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import krb5-1.21.1-4.el9_5

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c9 imports/c9/krb5-1.21.1-4.el9_5
MSVSphere Packaging Team 1 month ago
parent e4f6f486c3
commit c401043d2b
Signed by: sys_gitsync
GPG Key ID: B2B0B9F29E528FE8
12 changed files with 13859 additions and 11 deletions
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10694
SOURCES/0016-Eliminate-old-style-function-declarations.patch
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34
SOURCES/0017-End-connection-on-KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE.patch
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From 347079e258e6ded99d8dda162cafaf133b982ab9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 00:44:53 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] End connection on KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE
In sendto_kdc.c:service_fds(), if a message handler indicates that a
message should be discarded, kill the connection so we don't continue
waiting on it for more data.
ticket: 7899
(cherry picked from commit ca80f64c786341d5871ae1de18142e62af64f7b9)
---
src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
index 0f4bf23a95..262edf09b4 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
@@ -1440,7 +1440,10 @@ service_fds(krb5_context context, struct select_state *selstate,
if (msg_handler != NULL) {
krb5_data reply = make_data(state->in.buf, state->in.pos);
- stop = (msg_handler(context, &reply, msg_handler_data) != 0);
+ if (!msg_handler(context, &reply, msg_handler_data)) {
+ kill_conn(context, state, selstate);
+ stop = 0;
+ }
}
if (stop) {
--
2.44.0

226
SOURCES/0018-Add-request_timeout-configuration-parameter.patch
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From d71ebaef4619d6281551793c297caed7a025a909 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 14:20:34 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Add request_timeout configuration parameter
Add a parameter to limit the total amount of time taken for a KDC or
password change request.
ticket: 9106 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 802318cda963456b3ed7856c836e89da891483be)
---
doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst | 9 ++++++
src/include/k5-int.h | 2 ++
src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c | 14 +++++++-
src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
index a33711d918..65fb592d98 100644
--- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
@@ -356,6 +356,15 @@ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
(:ref:`duration` string.) Sets the default renewable lifetime
for initial ticket requests. The default value is 0.
+**request_timeout**
+ (:ref:`duration` string.) Sets the maximum total time for KDC or
+ password change requests. This timeout does not affect the
+ intervals between requests, so setting a low timeout may result in
+ fewer requests being attempted and/or some servers not being
+ contacted. A value of 0 indicates no specific maximum, in which
+ case requests will time out if no server responds after several
+ tries. The default value is 0. (New in release 1.22.)
+
**spake_preauth_groups**
A whitespace or comma-separated list of words which specifies the
groups allowed for SPAKE preauthentication. The possible values
diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
index b3e07945c1..69d6a6f569 100644
--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
+++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ typedef unsigned char u_char;
#define KRB5_CONF_SPAKE_PREAUTH_INDICATOR "spake_preauth_indicator"
#define KRB5_CONF_SPAKE_PREAUTH_KDC_CHALLENGE "spake_preauth_kdc_challenge"
#define KRB5_CONF_SPAKE_PREAUTH_GROUPS "spake_preauth_groups"
+#define KRB5_CONF_REQUEST_TIMEOUT "request_timeout"
#define KRB5_CONF_TICKET_LIFETIME "ticket_lifetime"
#define KRB5_CONF_UDP_PREFERENCE_LIMIT "udp_preference_limit"
#define KRB5_CONF_UNLOCKITER "unlockiter"
@@ -1200,6 +1201,7 @@ struct _krb5_context {
kdb5_dal_handle *dal_handle;
/* allowable clock skew */
krb5_deltat clockskew;
+ krb5_deltat req_timeout;
krb5_flags kdc_default_options;
krb5_flags library_options;
krb5_boolean profile_secure;
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
index 2b5abcd817..582a2945ff 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
krb5_context ctx = 0;
krb5_error_code retval;
int tmp;
- char *plugin_dir = NULL;
+ char *plugin_dir = NULL, *timeout_str = NULL;
/* Verify some assumptions. If the assumptions hold and the
compiler is optimizing, this should result in no code being
@@ -240,6 +240,17 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
get_integer(ctx, KRB5_CONF_CLOCKSKEW, DEFAULT_CLOCKSKEW, &tmp);
ctx->clockskew = tmp;
+ retval = profile_get_string(ctx->profile, KRB5_CONF_LIBDEFAULTS,
+ KRB5_CONF_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, NULL, NULL,
+ &timeout_str);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+ if (timeout_str != NULL) {
+ retval = krb5_string_to_deltat(timeout_str, &ctx->req_timeout);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
get_integer(ctx, KRB5_CONF_KDC_DEFAULT_OPTIONS, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK,
&tmp);
ctx->kdc_default_options = tmp;
@@ -281,6 +292,7 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
cleanup:
profile_release_string(plugin_dir);
+ profile_release_string(timeout_str);
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return retval;
}
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
index 262edf09b4..98247a1089 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
@@ -1395,34 +1395,41 @@ get_endtime(time_ms endtime, struct conn_state *conns)
static krb5_boolean
service_fds(krb5_context context, struct select_state *selstate,
- time_ms interval, struct conn_state *conns,
+ time_ms interval, time_ms timeout, struct conn_state *conns,
struct select_state *seltemp, const krb5_data *realm,
int (*msg_handler)(krb5_context, const krb5_data *, void *),
void *msg_handler_data, struct conn_state **winner_out)
{
int e, selret = 0;
- time_ms endtime;
+ time_ms curtime, interval_end, endtime;
struct conn_state *state;
*winner_out = NULL;
- e = get_curtime_ms(&endtime);
+ e = get_curtime_ms(&curtime);
if (e)
return TRUE;
- endtime += interval;
+ interval_end = curtime + interval;
e = 0;
while (selstate->nfds > 0) {
- e = cm_select_or_poll(selstate, get_endtime(endtime, conns),
- seltemp, &selret);
+ endtime = get_endtime(interval_end, conns);
+ /* Don't wait longer than the whole request should last. */
+ if (timeout && endtime > timeout)
+ endtime = timeout;
+ e = cm_select_or_poll(selstate, endtime, seltemp, &selret);
if (e == EINTR)
continue;
if (e != 0)
break;
- if (selret == 0)
- /* Timeout, return to caller. */
+ if (selret == 0) {
+ /* We timed out. Stop if we hit the overall request timeout. */
+ if (timeout && (get_curtime_ms(&curtime) || curtime >= timeout))
+ return TRUE;
+ /* Otherwise return to the caller to send the next request. */
return FALSE;
+ }
/* Got something on a socket, process it. */
for (state = conns; state != NULL; state = state->next) {
@@ -1495,7 +1502,7 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
void *msg_handler_data)
{
int pass;
- time_ms delay;
+ time_ms delay, timeout = 0;
krb5_error_code retval;
struct conn_state *conns = NULL, *state, **tailptr, *next, *winner;
size_t s;
@@ -1505,6 +1512,13 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
*reply = empty_data();
+ if (context->req_timeout) {
+ retval = get_curtime_ms(&timeout);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+ timeout += 1000 * context->req_timeout;
+ }
+
/* One for use here, listing all our fds in use, and one for
* temporary use in service_fds, for the fds of interest. */
sel_state = malloc(2 * sizeof(*sel_state));
@@ -1532,8 +1546,9 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
if (maybe_send(context, state, message, sel_state, realm,
callback_info))
continue;
- done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, conns, seltemp,
- realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
+ done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, timeout, conns,
+ seltemp, realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data,
+ &winner);
}
}
@@ -1545,13 +1560,13 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
if (maybe_send(context, state, message, sel_state, realm,
callback_info))
continue;
- done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, conns, seltemp,
+ done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, timeout, conns, seltemp,
realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
}
/* Wait for two seconds at the end of the first pass. */
if (!done) {
- done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 2000, conns, seltemp,
+ done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 2000, timeout, conns, seltemp,
realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
}
@@ -1562,15 +1577,17 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
if (maybe_send(context, state, message, sel_state, realm,
callback_info))
continue;
- done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, conns, seltemp,
- realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
+ done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, timeout, conns,
+ seltemp, realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data,
+ &winner);
if (sel_state->nfds == 0)
break;
}
/* Wait for the delay backoff at the end of this pass. */
if (!done) {
- done = service_fds(context, sel_state, delay, conns, seltemp,
- realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
+ done = service_fds(context, sel_state, delay, timeout, conns,
+ seltemp, realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data,
+ &winner);
}
if (sel_state->nfds == 0)
break;
--
2.44.0

138
SOURCES/0019-Wait-indefinitely-on-KDC-TCP-connections.patch
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From 0bf66d2018db92c95d3bab54a62f6a3265ceb158 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 16:26:42 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Wait indefinitely on KDC TCP connections
When making a KDC or password change request, wait indefinitely
(limited only by request_timeout if set) once a KDC has accepted a TCP
connection.
