import python3-3.6.8-69.el8_10

import python3-3.6.8-67.el8_10
import python3-3.6.8-62.el8_10
16 changed files with 8381 additions and 5 deletions
--- a/SOURCES/00397-tarfile-filter.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00397-tarfile-filter.patch
--- a/SOURCES/00399-cve-2023-24329.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00399-cve-2023-24329.patch
@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
+ <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Mon, 22 May 2023 03:42:37 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] 00399: CVE-2023-24329
+
+gh-102153: Start stripping C0 control and space chars in `urlsplit` (GH-102508)
+
+`urllib.parse.urlsplit` has already been respecting the WHATWG spec a bit GH-25595.
+
+This adds more sanitizing to respect the "Remove any leading C0 control or space from input" [rule](https://url.spec.whatwg.org/GH-url-parsing:~:text=Remove%20any%20leading%20and%20trailing%20C0%20control%20or%20space%20from%20input.) in response to [CVE-2023-24329](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-24329).
+
+Backported from Python 3.12
+
+(cherry picked from commit f48a96a28012d28ae37a2f4587a780a5eb779946)
+
+Co-authored-by: Illia Volochii <illia.volochii@gmail.com>
+Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith [Google] <greg@krypto.org>
+---
+ Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst                  | 40 +++++++++++-
+ Lib/test/test_urlparse.py                     | 61 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ Lib/urllib/parse.py                           | 12 ++++
+ ...-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst |  3 +
+ 4 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst
+
+diff --git a/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst b/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst
+index b717d7cc05..83a7a82089 100644
+--- a/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst
+@@ -126,6 +126,12 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string.
+    ``#``, ``@``, or ``:`` will raise a :exc:`ValueError`. If the URL is
+    decomposed before parsing, no error will be raised.
+ 
+
+   .. warning::
+
+      :func:`urlparse` does not perform validation.  See :ref:`URL parsing
+      security <url-parsing-security>` for details.
+
+    .. versionchanged:: 3.2
+       Added IPv6 URL parsing capabilities.
+ 
+@@ -288,8 +294,14 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string.
+    ``#``, ``@``, or ``:`` will raise a :exc:`ValueError`. If the URL is
+    decomposed before parsing, no error will be raised.
+ 
+-   Following the `WHATWG spec`_ that updates RFC 3986, ASCII newline
+-   ``\n``, ``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are stripped from the URL.
+   Following some of the `WHATWG spec`_ that updates RFC 3986, leading C0
+   control and space characters are stripped from the URL. ``\n``,
+   ``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are removed from the URL at any position.
+
+   .. warning::
+
+      :func:`urlsplit` does not perform validation.  See :ref:`URL parsing
+      security <url-parsing-security>` for details.
+ 
+    .. versionchanged:: 3.6
+       Out-of-range port numbers now raise :exc:`ValueError`, instead of
+@@ -302,6 +314,9 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string.
+    .. versionchanged:: 3.6.14
+       ASCII newline and tab characters are stripped from the URL.
+ 
+   .. versionchanged:: 3.6.15
+      Leading WHATWG C0 control and space characters are stripped from the URL.
+
+ .. _WHATWG spec: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-basic-url-parser
+ 
+ .. function:: urlunsplit(parts)
+@@ -371,6 +386,27 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string.
+    .. versionchanged:: 3.2
+       Result is a structured object rather than a simple 2-tuple.
+ 
+.. _url-parsing-security:
+
+URL parsing security
+--------------------
+
+The :func:`urlsplit` and :func:`urlparse` APIs do not perform **validation** of
+inputs.  They may not raise errors on inputs that other applications consider
+invalid.  They may also succeed on some inputs that might not be considered
+URLs elsewhere.  Their purpose is for practical functionality rather than
+purity.
+
+Instead of raising an exception on unusual input, they may instead return some
+component parts as empty strings. Or components may contain more than perhaps
+they should.
+
+We recommend that users of these APIs where the values may be used anywhere
+with security implications code defensively. Do some verification within your
+code before trusting a returned component part.  Does that ``scheme`` make
+sense?  Is that a sensible ``path``?  Is there anything strange about that
+``hostname``?  etc.
+
+ .. _parsing-ascii-encoded-bytes:
+ 
+ Parsing ASCII Encoded Bytes
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
+index 3509278a01..7fd61ffea9 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
+@@ -660,6 +660,65 @@ class UrlParseTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
+             self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https")
+             self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "https://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
+ 
+    def test_urlsplit_strip_url(self):
+        noise = bytes(range(0, 0x20 + 1))
+        base_url = "http://User:Pass@www.python.org:080/doc/?query=yes#frag"
+
+        url = noise.decode("utf-8") + base_url
+        p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
+        self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "http")
+        self.assertEqual(p.netloc, "User:Pass@www.python.org:080")
+        self.assertEqual(p.path, "/doc/")
+        self.assertEqual(p.query, "query=yes")
+        self.assertEqual(p.fragment, "frag")
+        self.assertEqual(p.username, "User")
+        self.assertEqual(p.password, "Pass")
+        self.assertEqual(p.hostname, "www.python.org")
+        self.assertEqual(p.port, 80)
+        self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), base_url)
+
+        url = noise + base_url.encode("utf-8")
+        p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
+        self.assertEqual(p.scheme, b"http")
+        self.assertEqual(p.netloc, b"User:Pass@www.python.org:080")
+        self.assertEqual(p.path, b"/doc/")
+        self.assertEqual(p.query, b"query=yes")
+        self.assertEqual(p.fragment, b"frag")
+        self.assertEqual(p.username, b"User")
+        self.assertEqual(p.password, b"Pass")
+        self.assertEqual(p.hostname, b"www.python.org")
+        self.assertEqual(p.port, 80)
+        self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), base_url.encode("utf-8"))
+
+        # Test that trailing space is preserved as some applications rely on
+        # this within query strings.
+        query_spaces_url = "https://www.python.org:88/doc/?query=    "
+        p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(noise.decode("utf-8") + query_spaces_url)
+        self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https")
+        self.assertEqual(p.netloc, "www.python.org:88")
+        self.assertEqual(p.path, "/doc/")
+        self.assertEqual(p.query, "query=    ")
+        self.assertEqual(p.port, 88)
+        self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), query_spaces_url)
+
+        p = urllib.parse.urlsplit("www.pypi.org ")
+        # That "hostname" gets considered a "path" due to the
+        # trailing space and our existing logic...  YUCK...
+        # and re-assembles via geturl aka unurlsplit into the original.
+        # django.core.validators.URLValidator (at least through v3.2) relies on
+        # this, for better or worse, to catch it in a ValidationError via its
+        # regular expressions.
+        # Here we test the basic round trip concept of such a trailing space.
+        self.assertEqual(urllib.parse.urlunsplit(p), "www.pypi.org ")
+
+        # with scheme as cache-key
+        url = "//www.python.org/"
+        scheme = noise.decode("utf-8") + "https" + noise.decode("utf-8")
+        for _ in range(2):
+            p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url, scheme=scheme)
+            self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https")
+            self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "https://www.python.org/")
+
+     def test_attributes_bad_port(self):
+         """Check handling of invalid ports."""
+         for bytes in (False, True):
+@@ -667,7 +726,7 @@ class UrlParseTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
+                 for port in ("foo", "1.5", "-1", "0x10"):
+                     with self.subTest(bytes=bytes, parse=parse, port=port):
+                         netloc = "www.example.net:" + port
+-                        url = "http://" + netloc
+                        url = "http://" + netloc + "/"
+                         if bytes:
+                             netloc = netloc.encode("ascii")
+                             url = url.encode("ascii")
+diff --git a/Lib/urllib/parse.py b/Lib/urllib/parse.py
+index ac6e7a9cee..717e990997 100644
+--- a/Lib/urllib/parse.py
+++ b/Lib/urllib/parse.py
+@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ currently not entirely compliant with this RFC due to defacto
+ scenarios for parsing, and for backward compatibility purposes, some
+ parsing quirks from older RFCs are retained. The testcases in
+ test_urlparse.py provides a good indicator of parsing behavior.
+
+The WHATWG URL Parser spec should also be considered.  We are not compliant with
+it either due to existing user code API behavior expectations (Hyrum's Law).
+It serves as a useful guide when making changes.
+ """
+ 
+ import re
+@@ -76,6 +80,10 @@ scheme_chars = ('abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
+                 '0123456789'
+                 '+-.')
+ 
+# Leading and trailing C0 control and space to be stripped per WHATWG spec.
+# == "".join([chr(i) for i in range(0, 0x20 + 1)])
+_WHATWG_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE = '\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\t\n\x0b\x0c\r\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f '
+
+ # Unsafe bytes to be removed per WHATWG spec
+ _UNSAFE_URL_BYTES_TO_REMOVE = ['\t', '\r', '\n']
+ 
+@@ -426,6 +434,10 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
+     url, scheme, _coerce_result = _coerce_args(url, scheme)
+     url = _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(url)
+     scheme = _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(scheme)
+    # Only lstrip url as some applications rely on preserving trailing space.
+    # (https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-basic-url-parser would strip both)
+    url = url.lstrip(_WHATWG_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE)
+    scheme = scheme.strip(_WHATWG_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE)
+     allow_fragments = bool(allow_fragments)
+     key = url, scheme, allow_fragments, type(url), type(scheme)
+     cached = _parse_cache.get(key, None)
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..e57ac4ed3a
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-03-07-20-59-17.gh-issue-102153.14CLSZ.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+:func:`urllib.parse.urlsplit` now strips leading C0 control and space
+characters following the specification for URLs defined by WHATWG in
+response to CVE-2023-24329. Patch by Illia Volochii.
--- a/SOURCES/00404-cve-2023-40217.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00404-cve-2023-40217.patch
@ -0,0 +1,648 @@
+From 9f39318072b5775cf527f83daf8cb5d64678ac86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?=C5=81ukasz=20Langa?= <lukasz@langa.pl>
+Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2023 19:57:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/4] gh-108310: Fix CVE-2023-40217: Check for & avoid the ssl
+ pre-close flaw (#108321)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+gh-108310: Fix CVE-2023-40217: Check for & avoid the ssl pre-close flaw
+
+Instances of `ssl.SSLSocket` were vulnerable to a bypass of the TLS handshake
+and included protections (like certificate verification) and treating sent
+unencrypted data as if it were post-handshake TLS encrypted data.
+
+The vulnerability is caused when a socket is connected, data is sent by the
+malicious peer and stored in a buffer, and then the malicious peer closes the
+socket within a small timing window before the other peers’ TLS handshake can
+begin. After this sequence of events the closed socket will not immediately
+attempt a TLS handshake due to not being connected but will also allow the
+buffered data to be read as if a successful TLS handshake had occurred.
+
+Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith [Google LLC] <greg@krypto.org>
+---
+ Lib/ssl.py                                    |  31 ++-
+ Lib/test/test_ssl.py                          | 214 ++++++++++++++++++
+ ...-08-22-17-39-12.gh-issue-108310.fVM3sg.rst |   7 +
+ 3 files changed, 251 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-08-22-17-39-12.gh-issue-108310.fVM3sg.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/ssl.py b/Lib/ssl.py
+index c5c5529..288f237 100644
+--- a/Lib/ssl.py
+++ b/Lib/ssl.py
+@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ class SSLSocket(socket):
+                             type=sock.type,
+                             proto=sock.proto,
+                             fileno=sock.fileno())
+-            self.settimeout(sock.gettimeout())
+            sock_timeout = sock.gettimeout()
+             sock.detach()
+         elif fileno is not None:
+             socket.__init__(self, fileno=fileno)
+@@ -755,9 +755,38 @@ class SSLSocket(socket):
+             if e.errno != errno.ENOTCONN:
+                 raise
+             connected = False
+            blocking = self.getblocking()
+            self.setblocking(False)
+            try:
+                # We are not connected so this is not supposed to block, but
+                # testing revealed otherwise on macOS and Windows so we do
+                # the non-blocking dance regardless. Our raise when any data
+                # is found means consuming the data is harmless.
+                notconn_pre_handshake_data = self.recv(1)
+            except OSError as e:
+                # EINVAL occurs for recv(1) on non-connected on unix sockets.
+                if e.errno not in (errno.ENOTCONN, errno.EINVAL):
+                    raise
+                notconn_pre_handshake_data = b''
+            self.setblocking(blocking)
+            if notconn_pre_handshake_data:
+                # This prevents pending data sent to the socket before it was
+                # closed from escaping to the caller who could otherwise
+                # presume it came through a successful TLS connection.
+                reason = "Closed before TLS handshake with data in recv buffer."
