diff --git a/SOURCES/tigervnc-dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device.patch b/SOURCES/tigervnc-dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3bf7dda --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/tigervnc-dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device.patch @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c +index b3d0926d..d36a096f 100644 +--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c ++++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c +@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ void vncPointerMove(int x, int y) + + void vncGetPointerPos(int *x, int *y) + { +- if (vncPointerDev != NULL) { ++ if (vncPointerDev != NULL && !IsFloating(vncPointerDev)) { + ScreenPtr ptrScreen; + + miPointerGetPosition(vncPointerDev, &cursorPosX, &cursorPosY); diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6816.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6816.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16b8468 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6816.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From 77e294797db17845808462b588d4e7a2130196bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:29:49 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: allocate enough space for logical button maps + +Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for +each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped +to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping. + +CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 3 +-- + dix/enterleave.c | 5 +++-- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c +index 5b77b1a444..2b05ac5f39 100644 +--- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c ++++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c +@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ ProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client) + if (pDev->button) { + int i; + +- rep.buttons_len = +- bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(pDev->button->numButtons)); ++ rep.buttons_len = bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(256)); /* button map up to 255 */ + rep.length += rep.buttons_len; + buttons = calloc(rep.buttons_len, 4); + if (!buttons) +diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c +index 867ec74363..ded8679d76 100644 +--- a/dix/enterleave.c ++++ b/dix/enterleave.c +@@ -784,8 +784,9 @@ DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail, + + mouse = IsFloating(dev) ? dev : GetMaster(dev, MASTER_POINTER); + +- /* XI 2 event */ +- btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(mouse->button->numButtons) : 0; ++ /* XI 2 event contains the logical button map - maps are CARD8 ++ * so we need 256 bits for the possibly maximum mapping */ ++ btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(256) : 0; + btlen = bytes_to_int32(btlen); + len = sizeof(xXIFocusInEvent) + btlen * 4; + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..30cc694 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +From 45ea0a93934c8a3760a4d68ba4ffc932375f60de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:27:50 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] dix: Allocate sufficient xEvents for our + DeviceStateNotify + +If a device has both a button class and a key class and numButtons is +zero, we can get an OOB write due to event under-allocation. + +This function seems to assume a device has either keys or buttons, not +both. It has two virtually identical code paths, both of which assume +they're applying to the first event in the sequence. + +A device with both a key and button class triggered a logic bug - only +one xEvent was allocated but the deviceStateNotify pointer was pushed on +once per type. So effectively this logic code: + + int count = 1; + if (button && nbuttons > 32) count++; + if (key && nbuttons > 0) count++; + if (key && nkeys > 32) count++; // this is basically always true + // count is at 2 for our keys + zero button device + + ev = alloc(count * sizeof(xEvent)); + FixDeviceStateNotify(ev); + if (button) + FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); + if (key) + FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); // santa drops into the wrong chimney here + +If the device has more than 3 valuators, the OOB is pushed back - we're +off by one so it will happen when the last deviceValuator event is +written instead. + +Fix this by allocating the maximum number of events we may allocate. +Note that the current behavior is not protocol-correct anyway, this +patch fixes only the allocation issue. + +Note that this issue does not trigger if the device has at least one +button. While the server does not prevent a button class with zero +buttons, it is very unlikely. + +CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c +index ded8679d76..17964b00a4 100644 +--- a/dix/enterleave.c ++++ b/dix/enterleave.c +@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static void + DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + { + int evcount = 1; +- deviceStateNotify *ev, *sev; ++ deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3]; ++ deviceStateNotify *ev; + deviceKeyStateNotify *kev; + deviceButtonStateNotify *bev; + +@@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + } + } + +- sev = ev = xallocarray(evcount, sizeof(xEvent)); ++ ev = sev; + FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first); + + if (b != NULL) { +@@ -770,7 +771,6 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + + DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount, + DeviceStateNotifyMask, NullGrab); +- free(sev); + } + + void +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ec784ed --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +From 4c7a16b089b721b9c07f4ed593deba4f22158dbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 12:26:20 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/2] dix: fix DeviceStateNotify event calculation + +The previous code only made sense if one considers buttons and keys to +be mutually exclusive on a device. That is not necessarily true, causing +a number of issues. + +This function allocates and fills in the number of xEvents we need to +send the device state down the wire. This is split across multiple +32-byte devices including one deviceStateNotify event and optional +deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify and (possibly multiple) +deviceValuator events. + +The previous behavior would instead compose a sequence +of [state, buttonstate, state, keystate, valuator...]