MSVSphere Packaging Team
7 months ago
parent
a56f081505
commit
d90320fae1
@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
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diff --git a/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx b/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx
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index 6f65e87..3142ba3 100644
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--- a/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx
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+++ b/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx
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@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
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#include <rdr/InStream.h>
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#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__APPLE__)
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#include <rfb/UnixPasswordValidator.h>
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+#include <unistd.h>
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+#include <pwd.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef WIN32
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#include <rfb/WinPasswdValidator.h>
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@@ -45,21 +47,22 @@ StringParameter PasswordValidator::plainUsers
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bool PasswordValidator::validUser(const char* username)
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{
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- CharArray users(plainUsers.getValueStr()), user;
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+ std::vector<std::string> users;
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- while (users.buf) {
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- strSplit(users.buf, ',', &user.buf, &users.buf);
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-#ifdef WIN32
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- if (0 == stricmp(user.buf, "*"))
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- return true;
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- if (0 == stricmp(user.buf, username))
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- return true;
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-#else
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- if (!strcmp(user.buf, "*"))
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- return true;
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- if (!strcmp(user.buf, username))
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- return true;
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+ users = split(plainUsers, ',');
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+
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+ for (size_t i = 0; i < users.size(); i++) {
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+ if (users[i] == "*")
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+ return true;
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+#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__APPLE__)
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+ if (users[i] == "%u") {
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+ struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(username);
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+ if (pw && pw->pw_uid == getuid())
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+ return true;
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+ }
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#endif
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+ if (users[i] == username)
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+ return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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diff --git a/common/rfb/util.cxx b/common/rfb/util.cxx
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index 649eb0b..cce73a0 100644
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--- a/common/rfb/util.cxx
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+++ b/common/rfb/util.cxx
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@@ -99,6 +99,26 @@ namespace rfb {
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return false;
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}
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+ std::vector<std::string> split(const char* src,
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+ const char delimiter)
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+ {
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+ std::vector<std::string> out;
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+ const char *start, *stop;
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+
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+ start = src;
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+ do {
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+ stop = strchr(start, delimiter);
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+ if (stop == NULL) {
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+ out.push_back(start);
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+ } else {
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+ out.push_back(std::string(start, stop-start));
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+ start = stop + 1;
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+ }
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+ } while (stop != NULL);
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+
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+ return out;
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+ }
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+
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bool strContains(const char* src, char c) {
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int l=strlen(src);
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for (int i=0; i<l; i++)
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diff --git a/common/rfb/util.h b/common/rfb/util.h
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index f0ac9ef..ed15c28 100644
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--- a/common/rfb/util.h
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+++ b/common/rfb/util.h
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@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <string.h>
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+#include <string>
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+#include <vector>
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+
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struct timeval;
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#ifdef __GNUC__
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@@ -76,6 +79,10 @@ namespace rfb {
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// that part of the string. Obviously, setting both to 0 is not useful...
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bool strSplit(const char* src, const char limiter, char** out1, char** out2, bool fromEnd=false);
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+ // Splits a string with the specified delimiter
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+ std::vector<std::string> split(const char* src,
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+ const char delimiter);
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+
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// Returns true if src contains c
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bool strContains(const char* src, char c);
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diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man b/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man
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index c36ae34..78db730 100644
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--- a/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man
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+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man
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@@ -125,8 +125,8 @@ parameter instead.
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.B \-PlainUsers \fIuser-list\fP
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A comma separated list of user names that are allowed to authenticate via
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any of the "Plain" security types (Plain, TLSPlain, etc.). Specify \fB*\fP
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-to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Default is to
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-deny all users.
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+to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Specify \fB%u\fP
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+to allow the user of the server process. Default is to deny all users.
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.
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.TP
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.B \-pam_service \fIname\fP, \-PAMService \fIname\fP
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diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
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index ea87dea..e9fb654 100644
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--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
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+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
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@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ parameter instead.
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.B \-PlainUsers \fIuser-list\fP
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A comma separated list of user names that are allowed to authenticate via
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any of the "Plain" security types (Plain, TLSPlain, etc.). Specify \fB*\fP
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-to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Default is to
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-deny all users.
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+to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Specify \fB%u\fP
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+to allow the user of the server process. Default is to deny all users.
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.
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.TP
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.B \-pam_service \fIname\fP, \-PAMService \fIname\fP
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@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
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diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c
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index f8141959..c5c36539 100644
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--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c
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+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c
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@@ -366,8 +366,10 @@ ddxProcessArgument(int argc, char *argv[], int i)
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if (strcmp(argv[i], "-inetd") == 0) {
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int nullfd;
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- dup2(0, 3);
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- vncInetdSock = 3;
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+ if ((vncInetdSock = dup(0)) == -1)
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+ FatalError
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+ ("Xvnc error: failed to allocate a new file descriptor for -inetd: %s\n", strerror(errno));
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+
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/* Avoid xserver >= 1.19's epoll-fd becoming fd 2 / stderr only to be
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replaced by /dev/null by OsInit() because the pollfd is not
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@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
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From a31ba141824a7649e11f0ef7673718ce559d6337 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend
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The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at
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least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new
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part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P
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existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements
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instead of N + P.
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Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old
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values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially
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uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes.