ticket: 9105 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 6436a3808061da787a43c6810f5f0370cdfb6e36)
---
doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst | 2 +-
src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
index 65fb592d98..b7284c47df 100644
--- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
for initial ticket requests. The default value is 0.
**request_timeout**
- (:ref:`duration` string.) Sets the maximum total time for KDC or
+ (:ref:`duration` string.) Sets the maximum total time for KDC and
password change requests. This timeout does not affect the
intervals between requests, so setting a low timeout may result in
fewer requests being attempted and/or some servers not being
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
index 98247a1089..924f5b2d26 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
@@ -134,7 +134,6 @@ struct conn_state {
krb5_data callback_buffer;
size_t server_index;
struct conn_state *next;
- time_ms endtime;
krb5_boolean defer;
struct {
const char *uri_path;
@@ -344,15 +343,19 @@ cm_select_or_poll(const struct select_state *in, time_ms endtime,
struct select_state *out, int *sret)
{
#ifndef USE_POLL
- struct timeval tv;
+ struct timeval tv, *tvp;
#endif
krb5_error_code retval;
time_ms curtime, interval;
- retval = get_curtime_ms(&curtime);
- if (retval != 0)
- return retval;
- interval = (curtime < endtime) ? endtime - curtime : 0;
+ if (endtime != 0) {
+ retval = get_curtime_ms(&curtime);
+ if (retval != 0)
+ return retval;
+ interval = (curtime < endtime) ? endtime - curtime : 0;
+ } else {
+ interval = -1;
+ }
/* We don't need a separate copy of the selstate for poll, but use one for
* consistency with how we use select. */
@@ -361,9 +364,14 @@ cm_select_or_poll(const struct select_state *in, time_ms endtime,
#ifdef USE_POLL
*sret = poll(out->fds, out->nfds, interval);
#else
- tv.tv_sec = interval / 1000;
- tv.tv_usec = interval % 1000 * 1000;
- *sret = select(out->max, &out->rfds, &out->wfds, &out->xfds, &tv);
+ if (interval != -1) {
+ tv.tv_sec = interval / 1000;
+ tv.tv_usec = interval % 1000 * 1000;
+ tvp = &tv;
+ } else {
+ tvp = NULL;
+ }
+ *sret = select(out->max, &out->rfds, &out->wfds, &out->xfds, tvp);
#endif
return (*sret < 0) ? SOCKET_ERRNO : 0;
@@ -1099,11 +1107,6 @@ service_tcp_connect(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *realm,
}
conn->state = WRITING;
-
- /* Record this connection's timeout for service_fds. */
- if (get_curtime_ms(&conn->endtime) == 0)
- conn->endtime += 10000;
-
return conn->service_write(context, realm, conn, selstate);
}
@@ -1378,19 +1381,18 @@ kill_conn:
return FALSE;
}
-/* Return the maximum of endtime and the endtime fields of all currently active
- * TCP connections. */
-static time_ms
-get_endtime(time_ms endtime, struct conn_state *conns)
+/* Return true if conns contains any states with connected TCP sockets. */
+static krb5_boolean
+any_tcp_connections(struct conn_state *conns)
{
struct conn_state *state;
for (state = conns; state != NULL; state = state->next) {
- if ((state->state == READING || state->state == WRITING) &&
- state->endtime > endtime)
- endtime = state->endtime;
+ if (state->addr.transport != UDP &&
+ (state->state == READING || state->state == WRITING))
+ return TRUE;
}
- return endtime;
+ return FALSE;
}
static krb5_boolean
@@ -1413,9 +1415,9 @@ service_fds(krb5_context context, struct select_state *selstate,
e = 0;
while (selstate->nfds > 0) {
- endtime = get_endtime(interval_end, conns);
+ endtime = any_tcp_connections(conns) ? 0 : interval_end;
/* Don't wait longer than the whole request should last. */
- if (timeout && endtime > timeout)
+ if (timeout && (!endtime || endtime > timeout))
endtime = timeout;
e = cm_select_or_poll(selstate, endtime, seltemp, &selret);
if (e == EINTR)
--
2.44.0

381
SOURCES/0020-Avoid-strict-prototype-compiler-errors.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
From 0cb2e6c09fee3863c16664bf180e773f662cd313 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Steffen=20Kie=C3=9F?=
<steffen.kiess@cis.iti.uni-stuttgart.de>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 18:39:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Avoid strict-prototype compiler errors
Commit 4b9d7f7c107f01a61600fddcd8cde3812d0366a2 added the
-Werror=strict-prototypes parameter to the build process, but left
behind 28 function definitions using "()" instead of "(void)". Most
of these definitions could not cause compiler errors for various
reasons (such as an accompanying prototype), but a few could cause
errors in gcc depending on the build configuration.
For consistency and safety, add "(void)" to all 28 definitions.
