From eb6cef2f9bb13799ffe4c38d587af289c0a93009 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: MSVSphere Packaging Team Date: Wed, 1 May 2024 04:04:58 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] import tigervnc-1.13.1-8.el9_4.3 --- ...support-username-alias-in-plainusers.patch | 135 +++++++++++ ...se-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd.patch | 17 ++ SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch | 80 ------- SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch | 99 -------- SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch | 74 ------ SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch | 59 ----- SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6816.patch | 51 ----- SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1.patch | 84 ------- SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2.patch | 216 ------------------ SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3.patch | 37 --- SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-followup.patch | 32 +++ SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21885.patch | 109 --------- SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1.patch | 70 ------ SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2.patch | 53 ----- SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31080.patch | 45 ++++ SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31081.patch | 43 ++++ SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31082.patch | 47 ++++ SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup.patch | 72 ++++++ SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083.patch | 112 +++++++++ ...-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown.patch | 77 ------- SPECS/tigervnc.spec | 131 ++++++----- 21 files changed, 567 insertions(+), 1076 deletions(-) create mode 100644 SOURCES/tigervnc-support-username-alias-in-plainusers.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/tigervnc-use-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6816.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-followup.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21885.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31080.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31081.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31082.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown.patch diff --git a/SOURCES/tigervnc-support-username-alias-in-plainusers.patch b/SOURCES/tigervnc-support-username-alias-in-plainusers.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..abf4eda --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/tigervnc-support-username-alias-in-plainusers.patch @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +diff --git a/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx b/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx +index 6f65e87..3142ba3 100644 +--- a/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx ++++ b/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx +@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ + #include + #if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__APPLE__) + #include ++#include ++#include + #endif + #ifdef WIN32 + #include +@@ -45,21 +47,22 @@ StringParameter PasswordValidator::plainUsers + + bool PasswordValidator::validUser(const char* username) + { +- CharArray users(plainUsers.getValueStr()), user; ++ std::vector users; + +- while (users.buf) { +- strSplit(users.buf, ',', &user.buf, &users.buf); +-#ifdef WIN32 +- if (0 == stricmp(user.buf, "*")) +- return true; +- if (0 == stricmp(user.buf, username)) +- return true; +-#else +- if (!strcmp(user.buf, "*")) +- return true; +- if (!strcmp(user.buf, username)) +- return true; ++ users = split(plainUsers, ','); ++ ++ for (size_t i = 0; i < users.size(); i++) { ++ if (users[i] == "*") ++ return true; ++#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__APPLE__) ++ if (users[i] == "%u") { ++ struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(username); ++ if (pw && pw->pw_uid == getuid()) ++ return true; ++ } + #endif ++ if (users[i] == username) ++ return true; + } + return false; + } +diff --git a/common/rfb/util.cxx b/common/rfb/util.cxx +index 649eb0b..cce73a0 100644 +--- a/common/rfb/util.cxx ++++ b/common/rfb/util.cxx +@@ -99,6 +99,26 @@ namespace rfb { + return false; + } + ++ std::vector split(const char* src, ++ const char delimiter) ++ { ++ std::vector out; ++ const char *start, *stop; ++ ++ start = src; ++ do { ++ stop = strchr(start, delimiter); ++ if (stop == NULL) { ++ out.push_back(start); ++ } else { ++ out.push_back(std::string(start, stop-start)); ++ start = stop + 1; ++ } ++ } while (stop != NULL); ++ ++ return out; ++ } ++ + bool strContains(const char* src, char c) { + int l=strlen(src); + for (int i=0; i + #include + ++#include ++#include ++ + struct timeval; + + #ifdef __GNUC__ +@@ -76,6 +79,10 @@ namespace rfb { + // that part of the string. Obviously, setting both to 0 is not useful... + bool strSplit(const char* src, const char limiter, char** out1, char** out2, bool fromEnd=false); + ++ // Splits a string with the specified delimiter ++ std::vector split(const char* src, ++ const char delimiter); ++ + // Returns true if src contains c + bool strContains(const char* src, char c); + +diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man b/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man +index c36ae34..78db730 100644 +--- a/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man ++++ b/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man +@@ -125,8 +125,8 @@ parameter instead. + .B \-PlainUsers \fIuser-list\fP + A comma separated list of user names that are allowed to authenticate via + any of the "Plain" security types (Plain, TLSPlain, etc.). Specify \fB*\fP +-to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Default is to +-deny all users. ++to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Specify \fB%u\fP ++to allow the user of the server process. Default is to deny all users. + . + .TP + .B \-pam_service \fIname\fP, \-PAMService \fIname\fP +diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man +index ea87dea..e9fb654 100644 +--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man ++++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man +@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ parameter instead. + .B \-PlainUsers \fIuser-list\fP + A comma separated list of user names that are allowed to authenticate via + any of the "Plain" security types (Plain, TLSPlain, etc.). Specify \fB*\fP +-to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Default is to +-deny all users. ++to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Specify \fB%u\fP ++to allow the user of the server process. Default is to deny all users. + . + .TP + .B \-pam_service \fIname\fP, \-PAMService \fIname\fP diff --git a/SOURCES/tigervnc-use-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd.patch b/SOURCES/tigervnc-use-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e0f794 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/tigervnc-use-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd.patch @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c +index f8141959..c5c36539 100644 +--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c ++++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c +@@ -366,8 +366,10 @@ ddxProcessArgument(int argc, char *argv[], int i) + if (strcmp(argv[i], "-inetd") == 0) { + int nullfd; + +- dup2(0, 3); +- vncInetdSock = 3; ++ if ((vncInetdSock = dup(0)) == -1) ++ FatalError ++ ("Xvnc error: failed to allocate a new file descriptor for -inetd: %s\n", strerror(errno)); ++ + + /* Avoid xserver >= 1.19's epoll-fd becoming fd 2 / stderr only to be + replaced by /dev/null by OsInit() because the pollfd is not diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 99625dd..