From 0790f1285e850cada9ad6904801a35b9ed073724 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: MSVSphere Packaging Team Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2024 03:34:19 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] import tigervnc-1.13.1-3.el9_3.3 --- SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch | 59 +++++++++++++++++++ SPECS/tigervnc.spec | 51 +++++++++++++--- 5 files changed, 355 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99625dd --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +From a31ba141824a7649e11f0ef7673718ce559d6337 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend + +The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at +least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new +part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P +existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements +instead of N + P. + +Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old +values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially +uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes. +For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would +result in this 8 value array: + [N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P + ^OOB write + +The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in +both. + +CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++-- + randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c +index 6ec419e870..563c4f31a5 100644 +--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c ++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c +@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type, + XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop); + return BadAlloc; + } +- new_value.size = len; ++ new_value.size = total_len; + new_value.type = type; + new_value.format = format; + +@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type, + case PropModePrepend: + new_data = new_value.data; + old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) + +- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes)); ++ (len * size_in_bytes)); + break; + } + if (new_data) +diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c +index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c +@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type, + RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop); + return BadAlloc; + } +- new_value.size = len; ++ new_value.size = total_len; + new_value.type = type; + new_value.format = format; + +@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type, + case PropModePrepend: + new_data = new_value.data; + old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) + +- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes)); ++ (len * size_in_bytes)); + break; + } + if (new_data) +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cbe9804 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +From 004f461c440cb6611eefb48fbbb4fa53a6d49f80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 12:19:45 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] mi: reset the PointerWindows reference on screen + switch + +PointerWindows[] keeps a reference to the last window our sprite +entered - changes are usually handled by CheckMotion(). + +If we switch between screens via XWarpPointer our +dev->spriteInfo->sprite->win is set to the new screen's root window. +If there's another window at the cursor location CheckMotion() will +trigger the right enter/leave events later. If there is not, it skips +that process and we never trigger LeaveWindow() - PointerWindows[] for +the device still refers to the previous window. + +If that window is destroyed we have a dangling reference that will +eventually cause a use-after-free bug when checking the window hierarchy +later. + +To trigger this, we require: +- two protocol screens +- XWarpPointer to the other screen's root window +- XDestroyWindow before entering any other window + +This is a niche bug so we hack around it by making sure we reset the +PointerWindows[] entry so we cannot have a dangling pointer. This +doesn't handle Enter/Leave events correctly but the previous code didn't +either. + +CVE-2023-5380, ZDI-CAN-21608 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Sri working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson +--- + dix/enterleave.h | 2 -- + include/eventstr.h | 3 +++ + mi/mipointer.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- + 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dix/enterleave.h b/dix/enterleave.h +index 4b833d8a3b..e8af924c68 100644 +--- a/dix/enterleave.h ++++ b/dix/enterleave.h +@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ extern void DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, + + extern void EnterWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win, int mode); + +-extern void LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev); +- + extern void CoreFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr kbd, + int type, int mode, int detail, WindowPtr pWin); + +diff --git a/include/eventstr.h b/include/eventstr.h +index bf3b95fe4a..2bae3b0767 100644 +--- a/include/eventstr.h ++++ b/include/eventstr.h +@@ -296,4 +296,7 @@ union _InternalEvent { + #endif + }; + ++extern void ++LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev); ++ + #endif +diff --git a/mi/mipointer.c b/mi/mipointer.c +index 75be1aeeb8..b12ae9be1d 100644 +--- a/mi/mipointer.c ++++ b/mi/mipointer.c +@@ -397,8 +397,21 @@ miPointerWarpCursor(DeviceIntPtr pDev, ScreenPtr pScreen, int x, int y) + #ifdef PANORAMIX + && noPanoramiXExtension + #endif +- ) +- UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen); ++ ) { ++ DeviceIntPtr master = GetMaster(pDev, MASTER_POINTER); ++ /* Hack for CVE-2023-5380: if we're moving ++ * screens PointerWindows[] keeps referring to the ++ * old window. If that gets destroyed we have a UAF ++ * bug later. Only happens when jumping from a window ++ * to the root window on the other screen. ++ * Enter/Leave events are incorrect for that case but ++ * too niche to fix. ++ */ ++ LeaveWindow(pDev); ++ if (master) ++ LeaveWindow(master); ++ UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen); ++ } + } + + /** +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf5e170 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +From 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:19:04 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons + +button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all +our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating +insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in +XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with, +leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies. + +CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + Xi/exevents.c | 12 ++++++------ + dix/devices.