+                notconn_pre_handshake_data_error = SSLError(e.errno, reason)
+                # Add the SSLError attributes that _ssl.c always adds.
+                notconn_pre_handshake_data_error.reason = reason
+                notconn_pre_handshake_data_error.library = None
+                try:
+                    self.close()
+                except OSError:
+                    pass
+                raise notconn_pre_handshake_data_error
+         else:
+             connected = True
+ 
+        self.settimeout(sock_timeout)  # Must come after setblocking() calls.
+         self._closed = False
+         self._sslobj = None
+         self._connected = connected
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_ssl.py b/Lib/test/test_ssl.py
+index b35db25..e24d11b 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_ssl.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_ssl.py
+@@ -3,11 +3,14 @@
+ import sys
+ import unittest
+ from test import support
+import re
+ import socket
+ import select
+import struct
+ import time
+ import datetime
+ import gc
+import http.client
+ import os
+ import errno
+ import pprint
+@@ -3940,6 +3943,217 @@ class TestPostHandshakeAuth(unittest.TestCase):
+                 # server cert has not been validated
+                 self.assertEqual(s.getpeercert(), {})
+ 
+def set_socket_so_linger_on_with_zero_timeout(sock):
+    sock.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_LINGER, struct.pack('ii', 1, 0))
+
+
+class TestPreHandshakeClose(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Verify behavior of close sockets with received data before to the handshake.
+    """
+
+    class SingleConnectionTestServerThread(threading.Thread):
+
+        def __init__(self, *, name, call_after_accept):
+            self.call_after_accept = call_after_accept
+            self.received_data = b''  # set by .run()
+            self.wrap_error = None  # set by .run()
+            self.listener = None  # set by .start()
+            self.port = None  # set by .start()
+            super().__init__(name=name)
+
+        def __enter__(self):
+            self.start()
+            return self
+
+        def __exit__(self, *args):
+            try:
+                if self.listener:
+                    self.listener.close()
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+            self.join()
+            self.wrap_error = None  # avoid dangling references
+
+        def start(self):
+            self.ssl_ctx = ssl.create_default_context(ssl.Purpose.CLIENT_AUTH)
+            self.ssl_ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
+            self.ssl_ctx.load_verify_locations(cafile=ONLYCERT)
+            self.ssl_ctx.load_cert_chain(certfile=ONLYCERT, keyfile=ONLYKEY)
+            self.listener = socket.socket()
+            self.port = support.bind_port(self.listener)
+            self.listener.settimeout(2.0)
+            self.listener.listen(1)
+            super().start()
+
+        def run(self):
+            conn, address = self.listener.accept()
+            self.listener.close()
+            with conn:
+                if self.call_after_accept(conn):
+                    return
+                try:
+                    tls_socket = self.ssl_ctx.wrap_socket(conn, server_side=True)
+                except OSError as err:  # ssl.SSLError inherits from OSError
+                    self.wrap_error = err
+                else:
+                    try:
+                        self.received_data = tls_socket.recv(400)
+                    except OSError:
+                        pass  # closed, protocol error, etc.
+
+    def non_linux_skip_if_other_okay_error(self, err):
+        if sys.platform == "linux":
+            return  # Expect the full test setup to always work on Linux.
+        if (isinstance(err, ConnectionResetError) or
+            (isinstance(err, OSError) and err.errno == errno.EINVAL) or
+            re.search('wrong.version.number', getattr(err, "reason", ""), re.I)):
+            # On Windows the TCP RST leads to a ConnectionResetError
+            # (ECONNRESET) which Linux doesn't appear to surface to userspace.
+            # If wrap_socket() winds up on the "if connected:" path and doing
+            # the actual wrapping... we get an SSLError from OpenSSL. Typically
+            # WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER. While appropriate, neither is the scenario
+            # we're specifically trying to test. The way this test is written
+            # is known to work on Linux. We'll skip it anywhere else that it
+            # does not present as doing so.
+            self.skipTest("Could not recreate conditions on {}: \
+                          err={}".format(sys.platform,err))
+        # If maintaining this conditional winds up being a problem.
+        # just turn this into an unconditional skip anything but Linux.
+        # The important thing is that our CI has the logic covered.
+
+    def test_preauth_data_to_tls_server(self):
+        server_accept_called = threading.Event()
+        ready_for_server_wrap_socket = threading.Event()
+
+        def call_after_accept(unused):
+            server_accept_called.set()
+            if not ready_for_server_wrap_socket.wait(2.0):
+                raise RuntimeError("wrap_socket event never set, test may fail.")
+            return False  # Tell the server thread to continue.
+
+        server = self.SingleConnectionTestServerThread(
+                call_after_accept=call_after_accept,
+                name="preauth_data_to_tls_server")
+        server.__enter__()  # starts it
+        self.addCleanup(server.__exit__)  # ... & unittest.TestCase stops it.
+
+        with socket.socket() as client:
+            client.connect(server.listener.getsockname())
+            # This forces an immediate connection close via RST on .close().
+            set_socket_so_linger_on_with_zero_timeout(client)
+            client.setblocking(False)
+
+            server_accept_called.wait()
+            client.send(b"DELETE /data HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n")
+            client.close()  # RST
+
+        ready_for_server_wrap_socket.set()
+        server.join()
+        wrap_error = server.wrap_error
+        self.assertEqual(b"", server.received_data)
+        self.assertIsInstance(wrap_error, OSError)  # All platforms.
+        self.non_linux_skip_if_other_okay_error(wrap_error)
+        self.assertIsInstance(wrap_error, ssl.SSLError)
+        self.assertIn("before TLS handshake with data", wrap_error.args[1])
+        self.assertIn("before TLS handshake with data", wrap_error.reason)
+        self.assertNotEqual(0, wrap_error.args[0])
+        self.assertIsNone(wrap_error.library, msg="attr must exist")
+
+    def test_preauth_data_to_tls_client(self):
+        client_can_continue_with_wrap_socket = threading.Event()
+
+        def call_after_accept(conn_to_client):
+            # This forces an immediate connection close via RST on .close().
+            set_socket_so_linger_on_with_zero_timeout(conn_to_client)
+            conn_to_client.send(
+                    b"HTTP/1.0 307 Temporary Redirect\r\n"
+                    b"Location: https://example.com/someone-elses-server\r\n"
+                    b"\r\n")
+            conn_to_client.close()  # RST
+            client_can_continue_with_wrap_socket.set()
+            return True  # Tell the server to stop.
+
+        server = self.SingleConnectionTestServerThread(
+                call_after_accept=call_after_accept,
+                name="preauth_data_to_tls_client")
+        server.__enter__()  # starts it
+        self.addCleanup(server.__exit__)  # ... & unittest.TestCase stops it.
+
+        # Redundant; call_after_accept sets SO_LINGER on the accepted conn.
+        set_socket_so_linger_on_with_zero_timeout(server.listener)
+
+        with socket.socket() as client:
+            client.connect(server.listener.getsockname())
+            if not client_can_continue_with_wrap_socket.wait(2.0):
+                self.fail("test server took too long.")
+            ssl_ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
+            try:
+                tls_client = ssl_ctx.wrap_socket(
+                        client, server_hostname="localhost")
+            except OSError as err:  # SSLError inherits from OSError
+                wrap_error = err
+                received_data = b""
+            else:
+                wrap_error = None
+                received_data = tls_client.recv(400)
+                tls_client.close()
+
+        server.join()
+        self.assertEqual(b"", received_data)
+        self.assertIsInstance(wrap_error, OSError)  # All platforms.
+        self.non_linux_skip_if_other_okay_error(wrap_error)
+        self.assertIsInstance(wrap_error, ssl.SSLError)
+        self.assertIn("before TLS handshake with data", wrap_error.args[1])
+        self.assertIn("before TLS handshake with data", wrap_error.reason)
+        self.assertNotEqual(0, wrap_error.args[0])
+        self.assertIsNone(wrap_error.library, msg="attr must exist")
+
+    def test_https_client_non_tls_response_ignored(self):
+
+        server_responding = threading.Event()
+
+        class SynchronizedHTTPSConnection(http.client.HTTPSConnection):
+            def connect(self):
+                http.client.HTTPConnection.connect(self)
+                # Wait for our fault injection server to have done its thing.
+                if not server_responding.wait(1.0) and support.verbose:
+                    sys.stdout.write("server_responding event never set.")
+                self.sock = self._context.wrap_socket(
+                        self.sock, server_hostname=self.host)
+
+        def call_after_accept(conn_to_client):
+            # This forces an immediate connection close via RST on .close().
+            set_socket_so_linger_on_with_zero_timeout(conn_to_client)
+            conn_to_client.send(
+                    b"HTTP/1.0 402 Payment Required\r\n"
+                    b"\r\n")
+            conn_to_client.close()  # RST
+            server_responding.set()
+            return True  # Tell the server to stop.
+
+        server = self.SingleConnectionTestServerThread(
+                call_after_accept=call_after_accept,
+                name="non_tls_http_RST_responder")
+        server.__enter__()  # starts it
+        self.addCleanup(server.__exit__)  # ... & unittest.TestCase stops it.
+        # Redundant; call_after_accept sets SO_LINGER on the accepted conn.
+        set_socket_so_linger_on_with_zero_timeout(server.listener)
+
+        connection = SynchronizedHTTPSConnection(
+                f"localhost",
+                port=server.port,
+                context=ssl.create_default_context(),
+                timeout=2.0,
+        )
+        # There are lots of reasons this raises as desired, long before this
+        # test was added. Sending the request requires a successful TLS wrapped
+        # socket; that fails if the connection is broken. It may seem pointless
+        # to test this. It serves as an illustration of something that we never
+        # want to happen... properly not happening.
+        with self.assertRaises(OSError) as err_ctx:
+            connection.request("HEAD", "/test", headers={"Host": "localhost"})
+            response = connection.getresponse()
+
+ 
+ def test_main(verbose=False):
+     if support.verbose:
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-08-22-17-39-12.gh-issue-108310.fVM3sg.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-08-22-17-39-12.gh-issue-108310.fVM3sg.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..403c77a
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2023-08-22-17-39-12.gh-issue-108310.fVM3sg.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+Fixed an issue where instances of :class:`ssl.SSLSocket` were vulnerable to
+a bypass of the TLS handshake and included protections (like certificate
+verification) and treating sent unencrypted data as if it were
+post-handshake TLS encrypted data.  Security issue reported as
+`CVE-2023-40217
+<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-40217>`_ by
+Aapo Oksman. Patch by Gregory P. Smith.
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
+
+From 6fbb37c0b7ab8ce1db8e2e78df62d6e5c1e56766 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
+ <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2023 03:10:56 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 2/4] gh-108342: Break ref cycle in SSLSocket._create() exc
+ (GH-108344) (#108352)
+
+Explicitly break a reference cycle when SSLSocket._create() raises an
+exception. Clear the variable storing the exception, since the
+exception traceback contains the variables and so creates a reference
+cycle.
+
+This test leak was introduced by the test added for the fix of GH-108310.
+(cherry picked from commit 64f99350351bc46e016b2286f36ba7cd669b79e3)
+
+Co-authored-by: Victor Stinner <vstinner@python.org>
+---
+ Lib/ssl.py | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Lib/ssl.py b/Lib/ssl.py
+index 288f237..67869c9 100644
+--- a/Lib/ssl.py
+++ b/Lib/ssl.py
+@@ -782,7 +782,11 @@ class SSLSocket(socket):
+                     self.close()
+                 except OSError:
+                     pass
+-                raise notconn_pre_handshake_data_error
+                try:
+                    raise notconn_pre_handshake_data_error
+                finally:
+                    # Explicitly break the reference cycle.
+                    notconn_pre_handshake_data_error = None
+         else:
+             connected = True
+ 
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
+
+From 579d809e60e569f06c00844cc3a3f06a0e359603 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?=C5=81ukasz=20Langa?= <lukasz@langa.pl>
+Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2023 12:09:30 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] gh-108342: Make ssl TestPreHandshakeClose more reliable
+ (GH-108370) (#108408)
+
+* In preauth tests of test_ssl, explicitly break reference cycles
+  invoving SingleConnectionTestServerThread to make sure that the
+  thread is deleted. Otherwise, the test marks the environment as
+  altered because the threading module sees a "dangling thread"
+  (SingleConnectionTestServerThread). This test leak was introduced
+  by the test added for the fix of issue gh-108310.
+* Use support.SHORT_TIMEOUT instead of hardcoded 1.0 or 2.0 seconds
+  timeout.
