13 changed files with 10958 additions and 292 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 SOURCES/cjs-module-lexer-1.2.2.tar.gz
-SOURCES/icu4c-73_2-src.tgz
+SOURCES/icu4c-71_1-src.tgz
-SOURCES/node-v20.5.1-stripped.tar.gz
+SOURCES/node-v16.20.2-stripped.tar.gz
-SOURCES/undici-5.22.1.tar.gz
+SOURCES/undici-5.20.0.tar.gz
-SOURCES/wasi-sdk-11.0-linux.tar.gz
+SOURCES/wasi-sdk-wasi-sdk-11.tar.gz
-SOURCES/wasi-sdk-14.0-linux.tar.gz
+SOURCES/wasi-sdk-wasi-sdk-14.tar.gz
--- a/.nodejs.metadata
+++ b/.nodejs.metadata
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 b0a91341ecf6c68a9d59a1c57d000fbbcc771679 SOURCES/cjs-module-lexer-1.2.2.tar.gz
-3d94969b097189bf5479c312d9593d2d252f5a73 SOURCES/icu4c-73_2-src.tgz
+406b0c8635288b772913b6ff646451e69748878a SOURCES/icu4c-71_1-src.tgz
-ff25b892461bb3d6b359dec449e9ef86dd87115c SOURCES/node-v20.5.1-stripped.tar.gz
+0024086ed6090aaea422fb2bd329f898bf924df6 SOURCES/node-v16.20.2-stripped.tar.gz
-616384b209d651b7cb7b41a8a7752eb2e923806a SOURCES/undici-5.22.1.tar.gz
+0b3e890fd45200fb3a2fdc14408cc51e23990480 SOURCES/undici-5.20.0.tar.gz
-ff114dd45b4efeeae7afe4621bfc6f886a475b4b SOURCES/wasi-sdk-11.0-linux.tar.gz
+8979d177dd62e3b167a6fd7dc7185adb0128c439 SOURCES/wasi-sdk-wasi-sdk-11.tar.gz
-c29e21be754c26cac4bf99848c5b1f4e8564e248 SOURCES/wasi-sdk-14.0-linux.tar.gz
+900a50a32f0079d53c299db92b88bb3c5d2022b8 SOURCES/wasi-sdk-wasi-sdk-14.tar.gz
--- a/SOURCES/0001-Disable-running-gyp-on-shared-deps.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0001-Disable-running-gyp-on-shared-deps.patch
@ -1,55 +1,26 @@
-From c73e0892eb1d0aa2df805618c019dc5c96b79705 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 6c80c1956373978489a297a630f4f50222c47775 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 13:12:35 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] Disable running gyp on shared deps
 Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 ---
- Makefile |  2 +-
+ Makefile | 2 +-
- node.gyp | 17 -----------------
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 18 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
-index 0be0659..3c44201 100644
+index ef3eda2..8b52a4f 100644
 --- a/Makefile
 +++ b/Makefile
-@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ with-code-cache test-code-cache:
+@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ with-code-cache test-code-cache:
 	$(warning '$@' target is a noop)
 out/Makefile: config.gypi common.gypi node.gyp \
 -	deps/uv/uv.gyp deps/llhttp/llhttp.gyp deps/zlib/zlib.gyp \
 +	deps/llhttp/llhttp.gyp \
 	deps/simdutf/simdutf.gyp deps/ada/ada.gyp \
 	tools/v8_gypfiles/toolchain.gypi tools/v8_gypfiles/features.gypi \
 	tools/v8_gypfiles/inspector.gypi tools/v8_gypfiles/v8.gyp
-diff --git a/node.gyp b/node.gyp
+ 	$(PYTHON) tools/gyp_node.py -f make
 index cf52281..c33b57b 100644
 --- a/node.gyp
 +++ b/node.gyp
@@ -430,23 +430,6 @@
               ],
             },
           ],
 -         }, {
 -           'variables': {
 -              'opensslconfig_internal': '<(obj_dir)/deps/openssl/openssl.cnf',
 -              'opensslconfig': './deps/openssl/nodejs-openssl.cnf',
 -           },
 -           'actions': [
 -             {
 -               'action_name': 'reset_openssl_cnf',
 -               'inputs': [ '<(opensslconfig)', ],
 -               'outputs': [ '<(opensslconfig_internal)', ],
 -               'action': [
 -                 '<(python)', 'tools/copyfile.py',
 -                 '<(opensslconfig)',
 -                 '<(opensslconfig_internal)',
 -               ],
 -             },
 -           ],
          }],
       ],
     }, # node_core_target_name
 -- 
-2.41.0
+2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0002-disable-fips-options.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0002-disable-fips-options.patch
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
 From b7d979b5f7d28114050d1cdc43f39e6e83bd80d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Honza Horak <hhorak@redhat.com>
 Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2023 13:52:59 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] disable fips options
 Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 ---
 src/crypto/crypto_util.cc | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_util.cc b/src/crypto/crypto_util.cc
 index 59ae7f8..7343396 100644
 --- a/src/crypto/crypto_util.cc
 +++ b/src/crypto/crypto_util.cc
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ bool ProcessFipsOptions() {
   /* Override FIPS settings in configuration file, if needed. */
   if (per_process::cli_options->enable_fips_crypto ||
       per_process::cli_options->force_fips_crypto) {