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c +index dcd4efb3bc..54ea11a938 100644 +--- a/Xi/exevents.c ++++ b/Xi/exevents.c +@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to) + } + + if (from->button->xkb_acts) { +- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) { +- to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction)); +- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) +- FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n"); +- } ++ size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons); ++ to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts, ++ maxbuttons, ++ sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction)); + memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts, +- sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction)); + } + else { + free(to->button->xkb_acts); +diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c +index b063128df0..3f3224d626 100644 +--- a/dix/devices.c ++++ b/dix/devices.c +@@ -2539,6 +2539,8 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave) + + if (master->button && master->button->numButtons != maxbuttons) { + int i; ++ int last_num_buttons = master->button->numButtons; ++ + DeviceChangedEvent event = { + .header = ET_Internal, + .type = ET_DeviceChanged, +@@ -2549,6 +2551,14 @@ RecalculateMasterButtons(DeviceIntPtr slave) + }; + + master->button->numButtons = maxbuttons; ++ if (last_num_buttons < maxbuttons) { ++ master->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(master->button->xkb_acts, ++ maxbuttons, ++ sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ memset(&master->button->xkb_acts[last_num_buttons], ++ 0, ++ (maxbuttons - last_num_buttons) * sizeof(XkbAction)); ++ } + + memcpy(&event.buttons.names, master->button->labels, maxbuttons * + sizeof(Atom)); +-- +GitLab diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d6bf8e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From 3e0222fcae552685d423914a683c1709dc5f6d6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:27:49 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] randr: avoid integer truncation in length check of + ProcRRChange*Property + +Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty. +See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core +protocol and XI. + +This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure. + +Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With +the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was +truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check. + +The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes +(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it +finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least +stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB. + +CVE-2023-XXXXX, ZDI-CAN-22561 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative +--- + randr/rrproperty.c | 2 +- + randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c +index 25469f57b2..c4fef8a1f6 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c +@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ ProcRRChangeOutputProperty(ClientPtr client) + char format, mode; + unsigned long len; + int sizeInBytes; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + int err; + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeOutputPropertyReq); +diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c +index b79c17f9bf..90c5a9a933 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c +@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ ProcRRChangeProviderProperty(ClientPtr client) + char format, mode; + unsigned long len; + int sizeInBytes; +- int totalSize; ++ uint64_t totalSize; + int err; + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRChangeProviderPropertyReq); +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/SPECS/tigervnc.spec b/SPECS/tigervnc.spec index a921d69..4f521dc 100644 --- a/SPECS/tigervnc.spec +++ b/SPECS/tigervnc.spec @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Name: tigervnc Version: 1.13.1 -Release: 2%{?dist} +Release: 3%{?dist}.3 Summary: A TigerVNC remote display system %global _hardened_build 1 @@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ Patch100: tigervnc-xserver120.patch # 1326867 - [RHEL7.3] GLX applications in an Xvnc session fails to start Patch101: 0001-rpath-hack.patch +# Xorg CVEs +Patch200: xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch +Patch201: xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch +Patch202: xorg-CVE-2023-6377.patch +Patch203: xorg-CVE-2023-6478.patch + BuildRequires: make BuildRequires: gcc-c++ BuildRequires: gettext @@ -156,15 +162,20 @@ This package contains icons for TigerVNC viewer %package selinux Summary: SELinux module for TigerVNC BuildArch: noarch +BuildRequires: pkgconfig(systemd) +BuildRequires: selinux-policy BuildRequires: selinux-policy-devel -Requires: selinux-policy-%{selinuxtype} -Requires(post): selinux-policy-%{selinuxtype} -BuildRequires: selinux-policy-devel -# Required for matchpathcon -Requires: libselinux-utils # Required for restorecon Requires: policycoreutils -%{?selinux_requires} +# Required for matchpathcon +Requires: libselinux-utils +Requires: selinux-policy +Requires: selinux-policy-%{selinuxtype} +Requires(post): selinux-policy-base +Requires(post): selinux-policy-%{selinuxtype} +Requires(post): libselinux-utils +Requires(post): policycoreutils +Requires(post): policycoreutils-python-utils %description selinux This package provides the SELinux policy module to ensure TigerVNC @@ -180,6 +191,10 @@ for all in `find . -type f -perm -001`; do done %patch100 -p1 -b .xserver120-rebased %patch101 -p1 -b .rpath +%patch200 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-5367 +%patch201 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-5380 +%patch202 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-6377 +%patch203 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-6478 popd %patch1 -p1 -b .use-gnome-as-default-session @@ -365,9 +380,29 @@ fi %files selinux %{_datadir}/selinux/packages/%{selinuxtype}/%{modulename}.pp.* -%ghost %verify(not md5 size mtime) %{_sharedstatedir}/selinux/%{selinuxtype}/active/modules/200/%{modulename} +%ghost %verify(not md5 size mode mtime) %{_sharedstatedir}/selinux/%{selinuxtype}/active/modules/200/%{modulename} %changelog +* Wed Dec 13 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.3 +- Updated fix for CVE-2023-6377 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory reads/writes in XKB button actions + Resolves: RHEL-18413 + +* Mon Dec 11 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.2 +- Rebuild (selinux-policy) + Resolves: RHEL-18413 + Resolves: RHEL-18425 + +* Wed Dec 07 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3.1 +- Fix CVE-2023-6377 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory reads/writes in XKB button actions + Resolves: RHEL-18413 +- Fix CVE-2023-6478 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory read in RRChangeOutputProperty and RRChangeProviderProperty + Resolves: RHEL-18425 + +* Thu Nov 02 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-3 +- Fix CVE-2023-5380 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Use-after-free bug in DestroyWindow +- Fix CVE-2023-5367 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Out-of-bounds write in XIChangeDeviceProperty/RRChangeOutputProperty + Resolves: RHEL-15233 + * Tue Apr 11 2023 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-2 - xorg-x11-server: X.Org Server Overlay Window Use-After-Free Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability