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% CONTAINERS-POLICY.JSON 5 policy.json Man Page
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% Miloslav Trmač
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% September 2016
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# NAME
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containers-policy.json - syntax for the signature verification policy file
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## DESCRIPTION
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Signature verification policy files are used to specify policy, e.g. trusted keys,
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applicable when deciding whether to accept an image, or individual signatures of that image, as valid.
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By default, the policy is read from `$HOME/.config/containers/policy.json`, if it exists, otherwise from `/etc/containers/policy.json`; applications performing verification may allow using a different policy instead.
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## FORMAT
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The signature verification policy file, usually called `policy.json`,
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uses a JSON format. Unlike some other JSON files, its parsing is fairly strict:
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unrecognized, duplicated or otherwise invalid fields cause the entire file,
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and usually the entire operation, to be rejected.
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The purpose of the policy file is to define a set of *policy requirements* for a container image,
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usually depending on its location (where it is being pulled from) or otherwise defined identity.
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Policy requirements can be defined for:
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- An individual *scope* in a *transport*.
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The *transport* values are the same as the transport prefixes when pushing/pulling images (e.g. `docker:`, `atomic:`),
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and *scope* values are defined by each transport; see below for more details.
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Usually, a scope can be defined to match a single image, and various prefixes of
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such a most specific scope define namespaces of matching images.
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- A default policy for a single transport, expressed using an empty string as a scope
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- A global default policy.
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If multiple policy requirements match a given image, only the requirements from the most specific match apply,
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the more general policy requirements definitions are ignored.
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This is expressed in JSON using the top-level syntax
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```js
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{
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"default": [/* policy requirements: global default */]
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"transports": {
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transport_name: {
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"": [/* policy requirements: default for transport $transport_name */],
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scope_1: [/* policy requirements: default for $scope_1 in $transport_name */],
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scope_2: [/*…*/]
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/*…*/
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},
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transport_name_2: {/*…*/}
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/*…*/
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}
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}
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```
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The global `default` set of policy requirements is mandatory; all of the other fields
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(`transports` itself, any specific transport, the transport-specific default, etc.) are optional.
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<!-- NOTE: Keep this in sync with transports/transports.go! -->
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## Supported transports and their scopes
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### `atomic:`
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The `atomic:` transport refers to images in an Atomic Registry.
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Supported scopes use the form _hostname_[`:`_port_][`/`_namespace_[`/`_imagestream_ [`:`_tag_]]],
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i.e. either specifying a complete name of a tagged image, or prefix denoting
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a host/namespace/image stream or a wildcarded expression for matching all
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subdomains. For wildcarded subdomain matching, `*.example.com` is a valid case, but `example*.*.com` is not.
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*Note:* The _hostname_ and _port_ refer to the container registry host and port (the one used
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e.g. for `docker pull`), _not_ to the OpenShift API host and port.
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### `dir:`
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The `dir:` transport refers to images stored in local directories.
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Supported scopes are paths of directories (either containing a single image or
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subdirectories possibly containing images).
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*Note:* The paths must be absolute and contain no symlinks. Paths violating these requirements may be silently ignored.
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The top-level scope `"/"` is forbidden; use the transport default scope `""`,
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for consistency with other transports.
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### `docker:`
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The `docker:` transport refers to images in a registry implementing the "Docker Registry HTTP API V2".
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Scopes matching individual images are named Docker references *in the fully expanded form*, either
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using a tag or digest. For example, `docker.io/library/busybox:latest` (*not* `busybox:latest`).
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More general scopes are prefixes of individual-image scopes, and specify a repository (by omitting the tag or digest),
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a repository namespace, or a registry host (by only specifying the host name)
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or a wildcarded expression for matching all subdomains. For wildcarded subdomain
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matching, `*.example.com` is a valid case, but `example*.*.com` is not.
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### `oci:`
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The `oci:` transport refers to images in directories compliant with "Open Container Image Layout Specification".
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Supported scopes use the form _directory_`:`_tag_, and _directory_ referring to
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a directory containing one or more tags, or any of the parent directories.