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,80 +0,0 @@ -From a31ba141824a7649e11f0ef7673718ce559d6337 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend - -The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at -least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new -part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P -existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements -instead of N + P. - -Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old -values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially -uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes. -For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would -result in this 8 value array: - [N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P - ^OOB write - -The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in -both. - -CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer ---- - Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++-- - randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++-- - 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c -index 6ec419e870..563c4f31a5 100644 ---- a/Xi/xiproperty.c -+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c -@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type, - XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop); - return BadAlloc; - } -- new_value.size = len; -+ new_value.size = total_len; - new_value.type = type; - new_value.format = format; - -@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type, - case PropModePrepend: - new_data = new_value.data; - old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) + -- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes)); -+ (len * size_in_bytes)); - break; - } - if (new_data) -diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c -index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644 ---- a/randr/rrproperty.c -+++ b/randr/rrproperty.c -@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type, - RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop); - return BadAlloc; - } -- new_value.size = len; -+ new_value.size = total_len; - new_value.type = type; - new_value.format = format; - -@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type, - case PropModePrepend: - new_data = new_value.data; - old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) + -- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes)); -+ (len * size_in_bytes)); - break; - } - if (new_data) --- -2.41.0 - diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch deleted file mode 100644 index cbe9804..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,99 +0,0 @@ -From 004f461c440cb6611eefb48fbbb4fa53a6d49f80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 12:19:45 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] mi: reset the PointerWindows reference on screen - switch - -PointerWindows[] keeps a reference to the last window our sprite -entered - changes are usually handled by CheckMotion(). - -If we switch between screens via XWarpPointer our -dev->spriteInfo->sprite->win is set to the new screen's root window. -If there's another window at the cursor location CheckMotion() will -trigger the right enter/leave events later. If there is not, it skips -that process and we never trigger LeaveWindow() - PointerWindows[] for -the device still refers to the previous window. - -If that window is destroyed we have a dangling reference that will -eventually cause a use-after-free bug when checking the window hierarchy -later. - -To trigger this, we require: -- two protocol screens -- XWarpPointer to the other screen's root window -- XDestroyWindow before entering any other window - -This is a niche bug so we hack around it by making sure we reset the -PointerWindows[] entry so we cannot have a dangling pointer. This -doesn't handle Enter/Leave events correctly but the previous code didn't -either. - -CVE-2023-5380, ZDI-CAN-21608 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Sri working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer -Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson ---- - dix/enterleave.h | 2 -- - include/eventstr.h | 3 +++ - mi/mipointer.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- - 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/dix/enterleave.h b/dix/enterleave.h -index 4b833d8a3b..e8af924c68 100644 ---- a/dix/enterleave.h -+++ b/dix/enterleave.h -@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ extern void DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, - - extern void EnterWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win, int mode); - --extern void LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev); -- - extern void CoreFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr kbd, - int type, int mode, int detail, WindowPtr pWin); - -diff --git a/include/eventstr.h b/include/eventstr.h -index bf3b95fe4a..2bae3b0767 100644 ---- a/include/eventstr.h -+++ b/include/eventstr.h -@@ -296,4 +296,7 @@ union _InternalEvent { - #endif - }; - -+extern void -+LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev); -+ - #endif -diff --git a/mi/mipointer.c b/mi/mipointer.c -index 75be1aeeb8..b12ae9be1d 100644 ---- a/mi/mipointer.c -+++ b/mi/mipointer.c -@@ -397,8 +397,21 @@ miPointerWarpCursor(DeviceIntPtr pDev, ScreenPtr pScreen, int x, int y) - #ifdef PANORAMIX - && noPanoramiXExtension - #endif -- ) -- UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen); -+ ) { -+ DeviceIntPtr master = GetMaster(pDev, MASTER_POINTER); -+ /* Hack for CVE-2023-5380: if we're moving -+ * screens PointerWindows[] keeps referring to the -+ * old window. If that gets destroyed we have a UAF -+ * bug later. Only happens when jumping from a window -+ * to the root window on the other screen. -+ * Enter/Leave events are incorrect for that case but -+ * too niche to fix. -+ */ -+ LeaveWindow(pDev); -+ if (master) -+ LeaveWindow(master); -+ UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen); -+ } - } - - /** --- -2.41.0 - diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch deleted file mode 100644 index cf5e170..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -From 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons - -button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all -our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating -insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in -XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with, -leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies. - -CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative ---- - Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------ - dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c -index dcd4efb3bc..54ea11a938 100644 ---- a/Xi/exevents.c -+++ b/Xi/exevents.c -@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to) - } - - if (from->button->xkb_acts) { -- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) { -- to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction)); -- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) -- FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n"); -- } -+ size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons); -+ to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts, -+ maxbuttons, -+ sizeof(XkbAction)); -+ memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction)); - memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts, -- sizeof(XkbAction)); -+ from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction)); - } - else { - free(to->button->xkb_acts); -diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c -index b063128df0..3f3224d626 100644 ---- a/dix/devices.c -+++ b/dix/devices.c -@@ -2539,6 +2539,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave) - - if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) { - int i; -+ int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons; -+ - DeviceChangedEvent event = { - .header = ET_Internal, - .type = ET_DeviceChanged, -@@ -2549,6 +2551,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave) - }; - - master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons; -+ if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) { -+ master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts, -+ maxbuttons, -+ sizeof(XkbAction)); -+ memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons], -+ 0, -+ (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction)); -+ } - - memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons * - sizeof(Atom)); --- -GitLab diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d6bf8e1..