+* SingleConnectionTestServerThread.run() catchs TimeoutError
+* Fix a race condition (missing synchronization) in
+  test_preauth_data_to_tls_client(): the server now waits until the
+  client connect() completed in call_after_accept().
+* test_https_client_non_tls_response_ignored() calls server.join()
+  explicitly.
+* Replace "localhost" with server.listener.getsockname()[0].
+(cherry picked from commit 592bacb6fc0833336c0453e818e9b95016e9fd47)
+---
+ Lib/test/test_ssl.py | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_ssl.py b/Lib/test/test_ssl.py
+index e24d11b..6332330 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_ssl.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_ssl.py
+@@ -3953,12 +3953,16 @@ class TestPreHandshakeClose(unittest.TestCase):
+ 
+     class SingleConnectionTestServerThread(threading.Thread):
+ 
+-        def __init__(self, *, name, call_after_accept):
+        def __init__(self, *, name, call_after_accept, timeout=None):
+             self.call_after_accept = call_after_accept
+             self.received_data = b''  # set by .run()
+             self.wrap_error = None  # set by .run()
+             self.listener = None  # set by .start()
+             self.port = None  # set by .start()
+            if timeout is None:
+                self.timeout = support.SHORT_TIMEOUT
+            else:
+                self.timeout = timeout
+             super().__init__(name=name)
+ 
+         def __enter__(self):
+@@ -3981,13 +3985,19 @@ class TestPreHandshakeClose(unittest.TestCase):
+             self.ssl_ctx.load_cert_chain(certfile=ONLYCERT, keyfile=ONLYKEY)
+             self.listener = socket.socket()
+             self.port = support.bind_port(self.listener)
+-            self.listener.settimeout(2.0)
+            self.listener.settimeout(self.timeout)
+             self.listener.listen(1)
+             super().start()
+ 
+         def run(self):
+-            conn, address = self.listener.accept()
+-            self.listener.close()
+            try:
+                conn, address = self.listener.accept()
+            except TimeoutError:
+                # on timeout, just close the listener
+                return
+            finally:
+                self.listener.close()
+
+             with conn:
+                 if self.call_after_accept(conn):
+                     return
+@@ -4015,8 +4025,13 @@ class TestPreHandshakeClose(unittest.TestCase):
+             # we're specifically trying to test. The way this test is written
+             # is known to work on Linux. We'll skip it anywhere else that it
+             # does not present as doing so.
+-            self.skipTest("Could not recreate conditions on {}: \
+-                          err={}".format(sys.platform,err))
+            try:
+                self.skipTest("Could not recreate conditions on {}: \
+                              err={}".format(sys.platform,err))
+            finally:
+                # gh-108342: Explicitly break the reference cycle
+                err = None
+
+         # If maintaining this conditional winds up being a problem.
+         # just turn this into an unconditional skip anything but Linux.
+         # The important thing is that our CI has the logic covered.
+@@ -4027,7 +4042,7 @@ class TestPreHandshakeClose(unittest.TestCase):
+ 
+         def call_after_accept(unused):
+             server_accept_called.set()
+-            if not ready_for_server_wrap_socket.wait(2.0):
+            if not ready_for_server_wrap_socket.wait(support.SHORT_TIMEOUT):
+                 raise RuntimeError("wrap_socket event never set, test may fail.")
+             return False  # Tell the server thread to continue.
+ 
+@@ -4049,20 +4064,31 @@ class TestPreHandshakeClose(unittest.TestCase):
+ 
+         ready_for_server_wrap_socket.set()
+         server.join()
+
+         wrap_error = server.wrap_error
+-        self.assertEqual(b"", server.received_data)
+-        self.assertIsInstance(wrap_error, OSError)  # All platforms.
+-        self.non_linux_skip_if_other_okay_error(wrap_error)
+-        self.assertIsInstance(wrap_error, ssl.SSLError)
+-        self.assertIn("before TLS handshake with data", wrap_error.args[1])
+-        self.assertIn("before TLS handshake with data", wrap_error.reason)
+-        self.assertNotEqual(0, wrap_error.args[0])
+-        self.assertIsNone(wrap_error.library, msg="attr must exist")
+        server.wrap_error = None
+        try:
+            self.assertEqual(b"", server.received_data)
+            self.assertIsInstance(wrap_error, OSError)  # All platforms.
+            self.non_linux_skip_if_other_okay_error(wrap_error)
+            self.assertIsInstance(wrap_error, ssl.SSLError)
+            self.assertIn("before TLS handshake with data", wrap_error.args[1])
+            self.assertIn("before TLS handshake with data", wrap_error.reason)
+            self.assertNotEqual(0, wrap_error.args[0])
+            self.assertIsNone(wrap_error.library, msg="attr must exist")
+        finally:
+            # gh-108342: Explicitly break the reference cycle
+            wrap_error = None
+            server = None
+ 
+     def test_preauth_data_to_tls_client(self):
+        server_can_continue_with_wrap_socket = threading.Event()
+         client_can_continue_with_wrap_socket = threading.Event()
+ 
+         def call_after_accept(conn_to_client):
+            if not server_can_continue_with_wrap_socket.wait(support.SHORT_TIMEOUT):
+                print("ERROR: test client took too long")
+
+             # This forces an immediate connection close via RST on .close().
+             set_socket_so_linger_on_with_zero_timeout(conn_to_client)
+             conn_to_client.send(
+@@ -4084,8 +4110,10 @@ class TestPreHandshakeClose(unittest.TestCase):
+ 
+         with socket.socket() as client:
+             client.connect(server.listener.getsockname())
+-            if not client_can_continue_with_wrap_socket.wait(2.0):
+-                self.fail("test server took too long.")
+            server_can_continue_with_wrap_socket.set()
+
+            if not client_can_continue_with_wrap_socket.wait(support.SHORT_TIMEOUT):
+                self.fail("test server took too long")
+             ssl_ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
+             try:
+                 tls_client = ssl_ctx.wrap_socket(
+@@ -4099,24 +4127,31 @@ class TestPreHandshakeClose(unittest.TestCase):
+                 tls_client.close()
+ 
+         server.join()
+-        self.assertEqual(b"", received_data)
+-        self.assertIsInstance(wrap_error, OSError)  # All platforms.
+-        self.non_linux_skip_if_other_okay_error(wrap_error)
+-        self.assertIsInstance(wrap_error, ssl.SSLError)
+-        self.assertIn("before TLS handshake with data", wrap_error.args[1])
+-        self.assertIn("before TLS handshake with data", wrap_error.reason)
+-        self.assertNotEqual(0, wrap_error.args[0])
+-        self.assertIsNone(wrap_error.library, msg="attr must exist")
+        try:
+            self.assertEqual(b"", received_data)
+            self.assertIsInstance(wrap_error, OSError)  # All platforms.
+            self.non_linux_skip_if_other_okay_error(wrap_error)
+            self.assertIsInstance(wrap_error, ssl.SSLError)
+            self.assertIn("before TLS handshake with data", wrap_error.args[1])
+            self.assertIn("before TLS handshake with data", wrap_error.reason)
+            self.assertNotEqual(0, wrap_error.args[0])
+            self.assertIsNone(wrap_error.library, msg="attr must exist")
+        finally:
+            # gh-108342: Explicitly break the reference cycle
+            wrap_error = None
+            server = None
+ 
+     def test_https_client_non_tls_response_ignored(self):
+-
+         server_responding = threading.Event()
+ 
+         class SynchronizedHTTPSConnection(http.client.HTTPSConnection):
+             def connect(self):
+                # Call clear text HTTP connect(), not the encrypted HTTPS (TLS)
+                # connect(): wrap_socket() is called manually below.
+                 http.client.HTTPConnection.connect(self)
+
+                 # Wait for our fault injection server to have done its thing.
+-                if not server_responding.wait(1.0) and support.verbose:
+                if not server_responding.wait(support.SHORT_TIMEOUT) and support.verbose:
+                     sys.stdout.write("server_responding event never set.")
+                 self.sock = self._context.wrap_socket(
+                         self.sock, server_hostname=self.host)
+@@ -4131,29 +4166,34 @@ class TestPreHandshakeClose(unittest.TestCase):
+             server_responding.set()
+             return True  # Tell the server to stop.
+ 
+        timeout = 2.0
+         server = self.SingleConnectionTestServerThread(
+                 call_after_accept=call_after_accept,
+-                name="non_tls_http_RST_responder")
+                name="non_tls_http_RST_responder",
+                timeout=timeout)
+         server.__enter__()  # starts it
+         self.addCleanup(server.__exit__)  # ... & unittest.TestCase stops it.
+         # Redundant; call_after_accept sets SO_LINGER on the accepted conn.
+         set_socket_so_linger_on_with_zero_timeout(server.listener)
+ 
+         connection = SynchronizedHTTPSConnection(
+-                f"localhost",
+                server.listener.getsockname()[0],
+                 port=server.port,
+                 context=ssl.create_default_context(),
+-                timeout=2.0,
+                timeout=timeout,
+         )
+
+         # There are lots of reasons this raises as desired, long before this
+         # test was added. Sending the request requires a successful TLS wrapped
+         # socket; that fails if the connection is broken. It may seem pointless
+         # to test this. It serves as an illustration of something that we never
+         # want to happen... properly not happening.
+-        with self.assertRaises(OSError) as err_ctx:
+        with self.assertRaises(OSError):
+             connection.request("HEAD", "/test", headers={"Host": "localhost"})
+             response = connection.getresponse()
+ 
+        server.join()
+
+ 
+ def test_main(verbose=False):
+     if support.verbose:
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
+
+From 2e8776245e9fb8ede784077df26684b4b53df0bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2023 21:55:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Downstream: Additional fixup for 3.6:
+
+Use alternative for self.getblocking(), which was added in Python 3.7
+see: https://docs.python.org/3/library/socket.html#socket.socket.getblocking
+
+Set self._sslobj early to avoid AttributeError
+---
+ Lib/ssl.py | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Lib/ssl.py b/Lib/ssl.py
+index 67869c9..daedc82 100644
+--- a/Lib/ssl.py
+++ b/Lib/ssl.py
+@@ -690,6 +690,7 @@ class SSLSocket(socket):
+                  suppress_ragged_eofs=True, npn_protocols=None, ciphers=None,
+                  server_hostname=None,
+                  _context=None, _session=None):
+        self._sslobj = None
+ 
+         if _context:
+             self._context = _context
+@@ -755,7 +756,7 @@ class SSLSocket(socket):
+             if e.errno != errno.ENOTCONN:
+                 raise
+             connected = False
+-            blocking = self.getblocking()
+            blocking = (self.gettimeout() != 0)
+             self.setblocking(False)
+             try:
+                 # We are not connected so this is not supposed to block, but
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/00408-CVE-2022-48560.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00408-CVE-2022-48560.patch
@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+From c563f409ea30bcb0623d785428c9257917371b76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
+ <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 06:49:19 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] bpo-39421: Fix posible crash in heapq with custom comparison
+ operators (GH-18118) (GH-18146)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 79f89e6e5a659846d1068e8b1bd8e491ccdef861)
+
+Co-authored-by: Pablo Galindo <Pablogsal@gmail.com>
+---
+ Lib/test/test_heapq.py                        | 31 ++++++++++++++++
+ .../2020-01-22-15-53-37.bpo-39421.O3nG7u.rst  |  2 ++
+ Modules/_heapqmodule.c                        | 35 ++++++++++++++-----
+ 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Core and Builtins/2020-01-22-15-53-37.bpo-39421.O3nG7u.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_heapq.py b/Lib/test/test_heapq.py
+index 2f8c648d84a58..7c3fb0210f69b 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_heapq.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_heapq.py
+@@ -414,6 +414,37 @@ def test_heappop_mutating_heap(self):
+         with self.assertRaises((IndexError, RuntimeError)):
+             self.module.heappop(heap)
+ 
+    def test_comparison_operator_modifiying_heap(self):
+        # See bpo-39421: Strong references need to be taken
+        # when comparing objects as they can alter the heap
+        class EvilClass(int):
+            def __lt__(self, o):
+                heap.clear()
+                return NotImplemented
+
+        heap = []
+        self.module.heappush(heap, EvilClass(0))
+        self.assertRaises(IndexError, self.module.heappushpop, heap, 1)
+
+    def test_comparison_operator_modifiying_heap_two_heaps(self):
+
+        class h(int):
+            def __lt__(self, o):
+                list2.clear()
+                return NotImplemented
+
+        class g(int):
+            def __lt__(self, o):
+                list1.clear()
+                return NotImplemented
+
+        list1, list2 = [], []
+
+        self.module.heappush(list1, h(0))
+        self.module.heappush(list2, g(0))
+
+        self.assertRaises((IndexError, RuntimeError), self.module.heappush, list1, g(1))
+        self.assertRaises((IndexError, RuntimeError), self.module.heappush, list2, h(1))
+ 
+ class TestErrorHandlingPython(TestErrorHandling, TestCase):
+     module = py_heapq
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Core and Builtins/2020-01-22-15-53-37.bpo-39421.O3nG7u.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Core and Builtins/2020-01-22-15-53-37.bpo-39421.O3nG7u.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..bae008150ee12
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Core and Builtins/2020-01-22-15-53-37.bpo-39421.O3nG7u.rst	
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Fix possible crashes when operating with the functions in the :mod:`heapq`
+module and custom comparison operators.