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For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would
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result in this 8 value array:
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[N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P
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^OOB write
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The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in
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both.
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CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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---
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Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
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randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++--
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2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
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index 6ec419e870..563c4f31a5 100644
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--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
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+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
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@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
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XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop);
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return BadAlloc;
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}
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- new_value.size = len;
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+ new_value.size = total_len;
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new_value.type = type;
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new_value.format = format;
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@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
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case PropModePrepend:
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new_data = new_value.data;
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old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
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- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
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+ (len * size_in_bytes));
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break;
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}
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if (new_data)
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diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
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index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644
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--- a/randr/rrproperty.c
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+++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
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@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
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RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop);
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return BadAlloc;
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}
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- new_value.size = len;
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+ new_value.size = total_len;
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new_value.type = type;
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new_value.format = format;
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@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
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case PropModePrepend:
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new_data = new_value.data;
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old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
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- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
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+ (len * size_in_bytes));
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break;
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}
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if (new_data)
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--
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2.41.0
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@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
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From 004f461c440cb6611eefb48fbbb4fa53a6d49f80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 12:19:45 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] mi: reset the PointerWindows reference on screen
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switch
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PointerWindows[] keeps a reference to the last window our sprite
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entered - changes are usually handled by CheckMotion().
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If we switch between screens via XWarpPointer our
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dev->spriteInfo->sprite->win is set to the new screen's root window.
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If there's another window at the cursor location CheckMotion() will
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trigger the right enter/leave events later. If there is not, it skips
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that process and we never trigger LeaveWindow() - PointerWindows[] for
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the device still refers to the previous window.
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If that window is destroyed we have a dangling reference that will
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eventually cause a use-after-free bug when checking the window hierarchy
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later.
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To trigger this, we require:
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- two protocol screens
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- XWarpPointer to the other screen's root window
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- XDestroyWindow before entering any other window
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This is a niche bug so we hack around it by making sure we reset the
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PointerWindows[] entry so we cannot have a dangling pointer. This
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doesn't handle Enter/Leave events correctly but the previous code didn't
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either.
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CVE-2023-5380, ZDI-CAN-21608
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Sri working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
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---
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dix/enterleave.h | 2 --
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include/eventstr.h | 3 +++
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mi/mipointer.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
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3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/dix/enterleave.h b/dix/enterleave.h
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index 4b833d8a3b..e8af924c68 100644
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--- a/dix/enterleave.h
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+++ b/dix/enterleave.h
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@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ extern void DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev,
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extern void EnterWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win, int mode);
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-extern void LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev);
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-
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extern void CoreFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr kbd,
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int type, int mode, int detail, WindowPtr pWin);
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diff --git a/include/eventstr.h b/include/eventstr.h
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index bf3b95fe4a..2bae3b0767 100644
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--- a/include/eventstr.h
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+++ b/include/eventstr.h
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@@ -296,4 +296,7 @@ union _InternalEvent {
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#endif
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};
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+extern void
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+LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev);
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+
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#endif
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diff --git a/mi/mipointer.c b/mi/mipointer.c
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index 75be1aeeb8..b12ae9be1d 100644
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--- a/mi/mipointer.c
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+++ b/mi/mipointer.c
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@@ -397,8 +397,21 @@ miPointerWarpCursor(DeviceIntPtr pDev, ScreenPtr pScreen, int x, int y)
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#ifdef PANORAMIX
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&& noPanoramiXExtension
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#endif
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- )
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- UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen);
|
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+ ) {
|
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+ DeviceIntPtr master = GetMaster(pDev, MASTER_POINTER);
|
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+ /* Hack for CVE-2023-5380: if we're moving
|
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+ * screens PointerWindows[] keeps referring to the
|
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+ * old window. If that gets destroyed we have a UAF
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+ * bug later. Only happens when jumping from a window
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+ * to the root window on the other screen.
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+ * Enter/Leave events are incorrect for that case but
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+ * too niche to fix.
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+ */
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+ LeaveWindow(pDev);
|
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+ if (master)
|
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+ LeaveWindow(master);
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+ UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen);
|
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+ }
|
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}
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/**
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--
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2.41.0
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@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
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From 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
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Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000
|
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Subject: [PATCH] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons
|
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|
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button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all
|
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our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating
|
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insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in
|
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XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with,
|
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leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies.
|
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|
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CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413
|
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|
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
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---
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Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------
|
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dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++
|
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2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
|
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|
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diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
|
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index dcd4efb3bc..54ea11a938 100644
|
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--- a/Xi/exevents.c
|
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+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
|
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@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
|
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}
|
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|
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if (from->button->xkb_acts) {
|
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- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) {
|
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- to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction));
|
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- if (!to->button->xkb_acts)
|
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- FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n");
|
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- }
|
||||
+ size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons);
|
||||
+ to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts,
|
||||
+ maxbuttons,
|
||||
+ sizeof(XkbAction));
|
||||
+ memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction));
|
||||
memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
|
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- sizeof(XkbAction));
|
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+ from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction));
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
free(to->button->xkb_acts);
|
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diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
|
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index b063128df0..3f3224d626 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/devices.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/devices.c
|
||||
@@ -2539,6 +2539,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
|
||||
|
||||
if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) {
|
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int i;
|
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+ int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons;
|
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+
|
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DeviceChangedEvent event = {
|
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.header = ET_Internal,
|
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.type = ET_DeviceChanged,
|
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@@ -2549,6 +2551,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave)
|
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};
|
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|
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master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons;
|
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+ if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) {
|
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+ master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts,
|
||||
+ maxbuttons,
|
||||
+ sizeof(XkbAction));
|
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+ memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons],
|
||||
+ 0,
|
||||
+ (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction));
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons *
|
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sizeof(Atom));
|
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--
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GitLab
|
||||
@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
|
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From 3e0222fcae552685d423914a683c1709dc5f6d6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of
|
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ProcRRChange*Property
|
||||
|
||||
Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty.