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -From 3e0222fcae552685d423914a683c1709dc5f6d6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of - ProcRRChange*Property - -Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty. -See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core -protocol and XI. - -This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure. - -Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With -the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was -truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check. - -The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes -(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it -finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least -stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB. - -CVE-2023-XXXXX, ZDI-CAN-22561 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative ---- - randr/rrproperty.c | 2 +- - randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +- - 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c -index 25469f57b2..c4fef8a1f6 100644 ---- a/randr/rrproperty.c -+++ b/randr/rrproperty.c -@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client) - char format, mode; - unsigned long len; - int sizeInBytes; -- int totalSize; -+ uint64_t totalSize; - int err; - - REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq); -diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c -index b79c17f9bf..90c5a9a933 100644 ---- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c -+++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c -@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client) - char format, mode; - unsigned long len; - int sizeInBytes; -- int totalSize; -+ uint64_t totalSize; - int err; - - REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq); --- -2.43.0 - diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6816.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6816.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 16b8468..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6816.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -From 77e294797db17845808462b588d4e7a2130196bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:29:49 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: allocate enough space for logical button maps - -Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for -each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped -to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping. - -CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative ---- - Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 3 +-- - dix/enterleave.c | 5 +++-- - 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c -index 5b77b1a444..2b05ac5f39 100644 ---- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c -+++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c -@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ ProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client) - if (pDev->button) { - int i; - -- rep.buttons_len = -- bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(pDev->button->numButtons)); -+ rep.buttons_len = bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(256)); /* button map up to 255 */ - rep.length += rep.buttons_len; - buttons = calloc(rep.buttons_len, 4); - if (!buttons) -diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c -index 867ec74363..ded8679d76 100644 ---- a/dix/enterleave.c -+++ b/dix/enterleave.c -@@ -784,8 +784,9 @@ DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail, - - mouse = IsFloating(dev) ? dev : GetMaster(dev, MASTER_POINTER); - -- /* XI 2 event */ -- btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(mouse->button->numButtons) : 0; -+ /* XI 2 event contains the logical button map - maps are CARD8 -+ * so we need 256 bits for the possibly maximum mapping */ -+ btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(256) : 0; - btlen = bytes_to_int32(btlen); - len = sizeof(xXIFocusInEvent) + btlen * 4; - --- -2.43.0 - diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 30cc694..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,84 +0,0 @@ -From 45ea0a93934c8a3760a4d68ba4ffc932375f60de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:27:50 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] dix: Allocate sufficient xEvents for our - DeviceStateNotify - -If a device has both a button class and a key class and numButtons is -zero, we can get an OOB write due to event under-allocation. - -This function seems to assume a device has either keys or buttons, not -both. It has two virtually identical code paths, both of which assume -they're applying to the first event in the sequence. - -A device with both a key and button class triggered a logic bug - only -one xEvent was allocated but the deviceStateNotify pointer was pushed on -once per type. So effectively this logic code: - - int count = 1; - if (button && nbuttons > 32) count++; - if (key && nbuttons > 0) count++; - if (key && nkeys > 32) count++; // this is basically always true - // count is at 2 for our keys + zero button device - - ev = alloc(count * sizeof(xEvent)); - FixDeviceStateNotify(ev); - if (button) - FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); - if (key) - FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); // santa drops into the wrong chimney here - -If the device has more than 3 valuators, the OOB is pushed back - we're -off by one so it will happen when the last deviceValuator event is -written instead. - -Fix this by allocating the maximum number of events we may allocate. -Note that the current behavior is not protocol-correct anyway, this -patch fixes only the allocation issue. - -Note that this issue does not trigger if the device has at least one -button. While the server does not prevent a button class with zero -buttons, it is very unlikely. - -CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative ---- - dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++--- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c -index ded8679d76..17964b00a4 100644 ---- a/dix/enterleave.c -+++ b/dix/enterleave.c -@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static void - DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) - { - int evcount = 1; -- deviceStateNotify *ev, *sev; -+ deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3]; -+ deviceStateNotify *ev; - deviceKeyStateNotify *kev; - deviceButtonStateNotify *bev; - -@@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) - } - } - -- sev = ev = xallocarray(evcount, sizeof(xEvent)); -+ ev = sev; - FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first); - - if (b != NULL) { -@@ -770,7 +771,6 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) - - DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount, - DeviceStateNotifyMask, NullGrab); -- free(sev); - } - - void --- -2.43.0 - diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ec784ed..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,216 +0,0 @@ -From 4c7a16b089b721b9c07f4ed593deba4f22158dbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 12:26:20 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/2] dix: fix DeviceStateNotify event calculation - -The previous code only made sense if one considers buttons and keys to -be mutually exclusive on a device. That is not necessarily true, causing -a number of issues. - -This function allocates and fills in the number of xEvents we need to -send the device state down the wire. This is split across multiple -32-byte devices including one deviceStateNotify event and optional -deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify and (possibly multiple) -deviceValuator events. - -The previous behavior would instead compose a sequence -of [state, buttonstate, state, keystate, valuator...]. This is not -protocol correct, and on top of that made the code extremely convoluted. - -Fix this by streamlining: add both button and key into the deviceStateNotify -and then append the key state and button state, followed by the -valuators. Finally, the deviceValuator events contain up to 6 valuators -per event but we only ever sent through 3 at a time. Let's double that -troughput. - -CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative ---- - dix/enterleave.