MSVSphere Packaging Team
3 months ago
parent
ddecfbec0d
commit
7e8a2a090a
@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
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From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
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Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 13:23:10 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH] kern/ieee1275/init: ppc64: Restrict high memory in presence
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of fadump
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When a kernel dump is present then restrict the high memory regions to
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avoid allocating memory where the kernel dump resides. Use the
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ibm,kernel-dump node under /rtas to determine whether a kernel dump exists
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and up to which limit grub can use available memory. Set the
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upper_mem_limit to the size of the kernel dump section of type
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'REAL_MODE_REGION' and therefore only allow grub's memory usage for high
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addresses from RMO_ADDR_MAX to 'upper_mem_limit'. This means that grub can
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use high memory in the range of RMO_ADDR_MAX (768MB) to upper_mem_limit and
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the kernel-dump memory regions above 'upper_mem_limit' remain untouched.
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This change has no effect on memory allocations below 'linux_rmo_save'
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(typically at 640MB).
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Also, fall back to allocating below rmo_linux_save in case the chunk of
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memory there would be larger than the chunk of memory above RMO_ADDR_MAX.
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This can for example occur if a free memory area is found starting at 300MB
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extending up to 1GB but a kernel dump is located at 768MB and therefore
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does not allow the allocation of the high memory area but requiring to use
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the chunk starting at 300MB to avoid an unnecessary out-of-memory
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condition.
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
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Reviewed-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
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Cc: Pavithra Prakash <pavrampu@in.ibm.com>
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Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Cc: Carolyn Scherrer <cpscherr@us.ibm.com>
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Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
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Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
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---
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grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 142 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
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index 3d4ad9d..8e7f742 100644
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--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
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+++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
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@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
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* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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+#include <stddef.h> /* offsetof() */
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+
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#include <grub/kernel.h>
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#include <grub/dl.h>
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#include <grub/disk.h>
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@@ -198,6 +200,96 @@ grub_claim_heap (void)
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#else
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/* Helpers for mm on powerpc. */
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+/* ibm,kernel-dump data structures */
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+struct kd_section
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+{
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+ grub_uint32_t flags;
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+ grub_uint16_t src_datatype;
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+#define KD_SRC_DATATYPE_REAL_MODE_REGION 0x0011
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+ grub_uint16_t error_flags;
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+ grub_uint64_t src_address;
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+ grub_uint64_t num_bytes;
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+ grub_uint64_t act_bytes;
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+ grub_uint64_t dst_address;
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+} GRUB_PACKED;
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+
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+#define MAX_KD_SECTIONS 10
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+
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+struct kernel_dump
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+{
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+ grub_uint32_t format;
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+ grub_uint16_t num_sections;
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+ grub_uint16_t status_flags;
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+ grub_uint32_t offset_1st_section;
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+ grub_uint32_t num_blocks;
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+ grub_uint64_t start_block;
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+ grub_uint64_t num_blocks_avail;
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+ grub_uint32_t offet_path_string;
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+ grub_uint32_t max_time_allowed;
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+ struct kd_section kds[MAX_KD_SECTIONS]; /* offset_1st_section should point to kds[0] */
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+} GRUB_PACKED;
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+
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+/*
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+ * Determine if a kernel dump exists and if it does, then determine the highest
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+ * address that grub can use for memory allocations.
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+ * The caller must have initialized *highest to rmo_top. *highest will not
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+ * be modified if no kernel dump is found.
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+ */
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+static void
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+check_kernel_dump (grub_uint64_t *highest)
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+{
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+ struct kernel_dump kernel_dump;
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+ grub_ssize_t kernel_dump_size;
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+ grub_ieee1275_phandle_t rtas;
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+ struct kd_section *kds;
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+ grub_size_t i;
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+
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+ /* If there's a kernel-dump it must have at least one section */
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+ if (grub_ieee1275_finddevice ("/rtas", &rtas) ||
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+ grub_ieee1275_get_property (rtas, "ibm,kernel-dump", &kernel_dump,
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+ sizeof (kernel_dump), &kernel_dump_size) ||
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+ kernel_dump_size <= (grub_ssize_t) offsetof (struct kernel_dump, kds[1]))
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+ return;
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+
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+ kernel_dump_size = grub_min (kernel_dump_size, (grub_ssize_t) sizeof (kernel_dump));
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+
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+ if (grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.format) != 1)
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+ {
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+ grub_printf (_("Error: ibm,kernel-dump has an unexpected format version '%u'\n"),
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+ grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.format));
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+ return;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (grub_be_to_cpu16 (kernel_dump.num_sections) > MAX_KD_SECTIONS)
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+ {
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+ grub_printf (_("Error: Too many kernel dump sections: %d\n"),
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+ grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.num_sections));
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+ return;
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+ }
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+
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+ for (i = 0; i < grub_be_to_cpu16 (kernel_dump.num_sections); i++)
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+ {
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+ kds = (struct kd_section *) ((grub_addr_t) &kernel_dump +
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+ grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.offset_1st_section) +
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+ i * sizeof (struct kd_section));
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+ /* sanity check the address is within the 'kernel_dump' struct */
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+ if ((grub_addr_t) kds > (grub_addr_t) &kernel_dump + kernel_dump_size + sizeof (*kds))
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+ {
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+ grub_printf (_("Error: 'kds' address beyond last available section\n"));
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+ return;
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+ }
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+
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+ if ((grub_be_to_cpu16 (kds->src_datatype) == KD_SRC_DATATYPE_REAL_MODE_REGION) &&
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+ (grub_be_to_cpu64 (kds->src_address) == 0))
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+ {
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+ *highest = grub_min (*highest, grub_be_to_cpu64 (kds->num_bytes));
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ return;
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+}
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+
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/*
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* How much memory does OF believe exists in total?