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*Note:* See `dir:` above for semantics and restrictions on the directory paths, they apply to `oci:` equivalently.
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### `tarball:`
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The `tarball:` transport refers to tarred up container root filesystems.
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Scopes are ignored.
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## Policy Requirements
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Using the mechanisms above, a set of policy requirements is looked up. The policy requirements
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are represented as a JSON array of individual requirement objects. For an image to be accepted,
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*all* of the requirements must be satisfied simultaneously.
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The policy requirements can also be used to decide whether an individual signature is accepted (= is signed by a recognized key of a known author);
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in that case some requirements may apply only to some signatures, but each signature must be accepted by *at least one* requirement object.
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The following requirement objects are supported:
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### `insecureAcceptAnything`
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A simple requirement with the following syntax
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```json
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{"type":"insecureAcceptAnything"}
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```
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This requirement accepts any image (but note that other requirements in the array still apply).
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When deciding to accept an individual signature, this requirement does not have any effect; it does *not* cause the signature to be accepted, though.
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This is useful primarily for policy scopes where no signature verification is required;
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because the array of policy requirements must not be empty, this requirement is used
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to represent the lack of requirements explicitly.
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### `reject`
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A simple requirement with the following syntax:
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```json
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{"type":"reject"}
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```
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This requirement rejects every image, and every signature.
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### `signedBy`
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This requirement requires an image to be signed using “simple signing” with an expected identity, or accepts a signature if it is using an expected identity and key.
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```js
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{
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"type": "signedBy",
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"keyType": "GPGKeys", /* The only currently supported value */
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"keyPath": "/path/to/local/keyring/file",
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"keyPaths": ["/path/to/local/keyring/file1","/path/to/local/keyring/file2"…],
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"keyData": "base64-encoded-keyring-data",
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"signedIdentity": identity_requirement
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}
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```
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<!-- Later: other keyType values -->
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Exactly one of `keyPath`, `keyPaths` and `keyData` must be present, containing a GPG keyring of one or more public keys. Only signatures made by these keys are accepted.
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The `signedIdentity` field, a JSON object, specifies what image identity the signature claims about the image.
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One of the following alternatives are supported:
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- The identity in the signature must exactly match the image identity. Note that with this, referencing an image by digest (with a signature claiming a _repository_`:`_tag_ identity) will fail.
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```json
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{"type":"matchExact"}
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```
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- If the image identity carries a tag, the identity in the signature must exactly match;
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if the image identity uses a digest reference, the identity in the signature must be in the same repository as the image identity (using any tag).
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(Note that with images identified using digest references, the digest from the reference is validated even before signature verification starts.)
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```json
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{"type":"matchRepoDigestOrExact"}
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```
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- The identity in the signature must be in the same repository as the image identity. This is useful e.g. to pull an image using the `:latest` tag when the image is signed with a tag specifying an exact image version.
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```json
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{"type":"matchRepository"}
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```
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- The identity in the signature must exactly match a specified identity.
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This is useful e.g. when locally mirroring images signed using their public identity.
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```js
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{
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"type": "exactReference",
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"dockerReference": docker_reference_value
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}
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```
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- The identity in the signature must be in the same repository as a specified identity.
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This combines the properties of `matchRepository` and `exactReference`.
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```js
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{
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"type": "exactRepository",
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"dockerRepository": docker_repository_value
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}
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```
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- Prefix remapping:
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If the image identity matches the specified prefix, that prefix is replaced by the specified “signed prefix”
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(otherwise it is used as unchanged and no remapping takes place);
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matching then follows the `matchRepoDigestOrExact` semantics documented above
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(i.e. if the image identity carries a tag, the identity in the signature must exactly match,
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if it uses a digest reference, the repository must match).
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The `prefix` and `signedPrefix` values can be either host[:port] values
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(matching exactly the same host[:port], string),
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repository namespaces, or repositories (i.e. they must not contain tags/digests),
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and match as prefixes *of the fully expanded form*.
