From fba19100f4802056078bf9056e9176d02dc825ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: MSVSphere Packaging Team Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2023 17:04:55 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] import samba-4.17.5-3.el8_8 --- SOURCES/CVE-2023-3347-signing-4.17-01.patch | 441 ++++++++++++++++++ ...-4.17-fix-netlogon-capability-level2.patch | 356 ++++++++++++++ SPECS/samba.spec | 9 +- 3 files changed, 805 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 SOURCES/CVE-2023-3347-signing-4.17-01.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/samba-4.17-fix-netlogon-capability-level2.patch diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2023-3347-signing-4.17-01.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-3347-signing-4.17-01.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4ab4892 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-3347-signing-4.17-01.patch @@ -0,0 +1,441 @@ +From 2c987aa203f12390c51810e4fbca6a176180a8b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme +Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 12:46:31 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/5] CVE-2023-3347: CI: add a test for server-side mandatory + signing + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15397 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme +--- + .../samba3.smb2.session-require-signing | 1 + + selftest/target/Samba3.pm | 1 + + source3/selftest/tests.py | 2 + + source4/torture/smb2/session.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++ + source4/torture/smb2/smb2.c | 1 + + 5 files changed, 69 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing + +diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000000..53b7a7022a83 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing +@@ -0,0 +1 @@ ++^samba3.smb2.session-require-signing.bug15397 +diff --git a/selftest/target/Samba3.pm b/selftest/target/Samba3.pm +index 9c590547c943..3336c5b8e97c 100755 +--- a/selftest/target/Samba3.pm ++++ b/selftest/target/Samba3.pm +@@ -1294,6 +1294,7 @@ sub setup_ad_member_idmap_rid + # values required for tests to succeed + create krb5 conf = no + map to guest = bad user ++ server signing = required + "; + + my $ret = $self->provision( +diff --git a/source3/selftest/tests.py b/source3/selftest/tests.py +index 04349c1f1f75..887bf6d52933 100755 +--- a/source3/selftest/tests.py ++++ b/source3/selftest/tests.py +@@ -938,6 +938,8 @@ tests = base + raw + smb2 + rpc + unix + local + rap + nbt + idmap + vfs + # Certain tests fail when run against ad_member with MIT kerberos because the private krb5.conf overrides the provisioned lib/krb5.conf, + # ad_member_idmap_rid sets "create krb5.conf = no" + plansmbtorture4testsuite(t, "ad_member_idmap_rid", '//$SERVER/tmp -k yes -U$DC_USERNAME@$REALM%$DC_PASSWORD', 'krb5') ++ elif t == "smb2.session-require-signing": ++ plansmbtorture4testsuite(t, "ad_member_idmap_rid", '//$SERVER_IP/tmp -U$DC_USERNAME@$REALM%$DC_PASSWORD') + elif t == "rpc.lsa": + plansmbtorture4testsuite(t, "nt4_dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmp -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD', 'over ncacn_np ') + plansmbtorture4testsuite(t, "nt4_dc", 'ncacn_ip_tcp:$SERVER_IP -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD', 'over ncacn_ip_tcp ') +diff --git a/source4/torture/smb2/session.c b/source4/torture/smb2/session.c +index 92f9e638ff47..e417008cad7a 100644 +--- a/source4/torture/smb2/session.c ++++ b/source4/torture/smb2/session.c +@@ -5498,3 +5498,67 @@ struct torture_suite *torture_smb2_session_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) + + return suite; + } ++ ++static bool test_session_require_sign_bug15397(struct torture_context *tctx, ++ struct smb2_tree *_tree) ++{ ++ const char *host = torture_setting_string(tctx, "host", NULL); ++ const char *share = torture_setting_string(tctx, "share", NULL); ++ struct cli_credentials *_creds = samba_cmdline_get_creds(); ++ struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL; ++ struct smbcli_options options; ++ struct smb2_tree *tree = NULL; ++ uint8_t security_mode; ++ NTSTATUS status; ++ bool ok = true; ++ ++ /* ++ * Setup our own connection so we can control the signing flags ++ */ ++ ++ creds = cli_credentials_shallow_copy(tctx, _creds); ++ torture_assert(tctx, creds != NULL, "cli_credentials_shallow_copy"); ++ ++ options = _tree->session->transport->options; ++ options.client_guid = GUID_random(); ++ options.signing = SMB_SIGNING_IF_REQUIRED; ++ ++ status = smb2_connect(tctx, ++ host, ++ lpcfg_smb_ports(tctx->lp_ctx), ++ share, ++ lpcfg_resolve_context(tctx->lp_ctx), ++ creds, ++ &tree, ++ tctx->ev, ++ &options, ++ lpcfg_socket_options(tctx->lp_ctx), ++ lpcfg_gensec_settings(tctx, tctx->lp_ctx)); ++ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ok, done, ++ "smb2_connect failed"); ++ ++ security_mode = smb2cli_session_security_mode(tree->session->smbXcli); ++ ++ torture_assert_int_equal_goto( ++ tctx, ++ security_mode, ++ SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED | SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED, ++ ok, ++ done, ++ "Signing not required"); ++ ++done: ++ return ok; ++} ++ ++struct torture_suite *torture_smb2_session_req_sign_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) ++{ ++ struct torture_suite *suite = ++ torture_suite_create(ctx, "session-require-signing"); ++ ++ torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "bug15397", ++ test_session_require_sign_bug15397); ++ ++ suite->description = talloc_strdup(suite, "SMB2-SESSION require signing tests"); ++ return suite; ++} +diff --git a/source4/torture/smb2/smb2.c b/source4/torture/smb2/smb2.c +index c717db50b70c..8621f09d820c 100644 +--- a/source4/torture/smb2/smb2.c ++++ b/source4/torture/smb2/smb2.c +@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ NTSTATUS torture_smb2_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) + torture_suite_add_suite(suite, torture_smb2_sharemode_init(suite)); + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "hold-oplock", test_smb2_hold_oplock); + torture_suite_add_suite(suite, torture_smb2_session_init(suite)); ++ torture_suite_add_suite(suite, torture_smb2_session_req_sign_init(suite)); + torture_suite_add_suite(suite, torture_smb2_replay_init(suite)); + torture_suite_add_simple_test(suite, "dosmode", torture_smb2_dosmode); + torture_suite_add_simple_test(suite, "async_dosmode", torture_smb2_async_dosmode); +-- +2.40.0 + + +From dfde1691d336fe658857e576cec0debd3a2450b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme +Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 15:06:12 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/5] CVE-2023-3347: smbd: pass lp_ctx to + smb[1|2]_srv_init_signing() + +No change in behaviour. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15397 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme +--- + source3/smbd/proto.h | 3 ++- + source3/smbd/smb1_signing.c | 10 ++-------- + source3/smbd/smb1_signing.h | 3 ++- + source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c | 25 +++++++++++++++---------- + 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source3/smbd/proto.h b/source3/smbd/proto.h +index c4a330145151..67cc5e8a380a 100644 +--- a/source3/smbd/proto.h ++++ b/source3/smbd/proto.h +@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ struct dcesrv_context; + + /* The following definitions come from smbd/smb2_signing.c */ + +-bool smb2_srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn); ++bool smb2_srv_init_signing(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, ++ struct smbXsrv_connection *conn); + bool srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn); + + /* The following definitions come from smbd/aio.c */ +diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.c b/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.c +index 6bcb0629c4f0..aa3027d53182 100644 +--- a/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.c ++++ b/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.c +@@ -170,18 +170,13 @@ static void smbd_shm_signing_free(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, void *ptr) + Called by server negprot when signing has been negotiated. + ************************************************************/ + +-bool smb1_srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn) ++bool smb1_srv_init_signing(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, ++ struct smbXsrv_connection *conn) + { + bool allowed = true; + bool desired; + bool mandatory = false; + +- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = loadparm_init_s3(conn, loadparm_s3_helpers()); +- if (lp_ctx == NULL) { +- DEBUG(10, ("loadparm_init_s3 failed\n")); +- return false; +- } +- + /* + * if the client and server allow signing, + * we desire to use it. +@@ -195,7 +190,6 @@ bool smb1_srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn) + */ + + desired = lpcfg_server_signing_allowed(lp_ctx, &mandatory); +- talloc_unlink(conn, lp_ctx); + + if (lp_async_smb_echo_handler()) { + struct smbd_shm_signing *s; +diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.h b/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.h +index 56c59c5bbc21..26f60420dfa8 100644 +--- a/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.h ++++ b/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.h +@@ -33,4 +33,5 @@ bool smb1_srv_is_signing_negotiated(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn); + void