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*
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@@ -277,10 +369,31 @@ regions_claim (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
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*
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* Finally, we also want to make sure that when grub loads the kernel,
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* it isn't going to use up all the memory we're trying to reserve! So
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- * enforce our entire RUNTIME_MIN_SPACE here:
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+ * enforce our entire RUNTIME_MIN_SPACE here (no fadump):
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+ *
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+ * | Top of memory == upper_mem_limit -|
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+ * | |
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+ * | available |
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+ * | |
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+ * |---------- 768 MB ----------|
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+ * | |
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+ * | reserved |
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+ * | |
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+ * |--- 768 MB - runtime min space ---|
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+ * | |
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+ * | available |
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+ * | |
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+ * |---------- 0 MB ----------|
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+ *
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+ * In case fadump is used, we allow the following:
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*
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* |---------- Top of memory ----------|
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* | |
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+ * | unavailable |
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+ * | (kernel dump area) |
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+ * | |
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+ * |--------- upper_mem_limit ---------|
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+ * | |
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* | available |
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* | |
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* |---------- 768 MB ----------|
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@@ -335,17 +448,44 @@ regions_claim (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
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}
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else
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{
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+ grub_uint64_t upper_mem_limit = rmo_top;
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+ grub_uint64_t orig_addr = addr;
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+
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+ check_kernel_dump (&upper_mem_limit);
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+
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/*
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* we order these cases to prefer higher addresses and avoid some
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* splitting issues
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+ * The following shows the order of variables:
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+ * no kernel dump: linux_rmo_save < RMO_ADDR_MAX <= upper_mem_limit == rmo_top
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+ * with kernel dump: liuxx_rmo_save < RMO_ADDR_MAX <= upper_mem_limit <= rmo_top
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*/
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- if (addr < RMO_ADDR_MAX && (addr + len) > RMO_ADDR_MAX)
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+ if (addr < RMO_ADDR_MAX && (addr + len) > RMO_ADDR_MAX && upper_mem_limit >= RMO_ADDR_MAX)
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{
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grub_dprintf ("ieee1275",
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"adjusting region for RUNTIME_MIN_SPACE: (%llx -> %llx) -> (%llx -> %llx)\n",
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addr, addr + len, RMO_ADDR_MAX, addr + len);
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len = (addr + len) - RMO_ADDR_MAX;
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addr = RMO_ADDR_MAX;
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+
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+ /* We must not exceed the upper_mem_limit (assuming it's >= RMO_ADDR_MAX) */
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+ if (addr + len > upper_mem_limit)
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+ {
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+ /* take the bigger chunk from either below linux_rmo_save or above upper_mem_limit */
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+ len = upper_mem_limit - addr;
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+ if (orig_addr < linux_rmo_save && linux_rmo_save - orig_addr > len)
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+ {
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+ /* lower part is bigger */
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+ addr = orig_addr;
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+ len = linux_rmo_save - addr;
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+ }
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+
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+ grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "re-adjusted region to: (%llx -> %llx)\n",
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+ addr, addr + len);
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+
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+ if (len == 0)
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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}
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else if ((addr < linux_rmo_save) && ((addr + len) > linux_rmo_save))
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{
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@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
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From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2023 16:52:05 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] normal: Remove grub_env_set prefix in grub_try_normal_prefix
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Commit de735a453aa35 added a grub_env_set where the prefix contains
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the arch name in the pathname. This create issues when trying to
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load modules using this prefix as the pathname contains a "doubled"
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arch name in it (ie .../powerpc-ieee1275/powerpc-ieee1275/).
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Signed-off-by: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
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---
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grub-core/normal/main.c | 1 -
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1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/normal/main.c b/grub-core/normal/main.c
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index d59145f861d5..bac7b8a0e1d8 100644
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--- a/grub-core/normal/main.c
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+++ b/grub-core/normal/main.c
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@@ -372,7 +372,6 @@ grub_try_normal_prefix (const char *prefix)
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file = grub_file_open (config, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CONFIG);
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if (file)
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{
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- grub_env_set ("prefix", prefix);
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grub_file_close (file);
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err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
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}
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@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
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From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
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Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:39:41 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] grub-set-bootflag: Conservative partial fix for CVE-2024-1048
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Following up on CVE-2019-14865 and taking a fresh look at
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grub2-set-bootflag now (through my work at CIQ on Rocky Linux), I saw some
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other ways in which users could still abuse this little program:
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1. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag no longer rewrites the
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grubenv file in-place, but writes into a temporary file and renames it
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over the original, checking for error returns from each call first.
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This prevents the original file truncation vulnerability, but it can
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leave the temporary file around if the program is killed before it can
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rename or remove the file. There are still many ways to get the program
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killed, such as through RLIMIT_FSIZE triggering SIGXFSZ (tested,
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reliable) or by careful timing (tricky) of signals sent by process group
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leader, pty, pre-scheduled timers, SIGXCPU (probably not an exhaustive
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list). Invoking the program multiple times fills up /boot (or if /boot
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is not separate, then it can fill up the root filesystem). Since the
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files are tiny, the filesystem is likely to run out of free inodes
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before it'd run out of blocks, but the effect is similar - can't create
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new files after this point (but still can add data to existing files,
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such as logs).
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2. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag naively tries to protect
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itself from signals by becoming full root. (This does protect it from
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signals sent by the user directly to the PID, but e.g. "kill -9 -1" by
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the user still works.) A side effect of such "protection" is that it's
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possible to invoke more concurrent instances of grub2-set-bootflag than
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the user's RLIMIT_NPROC would normally permit (as specified e.g. in
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/etc/security/limits.conf, or say in Apache httpd's RLimitNPROC if
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grub2-set-bootflag would be abused by a website script), thereby
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exhausting system resources (e.g., bypassing RAM usage limit if
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RLIMIT_AS was also set).
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3. umask is inherited. Again, due to how the CVE-2019-14865 fix creates
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a new file, and due to how mkstemp() works, this affects grubenv's new
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file permissions. Luckily, mkstemp() forces them to be no more relaxed
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than 0600, but the user ends up being able to set them e.g. to 0.
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Luckily, at least in my testing GRUB still works fine even when the file
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has such (lack of) permissions.
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This commit deals with the abuses above as follows:
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1. RLIMIT_FSIZE is pre-checked, so this specific way to get the process
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killed should no longer work. However, this isn't a complete fix
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because there are other ways to get the process killed after it has
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created the temporary file.
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The commit also fixes bug 1975892 ("RFE: grub2-set-bootflag should not
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write the grubenv when the flag being written is already set") and
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similar for "menu_show_once", which further reduces the abuse potential.
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2. RLIMIT_NPROC bypass should be avoided by not becoming full root (aka
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dropping the partial "kill protection").
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3. A safe umask is set.
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This is a partial fix (temporary files can still accumulate, but this is
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harder to trigger).
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While at it, this commit also fixes potential 1- or 2-byte over-read of
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env[] if its content is malformed - this was not a security issue since the
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grubenv file is trusted input, and the fix is just for robustness.
