import libreswan-4.12-1.el9

i9c changed/i9c/libreswan-4.12-1.el9
MSVSphere Packaging Team 1 year ago
parent 5d1e3fadfc
commit bda6a3fbeb

2
.gitignore vendored

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
SOURCES/ikev1_dsa.fax.bz2 SOURCES/ikev1_dsa.fax.bz2
SOURCES/ikev1_psk.fax.bz2 SOURCES/ikev1_psk.fax.bz2
SOURCES/ikev2.fax.bz2 SOURCES/ikev2.fax.bz2
SOURCES/libreswan-4.9.tar.gz SOURCES/libreswan-4.12.tar.gz

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
b35cd50b8bc0a08b9c07713bf19c72d53bfe66bb SOURCES/ikev1_dsa.fax.bz2 b35cd50b8bc0a08b9c07713bf19c72d53bfe66bb SOURCES/ikev1_dsa.fax.bz2
861d97bf488f9e296cad8c43ab72f111a5b1a848 SOURCES/ikev1_psk.fax.bz2 861d97bf488f9e296cad8c43ab72f111a5b1a848 SOURCES/ikev1_psk.fax.bz2
fcaf77f3deae3d8e99cdb3b1f8abea63167a0633 SOURCES/ikev2.fax.bz2 fcaf77f3deae3d8e99cdb3b1f8abea63167a0633 SOURCES/ikev2.fax.bz2
12b7351ca7e6ba1ac787239e67027a4d82f02f10 SOURCES/libreswan-4.9.tar.gz 786c14a4755311ea3103683a3294e1536b1e44a6 SOURCES/libreswan-4.12.tar.gz

@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
From 7a6c217f47b1ae37e32b173dc6d3ea7fdb86d532 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 11:24:22 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] pluto: abort processing corrupt TS payloads
CVE-2023-23009
Latest updates on this issue at https://libreswan.org/security/CVE-2023-23009
---
programs/pluto/ikev2_ts.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev2_ts.c b/programs/pluto/ikev2_ts.c
index 3f7519ca38..f06c40ba46 100644
--- a/programs/pluto/ikev2_ts.c
+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev2_ts.c
@@ -437,6 +437,11 @@ static bool v2_parse_tss(struct payload_digest *const ts_pd,
d = pbs_in_struct(&ts_pd->pbs, &ikev2_ts_header_desc,
&ts_h, sizeof(ts_h), &ts_body_pbs);
+ if (d != NULL) {
+ llog_diag(RC_LOG, logger, &d, "%s", "");
+ return false;
+ }
+
switch (ts_h.isath_type) {
case IKEv2_TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE:
case IKEv2_TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE:
--
2.39.2
From 52c19ccc9455ccd91fa4946b09f8e11222f1c923 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Cagney <cagney@gnu.org>
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 14:10:44 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] ikev1: only clean up a connection when it isn't deleted
fix #1018 reported by Wolfgang.
see also ecb9c88910df1fb070488835bf3180096f3ccba3:
IKEv1: Remove all IPsec SA's of a connection when newest SA is removed.
---
programs/pluto/ikev1_main.c | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev1_main.c b/programs/pluto/ikev1_main.c
index a616c5ccf3..21765d4002 100644
--- a/programs/pluto/ikev1_main.c
+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev1_main.c
@@ -2130,15 +2130,16 @@ bool accept_delete(struct msg_digest *md,
ntohl(spi));
}
- struct connection *rc = dst->st_connection;
+ /* save for post delete_state() code */
+ co_serial_t rc_serialno = dst->st_connection->serialno;
if (nat_traversal_enabled && dst->st_connection->ikev1_natt != NATT_NONE) {
nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, dst);
v1_maybe_natify_initiator_endpoints(st, HERE);
}
- if (rc->newest_ipsec_sa == dst->st_serialno &&
- (rc->policy & POLICY_UP)) {
+ if (dst->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa == dst->st_serialno &&
+ (dst->st_connection->policy & POLICY_UP)) {
/*
* Last IPsec SA for a permanent
* connection that we have initiated.
@@ -2162,7 +2163,12 @@ bool accept_delete(struct msg_digest *md,
md->v1_st = NULL;
}
- if (rc->newest_ipsec_sa == SOS_NOBODY) {
+ /*
+ * Either .newest_ipsec_sa matches DST
+ * and is cleared, or was never set.
+ */
+ struct connection *rc = connection_by_serialno(rc_serialno);
+ if (rc != NULL && rc->newest_ipsec_sa == SOS_NOBODY) {
dbg("%s() connection '%s' -POLICY_UP", __func__, rc->name);
rc->policy &= ~POLICY_UP;
if (!shared_phase1_connection(rc)) {
--
2.39.2

