE_CHUNK_EXTENSIONS_OVERFLOW:Chunk extensions overflow");
+ return HPE_USER;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Reset nread for the next chunk and also reset the extensions counter
int on_chunk_header() {
header_nread_ = 0;
+ chunk_extensions_nread_ = 0;
return 0;
}
@@ -887,6 +903,7 @@ class Parser : public AsyncWrap, public StreamListener {
const char* current_buffer_data_;
bool pending_pause_ = false;
uint64_t header_nread_ = 0;
+ uint64_t chunk_extensions_nread_ = 0;
uint64_t max_http_header_size_;
uint64_t headers_timeout_;
uint64_t header_parsing_start_time_ = 0;
@@ -921,6 +938,7 @@ const llhttp_settings_t Parser::settings = {
Proxy<DataCall, &Parser::on_header_field>::Raw,
Proxy<DataCall, &Parser::on_header_value>::Raw,
Proxy<Call, &Parser::on_headers_complete>::Raw,
+ Proxy<DataCall, &Parser::on_chunk_extension>::Raw,
Proxy<DataCall, &Parser::on_body>::Raw,
Proxy<Call, &Parser::on_message_complete>::Raw,
Proxy<Call, &Parser::on_chunk_header>::Raw,
diff --git a/test/parallel/test-http-chunk-extensions-limit.js b/test/parallel/test-http-chunk-extensions-limit.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6868b3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/parallel/test-http-chunk-extensions-limit.js
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+'use strict';
+
+const common = require('../common');
+const http = require('http');
+const net = require('net');
+const assert = require('assert');
+
+// Verify that chunk extensions are limited in size when sent all together.
+{
+ const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+ req.on('end', () => {
+ res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
+ res.end('bye');
+ });
+
+ req.resume();
+ });
+
+ server.listen(0, () => {
+ const sock = net.connect(server.address().port);
+ let data = '';
+
+ sock.on('data', (chunk) => data += chunk.toString('utf-8'));
+
+ sock.on('end', common.mustCall(function() {
+ assert.strictEqual(data, 'HTTP/1.1 413 Payload Too Large\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n');
+ server.close();
+ }));
+
+ sock.end('' +
+ 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n' +
+ 'Host: localhost:8080\r\n' +
+ 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n' +
+ '2;' + 'A'.repeat(20000) + '=bar\r\nAA\r\n' +
+ '0\r\n\r\n'
+ );
+ });
+}
+
+// Verify that chunk extensions are limited in size when sent in intervals.
+{
+ const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+ req.on('end', () => {
+ res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
+ res.end('bye');
+ });
+
+ req.resume();
+ });
+
+ server.listen(0, () => {
+ const sock = net.connect(server.address().port);
+ let remaining = 20000;
+ let data = '';
+
+ const interval = setInterval(
+ () => {
+ if (remaining > 0) {
+ sock.write('A'.repeat(1000));
+ } else {
+ sock.write('=bar\r\nAA\r\n0\r\n\r\n');
+ clearInterval(interval);
+ }
+
+ remaining -= 1000;
+ },
+ common.platformTimeout(20),
+ ).unref();
+
+ sock.on('data', (chunk) => data += chunk.toString('utf-8'));
+
+ sock.on('end', common.mustCall(function() {
+ assert.strictEqual(data, 'HTTP/1.1 413 Payload Too Large\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n');
+ server.close();
+ }));
+
+ sock.write('' +
+ 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n' +
+ 'Host: localhost:8080\r\n' +
+ 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n' +
+ '2;'
+ );
+ });
+}
+
+// Verify the chunk extensions is correctly reset after a chunk
+{
+ const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+ req.on('end', () => {
+ res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/plain', 'connection': 'close', 'date': 'now' });
+ res.end('bye');
+ });
+
+ req.resume();
+ });
+
+ server.listen(0, () => {
+ const sock = net.connect(server.address().port);
+ let data = '';
+
+ sock.on('data', (chunk) => data += chunk.toString('utf-8'));
+
+ sock.on('end', common.mustCall(function() {
+ assert.strictEqual(
+ data,
+ 'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n' +
+ 'content-type: text/plain\r\n' +
+ 'connection: close\r\n' +
+ 'date: now\r\n' +
+ 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n' +
+ '\r\n' +
+ '3\r\n' +
+ 'bye\r\n' +
+ '0\r\n' +
+ '\r\n',
+ );
+
+ server.close();
+ }));
+
+ sock.end('' +
+ 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n' +
+ 'Host: localhost:8080\r\n' +
+ 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n' +
+ '2;' + 'A'.repeat(10000) + '=bar\r\nAA\r\n' +
+ '2;' + 'A'.repeat(10000) + '=bar\r\nAA\r\n' +
+ '2;' + 'A'.repeat(10000) + '=bar\r\nAA\r\n' +
+ '0\r\n\r\n'
+ );
+ });
+}
diff --git a/tools/update-llhttp.sh b/tools/update-llhttp.sh
index 12e2f46..a95eef1 100755
--- a/tools/update-llhttp.sh
+++ b/tools/update-llhttp.sh
@@ -59,5 +59,5 @@ echo ""
echo "Please git add llhttp, commit the new version:"
echo ""
echo "$ git add -A deps/llhttp"
-echo "$ git commit -m \"deps: update nghttp2 to $LLHTTP_VERSION\""
+echo "$ git commit -m \"deps: update llhttp to $LLHTTP_VERSION\""
echo ""
--
2.44.0