|
||||
See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core
|
||||
protocol and XI.
|
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|
||||
This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
|
||||
|
||||
Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
|
||||
the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was
|
||||
truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
|
||||
|
||||
The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
|
||||
(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
|
||||
finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
|
||||
stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2023-XXXXX, ZDI-CAN-22561
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
---
|
||||
randr/rrproperty.c | 2 +-
|
||||
randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +-
|
||||
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
|
||||
index 25469f57b2..c4fef8a1f6 100644
|
||||
--- a/randr/rrproperty.c
|
||||
+++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
|
||||
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
char format, mode;
|
||||
unsigned long len;
|
||||
int sizeInBytes;
|
||||
- int totalSize;
|
||||
+ uint64_t totalSize;
|
||||
int err;
|
||||
|
||||
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq);
|
||||
diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
|
||||
index b79c17f9bf..90c5a9a933 100644
|
||||
--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
|
||||
+++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
|
||||
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
char format, mode;
|
||||
unsigned long len;
|
||||
int sizeInBytes;
|
||||
- int totalSize;
|
||||
+ uint64_t totalSize;
|
||||
int err;
|
||||
|
||||
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 77e294797db17845808462b588d4e7a2130196bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:29:49 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: allocate enough space for logical button maps
|
||||
|
||||
Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for
|
||||
each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped
|
||||
to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 3 +--
|
||||
dix/enterleave.c | 5 +++--
|
||||
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
|
||||
index 5b77b1a444..2b05ac5f39 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
|
||||
@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ ProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
if (pDev->button) {
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
- rep.buttons_len =
|
||||
- bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(pDev->button->numButtons));
|
||||
+ rep.buttons_len = bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(256)); /* button map up to 255 */
|
||||
rep.length += rep.buttons_len;
|
||||
buttons = calloc(rep.buttons_len, 4);
|
||||
if (!buttons)
|
||||
diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
|
||||
index 867ec74363..ded8679d76 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/enterleave.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
|
||||
@@ -784,8 +784,9 @@ DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail,
|
||||
|
||||
mouse = IsFloating(dev) ? dev : GetMaster(dev, MASTER_POINTER);
|
||||
|
||||
- /* XI 2 event */
|
||||
- btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(mouse->button->numButtons) : 0;
|
||||
+ /* XI 2 event contains the logical button map - maps are CARD8
|
||||
+ * so we need 256 bits for the possibly maximum mapping */
|
||||
+ btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(256) : 0;
|
||||
btlen = bytes_to_int32(btlen);
|
||||
len = sizeof(xXIFocusInEvent) + btlen * 4;
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 45ea0a93934c8a3760a4d68ba4ffc932375f60de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:27:50 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] dix: Allocate sufficient xEvents for our
|
||||
DeviceStateNotify
|
||||
|
||||
If a device has both a button class and a key class and numButtons is
|
||||
zero, we can get an OOB write due to event under-allocation.
|
||||
|
||||
This function seems to assume a device has either keys or buttons, not
|
||||
both. It has two virtually identical code paths, both of which assume
|
||||
they're applying to the first event in the sequence.
|
||||
|
||||
A device with both a key and button class triggered a logic bug - only
|
||||
one xEvent was allocated but the deviceStateNotify pointer was pushed on
|
||||
once per type. So effectively this logic code:
|
||||
|
||||
int count = 1;
|
||||
if (button && nbuttons > 32) count++;
|
||||
if (key && nbuttons > 0) count++;
|
||||
if (key && nkeys > 32) count++; // this is basically always true
|
||||
// count is at 2 for our keys + zero button device
|
||||
|
||||
ev = alloc(count * sizeof(xEvent));
|
||||
FixDeviceStateNotify(ev);
|
||||
if (button)
|
||||
FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++);
|
||||
if (key)
|
||||
FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); // santa drops into the wrong chimney here
|
||||
|
||||
If the device has more than 3 valuators, the OOB is pushed back - we're
|
||||
off by one so it will happen when the last deviceValuator event is
|
||||
written instead.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix this by allocating the maximum number of events we may allocate.
