import tigervnc-1.13.1-2.el8_9.7

i8c changed/i8c/tigervnc-1.13.1-2.el8_9.7
MSVSphere Packaging Team 10 months ago
parent d55ad25554
commit 2445d5435d

@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c
index b3d0926d..d36a096f 100644
--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ void vncPointerMove(int x, int y)
void vncGetPointerPos(int *x, int *y)
{
- if (vncPointerDev != NULL) {
+ if (vncPointerDev != NULL && !IsFloating(vncPointerDev)) {
ScreenPtr ptrScreen;
miPointerGetPosition(vncPointerDev, &cursorPosX, &cursorPosY);

@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From 77e294797db17845808462b588d4e7a2130196bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:29:49 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: allocate enough space for logical button maps
Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for
each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped
to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping.
CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
---
Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 3 +--
dix/enterleave.c | 5 +++--
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
index 5b77b1a444..2b05ac5f39 100644
--- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
+++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c
@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ ProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client)
if (pDev->button) {
int i;
- rep.buttons_len =
- bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(pDev->button->numButtons));
+ rep.buttons_len = bytes_to_int32(bits_to_bytes(256)); /* button map up to 255 */
rep.length += rep.buttons_len;
buttons = calloc(rep.buttons_len, 4);
if (!buttons)
diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
index 867ec74363..ded8679d76 100644
--- a/dix/enterleave.c
+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
@@ -784,8 +784,9 @@ DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail,
mouse = IsFloating(dev) ? dev : GetMaster(dev, MASTER_POINTER);
- /* XI 2 event */
- btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(mouse->button->numButtons) : 0;
+ /* XI 2 event contains the logical button map - maps are CARD8
+ * so we need 256 bits for the possibly maximum mapping */
+ btlen = (mouse->button) ? bits_to_bytes(256) : 0;
btlen = bytes_to_int32(btlen);
len = sizeof(xXIFocusInEvent) + btlen * 4;
--
2.43.0

@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
From 45ea0a93934c8a3760a4d68ba4ffc932375f60de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:27:50 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] dix: Allocate sufficient xEvents for our
DeviceStateNotify
If a device has both a button class and a key class and numButtons is
zero, we can get an OOB write due to event under-allocation.
This function seems to assume a device has either keys or buttons, not
both. It has two virtually identical code paths, both of which assume
they're applying to the first event in the sequence.
A device with both a key and button class triggered a logic bug - only
one xEvent was allocated but the deviceStateNotify pointer was pushed on
once per type. So effectively this logic code:
int count = 1;
if (button && nbuttons > 32) count++;
if (key && nbuttons > 0) count++;
if (key && nkeys > 32) count++; // this is basically always true
// count is at 2 for our keys + zero button device
ev = alloc(count * sizeof(xEvent));
FixDeviceStateNotify(ev);
if (button)
FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++);
if (key)
FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); // santa drops into the wrong chimney here
If the device has more than 3 valuators, the OOB is pushed back - we're
off by one so it will happen when the last deviceValuator event is
written instead.
Fix this by allocating the maximum number of events we may allocate.
Note that the current behavior is not protocol-correct anyway, this
patch fixes only the allocation issue.
Note that this issue does not trigger if the device has at least one
button. While the server does not prevent a button class with zero
buttons, it is very unlikely.
CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
---
dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
index ded8679d76..17964b00a4 100644
--- a/dix/enterleave.c
+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static void
DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
{
int evcount = 1;
- deviceStateNotify *ev, *sev;
+ deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
+ deviceStateNotify *ev;
deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
@@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
}
}
- sev = ev = xallocarray(evcount, sizeof(xEvent));
+ ev = sev;
FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
if (b != NULL) {
@@ -770,7 +771,6 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
DeviceStateNotifyMask, NullGrab);
- free(sev);
}
void
--
2.43.0