 +      fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Using options related to FIPS is not recommended, configure FIPS in openssl instead. See https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/9/html/security_hardening/assembly_installing-the-system-in-fips-mode_security-hardening for more details.\n");
 +      return false;
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
     OSSL_PROVIDER* fips_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(nullptr, "fips");
     if (fips_provider == nullptr)
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0003-deps-nghttp2-update-to-1.57.0.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0003-deps-nghttp2-update-to-1.57.0.patch
--- a/SOURCES/0004-Fix-CVE-2024-22019.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0004-Fix-CVE-2024-22019.patch
@ -0,0 +1,581 @@
 From fb8b050abf63459eb83cad4d4bf695c56db2790a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Honza Horak <hhorak@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2024 15:21:35 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2024-22019
 Resolves: RHEL-28064
 This is a combination of the upstream commit from v18:
 https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/911cb33cdadab57a75f97186290ea8f3903a6171
 and necessary rebase of llhttp from 6.0.11 to 6.1.0 that has the needed
 chunk features.
 Original patch:
 > From 11bd886e0a4eadd7e55502758fff6486a3fa3a4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 > From: Paolo Insogna <paolo@cowtech.it>
 > Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 18:10:04 +0100
 > Subject: [PATCH] http: add maximum chunk extension size
 >
 > Cherry-picked from v18 patch:
 > https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/911cb33cdadab57a75f97186290ea8f3903a6171
 >
 > PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/520
 > Refs: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/518
 > CVE-ID: CVE-2024-22019
 Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 ---
 deps/llhttp/.gitignore                        |   1 +
 deps/llhttp/CMakeLists.txt                    |   2 +-
 deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h                  |   7 +-
 deps/llhttp/src/api.c                         |   7 +
 deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c                      | 122 ++++++++++++++--
 doc/api/errors.md                             |  12 ++
 lib/_http_server.js                           |   9 ++
 src/node_http_parser.cc                       |  20 ++-
 .../test-http-chunk-extensions-limit.js       | 131 ++++++++++++++++++
 tools/update-llhttp.sh                        |   2 +-
 10 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 deps/llhttp/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 test/parallel/test-http-chunk-extensions-limit.js
 diff --git a/deps/llhttp/.gitignore b/deps/llhttp/.gitignore
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000..98438a2
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/deps/llhttp/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
 +libllhttp.pc
 diff --git a/deps/llhttp/CMakeLists.txt b/deps/llhttp/CMakeLists.txt
 index d038203..747564a 100644
 --- a/deps/llhttp/CMakeLists.txt
 +++ b/deps/llhttp/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.5.1)
 cmake_policy(SET CMP0069 NEW)
 -project(llhttp VERSION 6.0.11)
 +project(llhttp VERSION 6.1.0)
 include(GNUInstallDirs)
 set(CMAKE_C_STANDARD 99)
 diff --git a/deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h b/deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h
 index 2da66f1..78f27ab 100644
 --- a/deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h
 +++ b/deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 #define INCLUDE_LLHTTP_H_
 #define LLHTTP_VERSION_MAJOR 6
 -#define LLHTTP_VERSION_MINOR 0
 -#define LLHTTP_VERSION_PATCH 11
 +#define LLHTTP_VERSION_MINOR 1
 +#define LLHTTP_VERSION_PATCH 0
 #ifndef LLHTTP_STRICT_MODE
 # define LLHTTP_STRICT_MODE 0
@@ -348,6 +348,9 @@ struct llhttp_settings_s {
    */
   llhttp_cb      on_headers_complete;
 +  /* Possible return values 0, -1, HPE_USER */
 +  llhttp_data_cb on_chunk_parameters;
 +
   /* Possible return values 0, -1, HPE_USER */
   llhttp_data_cb on_body;
 diff --git a/deps/llhttp/src/api.c b/deps/llhttp/src/api.c
 index c4ce197..d3065b3 100644
 --- a/deps/llhttp/src/api.c
 +++ b/deps/llhttp/src/api.c
@@ -355,6 +355,13 @@ int llhttp__on_chunk_header(llhttp_t* s, const char* p, const char* endp) {
 }
 +int llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(llhttp_t* s, const char* p, const char* endp) {
 +  int err;
 +  SPAN_CALLBACK_MAYBE(s, on_chunk_parameters, p, endp - p);
 +  return err;
 +}
 +
 +
 int llhttp__on_chunk_complete(llhttp_t* s, const char* p, const char* endp) {