|
||||
Note that the current behavior is not protocol-correct anyway, this
|
||||
patch fixes only the allocation issue.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that this issue does not trigger if the device has at least one
|
||||
button. While the server does not prevent a button class with zero
|
||||
buttons, it is very unlikely.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
---
|
||||
dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++---
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
|
||||
index ded8679d76..17964b00a4 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/enterleave.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
|
||||
@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static void
|
||||
DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int evcount = 1;
|
||||
- deviceStateNotify *ev, *sev;
|
||||
+ deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
|
||||
+ deviceStateNotify *ev;
|
||||
deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
|
||||
deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- sev = ev = xallocarray(evcount, sizeof(xEvent));
|
||||
+ ev = sev;
|
||||
FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
|
||||
|
||||
if (b != NULL) {
|
||||
@@ -770,7 +771,6 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
|
||||
|
||||
DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
|
||||
DeviceStateNotifyMask, NullGrab);
|
||||
- free(sev);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 4c7a16b089b721b9c07f4ed593deba4f22158dbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 12:26:20 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/2] dix: fix DeviceStateNotify event calculation
|
||||
|
||||
The previous code only made sense if one considers buttons and keys to
|
||||
be mutually exclusive on a device. That is not necessarily true, causing
|
||||
a number of issues.
|
||||
|
||||
This function allocates and fills in the number of xEvents we need to
|
||||
send the device state down the wire. This is split across multiple
|
||||
32-byte devices including one deviceStateNotify event and optional
|
||||
deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify and (possibly multiple)
|
||||
deviceValuator events.
|
||||
|
||||
The previous behavior would instead compose a sequence
|
||||
of [state, buttonstate, state, keystate, valuator...]. This is not
|
||||
protocol correct, and on top of that made the code extremely convoluted.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix this by streamlining: add both button and key into the deviceStateNotify
|
||||
and then append the key state and button state, followed by the
|
||||
valuators. Finally, the deviceValuator events contain up to 6 valuators
|
||||
per event but we only ever sent through 3 at a time. Let's double that
|
||||
troughput.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
---
|
||||
dix/enterleave.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
|
||||
index 17964b00a4..7b7ba1098b 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/enterleave.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
|
||||
@@ -615,9 +615,15 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
|
||||
|
||||
ev->type = DeviceValuator;
|
||||
ev->deviceid = dev->id;
|
||||
- ev->num_valuators = nval < 3 ? nval : 3;
|
||||
+ ev->num_valuators = nval < 6 ? nval : 6;
|
||||
ev->first_valuator = first;
|
||||
switch (ev->num_valuators) {
|
||||
+ case 6:
|
||||
+ ev->valuator5 = v->axisVal[first + 5];
|
||||
+ case 5:
|
||||
+ ev->valuator4 = v->axisVal[first + 4];
|
||||
+ case 4:
|
||||
+ ev->valuator3 = v->axisVal[first + 3];
|
||||
case 3:
|
||||
ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2];
|
||||
case 2:
|
||||
@@ -626,7 +632,6 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
|
||||
ev->valuator0 = v->axisVal[first];
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- first += ev->num_valuators;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void
|
||||
@@ -646,7 +651,7 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
|
||||
ev->num_buttons = b->numButtons;
|
||||
memcpy((char *) ev->buttons, (char *) b->down, 4);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- else if (k) {
|
||||
+ if (k) {
|
||||
ev->classes_reported |= (1 << KeyClass);
|
||||
ev->num_keys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code -
|
||||
k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
|
||||
@@ -670,15 +675,26 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ * The device state notify event is split across multiple 32-byte events.
|
||||
+ * The first one contains the first 32 button state bits, the first 32
|
||||
+ * key state bits, and the first 3 valuator values.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * If a device has more than that, the server sends out:
|
||||
+ * - one deviceButtonStateNotify for buttons 32 and above
|
||||
+ * - one deviceKeyStateNotify for keys 32 and above
|
||||
+ * - one deviceValuator event per 6 valuators above valuator 4
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * All events but the last one have the deviceid binary ORed with MORE_EVENTS,
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
static void
|
||||
DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ /* deviceStateNotify, deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify
|
||||
+ * and one deviceValuator for each 6 valuators */
|
||||
+ deviceStateNotify sev[3 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 6)/6];
|
||||
int evcount = 1;
|
||||
- deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
|
||||
- deviceStateNotify *ev;
|
||||
- deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
|
||||
- deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
|
||||
+ deviceStateNotify *ev = sev;
|
||||
|
||||
KeyClassPtr k;
|
||||
ButtonClassPtr b;
|
||||
@@ -691,82 +707,49 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
|
||||
|
||||
if ((b = dev->button) != NULL) {
|
||||
nbuttons = b->numButtons;
|
||||
- if (nbuttons > 32)
|
||||
+ if (nbuttons > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
|
||||
evcount++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((k = dev->key) != NULL) {
|
||||
nkeys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
|
||||
- if (nkeys > 32)
|
||||
+ if (nkeys > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
|
||||
evcount++;
|
||||
- if (nbuttons > 0) {
|
||||
- evcount++;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((v = dev->valuator) != NULL) {
|
||||
nval = v->numAxes;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (nval > 3)
|
||||
- evcount++;
|
||||
- if (nval > 6) {
|
||||
- if (!(k && b))
|
||||
- evcount++;
|
||||
- if (nval > 9)
|
||||
- evcount += ((nval - 7) / 3);
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ /* first three are encoded in deviceStateNotify, then
|
||||
+ * it's 6 per deviceValuator event */
|
||||
+ evcount += ((nval - 3) + 6)/6;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- ev = sev;
|
||||
- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
|
||||
+ BUG_RETURN(evcount <= ARRAY_SIZE(sev));
|
||||
|
||||
- if (b != NULL) {
|
||||
- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, b, v, first);
|
||||
- first += 3;
|
||||
- nval -= 3;
|
||||
- if (nbuttons > 32) {
|
||||
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
||||
- bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ev++;
|
||||
- bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
|
||||
- bev->deviceid = dev->id;
|
||||
- memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
|
||||
- DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- if (nval > 0) {
|
||||
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
||||
- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
|
||||
- first += 3;
|
||||
- nval -= 3;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, k, b, v, first);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (b != NULL && nbuttons > 32) {
|
||||
+ deviceButtonStateNotify *bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ++ev;
|
||||
+ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
||||
+ bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
|
||||
+ bev->deviceid = dev->id;
|
||||
+ memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
|
||||
+ DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (k != NULL) {
|
||||
- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, k, NULL, v, first);
|
||||
- first += 3;
|
||||
- nval -= 3;
|
||||
- if (nkeys > 32) {
|
||||
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
||||
- kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ev++;
|
||||
- kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
|
||||
- kev->deviceid = dev->id;
|
||||
- memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- if (nval > 0) {
|
||||
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
||||
- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
|
||||
- first += 3;
|
||||
- nval -= 3;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ if (k != NULL && nkeys > 32) {
|
||||
+ deviceKeyStateNotify *kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ++ev;
|
||||
+ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
||||
+ kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
|
||||
+ kev->deviceid = dev->id;
|
||||
+ memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ first = 3;
|
||||
+ nval -= 3;
|
||||
while (nval > 0) {
|
||||
- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, NULL, v, first);
|
||||
- first += 3;
|
||||
- nval -= 3;
|
||||
- if (nval > 0) {
|
||||
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
||||
- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
|
||||
- first += 3;
|
||||
- nval -= 3;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ ev->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
|
||||
+ FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ++ev, v, first);
|
||||
+ first += 6;
|
||||
+ nval -= 6;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 061eb684996627347acdf87ec11d108cedee71b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 13:48:10 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: when creating a new ButtonClass, set the number
|
||||
of buttons
|
||||
|
||||
There's a racy sequence where a master device may copy the button class
|
||||
from the slave, without ever initializing numButtons. This leads to a
|
||||
device with zero buttons but a button class which is invalid.
|
||||
|
||||
Let's copy the numButtons value from the source - by definition if we
|
||||
don't have a button class yet we do not have any other slave devices
|
||||
with more than this number of buttons anyway.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xi/exevents.c | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
|
||||
index 54ea11a938..e161714682 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xi/exevents.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
|
||||
@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
|
||||
to->button = calloc(1, sizeof(ButtonClassRec));
|
||||
if (!to->button)
|
||||
FatalError("[Xi] no memory for class shift.\n");
|
||||
+ to->button->numButtons = from->button->numButtons;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
classes->button = NULL;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From a483b5c7724469309e3df427730cbb8b805b9c9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:01:24 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: flush hierarchy events after adding/removing
|
||||
master devices
|
||||
|
||||
The `XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent()` function allocates space to store up
|
||||
to `MAXDEVICES` (256) `xXIHierarchyInfo` structures in `info`.
|
||||
|
||||
If a device with a given ID was removed and a new device with the same
|
||||
ID added both in the same operation, the single device ID will lead to
|
||||
two info structures being written to `info`.
|
||||
|
||||
Since this case can occur for every device ID at once, a total of two
|
||||
times `MAXDEVICES` info structures might be written to the allocation.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid it, once one add/remove master is processed, send out the
|
||||
device hierarchy event for the current state and continue. That event
|
||||
thus only ever has exactly one of either added/removed in it (and
|
||||
optionally slave attached/detached).
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
|
||||
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
|
||||
index 01eb7a8af4..67eedddec6 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
|
||||
@@ -340,6 +340,11 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */
|
||||
int rc = Success;
|
||||
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
|
||||
+ enum {
|
||||
+ NO_CHANGE,
|
||||
+ FLUSH,
|
||||
+ CHANGED,
|
||||
+ } changes = NO_CHANGE;
|
||||
|
||||
REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
|
||||
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
|
||||
@@ -389,8 +394,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
|
||||
if (rc != Success)
|
||||
goto unwind;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ changes = FLUSH;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
case XIRemoveMaster:
|
||||
{
|
||||
xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
|
||||
@@ -399,8 +405,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
|
||||
if (rc != Success)
|
||||
goto unwind;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ changes = FLUSH;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
case XIDetachSlave:
|
||||
{
|
||||
xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
|
||||
@@ -409,8 +416,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
|
||||
if (rc != Success)
|
||||
goto unwind;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ changes = CHANGED;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
case XIAttachSlave:
|
||||
{
|
||||
xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
|
||||
@@ -495,16 +503,25 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
|
||||
if (rc != Success)
|
||||
goto unwind;
|
||||
+ changes = CHANGED;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (changes == FLUSH) {
|
||||
+ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
|
||||
+ memset(flags, 0, sizeof(flags));
|
||||
+ changes = NO_CHANGE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
len -= any->length * 4;
|
||||
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
unwind:
|
||||
-
|
||||
- XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
|
||||
+ if (changes != NO_CHANGE)
|
||||
+ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 4e0e99ef60f07757756913221847a26c71afc3e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= <jexposit@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 18:28:31 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Xi: do not keep linked list pointer during recursion
|
||||
|
||||
The `DisableDevice()` function is called whenever an enabled device
|
||||
is disabled and it moves the device from the `inputInfo.devices` linked
|
||||
list to the `inputInfo.off_devices` linked list.