[ghudson@mit.edu: rewrote commit message]
(cherry picked from commit 3ae9244cd021a75eba909d872a92c25db490714d)
---
src/clients/kcpytkt/kcpytkt.c | 2 +-
src/clients/kdeltkt/kdeltkt.c | 2 +-
src/clients/kinit/kinit.c | 4 ++--
src/clients/kinit/kinit_kdb.c | 2 +-
src/clients/klist/klist.c | 4 ++--
src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c | 2 +-
src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c | 4 ++--
src/kdc/main.c | 2 +-
src/kprop/kpropd.c | 4 ++--
src/lib/crypto/builtin/enc_provider/aes.c | 2 +-
src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c | 2 +-
src/lib/krb5/ccache/t_memory.c | 4 ++--
src/lib/krb5/ccache/t_stdio.c | 4 ++--
src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_debug.c | 2 +-
src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_open.c | 4 ++--
src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/hash/dbm.c | 2 +-
src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/test/btree.tests/main.c | 2 +-
src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/test/dbtest.c | 2 +-
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 2 +-
src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c | 2 +-
src/tests/asn.1/make-vectors.c | 2 +-
21 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/clients/kcpytkt/kcpytkt.c b/src/clients/kcpytkt/kcpytkt.c
index 0b8802261e..f1d50e5de0 100644
--- a/src/clients/kcpytkt/kcpytkt.c
+++ b/src/clients/kcpytkt/kcpytkt.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ static char *prog;
static int quiet = 0;
static void
-xusage()
+xusage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "xusage: %s [-c from_ccache] [-e etype] [-f flags] "
"dest_ccache service1 service2 ...\n", prog);
diff --git a/src/clients/kdeltkt/kdeltkt.c b/src/clients/kdeltkt/kdeltkt.c
index cd0bf637db..66a32a8bd3 100644
--- a/src/clients/kdeltkt/kdeltkt.c
+++ b/src/clients/kdeltkt/kdeltkt.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ static char *prog;
static int quiet = 0;
static void
-xusage()
+xusage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "xusage: %s [-c ccache] [-e etype] [-f flags] service1 "
"service2 ...\n", prog);
diff --git a/src/clients/kinit/kinit.c b/src/clients/kinit/kinit.c
index 7a33ffae59..b27b723f2d 100644
--- a/src/clients/kinit/kinit.c
+++ b/src/clients/kinit/kinit.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ get_name_from_os(void)
#else /* HAVE_PWD_H */
#ifdef _WIN32
static char *
-get_name_from_os()
+get_name_from_os(void)
{
static char name[1024];
DWORD name_size = sizeof(name);
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ get_name_from_os()
}
#else /* _WIN32 */
static char *
-get_name_from_os()
+get_name_from_os(void)
{
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/src/clients/kinit/kinit_kdb.c b/src/clients/kinit/kinit_kdb.c
index fbd174bf0c..4e7cd50169 100644
--- a/src/clients/kinit/kinit_kdb.c
+++ b/src/clients/kinit/kinit_kdb.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ kinit_kdb_init(krb5_context *pcontext, char *realm)
}
void
-kinit_kdb_fini()
+kinit_kdb_fini(void)
{
kadm5_destroy(server_handle);
}
diff --git a/src/clients/klist/klist.c b/src/clients/klist/klist.c
index c797b1698f..27cf0ee11b 100644
--- a/src/clients/klist/klist.c
+++ b/src/clients/klist/klist.c
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ do_keytab(const char *name)
}
static void
-list_all_ccaches()
+list_all_ccaches(void)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_ccache cache;
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ show_all_ccaches(void)
}
static void
-do_ccache()
+do_ccache(void)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_ccache cache;
diff --git a/src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c b/src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c
index 23b64b0f58..c1256f7708 100644
--- a/src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c
+++ b/src/kadmin/cli/kadmin.c
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ kadmin_startup(int argc, char *argv[], char **request_out, char ***args_out)
}
int
-quit()
+quit(void)
{
kadm5_ret_t retval;
diff --git a/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c b/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c
index 55d529fa4c..b9b61e3f91 100644
--- a/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c
+++ b/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
* program is run).
*/
static int
-open_db_and_mkey()
+open_db_and_mkey(void)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_data scratch, pwd, seed;
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ open_db_and_mkey()
#endif
int
-quit()
+quit(void)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
static krb5_boolean finished = 0;
diff --git a/src/kdc/main.c b/src/kdc/main.c
index b43fe9a082..2dfad5673f 100644
--- a/src/kdc/main.c
+++ b/src/kdc/main.c
@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ write_pid_file(const char *path)
}
static void
-finish_realms()
+finish_realms(void)
{
int i;
diff --git a/src/kprop/kpropd.c b/src/kprop/kpropd.c
index f883ae2df8..fbb8e37ae9 100644
--- a/src/kprop/kpropd.c
+++ b/src/kprop/kpropd.c
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ get_wildcard_addr(struct addrinfo **res)
}
static void
-do_standalone()
+do_standalone(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in frominet;
struct addrinfo *res;
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ full_resync(CLIENT *clnt)
* Returns non-zero on failure due to errors.
*/
krb5_error_code
-do_iprop()
+do_iprop(void)
{
kadm5_ret_t retval;
krb5_principal iprop_svc_principal = NULL;
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/builtin/enc_provider/aes.c b/src/lib/crypto/builtin/enc_provider/aes.c
index 7fa9449797..39e2a84005 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/builtin/enc_provider/aes.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/builtin/enc_provider/aes.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ void k5_iEnc256_CBC(struct aes_data *data);
void k5_iDec256_CBC(struct aes_data *data);
static krb5_boolean
-aesni_supported_by_cpu()
+aesni_supported_by_cpu(void)
{
unsigned int a, b, c, d;
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
index 25a419d73a..32dec3022e 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
#define HMAC_CTX_new compat_hmac_ctx_new
static HMAC_CTX *
-compat_hmac_ctx_new()
+compat_hmac_ctx_new(void)
{
HMAC_CTX *ctx;
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/t_memory.c b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/t_memory.c
index 6d103a00d1..0f94e823cb 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/t_memory.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/t_memory.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ krb5_creds test_creds = {
};
void
-init_test_cred()
+init_test_cred(void)
{
test_creds.client = (krb5_principal) malloc(sizeof(krb5_data *)*3);
test_creds.client[0] = &client1;
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ init_test_cred()
};
void
-mcc_test()
+mcc_test(void)
{
krb5_ccache id;
krb5_creds creds;
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/t_stdio.c b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/t_stdio.c
index 15185e301c..06a9c2dea1 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/t_stdio.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/t_stdio.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ krb5_creds test_creds = {
};
void
-init_test_cred()
+init_test_cred(void)
{
test_creds.client = (krb5_principal) malloc(sizeof(krb5_data *)*3);
test_creds.client[0] = &client1;
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ init_test_cred()
int flags = 0;
void
-scc_test()
+scc_test(void)
{
krb5_ccache id;
krb5_creds creds;
diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_debug.c b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_debug.c
index bc71076a35..5a955e09be 100644
--- a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_debug.c
+++ b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_debug.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static FILE *tracefp;
* initialize debugging.
*/
static void
-__bt_dinit()
+__bt_dinit(void)
{
static int first = 1;
diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_open.c b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_open.c
index a2910422eb..ef7515c3d4 100644
--- a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_open.c
+++ b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_open.c
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ nroot(BTREE *t)
}
static int
-tmp()
+tmp(void)
{
#ifdef SIG_BLOCK
sigset_t set, oset;
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ tmp()
}
static int
-byteorder()
+byteorder(void)
{
u_int32_t x;
u_char *p;
diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/hash/dbm.c b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/hash/dbm.c
index 2dca256dc3..e643634433 100644
--- a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/hash/dbm.c
+++ b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/hash/dbm.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ kdb2_store(datum key, datum dat)
}
static void
-no_open_db()
+no_open_db(void)
{
(void)fprintf(stderr, "dbm: no open database.\n");
}
diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/test/btree.tests/main.c b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/test/btree.tests/main.c
index 088f903231..eec843d4db 100644
--- a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/test/btree.tests/main.c
+++ b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/test/btree.tests/main.c
@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ keydata(key, data)
}
void
-usage()
+usage(void)
{
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s [-bdluw] [-c cache] [-i file] [-p page] [file]\n",
diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/test/dbtest.c b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/test/dbtest.c
index 04bf34b90d..a2866b4412 100644
--- a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/test/dbtest.c
+++ b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/test/dbtest.c
@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ xmalloc(char *text, size_t len)
}
void
-usage()
+usage(void)
{
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"usage: dbtest [-l] [-f file] [-i info] [-o file] type script\n");
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
index 6d96499d77..af3fa9ee8b 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
@@ -3090,7 +3090,7 @@ cleanup:
}
int
-pkinit_openssl_init()
+pkinit_openssl_init(void)
{
/* Initialize OpenSSL. */
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
diff --git a/src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c b/src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c
index 99fda7ffcd..aab67c01cb 100644
--- a/src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c
+++ b/src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static int ex_handle_id = -1;
MAKE_INIT_FUNCTION(init_openssl);
int
-init_openssl()
+init_openssl(void)
{
SSL_library_init();
SSL_load_error_strings();
diff --git a/src/tests/asn.1/make-vectors.c b/src/tests/asn.1/make-vectors.c
index 2fc85466bb..6f2b7dd021 100644
--- a/src/tests/asn.1/make-vectors.c
+++ b/src/tests/asn.1/make-vectors.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ printbuf(void)
}
int
-main()
+main(void)
{
/* Initialize values which can't use static initializers. */
asn_long2INTEGER(&otp_format, 2); /* Alphanumeric */
--
2.44.0

42
SOURCES/0021-Fix-leak-in-KDC-NDR-encoding.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From f54763bc90df9c76c69ee9a837cf856bcf93e633 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 17:38:49 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Fix leak in KDC NDR encoding
If the KDC tries to encode a principal containing encode invalid UTF-8
sequences for inclusion in a PAC delegation info buffer, it will leak
a small amount of memory in enc_wchar_pointer() before failing. Fix
the leak.