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- - 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c -index 17964b00a4..7b7ba1098b 100644 ---- a/dix/enterleave.c -+++ b/dix/enterleave.c -@@ -615,9 +615,15 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v, - - ev->type = DeviceValuator; - ev->deviceid = dev->id; -- ev->num_valuators = nval < 3 ? nval : 3; -+ ev->num_valuators = nval < 6 ? nval : 6; - ev->first_valuator = first; - switch (ev->num_valuators) { -+ case 6: -+ ev->valuator5 = v->axisVal[first + 5]; -+ case 5: -+ ev->valuator4 = v->axisVal[first + 4]; -+ case 4: -+ ev->valuator3 = v->axisVal[first + 3]; - case 3: - ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2]; - case 2: -@@ -626,7 +632,6 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v, - ev->valuator0 = v->axisVal[first]; - break; - } -- first += ev->num_valuators; - } - - static void -@@ -646,7 +651,7 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k, - ev->num_buttons = b->numButtons; - memcpy((char *) ev->buttons, (char *) b->down, 4); - } -- else if (k) { -+ if (k) { - ev->classes_reported |= (1 << KeyClass); - ev->num_keys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - - k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code; -@@ -670,15 +675,26 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k, - } - } - -- -+/** -+ * The device state notify event is split across multiple 32-byte events. -+ * The first one contains the first 32 button state bits, the first 32 -+ * key state bits, and the first 3 valuator values. -+ * -+ * If a device has more than that, the server sends out: -+ * - one deviceButtonStateNotify for buttons 32 and above -+ * - one deviceKeyStateNotify for keys 32 and above -+ * - one deviceValuator event per 6 valuators above valuator 4 -+ * -+ * All events but the last one have the deviceid binary ORed with MORE_EVENTS, -+ */ - static void - DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) - { -+ /* deviceStateNotify, deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify -+ * and one deviceValuator for each 6 valuators */ -+ deviceStateNotify sev[3 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 6)/6]; - int evcount = 1; -- deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3]; -- deviceStateNotify *ev; -- deviceKeyStateNotify *kev; -- deviceButtonStateNotify *bev; -+ deviceStateNotify *ev = sev; - - KeyClassPtr k; - ButtonClassPtr b; -@@ -691,82 +707,49 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win) - - if ((b = dev->button) != NULL) { - nbuttons = b->numButtons; -- if (nbuttons > 32) -+ if (nbuttons > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */ - evcount++; - } - if ((k = dev->key) != NULL) { - nkeys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code; -- if (nkeys > 32) -+ if (nkeys > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */ - evcount++; -- if (nbuttons > 0) { -- evcount++; -- } - } - if ((v = dev->valuator) != NULL) { - nval = v->numAxes; -- -- if (nval > 3) -- evcount++; -- if (nval > 6) { -- if (!(k && b)) -- evcount++; -- if (nval > 9) -- evcount += ((nval - 7) / 3); -- } -+ /* first three are encoded in deviceStateNotify, then -+ * it's 6 per deviceValuator event */ -+ evcount += ((nval - 3) + 6)/6; - } - -- ev = sev; -- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first); -+ BUG_RETURN(evcount <= ARRAY_SIZE(sev)); - -- if (b != NULL) { -- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, b, v, first); -- first += 3; -- nval -= 3; -- if (nbuttons > 32) { -- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; -- bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ev++; -- bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify; -- bev->deviceid = dev->id; -- memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4], -- DOWN_LENGTH - 4); -- } -- if (nval > 0) { -- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; -- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first); -- first += 3; -- nval -= 3; -- } -+ FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, k, b, v, first); -+ -+ if (b != NULL && nbuttons > 32) { -+ deviceButtonStateNotify *bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ++ev; -+ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; -+ bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify; -+ bev->deviceid = dev->id; -+ memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4], -+ DOWN_LENGTH - 4); - } - -- if (k != NULL) { -- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, k, NULL, v, first); -- first += 3; -- nval -= 3; -- if (nkeys > 32) { -- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; -- kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ev++; -- kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify; -- kev->deviceid = dev->id; -- memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28); -- } -- if (nval > 0) { -- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; -- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first); -- first += 3; -- nval -= 3; -- } -+ if (k != NULL && nkeys > 32) { -+ deviceKeyStateNotify *kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ++ev; -+ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; -+ kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify; -+ kev->deviceid = dev->id; -+ memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28); - } - -+ first = 3; -+ nval -= 3; - while (nval > 0) { -- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, NULL, v, first); -- first += 3; -- nval -= 3; -- if (nval > 0) { -- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; -- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first); -- first += 3; -- nval -= 3; -- } -+ ev->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS; -+ FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ++ev, v, first); -+ first += 6; -+ nval -= 6; - } - - DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount, --- -2.43.0 - diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d9f7ae1..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -From 061eb684996627347acdf87ec11d108cedee71b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 13:48:10 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: when creating a new ButtonClass, set the number - of buttons - -There's a racy sequence where a master device may copy the button class -from the slave, without ever initializing numButtons. This leads to a -device with zero buttons but a button class which is invalid. - -Let's copy the numButtons value from the source - by definition if we -don't have a button class yet we do not have any other slave devices -with more than this number of buttons anyway. - -CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative ---- - Xi/exevents.c | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - -diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c -index 54ea11a938..e161714682 100644 ---- a/Xi/exevents.c -+++ b/Xi/exevents.c -@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to) - to->button = calloc(1, sizeof(ButtonClassRec)); - if (!to->button) - FatalError("[Xi] no memory for class shift.\n"); -+ to->button->numButtons = from->button->numButtons; - } - else - classes->button = NULL; --- -2.43.0 - diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-followup.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-followup.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9ea651b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-followup.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From 133e0d651c5d12bf01999d6289e84e224ba77adc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 14:22:12 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] dix: fix valuator copy/paste error in the DeviceStateNotify + event + +Fixes 219c54b8a3337456ce5270ded6a67bcde53553d5 +--- + dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c +index 7b7ba1098b..c1e6ac600e 100644 +--- a/dix/enterleave.c ++++ b/dix/enterleave.c +@@ -619,11 +619,11 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v, + ev->first_valuator = first; + switch (ev->num_valuators) { + case 6: +- ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 5]; ++ ev->valuator5 = v->axisVal[first + 5]; + case 5: +- ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 4]; ++ ev->valuator4 = v->axisVal[first + 4]; + case 4: +- ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 3]; ++ ev->valuator3 = v->axisVal[first + 3]; + case 3: + ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2]; + case 2: +-- +GitLab diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21885.