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Update to 0.9.12 phase 2

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epel9
Sérgio M. Basto 5 years ago
parent 69c1237250
commit 6d0c01c615
8 changed files with 72 additions and 226 deletions
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44
CVE-2018-15127.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From 09e8fc02f59f16e2583b34fe1a270c238bd9ffec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= <ppisar@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 10:40:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Limit lenght to INT_MAX bytes in
rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer()
This ammends 15bb719c03cc70f14c36a843dcb16ed69b405707 fix for a heap
out-of-bound write access in rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer() when
reading a transfered file content in a server. The former fix did not
work on platforms with a 32-bit int type (expected by rfbReadExact()).
CVE-2018-15127
<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/243>
<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/273>
---
libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
index 7af84906..f2edbeea 100644
--- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
+++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@
#include <errno.h>
/* strftime() */
#include <time.h>
+/* INT_MAX */
+#include <limits.h>
#ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_WITH_WEBSOCKETS
#include "rfbssl.h"
@@ -1472,8 +1474,11 @@ char *rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer(rfbClientPtr cl, uint32_t length)
0XFFFFFFFF, i.e. SIZE_MAX for 32-bit systems. On 64-bit systems, a length of 0XFFFFFFFF
will safely be allocated since this check will never trigger and malloc() can digest length+1
without problems as length is a uint32_t.
+ We also later pass length to rfbReadExact() that expects a signed int type and
+ that might wrap on platforms with a 32-bit int type if length is bigger
+ than 0X7FFFFFFF.
*/
- if(length == SIZE_MAX) {
+ if(length == SIZE_MAX || length > INT_MAX) {
rfbErr("rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer: too big file transfer length requested: %u", (unsigned int)length);
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return NULL;

23
CVE-2019-15681.patch
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From d01e1bb4246323ba6fcee3b82ef1faa9b1dac82a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Beier <dontmind@freeshell.org>
Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2019 22:32:25 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] rfbserver: don't leak stack memory to the remote
Thanks go to Pavel Cheremushkin of Kaspersky for reporting.
---
libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
index 3bacc891..310e5487 100644
--- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
+++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
@@ -3724,6 +3724,8 @@ rfbSendServerCutText(rfbScreenInfoPtr rfbScreen,char *str, int len)
rfbServerCutTextMsg sct;
rfbClientIteratorPtr iterator;
+ memset((char *)&sct, 0, sizeof(sct));
+
iterator = rfbGetClientIterator(rfbScreen);
while ((cl = rfbClientIteratorNext(iterator)) != NULL) {
sct.type = rfbServerCutText;

20
libvncserver-0.9.1-multilib.patch
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@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
diff -up LibVNCServer-0.9.1/libvncserver-config.in.multilib LibVNCServer-0.9.1/libvncserver-config.in
--- LibVNCServer-0.9.1/libvncserver-config.in.multilib 2007-05-26 21:28:25.000000000 -0500
+++ LibVNCServer-0.9.1/libvncserver-config.in 2008-01-22 14:51:08.000000000 -0600
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ prefix=@prefix@
exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
exec_prefix_set=no
includedir=@includedir@
-libdir=@libdir@
# if this script is in the same directory as libvncserver-config.in, assume not installed
if [ -f "`dirname "$0"`/libvncserver-config.in" ]; then
@@ -63,7 +62,7 @@ while test $# -gt 0; do
libs="$libs -R$dir"
fi
done
- echo "$libs" -lvncserver -lvncclient @LIBS@ @WSOCKLIB@
+ echo "$libs" -lvncserver -lvncclient
;;
--link)
echo @CC@

40
libvncserver-0.9.11-Limit-client-cut-text-length-to-1-MB.patch
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@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
From e7d578afbb16592ccee8f13aedd65b2220e220ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= <ppisar@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 11:58:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Limit client cut text length to 1 MB
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This patch constrains client text length to 1 MB. Otherwise a client
could make server allocate 2 GB of memory and that seems to be to much
to classify it as denial of service.
I keep the previous checks for maximal type values intentionally as
a course of defensive coding. (You cannot never know how small the
types are. And as a warning for people patching out this change not to
introduce CVE-2018-7225 again.)
Signed-off-by: Petr Písař <ppisar@redhat.com>
---
libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
index a9561fc..0027343 100644
--- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
+++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
@@ -2587,7 +2587,9 @@ rfbProcessClientNormalMessage(rfbClientPtr cl)
* argument. Here we check that the value fits into all of them to
* prevent from misinterpretation and thus from accessing uninitialized
* memory. CVE-2018-7225 */
- if (msg.cct.length > SIZE_MAX || msg.cct.length > INT_MAX - sz_rfbClientCutTextMsg) {
+ /* But first to prevent from a denial-of-service by allocating to much
+ * memory in the server, we impose a limit of 1 MB. */
+ if (msg.cct.length > 1<<20 || msg.cct.length > SIZE_MAX || msg.cct.length > INT_MAX - sz_rfbClientCutTextMsg) {
rfbLog("rfbClientCutText: too big cut text length requested: %" PRIu32 "\n",
msg.cct.length);
rfbCloseClient(cl);
--
2.13.6