+diff --git a/Modules/_heapqmodule.c b/Modules/_heapqmodule.c
+index b499e1f668aae..0fb35ffe5ec48 100644
+--- a/Modules/_heapqmodule.c
+++ b/Modules/_heapqmodule.c
+@@ -29,7 +29,11 @@ siftdown(PyListObject *heap, Py_ssize_t startpos, Py_ssize_t pos)
+     while (pos > startpos) {
+         parentpos = (pos - 1) >> 1;
+         parent = arr[parentpos];
+        Py_INCREF(newitem);
+        Py_INCREF(parent);
+         cmp = PyObject_RichCompareBool(newitem, parent, Py_LT);
+        Py_DECREF(parent);
+        Py_DECREF(newitem);
+         if (cmp < 0)
+             return -1;
+         if (size != PyList_GET_SIZE(heap)) {
+@@ -71,10 +75,13 @@ siftup(PyListObject *heap, Py_ssize_t pos)
+         /* Set childpos to index of smaller child.   */
+         childpos = 2*pos + 1;    /* leftmost child position  */
+         if (childpos + 1 < endpos) {
+-            cmp = PyObject_RichCompareBool(
+-                arr[childpos],
+-                arr[childpos + 1],
+-                Py_LT);
+            PyObject* a = arr[childpos];
+            PyObject* b = arr[childpos + 1];
+            Py_INCREF(a);
+            Py_INCREF(b);
+            cmp = PyObject_RichCompareBool(a, b, Py_LT);
+            Py_DECREF(a);
+            Py_DECREF(b);
+             if (cmp < 0)
+                 return -1;
+             childpos += ((unsigned)cmp ^ 1);   /* increment when cmp==0 */
+@@ -229,7 +236,10 @@ heappushpop(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)
+         return item;
+     }
+ 
+-    cmp = PyObject_RichCompareBool(PyList_GET_ITEM(heap, 0), item, Py_LT);
+    PyObject* top = PyList_GET_ITEM(heap, 0);
+    Py_INCREF(top);
+    cmp = PyObject_RichCompareBool(top, item, Py_LT);
+    Py_DECREF(top);
+     if (cmp < 0)
+         return NULL;
+     if (cmp == 0) {
+@@ -383,7 +393,11 @@ siftdown_max(PyListObject *heap, Py_ssize_t startpos, Py_ssize_t pos)
+     while (pos > startpos) {
+         parentpos = (pos - 1) >> 1;
+         parent = arr[parentpos];
+        Py_INCREF(parent);
+        Py_INCREF(newitem);
+         cmp = PyObject_RichCompareBool(parent, newitem, Py_LT);
+        Py_DECREF(parent);
+        Py_DECREF(newitem);
+         if (cmp < 0)
+             return -1;
+         if (size != PyList_GET_SIZE(heap)) {
+@@ -425,10 +439,13 @@ siftup_max(PyListObject *heap, Py_ssize_t pos)
+         /* Set childpos to index of smaller child.   */
+         childpos = 2*pos + 1;    /* leftmost child position  */
+         if (childpos + 1 < endpos) {
+-            cmp = PyObject_RichCompareBool(
+-                arr[childpos + 1],
+-                arr[childpos],
+-                Py_LT);
+            PyObject* a = arr[childpos + 1];
+            PyObject* b = arr[childpos];
+            Py_INCREF(a);
+            Py_INCREF(b);
+            cmp = PyObject_RichCompareBool(a, b, Py_LT);
+            Py_DECREF(a);
+            Py_DECREF(b);
+             if (cmp < 0)
+                 return -1;
+             childpos += ((unsigned)cmp ^ 1);   /* increment when cmp==0 */
--- a/SOURCES/00413-CVE-2022-48564.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00413-CVE-2022-48564.patch
@ -0,0 +1,560 @@
+From cec66eefbee76ee95f252a52de0f5abc1b677f5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2023 13:03:42 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] [3.6] bpo-42103: Improve validation of Plist files. 
+ (GH-22882) (GH-23118)
+
+* Prevent some possible DoS attacks via providing invalid Plist files
+  with extremely large number of objects or collection sizes.
+* Raise InvalidFileException for too large bytes and string size instead of returning garbage.
+* Raise InvalidFileException instead of ValueError for specific invalid datetime (NaN).
+* Raise InvalidFileException instead of TypeError for non-hashable dict keys.
+* Add more tests for invalid Plist files..
+(cherry picked from commit 34637a0ce21e7261b952fbd9d006474cc29b681f)
+
+Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
+---
+ Lib/plistlib.py                               |  34 +-
+ Lib/test/test_plistlib.py                     | 394 +++++++++++++++---
+ .../2020-10-23-19-20-14.bpo-42103.C5obK2.rst  |   3 +
+ .../2020-10-23-19-19-30.bpo-42103.cILT66.rst  |   2 +
+ 4 files changed, 366 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-10-23-19-20-14.bpo-42103.C5obK2.rst
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-10-23-19-19-30.bpo-42103.cILT66.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/plistlib.py b/Lib/plistlib.py
+index a918643..df1f346 100644
+--- a/Lib/plistlib.py
+++ b/Lib/plistlib.py
+@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ class _BinaryPlistParser:
+             return self._read_object(top_object)
+ 
+         except (OSError, IndexError, struct.error, OverflowError,
+-                UnicodeDecodeError):
+                ValueError):
+             raise InvalidFileException()
+ 
+     def _get_size(self, tokenL):
+@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ class _BinaryPlistParser:
+     def _read_ints(self, n, size):
+         data = self._fp.read(size * n)
+         if size in _BINARY_FORMAT:
+-            return struct.unpack('>' + _BINARY_FORMAT[size] * n, data)
+            return struct.unpack(f'>{n}{_BINARY_FORMAT[size]}', data)
+         else:
+             if not size or len(data) != size * n:
+                 raise InvalidFileException()
+@@ -701,19 +701,25 @@ class _BinaryPlistParser:
+ 
+         elif tokenH == 0x40:  # data
+             s = self._get_size(tokenL)
+-            if self._use_builtin_types:
+-                result = self._fp.read(s)
+-            else:
+-                result = Data(self._fp.read(s))
+            result = self._fp.read(s)
+            if len(result) != s:
+                raise InvalidFileException()
+            if not self._use_builtin_types:
+                result = Data(result)
+ 
+         elif tokenH == 0x50:  # ascii string
+             s = self._get_size(tokenL)
+-            result =  self._fp.read(s).decode('ascii')
+-            result = result
+            data = self._fp.read(s)
+            if len(data) != s:
+                raise InvalidFileException()
+            result = data.decode('ascii')
+ 
+         elif tokenH == 0x60:  # unicode string
+-            s = self._get_size(tokenL)
+-            result = self._fp.read(s * 2).decode('utf-16be')
+            s = self._get_size(tokenL) * 2
+            data = self._fp.read(s)
+            if len(data) != s:
+                raise InvalidFileException()
+            result = data.decode('utf-16be')
+ 
+         # tokenH == 0x80 is documented as 'UID' and appears to be used for
+         # keyed-archiving, not in plists.
+@@ -737,9 +743,11 @@ class _BinaryPlistParser:
+             obj_refs = self._read_refs(s)
+             result = self._dict_type()
+             self._objects[ref] = result
+-            for k, o in zip(key_refs, obj_refs):
+-                result[self._read_object(k)] = self._read_object(o)
+-
+            try:
+                for k, o in zip(key_refs, obj_refs):
+                    result[self._read_object(k)] = self._read_object(o)
+            except TypeError:
+                raise InvalidFileException()
+         else:
+             raise InvalidFileException()
+ 
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_plistlib.py b/Lib/test/test_plistlib.py
+index d47c607..f71245d 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_plistlib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_plistlib.py
+@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
+ # Copyright (C) 2003-2013 Python Software Foundation
+ 
+import struct
+ import unittest
+ import plistlib
+ import os
+@@ -90,6 +91,284 @@ TESTDATA={
+         xQHHAsQC0gAAAAAAAAIBAAAAAAAAADkAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAALs'''),
+ }
+ 
+INVALID_BINARY_PLISTS = [
+    ('too short data',
+        b''
+    ),
+    ('too large offset_table_offset and offset_size = 1',
+        b'\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x2a'
+    ),
+    ('too large offset_table_offset and nonstandard offset_size',
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x2c'
+    ),
+    ('integer overflow in offset_table_offset',
+        b'\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff'
+    ),
+    ('too large top_object',
+        b'\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09'
+    ),
+    ('integer overflow in top_object',
+        b'\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09'
+    ),
+    ('too large num_objects and offset_size = 1',
+        b'\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09'
+    ),
+    ('too large num_objects and nonstandard offset_size',
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09'
+    ),
+    ('extremally large num_objects (32 bit)',
+        b'\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7f\xff\xff\xff'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09'
+    ),
+    ('extremally large num_objects (64 bit)',
+        b'\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09'
+    ),
+    ('integer overflow in num_objects',
+        b'\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09'
+    ),
+    ('offset_size = 0',
+        b'\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09'
+    ),
+    ('ref_size = 0',
+        b'\xa1\x01\x00\x08\x0a'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0b'
+    ),
+    ('too large offset',
+        b'\x00\x2a'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09'
+    ),
+    ('integer overflow in offset',
+        b'\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09'
+    ),
+    ('too large array size',
+        b'\xaf\x00\x01\xff\x00\x08\x0c'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0d'
+    ),
+    ('extremally large array size (32-bit)',
+        b'\xaf\x02\x7f\xff\xff\xff\x01\x00\x08\x0f'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x10'
+    ),
+    ('extremally large array size (64-bit)',
+        b'\xaf\x03\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x01\x00\x08\x13'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x14'
+    ),
+    ('integer overflow in array size',
+        b'\xaf\x03\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x01\x00\x08\x13'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x14'
+    ),
+    ('too large reference index',
+        b'\xa1\x02\x00\x08\x0a'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0b'
+    ),
+    ('integer overflow in reference index',
+        b'\xa1\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x08\x11'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x12'
+    ),
+    ('too large bytes size',
+        b'\x4f\x00\x23\x41\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0c'
+    ),
+    ('extremally large bytes size (32-bit)',
+        b'\x4f\x02\x7f\xff\xff\xff\x41\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0f'
+    ),
+    ('extremally large bytes size (64-bit)',
+        b'\x4f\x03\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x41\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x13'
+    ),
+    ('integer overflow in bytes size',
+        b'\x4f\x03\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x41\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x13'
+    ),
+    ('too large ASCII size',
+        b'\x5f\x00\x23\x41\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0c'
+    ),
+    ('extremally large ASCII size (32-bit)',
+        b'\x5f\x02\x7f\xff\xff\xff\x41\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0f'
+    ),
+    ('extremally large ASCII size (64-bit)',
+        b'\x5f\x03\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x41\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x13'
+    ),
+    ('integer overflow in ASCII size',
+        b'\x5f\x03\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x41\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x13'
+    ),
+    ('invalid ASCII',
+        b'\x51\xff\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0a'
+    ),
+    ('too large UTF-16 size',
+        b'\x6f\x00\x13\x20\xac\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0e'
+    ),
+    ('extremally large UTF-16 size (32-bit)',
+        b'\x6f\x02\x4f\xff\xff\xff\x20\xac\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x11'
+    ),
+    ('extremally large UTF-16 size (64-bit)',
+        b'\x6f\x03\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x20\xac\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x15'
+    ),
+    ('integer overflow in UTF-16 size',
+        b'\x6f\x03\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x20\xac\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x15'
+    ),
+    ('invalid UTF-16',
+        b'\x61\xd8\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0b'
+    ),
+    ('non-hashable key',
+        b'\xd1\x01\x01\xa0\x08\x0b'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0c'
+    ),
+    ('too large datetime (datetime overflow)',
+        b'\x33\x42\x50\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x11'
+    ),
+    ('too large datetime (timedelta overflow)',
+        b'\x33\x42\xe0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x11'
+    ),
+    ('invalid datetime (Infinity)',
+        b'\x33\x7f\xf0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x11'
+    ),
+    ('invalid datetime (NaN)',