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Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
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---
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util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
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1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
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index 3b4c25ca2ac6..5bbbef804391 100644
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--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
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+++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
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@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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+#include <sys/stat.h>
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+#include <sys/resource.h>
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#include "progname.h"
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@@ -57,12 +59,17 @@ static void usage(FILE *out)
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int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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{
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/* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */
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- char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1], buf[64], *s;
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+ char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s;
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/* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */
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char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1];
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const char *bootflag;
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int i, fd, len, ret;
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FILE *f;
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+ struct rlimit rlim;
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+
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+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
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+ return 1;
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+ umask(077);
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if (argc != 2)
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{
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@@ -94,20 +101,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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len = strlen (bootflag);
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/*
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- * Really become root. setuid avoids an user killing us, possibly leaking
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- * the tmpfile. setgid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
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+ * setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
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*/
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- ret = setuid(0);
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- if (ret)
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+ if (setegid(0))
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{
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- perror ("Error setuid(0) failed");
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- return 1;
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- }
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-
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- ret = setgid(0);
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- if (ret)
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- {
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- perror ("Error setgid(0) failed");
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+ perror ("Error setegid(0) failed");
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return 1;
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}
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@@ -136,6 +134,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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/* 0 terminate env */
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env[GRUBENV_SIZE] = 0;
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+ /* not a valid flag value */
|
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+ env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1] = 0;
|
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+ env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 2] = 0;
|
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|
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if (strncmp (env, GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE, strlen (GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE)))
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{
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@@ -171,6 +172,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
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|
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/* The grubenv is not 0 terminated, so memcpy the name + '=' , '1', '\n' */
|
||||
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s=1\n", bootflag);
|
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+ if (!memcmp(s, buf, len + 3))
|
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+ return 0; /* nothing to do */
|
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memcpy(s, buf, len + 3);
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|
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|
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@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
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From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:56:21 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] grub-set-bootflag: More complete fix for CVE-2024-1048
|
||||
|
||||
Switch to per-user fixed temporary filenames along with a weird locking
|
||||
mechanism, which is explained in source code comments. This is a more
|
||||
complete fix than the previous commit (temporary files can't accumulate).
|
||||
Unfortunately, it introduces new risks (by working on a temporary file
|
||||
shared between the user's invocations), which are _hopefully_ avoided by
|
||||
the patch's elaborate logic. I actually got it wrong at first, which
|
||||
suggests that this logic is hard to reason about, and more errors or
|
||||
omissions are possible. It also relies on the kernel's primitives' exact
|
||||
semantics to a greater extent (nothing out of the ordinary, though).
|
||||
|
||||
Remaining issues that I think cannot reasonably be fixed without a
|
||||
redesign (e.g., having per-flag files with nothing else in them) and
|
||||
without introducing new issues:
|
||||
|
||||
A. A user can still revert a concurrent user's attempt of setting the
|
||||
other flag - or of making other changes to grubenv by means other than
|
||||
this program.
|
||||
|
||||
B. One leftover temporary file per user is still possible.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
|
||||
1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
index 5bbbef804391..514c4f9091ac 100644
|
||||
--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
+++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <unistd.h>
|
||||
+#include <sys/file.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/stat.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/resource.h>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -60,15 +61,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */
|
||||
char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s;
|
||||
- /* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */
|
||||
- char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1];
|
||||
+ /* +1 for 0 termination, +11 for ".%u" in tmp filename */
|
||||
+ char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 11 + 1];
|
||||
const char *bootflag;
|
||||
int i, fd, len, ret;
|
||||
FILE *f;
|
||||
- struct rlimit rlim;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
|
||||
- return 1;
|
||||
umask(077);
|
||||
|
||||
if (argc != 2)
|
||||
@@ -105,7 +103,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (setegid(0))
|
||||
{
|
||||
- perror ("Error setegid(0) failed");
|
||||
+ perror ("setegid(0) failed");
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -176,19 +174,82 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
return 0; /* nothing to do */
|
||||
memcpy(s, buf, len + 3);
|
||||
|
||||
+ struct rlimit rlim;
|
||||
+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ fprintf (stderr, "Resource limits undetermined or too low\n");
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Here we work under the premise that we shouldn't write into the target
|
||||
+ * file directly because we might not be able to have all of our changes
|
||||
+ * written completely and atomically. That was CVE-2019-14865, known to
|
||||
+ * have been triggerable via RLIMIT_FSIZE. While we've dealt with that
|
||||
+ * specific attack via the check above, there may be other possibilities.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Create a tempfile for writing the new env. Use the canonicalized filename
|
||||
* for the template so that the tmpfile is in the same dir / on same fs.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * We now use per-user fixed temporary filenames, so that a user cannot cause
|
||||
+ * multiple files to accumulate.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * We don't use O_EXCL so that a stale temporary file doesn't prevent further
|
||||
+ * usage of the program by the user.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%sXXXXXX", env_filename);
|
||||
- fd = mkstemp(tmp_filename);
|
||||
+ snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%s.%u", env_filename, getuid());
|
||||
+ fd = open(tmp_filename, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0600);
|
||||
if (fd == -1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
perror ("Creating tmpfile failed");
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * The lock prevents the same user from reaching further steps ending in
|
||||
+ * rename() concurrently, in which case the temporary file only partially
|
||||
+ * written by one invocation could be renamed to the target file by another.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * The lock also guards the slow fsync() from concurrent calls. After the
|
||||
+ * first time that and the rename() complete, further invocations for the
|
||||
+ * same flag become no-ops.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * We lock the temporary file rather than the target file because locking the
|
||||
+ * latter would allow any user having SIGSTOP'ed their process to make all
|
||||
+ * other users' invocations fail (or lock up if we'd use blocking mode).
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * We use non-blocking mode (LOCK_NB) because the lock having been taken by
|
||||
+ * another process implies that the other process would normally have already
|
||||
+ * renamed the file to target by the time it releases the lock (and we could
|
||||
+ * acquire it), so we'd be working directly on the target if we proceeded,
|
||||
+ * which is undesirable, and we'd kind of fail on the already-done rename.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (flock(fd, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ perror ("Locking tmpfile failed");
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Deal with the potential that another invocation proceeded all the way to
|
||||
+ * rename() and process exit while we were between open() and flock().