ticket: 9115 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.21-next
(cherry picked from commit 7d0d85bf99caf60c0afd4dcf91b0c4c683b983fe)
---
src/kdc/ndr.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/kdc/ndr.c b/src/kdc/ndr.c
index 48395abe52..d438408ee2 100644
--- a/src/kdc/ndr.c
+++ b/src/kdc/ndr.c
@@ -96,14 +96,13 @@ enc_wchar_pointer(const char *utf8, struct encoded_wchars *encoded_out)
size_t utf16len, num_wchars;
uint8_t *utf16;
- k5_buf_init_dynamic(&b);
-
ret = k5_utf8_to_utf16le(utf8, &utf16, &utf16len);
if (ret)
return ret;
num_wchars = utf16len / 2;
+ k5_buf_init_dynamic(&b);
k5_buf_add_uint32_le(&b, num_wchars + 1);
k5_buf_add_uint32_le(&b, 0);
k5_buf_add_uint32_le(&b, num_wchars);
--
2.44.0

206
SOURCES/0022-Fix-two-unlikely-memory-leaks.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
From d230c72573430803c569817a71b79be8656fa6c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 19:53:07 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Fix two unlikely memory leaks
In gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(), one of the bounds checks (which
could probably never be triggered) leaks plain.data. Fix this leak
and use current practices for cleanup throughout the function.
In xmt_rmtcallres() (unused within the tree and likely elsewhere),
store port_ptr into crp->port_ptr as soon as it is allocated;
otherwise it could leak if the subsequent xdr_u_int32() operation
fails.
(cherry picked from commit c5f9c816107f70139de11b38aa02db2f1774ee0d)
---
src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c | 56 +++++++++++++++-------------------
src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c | 10 +++---
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
index 3b4f8cb837..e881eee835 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
int conf_req_flag, int toktype)
{
size_t bufsize = 16;
- unsigned char *outbuf = 0;
+ unsigned char *outbuf = NULL;
krb5_error_code err;
int key_usage;
unsigned char acceptor_flag;
@@ -75,9 +75,13 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
#endif
size_t ec;
unsigned short tok_id;
- krb5_checksum sum;
+ krb5_checksum sum = { 0 };
krb5_key key;
krb5_cksumtype cksumtype;
+ krb5_data plain = empty_data();
+
+ token->value = NULL;
+ token->length = 0;
acceptor_flag = ctx->initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
key_usage = (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG
@@ -107,14 +111,15 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
#endif
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && conf_req_flag) {
- krb5_data plain;
krb5_enc_data cipher;
size_t ec_max;
size_t encrypt_size;
/* 300: Adds some slop. */
- if (SIZE_MAX - 300 < message->length)
- return ENOMEM;
+ if (SIZE_MAX - 300 < message->length) {
+ err = ENOMEM;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
ec_max = SIZE_MAX - message->length - 300;
if (ec_max > 0xffff)
ec_max = 0xffff;
@@ -126,20 +131,20 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
#endif
err = alloc_data(&plain, message->length + 16 + ec);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto cleanup;
/* Get size of ciphertext. */
encrypt_size = krb5_encrypt_size(plain.length, key->keyblock.enctype);
if (encrypt_size > SIZE_MAX / 2) {
err = ENOMEM;
- goto error;
+ goto cleanup;
}
bufsize = 16 + encrypt_size;
/* Allocate space for header plus encrypted data. */
outbuf = gssalloc_malloc(bufsize);
if (outbuf == NULL) {
- free(plain.data);
- return ENOMEM;
+ err = ENOMEM;
+ goto cleanup;
}
/* TOK_ID */
@@ -164,11 +169,8 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
cipher.ciphertext.length = bufsize - 16;
cipher.enctype = key->keyblock.enctype;
err = krb5_k_encrypt(context, key, key_usage, 0, &plain, &cipher);
- zap(plain.data, plain.length);
- free(plain.data);
- plain.data = 0;
if (err)
- goto error;
+ goto cleanup;
/* Now that we know we're returning a valid token.... */
ctx->seq_send++;
@@ -181,7 +183,6 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
/* If the rotate fails, don't worry about it. */
#endif
} else if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && !conf_req_flag) {
- krb5_data plain;
size_t cksumsize;
/* Here, message is the application-supplied data; message2 is
@@ -193,21 +194,19 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
wrap_with_checksum:
err = alloc_data(&plain, message->length + 16);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto cleanup;
err = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, cksumtype, &cksumsize);
if (err)
- goto error;
+ goto cleanup;
assert(cksumsize <= 0xffff);
bufsize = 16 + message2->length + cksumsize;
outbuf = gssalloc_malloc(bufsize);
if (outbuf == NULL) {
- free(plain.data);
- plain.data = 0;
err = ENOMEM;
- goto error;
+ goto cleanup;
}
/* TOK_ID */
@@ -239,23 +238,15 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
if (message2->length)
memcpy(outbuf + 16, message2->value, message2->length);
- sum.contents = outbuf + 16 + message2->length;
- sum.length = cksumsize;
-
err = krb5_k_make_checksum(context, cksumtype, key,
key_usage, &plain, &sum);
- zap(plain.data, plain.length);
- free(plain.data);
- plain.data = 0;
if (err) {
zap(outbuf,bufsize);
- goto error;
+ goto cleanup;
}
if (sum.length != cksumsize)
abort();
memcpy(outbuf + 16 + message2->length, sum.contents, cksumsize);
- krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &sum);
- sum.contents = 0;
/* Now that we know we're actually generating the token... */
ctx->seq_send++;
@@ -285,12 +276,13 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
token->value = outbuf;
token->length = bufsize;
- return 0;
+ outbuf = NULL;
+ err = 0;
-error:
+cleanup:
+ krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &sum);
+ zapfree(plain.data, plain.length);
gssalloc_free(outbuf);
- token->value = NULL;
- token->length = 0;
return err;
}
diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c b/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
index 434e4eea65..f55ca46c60 100644
--- a/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
+++ b/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
@@ -161,12 +161,12 @@ xdr_rmtcallres(
caddr_t port_ptr;
port_ptr = (caddr_t)(void *)crp->port_ptr;
- if (xdr_reference(xdrs, &port_ptr, sizeof (uint32_t),
- (xdrproc_t)xdr_u_int32) &&
- xdr_u_int32(xdrs, &crp->resultslen)) {
- crp->port_ptr = (uint32_t *)(void *)port_ptr;
+ if (!xdr_reference(xdrs, &port_ptr, sizeof (uint32_t),
+ (xdrproc_t)xdr_u_int32))
+ return (FALSE);
+ crp->port_ptr = (uint32_t *)(void *)port_ptr;
+ if (xdr_u_int32(xdrs, &crp->resultslen))
return ((*(crp->xdr_results))(xdrs, crp->results_ptr));
- }
return (FALSE);
}
--
2.44.0

14
SOURCES/0016-Fix-vulnerabilities-in-GSS-message-token-handling.patch → SOURCES/0023-Fix-vulnerabilities-in-GSS-message-token-handling.patch
Unescape View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
From 7d9b143d1749cee1dc81c6b0f5a5493534bc6630 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 28009fda028c489ae38902b2c513c4208889f043 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2024 10:56:12 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix vulnerabilities in GSS message token handling
@ -40,10 +40,10 @@ target_version: 1.21-next
4 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
index 3b4f8cb837..1fcbdfbb87 100644
index e881eee835..d3210c1107 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
@@ -408,10 +408,15 @@ gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(krb5_context *contextptr,
@@ -400,10 +400,15 @@ gss_krb5int_unseal_token_v3(krb5_context *contextptr,
/* Don't use bodysize here! Use the fact that
cipher.ciphertext.length has been adjusted to the
correct length. */
@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ index 3ce2a90ce9..6a6585d9af 100644
switch (toktype2) {
case KG2_TOK_MIC_MSG:
diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c b/src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c
index fb8fe55111..8192935099 100644
index e08c0039f8..a052b8ab6e 100644
--- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c
+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_invalid.c
@@ -36,31 +36,41 @@
@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ index fb8fe55111..8192935099 100644
+/* Fake up enough of a CFX GSS context for gss_unwrap, using an AES key.