   int err;
   CALLBACK_MAYBE(s, on_chunk_complete);
 diff --git a/deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c b/deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c
 index 5e7c5d1..46f86a0 100644
 --- a/deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c
 +++ b/deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c
@@ -340,6 +340,8 @@ enum llparse_state_e {
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_is_equal_content_length,
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done,
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters,
 +  s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters,
 +  s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows,
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise,
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size,
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_digit,
@@ -539,6 +541,10 @@ int llhttp__on_body(
     llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
     const unsigned char* endp);
 +int llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(
 +    llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
 +    const unsigned char* endp);
 +
 int llhttp__on_status(
     llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
     const unsigned char* endp);
@@ -1226,8 +1232,7 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
           goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
         }
         case 2: {
 -          p++;
 -          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
 +          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
         }
         default: {
           goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_10;
@@ -1236,6 +1241,34 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
       /* UNREACHABLE */;
       abort();
     }
 +    case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters:
 +    s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters: {
 +      if (p == endp) {
 +        return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
 +      }
 +      state->_span_pos0 = (void*) p;
 +      state->_span_cb0 = llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
 +      goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
 +      /* UNREACHABLE */;
 +      abort();
 +    }
 +    case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows:
 +    s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows: {
 +      if (p == endp) {
 +        return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
 +      }
 +      switch (*p) {
 +        case ' ': {
 +          p++;
 +          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
 +        }
 +        default: {
 +          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
 +        }
 +      }
 +      /* UNREACHABLE */;
 +      abort();
 +    }
     case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise:
     s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise: {
       if (p == endp) {
@@ -1246,13 +1279,9 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
           p++;
           goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
         }
 -        case ' ': {
 -          p++;
 -          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
 -        }
         case ';': {
           p++;
 -          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
 +          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
         }
         default: {
           goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_11;
@@ -6074,6 +6103,24 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
     /* UNREACHABLE */;
     abort();
   }
 +  s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters: {
 +    const unsigned char* start;
 +    int err;
 +
 +    start = state->_span_pos0;
 +    state->_span_pos0 = NULL;
 +    err = llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(state, start, p);
 +    if (err != 0) {
 +      state->error = err;
 +      state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
 +      state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
 +      return s_error;
 +    }
 +    p++;
 +    goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
 +    /* UNREACHABLE */;
 +    abort();
 +  }
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_10: {
     state->error = 0x2;
     state->reason = "Invalid character in chunk parameters";
@@ -8441,6 +8488,8 @@ enum llparse_state_e {
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_is_equal_content_length,
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done,
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters,