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ struct stat st1, st2;
|
||||
+ if (fstat(fd, &st1) || stat(tmp_filename, &st2))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ perror ("stat of tmpfile failed");
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (st1.st_dev != st2.st_dev || st1.st_ino != st2.st_ino)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ fprintf (stderr, "Another invocation won race\n");
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
f = fdopen (fd, "w");
|
||||
if (!f)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -213,6 +274,14 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ ret = ftruncate (fileno (f), GRUBENV_SIZE);
|
||||
+ if (ret)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ perror ("Error truncating tmpfile");
|
||||
+ unlink(tmp_filename);
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
ret = fsync (fileno (f));
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -221,15 +290,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- ret = fclose (f);
|
||||
- if (ret)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- perror ("Error closing tmpfile");
|
||||
- unlink(tmp_filename);
|
||||
- return 1;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
/*
|
||||
+ * We must not close the file before rename() as that would remove the lock.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
* And finally rename the tmpfile with the new env over the old env, the
|
||||
* linux kernel guarantees that this is atomic (from a syscall pov).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
|
||||
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 22:05:45 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] grub-set-bootflag: Exit calmly when not running as root
|
||||
|
||||
Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root. This
|
||||
allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while
|
||||
supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 11 +++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
index 514c4f9091ac..31a868aeca8a 100644
|
||||
--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
+++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
|
||||
@@ -98,6 +98,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
bootflag = bootflags[i];
|
||||
len = strlen (bootflag);
|
||||
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root. This
|
||||
+ * allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while
|
||||
+ * supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (geteuid())
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ printf ("grub-set-bootflag not running as root, no action taken\n");
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
|
||||
From 43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:31:57 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB write when parsing the
|
||||
$ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute for the $MFT file
|
||||
|
||||
When parsing an extremely fragmented $MFT file, i.e., the file described
|
||||
using the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute, current NTFS code will reuse a buffer
|
||||
containing bytes read from the underlying drive to store sector numbers,
|
||||
which are consumed later to read data from these sectors into another buffer.
|
||||
|
||||
These sectors numbers, two 32-bit integers, are always stored at predefined
|
||||
offsets, 0x10 and 0x14, relative to first byte of the selected entry within
|
||||
the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute. Usually, this won't cause any problem.
|
||||
|
||||
However, when parsing a specially-crafted file system image, this may cause
|
||||
the NTFS code to write these integers beyond the buffer boundary, likely
|
||||
causing the GRUB memory allocator to misbehave or fail. These integers contain
|
||||
values which are controlled by on-disk structures of the NTFS file system.
|
||||
|
||||
Such modification and resulting misbehavior may touch a memory range not
|
||||
assigned to the GRUB and owned by firmware or another EFI application/driver.
|
||||
|
||||
This fix introduces checks to ensure that these sector numbers are never
|
||||
written beyond the boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2023-4692
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
index bbdbe24ada83..c3c4db117bba 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (at->attr_end)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- grub_uint8_t *pa;
|
||||
+ grub_uint8_t *pa, *pa_end;
|
||||
|
||||
at->emft_buf = grub_malloc (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
|
||||
if (at->emft_buf == NULL)
|
||||
@@ -209,11 +209,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
at->attr_nxt = at->edat_buf;
|
||||
at->attr_end = at->edat_buf + u32at (pa, 0x30);
|
||||
+ pa_end = at->edat_buf + n;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
|
||||
at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
|
||||
+ pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
|
||||
}
|
||||
at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST;
|
||||
while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end)
|
||||
@@ -230,6 +232,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
|
||||
at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_GPOS;
|
||||
at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt;
|
||||
pa = at->attr_cur;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
|
||||
+ return NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x10,
|
||||
grub_cpu_to_le32 (at->mft->data->mft_start));
|
||||
grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x14,
|
||||
@@ -240,6 +249,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (*pa != attr)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
|
||||
+ return NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (read_attr
|
||||
(at, pa + 0x10,
|
||||
u32at (pa, 0x10) * (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
|
||||
From 0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:32:33 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when reading data from the
|
||||
resident $DATA attribute
|
||||
|
||||
When reading a file containing resident data, i.e., the file data is stored in
|
||||
the $DATA attribute within the NTFS file record, not in external clusters,
|
||||
there are no checks that this resident data actually fits the corresponding
|
||||
file record segment.
|
||||
|
||||
When parsing a specially-crafted file system image, the current NTFS code will
|
||||
read the file data from an arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory offset and of
|
||||
arbitrary, attacker-chosen length.
|
||||
|
||||
This allows an attacker to display arbitrary chunks of memory, which could
|
||||
contain sensitive information like password hashes or even plain-text,
|
||||
obfuscated passwords from BS EFI variables.
|
||||
|
||||
This fix implements a check to ensure that resident data is read from the
|
||||
corresponding file record segment only.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2023-4693
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
index c3c4db117bba..a68e173d8285 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
@@ -401,7 +401,18 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
|
||||
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
|
||||
- grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u32at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
|
||||
+ (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
|
||||
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
|
||||
From 7e5f031a6a6a3decc2360a7b0c71abbe598e7354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:33:17 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing directory entries
|
||||
from resident and non-resident index attributes
|
||||
|
||||
This fix introduces checks to ensure that index entries are never read
|
||||
beyond the corresponding directory index.
|
||||
|
||||
The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not exploitable in any way.
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 +++++++++++--
|
||||
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
index a68e173d8285..2d78b96e19fb 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ get_utf8 (grub_uint8_t *in, grub_size_t len)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
-list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
|
||||
+list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos, grub_uint8_t *end_pos,
|
||||
grub_fshelp_iterate_dir_hook_t hook, void *hook_data)
|
||||
{
|
||||
grub_uint8_t *np;
|
||||
@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
|
||||
grub_uint8_t namespace;
|
||||
char *ustr;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if ((pos >= end_pos) || (end_pos - pos < 0x52))
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (pos[0xC] & 2) /* end signature */
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -617,6 +620,9 @@ list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
|
||||
ns = *(np++);
|
||||
namespace = *(np++);
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (2 * ns > end_pos - pos - 0x52)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Ignore files in DOS namespace, as they will reappear as Win32
|
||||
* names.
|
||||
@@ -806,7 +812,9 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cur_pos += 0x10; /* Skip index root */
|
||||
- ret = list_file (mft, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0), hook, hook_data);
|
||||
+ ret = list_file (mft, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0),
|
||||
+ at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
|
||||
+ hook, hook_data);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -893,6 +901,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
|
||||
(const grub_uint8_t *) "INDX")))
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
ret = list_file (mft, &indx[0x18 + u16at (indx, 0x18)],
|
||||
+ indx + (mft->data->idx_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
|
||||
hook, hook_data);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
|
||||
From 7a5a116739fa6d8a625da7d6b9272c9a2462f967 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:33:44 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing bitmaps for index
|
||||
attributes
|
||||
|
||||
This fix introduces checks to ensure that bitmaps for directory indices
|
||||
are never read beyond their actual sizes.
|
||||
|
||||
The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not exploitable in any way.