@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev1.c b/programs/pluto/ikev1.c
index e0615323ed..401618b6dd 100644
--- a/programs/pluto/ikev1.c
+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev1.c
@@ -1101,10 +1101,20 @@ void process_v1_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
struct state *st = NULL;
enum state_kind from_state = STATE_UNDEFINED; /* state we started in */
+ /*
+ * For the initial responses, don't leak the responder's SPI.
+ * Hence the use of send_v1_notification_from_md().
+ *
+ * AGGR mode is a mess in that the R0->R1 transition happens
+ * well before the transition succeeds.
+ */
#define SEND_NOTIFICATION(t) \
{ \
pstats(ikev1_sent_notifies_e, t); \
- if (st != NULL) \
+ if (st != NULL && \
+ st->st_state->kind != STATE_AGGR_R0 && \
+ st->st_state->kind != STATE_AGGR_R1 && \
+ st->st_state->kind != STATE_MAIN_R0) \
send_v1_notification_from_state(st, from_state, t); \
else \
send_v1_notification_from_md(md, t); \
@@ -1168,17 +1178,26 @@ void process_v1_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
from_state = (md->hdr.isa_xchg == ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT ?
STATE_MAIN_R0 : STATE_AGGR_R0);
} else {
- /* not an initial message */
+ /*
+ * Possibly not an initial message. Possibly
+ * from initiator. Possibly from responder.
+ *
+ * Possibly. Which is probably hopeless.
+ */
st = find_state_ikev1(&md->hdr.isa_ike_spis,
md->hdr.isa_msgid);
if (st == NULL) {
/*
- * perhaps this is a first message
+ * Perhaps this is a first message
* from the responder and contains a
* responder cookie that we've not yet
* seen.
+ *
+ * Perhaps this is a random message
+ * with a bogus non-zero responder IKE
+ * SPI.
*/
st = find_state_ikev1_init(&md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi,
md->hdr.isa_msgid);
@@ -1189,6 +1208,21 @@ void process_v1_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
/* XXX Could send notification back */
return;
}
+ if (st->st_state->kind == STATE_AGGR_R0) {
+ /*
+ * The only way for this to
+ * happen is for the attacker
+ * to guess the responder's
+ * IKE SPI that hasn't been
+ * sent over the wire?
+ *
+ * Well that or played 1/2^32
+ * odds.
+ */
+ llog_pexpect(md->md_logger, HERE,
+ "phase 1 message matching AGGR_R0 state");
+ return;
+ }
}
from_state = st->st_state->kind;
}
@@ -2870,7 +2904,28 @@ void complete_v1_state_transition(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md, stf_s
delete_state(st);
/* wipe out dangling pointer to st */
md->v1_st = NULL;
+ } else if (st->st_state->kind == STATE_AGGR_R0 ||
+ st->st_state->kind == STATE_AGGR_R1 ||
+ st->st_state->kind == STATE_MAIN_R0) {
+ /*
+ *
+ * Wipe out the incomplete larval state.
+ *
+ * ARGH! In <=v4.10, the aggr code flipped the
+ * larval state to R1 right at the start of
+ * the transition and not the end, so using
+ * state to figure things out is close to
+ * useless.
+ *
+ * Deleting the state means that pluto has no
+ * way to detect and ignore amplification
+ * attacks.
+ */
+ delete_state(st);
+ /* wipe out dangling pointer to st */
+ md->v1_st = NULL;
}
+
break;
}
}
diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c b/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c
index 2732951beb..87be80cb6c 100644
--- a/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c
+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ stf_status aggr_inI1_outR1(struct state *null_st UNUSED,
/* Set up state */
struct ike_sa *ike = new_v1_rstate(c, md);
md->v1_st = &ike->sa; /* (caller will reset cur_state) */
- change_v1_state(&ike->sa, STATE_AGGR_R1);
+ change_v1_state(&ike->sa, STATE_AGGR_R0);
/*
* Warn when peer is expected to use especially dangerous
@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ stf_status aggr_inI1_outR1(struct state *null_st UNUSED,
if (!v1_decode_certs(md)) {
llog_sa(RC_LOG, ike, "X509: CERT payload bogus or revoked");
- return false;
+ /* XXX notification is in order! */
+ return STF_FAIL_v1N + v1N_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
}
/*

@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
Name: libreswan Name: libreswan
Summary: Internet Key Exchange (IKEv1 and IKEv2) implementation for IPsec Summary: Internet Key Exchange (IKEv1 and IKEv2) implementation for IPsec
# version is generated in the release script # version is generated in the release script
Version: 4.9 Version: 4.12
Release: %{?prever:0.}4%{?prever:.%{prever}}%{?dist} Release: %{?prever:0.}1%{?prever:.%{prever}}%{?dist}
License: GPLv2 License: GPLv2
Url: https://libreswan.org/ Url: https://libreswan.org/
Source0: https://download.libreswan.org/%{?prever:development/}%{name}-%{version}%{?prever}.tar.gz Source0: https://download.libreswan.org/%{?prever:development/}%{name}-%{version}%{?prever}.tar.gz
@ -41,8 +41,6 @@ Source2: https://download.libreswan.org/cavs/ikev1_psk.fax.bz2
Source3: https://download.libreswan.org/cavs/ikev2.fax.bz2 Source3: https://download.libreswan.org/cavs/ikev2.fax.bz2
%endif %endif
Patch: libreswan-4.6-ikev1-policy-defaults-to-drop.patch Patch: libreswan-4.6-ikev1-policy-defaults-to-drop.patch
Patch: libreswan-4.9-cve-2023-23009.patch
Patch: libreswan-4.9-cve-2023-30570.patch
BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel
BuildRequires: bison BuildRequires: bison
@ -198,6 +196,17 @@ certutil -N -d sql:$tmpdir --empty-password
%doc %{_mandir}/*/* %doc %{_mandir}/*/*
%changelog %changelog
* Wed Aug 9 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.12-1
- Update to 4.12 to fix CVE-2023-38710, CVE-2023-38711, CVE-2023-38712
- Resolves: rhbz#2215956
* Fri May 05 2023 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 4.9-5
- Just bumping up the version to include bugs for CVE-2023-2295. There is no
code fix for it. Fix for it is including the code fix for CVE-2023-30570.
- Fix CVE-2023-2295 Regression of CVE-2023-30570 fixes in the
Red Hat Enterprise Linux
- Resolves: rhbz#2189777, rhbz#2190148
* Thu May 04 2023 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 4.9-4 * Thu May 04 2023 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 4.9-4
- Just bumping up the version as an incorrect 9.3 build was created. - Just bumping up the version as an incorrect 9.3 build was created.
- Related: rhbz#2187171 - Related: rhbz#2187171
@ -211,7 +220,7 @@ certutil -N -d sql:$tmpdir --empty-password
- Fix CVE-2023-23009: remote DoS via crafted TS payload with an - Fix CVE-2023-23009: remote DoS via crafted TS payload with an
incorrect selector length (rhbz#2173674) incorrect selector length (rhbz#2173674)
* Wed Mar 15 2023 MSVSphere Packaging Team <packager@msvsphere.ru> - 4.6-3 * Wed Mar 15 2023 MSVSphere Packaging Team <packager@msvsphere.ru> - 4.9-1
- Rebuilt for MSVSphere 9.1. - Rebuilt for MSVSphere 9.1.
* Wed Jan 4 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.9-1 * Wed Jan 4 2023 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 4.9-1

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