+        b'\x33\x7f\xf8\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x11'
+    ),
+]
+ 
+ class TestPlistlib(unittest.TestCase):
+ 
+@@ -447,6 +726,21 @@ class TestPlistlib(unittest.TestCase):
+ 
+ class TestBinaryPlistlib(unittest.TestCase):
+ 
+    @staticmethod
+    def decode(*objects, offset_size=1, ref_size=1):
+        data = [b'bplist00']
+        offset = 8
+        offsets = []
+        for x in objects:
+            offsets.append(offset.to_bytes(offset_size, 'big'))
+            data.append(x)
+            offset += len(x)
+        tail = struct.pack('>6xBBQQQ', offset_size, ref_size,
+                           len(objects), 0, offset)
+        data.extend(offsets)
+        data.append(tail)
+        return plistlib.loads(b''.join(data), fmt=plistlib.FMT_BINARY)
+
+     def test_nonstandard_refs_size(self):
+         # Issue #21538: Refs and offsets are 24-bit integers
+         data = (b'bplist00'
+@@ -461,7 +755,7 @@ class TestBinaryPlistlib(unittest.TestCase):
+ 
+     def test_dump_duplicates(self):
+         # Test effectiveness of saving duplicated objects
+-        for x in (None, False, True, 12345, 123.45, 'abcde', b'abcde',
+        for x in (None, False, True, 12345, 123.45, 'abcde', 'абвгд', b'abcde',
+                   datetime.datetime(2004, 10, 26, 10, 33, 33),
+                   plistlib.Data(b'abcde'), bytearray(b'abcde'),
+                   [12, 345], (12, 345), {'12': 345}):
+@@ -500,6 +794,20 @@ class TestBinaryPlistlib(unittest.TestCase):
+         b = plistlib.loads(plistlib.dumps(a, fmt=plistlib.FMT_BINARY))
+         self.assertIs(b['x'], b)
+ 
+    def test_deep_nesting(self):
+        for N in [300, 100000]:
+            chunks = [b'\xa1' + (i + 1).to_bytes(4, 'big') for i in range(N)]
+            try:
+                result = self.decode(*chunks, b'\x54seed', offset_size=4, ref_size=4)
+            except RecursionError:
+                pass
+            else:
+                for i in range(N):
+                    self.assertIsInstance(result, list)
+                    self.assertEqual(len(result), 1)
+                    result = result[0]
+                self.assertEqual(result, 'seed')
+
+     def test_large_timestamp(self):
+         # Issue #26709: 32-bit timestamp out of range
+         for ts in -2**31-1, 2**31:
+@@ -509,55 +817,37 @@ class TestBinaryPlistlib(unittest.TestCase):
+                 data = plistlib.dumps(d, fmt=plistlib.FMT_BINARY)
+                 self.assertEqual(plistlib.loads(data), d)
+ 
+    def test_load_singletons(self):
+        self.assertIs(self.decode(b'\x00'), None)
+        self.assertIs(self.decode(b'\x08'), False)
+        self.assertIs(self.decode(b'\x09'), True)
+        self.assertEqual(self.decode(b'\x0f'), b'')
+
+    def test_load_int(self):
+        self.assertEqual(self.decode(b'\x10\x00'), 0)
+        self.assertEqual(self.decode(b'\x10\xfe'), 0xfe)
+        self.assertEqual(self.decode(b'\x11\xfe\xdc'), 0xfedc)
+        self.assertEqual(self.decode(b'\x12\xfe\xdc\xba\x98'), 0xfedcba98)
+        self.assertEqual(self.decode(b'\x13\x01\x23\x45\x67\x89\xab\xcd\xef'),
+                         0x0123456789abcdef)
+        self.assertEqual(self.decode(b'\x13\xfe\xdc\xba\x98\x76\x54\x32\x10'),
+                         -0x123456789abcdf0)
+
+    def test_unsupported(self):
+        unsupported = [*range(1, 8), *range(10, 15),
+                       0x20, 0x21, *range(0x24, 0x33), *range(0x34, 0x40)]
+        for i in [0x70, 0x90, 0xb0, 0xc0, 0xe0, 0xf0]:
+            unsupported.extend(i + j for j in range(16))
+        for token in unsupported:
+            with self.subTest(f'token {token:02x}'):
+                with self.assertRaises(plistlib.InvalidFileException):
+                    self.decode(bytes([token]) + b'\x00'*16)
+
+     def test_invalid_binary(self):
+-        for data in [
+-                # too short data
+-                b'',
+-                # too large offset_table_offset and nonstandard offset_size
+-                b'\x00\x08'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x01'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x2a',
+-                # integer overflow in offset_table_offset
+-                b'\x00\x08'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+-                b'\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff',
+-                # offset_size = 0
+-                b'\x00\x08'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09',
+-                # ref_size = 0
+-                b'\xa1\x01\x00\x08\x0a'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0b',
+-                # integer overflow in offset
+-                b'\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\x01'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09',
+-                # invalid ASCII
+-                b'\x51\xff\x08'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0a',
+-                # invalid UTF-16
+-                b'\x61\xd8\x00\x08'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+-                b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0b',
+-                ]:
+-            with self.assertRaises(plistlib.InvalidFileException):
+-                plistlib.loads(b'bplist00' + data, fmt=plistlib.FMT_BINARY)
+        for name, data in INVALID_BINARY_PLISTS:
+            with self.subTest(name):
+                with self.assertRaises(plistlib.InvalidFileException):
+                    plistlib.loads(b'bplist00' + data, fmt=plistlib.FMT_BINARY)
+ 
+ 
+ class TestPlistlibDeprecated(unittest.TestCase):
+@@ -655,9 +945,5 @@ class MiscTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
+         support.check__all__(self, plistlib, blacklist=blacklist)
+ 
+ 
+-def test_main():
+-    support.run_unittest(TestPlistlib, TestPlistlibDeprecated, MiscTestCase)
+-
+-
+ if __name__ == '__main__':
+-    test_main()
+    unittest.main()
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-10-23-19-20-14.bpo-42103.C5obK2.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-10-23-19-20-14.bpo-42103.C5obK2.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..4eb694c
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-10-23-19-20-14.bpo-42103.C5obK2.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+:exc:`~plistlib.InvalidFileException` and :exc:`RecursionError` are now
+the only errors caused by loading malformed binary Plist file (previously
+ValueError and TypeError could be raised in some specific cases).
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-10-23-19-19-30.bpo-42103.cILT66.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-10-23-19-19-30.bpo-42103.cILT66.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..15d7b65
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-10-23-19-19-30.bpo-42103.cILT66.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Prevented potential DoS attack via CPU and RAM exhaustion when processing
+malformed Apple Property List files in binary format.
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/00414-skip_test_zlib_s390x.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00414-skip_test_zlib_s390x.patch
@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+From 0d02ff99721f7650e39ba4c7d8fe06f412bbb591 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Victor Stinner <vstinner@python.org>
+Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2023 11:50:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] bpo-46623: Skip two test_zlib tests on s390x (GH-31096)
+
+Skip test_pair() and test_speech128() of test_zlib on s390x since
+they fail if zlib uses the s390x hardware accelerator.
+---
+ Lib/test/test_zlib.py                         | 32 +++++++++++++++++++
+ .../2022-02-03-09-45-26.bpo-46623.vxzuhV.rst  |  2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Tests/2022-02-03-09-45-26.bpo-46623.vxzuhV.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_zlib.py b/Lib/test/test_zlib.py
+index b7170b4..770a425 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_zlib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_zlib.py
+@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
+ import unittest
+ from test import support
+ import binascii
+import os
+ import pickle
+ import random
+ import sys
+@@ -15,6 +16,35 @@ requires_Decompress_copy = unittest.skipUnless(
+         hasattr(zlib.decompressobj(), "copy"),
+         'requires Decompress.copy()')
+ 
+# bpo-46623: On s390x, when a hardware accelerator is used, using different
+# ways to compress data with zlib can produce different compressed data.
+# Simplified test_pair() code:
+#
+#   def func1(data):
+#       return zlib.compress(data)
+#
+#   def func2(data)
+#       co = zlib.compressobj()
+#       x1 = co.compress(data)
+#       x2 = co.flush()
+#       return x1 + x2
+#
+# On s390x if zlib uses a hardware accelerator, func1() creates a single
+# "final" compressed block whereas func2() produces 3 compressed blocks (the
+# last one is a final block). On other platforms with no accelerator, func1()
+# and func2() produce the same compressed data made of a single (final)
+# compressed block.
+#
+# Only the compressed data is different, the decompression returns the original
+# data:
+#
+#   zlib.decompress(func1(data)) == zlib.decompress(func2(data)) == data
+#
+# Make the assumption that s390x always has an accelerator to simplify the skip
+# condition. Windows doesn't have os.uname() but it doesn't support s390x.
+skip_on_s390x = unittest.skipIf(hasattr(os, 'uname') and os.uname().machine == 's390x',
+                                'skipped on s390x')
+
+ 
+ class VersionTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
+ 
+@@ -174,6 +204,7 @@ class CompressTestCase(BaseCompressTestCase, unittest.TestCase):
+                                          bufsize=zlib.DEF_BUF_SIZE),
+                          HAMLET_SCENE)
+ 
+    @skip_on_s390x
+     def test_speech128(self):
+         # compress more data
+         data = HAMLET_SCENE * 128
+@@ -225,6 +256,7 @@ class CompressTestCase(BaseCompressTestCase, unittest.TestCase):
+ 
+ class CompressObjectTestCase(BaseCompressTestCase, unittest.TestCase):
+     # Test compression object
+    @skip_on_s390x
+     def test_pair(self):
+         # straightforward compress/decompress objects
+         datasrc = HAMLET_SCENE * 128
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Tests/2022-02-03-09-45-26.bpo-46623.vxzuhV.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Tests/2022-02-03-09-45-26.bpo-46623.vxzuhV.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..be085c0
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Tests/2022-02-03-09-45-26.bpo-46623.vxzuhV.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Skip test_pair() and test_speech128() of test_zlib on s390x since they fail
+if zlib uses the s390x hardware accelerator. Patch by Victor Stinner.
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/00415-cve-2023-27043-gh-102988-reject-malformed-addresses-in-email-parseaddr-111116.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00415-cve-2023-27043-gh-102988-reject-malformed-addresses-in-email-parseaddr-111116.patch
@ -0,0 +1,750 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Victor Stinner <vstinner@python.org>
+Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 16:10:40 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 00415: [CVE-2023-27043] gh-102988: Reject malformed addresses
+ in email.parseaddr() (#111116)
+
+Detect email address parsing errors and return empty tuple to
+indicate the parsing error (old API). Add an optional 'strict'
+parameter to getaddresses() and parseaddr() functions. Patch by
+Thomas Dwyer.
+
+Co-Authored-By: Thomas Dwyer <github@tomd.tel>
+---
+ Doc/library/email.utils.rst                   |  19 +-
+ Lib/email/utils.py                            | 151 ++++++++++++-
+ Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py             | 204 +++++++++++++++++-
+ ...-10-20-15-28-08.gh-issue-102988.dStNO7.rst |   8 +
+ 4 files changed, 361 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-10-20-15-28-08.gh-issue-102988.dStNO7.rst
+
+diff --git a/Doc/library/email.utils.rst b/Doc/library/email.utils.rst
+index 63fae2ab84..d1e1898591 100644
+--- a/Doc/library/email.utils.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/email.utils.rst
+@@ -60,13 +60,18 @@ of the new API.
+    begins with angle brackets, they are stripped off.
+ 
+ 
+-.. function:: parseaddr(address)
+.. function:: parseaddr(address, *, strict=True)
+ 
+    Parse address -- which should be the value of some address-containing field such
+    as :mailheader:`To` or :mailheader:`Cc` -- into its constituent *realname* and
+    *email address* parts.  Returns a tuple of that information, unless the parse
+    fails, in which case a 2-tuple of ``('', '')`` is returned.
+ 
+   If *strict* is true, use a strict parser which rejects malformed inputs.
+
+   .. versionchanged:: 3.13
+      Add *strict* optional parameter and reject malformed inputs by default.
+
+ 
+ .. function:: formataddr(pair, charset='utf-8')
+ 
+@@ -84,12 +89,15 @@ of the new API.
+       Added the *charset* option.
+ 
+ 
+-.. function:: getaddresses(fieldvalues)
+.. function:: getaddresses(fieldvalues, *, strict=True)
+ 
+    This method returns a list of 2-tuples of the form returned by ``parseaddr()``.