smb1_srv_set_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn, + const DATA_BLOB user_session_key, + const DATA_BLOB response); +-bool smb1_srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn); ++bool smb1_srv_init_signing(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, ++ struct smbXsrv_connection *conn); +diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c +index 4691ef4d6130..c1f876f9cd74 100644 +--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c ++++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c +@@ -26,32 +26,37 @@ + #include "lib/param/param.h" + #include "smb2_signing.h" + +-bool smb2_srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn) ++bool smb2_srv_init_signing(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, ++ struct smbXsrv_connection *conn) + { +- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = loadparm_init_s3(conn, loadparm_s3_helpers()); +- if (lp_ctx == NULL) { +- DBG_DEBUG("loadparm_init_s3 failed\n"); +- return false; +- } +- + /* + * For SMB2 all we need to know is if signing is mandatory. + * It is always allowed and desired, whatever the smb.conf says. + */ + (void)lpcfg_server_signing_allowed(lp_ctx, &conn->smb2.signing_mandatory); +- talloc_unlink(conn, lp_ctx); + return true; + } + + bool srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn) + { ++ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = NULL; ++ bool ok; ++ ++ lp_ctx = loadparm_init_s3(conn, loadparm_s3_helpers()); ++ if (lp_ctx == NULL) { ++ DBG_DEBUG("loadparm_init_s3 failed\n"); ++ return false; ++ } ++ + #if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER) + if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) { + #endif +- return smb2_srv_init_signing(conn); ++ ok = smb2_srv_init_signing(lp_ctx, conn); + #if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER) + } else { +- return smb1_srv_init_signing(conn); ++ ok = smb1_srv_init_signing(lp_ctx, conn); + } + #endif ++ talloc_unlink(conn, lp_ctx); ++ return ok; + } +-- +2.40.0 + + +From fd5f7d15869b67c41f681539348f7917a8c2fc0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme +Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 15:10:58 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 3/5] CVE-2023-3347: smbd: inline smb2_srv_init_signing() code + in srv_init_signing() + +It's now a one-line function, imho the overall code is simpler if that code is +just inlined. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15397 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme +--- + source3/smbd/proto.h | 2 -- + source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c | 19 ++++++------------- + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source3/smbd/proto.h b/source3/smbd/proto.h +index 67cc5e8a380a..8075f4e567e3 100644 +--- a/source3/smbd/proto.h ++++ b/source3/smbd/proto.h +@@ -52,8 +52,6 @@ struct dcesrv_context; + + /* The following definitions come from smbd/smb2_signing.c */ + +-bool smb2_srv_init_signing(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, +- struct smbXsrv_connection *conn); + bool srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn); + + /* The following definitions come from smbd/aio.c */ +diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c +index c1f876f9cd74..ef4a54d57107 100644 +--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c ++++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c +@@ -26,21 +26,10 @@ + #include "lib/param/param.h" + #include "smb2_signing.h" + +-bool smb2_srv_init_signing(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, +- struct smbXsrv_connection *conn) +-{ +- /* +- * For SMB2 all we need to know is if signing is mandatory. +- * It is always allowed and desired, whatever the smb.conf says. +- */ +- (void)lpcfg_server_signing_allowed(lp_ctx, &conn->smb2.signing_mandatory); +- return true; +-} +- + bool srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn) + { + struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = NULL; +- bool ok; ++ bool ok = true; + + lp_ctx = loadparm_init_s3(conn, loadparm_s3_helpers()); + if (lp_ctx == NULL) { +@@ -51,7 +40,11 @@ bool srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn) + #if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER) + if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) { + #endif +- ok = smb2_srv_init_signing(lp_ctx, conn); ++ /* ++ * For SMB2 all we need to know is if signing is mandatory. ++ * It is always allowed and desired, whatever the smb.conf says. ++ */ ++ (void)lpcfg_server_signing_allowed(lp_ctx, &conn->smb2.signing_mandatory); + #if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER) + } else { + ok = smb1_srv_init_signing(lp_ctx, conn); +-- +2.40.0 + + +From afe8b8d4f55ac330683645dad149a1691c15e2bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme +Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 18:13:23 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 4/5] CVE-2023-3347: smbd: remove comment in + smbd_smb2_request_process_negprot() + +This is just going to bitrot. Anyone who's interested can just grep for +"signing_mandatory" and look up what it does. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15397 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme +--- + source3/smbd/smb2_negprot.c | 6 ------ + 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_negprot.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_negprot.c +index baddbecaade9..685a1460cef4 100644 +--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_negprot.c ++++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_negprot.c +@@ -361,12 +361,6 @@ NTSTATUS smbd_smb2_request_process_negprot(struct smbd_smb2_request *req) + } + + security_mode = SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED; +- /* +- * We use xconn->smb2.signing_mandatory set up via +- * srv_init_signing() -> smb2_srv_init_signing(). +- * This calls lpcfg_server_signing_allowed() to get the correct +- * defaults, e.g. signing_required for an ad_dc. +- */ + if (xconn->smb2.signing_mandatory) { + security_mode |= SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED; + } +-- +2.40.0 + + +From d01483dba47134ee1cc959d3e52ef2af1b1221d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme +Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 15:33:02 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 5/5] CVE-2023-3347: smbd: fix "server signing = mandatory" + +This was broken by commit 1f3f6e20dc086a36de52bffd0bc36e15fb19e1c6 because when +calling srv_init_signing() very early after accepting the connection in +smbd_add_connection(), conn->protocol is still PROTOCOL_NONE. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15397 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme +--- + .../samba3.smb2.session-require-signing | 1 - + source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c | 19 ++++++++----------- + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + delete mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing + +diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing +deleted file mode 100644 +index 53b7a7022a83..000000000000 +--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1 +0,0 @@ +-^samba3.smb2.session-require-signing.bug15397 +diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c +index ef4a54d57107..73d07380dfa1 100644 +--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c ++++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c +@@ -37,19 +37,16 @@ bool srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn) + return false; + } + ++ /* ++ * For SMB2 all we need to know is if signing is mandatory. ++ * It is always allowed and desired, whatever the smb.conf says. ++ */ ++ (void)lpcfg_server_signing_allowed(lp_ctx, &conn->smb2.signing_mandatory); ++ + #if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER) +- if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) { +-#endif +- /* +- * For SMB2 all we need to know is if signing is mandatory. +- * It is always allowed and desired, whatever the smb.conf says. +- */ +- (void)lpcfg_server_signing_allowed(lp_ctx, &conn->smb2.signing_mandatory); +-#if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER) +- } else { +- ok = smb1_srv_init_signing(lp_ctx, conn); +- } ++ ok = smb1_srv_init_signing(lp_ctx, conn); + #endif ++ + talloc_unlink(conn, lp_ctx); + return ok; + } +-- +2.40.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/samba-4.17-fix-netlogon-capability-level2.patch b/SOURCES/samba-4.17-fix-netlogon-capability-level2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cca4d97 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/samba-4.17-fix-netlogon-capability-level2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,356 @@ +From 5a0951ffae8e030dfabad6f6eac9d2b48aba7a5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2023 17:20:32 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/4] netlogon.idl: add support for netr_LogonGetCapabilities + response level 2 + +We don't have any documentation about this yet, but tests against +a Windows Server 2022 patched with KB5028166 revealed that +the response for query_level=2 is exactly the same as +for querey_level=1. + +Until we know the reason for query_level=2 we won't +use it as client nor support it in the server, but +we want ndrdump to work. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15418 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett +(cherry picked from commit 5f87888ed53320538cf773d64868390d8641a40e) +--- + librpc/idl/netlogon.idl | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/librpc/idl/netlogon.idl b/librpc/idl/netlogon.idl +index e563e114900b..c77151af26b1 100644 +--- a/librpc/idl/netlogon.idl ++++ b/librpc/idl/netlogon.idl +@@ -1241,6 +1241,7 @@ interface netlogon + /* Function 0x15 */ + typedef [switch_type(uint32)] union { + [case(1)] netr_NegotiateFlags server_capabilities; ++ [case(2)] netr_NegotiateFlags server_capabilities; + } netr_Capabilities; + + NTSTATUS netr_LogonGetCapabilities( +-- +2.34.1 + + +From c28a4312122189740a6e02f1a9e4394d6c9c7f2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2023 17:25:05 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/4] s4:torture/rpc: let rpc.schannel also check + netr_LogonGetCapabilities with different levels + +The important change it that we expect DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG +for unsupported query_levels, we allow it to work with servers +with or without support for query_level=2. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15418 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett +(cherry picked from commit 404ce08e9088968311c714e756f5d58ce2cef715) +--- + .../knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities | 3 + + source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++- + 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities + +diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities b/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000000..30aadf3bb9d5 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities +@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ ++^samba3.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(nt4_dc ++^samba3.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(ad_dc ++^samba4.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(ad_dc +diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c b/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c +index 1f068eb78265..a3d190f13dd8 100644 +--- a/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c ++++ b/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c +@@ -2056,8 +2056,47 @@ bool test_netlogon_capabilities(struct dcerpc_pipe *p, struct torture_context *t + r.out.capabilities = &capabilities; + r.out.return_authenticator = &return_auth; + +- torture_comment(tctx, "Testing LogonGetCapabilities\n"); ++ torture_comment(tctx, "Testing LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=0\n"); + ++ r.in.query_level = 0; ++ ZERO_STRUCT(return_auth); ++ ++ /* ++ * we need to operate on a temporary copy of creds ++ * because dcerpc_netr_LogonGetCapabilities with ++ * an unknown query level returns DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG ++ * => NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE ++ * without looking a the authenticator. ++ */ ++ tmp_creds = *creds; ++ netlogon_creds_client_authenticator(&tmp_creds, &auth); ++ ++ status = dcerpc_netr_LogonGetCapabilities_r(b, tctx, &r); ++ torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, status, NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ "LogonGetCapabilities query_level=0 failed"); ++ ++ torture_comment(tctx, "Testing LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=3\n"); ++ ++ r.in.query_level = 3; ++ ZERO_STRUCT(return_auth); ++ ++ /* ++ * we need to operate on a temporary copy of creds ++ * because dcerpc_netr_LogonGetCapabilities with ++ * an unknown query level returns DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG ++ * => NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE ++ * without looking a the authenticator. ++ */ ++ tmp_creds = *creds; ++ netlogon_creds_client_authenticator(&tmp_creds, &auth); ++ ++ status = dcerpc_netr_LogonGetCapabilities_r(b, tctx, &r); ++ torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, status, NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ "LogonGetCapabilities query_level=0 failed"); ++ ++ torture_comment(tctx, "Testing LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=1\n"); ++ ++ r.in.query_level = 1; + ZERO_STRUCT(return_auth); + + /* +@@ -2077,6 +2116,42 @@ bool test_netlogon_capabilities(struct dcerpc_pipe *p, struct torture_context *t + + *creds = tmp_creds; + ++ torture_assert(tctx, netlogon_creds_client_check(creds, ++ &r.out.return_authenticator->cred), ++ "Credential chaining failed"); ++ ++ torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, creds->negotiate_flags, ++ capabilities.server_capabilities, ++ "negotiate flags"); ++ ++ torture_comment(tctx, "Testing LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=2\n"); ++ ++ r.in.query_level = 2; ++ ZERO_STRUCT(return_auth); ++ ++ /* ++ * we need to operate on a temporary copy of creds ++ * because dcerpc_netr_LogonGetCapabilities with ++ * an query level 2 may returns DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG ++ * => NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE ++ * without looking a the authenticator. ++ */ ++ tmp_creds = *creds; ++ netlogon_creds_client_authenticator(&tmp_creds, &auth); ++ ++ status = dcerpc_netr_LogonGetCapabilities_r(b, tctx, &r); ++ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE)) { ++ /* ++ * an server without KB5028166 returns ++ * DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG => ++ * NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE ++ */ ++ return true; ++ } ++ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, status, "LogonGetCapabilities query_level=2 failed"); ++ ++ *creds = tmp_creds; ++ + torture_assert(tctx, netlogon_creds_client_check(creds, + &r.out.return_authenticator->cred), + "Credential chaining failed"); +-- +2.34.1 + + +From 4c4c630fe99c253f3400fc7a4542178eba9d0aa7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2023 16:11:48 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 3/4] s4:rpc_server:netlogon: generate FAULT_INVALID_TAG for + invalid netr_LogonGetCapabilities levels + +This is important as Windows clients with KB5028166 seem to +call netr_LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=2 after +a call with query_level=1. + +An unpatched Windows Server returns DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG +for query_level values other than 1. +While Samba tries to return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED, but +later fails to marshall the response, which results +in DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA instead. + +Because we don't have any documentation for level 2 yet, +we just try to behave like an unpatched server and +generate DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG instead of +DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA. +Which allows patched Windows clients to keep working +against a Samba DC. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15418 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett +(cherry picked from commit d5f1097b6220676d56ed5fc6707acf667b704518) +--- + .../knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities | 2 -- + source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++--- + 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities b/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities +index 30aadf3bb9d5..99c7ac711ede 100644 +--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities ++++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities +@@ -1,3 +1 @@ + ^samba3.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(nt4_dc +-^samba3.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(ad_dc +-^samba4.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(ad_dc +diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c +index 314b469a718a..e203e04143d7 100644 +--- a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c ++++ b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c +@@ -2359,6 +2359,30 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_LogonGetCapabilities(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_c + struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds; + NTSTATUS status; + ++ switch (r->in.query_level) { ++ case 1: ++ break; ++ case 2: ++ /* ++ * Until we know the details behind KB5028166 ++ * just return DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG ++ * like an unpatched Windows Server. ++ */ ++ FALL_THROUGH; ++ default: ++ /* ++ * There would not be a way to marshall the ++ * the response. Which would mean our final ++ * ndr_push would fail an we would return ++ * an RPC-level fault with DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA. ++ * ++ * But it's important to match a Windows server ++ * especially before KB5028166, see also our bug #15418 ++ * Otherwise Windows client would stop talking to us. ++ */ ++ DCESRV_FAULT(DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG); ++ } ++ + status = dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check(dce_call, + mem_ctx, + r->in.computer_name, +@@ -2370,10 +2394,6 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_LogonGetCapabilities(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_c + } + NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(status); + +- if (r->in.query_level != 1) { +- return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED; +- } +- + r->out.capabilities->server_capabilities = creds->negotiate_flags; + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +-- +2.34.1 + + +From 44fb6686eee8f1c8767eee6a26edc215dccbc766 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2023 16:11:48 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 4/4] s3:rpc_server:netlogon: generate FAULT_INVALID_TAG for + invalid netr_LogonGetCapabilities levels + +This is important as Windows clients with KB5028166 seem to +call netr_LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=2 after +a call with query_level=1. + +An unpatched Windows Server returns DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG +for query_level values other than 1. +While Samba tries to return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED, but +later fails to marshall the response, which results +in DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA instead. + +Because we don't have any documentation for level 2 yet, +we just try to behave like an unpatched server and +generate DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG instead of +DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA. +Which allows patched Windows clients to keep working +against a Samba DC. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15418 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett + +Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher +Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jul 17 07:35:09 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224 + +(cherry picked from commit dfeabce44fbb78083fbbb2aa634fc4172cf83db9) +--- + .../knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities | 1 - + source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++--- + 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + delete mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities + +diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities b/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities +deleted file mode 100644 +index 99c7ac711ede..000000000000 +--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1 +0,0 @@ +-^samba3.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(nt4_dc +diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c +index 83318fff7532..c91eeed06b8d 100644 +--- a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c ++++ b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c +@@ -2286,6 +2286,31 @@ NTSTATUS _netr_LogonGetCapabilities(struct pipes_struct *p, + struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds; + NTSTATUS status; + ++ switch (r->in.query_level) { ++ case 1: ++ break; ++ case 2: ++ /* ++ * Until we know the details behind KB5028166 ++ * just return DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG ++ * like an unpatched Windows Server. ++ */ ++ FALL_THROUGH; ++ default: ++ /* ++ * There would not be a way to marshall the ++ * the response. Which would mean our final ++ * ndr_push would fail an we would return ++ * an RPC-level fault with DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA. ++ * ++ * But it's important to match a Windows server ++ * especially before KB5028166, see also our bug #15418 ++ * Otherwise Windows client would stop talking to us. ++ */ ++ p->fault_state = DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG; ++ return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED; ++ } ++ + become_root(); + status = dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check(p->dce_call, + p->mem_ctx, +@@ -2298,10 +2323,6 @@ NTSTATUS _netr_LogonGetCapabilities(struct pipes_struct *p, + return status; + } + +- if (r->in.query_level != 1) { +- return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED; +- } +- + r->out.capabilities->server_capabilities = creds->negotiate_flags; + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/SPECS/samba.spec b/SPECS/samba.spec index 787ca78..ff19a07 100644 --- a/SPECS/samba.spec +++ b/SPECS/samba.spec @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ %define samba_requires_eq() %(LC_ALL="C" echo '%*' | xargs -r rpm -q --qf 'Requires: %%{name} = %%{epoch}:%%{version}\\n' | sed -e 's/ (none):/ /' -e 's/ 0:/ /' | grep -v "is not") %global samba_version 4.17.5 -%global baserelease 2 +%global baserelease 3 # This should be rc1 or %%nil %global pre_release %nil @@ -231,6 +231,9 @@ Source17: samba-usershares-systemd-sysusers.conf Source201: README.downgrade Source202: samba.abignore +Patch0: samba-4.17-fix-netlogon-capability-level2.patch +Patch1: CVE-2023-3347-signing-4.17-01.patch + Requires(pre): /usr/sbin/groupadd Requires(pre): %{name}-common = %{samba_depver} @@ -4300,6 +4303,10 @@ fi * Wed Jul 26 2023 MSVSphere Packaging Team - 2:4.17.5-2 - Rebuilt for MSVSphere 8.8 +* Tue Jul 18 2023 Andreas Schneider - 4.17.5-3 +- resolves: rhbz#2223515 - Fix CVE-2023-3347 - SMB2 packet signing not enforced +- resolves: rhbz#2223601 - Fix netlogon capabilities level 2 + * Wed Feb 15 2023 Pavel Filipenský - 4.17.5-2 - resolves: rhbz#2169339 - Fix winbind memory leak - resolves: rhbz#2152899 - Fix Samba shares not accessible issue