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21885.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b9da09b..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21885.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,109 +0,0 @@ -From a483b5c7724469309e3df427730cbb8b805b9c9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:01:24 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: flush hierarchy events after adding/removing - master devices - -The `XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent()` function allocates space to store up -to `MAXDEVICES` (256) `xXIHierarchyInfo` structures in `info`. - -If a device with a given ID was removed and a new device with the same -ID added both in the same operation, the single device ID will lead to -two info structures being written to `info`. - -Since this case can occur for every device ID at once, a total of two -times `MAXDEVICES` info structures might be written to the allocation. - -To avoid it, once one add/remove master is processed, send out the -device hierarchy event for the current state and continue. That event -thus only ever has exactly one of either added/removed in it (and -optionally slave attached/detached). - -CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative ---- - Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------ - 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c -index 01eb7a8af4..67eedddec6 100644 ---- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c -+++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c -@@ -340,6 +340,11 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) - size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */ - int rc = Success; - int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 }; -+ enum { -+ NO_CHANGE, -+ FLUSH, -+ CHANGED, -+ } changes = NO_CHANGE; - - REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq); - REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq); -@@ -389,8 +394,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) - rc = add_master(client, c, flags); - if (rc != Success) - goto unwind; -- } -+ changes = FLUSH; - break; -+ } - case XIRemoveMaster: - { - xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any; -@@ -399,8 +405,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) - rc = remove_master(client, r, flags); - if (rc != Success) - goto unwind; -- } -+ changes = FLUSH; - break; -+ } - case XIDetachSlave: - { - xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any; -@@ -409,8 +416,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) - rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags); - if (rc != Success) - goto unwind; -- } -+ changes = CHANGED; - break; -+ } - case XIAttachSlave: - { - xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any; -@@ -495,16 +503,25 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) - rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags); - if (rc != Success) - goto unwind; -+ changes = CHANGED; -+ break; - } -+ default: - break; - } - -+ if (changes == FLUSH) { -+ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags); -+ memset(flags, 0, sizeof(flags)); -+ changes = NO_CHANGE; -+ } -+ - len -= any->length * 4; - any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4); - } - - unwind: -- -- XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags); -+ if (changes != NO_CHANGE) -+ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags); - return rc; - } --- -2.43.0 - diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b6b0d8e..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ -From 4e0e99ef60f07757756913221847a26c71afc3e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= -Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 18:28:31 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Xi: do not keep linked list pointer during recursion - -The `DisableDevice()` function is called whenever an enabled device -is disabled and it moves the device from the `inputInfo.devices` linked -list to the `inputInfo.off_devices` linked list. - -However, its link/unlink operation has an issue during the recursive -call to `DisableDevice()` due to the `prev` pointer pointing to a -removed device. - -This issue leads to a length mismatch between the total number of -devices and the number of device in the list, leading to a heap -overflow and, possibly, to local privilege escalation. - -Simplify the code that checked whether the device passed to -`DisableDevice()` was in `inputInfo.devices` or not and find the -previous device after the recursion. - -CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative ---- - dix/devices.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- - 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c -index 3f3224d62..3a64d8702 100644 ---- a/dix/devices.c -+++ b/dix/devices.c -@@ -451,14 +451,20 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) - { - DeviceIntPtr *prev, other; - BOOL enabled; -+ BOOL dev_in_devices_list = FALSE; - int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 }; - - if (!dev->enabled) - return TRUE; - -- for (prev = &inputInfo.devices; -- *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next); -- if (*prev != dev) -+ for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) { -+ if (other == dev) { -+ dev_in_devices_list = TRUE; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (!dev_in_devices_list) - return FALSE; - - TouchEndPhysicallyActiveTouches(dev); -@@ -509,6 +515,9 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) - LeaveWindow(dev); - SetFocusOut(dev); - -+ for (prev = &inputInfo.devices; -+ *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next); -+ - *prev = dev->next; - dev->next = inputInfo.off_devices; - inputInfo.off_devices = dev; --- -2.43.0 - diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0703388..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -From 1a5e3c3e68d4f965077ea6a40ba57cc0d5a4e8cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Peter Hutterer -Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 09:40:27 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: when disabling a master, float disabled slaved - devices too - -Disabling a master device floats all slave devices but we didn't do this -to already-disabled slave devices. As a result those devices kept their -reference to the master device resulting in access to already freed -memory if the master device was removed before the corresponding slave -device. - -And to match this behavior, also forcibly reset that pointer during -CloseDownDevices(). - -Related to CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840 ---- - dix/devices.c | 12 ++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c -index c7fa8fad69..87f4d4a213 100644 ---- a/dix/devices.c -+++ b/dix/devices.c -@@ -482,6 +482,13 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) - flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached; - } - } -+ -+ for (other = inputInfo.off_devices; other; other = other->next) { -+ if (!IsMaster(other) && GetMaster(other, MASTER_ATTACHED) == dev) { -+ AttachDevice(NULL, other, NULL); -+ flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached; -+ } -+ } - } - else { - for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) { -@@ -1088,6 +1095,11 @@ CloseDownDevices(void) - dev->master = NULL; - } - -+ for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) { -+ if (!IsMaster(dev) && !IsFloating(dev)) -+ dev->master = NULL; -+ } -+ - CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.devices); - CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.off_devices); - --- -2.43.0 - diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31080.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31080.