@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
From 2df9af7073929ab94b6dda040df08bc3ff7d8ab1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: RafaelGSS <rafael.nunu@hotmail.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 15:55:13 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] src: ensure to close stream when destroying session
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Co-Authored-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/561
Fixes: https://hackerone.com/reports/2319584
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Marco Ippolito <marcoippolito54@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Matteo Collina <matteo.collina@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
CVE-ID: CVE-2024-27983
Signed-off-by: Jan Staněk <jstanek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
---
src/node_http2.cc | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/node_http2.cc b/src/node_http2.cc
index 53216dc..9a6d63d 100644
--- a/src/node_http2.cc
+++ b/src/node_http2.cc
@@ -529,6 +529,12 @@ Http2Session::Http2Session(Http2State* http2_state,
Http2Session::~Http2Session() {
CHECK(!is_in_scope());
Debug(this, "freeing nghttp2 session");
+ // Ensure that all `Http2Stream` instances and the memory they hold
+ // on to are destroyed before the nghttp2 session is.
+ for (const auto& [id, stream] : streams_) {
+ stream->Detach();
+ }
+ streams_.clear();
// Explicitly reset session_ so the subsequent
// current_nghttp2_memory_ check passes.
session_.reset();
--
2.44.0

@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
From 132ad9e8a8f8e246e59744a7fed995ed396f6cb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa <tatsuhiro.t@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2024 16:26:42 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Limit CONTINUATION frames following an incoming HEADER frame
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Signed-off-by: Jan Staněk <jstanek@redhat.com>
Fixes: CVE-2024-28182
Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
---
deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h | 7 ++++++-
deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_helper.c | 2 ++
deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c | 7 +++++++
deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.h | 10 ++++++++++
4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h b/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h
index fa22081..b394bde 100644
--- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h
+++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h
@@ -440,7 +440,12 @@ typedef enum {
* exhaustion on server side to send these frames forever and does
* not read network.
*/
- NGHTTP2_ERR_FLOODED = -904
+ NGHTTP2_ERR_FLOODED = -904,
+ /**
+ * When a local endpoint receives too many CONTINUATION frames
+ * following a HEADER frame.
+ */
+ NGHTTP2_ERR_TOO_MANY_CONTINUATIONS = -905,
} nghttp2_error;
/**
diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_helper.c b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_helper.c
index 93dd475..b3563d9 100644
--- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_helper.c
+++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_helper.c
@@ -336,6 +336,8 @@ const char *nghttp2_strerror(int error_code) {
"closed";
case NGHTTP2_ERR_TOO_MANY_SETTINGS:
return "SETTINGS frame contained more than the maximum allowed entries";
+ case NGHTTP2_ERR_TOO_MANY_CONTINUATIONS:
+ return "Too many CONTINUATION frames following a HEADER frame";
default:
return "Unknown error code";
}
diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c
index ec5024d..8e4d2e7 100644
--- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c
+++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ static int session_new(nghttp2_session **session_ptr,
(*session_ptr)->max_send_header_block_length = NGHTTP2_MAX_HEADERSLEN;
(*session_ptr)->max_outbound_ack = NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_MAX_OBQ_FLOOD_ITEM;
(*session_ptr)->max_settings = NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_MAX_SETTINGS;
+ (*session_ptr)->max_continuations = NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS;
if (option) {
if ((option->opt_set_mask & NGHTTP2_OPT_NO_AUTO_WINDOW_UPDATE) &&
@@ -6778,6 +6779,8 @@ ssize_t nghttp2_session_mem_recv(nghttp2_session *session, const uint8_t *in,
}
}
session_inbound_frame_reset(session);
+
+ session->num_continuations = 0;
}
break;
}
@@ -6899,6 +6902,10 @@ ssize_t nghttp2_session_mem_recv(nghttp2_session *session, const uint8_t *in,
}
#endif /* DEBUGBUILD */
+ if (++session->num_continuations > session->max_continuations) {
+ return NGHTTP2_ERR_TOO_MANY_CONTINUATIONS;
+ }
+
readlen = inbound_frame_buf_read(iframe, in, last);
in += readlen;
diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.h b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.h
index b119329..ef8f7b2 100644
--- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.h
+++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.h
@@ -110,6 +110,10 @@ typedef struct {
#define NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_STREAM_RESET_BURST 1000
#define NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_STREAM_RESET_RATE 33
+/* The default max number of CONTINUATION frames following an incoming
+ HEADER frame. */
+#define NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS 8
+
/* Internal state when receiving incoming frame */
typedef enum {
/* Receiving frame header */
@@ -290,6 +294,12 @@ struct nghttp2_session {
size_t max_send_header_block_length;
/* The maximum number of settings accepted per SETTINGS frame. */
size_t max_settings;
+ /* The maximum number of CONTINUATION frames following an incoming
+ HEADER frame. */
+ size_t max_continuations;
+ /* The number of CONTINUATION frames following an incoming HEADER
+ frame. This variable is reset when END_HEADERS flag is seen. */
+ size_t num_continuations;
/* Next Stream ID. Made unsigned int to detect >= (1 << 31). */
uint32_t next_stream_id;
/* The last stream ID this session initiated. For client session,
--
2.44.0