+ * The context takes ownership of subkey. */
static gss_ctx_id_t
-make_fake_cfx_context()
-make_fake_cfx_context(void)
+make_fake_cfx_context(krb5_key subkey)
{
gss_union_ctx_id_t uctx;
@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ index fb8fe55111..8192935099 100644
kgctx->established = 1;
kgctx->proto = 1;
if (g_seqstate_init(&kgctx->seqstate, 0, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
@@ -116,15 +134,10 @@ make_fake_cfx_context()
@@ -116,15 +134,10 @@ make_fake_cfx_context(void)
kgctx->sealalg = -1;
kgctx->signalg = -1;
@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ index fb8fe55111..8192935099 100644
memcpy(in.value, value, len);
in.length = len;
(void)gss_accept_sec_context(&minor, &ctx, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &in,
@@ -424,11 +569,23 @@ test_short_encapsulation()
@@ -424,11 +569,23 @@ test_short_encapsulation(void)
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{

1295
SOURCES/0024-Remove-PKINIT-RSA-support.patch
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

175
SOURCES/0025-Fix-various-issues-detected-by-static-analysis.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
From 5464ad5b64f7ce7c3d78082352189af7c8feb95f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2024 17:18:11 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix various issues detected by static analysis
(cherry picked from commit 53d352949941ee236461658d01f03c37abafc6f6)
---
src/clients/klist/klist.c | 13 +++++++------
src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c | 5 +++++
src/kdc/ndr.c | 2 +-
src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c | 2 +-
src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c | 5 ++++-
src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c | 13 +++++++------
src/util/support/threads.c | 2 --
7 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/clients/klist/klist.c b/src/clients/klist/klist.c
index 27cf0ee11b..9db66f6072 100644
--- a/src/clients/klist/klist.c
+++ b/src/clients/klist/klist.c
@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ show_credential(krb5_creds *cred)
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_ticket *tkt = NULL;
char *name = NULL, *sname = NULL, *tktsname, *flags;
- int extra_field = 0, ccol = 0, i;
+ int extra_field = 0, ccol = 0, i, r;
krb5_boolean is_config = krb5_is_config_principal(context, cred->server);
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, cred->client, &name);
@@ -696,11 +696,12 @@ show_credential(krb5_creds *cred)
fputs("config: ", stdout);
ccol = 8;
for (i = 1; i < cred->server->length; i++) {
- ccol += printf("%s%.*s%s",
- i > 1 ? "(" : "",
- (int)cred->server->data[i].length,
- cred->server->data[i].data,
- i > 1 ? ")" : "");
+ r = printf("%s%.*s%s", i > 1 ? "(" : "",
+ (int)cred->server->data[i].length,
+ cred->server->data[i].data,
+ i > 1 ? ")" : "");
+ if (r >= 0)
+ ccol += r;
}
fputs(" = ", stdout);
ccol += 3;
diff --git a/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c b/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c
index 4d6cc0bdf9..feb053d834 100644
--- a/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c
+++ b/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c
@@ -704,6 +704,11 @@ process_k5beta7_princ(krb5_context context, const char *fname, FILE *filep,
dbentry->len = u1;
dbentry->n_key_data = u4;
+
+ if (u5 > UINT16_MAX) {
+ load_err(fname, *linenop, _("invalid principal extra data size"));
+ goto fail;
+ }
dbentry->e_length = u5;
if (kp != NULL) {
diff --git a/src/kdc/ndr.c b/src/kdc/ndr.c
index d438408ee2..38be9fe42a 100644
--- a/src/kdc/ndr.c
+++ b/src/kdc/ndr.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ ndr_enc_delegation_info(struct pac_s4u_delegation_info *in, krb5_data *out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
size_t i;
- struct k5buf b;
+ struct k5buf b = EMPTY_K5BUF;
struct encoded_wchars pt_encoded = { 0 }, *tss_encoded = NULL;
uint32_t pointer = 0;
diff --git a/src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c b/src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c
index 82bbed6312..c971793c9d 100644
--- a/src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c
+++ b/src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ krb5_dbe_def_decrypt_key_data(krb5_context context, const krb5_keyblock *mkey,
krb5_keyblock *dbkey_out,
krb5_keysalt *keysalt_out)
{
- krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_error_code ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
int16_t keylen;
krb5_enc_data cipher;
krb5_data plain = empty_data();
diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c b/src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c
index 98d601c8ab..461e5de542 100644
--- a/src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c
+++ b/src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ svcauth_gss_validate(struct svc_req *rqst, struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd, struct r
struct opaque_auth *oa;
gss_buffer_desc rpcbuf, checksum;
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat, qop_state;
- u_char rpchdr[128];
+ u_char rpchdr[32 + MAX_AUTH_BYTES];
int32_t *buf;
log_debug("in svcauth_gss_validate()");
@@ -315,6 +315,8 @@ svcauth_gss_validate(struct svc_req *rqst, struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd, struct r
return (FALSE);
buf = (int32_t *)(void *)rpchdr;
+
+ /* Write the 32 first bytes of the header. */
IXDR_PUT_LONG(buf, msg->rm_xid);
IXDR_PUT_ENUM(buf, msg->rm_direction);
IXDR_PUT_LONG(buf, msg->rm_call.cb_rpcvers);
@@ -323,6 +325,7 @@ svcauth_gss_validate(struct svc_req *rqst, struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd, struct r
IXDR_PUT_LONG(buf, msg->rm_call.cb_proc);
IXDR_PUT_ENUM(buf, oa->oa_flavor);
IXDR_PUT_LONG(buf, oa->oa_length);
+
if (oa->oa_length) {
memcpy((caddr_t)buf, oa->oa_base, oa->oa_length);
buf += RNDUP(oa->oa_length) / sizeof(int32_t);
diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c b/src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c
index 8ecbdf2b33..3aff277eb7 100644
--- a/src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c
+++ b/src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c
@@ -248,8 +248,9 @@ static bool_t svcudp_reply(
{
struct svcudp_data *su = su_data(xprt);
XDR *xdrs = &su->su_xdrs;
- int slen;
+ u_int slen;
bool_t stat = FALSE;
+ ssize_t r;
xdrproc_t xdr_results = NULL;
caddr_t xdr_location = 0;
@@ -272,12 +273,12 @@ static bool_t svcudp_reply(
if (xdr_replymsg(xdrs, msg) &&
(!has_args ||
(SVCAUTH_WRAP(xprt->xp_auth, xdrs, xdr_results, xdr_location)))) {
- slen = (int)XDR_GETPOS(xdrs);
- if (sendto(xprt->xp_sock, rpc_buffer(xprt), slen, 0,
- (struct sockaddr *)&(xprt->xp_raddr), xprt->xp_addrlen)
- == slen) {
+ slen = XDR_GETPOS(xdrs);
+ r = sendto(xprt->xp_sock, rpc_buffer(xprt), slen, 0,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&(xprt->xp_raddr), xprt->xp_addrlen);
+ if (r >= 0 && (u_int)r == slen) {
stat = TRUE;
- if (su->su_cache && slen >= 0) {
+ if (su->su_cache) {
cache_set(xprt, (uint32_t) slen);
}
}
diff --git a/src/util/support/threads.c b/src/util/support/threads.c
index be7e4c2e3f..4ded805b79 100644
--- a/src/util/support/threads.c
+++ b/src/util/support/threads.c
@@ -118,7 +118,6 @@ struct tsd_block {
# pragma weak pthread_mutex_destroy
# pragma weak pthread_mutex_init
# pragma weak pthread_self
-# pragma weak pthread_equal
# pragma weak pthread_getspecific
# pragma weak pthread_setspecific
# pragma weak pthread_key_create
@@ -151,7 +150,6 @@ int krb5int_pthread_loaded (void)
|| &pthread_mutex_destroy == 0
|| &pthread_mutex_init == 0
|| &pthread_self == 0
- || &pthread_equal == 0
/* Any program that's really multithreaded will have to be
able to create threads. */
|| &pthread_create == 0
--
2.46.0

629
SOURCES/0026-Generate-and-verify-message-MACs-in-libkrad.patch
Unescape View File

@ -0,0 +1,629 @@
From 023dcf87d34e29649dd76d33ce7d896c2b6f61d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 17:15:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Generate and verify message MACs in libkrad
Implement some of the measures specified in
draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 for mitigating the BlastRADIUS
attack (CVE-2024-3596):
* Include a Message-Authenticator MAC as the first attribute when
generating a packet of type Access-Request, Access-Reject,
Access-Accept, or Access-Challenge (sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4), if
the secret is non-empty. (An empty secret indicates the use of Unix
domain socket transport.)