76
libvncserver-0.9.11-Validate-client-cut-text-length.patch
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@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
From 0073e4f694d5a51bb72ff12a5e8364b6e752e094 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= <ppisar@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 13:48:00 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Validate client cut text length
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Client-provided unsigned 32-bit cut text length is passed to various
functions that expects argument of a different type.
E.g. "RFB 003.003\n\001\006\0\0\0\xff\xff\xff\xff" string sent to the
RFB server leads to 4294967295 msg.cct.length value that in turn is
interpreted as -1 by rfbReadExact() and thus uninitialized str buffer
with potentially sensitive data is passed to subsequent functions.
This patch fixes it by checking for a maximal value that still can be
processed correctly. It also corrects accepting length value of zero
(malloc(0) is interpreted on differnet systems differently).
Whether a client can make the server allocate up to 2 GB and cause
a denial of service on memory-tight systems is kept without answer.
A possible solution would be adding an arbitrary memory limit that is
deemed safe.
CVE-2018-7225
<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/218>
Signed-off-by: Petr Písař <ppisar@redhat.com>
---
libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
index 116c488..a9561fc 100644
--- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
+++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@
#include <errno.h>
/* strftime() */
#include <time.h>
+/* SIZE_MAX */
+#include <stdint.h>
+/* PRIu32 */
+#include <inttypes.h>
+/* INT_MAX */
+#include <limits.h>
#ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_WITH_WEBSOCKETS
#include "rfbssl.h"
@@ -2575,7 +2581,21 @@ rfbProcessClientNormalMessage(rfbClientPtr cl)
msg.cct.length = Swap32IfLE(msg.cct.length);
- str = (char *)malloc(msg.cct.length);
+ /* uint32_t input is passed to malloc()'s size_t argument,
+ * to rfbReadExact()'s int argument, to rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd()'s int
+ * argument increased of sz_rfbClientCutTextMsg, and to setXCutText()'s int
+ * argument. Here we check that the value fits into all of them to
+ * prevent from misinterpretation and thus from accessing uninitialized
+ * memory. CVE-2018-7225 */
+ if (msg.cct.length > SIZE_MAX || msg.cct.length > INT_MAX - sz_rfbClientCutTextMsg) {
+ rfbLog("rfbClientCutText: too big cut text length requested: %" PRIu32 "\n",
+ msg.cct.length);
+ rfbCloseClient(cl);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Allow zero-length client cut text. */
+ str = (char *)malloc(msg.cct.length ? msg.cct.length : 1);
if (str == NULL) {
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: not enough memory");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
--
2.13.6

22
libvncserver-0.9.11-soname.patch
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@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
diff -up libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncclient/Makefile.am.soname libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncclient/Makefile.am
--- libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncclient/Makefile.am.soname 2017-05-16 10:21:51.500768946 -0500
+++ libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncclient/Makefile.am 2017-05-17 11:26:44.383312391 -0500
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@ EXTRA_DIST=corre.c hextile.c rre.c tight
$(libvncclient_la_OBJECTS): ../rfb/rfbclient.h
lib_LTLIBRARIES=libvncclient.la
-libvncclient_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 1:0:0
+libvncclient_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 0:0:0
diff -up libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncserver/Makefile.am.soname libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncserver/Makefile.am
--- libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncserver/Makefile.am.soname 2017-05-16 10:21:51.500768946 -0500
+++ libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncserver/Makefile.am 2017-05-17 11:27:02.259459683 -0500
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ libvncserver_la_LIBADD += $(LIBSYSTEMD_L
endif
lib_LTLIBRARIES=libvncserver.la
-libvncserver_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 1:0:0
+libvncserver_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 0:0:0
if HAVE_RPM
$(PACKAGE)-$(VERSION).tar.gz: dist