+    *fieldvalues* is a sequence of header field values as might be returned by
+-   :meth:`Message.get_all <email.message.Message.get_all>`.  Here's a simple
+-   example that gets all the recipients of a message::
+   :meth:`Message.get_all <email.message.Message.get_all>`.
+
+   If *strict* is true, use a strict parser which rejects malformed inputs.
+
+   Here's a simple example that gets all the recipients of a message::
+ 
+       from email.utils import getaddresses
+ 
+@@ -99,6 +107,9 @@ of the new API.
+       resent_ccs = msg.get_all('resent-cc', [])
+       all_recipients = getaddresses(tos + ccs + resent_tos + resent_ccs)
+ 
+   .. versionchanged:: 3.13
+      Add *strict* optional parameter and reject malformed inputs by default.
+
+ 
+ .. function:: parsedate(date)
+ 
+diff --git a/Lib/email/utils.py b/Lib/email/utils.py
+index 39c2240607..f83b7e5d7e 100644
+--- a/Lib/email/utils.py
+++ b/Lib/email/utils.py
+@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ TICK = "'"
+ specialsre = re.compile(r'[][\\()<>@,:;".]')
+ escapesre = re.compile(r'[\\"]')
+ 
+
+ def _has_surrogates(s):
+     """Return True if s contains surrogate-escaped binary data."""
+     # This check is based on the fact that unless there are surrogates, utf8
+@@ -106,12 +107,127 @@ def formataddr(pair, charset='utf-8'):
+     return address
+ 
+ 
+def _iter_escaped_chars(addr):
+    pos = 0
+    escape = False
+    for pos, ch in enumerate(addr):
+        if escape:
+            yield (pos, '\\' + ch)
+            escape = False
+        elif ch == '\\':
+            escape = True
+        else:
+            yield (pos, ch)
+    if escape:
+        yield (pos, '\\')
+ 
+-def getaddresses(fieldvalues):
+-    """Return a list of (REALNAME, EMAIL) for each fieldvalue."""
+-    all = COMMASPACE.join(fieldvalues)
+-    a = _AddressList(all)
+-    return a.addresslist
+
+def _strip_quoted_realnames(addr):
+    """Strip real names between quotes."""
+    if '"' not in addr:
+        # Fast path
+        return addr
+
+    start = 0
+    open_pos = None
+    result = []
+    for pos, ch in _iter_escaped_chars(addr):
+        if ch == '"':
+            if open_pos is None:
+                open_pos = pos
+            else:
+                if start != open_pos:
+                    result.append(addr[start:open_pos])
+                start = pos + 1
+                open_pos = None
+
+    if start < len(addr):
+        result.append(addr[start:])
+
+    return ''.join(result)
+
+
+supports_strict_parsing = True
+
+def getaddresses(fieldvalues, *, strict=True):
+    """Return a list of (REALNAME, EMAIL) or ('','') for each fieldvalue.
+
+    When parsing fails for a fieldvalue, a 2-tuple of ('', '') is returned in
+    its place.
+
+    If strict is true, use a strict parser which rejects malformed inputs.
+    """
+
+    # If strict is true, if the resulting list of parsed addresses is greater
+    # than the number of fieldvalues in the input list, a parsing error has
+    # occurred and consequently a list containing a single empty 2-tuple [('',
+    # '')] is returned in its place. This is done to avoid invalid output.
+    #
+    # Malformed input: getaddresses(['alice@example.com <bob@example.com>'])
+    # Invalid output: [('', 'alice@example.com'), ('', 'bob@example.com')]
+    # Safe output: [('', '')]
+
+    if not strict:
+        all = COMMASPACE.join(str(v) for v in fieldvalues)
+        a = _AddressList(all)
+        return a.addresslist
+
+    fieldvalues = [str(v) for v in fieldvalues]
+    fieldvalues = _pre_parse_validation(fieldvalues)
+    addr = COMMASPACE.join(fieldvalues)
+    a = _AddressList(addr)
+    result = _post_parse_validation(a.addresslist)
+
+    # Treat output as invalid if the number of addresses is not equal to the
+    # expected number of addresses.
+    n = 0
+    for v in fieldvalues:
+        # When a comma is used in the Real Name part it is not a deliminator.
+        # So strip those out before counting the commas.
+        v = _strip_quoted_realnames(v)
+        # Expected number of addresses: 1 + number of commas
+        n += 1 + v.count(',')
+    if len(result) != n:
+        return [('', '')]
+
+    return result
+
+
+def _check_parenthesis(addr):
+    # Ignore parenthesis in quoted real names.
+    addr = _strip_quoted_realnames(addr)
+
+    opens = 0
+    for pos, ch in _iter_escaped_chars(addr):
+        if ch == '(':
+            opens += 1
+        elif ch == ')':
+            opens -= 1
+            if opens < 0:
+                return False
+    return (opens == 0)
+
+
+def _pre_parse_validation(email_header_fields):
+    accepted_values = []
+    for v in email_header_fields:
+        if not _check_parenthesis(v):
+            v = "('', '')"
+        accepted_values.append(v)
+
+    return accepted_values
+
+
+def _post_parse_validation(parsed_email_header_tuples):
+    accepted_values = []
+    # The parser would have parsed a correctly formatted domain-literal
+    # The existence of an [ after parsing indicates a parsing failure
+    for v in parsed_email_header_tuples:
+        if '[' in v[1]:
+            v = ('', '')
+        accepted_values.append(v)
+
+    return accepted_values
+ 
+ 
+ 
+@@ -214,16 +330,33 @@ def parsedate_to_datetime(data):
+             tzinfo=datetime.timezone(datetime.timedelta(seconds=tz)))
+ 
+ 
+-def parseaddr(addr):
+def parseaddr(addr, *, strict=True):
+     """
+     Parse addr into its constituent realname and email address parts.
+ 
+     Return a tuple of realname and email address, unless the parse fails, in
+     which case return a 2-tuple of ('', '').
+
+    If strict is True, use a strict parser which rejects malformed inputs.
+     """
+-    addrs = _AddressList(addr).addresslist
+-    if not addrs:
+-        return '', ''
+    if not strict:
+        addrs = _AddressList(addr).addresslist
+        if not addrs:
+            return ('', '')
+        return addrs[0]
+
+    if isinstance(addr, list):
+        addr = addr[0]
+
+    if not isinstance(addr, str):
+        return ('', '')
+
+    addr = _pre_parse_validation([addr])[0]
+    addrs = _post_parse_validation(_AddressList(addr).addresslist)
+
+    if not addrs or len(addrs) > 1:
+        return ('', '')
+
+     return addrs[0]
+ 
+ 
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py b/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
+index e4e40b612f..ce36efc1b1 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ except ImportError:
+ 
+ import email
+ import email.policy
+import email.utils
+ 
+ from email.charset import Charset
+ from email.header import Header, decode_header, make_header
+@@ -3207,15 +3208,154 @@ Foo
+            [('Al Person', 'aperson@dom.ain'),
+             ('Bud Person', 'bperson@dom.ain')])
+ 
+    def test_getaddresses_comma_in_name(self):
+        """GH-106669 regression test."""
+        self.assertEqual(
+            utils.getaddresses(
+                [
+                    '"Bud, Person" <bperson@dom.ain>',
+                    'aperson@dom.ain (Al Person)',
+                    '"Mariusz Felisiak" <to@example.com>',
+                ]
+            ),
+            [
+                ('Bud, Person', 'bperson@dom.ain'),
+                ('Al Person', 'aperson@dom.ain'),
+                ('Mariusz Felisiak', 'to@example.com'),
+            ],
+        )
+
+    def test_parsing_errors(self):
+        """Test for parsing errors from CVE-2023-27043 and CVE-2019-16056"""
+        alice = 'alice@example.org'
+        bob = 'bob@example.com'
+        empty = ('', '')
+
+        # Test utils.getaddresses() and utils.parseaddr() on malformed email
+        # addresses: default behavior (strict=True) rejects malformed address,
+        # and strict=False which tolerates malformed address.
+        for invalid_separator, expected_non_strict in (
+            ('(', [(f'<{bob}>', alice)]),
+            (')', [('', alice), empty, ('', bob)]),
+            ('<', [('', alice), empty, ('', bob), empty]),
+            ('>', [('', alice), empty, ('', bob)]),
+            ('[', [('', f'{alice}[<{bob}>]')]),
+            (']', [('', alice), empty, ('', bob)]),
+            ('@', [empty, empty, ('', bob)]),
+            (';', [('', alice), empty, ('', bob)]),
+            (':', [('', alice), ('', bob)]),
+            ('.', [('', alice + '.'), ('', bob)]),
+            ('"', [('', alice), ('', f'<{bob}>')]),
+        ):
+            address = f'{alice}{invalid_separator}<{bob}>'
+            with self.subTest(address=address):
+                self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]),
+                                 [empty])
+                self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address], strict=False),
+                                 expected_non_strict)
+
+                self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]),
+                                 empty)
+                self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address], strict=False),
+                                 ('', address))
+
+        # Comma (',') is treated differently depending on strict parameter.
+        # Comma without quotes.
+        address = f'{alice},<{bob}>'
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]),
+                         [('', alice), ('', bob)])
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address], strict=False),
+                         [('', alice), ('', bob)])
+        self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]),
+                         empty)
+        self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address], strict=False),
+                         ('', address))
+
+        # Real name between quotes containing comma.
+        address = '"Alice, alice@example.org" <bob@example.com>'
+        expected_strict = ('Alice, alice@example.org', 'bob@example.com')
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]), [expected_strict])
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address], strict=False), [expected_strict])
+        self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]), expected_strict)
+        self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address], strict=False),
+                         ('', address))
+
+        # Valid parenthesis in comments.
+        address = 'alice@example.org (Alice)'
+        expected_strict = ('Alice', 'alice@example.org')
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]), [expected_strict])
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address], strict=False), [expected_strict])
+        self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]), expected_strict)
+        self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address], strict=False),
+                         ('', address))
+
+        # Invalid parenthesis in comments.
+        address = 'alice@example.org )Alice('
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]), [empty])
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address], strict=False),
+                         [('', 'alice@example.org'), ('', ''), ('', 'Alice')])
+        self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]), empty)
+        self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address], strict=False),
+                         ('', address))
+
+        # Two addresses with quotes separated by comma.