|
||||
|
||||
However, its link/unlink operation has an issue during the recursive
|
||||
call to `DisableDevice()` due to the `prev` pointer pointing to a
|
||||
removed device.
|
||||
|
||||
This issue leads to a length mismatch between the total number of
|
||||
devices and the number of device in the list, leading to a heap
|
||||
overflow and, possibly, to local privilege escalation.
|
||||
|
||||
Simplify the code that checked whether the device passed to
|
||||
`DisableDevice()` was in `inputInfo.devices` or not and find the
|
||||
previous device after the recursion.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
---
|
||||
dix/devices.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
|
||||
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
|
||||
index 3f3224d62..3a64d8702 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/devices.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/devices.c
|
||||
@@ -451,14 +451,20 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DeviceIntPtr *prev, other;
|
||||
BOOL enabled;
|
||||
+ BOOL dev_in_devices_list = FALSE;
|
||||
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
|
||||
|
||||
if (!dev->enabled)
|
||||
return TRUE;
|
||||
|
||||
- for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
|
||||
- *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
|
||||
- if (*prev != dev)
|
||||
+ for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
|
||||
+ if (other == dev) {
|
||||
+ dev_in_devices_list = TRUE;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!dev_in_devices_list)
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
|
||||
TouchEndPhysicallyActiveTouches(dev);
|
||||
@@ -509,6 +515,9 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
|
||||
LeaveWindow(dev);
|
||||
SetFocusOut(dev);
|
||||
|
||||
+ for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
|
||||
+ *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
|
||||
+
|
||||
*prev = dev->next;
|
||||
dev->next = inputInfo.off_devices;
|
||||
inputInfo.off_devices = dev;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 1a5e3c3e68d4f965077ea6a40ba57cc0d5a4e8cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 09:40:27 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: when disabling a master, float disabled slaved
|
||||
devices too
|
||||
|
||||
Disabling a master device floats all slave devices but we didn't do this
|
||||
to already-disabled slave devices. As a result those devices kept their
|
||||
reference to the master device resulting in access to already freed
|
||||
memory if the master device was removed before the corresponding slave
|
||||
device.
|
||||
|
||||
And to match this behavior, also forcibly reset that pointer during
|
||||
CloseDownDevices().
|
||||
|
||||
Related to CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
|
||||
---
|
||||
dix/devices.c | 12 ++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
|
||||
index c7fa8fad69..87f4d4a213 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/devices.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/devices.c
|
||||
@@ -482,6 +482,13 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
|
||||
flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (other = inputInfo.off_devices; other; other = other->next) {
|
||||
+ if (!IsMaster(other) && GetMaster(other, MASTER_ATTACHED) == dev) {
|
||||
+ AttachDevice(NULL, other, NULL);
|
||||
+ flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
|
||||
@@ -1088,6 +1095,11 @@ CloseDownDevices(void)
|
||||
dev->master = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
|
||||
+ if (!IsMaster(dev) && !IsFloating(dev))
|
||||
+ dev->master = NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.devices);
|
||||
CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.off_devices);
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 96798fc1967491c80a4d0c8d9e0a80586cb2152b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 18:51:45 -0700
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Xi: ProcXIGetSelectedEvents needs to use unswapped length
|
||||
to send reply
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-31080
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=69762
|
||||
Fixes: 53e821ab4 ("Xi: add request processing for XIGetSelectedEvents.")
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
|
||||
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1463>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xi/xiselectev.c | 5 ++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xi/xiselectev.c b/Xi/xiselectev.c
|
||||
index edcb8a0d3..ac1494987 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xi/xiselectev.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xi/xiselectev.c
|
||||
@@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ ProcXIGetSelectedEvents(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
InputClientsPtr others = NULL;
|
||||
xXIEventMask *evmask = NULL;
|
||||
DeviceIntPtr dev;
|
||||
+ uint32_t length;
|
||||
|
||||
REQUEST(xXIGetSelectedEventsReq);
|
||||
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIGetSelectedEventsReq);
|
||||
@@ -418,10 +419,12 @@ ProcXIGetSelectedEvents(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* save the value before SRepXIGetSelectedEvents swaps it */
|
||||
+ length = reply.length;
|
||||
WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(xXIGetSelectedEventsReply), &reply);
|
||||
|
||||
if (reply.num_masks)
|
||||
- WriteToClient(client, reply.length * 4, buffer);
|
||||
+ WriteToClient(client, length * 4, buffer);
|
||||
|
||||
free(buffer);
|
||||
return Success;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.44.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 3e77295f888c67fc7645db5d0c00926a29ffecee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 18:56:27 -0700
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Xi: ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice needs to use unswapped length
|
||||
to send reply
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-31081
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: d220d6907 ("Xi: add GrabButton and GrabKeysym code.")
