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systemd/SOURCES/0495-tree-wide-use-CLEANUP_...

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From a86b58ed1419b9af8a486dcaf95608eb07241965 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 12:39:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] tree-wide: use CLEANUP_ERASE() at various places
Let's use this new macro wherever it makes sense, as it allows us to
shorten or clean-up paths, and makes it less likely to miss a return
path.
(cherry picked from commit 692597c84395ad2b3f8e221bb1eca55a9dfc544f)
Related: RHEL-16182
---
src/home/homework-fscrypt.c | 58 ++++++++++--------------------
src/shared/ask-password-api.c | 66 +++++++++++++----------------------
src/shared/creds-util.c | 24 ++++++-------
src/shared/ethtool-util.c | 11 +++---
src/shared/tpm2-util.c | 15 ++++----
5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/home/homework-fscrypt.c b/src/home/homework-fscrypt.c
index bd32393d93..455a4c88fc 100644
--- a/src/home/homework-fscrypt.c
+++ b/src/home/homework-fscrypt.c
@@ -58,10 +58,10 @@ static int fscrypt_upload_volume_key(
};
memcpy(key.raw, volume_key, volume_key_size);
+ CLEANUP_ERASE(key);
+
/* Upload to the kernel */
serial = add_key("logon", description, &key, sizeof(key), where);
- explicit_bzero_safe(&key, sizeof(key));
-
if (serial < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to install master key in keyring: %m");
@@ -124,20 +124,18 @@ static int fscrypt_slot_try_one(
* resulting hash.
*/
+ CLEANUP_ERASE(derived);
+
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(
password, strlen(password),
salt, salt_size,
0xFFFF, EVP_sha512(),
- sizeof(derived), derived) != 1) {
- r = log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE), "PBKDF2 failed");
- goto finish;
- }
+ sizeof(derived), derived) != 1)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE), "PBKDF2 failed");
context = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- if (!context) {
- r = log_oom();
- goto finish;
- }
+ if (!context)
+ return log_oom();
/* We use AES256 in counter mode */
assert_se(cc = EVP_aes_256_ctr());
@@ -145,13 +143,8 @@ static int fscrypt_slot_try_one(
/* We only use the first half of the derived key */
assert(sizeof(derived) >= (size_t) EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cc));
- if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(context, cc, NULL, derived, NULL) != 1) {
- r = log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initialize decryption context.");
- goto finish;
- }
-
- /* Flush out the derived key now, we don't need it anymore */
- explicit_bzero_safe(derived, sizeof(derived));
+ if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(context, cc, NULL, derived, NULL) != 1)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initialize decryption context.");
decrypted_size = encrypted_size + EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cc) * 2;
decrypted = malloc(decrypted_size);
@@ -184,10 +177,6 @@ static int fscrypt_slot_try_one(
*ret_decrypted_size = decrypted_size;
return 0;
-
-finish:
- explicit_bzero_safe(derived, sizeof(derived));
- return r;
}
static int fscrypt_slot_try_many(
@@ -414,20 +403,18 @@ static int fscrypt_slot_set(
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to generate salt: %m");
+ CLEANUP_ERASE(derived);
+
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(
password, strlen(password),
salt, sizeof(salt),
0xFFFF, EVP_sha512(),
- sizeof(derived), derived) != 1) {
- r = log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE), "PBKDF2 failed");
- goto finish;
- }
+ sizeof(derived), derived) != 1)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE), "PBKDF2 failed");
context = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- if (!context) {
- r = log_oom();
- goto finish;
- }
+ if (!context)
+ return log_oom();
/* We use AES256 in counter mode */
cc = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
@@ -435,13 +422,8 @@ static int fscrypt_slot_set(
/* We only use the first half of the derived key */
assert(sizeof(derived) >= (size_t) EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cc));
- if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(context, cc, NULL, derived, NULL) != 1) {
- r = log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initialize encryption context.");
- goto finish;
- }
-
- /* Flush out the derived key now, we don't need it anymore */
- explicit_bzero_safe(derived, sizeof(derived));