@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
From 4c7a16b089b721b9c07f4ed593deba4f22158dbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 12:26:20 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/2] dix: fix DeviceStateNotify event calculation
The previous code only made sense if one considers buttons and keys to
be mutually exclusive on a device. That is not necessarily true, causing
a number of issues.
This function allocates and fills in the number of xEvents we need to
send the device state down the wire. This is split across multiple
32-byte devices including one deviceStateNotify event and optional
deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify and (possibly multiple)
deviceValuator events.
The previous behavior would instead compose a sequence
of [state, buttonstate, state, keystate, valuator...]. This is not
protocol correct, and on top of that made the code extremely convoluted.
Fix this by streamlining: add both button and key into the deviceStateNotify
and then append the key state and button state, followed by the
valuators. Finally, the deviceValuator events contain up to 6 valuators
per event but we only ever sent through 3 at a time. Let's double that
troughput.
CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
---
dix/enterleave.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
index 17964b00a4..7b7ba1098b 100644
--- a/dix/enterleave.c
+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
@@ -615,9 +615,15 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
ev->type = DeviceValuator;
ev->deviceid = dev->id;
- ev->num_valuators = nval < 3 ? nval : 3;
+ ev->num_valuators = nval < 6 ? nval : 6;
ev->first_valuator = first;
switch (ev->num_valuators) {
+ case 6:
+ ev->valuator5 = v->axisVal[first + 5];
+ case 5:
+ ev->valuator4 = v->axisVal[first + 4];
+ case 4:
+ ev->valuator3 = v->axisVal[first + 3];
case 3:
ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2];
case 2:
@@ -626,7 +632,6 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
ev->valuator0 = v->axisVal[first];
break;
}
- first += ev->num_valuators;
}
static void
@@ -646,7 +651,7 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
ev->num_buttons = b->numButtons;
memcpy((char *) ev->buttons, (char *) b->down, 4);
}
- else if (k) {
+ if (k) {
ev->classes_reported |= (1 << KeyClass);
ev->num_keys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code -
k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
@@ -670,15 +675,26 @@ FixDeviceStateNotify(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceStateNotify * ev, KeyClassPtr k,
}
}
-
+/**
+ * The device state notify event is split across multiple 32-byte events.
+ * The first one contains the first 32 button state bits, the first 32
+ * key state bits, and the first 3 valuator values.
+ *
+ * If a device has more than that, the server sends out:
+ * - one deviceButtonStateNotify for buttons 32 and above
+ * - one deviceKeyStateNotify for keys 32 and above
+ * - one deviceValuator event per 6 valuators above valuator 4
+ *
+ * All events but the last one have the deviceid binary ORed with MORE_EVENTS,
+ */
static void
DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
{
+ /* deviceStateNotify, deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify
+ * and one deviceValuator for each 6 valuators */
+ deviceStateNotify sev[3 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 6)/6];
int evcount = 1;
- deviceStateNotify sev[6 + (MAX_VALUATORS + 2)/3];
- deviceStateNotify *ev;
- deviceKeyStateNotify *kev;
- deviceButtonStateNotify *bev;
+ deviceStateNotify *ev = sev;
KeyClassPtr k;
ButtonClassPtr b;
@@ -691,82 +707,49 @@ DeliverStateNotifyEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win)
if ((b = dev->button) != NULL) {
nbuttons = b->numButtons;
- if (nbuttons > 32)
+ if (nbuttons > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
evcount++;
}
if ((k = dev->key) != NULL) {
nkeys = k->xkbInfo->desc->max_key_code - k->xkbInfo->desc->min_key_code;
- if (nkeys > 32)
+ if (nkeys > 32) /* first 32 are encoded in deviceStateNotify */
evcount++;
- if (nbuttons > 0) {
- evcount++;
- }
}
if ((v = dev->valuator) != NULL) {
nval = v->numAxes;
-
- if (nval > 3)
- evcount++;
- if (nval > 6) {
- if (!(k && b))
- evcount++;
- if (nval > 9)
- evcount += ((nval - 7) / 3);
- }
+ /* first three are encoded in deviceStateNotify, then
+ * it's 6 per deviceValuator event */
+ evcount += ((nval - 3) + 6)/6;
}
- ev = sev;
- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, NULL, NULL, NULL, first);
+ BUG_RETURN(evcount <= ARRAY_SIZE(sev));
- if (b != NULL) {
- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, b, v, first);
- first += 3;
- nval -= 3;
- if (nbuttons > 32) {
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
- bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ev++;
- bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
- bev->deviceid = dev->id;
- memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
- DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
- }
- if (nval > 0) {
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
- first += 3;
- nval -= 3;
- }
+ FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev, k, b, v, first);
+
+ if (b != NULL && nbuttons > 32) {
+ deviceButtonStateNotify *bev = (deviceButtonStateNotify *) ++ev;
+ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
+ bev->type = DeviceButtonStateNotify;
+ bev->deviceid = dev->id;
+ memcpy((char *) &bev->buttons[4], (char *) &b->down[4],
+ DOWN_LENGTH - 4);
}
- if (k != NULL) {
- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, k, NULL, v, first);
- first += 3;
- nval -= 3;
- if (nkeys > 32) {
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
- kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ev++;
- kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
- kev->deviceid = dev->id;
- memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
- }
- if (nval > 0) {
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
- first += 3;
- nval -= 3;
- }
+ if (k != NULL && nkeys > 32) {
+ deviceKeyStateNotify *kev = (deviceKeyStateNotify *) ++ev;
+ (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
+ kev->type = DeviceKeyStateNotify;
+ kev->deviceid = dev->id;
+ memmove((char *) &kev->keys[0], (char *) &k->down[4], 28);
}
+ first = 3;
+ nval -= 3;
while (nval > 0) {
- FixDeviceStateNotify(dev, ev++, NULL, NULL, v, first);
- first += 3;
- nval -= 3;
- if (nval > 0) {
- (ev - 1)->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
- FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ev++, v, first);
- first += 3;
- nval -= 3;
- }
+ ev->deviceid |= MORE_EVENTS;
+ FixDeviceValuator(dev, (deviceValuator *) ++ev, v, first);
+ first += 6;
+ nval -= 6;
}
DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, win, (xEvent *) sev, evcount,
--
2.43.0

@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 061eb684996627347acdf87ec11d108cedee71b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 13:48:10 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: when creating a new ButtonClass, set the number
of buttons
There's a racy sequence where a master device may copy the button class
from the slave, without ever initializing numButtons. This leads to a
device with zero buttons but a button class which is invalid.
Let's copy the numButtons value from the source - by definition if we
don't have a button class yet we do not have any other slave devices
with more than this number of buttons anyway.
CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
---
Xi/exevents.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
index 54ea11a938..e161714682 100644
--- a/Xi/exevents.c
+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
to->button = calloc(1, sizeof(ButtonClassRec));
if (!to->button)
FatalError("[Xi] no memory for class shift.\n");
+ to->button->numButtons = from->button->numButtons;
}
else
classes->button = NULL;
--
2.43.0

@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
From a483b5c7724469309e3df427730cbb8b805b9c9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:01:24 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: flush hierarchy events after adding/removing
master devices
The `XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent()` function allocates space to store up
to `MAXDEVICES` (256) `xXIHierarchyInfo` structures in `info`.
If a device with a given ID was removed and a new device with the same
ID added both in the same operation, the single device ID will lead to
two info structures being written to `info`.
Since this case can occur for every device ID at once, a total of two
times `MAXDEVICES` info structures might be written to the allocation.
To avoid it, once one add/remove master is processed, send out the
device hierarchy event for the current state and continue. That event
thus only ever has exactly one of either added/removed in it (and
optionally slave attached/detached).
CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
---
Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
index 01eb7a8af4..67eedddec6 100644
--- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
+++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
@@ -340,6 +340,11 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */
int rc = Success;
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
+ enum {
+ NO_CHANGE,
+ FLUSH,
+ CHANGED,
+ } changes = NO_CHANGE;
REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
@@ -389,8 +394,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
- }
+ changes = FLUSH;
break;
+ }
case XIRemoveMaster:
{
xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
@@ -399,8 +405,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
- }
+ changes = FLUSH;
break;
+ }
case XIDetachSlave:
{
xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
@@ -409,8 +416,9 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
- }
+ changes = CHANGED;
break;
+ }
case XIAttachSlave:
{
xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
@@ -495,16 +503,25 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
+ changes = CHANGED;
+ break;
}
+ default:
break;
}
+ if (changes == FLUSH) {
+ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
+ memset(flags, 0, sizeof(flags));
+ changes = NO_CHANGE;
+ }
+
len -= any->length * 4;
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
}
unwind:
-
- XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
+ if (changes != NO_CHANGE)
+ XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
return rc;
}
--
2.43.0