 +  s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters,
 +  s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows,
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise,
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size,
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_digit,
@@ -8635,6 +8684,10 @@ int llhttp__on_body(
     llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
     const unsigned char* endp);
 +int llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(
 +    llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
 +    const unsigned char* endp);
 +
 int llhttp__on_status(
     llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
     const unsigned char* endp);
@@ -9299,8 +9352,7 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
           goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
         }
         case 2: {
 -          p++;
 -          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
 +          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
         }
         default: {
           goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_6;
@@ -9309,6 +9361,34 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
       /* UNREACHABLE */;
       abort();
     }
 +    case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters:
 +    s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters: {
 +      if (p == endp) {
 +        return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
 +      }
 +      state->_span_pos0 = (void*) p;
 +      state->_span_cb0 = llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
 +      goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
 +      /* UNREACHABLE */;
 +      abort();
 +    }
 +    case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows:
 +    s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows: {
 +      if (p == endp) {
 +        return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
 +      }
 +      switch (*p) {
 +        case ' ': {
 +          p++;
 +          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
 +        }
 +        default: {
 +          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
 +        }
 +      }
 +      /* UNREACHABLE */;
 +      abort();
 +    }
     case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise:
     s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise: {
       if (p == endp) {
@@ -9319,13 +9399,9 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
           p++;
           goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
         }
 -        case ' ': {
 -          p++;
 -          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
 -        }
         case ';': {
           p++;
 -          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
 +          goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
         }
         default: {
           goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_7;
@@ -13951,6 +14027,24 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal__run(
     /* UNREACHABLE */;
     abort();
   }
 +  s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters: {
 +    const unsigned char* start;
 +    int err;
 +
 +    start = state->_span_pos0;
 +    state->_span_pos0 = NULL;
 +    err = llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(state, start, p);
 +    if (err != 0) {
 +      state->error = err;
 +      state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
 +      state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
 +      return s_error;
 +    }
 +    p++;
 +    goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
 +    /* UNREACHABLE */;
 +    abort();
 +  }
   s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_6: {
     state->error = 0x2;
     state->reason = "Invalid character in chunk parameters";
 diff --git a/doc/api/errors.md b/doc/api/errors.md
 index dcf8744..a76bfe5 100644
 --- a/doc/api/errors.md
 +++ b/doc/api/errors.md
@@ -3043,6 +3043,18 @@ malconfigured clients, if more than 8 KiB of HTTP header data is received then
 HTTP parsing will abort without a request or response object being created, and
 an `Error` with this code will be emitted.
 +<a id="HPE_CHUNK_EXTENSIONS_OVERFLOW"></a>
 +
 +### `HPE_CHUNK_EXTENSIONS_OVERFLOW`
 +
 +<!-- YAML
 +added: REPLACEME
 +-->
 +
 +Too much data was received for a chunk extensions. In order to protect against
 +malicious or malconfigured clients, if more than 16 KiB of data is received
 +then an `Error` with this code will be emitted.
 +
 <a id="HPE_UNEXPECTED_CONTENT_LENGTH"></a>
 ### `HPE_UNEXPECTED_CONTENT_LENGTH`
 diff --git a/lib/_http_server.js b/lib/_http_server.js
 index 4e23266..325bce6 100644