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For example, `docker.io/library/busybox` (*not* `busybox`) to specify that single repository,
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or `docker.io/library` (not an empty string) to specify the parent namespace of `docker.io/library/busybox`==`busybox`).
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The `prefix` value is usually the same as the scope containing the parent `signedBy` requirement.
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```js
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{
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"type": "remapIdentity",
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"prefix": prefix,
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"signedPrefix": prefix,
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}
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```
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If the `signedIdentity` field is missing, it is treated as `matchRepoDigestOrExact`.
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*Note*: `matchExact`, `matchRepoDigestOrExact` and `matchRepository` can be only used if a Docker-like image identity is
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provided by the transport. In particular, the `dir:` and `oci:` transports can be only
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used with `exactReference` or `exactRepository`.
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<!-- ### `signedBaseLayer` -->
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### `sigstoreSigned`
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This requirement requires an image to be signed using a sigstore signature with an expected identity and key.
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```js
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{
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"type": "sigstoreSigned",
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"keyPath": "/path/to/local/public/key/file",
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"keyData": "base64-encoded-public-key-data",
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"fulcio": {
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"caPath": "/path/to/local/CA/file",
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"caData": "base64-encoded-CA-data",
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"oidcIssuer": "https://expected.OIDC.issuer/",
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"subjectEmail", "expected-signing-user@example.com",
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},
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"rekorPublicKeyPath": "/path/to/local/public/key/file",
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"rekorPublicKeyData": "base64-encoded-public-key-data",
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"signedIdentity": identity_requirement
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}
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```
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Exactly one of `keyPath`, `keyData` and `fulcio` must be present.
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If `keyPath` or `keyData` is present, it contains a sigstore public key.
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Only signatures made by this key are accepted.
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If `fulcio` is present, the signature must be based on a Fulcio-issued certificate.
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One of `caPath` and `caData` must be specified, containing the public key of the Fulcio instance.
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Both `oidcIssuer` and `subjectEmail` are mandatory,
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exactly specifying the expected identity provider,
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and the identity of the user obtaining the Fulcio certificate.
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At most one of `rekorPublicKeyPath` and `rekorPublicKeyData` can be present;
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it is mandatory if `fulcio` is specified.
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If a Rekor public key is specified,
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the signature must have been uploaded to a Rekor server
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and the signature must contain an (offline-verifiable) “signed entry timestamp”
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proving the existence of the Rekor log record,
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signed by the provided public key.
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The `signedIdentity` field has the same semantics as in the `signedBy` requirement described above.
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Note that `cosign`-created signatures only contain a repository, so only `matchRepository` and `exactRepository` can be used to accept them (and that does not protect against substitution of a signed image with an unexpected tag).
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To use this with images hosted on image registries, the `use-sigstore-attachments` option needs to be enabled for the relevant registry or repository in the client's containers-registries.d(5).
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## Examples
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It is *strongly* recommended to set the `default` policy to `reject`, and then
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selectively allow individual transports and scopes as desired.
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### A reasonably locked-down system
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(Note that the `/*`…`*/` comments are not valid in JSON, and must not be used in real policies.)
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```js
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{
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"default": [{"type": "reject"}], /* Reject anything not explicitly allowed */
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"transports": {
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"docker": {
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/* Allow installing images from a specific repository namespace, without cryptographic verification.
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This namespace includes images like openshift/hello-openshift and openshift/origin. */
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"docker.io/openshift": [{"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"}],
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/* Similarly, allow installing the “official” busybox images. Note how the fully expanded
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form, with the explicit /library/, must be used. */
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"docker.io/library/busybox": [{"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"}],
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/* Allow installing images from all subdomains */
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"*.temporary-project.example.com": [{"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"}],
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/* A sigstore-signed repository */
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"hostname:5000/myns/sigstore-signed-with-full-references": [
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{
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"type": "sigstoreSigned",
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"keyPath": "/path/to/sigstore-pubkey.pub"
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}
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],
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/* A sigstore-signed repository using the community Fulcio+Rekor servers.