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
index 2d78b96e19fb..bb70c89fb803 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
@@ -843,6 +843,25 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
|
||||
|
||||
if (is_resident)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ if (bitmap_len > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap too large");
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (cur_pos >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (u16at (cur_pos, 0x14) + u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) >
|
||||
+ (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) cur_pos)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0x14),
|
||||
bitmap_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
||||
From 1fe82c41e070385e273d7bb1cfb482627a3c28e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:38:19 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing a volume label
|
||||
|
||||
This fix introduces checks to ensure that an NTFS volume label is always
|
||||
read from the corresponding file record segment.
|
||||
|
||||
The current NTFS code allows the volume label string to be read from an
|
||||
arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory location. However, the bytes read are
|
||||
always treated as UTF-16LE. So, the final string displayed is mostly
|
||||
unreadable and it can't be easily converted back to raw bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not causing a significant
|
||||
data leak.
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
index bb70c89fb803..ff5e3740f0dd 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
@@ -1213,13 +1213,29 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
|
||||
|
||||
init_attr (&mft->attr, mft);
|
||||
pa = find_attr (&mft->attr, GRUB_NTFS_AT_VOLUME_NAME);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (pa >= mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
|
||||
+ goto fail;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa < 0x16)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
|
||||
+ goto fail;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (u32at (pa, 0x10)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
|
||||
len = u32at (pa, 0x10) / 2;
|
||||
pa += u16at (pa, 0x14);
|
||||
- *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
|
||||
+ if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa >= 2 * len)
|
||||
+ *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fail:
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
|
||||
From e58b870ff926415e23fc386af41ff81b2f588763 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:40:07 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fs/ntfs: Make code more readable
|
||||
|
||||
Move some calls used to access NTFS attribute header fields into
|
||||
functions with human-readable names.
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
index ff5e3740f0dd..de435aa14d85 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
|
||||
@@ -52,6 +52,24 @@ u64at (void *ptr, grub_size_t ofs)
|
||||
return grub_le_to_cpu64 (grub_get_unaligned64 ((char *) ptr + ofs));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static grub_uint16_t
|
||||
+first_attr_off (void *mft_buf_ptr)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return u16at (mft_buf_ptr, 0x14);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static grub_uint16_t
|
||||
+res_attr_data_off (void *res_attr_ptr)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return u16at (res_attr_ptr, 0x14);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static grub_uint32_t
|
||||
+res_attr_data_len (void *res_attr_ptr)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return u32at (res_attr_ptr, 0x10);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
grub_ntfscomp_func_t grub_ntfscomp_func;
|
||||
|
||||
static grub_err_t
|
||||
@@ -106,7 +124,7 @@ init_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, struct grub_ntfs_file *mft)
|
||||
{
|
||||
at->mft = mft;
|
||||
at->flags = (mft == &mft->data->mmft) ? GRUB_NTFS_AF_MMFT : 0;
|
||||
- at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + u16at (mft->buf, 0x14);
|
||||
+ at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + first_attr_off (mft->buf);
|
||||
at->attr_end = at->emft_buf = at->edat_buf = at->sbuf = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -154,7 +172,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- new_pos = &at->emft_buf[u16at (at->emft_buf, 0x14)];
|
||||
+ new_pos = &at->emft_buf[first_attr_off (at->emft_buf)];
|
||||
while (*new_pos != 0xFF)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if ((*new_pos == *at->attr_cur)
|
||||
@@ -213,7 +231,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
- at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
|
||||
+ at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + res_attr_data_off (pa);
|
||||
at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
|
||||
pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -399,20 +417,20 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
|
||||
|
||||
if (pa[8] == 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
|
||||
+ if (ofs + len > res_attr_data_len (pa))
|
||||
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
|
||||
|
||||
- if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
+ if (res_attr_data_len (pa) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
|
||||
|
||||
if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
|
||||
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
|
||||
|
||||
- if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
|
||||
+ if (res_attr_data_off (pa) + res_attr_data_len (pa) >
|
||||
(grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
|
||||
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
|
||||
|
||||
- grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
|
||||
+ grub_memcpy (dest, pa + res_attr_data_off (pa) + ofs, len);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -556,7 +574,7 @@ init_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *mft, grub_uint64_t mftno)
|
||||
(unsigned long long) mftno);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!pa[8])
|
||||
- mft->size = u32at (pa, 0x10);
|
||||
+ mft->size = res_attr_data_len (pa);
|
||||
else
|
||||
mft->size = u64at (pa, 0x30);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -805,7 +823,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
|
||||
(u32at (cur_pos, 0x18) != 0x490024) ||
|
||||
(u32at (cur_pos, 0x1C) != 0x300033))
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
- cur_pos += u16at (cur_pos, 0x14);
|
||||
+ cur_pos += res_attr_data_off (cur_pos);
|
||||
if (*cur_pos != 0x30) /* Not filename index */
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
@@ -834,7 +852,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
|
||||
{
|
||||
int is_resident = (cur_pos[8] == 0);
|
||||
|
||||
- bitmap_len = ((is_resident) ? u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) :
|
||||
+ bitmap_len = ((is_resident) ? res_attr_data_len (cur_pos) :
|
||||
u32at (cur_pos, 0x28));
|
||||
|
||||
bmp = grub_malloc (bitmap_len);
|
||||
@@ -855,14 +873,14 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (u16at (cur_pos, 0x14) + u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) >
|
||||
+ if (res_attr_data_off (cur_pos) + res_attr_data_len (cur_pos) >
|
||||
(grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) cur_pos)
|
||||
{
|
||||
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0x14),
|
||||
+ grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + res_attr_data_off (cur_pos),
|
||||
bitmap_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
@@ -1226,12 +1244,12 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (u32at (pa, 0x10)))
|
||||
+ if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (res_attr_data_len (pa)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
|
||||
- len = u32at (pa, 0x10) / 2;
|
||||
- pa += u16at (pa, 0x14);
|
||||
+ len = res_attr_data_len (pa) / 2;
|
||||
+ pa += res_attr_data_off (pa);
|
||||
if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa >= 2 * len)
|
||||
*label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
|
||||
else
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
|
||||
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2023 14:54:35 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] grub_dl_set_mem_attrs(): fix format string
|
||||
|
||||
The grub_dprintf() call for printing the message
|
||||
|
||||
updating attributes for GOT and trampolines
|
||||
|
||||
passes the argument "mod->name", but the format string doesn't accept that
|
||||
argument.
|
||||
|
||||
Print the module name too.
|
||||
|
||||
Example output:
|
||||
|
||||
> kern/dl.c:736: updating attributes for GOT and trampolines ("video_fb")
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: ad1b904d325b (nx: set page permissions for loaded modules.)