 --- a/lib/_http_server.js
 +++ b/lib/_http_server.js
@@ -706,6 +706,12 @@ const requestHeaderFieldsTooLargeResponse = Buffer.from(
   `HTTP/1.1 431 ${STATUS_CODES[431]}\r\n` +
   'Connection: close\r\n\r\n', 'ascii'
 );
 +
 +const requestChunkExtensionsTooLargeResponse = Buffer.from(
 +  `HTTP/1.1 413 ${STATUS_CODES[413]}\r\n` +
 +  'Connection: close\r\n\r\n', 'ascii',
 +);
 +
 function socketOnError(e) {
   // Ignore further errors
   this.removeListener('error', socketOnError);
@@ -719,6 +725,9 @@ function socketOnError(e) {
         case 'HPE_HEADER_OVERFLOW':
           response = requestHeaderFieldsTooLargeResponse;
           break;
 +        case 'HPE_CHUNK_EXTENSIONS_OVERFLOW':
 +          response = requestChunkExtensionsTooLargeResponse;
 +          break;
         case 'ERR_HTTP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT':
           response = requestTimeoutResponse;
           break;
 diff --git a/src/node_http_parser.cc b/src/node_http_parser.cc
 index 74f3248..b92e848 100644
 --- a/src/node_http_parser.cc
 +++ b/src/node_http_parser.cc
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ const uint32_t kOnExecute = 5;
 const uint32_t kOnTimeout = 6;
 // Any more fields than this will be flushed into JS
 const size_t kMaxHeaderFieldsCount = 32;
 +// Maximum size of chunk extensions
 +const size_t kMaxChunkExtensionsSize = 16384;
 const uint32_t kLenientNone = 0;
 const uint32_t kLenientHeaders = 1 << 0;
@@ -206,6 +208,7 @@ class Parser : public AsyncWrap, public StreamListener {
   int on_message_begin() {
     num_fields_ = num_values_ = 0;
 +    chunk_extensions_nread_ = 0;
     url_.Reset();
     status_message_.Reset();
     header_parsing_start_time_ = uv_hrtime();
@@ -443,9 +446,22 @@ class Parser : public AsyncWrap, public StreamListener {
     return 0;
   }
 -  // Reset nread for the next chunk
 +  int on_chunk_extension(const char* at, size_t length) {
 +    chunk_extensions_nread_ += length;
 +
 +    if (chunk_extensions_nread_ > kMaxChunkExtensionsSize) {
 +      llhttp_set_error_reason(&parser_,
 +        "HPE_CHUNK_EXTENSIONS_OVERFLOW:Chunk extensions overflow");
 +      return HPE_USER;
 +    }
 +
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  // Reset nread for the next chunk and also reset the extensions counter
   int on_chunk_header() {
     header_nread_ = 0;
 +    chunk_extensions_nread_ = 0;
     return 0;
   }
@@ -887,6 +903,7 @@ class Parser : public AsyncWrap, public StreamListener {
   const char* current_buffer_data_;
   bool pending_pause_ = false;
   uint64_t header_nread_ = 0;
 +  uint64_t chunk_extensions_nread_ = 0;
   uint64_t max_http_header_size_;
   uint64_t headers_timeout_;
   uint64_t header_parsing_start_time_ = 0;
@@ -921,6 +938,7 @@ const llhttp_settings_t Parser::settings = {
   Proxy<DataCall, &Parser::on_header_field>::Raw,
   Proxy<DataCall, &Parser::on_header_value>::Raw,
   Proxy<Call, &Parser::on_headers_complete>::Raw,
 +  Proxy<DataCall, &Parser::on_chunk_extension>::Raw,
   Proxy<DataCall, &Parser::on_body>::Raw,
   Proxy<Call, &Parser::on_message_complete>::Raw,
   Proxy<Call, &Parser::on_chunk_header>::Raw,
 diff --git a/test/parallel/test-http-chunk-extensions-limit.js b/test/parallel/test-http-chunk-extensions-limit.js
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000..6868b3d
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/test/parallel/test-http-chunk-extensions-limit.js
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
 +'use strict';
 +
 +const common = require('../common');
 +const http = require('http');
 +const net = require('net');
 +const assert = require('assert');
 +
 +// Verify that chunk extensions are limited in size when sent all together.
 +{
 +  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
 +    req.on('end', () => {
 +      res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
 +      res.end('bye');
 +    });
 +
 +    req.resume();
 +  });
 +
 +  server.listen(0, () => {
 +    const sock = net.connect(server.address().port);
 +    let data = '';
 +
 +    sock.on('data', (chunk) => data += chunk.toString('utf-8'));
 +
 +    sock.on('end', common.mustCall(function() {
 +      assert.strictEqual(data, 'HTTP/1.1 413 Payload Too Large\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n');
 +      server.close();
 +    }));
 +
 +    sock.end('' +
 +      'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n' +
 +      'Host: localhost:8080\r\n' +
 +      'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n' +
 +      '2;' + 'A'.repeat(20000) + '=bar\r\nAA\r\n' +
 +      '0\r\n\r\n'
 +    );
 +  });
 +}
 +
 +// Verify that chunk extensions are limited in size when sent in intervals.