* Validate the Message-Authenticator MAC in received packets, if
present.
FreeRADIUS enforces Message-Authenticator as of versions 3.2.5 and
3.0.27. libkrad must generate Message-Authenticator attributes in
order to remain compatible with these implementations.
[ghudson@mit.edu: adjusted style and naming; simplified some
functions; edited commit message]
ticket: 9142 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.21-next
(cherry picked from commit 871125fea8ce0370a972bf65f7d1de63f619b06c)
---
src/include/k5-int.h | 5 +
src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c | 28 ++++
src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports | 1 +
src/lib/krad/attr.c | 17 ++
src/lib/krad/attrset.c | 59 +++++--
src/lib/krad/internal.h | 7 +-
src/lib/krad/packet.c | 206 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c | 2 +-
src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py | 3 +-
src/lib/krad/t_packet.c | 11 ++
src/tests/t_otp.py | 3 +
11 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
index 69d6a6f569..b7789a2dd8 100644
--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
+++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
@@ -2403,4 +2403,9 @@ krb5_boolean
k5_sname_compare(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal sname,
krb5_const_principal princ);
+/* Generate an HMAC-MD5 keyed checksum as specified by RFC 2104. */
+krb5_error_code
+k5_hmac_md5(const krb5_data *key, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+ krb5_data *output);
+
#endif /* _KRB5_INT_H */
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
index ec024f3966..a809388549 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
@@ -92,3 +92,31 @@ cleanup:
free(hash_iov);
return ret;
}
+
+krb5_error_code
+k5_hmac_md5(const krb5_data *key, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+ krb5_data *output)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash = &krb5int_hash_md5;
+ krb5_keyblock keyblock = { 0 };
+ krb5_data hashed_key;
+ uint8_t hkeybuf[16];
+ krb5_crypto_iov iov;
+
+ /* Hash the key if it is longer than the block size. */
+ if (key->length > hash->blocksize) {
+ hashed_key = make_data(hkeybuf, sizeof(hkeybuf));
+ iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ iov.data = *key;
+ ret = hash->hash(&iov, 1, &hashed_key);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ key = &hashed_key;
+ }
+
+ keyblock.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+ keyblock.length = key->length;
+ keyblock.contents = (uint8_t *)key->data;
+ return krb5int_hmac_keyblock(hash, &keyblock, data, num_data, output);
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports b/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
index d8ffa63304..00e0ce1812 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
@@ -102,3 +102,4 @@ krb5_c_prfplus
krb5_c_derive_prfplus
k5_enctype_to_ssf
krb5int_c_deprecated_enctype
+k5_hmac_md5
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attr.c b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
index 42d354a3b5..65ed1d35e7 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/attr.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
@@ -125,6 +125,23 @@ static const attribute_record attributes[UCHAR_MAX] = {
{"NAS-Port-Type", 4, 4, NULL, NULL},
{"Port-Limit", 4, 4, NULL, NULL},
{"Login-LAT-Port", 1, MAX_ATTRSIZE, NULL, NULL},
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Password-Retry */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Prompt */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Connect-Info */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Configuration-Token */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* EAP-Message */
+ {"Message-Authenticator", MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL, NULL},
};
/* Encode User-Password attribute. */
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
index 6ec031e320..e5457ebfd7 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
@@ -164,15 +164,44 @@ krad_attrset_copy(const krad_attrset *set, krad_attrset **copy)
return 0;
}
+/* Place an encoded attributes into outbuf at position *i. Increment *i by the
+ * length of the encoding. */
+static krb5_error_code
+append_attr(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
+ const uint8_t *auth, krad_attr type, const krb5_data *data,
+ uint8_t outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *i, krb5_boolean *is_fips)
+{
+ uint8_t buffer[MAX_ATTRSIZE];
+ size_t attrlen;
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+
+ retval = kr_attr_encode(ctx, secret, auth, type, data, buffer, &attrlen,
+ is_fips);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (attrlen > MAX_ATTRSETSIZE - *i - 2)
+ return EMSGSIZE;
+
+ outbuf[(*i)++] = type;
+ outbuf[(*i)++] = attrlen + 2;
+ memcpy(outbuf + *i, buffer, attrlen);
+ *i += attrlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
krb5_error_code
kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
- const unsigned char *auth,
+ const uint8_t *auth, krb5_boolean add_msgauth,
unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen,
krb5_boolean *is_fips)
{
- unsigned char buffer[MAX_ATTRSIZE];
krb5_error_code retval;
- size_t i = 0, attrlen;
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+ const uint8_t zeroes[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
+ krb5_data zerodata;
+ size_t i = 0;
attr *a;
if (set == NULL) {
@@ -180,19 +209,21 @@ kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
return 0;
}
- K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(a, &set->list, list) {
- retval = kr_attr_encode(set->ctx, secret, auth, a->type, &a->attr,
- buffer, &attrlen, is_fips);
- if (retval != 0)
+ if (add_msgauth) {
+ /* Encode Message-Authenticator as the first attribute, per
+ * draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 section 5.2. */
+ zerodata = make_data((uint8_t *)zeroes, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ retval = append_attr(set->ctx, secret, auth, msgauth_type, &zerodata,
+ outbuf, &i, is_fips);
+ if (retval)
return retval;
+ }
- if (i + attrlen + 2 > MAX_ATTRSETSIZE)
- return EMSGSIZE;
-
- outbuf[i++] = a->type;
- outbuf[i++] = attrlen + 2;
- memcpy(&outbuf[i], buffer, attrlen);
- i += attrlen;
+ K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(a, &set->list, list) {
+ retval = append_attr(set->ctx, secret, auth, a->type, &a->attr,
+ outbuf, &i, is_fips);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
}
*outlen = i;
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/internal.h b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
index a17b6f39b1..ca66f3ec68 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/internal.h
+++ b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@
#define UCHAR_MAX 255
#endif
+#define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE 16
+
/* RFC 2865 */
#define MAX_ATTRSIZE (UCHAR_MAX - 2)
#define MAX_ATTRSETSIZE (KRAD_PACKET_SIZE_MAX - 20)
@@ -79,10 +81,11 @@ kr_attr_decode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const unsigned char *auth,
krad_attr type, const krb5_data *in,
unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen);
-/* Encode the attributes into the buffer. */
+/* Encode set into outbuf. If add_msgauth is true, include a zeroed
+ * Message-Authenticator as the first attribute. */
krb5_error_code
kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
- const unsigned char *auth,
+ const uint8_t *auth, krb5_boolean add_msgauth,
unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen,
krb5_boolean *is_fips);
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/packet.c b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
index c5446b890c..3c1a4d507e 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/packet.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
typedef unsigned char uchar;
/* RFC 2865 */
+#define MSGAUTH_SIZE (2 + MD5_DIGEST_SIZE)
#define OFFSET_CODE 0
#define OFFSET_ID 1
#define OFFSET_LENGTH 2
@@ -222,6 +223,106 @@ packet_set_attrset(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_packet *pkt)
return kr_attrset_decode(ctx, &tmp, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), &pkt->attrset);
}
+/* Determine if a packet requires a Message-Authenticator attribute. */
+static inline krb5_boolean
+requires_msgauth(const char *secret, krad_code code)
+{
+ /* If no secret is provided, assume that the transport is a UNIX socket.