@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
From 4e0e99ef60f07757756913221847a26c71afc3e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Exp=C3=B3sito?= <jexposit@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 18:28:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Xi: do not keep linked list pointer during recursion
The `DisableDevice()` function is called whenever an enabled device
is disabled and it moves the device from the `inputInfo.devices` linked
list to the `inputInfo.off_devices` linked list.
However, its link/unlink operation has an issue during the recursive
call to `DisableDevice()` due to the `prev` pointer pointing to a
removed device.
This issue leads to a length mismatch between the total number of
devices and the number of device in the list, leading to a heap
overflow and, possibly, to local privilege escalation.
Simplify the code that checked whether the device passed to
`DisableDevice()` was in `inputInfo.devices` or not and find the
previous device after the recursion.
CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
---
dix/devices.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
index 3f3224d62..3a64d8702 100644
--- a/dix/devices.c
+++ b/dix/devices.c
@@ -451,14 +451,20 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
{
DeviceIntPtr *prev, other;
BOOL enabled;
+ BOOL dev_in_devices_list = FALSE;
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
if (!dev->enabled)
return TRUE;
- for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
- *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
- if (*prev != dev)
+ for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
+ if (other == dev) {
+ dev_in_devices_list = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!dev_in_devices_list)
return FALSE;
TouchEndPhysicallyActiveTouches(dev);
@@ -509,6 +515,9 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
LeaveWindow(dev);
SetFocusOut(dev);
+ for (prev = &inputInfo.devices;
+ *prev && (*prev != dev); prev = &(*prev)->next);
+
*prev = dev->next;
dev->next = inputInfo.off_devices;
inputInfo.off_devices = dev;
--
2.43.0

@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From 1a5e3c3e68d4f965077ea6a40ba57cc0d5a4e8cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 09:40:27 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: when disabling a master, float disabled slaved
devices too
Disabling a master device floats all slave devices but we didn't do this
to already-disabled slave devices. As a result those devices kept their
reference to the master device resulting in access to already freed
memory if the master device was removed before the corresponding slave
device.
And to match this behavior, also forcibly reset that pointer during
CloseDownDevices().
Related to CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
---
dix/devices.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
index c7fa8fad69..87f4d4a213 100644
--- a/dix/devices.c
+++ b/dix/devices.c
@@ -482,6 +482,13 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
}
}
+
+ for (other = inputInfo.off_devices; other; other = other->next) {
+ if (!IsMaster(other) && GetMaster(other, MASTER_ATTACHED) == dev) {
+ AttachDevice(NULL, other, NULL);
+ flags[other->id] |= XISlaveDetached;
+ }
+ }
}
else {
for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
@@ -1088,6 +1095,11 @@ CloseDownDevices(void)
dev->master = NULL;
}
+ for (dev = inputInfo.off_devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
+ if (!IsMaster(dev) && !IsFloating(dev))
+ dev->master = NULL;
+ }
+
CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.devices);
CloseDeviceList(&inputInfo.off_devices);
--
2.43.0

@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
From 1801fe0ac3926882d47d7e1ad6c0518a2cdffd41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2021 18:11:07 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] dix: Fix use after free in input device shutdown
This fixes access to freed heap memory via dev->master. E.g. when
running BarrierNotify.ReceivesNotifyEvents/7 test from
xorg-integration-tests:
==24736==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address
0x619000065020 at pc 0x55c450e2b9cf bp 0x7fffc532fd20 sp 0x7fffc532fd10
READ of size 4 at 0x619000065020 thread T0
#0 0x55c450e2b9ce in GetMaster ../../../dix/devices.c:2722
#1 0x55c450e9d035 in IsFloating ../../../dix/events.c:346
#2 0x55c4513209c6 in GetDeviceUse ../../../Xi/xiquerydevice.c:525
../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:95
#4 0x55c450e3455c in RemoveDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1204
../../../hw/xfree86/common/xf86Xinput.c:1142
#6 0x55c450e17b04 in CloseDeviceList ../../../dix/devices.c:1038
#7 0x55c450e1de85 in CloseDownDevices ../../../dix/devices.c:1068
#8 0x55c450e837ef in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:302
#9 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564)
#11 0x55c450d0113d in _start (/usr/lib/xorg/Xorg+0x117713d)
0x619000065020 is located 160 bytes inside of 912-byte region
[0x619000064f80,0x619000065310)
freed by thread T0 here:
(/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10d7cf)
#1 0x55c450e19f1c in CloseDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1014
#2 0x55c450e343a4 in RemoveDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1186
../../../hw/xfree86/common/xf86Xinput.c:1142
#4 0x55c450e17b04 in CloseDeviceList ../../../dix/devices.c:1038
#5 0x55c450e1de85 in CloseDownDevices ../../../dix/devices.c:1068
#6 0x55c450e837ef in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:302
#7 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564)
previously allocated by thread T0 here:
(/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10ddc6)
#1 0x55c450e1c57b in AddInputDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:259
#2 0x55c450e34840 in AllocDevicePair ../../../dix/devices.c:2755
#3 0x55c45130318f in add_master ../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:152
../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:465
#5 0x55c4512cb9f5 in ProcIDispatch ../../../Xi/extinit.c:390
#6 0x55c450e6a92b in Dispatch ../../../dix/dispatch.c:551
#7 0x55c450e834b7 in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:272
#8 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564)
The problem is caused by dev->master being not reset when disabling the
device, which then causes dangling pointer when the master device itself
is being deleted when exiting whole server.
Note that RecalculateMasterButtons() requires dev->master to be still
valid, so we can reset it only at the end of function.
Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
---
dix/devices.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
index e62c34c55..5f9ce1678 100644
--- a/dix/devices.c
+++ b/dix/devices.c
@@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ DisableDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev, BOOL sendevent)
}
RecalculateMasterButtons(dev);
+ dev->master = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
--
2.43.0