 +{
 +  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
 +    req.on('end', () => {
 +      res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
 +      res.end('bye');
 +    });
 +
 +    req.resume();
 +  });
 +
 +  server.listen(0, () => {
 +    const sock = net.connect(server.address().port);
 +    let remaining = 20000;
 +    let data = '';
 +
 +    const interval = setInterval(
 +      () => {
 +        if (remaining > 0) {
 +          sock.write('A'.repeat(1000));
 +        } else {
 +          sock.write('=bar\r\nAA\r\n0\r\n\r\n');
 +          clearInterval(interval);
 +        }
 +
 +        remaining -= 1000;
 +      },
 +      common.platformTimeout(20),
 +    ).unref();
 +
 +    sock.on('data', (chunk) => data += chunk.toString('utf-8'));
 +
 +    sock.on('end', common.mustCall(function() {
 +      assert.strictEqual(data, 'HTTP/1.1 413 Payload Too Large\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n');
 +      server.close();
 +    }));
 +
 +    sock.write('' +
 +    'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n' +
 +    'Host: localhost:8080\r\n' +
 +    'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n' +
 +    '2;'
 +    );
 +  });
 +}
 +
 +// Verify the chunk extensions is correctly reset after a chunk
 +{
 +  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
 +    req.on('end', () => {
 +      res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/plain', 'connection': 'close', 'date': 'now' });
 +      res.end('bye');
 +    });
 +
 +    req.resume();
 +  });
 +
 +  server.listen(0, () => {
 +    const sock = net.connect(server.address().port);
 +    let data = '';
 +
 +    sock.on('data', (chunk) => data += chunk.toString('utf-8'));
 +
 +    sock.on('end', common.mustCall(function() {
 +      assert.strictEqual(
 +        data,
 +        'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n' +
 +        'content-type: text/plain\r\n' +
 +        'connection: close\r\n' +
 +        'date: now\r\n' +
 +        'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n' +
 +        '\r\n' +
 +        '3\r\n' +
 +        'bye\r\n' +
 +        '0\r\n' +
 +        '\r\n',
 +      );
 +
 +      server.close();
 +    }));
 +
 +    sock.end('' +
 +      'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n' +
 +      'Host: localhost:8080\r\n' +
 +      'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n' +
 +      '2;' + 'A'.repeat(10000) + '=bar\r\nAA\r\n' +
 +      '2;' + 'A'.repeat(10000) + '=bar\r\nAA\r\n' +
 +      '2;' + 'A'.repeat(10000) + '=bar\r\nAA\r\n' +
 +      '0\r\n\r\n'
 +    );
 +  });
 +}
 diff --git a/tools/update-llhttp.sh b/tools/update-llhttp.sh
 index 12e2f46..a95eef1 100755
 --- a/tools/update-llhttp.sh
 +++ b/tools/update-llhttp.sh
@@ -59,5 +59,5 @@ echo ""
 echo "Please git add llhttp, commit the new version:"
 echo ""
 echo "$ git add -A deps/llhttp"
 -echo "$ git commit -m \"deps: update nghttp2 to $LLHTTP_VERSION\""
 +echo "$ git commit -m \"deps: update llhttp to $LLHTTP_VERSION\""
 echo ""
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0005-src-ensure-to-close-stream-when-destroying-session.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0005-src-ensure-to-close-stream-when-destroying-session.patch
@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
 From 2df9af7073929ab94b6dda040df08bc3ff7d8ab1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: RafaelGSS <rafael.nunu@hotmail.com>
 Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 15:55:13 -0300
 Subject: [PATCH] src: ensure to close stream when destroying session
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 Co-Authored-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
 PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/561
 Fixes: https://hackerone.com/reports/2319584
 Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com>
 Reviewed-By: Marco Ippolito <marcoippolito54@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-By: Matteo Collina <matteo.collina@gmail.com>
 Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
 CVE-ID: CVE-2024-27983
 Signed-off-by: Jan Staněk <jstanek@redhat.com>
 Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 ---
 src/node_http2.cc | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/src/node_http2.cc b/src/node_http2.cc
 index 53216dc..9a6d63d 100644
 --- a/src/node_http2.cc
 +++ b/src/node_http2.cc
@@ -529,6 +529,12 @@ Http2Session::Http2Session(Http2State* http2_state,
 Http2Session::~Http2Session() {
   CHECK(!is_in_scope());
   Debug(this, "freeing nghttp2 session");
 +  // Ensure that all `Http2Stream` instances and the memory they hold
 +  // on to are destroyed before the nghttp2 session is.
 +  for (const auto& [id, stream] : streams_) {
 +    stream->Detach();
 +  }
 +  streams_.clear();
   // Explicitly reset session_ so the subsequent
   // current_nghttp2_memory_ check passes.
   session_.reset();
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0006-Limit-CONTINUATION-frames-following-an-incoming-HEAD.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0006-Limit-CONTINUATION-frames-following-an-incoming-HEAD.patch
@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
 From 132ad9e8a8f8e246e59744a7fed995ed396f6cb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa <tatsuhiro.t@gmail.com>
 Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2024 16:26:42 +0900
 Subject: [PATCH] Limit CONTINUATION frames following an incoming HEADER frame
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 Signed-off-by: Jan Staněk <jstanek@redhat.com>
 Fixes: CVE-2024-28182
 Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 ---
 deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h |  7 ++++++-
 deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_helper.c           |  2 ++
 deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c          |  7 +++++++
 deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.h          | 10 ++++++++++
 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h b/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h
 index fa22081..b394bde 100644
 --- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h
 +++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h
@@ -440,7 +440,12 @@ typedef enum {
    * exhaustion on server side to send these frames forever and does
    * not read network.