+ * Message-Authenticator is required only on UDP and TCP connections. */
+ if (*secret == '\0')
+ return FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * Per draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4,
+ * Message-Authenticator is required in Access-Request packets and all
+ * potential responses when UDP or TCP transport is used.
+ */
+ return code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Request") ||
+ code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Reject") ||
+ code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Accept") ||
+ code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Challenge");
+}
+
+/* Check if the packet has a Message-Authenticator attribute. */
+static inline krb5_boolean
+has_pkt_msgauth(const krad_packet *pkt)
+{
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+
+ return krad_attrset_get(pkt->attrset, msgauth_type, 0) != NULL;
+}
+
+/* Return the beginning of the Message-Authenticator attribute in pkt, or NULL
+ * if no such attribute is present. */
+static const uint8_t *
+lookup_msgauth_addr(const krad_packet *pkt)
+{
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+ size_t i;
+ uint8_t *p;
+
+ i = OFFSET_ATTR;
+ while (i + 2 < pkt->pkt.length) {
+ p = (uint8_t *)offset(&pkt->pkt, i);
+ if (msgauth_type == *p)
+ return p;
+ i += p[1];
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the message authenticator MAC for pkt as specified in RFC 2869
+ * section 5.14, placing the result in mac_out. Use the provided authenticator
+ * auth, which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code
+calculate_mac(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
+ const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE],
+ uint8_t mac_out[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE])
+{
+ uint8_t zeroed_msgauth[MSGAUTH_SIZE];
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+ const uint8_t *msgauth_attr, *msgauth_end, *pkt_end;
+ krb5_crypto_iov input[5];
+ krb5_data ksecr, mac;
+
+ msgauth_attr = lookup_msgauth_addr(pkt);
+ if (msgauth_attr == NULL)
+ return EINVAL;
+ msgauth_end = msgauth_attr + MSGAUTH_SIZE;
+ pkt_end = (const uint8_t *)pkt->pkt.data + pkt->pkt.length;
+
+ /* Read code, id, and length from the packet. */
+ input[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[0].data = make_data(pkt->pkt.data, OFFSET_AUTH);
+
+ /* Read the provided authenticator. */
+ input[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[1].data = make_data((uint8_t *)auth, AUTH_FIELD_SIZE);
+
+ /* Read any attributes before Message-Authenticator. */
+ input[2].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[2].data = make_data(pkt_attr(pkt), msgauth_attr - pkt_attr(pkt));
+
+ /* Read Message-Authenticator with the data bytes all set to zero, per RFC
+ * 2869 section 5.14. */
+ zeroed_msgauth[0] = msgauth_type;
+ zeroed_msgauth[1] = MSGAUTH_SIZE;
+ memset(zeroed_msgauth + 2, 0, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ input[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[3].data = make_data(zeroed_msgauth, MSGAUTH_SIZE);
+
+ /* Read any attributes after Message-Authenticator. */
+ input[4].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[4].data = make_data((uint8_t *)msgauth_end, pkt_end - msgauth_end);
+
+ mac = make_data(mac_out, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ ksecr = string2data((char *)secret);
+ return k5_hmac_md5(&ksecr, input, 5, &mac);
+}
+
ssize_t
krad_packet_bytes_needed(const krb5_data *buffer)
{
@@ -255,6 +356,7 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
krad_packet *pkt;
uchar id;
size_t attrset_len;
+ krb5_boolean msgauth_required;
pkt = packet_new();
if (pkt == NULL) {
@@ -274,9 +376,13 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
+ /* Determine if Message-Authenticator is required. */
+ msgauth_required = (*secret != '\0' &&
+ code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Request"));
+
/* Encode the attributes. */
- retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), pkt_attr(pkt),
- &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
+ retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), msgauth_required,
+ pkt_attr(pkt), &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
@@ -285,6 +391,13 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
pkt_code_set(pkt, code);
pkt_len_set(pkt, pkt->pkt.length);
+ if (msgauth_required) {
+ /* Calculate and set the Message-Authenticator MAC. */
+ retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(pkt), pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
+ if (retval != 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
+
/* Copy the attrset for future use. */
retval = packet_set_attrset(ctx, secret, pkt);
if (retval != 0)
@@ -307,14 +420,19 @@ krad_packet_new_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
krb5_error_code retval;
krad_packet *pkt;
size_t attrset_len;
+ krb5_boolean msgauth_required;
pkt = packet_new();
if (pkt == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
+ /* Determine if Message-Authenticator is required. */
+ msgauth_required = requires_msgauth(secret, code);
+
/* Encode the attributes. */
- retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(request), pkt_attr(pkt),
- &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
+ retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(request),
+ msgauth_required, pkt_attr(pkt), &attrset_len,
+ &pkt->is_fips);
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
@@ -330,6 +448,18 @@ krad_packet_new_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
+ if (msgauth_required) {
+ /*
+ * Calculate and replace the Message-Authenticator MAC. Per RFC 2869
+ * section 5.14, use the authenticator from the request, not from the
+ * response.