+        address = '"Jane Doe" <jane@example.net>, "John Doe" <john@example.net>'
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]),
+                         [('Jane Doe', 'jane@example.net'),
+                          ('John Doe', 'john@example.net')])
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address], strict=False),
+                         [('Jane Doe', 'jane@example.net'),
+                          ('John Doe', 'john@example.net')])
+        self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]), empty)
+        self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address], strict=False),
+                         ('', address))
+
+        # Test email.utils.supports_strict_parsing attribute
+        self.assertEqual(email.utils.supports_strict_parsing, True)
+
+     def test_getaddresses_nasty(self):
+-        eq = self.assertEqual
+-        eq(utils.getaddresses(['foo: ;']), [('', '')])
+-        eq(utils.getaddresses(
+-           ['[]*-- =~$']),
+-           [('', ''), ('', ''), ('', '*--')])
+-        eq(utils.getaddresses(
+-           ['foo: ;', '"Jason R. Mastaler" <jason@dom.ain>']),
+-           [('', ''), ('Jason R. Mastaler', 'jason@dom.ain')])
+        for addresses, expected in (
+            (['"Sürname, Firstname" <to@example.com>'],
+             [('Sürname, Firstname', 'to@example.com')]),
+
+            (['foo: ;'],
+             [('', '')]),
+
+            (['foo: ;', '"Jason R. Mastaler" <jason@dom.ain>'],
+             [('', ''), ('Jason R. Mastaler', 'jason@dom.ain')]),
+
+            ([r'Pete(A nice \) chap) <pete(his account)@silly.test(his host)>'],
+             [('Pete (A nice ) chap his account his host)', 'pete@silly.test')]),
+
+            (['(Empty list)(start)Undisclosed recipients  :(nobody(I know))'],
+             [('', '')]),
+
+            (['Mary <@machine.tld:mary@example.net>, , jdoe@test   . example'],
+             [('Mary', 'mary@example.net'), ('', ''), ('', 'jdoe@test.example')]),
+
+            (['John Doe <jdoe@machine(comment).  example>'],
+             [('John Doe (comment)', 'jdoe@machine.example')]),
+
+            (['"Mary Smith: Personal Account" <smith@home.example>'],
+             [('Mary Smith: Personal Account', 'smith@home.example')]),
+
+            (['Undisclosed recipients:;'],
+             [('', '')]),
+
+            ([r'<boss@nil.test>, "Giant; \"Big\" Box" <bob@example.net>'],
+             [('', 'boss@nil.test'), ('Giant; "Big" Box', 'bob@example.net')]),
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(addresses=addresses):
+                self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses(addresses),
+                                 expected)
+                self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses(addresses, strict=False),
+                                 expected)
+
+        addresses = ['[]*-- =~$']
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses(addresses),
+                         [('', '')])
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses(addresses, strict=False),
+                         [('', ''), ('', ''), ('', '*--')])
+ 
+     def test_getaddresses_embedded_comment(self):
+         """Test proper handling of a nested comment"""
+@@ -3397,6 +3537,54 @@ multipart/report
+                 m = cls(*constructor, policy=email.policy.default)
+                 self.assertIs(m.policy, email.policy.default)
+ 
+    def test_iter_escaped_chars(self):
+        self.assertEqual(list(utils._iter_escaped_chars(r'a\\b\"c\\"d')),
+                         [(0, 'a'),
+                          (2, '\\\\'),
+                          (3, 'b'),
+                          (5, '\\"'),
+                          (6, 'c'),
+                          (8, '\\\\'),
+                          (9, '"'),
+                          (10, 'd')])
+        self.assertEqual(list(utils._iter_escaped_chars('a\\')),
+                         [(0, 'a'), (1, '\\')])
+
+    def test_strip_quoted_realnames(self):
+        def check(addr, expected):
+            self.assertEqual(utils._strip_quoted_realnames(addr), expected)
+
+        check('"Jane Doe" <jane@example.net>, "John Doe" <john@example.net>',
+              ' <jane@example.net>,  <john@example.net>')
+        check(r'"Jane \"Doe\"." <jane@example.net>',
+              ' <jane@example.net>')
+
+        # special cases
+        check(r'before"name"after', 'beforeafter')
+        check(r'before"name"', 'before')
+        check(r'b"name"', 'b')  # single char
+        check(r'"name"after', 'after')
+        check(r'"name"a', 'a')  # single char
+        check(r'"name"', '')
+
+        # no change
+        for addr in (
+            'Jane Doe <jane@example.net>, John Doe <john@example.net>',
+            'lone " quote',
+        ):
+            self.assertEqual(utils._strip_quoted_realnames(addr), addr)
+
+
+    def test_check_parenthesis(self):
+        addr = 'alice@example.net'
+        self.assertTrue(utils._check_parenthesis(f'{addr} (Alice)'))
+        self.assertFalse(utils._check_parenthesis(f'{addr} )Alice('))
+        self.assertFalse(utils._check_parenthesis(f'{addr} (Alice))'))
+        self.assertFalse(utils._check_parenthesis(f'{addr} ((Alice)'))
+
+        # Ignore real name between quotes
+        self.assertTrue(utils._check_parenthesis(f'")Alice((" {addr}'))
+
+ 
+ # Test the iterator/generators
+ class TestIterators(TestEmailBase):
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-10-20-15-28-08.gh-issue-102988.dStNO7.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-10-20-15-28-08.gh-issue-102988.dStNO7.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..3d0e9e4078
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-10-20-15-28-08.gh-issue-102988.dStNO7.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+:func:`email.utils.getaddresses` and :func:`email.utils.parseaddr` now
+return ``('', '')`` 2-tuples in more situations where invalid email
+addresses are encountered instead of potentially inaccurate values. Add
+optional *strict* parameter to these two functions: use ``strict=False`` to
+get the old behavior, accept malformed inputs.
+``getattr(email.utils, 'supports_strict_parsing', False)`` can be use to check
+if the *strict* paramater is available. Patch by Thomas Dwyer and Victor
+Stinner to improve the CVE-2023-27043 fix.
+
+
+From 4df4fad359c280f2328b98ea9b4414f244624a58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 20:15:33 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Make it possible to disable strict parsing in email module
+
+---
+ Doc/library/email.utils.rst       | 26 +++++++++++
+ Lib/email/utils.py                | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 3 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Doc/library/email.utils.rst b/Doc/library/email.utils.rst
+index d1e1898591..7aef773b5f 100644
+--- a/Doc/library/email.utils.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/email.utils.rst
+@@ -69,6 +69,19 @@ of the new API.
+ 
+    If *strict* is true, use a strict parser which rejects malformed inputs.
+ 
+   The default setting for *strict* is set to ``True``, but you can override
+   it by setting the environment variable ``PYTHON_EMAIL_DISABLE_STRICT_ADDR_PARSING``
+   to non-empty string.
+
+   Additionally, you can permanently set the default value for *strict* to
+   ``False`` by creating the configuration file ``/etc/python/email.cfg``
+   with the following content:
+
+   .. code-block:: ini
+
+      [email_addr_parsing]
+      PYTHON_EMAIL_DISABLE_STRICT_ADDR_PARSING = true
+
+    .. versionchanged:: 3.13
+       Add *strict* optional parameter and reject malformed inputs by default.
+ 
+@@ -97,6 +110,19 @@ of the new API.
+ 
+    If *strict* is true, use a strict parser which rejects malformed inputs.
+ 
+   The default setting for *strict* is set to ``True``, but you can override
+   it by setting the environment variable ``PYTHON_EMAIL_DISABLE_STRICT_ADDR_PARSING``
+   to non-empty string.
+
+   Additionally, you can permanently set the default value for *strict* to
+   ``False`` by creating the configuration file ``/etc/python/email.cfg``
+   with the following content:
+
+   .. code-block:: ini
+
+      [email_addr_parsing]
+      PYTHON_EMAIL_DISABLE_STRICT_ADDR_PARSING = true
+
+    Here's a simple example that gets all the recipients of a message::
+ 
+       from email.utils import getaddresses
+diff --git a/Lib/email/utils.py b/Lib/email/utils.py
+index f83b7e5d7e..b8e90ceb8e 100644
+--- a/Lib/email/utils.py
+++ b/Lib/email/utils.py
+@@ -48,6 +48,46 @@ TICK = "'"
+ specialsre = re.compile(r'[][\\()<>@,:;".]')
+ escapesre = re.compile(r'[\\"]')
+ 
+_EMAIL_CONFIG_FILE = "/etc/python/email.cfg"
+_cached_strict_addr_parsing = None
+
+
+def _use_strict_email_parsing():
+    """"Cache implementation for _cached_strict_addr_parsing"""
+    global _cached_strict_addr_parsing
+    if _cached_strict_addr_parsing is None:
+        _cached_strict_addr_parsing = _use_strict_email_parsing_impl()
+    return _cached_strict_addr_parsing
+
+
+def _use_strict_email_parsing_impl():
+    """Returns True if strict email parsing is not disabled by
+    config file or env variable.
+    """
+    disabled = bool(os.environ.get("PYTHON_EMAIL_DISABLE_STRICT_ADDR_PARSING"))
+    if disabled:
+        return False
+
+    try:
+        file = open(_EMAIL_CONFIG_FILE)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        pass
+    else:
+        with file:
+            import configparser
+            config = configparser.ConfigParser(
+                interpolation=None,
+                comment_prefixes=('#', ),
+
+            )
+            config.read_file(file)
+            disabled = config.getboolean('email_addr_parsing', "PYTHON_EMAIL_DISABLE_STRICT_ADDR_PARSING", fallback=None)
+
+    if disabled:
+        return False
+
+    return True
+
+ 
+ def _has_surrogates(s):
+     """Return True if s contains surrogate-escaped binary data."""
+@@ -149,7 +189,7 @@ def _strip_quoted_realnames(addr):
+ 
+ supports_strict_parsing = True
+ 
+-def getaddresses(fieldvalues, *, strict=True):
+def getaddresses(fieldvalues, *, strict=None):
+     """Return a list of (REALNAME, EMAIL) or ('','') for each fieldvalue.
+ 
+     When parsing fails for a fieldvalue, a 2-tuple of ('', '') is returned in
+@@ -158,6 +198,11 @@ def getaddresses(fieldvalues, *, strict=True):
+     If strict is true, use a strict parser which rejects malformed inputs.
+     """
+ 
+    # If default is used, it's True unless disabled
+    # by env variable or config file.
+    if strict == None:
+        strict = _use_strict_email_parsing()
+
+     # If strict is true, if the resulting list of parsed addresses is greater
+     # than the number of fieldvalues in the input list, a parsing error has
+     # occurred and consequently a list containing a single empty 2-tuple [('',
+@@ -330,7 +375,7 @@ def parsedate_to_datetime(data):
+             tzinfo=datetime.timezone(datetime.timedelta(seconds=tz)))
+ 
+ 
+-def parseaddr(addr, *, strict=True):
+def parseaddr(addr, *, strict=None):
+     """
+     Parse addr into its constituent realname and email address parts.
+ 
+@@ -339,6 +384,11 @@ def parseaddr(addr, *, strict=True):
+ 
+     If strict is True, use a strict parser which rejects malformed inputs.
+     """
+    # If default is used, it's True unless disabled
+    # by env variable or config file.
+    if strict == None:
+        strict = _use_strict_email_parsing()
+
+     if not strict:
+         addrs = _AddressList(addr).addresslist
+         if not addrs:
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py b/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
+index ce36efc1b1..05ea201b68 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
+@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ import time
+ import base64
+ import unittest
+ import textwrap
+import contextlib
+import tempfile
+import os
+ 
+ from io import StringIO, BytesIO
+ from itertools import chain
+@@ -41,7 +44,7 @@ from email import iterators
+ from email import base64mime
+ from email import quoprimime
+ 
+-from test.support import unlink, start_threads
+from test.support import unlink, start_threads, EnvironmentVarGuard, swap_attr
+ from test.test_email import openfile, TestEmailBase
+ 
+ # These imports are documented to work, but we are testing them using a
+@@ -3313,6 +3316,73 @@ Foo
+         # Test email.utils.supports_strict_parsing attribute
+         self.assertEqual(email.utils.supports_strict_parsing, True)
+ 
+    def test_parsing_errors_strict_set_via_env_var(self):
+        address = 'alice@example.org )Alice('
+        empty = ('', '')
+
+        # Reset cached default value to make the function
+        # reload the config file provided below.
+        utils._cached_strict_addr_parsing = None
+
+        # Strict disabled via env variable, old behavior expected
+        with EnvironmentVarGuard() as environ:
+            environ["PYTHON_EMAIL_DISABLE_STRICT_ADDR_PARSING"] = "1"
+
+            self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]),
+                             [('', 'alice@example.org'), ('', ''), ('', 'Alice')])
+            self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]), ('', address))
+
+        # Clear cache again
+        utils._cached_strict_addr_parsing = None
+
+        # Default strict=True, empty result expected
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]), [empty])
+        self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]), empty)
+
+        # Clear cache again
+        utils._cached_strict_addr_parsing = None
+
+        # Empty string in env variable = strict parsing enabled (default)
+        with EnvironmentVarGuard() as environ:
+            environ["PYTHON_EMAIL_DISABLE_STRICT_ADDR_PARSING"] = ""
+
+            # Default strict=True, empty result expected
+            self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]), [empty])
+            self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]), empty)
+
+    @contextlib.contextmanager
+    def _email_strict_parsing_conf(self):
+        """Context for the given email strict parsing configured in config file"""
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdirname:
+            filename = os.path.join(tmpdirname, 'conf.cfg')
+            with swap_attr(utils, "_EMAIL_CONFIG_FILE", filename):
+                with open(filename, 'w') as file:
+                    file.write('[email_addr_parsing]\n')
+                    file.write('PYTHON_EMAIL_DISABLE_STRICT_ADDR_PARSING = true')
+                utils._EMAIL_CONFIG_FILE = filename
+                yield
+
+    def test_parsing_errors_strict_disabled_via_config_file(self):
+        address = 'alice@example.org )Alice('
+        empty = ('', '')
+
+        # Reset cached default value to make the function
+        # reload the config file provided below.