. This is not +protocol correct, and on top of that made the code extremely convoluted. + +Fix this by streamlining: add both button and key into the deviceStateNotify +and then append the key state and button state, followed by the +valuators. Finally, the deviceValuator events contain up to 6 valuators +per event but we only ever sent through 3 at a time. Let's double that +troughput. + +CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + dix/enterleave.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- + 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c +index 17964b00a4..7b7ba1098b 100644 +--- a/dix/enterleave.c ++++ b/dix/enterleave.c +@@ -615,9 +615,15 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v, + + ev->type = DeviceValuator; + ev->deviceid = dev->id; +- ev->num_valuators = nval < 3 ? nval : 3; ++ ev->num_valuators = nval < 6 ? nval : 6; + ev->first_valuator = first; + switch (ev->num_valuators) { ++ case 6: ++ ev->valuator5 = v->axisVal[first + 5]; ++ case 5: ++ ev->valuator4 = v->axisVal[first + 4]; ++ case 4: ++ ev->valuator3 = v->axisVal[first + 3]; + case 3: + ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2]; + case 2: +@@ -626,7 +632,6 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v, + ev->valuator0 = v->axisVal[first]; + break; + } +- first += ev->num_valuators; + } + + static void +@@ -646,7 +651,7 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k, + ev->num_buttons = b->numButtons; + memcpy((char *) ev->buttons, (char *) b->down, 4); + } +- else if (k) { ++ if (k) { + ev->classes_reported |= (1 << KeyClass); + ev->num_keys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - + k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code; +@@ -670,15 +675,26 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k, + } + } + +- ++/** ++ * The device state notify event is split across multiple 32-byte events. ++ * The first one contains the first 32 button state bits, the first 32 ++ * key state bits, and the first 3 valuator values. ++ * ++ * If a device has more than that, the server sends out: ++ * - one deviceButtonStateNotify for buttons 32 and above ++ * - one deviceKeyStateNotify for keys 32 and above ++ * - one deviceValuator event per 6 valuators above valuator 4 ++ * ++ * All events but the last one have the deviceid binary ORed with MORE_EVENTS, ++ */ + static void + DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + { ++ /* deviceStateNotify, deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify ++ * and one deviceValuator for each 6 valuators */ ++ deviceStateNotify sev[3 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 6)/6]; + int evcount = 1; +- deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3]; +- deviceStateNotify *ev; +- deviceKeyStateNotify *kev; +- deviceButtonStateNotify *bev; ++ deviceStateNotify *ev = sev; + + KeyClassPtr k; + ButtonClassPtr b; +@@ -691,82 +707,49 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) + + if ((b = dev->button) != NULL) { + nbuttons = b->numButtons; +- if (nbuttons > 32) ++ if (nbuttons > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */ + evcount++; + } + if ((k = dev->key) != NULL) { + nkeys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code; +- if (nkeys > 32) ++ if (nkeys > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */ + evcount++; +- if (nbuttons > 0) { +- evcount++; +- } + } + if ((v = dev->valuator) != NULL) { + nval = v->numAxes; +- +- if (nval > 3) +- evcount++; +- if (nval > 6) { +- if (!(k && b)) +- evcount++; +- if (nval > 9) +- evcount += ((nval - 7) / 3); +- } ++ /* first three are encoded in deviceStateNotify, then ++ * it's 6 per deviceValuator event */ ++ evcount += ((nval - 3) + 6)/6; + } + +- ev = sev; +- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first); ++ BUG_RETURN(evcount <= ARRAY_SIZE(sev)); + +- if (b != NULL) { +- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, b, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- if (nbuttons > 32) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ev++; +- bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify; +- bev->deviceid = dev->id; +- memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4], +- DOWN_LENGTH - 4); +- } +- if (nval > 0) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- } ++ FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, k, b, v, first); ++ ++ if (b != NULL && nbuttons > 32) { ++ deviceButtonStateNotify *bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ++ev; ++ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; ++ bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify; ++ bev->deviceid = dev->id; ++ memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4], ++ DOWN_LENGTH - 4); + } + +- if (k != NULL) { +- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, k, NULL, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- if (nkeys > 32) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ev++; +- kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify; +- kev->deviceid = dev->id; +- memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28); +- } +- if (nval > 0) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- } ++ if (k != NULL && nkeys > 32) { ++ deviceKeyStateNotify *kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ++ev; ++ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; ++ kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify; ++ kev->deviceid = dev->id; ++ memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28); + } + ++ first = 3; ++ nval -= 3; + while (nval > 0) { +- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, NULL, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- if (nval > 0) { +- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; +- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first); +- first += 3; +- nval -= 3; +- } ++ ev->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; ++ FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ++ev, v, first); ++ first += 6; ++ nval -= 6; + } + + DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount, +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9f7ae1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 061eb684996627347acdf87ec11d108cedee71b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 13:48:10 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: when creating a new ButtonClass, set the number + of buttons + +There's a racy sequence where a master device may copy the button class +from the slave, without ever initializing numButtons. This leads to a +device with zero buttons but a button class which is invalid. + +Let's copy the numButtons value from the source - by definition if we +don't have a button class yet we do not have any other slave devices +with more than this number of buttons anyway. + +CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + Xi/exevents.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c +index 54ea11a938..e161714682 100644 +--- a/Xi/exevents.c ++++ b/Xi/exevents.c +@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to) + to->button = calloc(1, sizeof(ButtonClassRec)); + if (!to->button) + FatalError("[Xi] no memory for class shift.\n"); ++ to->button->numButtons = from->button->numButtons; + } + else + classes->button = NULL; +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21885.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21885.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9da09b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21885.patch @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +From a483b5c7724469309e3df427730cbb8b805b9c9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:01:24 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: flush hierarchy events after adding/removing + master devices + +The `XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent()` function allocates space to store up +to `MAXDEVICES` (256) `xXIHierarchyInfo` structures in `info`. + +If a device with a given ID was removed and a new device with the same +ID added both in the same operation, the single device ID will lead to +two info structures being written to `info`. + +Since this case can occur for every device ID at once, a total of two +times `MAXDEVICES` info structures might be written to the allocation. + +To avoid it, once one add/remove master is processed, send out the +device hierarchy event for the current state and continue. That event +thus only ever has exactly one of either added/removed in it (and +optionally slave attached/detached). + +CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c +index 01eb7a8af4..67eedddec6 100644 +--- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c ++++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c +@@ -340,6 +340,11 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */ + int rc = Success; + int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 }; ++ enum { ++ NO_CHANGE, ++ FLUSH, ++ CHANGED, ++ } changes = NO_CHANGE; + + REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq); +@@ -389,8 +394,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + rc = add_master(client, c, flags); + if (rc != Success) + goto unwind; +- } ++ changes = FLUSH; + break; ++ } + case XIRemoveMaster: + { + xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any; +@@ -399,8 +405,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + rc = remove_master(client, r, flags); + if (rc != Success) + goto unwind; +- } ++ changes = FLUSH; + break; ++ } + case XIDetachSlave: + { + xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any; +@@ -409,8 +416,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags); + if (rc != Success) + goto unwind; +- } ++ changes = CHANGED; + break; ++ } + case XIAttachSlave: + { + xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any; +@@ -495,16 +503,25 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) + rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags); + if (rc != Success) + goto unwind; ++ changes = CHANGED; ++ break; + } ++ default: + break; + } + ++ if (changes == FLUSH) { ++ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags); ++ memset(flags, 0, sizeof(flags)); ++ changes = NO_CHANGE; ++ } ++ + len -= any->length * 4; + any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4); + } + + unwind: +- +- XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags); ++ if (changes != NO_CHANGE) ++ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags); + return rc; + } +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b6b0d8e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +From 4e0e99ef60f07757756913221847a26c71afc3e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= +Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 18:28:31 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Xi: do not keep linked list pointer during recursion + +The `DisableDevice()` function is called whenever an enabled device +is disabled and it moves the device from the `inputInfo.devices` linked +list to the `inputInfo.off_devices` linked list. + +However, its link/unlink operation has an issue during the recursive +call to `DisableDevice()` due to the `prev` pointer pointing to a +removed device. + +This issue leads to a length mismatch between the total number of +devices and the number of device in the list, leading to a heap +overflow and, possibly, to local privilege escalation. + +Simplify the code that checked whether the device passed to +`DisableDevice()` was in `inputInfo.devices` or not and find the +previous device after the recursion. + +CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + dix/devices.