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a64c75 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31080.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From 96798fc1967491c80a4d0c8d9e0a80586cb2152b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith +Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 18:51:45 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Xi: ProcXIGetSelectedEvents needs to use unswapped length + to send reply + +CVE-2024-31080 + +Reported-by: https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=69762 +Fixes: 53e821ab4 ("Xi: add request processing for XIGetSelectedEvents.") +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith +Part-of: +--- + Xi/xiselectev.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xiselectev.c b/Xi/xiselectev.c +index edcb8a0d3..ac1494987 100644 +--- a/Xi/xiselectev.c ++++ b/Xi/xiselectev.c +@@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ ProcXIGetSelectedEvents(ClientPtr client) + InputClientsPtr others = NULL; + xXIEventMask *evmask = NULL; + DeviceIntPtr dev; ++ uint32_t length; + + REQUEST(xXIGetSelectedEventsReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIGetSelectedEventsReq); +@@ -418,10 +419,12 @@ ProcXIGetSelectedEvents(ClientPtr client) + } + } + ++ /* save the value before SRepXIGetSelectedEvents swaps it */ ++ length = reply.length; + WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(xXIGetSelectedEventsReply), &reply); + + if (reply.num_masks) +- WriteToClient(client, reply.length * 4, buffer); ++ WriteToClient(client, length * 4, buffer); + + free(buffer); + return Success; +-- +2.44.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31081.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31081.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e061f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31081.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 3e77295f888c67fc7645db5d0c00926a29ffecee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith +Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 18:56:27 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Xi: ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice needs to use unswapped length + to send reply + +CVE-2024-31081 + +Fixes: d220d6907 ("Xi: add GrabButton and GrabKeysym code.") +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith +Part-of: +--- + Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c +index c9ac2f855..896233bec 100644 +--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c ++++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c +@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) + GrabParameters param; + void *tmp; + int mask_len; ++ uint32_t length; + + REQUEST(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq); + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq, +@@ -247,9 +248,11 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) + } + } + ++ /* save the value before SRepXIPassiveGrabDevice swaps it */ ++ length = rep.length; + WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(rep), &rep); + if (rep.num_modifiers) +- WriteToClient(client, rep.length * 4, modifiers_failed); ++ WriteToClient(client, length * 4, modifiers_failed); + + out: + free(modifiers_failed); +-- +2.44.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31082.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31082.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df0a498 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31082.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 6c684d035c06fd41c727f0ef0744517580864cef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith +Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 19:07:34 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Xquartz: ProcAppleDRICreatePixmap needs to use unswapped + length to send reply + +CVE-2024-31082 + +Fixes: 14205ade0 ("XQuartz: appledri: Fix byte swapping in replies") +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith +Part-of: +--- + hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c b/hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c +index 77574655b..40422b61a 100644 +--- a/hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c ++++ b/hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c +@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ ProcAppleDRICreatePixmap(ClientPtr client) + xAppleDRICreatePixmapReply rep; + int width, height, pitch, bpp; + void *ptr; ++ CARD32 stringLength; + + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xAppleDRICreatePixmapReq); + +@@ -307,6 +308,7 @@ ProcAppleDRICreatePixmap(ClientPtr client) + if (sizeof(rep) != sz_xAppleDRICreatePixmapReply) + ErrorF("error sizeof(rep) is %zu\n", sizeof(rep)); + ++ stringLength = rep.stringLength; /* save unswapped value */ + if (client->swapped) { + swaps(&rep.sequenceNumber); + swapl(&rep.length); +@@ -319,7 +321,7 @@ ProcAppleDRICreatePixmap(ClientPtr client) + } + + WriteToClient(client, sizeof(rep), &rep); +- WriteToClient(client, rep.stringLength, path); ++ WriteToClient(client, stringLength, path); + + return Success; + } +-- +2.44.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..549f90a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup.patch @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +From 337d8d48b618d4fc0168a7b978be4c3447650b04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 15:24:49 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] render: Avoid possible double-free in ProcRenderAddGlyphs() + +ProcRenderAddGlyphs() adds the glyph to the glyphset using AddGlyph() and +then frees it using FreeGlyph() to decrease the reference count, after +AddGlyph() has increased it. + +AddGlyph() however may chose to reuse an existing glyph if it's already +in the glyphSet, and free the glyph that was given, in which case the +caller function, ProcRenderAddGlyphs() will call FreeGlyph() on an +already freed glyph, as reported by ASan: + + READ of size 4 thread T0 + #0 in FreeGlyph xserver/render/glyph.c:252 + #1 in ProcRenderAddGlyphs xserver/render/render.c:1174 + #2 in Dispatch xserver/dix/dispatch.c:546 + #3 in dix_main xserver/dix/main.c:271 + #4 in main xserver/dix/stubmain.c:34 + #5 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 + #6 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 + #7 (/usr/bin/Xwayland+0x44fe4) + Address is located 0 bytes inside of 64-byte region + freed by thread T0 here: + #0 in __interceptor_free libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:52 + #1 in _dixFreeObjectWithPrivates xserver/dix/privates.c:538 + #2 in AddGlyph xserver/render/glyph.c:295 + #3 in ProcRenderAddGlyphs xserver/render/render.c:1173 + #4 in Dispatch xserver/dix/dispatch.c:546 + #5 in dix_main xserver/dix/main.c:271 + #6 in main xserver/dix/stubmain.c:34 + #7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 + previously allocated by thread T0 here: + #0 in __interceptor_malloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69 + #1 in AllocateGlyph xserver/render/glyph.c:355 + #2 in ProcRenderAddGlyphs xserver/render/render.c:1085 + #3 in Dispatch xserver/dix/dispatch.c:546 + #4 in dix_main xserver/dix/main.c:271 + #5 in main xserver/dix/stubmain.c:34 + #6 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 + SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free xserver/render/glyph.c:252 in FreeGlyph + +To avoid that, make sure not to free the given glyph in AddGlyph(). + +v2: Simplify the test using the boolean returned from AddGlyph() (Michel) +v3: Simplify even more by not freeing the glyph in AddGlyph() (Peter) + +Fixes: bdca6c3d1 - render: fix refcounting of glyphs during ProcRenderAddGlyphs +Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/issues/1659 +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Part-of: +--- + render/glyph.c | 2 -- + 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/render/glyph.c b/render/glyph.c +index 13991f8a1..5fa7f3b5b 100644 +--- a/render/glyph.c ++++ b/render/glyph.c +@@ -291,8 +291,6 @@ AddGlyph(GlyphSetPtr glyphSet, GlyphPtr glyph, Glyph id) + gr = FindGlyphRef(&globalGlyphs[glyphSet->fdepth], signature, + TRUE, glyph->sha1); + if (gr->glyph && gr->glyph != DeletedGlyph && gr->glyph != glyph) { +- FreeGlyphPicture(glyph); +- dixFreeObjectWithPrivates(glyph, PRIVATE_GLYPH); + glyph = gr->glyph; + } + else if (gr->glyph != glyph) { +-- +2.44.