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/kern/dl.c | 3 ++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
|
||||
index ab9101a5ad1a..a97f4a8b1355 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
|
||||
@@ -733,7 +733,8 @@ grub_dl_set_mem_attrs (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
tgsz = ALIGN_UP(tgsz, arch_addralign);
|
||||
|
||||
- grub_dprintf ("modules", "updating attributes for GOT and trampolines\n",
|
||||
+ grub_dprintf ("modules",
|
||||
+ "updating attributes for GOT and trampolines (\"%s\")\n",
|
||||
mod->name);
|
||||
grub_update_mem_attrs (tgaddr, tgsz, GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R|GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X,
|
||||
GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W);
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
|
||||
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2023 16:21:54 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] grub_dl_set_mem_attrs(): add self-check for the tramp/GOT
|
||||
sizes
|
||||
|
||||
On aarch64 UEFI, we currently have a crasher:
|
||||
|
||||
grub_dl_load_core()
|
||||
grub_dl_load_core_noinit()
|
||||
|
||||
/* independent allocation: must remain writable */
|
||||
mod = grub_zalloc();
|
||||
|
||||
/* allocates module image with incorrect tail alignment */
|
||||
grub_dl_load_segments()
|
||||
|
||||
/* write-protecting the module image makes "mod" read-only! */
|
||||
grub_dl_set_mem_attrs()
|
||||
grub_update_mem_attrs()
|
||||
|
||||
grub_dl_init()
|
||||
/* page fault, crash */
|
||||
mod->next = ...;
|
||||
|
||||
- Commit 887f1d8fa976 ("modules: load module sections at page-aligned
|
||||
addresses", 2023-02-08) forgot to page-align the allocation of the
|
||||
trampolines and GOT areas of grub2 modules, in grub_dl_load_segments().
|
||||
|
||||
- Commit ad1b904d325b ("nx: set page permissions for loaded modules.",
|
||||
2023-02-08) calculated a common bounding box for the trampolines and GOT
|
||||
areas in grub_dl_set_mem_attrs(), rounded the box size up to a whole
|
||||
multiple of EFI page size ("arch_addralign"), and write-protected the
|
||||
resultant page range.
|
||||
|
||||
Consequently, grub_dl_load_segments() places the module image in memory
|
||||
such that its tail -- the end of the trampolines and GOT areas -- lands at
|
||||
the head of a page whose tail in turn contains independent memory
|
||||
allocations, such as "mod". grub_dl_set_mem_attrs() will then unwittingly
|
||||
write-protect these other allocations too.
|
||||
|
||||
But "mod" must remain writable: we assign "mod->next" in grub_dl_init()
|
||||
subsequently. Currently we crash there with a page fault / permission
|
||||
fault.
|
||||
|
||||
(The crash is not trivial to hit: the tramp/GOT areas are irrelevant on
|
||||
x86_64, plus the page protection depends on the UEFI platform firmware
|
||||
providing EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL. In practice, the crash is
|
||||
restricted to aarch64 edk2 (ArmVirtQemu) builds containing commit
|
||||
1c4dfadb4611, "ArmPkg/CpuDxe: Implement EFI memory attributes protocol",
|
||||
2023-03-16.)
|
||||
|
||||
Example log before the patch:
|
||||
|
||||
> kern/dl.c:736: updating attributes for GOT and trampolines ("video_fb")
|
||||
> kern/efi/mm.c:927: set +rx -w on 0x13b88b000-0x13b88bfff before:rwx after:r-x
|
||||
> kern/dl.c:744: done updating module memory attributes for "video_fb"
|
||||
> kern/dl.c:639: flushing 0xe4f0 bytes at 0x13b87d000
|
||||
> kern/arm64/cache.c:42: D$ line size: 64
|
||||
> kern/arm64/cache.c:43: I$ line size: 64
|
||||
> kern/dl.c:839: module name: video_fb
|
||||
> kern/dl.c:840: init function: 0x0
|
||||
> kern/dl.c:865: Initing module video_fb
|
||||
>
|
||||
> Synchronous Exception at 0x000000013B8A76EC
|
||||
> PC 0x00013B8A76EC
|
||||
>
|
||||
> X0 0x000000013B88B960 X1 0x0000000000000000 X2 0x000000013F93587C X3 0x0000000000000075
|
||||
>
|
||||
> SP 0x00000000470745C0 ELR 0x000000013B8A76EC SPSR 0x60000205 FPSR 0x00000000
|
||||
> ESR 0x9600004F FAR 0x000000013B88B9D0
|
||||
>
|
||||
> ESR : EC 0x25 IL 0x1 ISS 0x0000004F
|
||||
>
|
||||
> Data abort: Permission fault, third level
|
||||
|
||||
Note the following:
|
||||
|
||||
- The whole 4K page at 0x1_3B88_B000 is write-protected.
|
||||
|
||||
- The "video_fb" module actually lives at [0x1_3B87_D000, 0x1_3B88_B4F0)
|
||||
-- left-inclusive, right-exclusive --; that is, in the last page (at
|
||||
0x1_3B88_B000), it only occupies the first 0x4F0 bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
- The instruction at 0x1_3B8A_76EC faults. Not shown here, but it is a
|
||||
store instruction, which writes to the field at offset 0x70 of the
|
||||
structure pointed-to by the X0 register. This is the "mod->next"
|
||||
assignment from grub_dl_init().
|
||||
|
||||
- The faulting address is therefore (X0 + 0x70), i.e., 0x1_3B88_B9D0. This
|
||||
is indeed the value held in the FAR register.
|
||||
|
||||
- The faulting address 0x1_3B88_B9D0 falls in the above-noted page (at
|
||||
0x1_3B88_B000), namely at offset 0x9D0. This is *beyond* the first 0x4F0
|
||||
bytes that the very tail of the "video_fb" module occupies at the front
|
||||
of that page.
|
||||
|
||||
For now, add a self-check that reports this bug (and prevents the crash by
|
||||
skipping the write protection).