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c +index 3f3224d62..3a64d8702 100644 +--- a/dix/devices.c ++++ b/dix/devices.c +@@ -451,14 +451,20 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) + { + DeviceIntPtr *prev, other; + BOOL enabled; ++ BOOL dev_in_devices_list = FALSE; + int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 }; + + if (!dev->enabled) + return TRUE; + +- for (prev = &inputInfo.devices; +- *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next); +- if (*prev != dev) ++ for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) { ++ if (other == dev) { ++ dev_in_devices_list = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (!dev_in_devices_list) + return FALSE; + + TouchEndPhysicallyActiveTouches(dev); +@@ -509,6 +515,9 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) + LeaveWindow(dev); + SetFocusOut(dev); + ++ for (prev = &inputInfo.devices; ++ *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next); ++ + *prev = dev->next; + dev->next = inputInfo.off_devices; + inputInfo.off_devices = dev; +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0703388 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 1a5e3c3e68d4f965077ea6a40ba57cc0d5a4e8cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 09:40:27 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: when disabling a master, float disabled slaved + devices too + +Disabling a master device floats all slave devices but we didn't do this +to already-disabled slave devices. As a result those devices kept their +reference to the master device resulting in access to already freed +memory if the master device was removed before the corresponding slave +device. + +And to match this behavior, also forcibly reset that pointer during +CloseDownDevices(). + +Related to CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840 +--- + dix/devices.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c +index c7fa8fad69..87f4d4a213 100644 +--- a/dix/devices.c ++++ b/dix/devices.c +@@ -482,6 +482,13 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) + flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached; + } + } ++ ++ for (other = inputInfo.off_devices; other; other = other->next) { ++ if (!IsMaster(other) && GetMaster(other, MASTER_ATTACHED) == dev) { ++ AttachDevice(NULL, other, NULL); ++ flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached; ++ } ++ } + } + else { + for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) { +@@ -1088,6 +1095,11 @@ CloseDownDevices(void) + dev->master = NULL; + } + ++ for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) { ++ if (!IsMaster(dev) && !IsFloating(dev)) ++ dev->master = NULL; ++ } ++ + CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.devices); + CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.off_devices); + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2d723f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown.patch @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +From 1801fe0ac3926882d47d7e1ad6c0518a2cdffd41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Povilas Kanapickas +Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2021 18:11:07 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] dix: Fix use after free in input device shutdown + +This fixes access to freed heap memory via dev->master. E.g. when +running BarrierNotify.ReceivesNotifyEvents/7 test from +xorg-integration-tests: + +==24736==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address +0x619000065020 at pc 0x55c450e2b9cf bp 0x7fffc532fd20 sp 0x7fffc532fd10 +READ of size 4 at 0x619000065020 thread T0 + #0 0x55c450e2b9ce in GetMaster ../../../dix/devices.c:2722 + #1 0x55c450e9d035 in IsFloating ../../../dix/events.c:346 + #2 0x55c4513209c6 in GetDeviceUse ../../../Xi/xiquerydevice.c:525 +../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:95 + #4 0x55c450e3455c in RemoveDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1204 +../../../hw/xfree86/common/xf86Xinput.c:1142 + #6 0x55c450e17b04 in CloseDeviceList ../../../dix/devices.c:1038 + #7 0x55c450e1de85 in CloseDownDevices ../../../dix/devices.c:1068 + #8 0x55c450e837ef in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:302 + #9 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34 +(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564) + #11 0x55c450d0113d in _start (/usr/lib/xorg/Xorg+0x117713d) + +0x619000065020 is located 160 bytes inside of 912-byte region +[0x619000064f80,0x619000065310) +freed by thread T0 here: +(/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10d7cf) + #1 0x55c450e19f1c in CloseDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1014 + #2 0x55c450e343a4 in RemoveDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1186 +../../../hw/xfree86/common/xf86Xinput.c:1142 + #4 0x55c450e17b04 in CloseDeviceList ../../../dix/devices.c:1038 + #5 0x55c450e1de85 in CloseDownDevices ../../../dix/devices.c:1068 + #6 0x55c450e837ef in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:302 + #7 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34 +(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564) + +previously allocated by thread T0 here: +(/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10ddc6) + #1 0x55c450e1c57b in AddInputDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:259 + #2 0x55c450e34840 in AllocDevicePair ../../../dix/devices.c:2755 + #3 0x55c45130318f in add_master ../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:152 +../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:465 + #5 0x55c4512cb9f5 in ProcIDispatch ../../../Xi/extinit.c:390 + #6 0x55c450e6a92b in Dispatch ../../../dix/dispatch.c:551 + #7 0x55c450e834b7 in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:272 + #8 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34 +(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564) + +The problem is caused by dev->master being not reset when disabling the +device, which then causes dangling pointer when the master device itself +is being deleted when exiting whole server. + +Note that RecalculateMasterButtons() requires dev->master to be still +valid, so we can reset it only at the end of function. + +Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas +--- + dix/devices.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c +index e62c34c55..5f9ce1678 100644 +--- a/dix/devices.c ++++ b/dix/devices.c +@@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) + } + + RecalculateMasterButtons(dev); ++ dev->master = NULL; + + return TRUE; + } +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SPECS/tigervnc.spec b/SPECS/tigervnc.spec index 4f521dc..d7fd002 100644 --- a/SPECS/tigervnc.spec +++ b/SPECS/tigervnc.spec @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Name: tigervnc Version: 1.13.1 -Release: 3%{?dist}.3 +Release: 3%{?dist}.6 Summary: A TigerVNC remote display system %global _hardened_build 1 @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ Patch2: tigervnc-vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service.patch # Upstream patches +# Upstreamable patches +Patch50: tigervnc-dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device.patch + # This is tigervnc-%%{version}/unix/xserver116.patch rebased on the latest xorg Patch100: tigervnc-xserver120.patch # 1326867 - [RHEL7.3] GLX applications in an Xvnc session fails to start @@ -37,6 +40,16 @@ Patch200: xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch Patch201: xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch Patch202: xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch Patch203: xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch +Patch204: xorg-CVE-2023-6816.patch +Patch205: xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1.patch +Patch206: xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2.patch +Patch207: xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3.patch +Patch208: xorg-CVE-2024-21885.patch +Patch209: xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1.patch +Patch210: xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2.patch +# Related to CVE-2024-21886 +Patch211: xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown.patch + BuildRequires: make BuildRequires: gcc-c++ @@ -195,6 +208,14 @@ done %patch201 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-5380 %patch202 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-6377 %patch203 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-6478 +%patch204 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-6816 +%patch205 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1 +%patch206 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2 +%patch207 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3 +%patch208 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-21885 +%patch209 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1 +%patch210 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2 +%patch211 -p1 -b .xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown popd %patch1 -p1 -b .use-gnome-as-default-session @@ -202,6 +223,9 @@ popd # Upstream patches +# Upstreamable patches +%patch50 -p1 -b .dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device + %build %ifarch sparcv9 sparc64 s390 s390x export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fPIC" @@ -383,6 +407,26 @@ fi %ghost %verify(not md5 size mode mtime) %{_sharedstatedir}/selinux/%{selinuxtype}/active/modules/200/%{modulename} %changelog +* Thu Jan 25 2024 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.6 +- Fix use after free related to CVE-2024-21886 + Resolves: RHEL-20435 +- Fix copy/paste error in the DeviceStateNotify + Resolves: RHEL-20586 + +* Fri Jan 19 2024 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.5 +- Don't try to get pointer position when the pointer becomes a floating device + Resolves: RHEL-20435 + +* Fri Jan 12 2024 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.4 +- Fix CVE-2024-21886 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: heap buffer overflow in DisableDevice + Resolves: RHEL-20435 +- Fix CVE-2024-21885 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: heap buffer overflow in XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent + Resolves: RHEL-20424 +- Fix CVE-2024-0229 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: reattaching to different master device may lead to out-of-bounds memory access + Resolves: RHEL-20586 +- Fix CVE-2023-6816 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overflow in DeviceFocusEvent and ProcXIQueryPointer + Resolves: RHEL-21247 + * Wed Dec 13 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.3 - Updated fix for CVE-2023-6377 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory reads/writes in XKB button actions Resolves: RHEL-18413 @@ -392,7 +436,7 @@ fi Resolves: RHEL-18413 Resolves: RHEL-18425 -* Wed Dec 07 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.1 +* Thu Dec 07 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.1 - Fix CVE-2023-6377 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory reads/writes in XKB button actions Resolves: RHEL-18413 - Fix CVE-2023-6478 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory read in RRChangeOutputProperty and RRChangeProviderProperty