+ */
+ retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(request),
+ pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
+ if (retval != 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
+
/* Copy the attrset for future use. */
retval = packet_set_attrset(ctx, secret, pkt);
if (retval != 0)
@@ -343,6 +473,34 @@ error:
return retval;
}
+/* Verify the Message-Authenticator value in pkt, using the provided
+ * authenticator (which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request). */
+static krb5_error_code
+verify_msgauth(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
+ const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE])
+{
+ uint8_t mac[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+ const krb5_data *msgauth;
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+
+ msgauth = krad_packet_get_attr(pkt, msgauth_type, 0);
+ if (msgauth == NULL)
+ return ENODATA;
+
+ retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, auth, mac);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (msgauth->length != MD5_DIGEST_SIZE)
+ return EMSGSIZE;
+
+ if (k5_bcmp(mac, msgauth->data, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0)
+ return EBADMSG;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Decode a packet. */
static krb5_error_code
decode_packet(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const krb5_data *buffer,
@@ -394,21 +552,35 @@ krad_packet_decode_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
krad_packet **reqpkt)
{
const krad_packet *tmp = NULL;
+ krad_packet *req;
krb5_error_code retval;
- retval = decode_packet(ctx, secret, buffer, reqpkt);
- if (cb != NULL && retval == 0) {
+ retval = decode_packet(ctx, secret, buffer, &req);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ /* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
+ if (has_pkt_msgauth(req)) {
+ retval = verify_msgauth(secret, req, pkt_auth(req));
+ if (retval) {
+ krad_packet_free(req);
+ return retval;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cb != NULL) {
for (tmp = (*cb)(data, FALSE); tmp != NULL; tmp = (*cb)(data, FALSE)) {
if (pkt_id_get(*reqpkt) == pkt_id_get(tmp))
break;
}
- }
- if (cb != NULL && (retval != 0 || tmp != NULL))
- (*cb)(data, TRUE);
+ if (tmp != NULL)
+ (*cb)(data, TRUE);
+ }
+ *reqpkt = req;
*duppkt = tmp;
- return retval;
+ return 0;
}
krb5_error_code
@@ -435,9 +607,17 @@ krad_packet_decode_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
break;
}
- /* If the authenticator matches, then the response is valid. */
- if (memcmp(pkt_auth(*rsppkt), auth, sizeof(auth)) == 0)
- break;
+ /* Verify the response authenticator. */
+ if (k5_bcmp(pkt_auth(*rsppkt), auth, sizeof(auth)) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
+ if (has_pkt_msgauth(*rsppkt)) {
+ if (verify_msgauth(secret, *rsppkt, pkt_auth(tmp)) != 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ break;
}
}
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
index 4cdb8b7d8e..f9c66509bd 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ main(void)
noerror(krad_attrset_add(set, krad_attr_name2num("User-Password"), &tmp));
/* Encode attrset. */
- noerror(kr_attrset_encode(set, "foo", auth, buffer, &encode_len,
+ noerror(kr_attrset_encode(set, "foo", auth, FALSE, buffer, &encode_len,
&is_fips));
krad_attrset_free(set);
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py b/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
index 4a3de079c7..647d4894eb 100755
--- a/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ DICTIONARY = """
ATTRIBUTE\tUser-Name\t1\tstring
ATTRIBUTE\tUser-Password\t2\toctets
ATTRIBUTE\tNAS-Identifier\t32\tstring
+ATTRIBUTE\tMessage-Authenticator\t80\toctets
"""
class TestServer(server.Server):
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ class TestServer(server.Server):
if key == "User-Password":
passwd = [pkt.PwDecrypt(x) for x in pkt[key]]
- reply = self.CreateReplyPacket(pkt)
+ reply = self.CreateReplyPacket(pkt, message_authenticator=True)
if passwd == ['accept']:
reply.code = packet.AccessAccept
else:
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c b/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
index c22489144f..104b6507a2 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ main(int argc, const char **argv)
krb5_data username, password;
krb5_boolean auth = FALSE;
krb5_context ctx;
+ const krad_packet *dupreq;
+ const krb5_data *encpkt;
+ krad_packet *decreq;
username = string2data("testUser");
@@ -184,9 +187,17 @@ main(int argc, const char **argv)
password = string2data("accept");
noerror(make_packet(ctx, &username, &password, &packets[ACCEPT_PACKET]));
+ encpkt = krad_packet_encode(packets[ACCEPT_PACKET]);
+ noerror(krad_packet_decode_request(ctx, "foo", encpkt, NULL, NULL,
+ &dupreq, &decreq));
+ krad_packet_free(decreq);
password = string2data("reject");
noerror(make_packet(ctx, &username, &password, &packets[REJECT_PACKET]));
+ encpkt = krad_packet_encode(packets[REJECT_PACKET]);
+ noerror(krad_packet_decode_request(ctx, "foo", encpkt, NULL, NULL,
+ &dupreq, &decreq));
+ krad_packet_free(decreq);
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
diff --git a/src/tests/t_otp.py b/src/tests/t_otp.py
index c3b820a411..dd5cdc5c26 100755
--- a/src/tests/t_otp.py
+++ b/src/tests/t_otp.py
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ ATTRIBUTE User-Name 1 string
ATTRIBUTE User-Password 2 octets
ATTRIBUTE Service-Type 6 integer
ATTRIBUTE NAS-Identifier 32 string
+ATTRIBUTE Message-Authenticator 80 octets
'''
class RadiusDaemon(Process):
@@ -97,6 +98,8 @@ class RadiusDaemon(Process):
reply.code = packet.AccessReject
replyq['reply'] = False
+ reply.add_message_authenticator()
+
outq.put(replyq)
if addr is None:
sock.send(reply.ReplyPacket())
--
2.46.0

36
SPECS/krb5.spec
Unescape View File

@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
#
# baserelease is what we have standardized across Fedora and what
# rpmdev-bumpspec knows how to handle.
%global baserelease 2
%global baserelease 4
# This should be e.g. beta1 or %%nil
%global pre_release %nil
@ -98,7 +98,17 @@ Patch0012: 0012-downstream-Allow-to-set-PAC-ticket-signature-as-opti.patch
Patch0013: 0013-downstream-Make-PKINIT-CMS-SHA-1-signature-verificat.patch
Patch0014: 0014-Enable-PKINIT-if-at-least-one-group-is-available.patch
Patch0015: 0015-Fix-double-free-in-KDC-TGS-processing.patch
Patch0016: 0016-Fix-vulnerabilities-in-GSS-message-token-handling.patch
Patch0016: 0016-Eliminate-old-style-function-declarations.patch
Patch0017: 0017-End-connection-on-KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE.patch
Patch0018: 0018-Add-request_timeout-configuration-parameter.patch
Patch0019: 0019-Wait-indefinitely-on-KDC-TCP-connections.patch
Patch0020: 0020-Avoid-strict-prototype-compiler-errors.patch
Patch0021: 0021-Fix-leak-in-KDC-NDR-encoding.patch
Patch0022: 0022-Fix-two-unlikely-memory-leaks.patch
Patch0023: 0023-Fix-vulnerabilities-in-GSS-message-token-handling.patch
Patch0024: 0024-Remove-PKINIT-RSA-support.patch
Patch0025: 0025-Fix-various-issues-detected-by-static-analysis.patch
Patch0026: 0026-Generate-and-verify-message-MACs-in-libkrad.patch
License: MIT
URL: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/
@ -663,10 +673,28 @@ exit 0
%{_libdir}/libkadm5srv_mit.so.*
%changelog
* Mon Jul 01 2024 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.21.1-2
* Thu Oct 17 2024 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.21.1-4
- libkrad: implement support for Message-Authenticator (CVE-2024-3596)
Resolves: RHEL-55423
- Fix various issues detected by static analysis
Resolves: RHEL-58216
- Remove RSA protocol for PKINIT
Resolves: RHEL-15323
* Fri Jul 05 2024 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.21.1-3
- CVE-2024-37370 CVE-2024-37371
Fix vulnerabilities in GSS message token handling
Resolves: RHEL-45401 RHEL-45390
Resolves: RHEL-45402 RHEL-45392
* Wed Mar 20 2024 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.21.1-2
- Fix memory leak in GSSAPI interface
Resolves: RHEL-27251
- Fix memory leak in PMAP RPC interface
Resolves: RHEL-27245
- Fix memory leak in failing UTF-8 to UTF-16 re-encoding for PAC
Resolves: RHEL-27253
- Make TCP waiting time configurable
Resolves: RHEL-17132
* Tue Aug 08 2023 Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com> - 1.21.1-1
- New upstream version (1.21.1)

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