|
||||
|
||||
Example log after the patch:
|
||||
|
||||
> kern/dl.c:742:BUG: trying to protect pages outside of module allocation
|
||||
> ("video_fb"): module base 0x13b87d000, size 0xe4f0; tramp/GOT base
|
||||
> 0x13b88b000, size 0x1000
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/kern/dl.c | 11 ++++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
|
||||
index a97f4a8b1355..3b66fa410e80 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
|
||||
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ grub_dl_set_mem_attrs (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr)
|
||||
#if !defined (__i386__) && !defined (__x86_64__) && !defined(__riscv)
|
||||
grub_size_t arch_addralign = grub_arch_dl_min_alignment ();
|
||||
grub_addr_t tgaddr;
|
||||
- grub_uint64_t tgsz;
|
||||
+ grub_size_t tgsz;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
grub_dprintf ("modules", "updating memory attributes for \"%s\"\n",
|
||||
@@ -736,6 +736,15 @@ grub_dl_set_mem_attrs (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr)
|
||||
grub_dprintf ("modules",
|
||||
"updating attributes for GOT and trampolines (\"%s\")\n",
|
||||
mod->name);
|
||||
+ if (tgaddr < (grub_addr_t)mod->base ||
|
||||
+ tgsz > (grub_addr_t)-1 - tgaddr ||
|
||||
+ tgaddr + tgsz > (grub_addr_t)mod->base + mod->sz)
|
||||
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG,
|
||||
+ "BUG: trying to protect pages outside of module "
|
||||
+ "allocation (\"%s\"): module base %p, size 0x%"
|
||||
+ PRIxGRUB_SIZE "; tramp/GOT base 0x%" PRIxGRUB_ADDR
|
||||
+ ", size 0x%" PRIxGRUB_SIZE,
|
||||
+ mod->name, mod->base, mod->sz, tgaddr, tgsz);
|
||||
grub_update_mem_attrs (tgaddr, tgsz, GRUB_MEM_ATTR_R|GRUB_MEM_ATTR_X,
|
||||
GRUB_MEM_ATTR_W);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
|
||||
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2023 16:56:09 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] grub_dl_load_segments(): page-align the tramp/GOT areas too
|
||||
|
||||
The tramp/GOT write-protection in grub_dl_set_mem_attrs() requires that
|
||||
the tramp/GOT areas of the module image *not* share a page with any other
|
||||
memory allocations. Page-align the tramp/GOT areas, while satisfying their
|
||||
intrinsic alignment requirements too.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: 887f1d8fa976 (modules: load module sections at page-aligned addresses)
|
||||
Fixes: ad1b904d325b (nx: set page permissions for loaded modules.)
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/kern/dl.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
|
||||
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
|
||||
index 3b66fa410e80..f3cdb9e0bacf 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c
|
||||
@@ -280,7 +280,9 @@ grub_dl_load_segments (grub_dl_t mod, const Elf_Ehdr *e)
|
||||
grub_size_t tsize = 0, talign = 1, arch_addralign = 1;
|
||||
#if !defined (__i386__) && !defined (__x86_64__) && !defined(__riscv)
|
||||
grub_size_t tramp;
|
||||
+ grub_size_t tramp_align;
|
||||
grub_size_t got;
|
||||
+ grub_size_t got_align;
|
||||
grub_err_t err;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
char *ptr;
|
||||
@@ -311,12 +313,18 @@ grub_dl_load_segments (grub_dl_t mod, const Elf_Ehdr *e)
|
||||
err = grub_arch_dl_get_tramp_got_size (e, &tramp, &got);
|
||||
if (err)
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
- tsize += ALIGN_UP (tramp, GRUB_ARCH_DL_TRAMP_ALIGN);
|
||||
- if (talign < GRUB_ARCH_DL_TRAMP_ALIGN)
|
||||
- talign = GRUB_ARCH_DL_TRAMP_ALIGN;
|
||||
- tsize += ALIGN_UP (got, GRUB_ARCH_DL_GOT_ALIGN);
|
||||
- if (talign < GRUB_ARCH_DL_GOT_ALIGN)
|
||||
- talign = GRUB_ARCH_DL_GOT_ALIGN;
|
||||
+ tramp_align = GRUB_ARCH_DL_TRAMP_ALIGN;
|
||||
+ if (tramp_align < arch_addralign)
|
||||
+ tramp_align = arch_addralign;
|
||||
+ tsize += ALIGN_UP (tramp, tramp_align);
|
||||
+ if (talign < tramp_align)
|
||||
+ talign = tramp_align;
|
||||
+ got_align = GRUB_ARCH_DL_GOT_ALIGN;
|
||||
+ if (got_align < arch_addralign)
|
||||
+ got_align = arch_addralign;
|
||||
+ tsize += ALIGN_UP (got, got_align);
|
||||
+ if (talign < got_align)
|
||||
+ talign = got_align;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EMU
|
||||
@@ -376,11 +384,11 @@ grub_dl_load_segments (grub_dl_t mod, const Elf_Ehdr *e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#if !defined (__i386__) && !defined (__x86_64__) && !defined(__riscv)
|
||||
- ptr = (char *) ALIGN_UP ((grub_addr_t) ptr, GRUB_ARCH_DL_TRAMP_ALIGN);
|
||||
+ ptr = (char *) ALIGN_UP ((grub_addr_t) ptr, tramp_align);
|
||||
mod->tramp = ptr;
|
||||
mod->trampptr = ptr;
|
||||
ptr += tramp;
|
||||
- ptr = (char *) ALIGN_UP ((grub_addr_t) ptr, GRUB_ARCH_DL_GOT_ALIGN);
|
||||
+ ptr = (char *) ALIGN_UP ((grub_addr_t) ptr, got_align);
|
||||
mod->got = ptr;
|
||||
mod->gotptr = ptr;
|
||||
ptr += got;
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
|
||||
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Marta Lewandowska <mlewando@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2023 09:13:41 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] grub-install on EFI if forced
|
||||
|
||||
UEFI Secure Boot requires signed grub binaries to work, so grub-
|
||||
install should not be used. However, users who have Secure Boot
|
||||
disabled and wish to use the command should not be prevented from
|
||||
doing so if they invoke --force.