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
|
||||
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1463>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 5 ++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
|
||||
index c9ac2f855..896233bec 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
|
||||
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
GrabParameters param;
|
||||
void *tmp;
|
||||
int mask_len;
|
||||
+ uint32_t length;
|
||||
|
||||
REQUEST(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq);
|
||||
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq,
|
||||
@@ -247,9 +248,11 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* save the value before SRepXIPassiveGrabDevice swaps it */
|
||||
+ length = rep.length;
|
||||
WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(rep), &rep);
|
||||
if (rep.num_modifiers)
|
||||
- WriteToClient(client, rep.length * 4, modifiers_failed);
|
||||
+ WriteToClient(client, length * 4, modifiers_failed);
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
free(modifiers_failed);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.44.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 6c684d035c06fd41c727f0ef0744517580864cef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 19:07:34 -0700
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Xquartz: ProcAppleDRICreatePixmap needs to use unswapped
|
||||
length to send reply
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-31082
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: 14205ade0 ("XQuartz: appledri: Fix byte swapping in replies")
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
|
||||
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1463>
|
||||
---
|
||||
hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c | 4 +++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c b/hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c
|
||||
index 77574655b..40422b61a 100644
|
||||
--- a/hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c
|
||||
+++ b/hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c
|
||||
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ ProcAppleDRICreatePixmap(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
xAppleDRICreatePixmapReply rep;
|
||||
int width, height, pitch, bpp;
|
||||
void *ptr;
|
||||
+ CARD32 stringLength;
|
||||
|
||||
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xAppleDRICreatePixmapReq);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -307,6 +308,7 @@ ProcAppleDRICreatePixmap(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
if (sizeof(rep) != sz_xAppleDRICreatePixmapReply)
|
||||
ErrorF("error sizeof(rep) is %zu\n", sizeof(rep));
|
||||
|
||||
+ stringLength = rep.stringLength; /* save unswapped value */
|
||||
if (client->swapped) {
|
||||
swaps(&rep.sequenceNumber);
|
||||
swapl(&rep.length);
|
||||
@@ -319,7 +321,7 @@ ProcAppleDRICreatePixmap(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(rep), &rep);
|
||||
- WriteToClient(client, rep.stringLength, path);
|
||||
+ WriteToClient(client, stringLength, path);
|
||||
|
||||
return Success;
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.44.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From bdca6c3d1f5057eeb31609b1280fc93237b00c77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 13:13:35 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] render: fix refcounting of glyphs during
|
||||
ProcRenderAddGlyphs
|
||||
|
||||
Previously, AllocateGlyph would return a new glyph with refcount=0 and a
|
||||
re-used glyph would end up not changing the refcount at all. The
|
||||
resulting glyph_new array would thus have multiple entries pointing to
|
||||
the same non-refcounted glyphs.
|
||||
|
||||
AddGlyph may free a glyph, resulting in a UAF when the same glyph
|
||||
pointer is then later used.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix this by returning a refcount of 1 for a new glyph and always
|
||||
incrementing the refcount for a re-used glyph, followed by dropping that
|
||||
refcount back down again when we're done with it.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-31083, ZDI-CAN-22880
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1463>
|
||||
---
|
||||
render/glyph.c | 5 +++--
|
||||
render/glyphstr_priv.h | 1 +
|
||||
render/render.c | 15 +++++++++++----
|
||||
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/render/glyph.c b/render/glyph.c
|
||||
index 850ea8440..13991f8a1 100644
|
||||
--- a/render/glyph.c
|
||||
+++ b/render/glyph.c
|
||||
@@ -245,10 +245,11 @@ FreeGlyphPicture(GlyphPtr glyph)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-static void
|
||||
+void
|
||||
FreeGlyph(GlyphPtr glyph, int format)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CheckDuplicates(&globalGlyphs[format], "FreeGlyph");
|
||||
+ BUG_RETURN(glyph->refcnt == 0);
|
||||
if (--glyph->refcnt == 0) {
|
||||
GlyphRefPtr gr;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
@@ -354,7 +355,7 @@ AllocateGlyph(xGlyphInfo * gi, int fdepth)
|
||||
glyph = (GlyphPtr) malloc(size);
|
||||
if (!glyph)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
- glyph->refcnt = 0;
|
||||
+ glyph->refcnt = 1;
|
||||
glyph->size = size + sizeof(xGlyphInfo);
|
||||
glyph->info = *gi;
|
||||
dixInitPrivates(glyph, (char *) glyph + head_size, PRIVATE_GLYPH);
|
||||
diff --git a/render/glyphstr.h b/render/glyphstr.h
|
||||
index 2f51bd244..3b1d806d1 100644
|
||||
--- a/render/glyphstr.h
|
||||
+++ b/render/glyphstr.h
|
||||
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ extern Bool
|
||||
extern GlyphPtr FindGlyph(GlyphSetPtr glyphSet, Glyph id);
|
||||
|
||||
extern GlyphPtr AllocateGlyph(xGlyphInfo * gi, int format);
|
||||
+extern void FreeGlyph(GlyphPtr glyph, int format);
|