    */
 -  NGHTTP2_ERR_FLOODED = -904
 +  NGHTTP2_ERR_FLOODED = -904,
 +  /**
 +   * When a local endpoint receives too many CONTINUATION frames
 +   * following a HEADER frame.
 +   */
 +  NGHTTP2_ERR_TOO_MANY_CONTINUATIONS = -905,
 } nghttp2_error;
 /**
 diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_helper.c b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_helper.c
 index 93dd475..b3563d9 100644
 --- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_helper.c
 +++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_helper.c
@@ -336,6 +336,8 @@ const char *nghttp2_strerror(int error_code) {
            "closed";
   case NGHTTP2_ERR_TOO_MANY_SETTINGS:
     return "SETTINGS frame contained more than the maximum allowed entries";
 +  case NGHTTP2_ERR_TOO_MANY_CONTINUATIONS:
 +    return "Too many CONTINUATION frames following a HEADER frame";
   default:
     return "Unknown error code";
   }
 diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c
 index ec5024d..8e4d2e7 100644
 --- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c
 +++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ static int session_new(nghttp2_session **session_ptr,
   (*session_ptr)->max_send_header_block_length = NGHTTP2_MAX_HEADERSLEN;
   (*session_ptr)->max_outbound_ack = NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_MAX_OBQ_FLOOD_ITEM;
   (*session_ptr)->max_settings = NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_MAX_SETTINGS;
 +  (*session_ptr)->max_continuations = NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS;
   if (option) {
     if ((option->opt_set_mask & NGHTTP2_OPT_NO_AUTO_WINDOW_UPDATE) &&
@@ -6778,6 +6779,8 @@ ssize_t nghttp2_session_mem_recv(nghttp2_session *session, const uint8_t *in,
           }
         }
         session_inbound_frame_reset(session);
 +
 +        session->num_continuations = 0;
       }
       break;
     }
@@ -6899,6 +6902,10 @@ ssize_t nghttp2_session_mem_recv(nghttp2_session *session, const uint8_t *in,
       }
 #endif /* DEBUGBUILD */
 +      if (++session->num_continuations > session->max_continuations) {
 +        return NGHTTP2_ERR_TOO_MANY_CONTINUATIONS;
 +      }
 +
       readlen = inbound_frame_buf_read(iframe, in, last);
       in += readlen;
 diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.h b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.h
 index b119329..ef8f7b2 100644
 --- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.h
 +++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.h
@@ -110,6 +110,10 @@ typedef struct {
 #define NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_STREAM_RESET_BURST 1000
 #define NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_STREAM_RESET_RATE 33
 +/* The default max number of CONTINUATION frames following an incoming
 +   HEADER frame. */
 +#define NGHTTP2_DEFAULT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS 8
 +
 /* Internal state when receiving incoming frame */
 typedef enum {
   /* Receiving frame header */
@@ -290,6 +294,12 @@ struct nghttp2_session {
   size_t max_send_header_block_length;
   /* The maximum number of settings accepted per SETTINGS frame. */
   size_t max_settings;
 +  /* The maximum number of CONTINUATION frames following an incoming
 +     HEADER frame. */
 +  size_t max_continuations;
 +  /* The number of CONTINUATION frames following an incoming HEADER
 +     frame.  This variable is reset when END_HEADERS flag is seen. */
 +  size_t num_continuations;
   /* Next Stream ID. Made unsigned int to detect >= (1 << 31). */
   uint32_t next_stream_id;
   /* The last stream ID this session initiated.  For client session,
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0007-Add-nghttp2_option_set_max_continuations.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0007-Add-nghttp2_option_set_max_continuations.patch
@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
 From 625b03149d2ec68cdbcfe3f2801d6f0420d917cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa <tatsuhiro.t@gmail.com>
 Date: Sat, 9 Mar 2024 16:48:10 +0900
 Subject: [PATCH] Add nghttp2_option_set_max_continuations
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 Signed-off-by: Jan Staněk <jstanek@redhat.com>
 Related: CVE-2024-28182
 Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 ---
 deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h | 11 +++++++++++
 deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.c           |  5 +++++
 deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.h           |  5 +++++
 deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c          |  4 ++++
 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h b/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h
 index b394bde..4d3339b 100644
 --- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h
 +++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/includes/nghttp2/nghttp2.h
@@ -2778,6 +2778,17 @@ NGHTTP2_EXTERN void
 nghttp2_option_set_stream_reset_rate_limit(nghttp2_option *option,
                                            uint64_t burst, uint64_t rate);
 +/**
 + * @function
 + *
 + * This function sets the maximum number of CONTINUATION frames
 + * following an incoming HEADER frame.  If more than those frames are
 + * received, the remote endpoint is considered to be misbehaving and
 + * session will be closed.  The default value is 8.