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The community servers’ public keys can be obtained from
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https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore/tree/main/pkg/tuf/repository/targets . */
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"hostname:5000/myns/sigstore-signed-fulcio-rekor": [
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{
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"type": "sigstoreSigned",
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"fulcio": {
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"caPath": "/path/to/fulcio_v1.crt.pem",
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"oidcIssuer": "https://github.com/login/oauth",
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"subjectEmail": "test-user@example.com"
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},
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"rekorPublicKeyPath": "/path/to/rekor.pub",
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}
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],
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/* A sigstore-signed repository, accepts signatures by /usr/bin/cosign */
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"hostname:5000/myns/sigstore-signed-allows-malicious-tag-substitution": [
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{
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"type": "sigstoreSigned",
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"keyPath": "/path/to/sigstore-pubkey.pub",
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"signedIdentity": {"type": "matchRepository"}
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}
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],
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/* A sigstore-signed repository using the community Fulcio+Rekor servers,
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accepts signatures by /usr/bin/cosign.
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The community servers’ public keys can be obtained from
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https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore/tree/main/pkg/tuf/repository/targets . */
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"hostname:5000/myns/sigstore-signed-fulcio-rekor- allows-malicious-tag-substitution": [
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{
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"type": "sigstoreSigned",
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"fulcio": {
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"caPath": "/path/to/fulcio_v1.crt.pem",
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"oidcIssuer": "https://github.com/login/oauth",
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"subjectEmail": "test-user@example.com"
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},
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"rekorPublicKeyPath": "/path/to/rekor.pub",
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"signedIdentity": { "type": "matchRepository" }
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}
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]
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/* Other docker: images use the global default policy and are rejected */
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},
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"dir": {
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"": [{"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"}] /* Allow any images originating in local directories */
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},
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"atomic": {
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/* The common case: using a known key for a repository or set of repositories */
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"hostname:5000/myns/official": [
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{
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"type": "signedBy",
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"keyType": "GPGKeys",
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"keyPath": "/path/to/official-pubkey.gpg"
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}
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],
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/* A more complex example, for a repository which contains a mirror of a third-party product,
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which must be signed-off by local IT */
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"hostname:5000/vendor/product": [
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{ /* Require the image to be signed by the original vendor, using the vendor's repository location. */
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"type": "signedBy",
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"keyType": "GPGKeys",
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"keyPath": "/path/to/vendor-pubkey.gpg",
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"signedIdentity": {
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"type": "exactRepository",
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"dockerRepository": "vendor-hostname/product/repository"
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}
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},
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{ /* Require the image to _also_ be signed by a local reviewer. */
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"type": "signedBy",
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"keyType": "GPGKeys",
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"keyPath": "/path/to/reviewer-pubkey.gpg"
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}
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],
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/* A way to mirror many repositories from a single vendor */
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"private-mirror:5000/vendor-mirror": [
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{ /* Require the image to be signed by the original vendor, using the vendor's repository location.
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For example, private-mirror:5000/vendor-mirror/productA/image1:latest needs to be signed as
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vendor.example/productA/image1:latest . */
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"type": "signedBy",
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"keyType": "GPGKeys",
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"keyPath": "/path/to/vendor-pubkey.gpg",
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"signedIdentity": {
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"type": "remapIdentity",
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"prefix": "private-mirror:5000/vendor-mirror",
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"signedPrefix": "vendor.example.com"
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}
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}
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]
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|
}
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
}
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|
|
```
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|
### Completely disable security, allow all images, do not trust any signatures
|
|
|
|
|
|
```json
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
"default": [{"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"}]
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
```
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|
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## SEE ALSO
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|
|
atomic(1)
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|
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|
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## HISTORY
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|
|
August 2018, Rename to containers-policy.json(5) by Valentin Rothberg <vrothberg@suse.com>
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|
|
|
|
|
September 2016, Originally compiled by Miloslav Trmač <mitr@redhat.com>
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