@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
From 625b03149d2ec68cdbcfe3f2801d6f0420d917cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa <tatsuhiro.t@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2024 16:48:10 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Add nghttp2_option_set_max_continuations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Signed-off-by: Jan Staněk <jstanek@redhat.com>
Related: CVE-2024-28182
Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
---
deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h | 11 +++++++++++
deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.c | 5 +++++
deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.h | 5 +++++
deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c | 4 ++++
4 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h b/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h
index b394bde..4d3339b 100644
--- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h
+++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h
@@ -2778,6 +2778,17 @@ NGHTTP2_EXTERN void
nghttp2_option_set_stream_reset_rate_limit(nghttp2_option *option,
uint64_t burst, uint64_t rate);
+/**
+ * @function
+ *
+ * This function sets the maximum number of CONTINUATION frames
+ * following an incoming HEADER frame. If more than those frames are
+ * received, the remote endpoint is considered to be misbehaving and
+ * session will be closed. The default value is 8.
+ */
+NGHTTP2_EXTERN void nghttp2_option_set_max_continuations(nghttp2_option *option,
+ size_t val);
+
/**
* @function
*
diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.c b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.c
index 43d4e95..53144b9 100644
--- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.c
+++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.c
@@ -150,3 +150,8 @@ void nghttp2_option_set_stream_reset_rate_limit(nghttp2_option *option,
option->stream_reset_burst = burst;
option->stream_reset_rate = rate;
}
+
+void nghttp2_option_set_max_continuations(nghttp2_option *option, size_t val) {
+ option->opt_set_mask |= NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS;
+ option->max_continuations = val;
+}
diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.h b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.h
index 2259e18..c89cb97 100644
--- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.h
+++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ typedef enum {
NGHTTP2_OPT_SERVER_FALLBACK_RFC7540_PRIORITIES = 1 << 13,
NGHTTP2_OPT_NO_RFC9113_LEADING_AND_TRAILING_WS_VALIDATION = 1 << 14,
NGHTTP2_OPT_STREAM_RESET_RATE_LIMIT = 1 << 15,
+ NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS = 1 << 16,
} nghttp2_option_flag;
/**
@@ -98,6 +99,10 @@ struct nghttp2_option {
* NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_SETTINGS
*/
size_t max_settings;
+ /**
+ * NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS
+ */
+ size_t max_continuations;
/**
* Bitwise OR of nghttp2_option_flag to determine that which fields
* are specified.
diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c
index 8e4d2e7..ced7517 100644
--- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c
+++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c
@@ -585,6 +585,10 @@ static int session_new(nghttp2_session **session_ptr,
option->stream_reset_burst,
option->stream_reset_rate);
}
+
+ if (option->opt_set_mask & NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS) {
+ (*session_ptr)->max_continuations = option->max_continuations;
+ }
}
rv = nghttp2_hd_deflate_init2(&(*session_ptr)->hd_deflater,
--
2.44.0

File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
From ec80a9196e2aedfd617d05964725f113000a41ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brad House <brad@brad-house.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2024 16:23:33 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Address CVE-2024-25629
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Original commit title: Merge pull request from GHSA-mg26-v6qh-x48q
Signed-off-by: Jan Staněk <jstanek@redhat.com>
Fixes: CVE-2024-25629
Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
---
deps/cares/src/lib/ares__read_line.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/deps/cares/src/lib/ares__read_line.c b/deps/cares/src/lib/ares__read_line.c
index c62ad2a..16627e4 100644
--- a/deps/cares/src/lib/ares__read_line.c
+++ b/deps/cares/src/lib/ares__read_line.c
@@ -49,6 +49,14 @@ int ares__read_line(FILE *fp, char **buf, size_t *bufsize)
if (!fgets(*buf + offset, bytestoread, fp))
return (offset != 0) ? 0 : (ferror(fp)) ? ARES_EFILE : ARES_EOF;
len = offset + strlen(*buf + offset);
+
+ /* Probably means there was an embedded NULL as the first character in
+ * the line, throw away line */
+ if (len == 0) {
+ offset = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
if ((*buf)[len - 1] == '\n')
{
(*buf)[len - 1] = 0;
--
2.44.0

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
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