 + */
 +NGHTTP2_EXTERN void nghttp2_option_set_max_continuations(nghttp2_option *option,
 +                                                         size_t val);
 +
 /**
  * @function
  *
 diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.c b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.c
 index 43d4e95..53144b9 100644
 --- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.c
 +++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.c
@@ -150,3 +150,8 @@ void nghttp2_option_set_stream_reset_rate_limit(nghttp2_option *option,
   option->stream_reset_burst = burst;
   option->stream_reset_rate = rate;
 }
 +
 +void nghttp2_option_set_max_continuations(nghttp2_option *option, size_t val) {
 +  option->opt_set_mask |= NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS;
 +  option->max_continuations = val;
 +}
 diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.h b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.h
 index 2259e18..c89cb97 100644
 --- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.h
 +++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_option.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ typedef enum {
   NGHTTP2_OPT_SERVER_FALLBACK_RFC7540_PRIORITIES = 1 << 13,
   NGHTTP2_OPT_NO_RFC9113_LEADING_AND_TRAILING_WS_VALIDATION = 1 << 14,
   NGHTTP2_OPT_STREAM_RESET_RATE_LIMIT = 1 << 15,
 +  NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS = 1 << 16,
 } nghttp2_option_flag;
 /**
@@ -98,6 +99,10 @@ struct nghttp2_option {
    * NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_SETTINGS
    */
   size_t max_settings;
 +  /**
 +   * NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS
 +   */
 +  size_t max_continuations;
   /**
    * Bitwise OR of nghttp2_option_flag to determine that which fields
    * are specified.
 diff --git a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c
 index 8e4d2e7..ced7517 100644
 --- a/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c
 +++ b/deps/nghttp2/lib/nghttp2_session.c
@@ -585,6 +585,10 @@ static int session_new(nghttp2_session **session_ptr,
                            option->stream_reset_burst,
                            option->stream_reset_rate);
     }
 +
 +    if (option->opt_set_mask & NGHTTP2_OPT_MAX_CONTINUATIONS) {
 +      (*session_ptr)->max_continuations = option->max_continuations;
 +    }
   }
   rv = nghttp2_hd_deflate_init2(&(*session_ptr)->hd_deflater,
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0008-zlib-pause-stream-if-outgoing-buffer-is-full.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0008-zlib-pause-stream-if-outgoing-buffer-is-full.patch
--- a/SOURCES/0009-Address-CVE-2024-25629.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0009-Address-CVE-2024-25629.patch
@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
 From ec80a9196e2aedfd617d05964725f113000a41ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Brad House <brad@brad-house.com>
 Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2024 16:23:33 -0500
 Subject: [PATCH] Address CVE-2024-25629
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 Original commit title: Merge pull request from GHSA-mg26-v6qh-x48q
 Signed-off-by: Jan Staněk <jstanek@redhat.com>
 Fixes: CVE-2024-25629
 Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
 ---
 deps/cares/src/lib/ares__read_line.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/deps/cares/src/lib/ares__read_line.c b/deps/cares/src/lib/ares__read_line.c
 index c62ad2a..16627e4 100644
 --- a/deps/cares/src/lib/ares__read_line.c
 +++ b/deps/cares/src/lib/ares__read_line.c
@@ -49,6 +49,14 @@ int ares__read_line(FILE *fp, char **buf, size_t *bufsize)
       if (!fgets(*buf + offset, bytestoread, fp))
         return (offset != 0) ? 0 : (ferror(fp)) ? ARES_EFILE : ARES_EOF;
       len = offset + strlen(*buf + offset);
 +
 +      /* Probably means there was an embedded NULL as the first character in
 +      * the line, throw away line */
 +      if (len == 0) {
 +        offset = 0;
 +        continue;
 +      }
 +
       if ((*buf)[len - 1] == '\n')
         {
           (*buf)[len - 1] = 0;
 -- 
 2.44.0
--- a/SOURCES/0010-http-do-not-allow-OBS-fold-in-headers-by-default.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0010-http-do-not-allow-OBS-fold-in-headers-by-default.patch
--- a/SPECS/nodejs.spec
+++ b/SPECS/nodejs.spec