|
||||
|
||||
fixes bz#1917213 / bz#2240994
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Marta Lewandowska <mlewando@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
util/grub-install.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/util/grub-install.c b/util/grub-install.c
|
||||
index 5babc7af5518..162162bec6e2 100644
|
||||
--- a/util/grub-install.c
|
||||
+++ b/util/grub-install.c
|
||||
@@ -899,22 +899,6 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
|
||||
platform = grub_install_get_target (grub_install_source_directory);
|
||||
|
||||
- switch (platform)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- case GRUB_INSTALL_PLATFORM_ARM_EFI:
|
||||
- case GRUB_INSTALL_PLATFORM_ARM64_EFI:
|
||||
- case GRUB_INSTALL_PLATFORM_I386_EFI:
|
||||
- case GRUB_INSTALL_PLATFORM_IA64_EFI:
|
||||
- case GRUB_INSTALL_PLATFORM_X86_64_EFI:
|
||||
- is_efi = 1;
|
||||
- grub_util_error (_("this utility cannot be used for EFI platforms"
|
||||
- " because it does not support UEFI Secure Boot"));
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
- default:
|
||||
- is_efi = 0;
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
{
|
||||
char *platname = grub_install_get_platform_name (platform);
|
||||
fprintf (stderr, _("Installing for %s platform.\n"), platname);
|
||||
@@ -1027,6 +1011,32 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
grub_hostfs_init ();
|
||||
grub_host_init ();
|
||||
|
||||
+ switch (platform)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ case GRUB_INSTALL_PLATFORM_I386_EFI:
|
||||
+ case GRUB_INSTALL_PLATFORM_X86_64_EFI:
|
||||
+ case GRUB_INSTALL_PLATFORM_ARM_EFI:
|
||||
+ case GRUB_INSTALL_PLATFORM_ARM64_EFI:
|
||||
+ case GRUB_INSTALL_PLATFORM_RISCV32_EFI:
|
||||
+ case GRUB_INSTALL_PLATFORM_RISCV64_EFI:
|
||||
+ case GRUB_INSTALL_PLATFORM_IA64_EFI:
|
||||
+ is_efi = 1;
|
||||
+ if (!force)
|
||||
+ grub_util_error (_("This utility should not be used for EFI platforms"
|
||||
+ " because it does not support UEFI Secure Boot."
|
||||
+ " If you really wish to proceed, invoke the --force"
|
||||
+ " option.\nMake sure Secure Boot is disabled before"
|
||||
+ " proceeding"));
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
+ is_efi = 0;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* pacify warning. */
|
||||
+ case GRUB_INSTALL_PLATFORM_MAX:
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Find the EFI System Partition. */
|
||||
if (is_efi)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
|
||||
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 10:58:32 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] cmd/search: Rework of CVE-2023-4001 fix
|
||||
|
||||
The initial fix implemented a new flag that forces the grub cfg
|
||||
stub to be located on the same disk as grub. This created several
|
||||
issues such as RAID machines not being able to boot as their
|
||||
partition names under grub were different from the partition where
|
||||
grub is located. It also simply means that any machines with the
|
||||
/boot partition located on a disk other than the one containing grub
|
||||
won't boot.
|
||||
This commit denies booting if the grub cfg stub is located on a USB
|
||||
drive with a duplicated UUID (UUID being the same as the partition
|
||||
containing the actual grub cfg stub)
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/commands/search.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
|
||||
1 file changed, 127 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/commands/search.c b/grub-core/commands/search.c
|
||||
index 94fe8b2872a1..c052cb098c36 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/commands/search.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/commands/search.c
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
|
||||
#include <grub/i18n.h>
|
||||
#include <grub/disk.h>
|
||||
#include <grub/partition.h>
|
||||
+#include <grub/efi/api.h>
|
||||
+#include <grub/time.h>
|
||||
|
||||
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -54,6 +56,100 @@ struct search_ctx
|
||||
int is_cache;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
+static int
|
||||
+is_device_usb (const char *name)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ int ret = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ grub_device_t dev = grub_device_open(name);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (dev)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ struct grub_efidisk_data
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_efi_handle_t handle;
|
||||
+ grub_efi_device_path_t *device_path;
|
||||
+ grub_efi_device_path_t *last_device_path;
|
||||
+ grub_efi_block_io_t *block_io;
|
||||
+ struct grub_efidisk_data *next;
|
||||
+ };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (dev->disk && dev->disk->data)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ struct grub_efidisk_data *dp = dev->disk->data;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ( GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp->last_device_path) == GRUB_EFI_MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE &&
|
||||
+ GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp->last_device_path) == GRUB_EFI_USB_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ ret = 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ grub_device_close(dev);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return ret;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static int
|
||||
+get_device_uuid(const char *name, char** quid)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ int ret = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ grub_device_t dev_part = grub_device_open(name);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (dev_part)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_fs_t fs;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ fs = grub_fs_probe (dev_part);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#ifdef DO_SEARCH_FS_UUID
|
||||
+#define read_fn fs_uuid
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+#define read_fn fs_label
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+ if (fs && fs->read_fn)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ fs->read_fn (dev_part, quid);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE && *quid)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ ret = 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ grub_device_close (dev_part);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return ret;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+struct uuid_context {
|
||||
+ char* name;
|
||||
+ char* uuid;
|
||||
+};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static int
|
||||
+check_for_duplicate (const char *name, void *data)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ int ret = 0;
|
||||
+ struct uuid_context * uuid_ctx = (struct uuid_context *)data;
|
||||
+ char *quid = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ get_device_uuid(name, &quid);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (quid == NULL)
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!grub_strcasecmp(quid, uuid_ctx->uuid) && grub_strcasecmp(name, uuid_ctx->name))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ ret = 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ grub_free(quid);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return ret;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Helper for FUNC_NAME. */
|
||||
static int
|
||||
iterate_device (const char *name, void *data)
|
||||
@@ -104,15 +200,37 @@ iterate_device (const char *name, void *data)
|
||||
grub_str_sep (root_dev, root_disk, ',', rem_1);
|
||||
grub_str_sep (name, name_disk, ',', rem_2);
|
||||
if (root_disk != NULL && *root_disk != '\0' &&
|
||||
- name_disk != NULL && *name_disk != '\0')
|
||||
- if (grub_strcmp(root_disk, name_disk) != 0)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- grub_free (root_disk);
|
||||
- grub_free (name_disk);
|
||||
- grub_free (rem_1);
|
||||
- grub_free (rem_2);
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ name_disk != NULL && *name_disk != '\0')
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_device_t dev, dev_part;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (is_device_usb(name) && !is_device_usb(root_dev))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ char *quid_name = NULL;
|
||||
+ int longlist = 0;
|
||||
+ struct uuid_context uuid_ctx;
|
||||
+ int ret = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ get_device_uuid(name, &quid_name);
|
||||
+ if (!grub_strcmp(quid_name, ctx->key))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ uuid_ctx.name = name;
|
||||
+ uuid_ctx.uuid = quid_name;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ret = grub_device_iterate (check_for_duplicate, &uuid_ctx);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (ret)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_printf("Duplicated media UUID found, rebooting ...\n");
|
||||
+ grub_sleep(10);
|
||||
+ grub_reboot();
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (quid_name) grub_free (quid_name);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
grub_free (root_disk);
|
||||
grub_free (name_disk);
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in new issue