+ if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(context, cc, NULL, derived, NULL) != 1)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initialize encryption context.");
encrypted_size = volume_key_size + EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cc) * 2;
encrypted = malloc(encrypted_size);
@@ -478,10 +460,6 @@ static int fscrypt_slot_set(
log_info("Written key slot %s.", label);
return 0;
-
-finish:
- explicit_bzero_safe(derived, sizeof(derived));
- return r;
}
int home_create_fscrypt(
diff --git a/src/shared/ask-password-api.c b/src/shared/ask-password-api.c
index 871af2ec99..5f05271caa 100644
--- a/src/shared/ask-password-api.c
+++ b/src/shared/ask-password-api.c
@@ -253,6 +253,8 @@ int ask_password_plymouth(
if (r < 0)
return r;
+ CLEANUP_ERASE(buffer);
+
pollfd[POLL_SOCKET].fd = fd;
pollfd[POLL_SOCKET].events = POLLIN;
pollfd[POLL_INOTIFY].fd = notify;
@@ -266,20 +268,16 @@ int ask_password_plymouth(
else
timeout = USEC_INFINITY;
- if (flag_file && access(flag_file, F_OK) < 0) {
- r = -errno;
- goto finish;
- }
+ if (flag_file && access(flag_file, F_OK) < 0)
+ return -errno;
r = ppoll_usec(pollfd, notify >= 0 ? 2 : 1, timeout);
if (r == -EINTR)
continue;
if (r < 0)
- goto finish;
- if (r == 0) {
- r = -ETIME;
- goto finish;
- }
+ return r;
+ if (r == 0)
+ return -ETIME;
if (notify >= 0 && pollfd[POLL_INOTIFY].revents != 0)
(void) flush_fd(notify);
@@ -292,13 +290,10 @@ int ask_password_plymouth(
if (ERRNO_IS_TRANSIENT(errno))
continue;
- r = -errno;
- goto finish;
- }
- if (k == 0) {
- r = -EIO;
- goto finish;
+ return -errno;
}
+ if (k == 0)
+ return -EIO;
p += k;
@@ -310,14 +305,12 @@ int ask_password_plymouth(
* with a normal password request */
packet = mfree(packet);
- if (asprintf(&packet, "*\002%c%s%n", (int) (strlen(message) + 1), message, &n) < 0) {
- r = -ENOMEM;
- goto finish;
- }
+ if (asprintf(&packet, "*\002%c%s%n", (int) (strlen(message) + 1), message, &n) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
r = loop_write(fd, packet, n+1, true);
if (r < 0)
- goto finish;
+ return r;
flags &= ~ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED;
p = 0;
@@ -325,8 +318,7 @@ int ask_password_plymouth(
}
/* No password, because UI not shown */
- r = -ENOENT;
- goto finish;
+ return -ENOENT;
} else if (IN_SET(buffer[0], 2, 9)) {
uint32_t size;
@@ -338,35 +330,25 @@ int ask_password_plymouth(
memcpy(&size, buffer+1, sizeof(size));
size = le32toh(size);
- if (size + 5 > sizeof(buffer)) {
- r = -EIO;
- goto finish;
- }
+ if (size + 5 > sizeof(buffer))
+ return -EIO;
if (p-5 < size)
continue;
l = strv_parse_nulstr(buffer + 5, size);
- if (!l) {
- r = -ENOMEM;
- goto finish;
- }
+ if (!l)
+ return -ENOMEM;
*ret = l;
break;
- } else {
+ } else
/* Unknown packet */
- r = -EIO;
- goto finish;
- }
+ return -EIO;
}
- r = 0;
-
-finish:
- explicit_bzero_safe(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
- return r;
+ return 0;
}
#define NO_ECHO "(no echo) "
@@ -428,6 +410,8 @@ int ask_password_tty(
return -errno;
}
+ CLEANUP_ERASE(passphrase);
+
/* If the caller didn't specify a TTY, then use the controlling tty, if we can. */
if (ttyfd < 0)
ttyfd = cttyfd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
@@ -631,7 +615,6 @@ int ask_password_tty(
}
x = strndup(passphrase, p);
- explicit_bzero_safe(passphrase, sizeof(passphrase));
if (!x) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto finish;
@@ -891,6 +874,8 @@ int ask_password_agent(
goto finish;
}
+ CLEANUP_ERASE(passphrase);
+
cmsg_close_all(&msghdr);
if (n == 0) {
@@ -915,7 +900,6 @@ int ask_password_agent(
l = strv_new("");
else
l = strv_parse_nulstr(passphrase+1, n-1);
- explicit_bzero_safe(passphrase, n);
if (!l) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto finish;
diff --git a/src/shared/creds-util.c b/src/shared/creds-util.c
index ecf90e2084..9ac0320c58 100644
--- a/src/shared/creds-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/creds-util.c
@@ -165,7 +165,6 @@ static int make_credential_host_secret(
void **ret_data,
size_t *ret_size) {
- struct credential_host_secret_format buf;
_cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
int r;
@@ -189,21 +188,23 @@ static int make_credential_host_secret(
if (r < 0)
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set file attributes for secrets file, ignoring: %m");
- buf = (struct credential_host_secret_format) {
+ struct credential_host_secret_format buf = {
.machine_id = machine_id,
};
+ CLEANUP_ERASE(buf);