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
Name: tigervnc
Version: 1.13.1
Release: 2%{?dist}.4
Release: 2%{?dist}.7
Summary: A TigerVNC remote display system
%global _hardened_build 1
@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ Patch3: tigervnc-dont-install-appstream-metadata-file.patch
# Upstream patches
# Upstreamable patches
Patch80: tigervnc-dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device.patch
# This is tigervnc-%%{version}/unix/xserver116.patch rebased on the latest xorg
Patch100: tigervnc-xserver120.patch
# 1326867 - [RHEL7.3] GLX applications in an Xvnc session fails to start
@ -38,6 +41,16 @@ Patch200: xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch
Patch201: xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch
Patch202: xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch
Patch203: xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch
Patch204: xorg-CVE-2023-6816.patch
Patch205: xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1.patch
Patch206: xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2.patch
Patch207: xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3.patch
Patch208: xorg-CVE-2024-21885.patch
Patch209: xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1.patch
Patch210: xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2.patch
# Related to CVE-2024-21886
Patch211: xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown.patch
BuildRequires: make
BuildRequires: gcc-c++
@ -194,12 +207,23 @@ done
%patch201 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-5380
%patch202 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-6377
%patch203 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-6478
%patch204 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-6816
%patch205 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-0229-1
%patch206 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-0229-2
%patch207 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-0229-3
%patch208 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-21885
%patch209 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1
%patch210 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2
%patch211 -p1 -b .xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown
popd
%patch1 -p1 -b .use-gnome-as-default-session
%patch2 -p1 -b .vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service
%patch3 -p1 -b .dont-install-appstream-metadata-file.patch
# Upstreamable patches
%patch80 -p1 -b .dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device
%build
%ifarch sparcv9 sparc64 s390 s390x
export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fPIC"
@ -353,6 +377,26 @@ fi
%ghost %verify(not md5 size mode mtime) %{_sharedstatedir}/selinux/%{selinuxtype}/active/modules/200/%{modulename}
%changelog
* Thu Jan 25 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-3.7
- Fix use after free related to CVE-2024-21886
Resolves: RHEL-20432
- Fix copy/paste error in the DeviceStateNotify
Resolves: RHEL-20583
* Fri Jan 19 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-3.6
- Don't try to get pointer position when the pointer becomes a floating device
Resolves: RHEL-20432
* Fri Jan 12 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-3.5
- Fix CVE-2024-21886 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: heap buffer overflow in DisableDevice
Resolves: RHEL-20432
- Fix CVE-2024-21885 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: heap buffer overflow in XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent
Resolves: RHEL-20420
- Fix CVE-2024-0229 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: reattaching to different master device may lead to out-of-bounds memory access
Resolves: RHEL-20583
- Fix CVE-2023-6816 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overflow in DeviceFocusEvent and ProcXIQueryPointer
Resolves: RHEL-21252
* Wed Dec 13 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-2.4
- Updated fix for CVE-2023-6377 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory reads/writes in XKB button actions
Resolves: RHEL-18409

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