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dcbf337 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083.patch @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +From bdca6c3d1f5057eeb31609b1280fc93237b00c77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 13:13:35 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH 4/4] render: fix refcounting of glyphs during + ProcRenderAddGlyphs + +Previously, AllocateGlyph would return a new glyph with refcount=0 and a +re-used glyph would end up not changing the refcount at all. The +resulting glyph_new array would thus have multiple entries pointing to +the same non-refcounted glyphs. + +AddGlyph may free a glyph, resulting in a UAF when the same glyph +pointer is then later used. + +Fix this by returning a refcount of 1 for a new glyph and always +incrementing the refcount for a re-used glyph, followed by dropping that +refcount back down again when we're done with it. + +CVE-2024-31083, ZDI-CAN-22880 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Part-of: +--- + render/glyph.c | 5 +++-- + render/glyphstr_priv.h | 1 + + render/render.c | 15 +++++++++++---- + 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/render/glyph.c b/render/glyph.c +index 850ea8440..13991f8a1 100644 +--- a/render/glyph.c ++++ b/render/glyph.c +@@ -245,10 +245,11 @@ FreeGlyphPicture(GlyphPtr glyph) + } + } + +-static void ++void + FreeGlyph(GlyphPtr glyph, int format) + { + CheckDuplicates(&globalGlyphs[format], "FreeGlyph"); ++ BUG_RETURN(glyph->refcnt == 0); + if (--glyph->refcnt == 0) { + GlyphRefPtr gr; + int i; +@@ -354,7 +355,7 @@ AllocateGlyph(xGlyphInfo * gi, int fdepth) + glyph = (GlyphPtr) malloc(size); + if (!glyph) + return 0; +- glyph->refcnt = 0; ++ glyph->refcnt = 1; + glyph->size = size + sizeof(xGlyphInfo); + glyph->info = *gi; + dixInitPrivates(glyph, (char *) glyph + head_size, PRIVATE_GLYPH); +diff --git a/render/glyphstr.h b/render/glyphstr.h +index 2f51bd244..3b1d806d1 100644 +--- a/render/glyphstr.h ++++ b/render/glyphstr.h +@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ extern Bool + extern GlyphPtr FindGlyph(GlyphSetPtr glyphSet, Glyph id); + + extern GlyphPtr AllocateGlyph(xGlyphInfo * gi, int format); ++extern void FreeGlyph(GlyphPtr glyph, int format); + + extern Bool + ResizeGlyphSet(GlyphSetPtr glyphSet, CARD32 change); +diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c +index 29c5055c6..fe5e37dd9 100644 +--- a/render/render.c ++++ b/render/render.c +@@ -1076,6 +1076,7 @@ ProcRenderAddGlyphs(ClientPtr client) + + if (glyph_new->glyph && glyph_new->glyph != DeletedGlyph) { + glyph_new->found = TRUE; ++ ++glyph_new->glyph->refcnt; + } + else { + GlyphPtr glyph; +@@ -1168,8 +1169,10 @@ ProcRenderAddGlyphs(ClientPtr client) + err = BadAlloc; + goto bail; + } +- for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) { + AddGlyph(glyphSet, glyphs[i].glyph, glyphs[i].id); ++ FreeGlyph(glyphs[i].glyph, glyphSet->fdepth); ++ } + + if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal) + free(glyphsBase); +@@ -1179,9 +1182,13 @@ ProcRenderAddGlyphs(ClientPtr client) + FreePicture((void *) pSrc, 0); + if (pSrcPix) + FreeScratchPixmapHeader(pSrcPix); +- for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) +- if (glyphs[i].glyph && !glyphs[i].found) +- free(glyphs[i].glyph); ++ for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) { ++ if (glyphs[i].glyph) { ++ --glyphs[i].glyph->refcnt; ++ if (!glyphs[i].found) ++ free(glyphs[i].glyph); ++ } ++ } + if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal) + free(glyphsBase); + return err; +-- +2.44.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c2d723f..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -From 1801fe0ac3926882d47d7e1ad6c0518a2cdffd41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Povilas Kanapickas -Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2021 18:11:07 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] dix: Fix use after free in input device shutdown - -This fixes access to freed heap memory via dev->master. E.g. when -running BarrierNotify.ReceivesNotifyEvents/7 test from -xorg-integration-tests: - -==24736==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address -0x619000065020 at pc 0x55c450e2b9cf bp 0x7fffc532fd20 sp 0x7fffc532fd10 -READ of size 4 at 0x619000065020 thread T0 - #0 0x55c450e2b9ce in GetMaster ../../../dix/devices.c:2722 - #1 0x55c450e9d035 in IsFloating ../../../dix/events.c:346 - #2 0x55c4513209c6 in GetDeviceUse ../../../Xi/xiquerydevice.c:525 -../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:95 - #4 0x55c450e3455c in RemoveDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1204 -../../../hw/xfree86/common/xf86Xinput.c:1142 - #6 0x55c450e17b04 in CloseDeviceList ../../../dix/devices.c:1038 - #7 0x55c450e1de85 in CloseDownDevices ../../../dix/devices.c:1068 - #8 0x55c450e837ef in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:302 - #9 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34 -(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564) - #11 0x55c450d0113d in _start (/usr/lib/xorg/Xorg+0x117713d) - -0x619000065020 is located 160 bytes inside of 912-byte region -[0x619000064f80,0x619000065310) -freed by thread T0 here: -(/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10d7cf) - #1 0x55c450e19f1c in CloseDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1014 - #2 0x55c450e343a4 in RemoveDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1186 -../../../hw/xfree86/common/xf86Xinput.c:1142 - #4 0x55c450e17b04 in CloseDeviceList ../../../dix/devices.c:1038 - #5 0x55c450e1de85 in CloseDownDevices ../../../dix/devices.c:1068 - #6 0x55c450e837ef in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:302 - #7 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34 -(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564) - -previously allocated by thread T0 here: -(/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10ddc6) - #1 0x55c450e1c57b in AddInputDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:259 - #2 0x55c450e34840 in AllocDevicePair ../../../dix/devices.c:2755 - #3 0x55c45130318f in add_master ../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:152 -../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:465 - #5 0x55c4512cb9f5 in ProcIDispatch ../../../Xi/extinit.c:390 - #6 0x55c450e6a92b in Dispatch ../../../dix/dispatch.c:551 - #7 0x55c450e834b7 in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:272 - #8 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34 -(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564) - -The problem is caused by dev->master being not reset when disabling the -device, which then causes dangling pointer when the master device itself -is being deleted when exiting whole server. - -Note that RecalculateMasterButtons() requires dev->master to be still -valid, so we can reset it only at the end of function. - -Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas ---- - dix/devices.c | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - -diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c -index e62c34c55..5f9ce1678 100644 ---- a/dix/devices.c -+++ b/dix/devices.c -@@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent) - } - - RecalculateMasterButtons(dev); -+ dev->master = NULL; - - return TRUE; - } --- -2.43.0 - diff --git a/SPECS/tigervnc.spec b/SPECS/tigervnc.spec index d7fd002..052cb78 100644 --- a/SPECS/tigervnc.spec +++ b/SPECS/tigervnc.spec @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Name: tigervnc Version: 1.13.1 -Release: 3%{?dist}.6 +Release: 8%{?dist}.3 Summary: A TigerVNC remote display system %global _hardened_build 1 @@ -26,30 +26,26 @@ Patch1: tigervnc-use-gnome-as-default-session.patch Patch2: tigervnc-vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service.patch # Upstream patches +Patch50: tigervnc-support-username-alias-in-plainusers.patch +Patch51: tigervnc-use-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd.patch # Upstreamable patches -Patch50: tigervnc-dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device.patch +Patch80: tigervnc-dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device.patch # This is tigervnc-%%{version}/unix/xserver116.patch rebased on the latest xorg Patch100: tigervnc-xserver120.patch # 1326867 - [RHEL7.3] GLX applications in an Xvnc session fails to start Patch101: 0001-rpath-hack.patch -# Xorg CVEs -Patch200: xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch -Patch201: xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch -Patch202: xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch -Patch203: xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch -Patch204: xorg-CVE-2023-6816.patch -Patch205: xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1.patch -Patch206: xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2.patch -Patch207: xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3.patch -Patch208: xorg-CVE-2024-21885.patch -Patch209: xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1.patch -Patch210: xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2.patch -# Related to CVE-2024-21886 -Patch211: xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown.patch - +# XServer patches +# CVE-2024-0229 +# https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1251 +Patch200: xorg-CVE-2024-0229-followup.patch +Patch201: xorg-CVE-2024-31080.patch +Patch202: xorg-CVE-2024-31081.patch +Patch203: xorg-CVE-2024-31082.patch +Patch204: xorg-CVE-2024-31083.patch +Patch205: xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup.patch BuildRequires: make BuildRequires: gcc-c++ @@ -175,20 +171,15 @@ This package contains icons for TigerVNC viewer %package selinux Summary: SELinux module for TigerVNC BuildArch: noarch -BuildRequires: pkgconfig(systemd) -BuildRequires: selinux-policy BuildRequires: selinux-policy-devel -# Required for restorecon -Requires: policycoreutils -# Required for matchpathcon -Requires: libselinux-utils -Requires: selinux-policy Requires: selinux-policy-%{selinuxtype} -Requires(post): selinux-policy-base Requires(post): selinux-policy-%{selinuxtype} -Requires(post): libselinux-utils -Requires(post): policycoreutils -Requires(post): policycoreutils-python-utils +BuildRequires: selinux-policy-devel +# Required for matchpathcon +Requires: libselinux-utils +# Required for restorecon +Requires: policycoreutils +%{?selinux_requires} %description selinux This package provides the SELinux policy module to ensure TigerVNC @@ -204,27 +195,23 @@ for all in `find . -type f -perm -001`; do done %patch100 -p1 -b .xserver120-rebased %patch101 -p1 -b .rpath -%patch200 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-5367 -%patch201 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-5380 -%patch202 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-6377 -%patch203 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-6478 -%patch204 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-6816 -%patch205 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1 -%patch206 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2 -%patch207 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3 -%patch208 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-21885 -%patch209 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1 -%patch210 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2 -%patch211 -p1 -b .xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown +%patch200 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-0229-followup +%patch201 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-31080.patch +%patch202 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-31081.patch +%patch203 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-31082.patch +%patch204 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-31083.patch +%patch205 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup popd %patch1 -p1 -b .use-gnome-as-default-session %patch2 -p1 -b .vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service # Upstream patches +%patch50 -p1 -b .support-username-alias-in-plainusers +%patch51 -p1 -b .use-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd # Upstreamable patches -%patch50 -p1 -b .dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device +%patch80 -p1 -b .dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device %build %ifarch sparcv9 sparc64 s390 s390x @@ -407,45 +394,55 @@ fi %ghost %verify(not md5 size mode mtime) %{_sharedstatedir}/selinux/%{selinuxtype}/active/modules/200/%{modulename} %changelog -* Thu Jan 25 2024 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.6 -- Fix use after free related to CVE-2024-21886 - Resolves: RHEL-20435 +* Mon Apr 22 2024 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-8.3 +- Rebuild (z-stream target) + Resolves: RHEL-30985 + Resolves: RHEL-31015 + +* Fri Apr 12 2024 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-8.2 +- Fix crash caused by fix for CVE-2024-31083 + Resolves: RHEL-30985 + +* Thu Apr 04 2024 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-8.1 +- Fix CVE-2024-31080 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overread/data leakage in ProcXIGetSelectedEvents + Resolves: RHEL-31015 +- Fix CVE-2024-31083 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: User-after-free in ProcRenderAddGlyphs + Resolves: RHEL-30985 + +* Wed Feb 07 2024 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-8 - Fix copy/paste error in the DeviceStateNotify - Resolves: RHEL-20586 - -* Fri Jan 19 2024 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.5 -- Don't try to get pointer position when the pointer becomes a floating device - Resolves: RHEL-20435 + Resolves: RHEL-20533 -* Fri Jan 12 2024 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.4 +* Mon Jan 22 2024 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-7 - Fix CVE-2024-21886 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: heap buffer overflow in DisableDevice - Resolves: RHEL-20435 + Resolves: RHEL-20389 - Fix CVE-2024-21885 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: heap buffer overflow in XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent - Resolves: RHEL-20424 + Resolves: RHEL-20383 - Fix CVE-2024-0229 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: reattaching to different master device may lead to out-of-bounds memory access - Resolves: RHEL-20586 + Resolves: RHEL-20533 - Fix CVE-2023-6816 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overflow in DeviceFocusEvent and ProcXIQueryPointer - Resolves: RHEL-21247 + Resolves: RHEL-21213 -* Wed Dec 13 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.3 -- Updated fix for CVE-2023-6377 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory reads/writes in XKB button actions - Resolves: RHEL-18413 +* Mon Jan 08 2024 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-6 +- Use dup() to get available file descriptor when using -inetd option + Resolves: RHEL-19858 -* Mon Dec 11 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.2 -- Rebuild (selinux-policy) - Resolves: RHEL-18413 - Resolves: RHEL-18425 - -* Thu Dec 07 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.1 +* Mon Dec 18 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-5 - Fix CVE-2023-6377 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory reads/writes in XKB button actions - Resolves: RHEL-18413 + Resolves: RHEL-18414 - Fix CVE-2023-6478 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory read in RRChangeOutputProperty and RRChangeProviderProperty - Resolves: RHEL-18425 + Resolves: RHEL-18426 -* Thu Nov 02 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3 +* Wed Nov 01 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-4 - Fix CVE-2023-5380 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Use-after-free bug in DestroyWindow + Resolves: RHEL-15237 + - Fix CVE-2023-5367 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Out-of-bounds write in XIChangeDeviceProperty/RRChangeOutputProperty - Resolves: RHEL-15233 + Resolves: RHEL-15249 + +* Mon Oct 09 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3 +- Support username alias in PlainUsers + Resolves: RHEL-8430 * Tue Apr 11 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-2 - xorg-x11-server: X.Org Server Overlay Window Use-After-Free Local Privilege