+
r = crypto_random_bytes(buf.data, sizeof(buf.data));
if (r < 0)
- goto finish;
+ goto fail;
r = loop_write(fd, &buf, sizeof(buf), false);
if (r < 0)
- goto finish;
+ goto fail;
if (fsync(fd) < 0) {
r = -errno;
- goto finish;
+ goto fail;
}
warn_not_encrypted(fd, flags, dirname, fn);
@@ -211,17 +212,17 @@ static int make_credential_host_secret(
if (t) {
r = rename_noreplace(dfd, t, dfd, fn);
if (r < 0)
- goto finish;
+ goto fail;
t = mfree(t);
} else if (linkat(fd, "", dfd, fn, AT_EMPTY_PATH) < 0) {
r = -errno;
- goto finish;
+ goto fail;
}
if (fsync(dfd) < 0) {
r = -errno;
- goto finish;
+ goto fail;
}
if (ret_data) {
@@ -230,7 +231,7 @@ static int make_credential_host_secret(
copy = memdup(buf.data, sizeof(buf.data));
if (!copy) {
r = -ENOMEM;
- goto finish;
+ goto fail;
}
*ret_data = copy;
@@ -239,13 +240,12 @@ static int make_credential_host_secret(
if (ret_size)
*ret_size = sizeof(buf.data);
- r = 0;
+ return 0;
-finish:
+fail:
if (t && unlinkat(dfd, t, 0) < 0)
log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remove temporary credential key: %m");
- explicit_bzero_safe(&buf, sizeof(buf));
return r;
}
diff --git a/src/shared/ethtool-util.c b/src/shared/ethtool-util.c
index e39b2f754b..1900537917 100644
--- a/src/shared/ethtool-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/ethtool-util.c
@@ -434,6 +434,8 @@ int ethtool_set_wol(
strscpy(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), ifname);
+ CLEANUP_ERASE(ecmd);
+
if (ioctl(*ethtool_fd, SIOCETHTOOL, &ifr) < 0)
return -errno;
@@ -466,16 +468,11 @@ int ethtool_set_wol(
need_update = true;
}
- if (!need_update) {
- explicit_bzero_safe(&ecmd, sizeof(ecmd));
+ if (!need_update)
return 0;
- }
ecmd.cmd = ETHTOOL_SWOL;
- r = RET_NERRNO(ioctl(*ethtool_fd, SIOCETHTOOL, &ifr));
-
- explicit_bzero_safe(&ecmd, sizeof(ecmd));
- return r;
+ return RET_NERRNO(ioctl(*ethtool_fd, SIOCETHTOOL, &ifr));
}
int ethtool_set_nic_buffer_size(int *ethtool_fd, const char *ifname, const netdev_ring_param *ring) {
diff --git a/src/shared/tpm2-util.c b/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
index d1a4e9cd11..7e98ec851b 100644
--- a/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
@@ -778,13 +778,14 @@ static void hash_pin(const char *pin, size_t len, TPM2B_AUTH *auth) {
assert(auth);
assert(pin);
+
auth->size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ CLEANUP_ERASE(hash);
+
sha256_init_ctx(&hash);
sha256_process_bytes(pin, len, &hash);
sha256_finish_ctx(&hash, auth->buffer);
-
- explicit_bzero_safe(&hash, sizeof(hash));
}
static int tpm2_make_encryption_session(
@@ -816,11 +817,11 @@ static int tpm2_make_encryption_session(
if (pin) {
TPM2B_AUTH auth = {};
+ CLEANUP_ERASE(auth);
+
hash_pin(pin, strlen(pin), &auth);
rc = sym_Esys_TR_SetAuth(c, bind_key, &auth);
- /* ESAPI knows about it, so clear it from our memory */
- explicit_bzero_safe(&auth, sizeof(auth));
if (rc != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS)
return log_error_errno(
SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE),
@@ -1412,8 +1413,8 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
static const TPML_PCR_SELECTION creation_pcr = {};
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *secret = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ void *blob = NULL, *hash = NULL;
- TPM2B_SENSITIVE_CREATE hmac_sensitive;
ESYS_TR primary = ESYS_TR_NONE, session = ESYS_TR_NONE;
+ TPM2B_SENSITIVE_CREATE hmac_sensitive;
TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC primary_alg;
TPM2B_PUBLIC hmac_template;
TPMI_ALG_HASH pcr_bank;
@@ -1453,6 +1454,8 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
start = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
+ CLEANUP_ERASE(hmac_sensitive);
+
r = tpm2_context_init(device, &c);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -1541,7 +1544,6 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
}
secret = memdup(hmac_sensitive.sensitive.data.buffer, hmac_sensitive.sensitive.data.size);
- explicit_bzero_safe(hmac_sensitive.sensitive.data.buffer, hmac_sensitive.sensitive.data.size);
if (!secret) {
r = log_oom();
goto finish;
@@ -1602,7 +1604,6 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
r = 0;
finish:
- explicit_bzero_safe(&hmac_sensitive, sizeof(hmac_sensitive));
primary = tpm2_flush_context_verbose(c.esys_context, primary);
session = tpm2_flush_context_verbose(c.esys_context, session);
return r;
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