||||
|
||||
extern Bool
|
||||
ResizeGlyphSet(GlyphSetPtr glyphSet, CARD32 change);
|
||||
diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c
|
||||
index 29c5055c6..fe5e37dd9 100644
|
||||
--- a/render/render.c
|
||||
+++ b/render/render.c
|
||||
@@ -1076,6 +1076,7 @@ ProcRenderAddGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
|
||||
if (glyph_new->glyph && glyph_new->glyph != DeletedGlyph) {
|
||||
glyph_new->found = TRUE;
|
||||
+ ++glyph_new->glyph->refcnt;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
GlyphPtr glyph;
|
||||
@@ -1168,8 +1169,10 @@ ProcRenderAddGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
err = BadAlloc;
|
||||
goto bail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++)
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) {
|
||||
AddGlyph(glyphSet, glyphs[i].glyph, glyphs[i].id);
|
||||
+ FreeGlyph(glyphs[i].glyph, glyphSet->fdepth);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal)
|
||||
free(glyphsBase);
|
||||
@@ -1179,9 +1182,13 @@ ProcRenderAddGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
FreePicture((void *) pSrc, 0);
|
||||
if (pSrcPix)
|
||||
FreeScratchPixmapHeader(pSrcPix);
|
||||
- for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++)
|
||||
- if (glyphs[i].glyph && !glyphs[i].found)
|
||||
- free(glyphs[i].glyph);
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) {
|
||||
+ if (glyphs[i].glyph) {
|
||||
+ --glyphs[i].glyph->refcnt;
|
||||
+ if (!glyphs[i].found)
|
||||
+ free(glyphs[i].glyph);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal)
|
||||
free(glyphsBase);
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.44.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 1801fe0ac3926882d47d7e1ad6c0518a2cdffd41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
|
||||
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2021 18:11:07 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] dix: Fix use after free in input device shutdown
|
||||
|
||||
This fixes access to freed heap memory via dev->master. E.g. when
|
||||
running BarrierNotify.ReceivesNotifyEvents/7 test from
|
||||
xorg-integration-tests:
|
||||
|
||||
==24736==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address
|
||||
0x619000065020 at pc 0x55c450e2b9cf bp 0x7fffc532fd20 sp 0x7fffc532fd10
|
||||
READ of size 4 at 0x619000065020 thread T0
|
||||
#0 0x55c450e2b9ce in GetMaster ../../../dix/devices.c:2722
|
||||
#1 0x55c450e9d035 in IsFloating ../../../dix/events.c:346
|
||||
#2 0x55c4513209c6 in GetDeviceUse ../../../Xi/xiquerydevice.c:525
|
||||
../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:95
|
||||
#4 0x55c450e3455c in RemoveDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1204
|
||||
../../../hw/xfree86/common/xf86Xinput.c:1142
|
||||
#6 0x55c450e17b04 in CloseDeviceList ../../../dix/devices.c:1038
|
||||
#7 0x55c450e1de85 in CloseDownDevices ../../../dix/devices.c:1068
|
||||
#8 0x55c450e837ef in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:302
|
||||
#9 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34
|
||||
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564)
|
||||
#11 0x55c450d0113d in _start (/usr/lib/xorg/Xorg+0x117713d)
|
||||
|
||||
0x619000065020 is located 160 bytes inside of 912-byte region
|
||||
[0x619000064f80,0x619000065310)
|
||||
freed by thread T0 here:
|
||||
(/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10d7cf)
|
||||
#1 0x55c450e19f1c in CloseDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1014
|
||||
#2 0x55c450e343a4 in RemoveDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1186
|
||||
../../../hw/xfree86/common/xf86Xinput.c:1142
|
||||
#4 0x55c450e17b04 in CloseDeviceList ../../../dix/devices.c:1038
|
||||
#5 0x55c450e1de85 in CloseDownDevices ../../../dix/devices.c:1068
|
||||
#6 0x55c450e837ef in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:302
|
||||
#7 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34
|
||||
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564)
|
||||
|
||||
previously allocated by thread T0 here:
|
||||
(/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10ddc6)
|
||||
#1 0x55c450e1c57b in AddInputDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:259
|
||||
#2 0x55c450e34840 in AllocDevicePair ../../../dix/devices.c:2755
|
||||
#3 0x55c45130318f in add_master ../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:152
|
||||
../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:465
|
||||
#5 0x55c4512cb9f5 in ProcIDispatch ../../../Xi/extinit.c:390
|
||||
#6 0x55c450e6a92b in Dispatch ../../../dix/dispatch.c:551
|
||||
#7 0x55c450e834b7 in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:272
|
||||
#8 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34
|
||||
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564)
|
||||
|
||||
The problem is caused by dev->master being not reset when disabling the
|
||||
device, which then causes dangling pointer when the master device itself
|
||||
is being deleted when exiting whole server.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that RecalculateMasterButtons() requires dev->master to be still
|
||||
valid, so we can reset it only at the end of function.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
|
||||
---
|
||||
dix/devices.c | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
|
||||
index e62c34c55..5f9ce1678 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/devices.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/devices.c
|
||||
@@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
RecalculateMasterButtons(dev);
|
||||
+ dev->master = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
return TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.43.0
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in new issue