55
libvncserver-0.9.11-system_minilzo.patch
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@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
diff -up libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncclient/Makefile.am.system_minilzo libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncclient/Makefile.am
--- libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncclient/Makefile.am.system_minilzo 2017-02-14 10:54:54.308402791 -0600
+++ libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncclient/Makefile.am 2017-02-14 10:56:28.007379315 -0600
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ endif
endif
-libvncclient_la_SOURCES=cursor.c listen.c rfbproto.c sockets.c vncviewer.c ../common/minilzo.c $(TLSSRCS)
-libvncclient_la_LIBADD=$(TLSLIBS)
+libvncclient_la_SOURCES=cursor.c listen.c rfbproto.c sockets.c vncviewer.c $(TLSSRCS)
+libvncclient_la_LIBADD=$(TLSLIBS) -lminilzo
noinst_HEADERS=../common/lzodefs.h ../common/lzoconf.h ../common/minilzo.h tls.h
diff -up libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncclient/rfbproto.c.system_minilzo libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncclient/rfbproto.c
--- libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncclient/rfbproto.c.system_minilzo 2016-12-30 07:01:28.000000000 -0600
+++ libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncclient/rfbproto.c 2017-02-14 10:54:54.309402801 -0600
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
#include <gcrypt.h>
#endif
-#include "minilzo.h"
+#include <lzo/minilzo.h>
#include "tls.h"
#ifdef _MSC_VER
diff -up libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncserver/Makefile.am.system_minilzo libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncserver/Makefile.am
--- libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncserver/Makefile.am.system_minilzo 2017-02-14 10:54:54.309402801 -0600
+++ libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncserver/Makefile.am 2017-02-14 10:57:28.495009713 -0600
@@ -53,11 +53,11 @@ endif
LIB_SRCS = main.c rfbserver.c rfbregion.c auth.c sockets.c $(WEBSOCKETSSRCS) \
stats.c corre.c hextile.c rre.c translate.c cutpaste.c \
httpd.c cursor.c font.c \
- draw.c selbox.c ../common/d3des.c ../common/vncauth.c cargs.c ../common/minilzo.c ultra.c scale.c \
+ draw.c selbox.c ../common/d3des.c ../common/vncauth.c cargs.c ultra.c scale.c \
$(ZLIBSRCS) $(TIGHTSRCS) $(TIGHTVNCFILETRANSFERSRCS)
libvncserver_la_SOURCES=$(LIB_SRCS)
-libvncserver_la_LIBADD=$(WEBSOCKETSSSLLIBS)
+libvncserver_la_LIBADD=$(WEBSOCKETSSSLLIBS) -lminilzo
if WITH_SYSTEMD
AM_CPPFLAGS += -DLIBVNCSERVER_WITH_SYSTEMD
diff -up libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncserver/ultra.c.system_minilzo libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncserver/ultra.c
--- libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncserver/ultra.c.system_minilzo 2016-12-30 07:01:28.000000000 -0600
+++ libvncserver-LibVNCServer-0.9.11/libvncserver/ultra.c 2017-02-14 10:54:54.309402801 -0600
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
*/
#include <rfb/rfb.h>
-#include "minilzo.h"
+#include <lzo/minilzo.h>
/*
* cl->beforeEncBuf contains pixel data in the client's format.

18
libvncserver.spec
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@ -16,15 +16,10 @@ Patch10: 0001-libvncserver-Add-API-to-add-custom-I-O-entry-points.patch
Patch11: 0002-libvncserver-Add-channel-security-handlers.patch
## downstream patches
Patch100: libvncserver-0.9.11-system_minilzo.patch
Patch101: libvncserver-0.9.1-multilib.patch
Patch102: LibVNCServer-0.9.10-system-crypto-policy.patch
# revert soname bump
Patch103: libvncserver-0.9.11-soname.patch
# 1/2 Fix CVE-2018-7225, bug #1546860
Patch104: libvncserver-0.9.11-Validate-client-cut-text-length.patch
# 2/2 Fix CVE-2018-7225, bug #1546860
Patch105: libvncserver-0.9.11-Limit-client-cut-text-length-to-1-MB.patch
Patch106: CVE-2018-15127.patch
Patch107: CVE-2019-15681.patch
BuildRequires: cmake
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(gnutls)
@ -89,19 +84,16 @@ developing applications that use %{name}.
%setup -q -n %{name}-LibVNCServer-%{version}
%patch1 -p1
#patch4 -p1 -b .0004
%patch10 -p1
%patch11 -p1
#patch100 -p1 -b .system_minilzo
# Nuke bundled minilzo
rm -fv common/lzodefs.h common/lzoconf.h commmon/minilzo.h common/minilzo.c
#patch101 -p1 -b .multilib
%patch102 -p1
#patch104 -p1
#patch105 -p1
%patch106 -p1
%patch107 -p1
# Fix encoding
for file in ChangeLog ; do

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