+        utils._cached_strict_addr_parsing = None
+
+        # Strict disabled via config file, old results expected
+        with self._email_strict_parsing_conf():
+            self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]),
+                             [('', 'alice@example.org'), ('', ''), ('', 'Alice')])
+            self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]), ('', address))
+
+        # Clear cache again
+        utils._cached_strict_addr_parsing = None
+
+        # Default strict=True, empty result expected
+        self.assertEqual(utils.getaddresses([address]), [empty])
+        self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr([address]), empty)
+
+     def test_getaddresses_nasty(self):
+         for addresses, expected in (
+             (['"Sürname, Firstname" <to@example.com>'],
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/00422-gh-115133-fix-tests-for-xmlpullparser-with-expat-2-6-0.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00422-gh-115133-fix-tests-for-xmlpullparser-with-expat-2-6-0.patch
@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+From 87acab66e124912549fbc3151f27ca7fae76386c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2024 19:54:00 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] gh-115133: Fix tests for XMLPullParser with Expat 2.6.0
+
+Feeding the parser by too small chunks defers parsing to prevent
+CVE-2023-52425. Future versions of Expat may be more reactive.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 4a08e7b3431cd32a0daf22a33421cd3035343dc4)
+---
+ Lib/test/test_xml_etree.py                    | 53 +++++++++++--------
+ ...-02-08-14-21-28.gh-issue-115133.ycl4ko.rst |  2 +
+ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-02-08-14-21-28.gh-issue-115133.ycl4ko.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_xml_etree.py b/Lib/test/test_xml_etree.py
+index acaa519..c01af47 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_xml_etree.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_xml_etree.py
+@@ -1044,28 +1044,37 @@ class XMLPullParserTest(unittest.TestCase):
+         self.assertEqual([(action, elem.tag) for action, elem in events],
+                          expected)
+ 
+-    def test_simple_xml(self):
+-        for chunk_size in (None, 1, 5):
+-            with self.subTest(chunk_size=chunk_size):
+-                parser = ET.XMLPullParser()
+-                self.assert_event_tags(parser, [])
+-                self._feed(parser, "<!-- comment -->\n", chunk_size)
+-                self.assert_event_tags(parser, [])
+-                self._feed(parser,
+-                           "<root>\n  <element key='value'>text</element",
+-                           chunk_size)
+-                self.assert_event_tags(parser, [])
+-                self._feed(parser, ">\n", chunk_size)
+-                self.assert_event_tags(parser, [('end', 'element')])
+-                self._feed(parser, "<element>text</element>tail\n", chunk_size)
+-                self._feed(parser, "<empty-element/>\n", chunk_size)
+-                self.assert_event_tags(parser, [
+-                    ('end', 'element'),
+-                    ('end', 'empty-element'),
+-                    ])
+-                self._feed(parser, "</root>\n", chunk_size)
+-                self.assert_event_tags(parser, [('end', 'root')])
+-                self.assertIsNone(parser.close())
+    def test_simple_xml(self, chunk_size=None):
+        parser = ET.XMLPullParser()
+        self.assert_event_tags(parser, [])
+        self._feed(parser, "<!-- comment -->\n", chunk_size)
+        self.assert_event_tags(parser, [])
+        self._feed(parser,
+                   "<root>\n  <element key='value'>text</element",
+                   chunk_size)
+        self.assert_event_tags(parser, [])
+        self._feed(parser, ">\n", chunk_size)
+        self.assert_event_tags(parser, [('end', 'element')])
+        self._feed(parser, "<element>text</element>tail\n", chunk_size)
+        self._feed(parser, "<empty-element/>\n", chunk_size)
+        self.assert_event_tags(parser, [
+            ('end', 'element'),
+            ('end', 'empty-element'),
+            ])
+        self._feed(parser, "</root>\n", chunk_size)
+        self.assert_event_tags(parser, [('end', 'root')])
+        self.assertIsNone(parser.close())
+
+    @unittest.expectedFailure
+    def test_simple_xml_chunk_1(self):
+        self.test_simple_xml(chunk_size=1)
+
+    @unittest.expectedFailure
+    def test_simple_xml_chunk_5(self):
+        self.test_simple_xml(chunk_size=5)
+
+    def test_simple_xml_chunk_22(self):
+        self.test_simple_xml(chunk_size=22)
+ 
+     def test_feed_while_iterating(self):
+         parser = ET.XMLPullParser()
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-02-08-14-21-28.gh-issue-115133.ycl4ko.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-02-08-14-21-28.gh-issue-115133.ycl4ko.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6f10152
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-02-08-14-21-28.gh-issue-115133.ycl4ko.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Fix tests for :class:`~xml.etree.ElementTree.XMLPullParser` with Expat
+2.6.0.
+-- 
+2.44.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/00426-CVE-2023-6597.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00426-CVE-2023-6597.patch
@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+From 82f1ea4b72be40f58fd0a9a37f8d8d2f7d16f9e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 00:19:23 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-6597
+
+Co-authored-by: Søren Løvborg <sorenl@unity3d.com>
+Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
+---
+ Lib/tempfile.py           |  44 +++++++++-
+ Lib/test/test_tempfile.py | 166 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Lib/tempfile.py b/Lib/tempfile.py
+index 2cb5434..d79b70c 100644
+--- a/Lib/tempfile.py
+++ b/Lib/tempfile.py
+@@ -276,6 +276,23 @@ def _mkstemp_inner(dir, pre, suf, flags, output_type):
+                           "No usable temporary file name found")
+ 
+ 
+def _dont_follow_symlinks(func, path, *args):
+    # Pass follow_symlinks=False, unless not supported on this platform.
+    if func in _os.supports_follow_symlinks:
+        func(path, *args, follow_symlinks=False)
+    elif _os.name == 'nt' or not _os.path.islink(path):
+        func(path, *args)
+
+
+def _resetperms(path):
+    try:
+        chflags = _os.chflags
+    except AttributeError:
+        pass
+    else:
+        _dont_follow_symlinks(chflags, path, 0)
+    _dont_follow_symlinks(_os.chmod, path, 0o700)
+
+ # User visible interfaces.
+ 
+ def gettempprefix():
+@@ -794,9 +811,32 @@ class TemporaryDirectory(object):
+             self, self._cleanup, self.name,
+             warn_message="Implicitly cleaning up {!r}".format(self))
+ 
+    @classmethod
+    def _rmtree(cls, name):
+        def onerror(func, path, exc_info):
+            if issubclass(exc_info[0], PermissionError):
+                try:
+                    if path != name:
+                        _resetperms(_os.path.dirname(path))
+                    _resetperms(path)
+
+                    try:
+                        _os.unlink(path)
+                    # PermissionError is raised on FreeBSD for directories
+                    except (IsADirectoryError, PermissionError):
+                        cls._rmtree(path)
+                except FileNotFoundError:
+                    pass
+            elif issubclass(exc_info[0], FileNotFoundError):
+                pass
+            else:
+                raise
+
+        _shutil.rmtree(name, onerror=onerror)
+
+     @classmethod
+     def _cleanup(cls, name, warn_message):
+-        _shutil.rmtree(name)
+        cls._rmtree(name)
+         _warnings.warn(warn_message, ResourceWarning)
+ 
+     def __repr__(self):
+@@ -810,4 +850,4 @@ class TemporaryDirectory(object):
+ 
+     def cleanup(self):
+         if self._finalizer.detach():
+-            _shutil.rmtree(self.name)
+            self._rmtree(self.name)
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tempfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tempfile.py
+index 710756b..c5560e1 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_tempfile.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_tempfile.py
+@@ -1298,19 +1298,25 @@ class NulledModules:
+ class TestTemporaryDirectory(BaseTestCase):
+     """Test TemporaryDirectory()."""
+ 
+-    def do_create(self, dir=None, pre="", suf="", recurse=1):
+    def do_create(self, dir=None, pre="", suf="", recurse=1, dirs=1, files=1):
+         if dir is None:
+             dir = tempfile.gettempdir()
+         tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(dir=dir, prefix=pre, suffix=suf)
+         self.nameCheck(tmp.name, dir, pre, suf)
+-        # Create a subdirectory and some files
+-        if recurse:
+-            d1 = self.do_create(tmp.name, pre, suf, recurse-1)
+-            d1.name = None
+-        with open(os.path.join(tmp.name, "test.txt"), "wb") as f:
+-            f.write(b"Hello world!")
+        self.do_create2(tmp.name, recurse, dirs, files)
+         return tmp
+ 
+    def do_create2(self, path, recurse=1, dirs=1, files=1):
+        # Create subdirectories and some files
+        if recurse:
+            for i in range(dirs):
+                name = os.path.join(path, "dir%d" % i)
+                os.mkdir(name)
+                self.do_create2(name, recurse-1, dirs, files)
+        for i in range(files):
+            with open(os.path.join(path, "test%d.txt" % i), "wb") as f:
+                f.write(b"Hello world!")
+
+     def test_mkdtemp_failure(self):
+         # Check no additional exception if mkdtemp fails
+         # Previously would raise AttributeError instead
+@@ -1350,11 +1356,108 @@ class TestTemporaryDirectory(BaseTestCase):
+                          "TemporaryDirectory %s exists after cleanup" % d1.name)
+         self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(d2.name),
+                         "Directory pointed to by a symlink was deleted")
+-        self.assertEqual(os.listdir(d2.name), ['test.txt'],
+        self.assertEqual(os.listdir(d2.name), ['test0.txt'],
+                          "Contents of the directory pointed to by a symlink "
+                          "were deleted")
+         d2.cleanup()
+ 
+    @support.skip_unless_symlink
+    def test_cleanup_with_symlink_modes(self):
+        # cleanup() should not follow symlinks when fixing mode bits (#91133)
+        with self.do_create(recurse=0) as d2:
+            file1 = os.path.join(d2, 'file1')
+            open(file1, 'wb').close()
+            dir1 = os.path.join(d2, 'dir1')
+            os.mkdir(dir1)
+            for mode in range(8):
+                mode <<= 6
+                with self.subTest(mode=format(mode, '03o')):
+                    def test(target, target_is_directory):
+                        d1 = self.do_create(recurse=0)
+                        symlink = os.path.join(d1.name, 'symlink')
+                        os.symlink(target, symlink,
+                                target_is_directory=target_is_directory)
+                        try:
+                            os.chmod(symlink, mode, follow_symlinks=False)
+                        except NotImplementedError:
+                            pass
+                        try:
+                            os.chmod(symlink, mode)
+                        except FileNotFoundError:
+                            pass
+                        os.chmod(d1.name, mode)
+                        d1.cleanup()
+                        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(d1.name))
+
+                    with self.subTest('nonexisting file'):
+                        test('nonexisting', target_is_directory=False)
+                    with self.subTest('nonexisting dir'):
+                        test('nonexisting', target_is_directory=True)
+
+                    with self.subTest('existing file'):
+                        os.chmod(file1, mode)
+                        old_mode = os.stat(file1).st_mode
+                        test(file1, target_is_directory=False)
+                        new_mode = os.stat(file1).st_mode
+                        self.assertEqual(new_mode, old_mode,
+                                         '%03o != %03o' % (new_mode, old_mode))
+
+                    with self.subTest('existing dir'):
+                        os.chmod(dir1, mode)
+                        old_mode = os.stat(dir1).st_mode
+                        test(dir1, target_is_directory=True)
+                        new_mode = os.stat(dir1).st_mode
+                        self.assertEqual(new_mode, old_mode,
+                                         '%03o != %03o' % (new_mode, old_mode))
+
+    @unittest.skipUnless(hasattr(os, 'chflags'), 'requires os.chflags')
+    @support.skip_unless_symlink
+    def test_cleanup_with_symlink_flags(self):
+        # cleanup() should not follow symlinks when fixing flags (#91133)
+        flags = stat.UF_IMMUTABLE | stat.UF_NOUNLINK
+        self.check_flags(flags)
+
+        with self.do_create(recurse=0) as d2:
+            file1 = os.path.join(d2, 'file1')
+            open(file1, 'wb').close()
+            dir1 = os.path.join(d2, 'dir1')
+            os.mkdir(dir1)
+            def test(target, target_is_directory):
+                d1 = self.do_create(recurse=0)
+                symlink = os.path.join(d1.name, 'symlink')
+                os.symlink(target, symlink,
+                           target_is_directory=target_is_directory)
+                try:
+                    os.chflags(symlink, flags, follow_symlinks=False)
+                except NotImplementedError:
+                    pass
+                try:
+                    os.chflags(symlink, flags)
+                except FileNotFoundError:
+                    pass
+                os.chflags(d1.name, flags)
+                d1.cleanup()
+                self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(d1.name))
+
+            with self.subTest('nonexisting file'):
+                test('nonexisting', target_is_directory=False)
+            with self.subTest('nonexisting dir'):
+                test('nonexisting', target_is_directory=True)
+
+            with self.subTest('existing file'):
+                os.chflags(file1, flags)
+                old_flags = os.stat(file1).st_flags
+                test(file1, target_is_directory=False)
+                new_flags = os.stat(file1).st_flags
+                self.assertEqual(new_flags, old_flags)
+
+            with self.subTest('existing dir'):
+                os.chflags(dir1, flags)
+                old_flags = os.stat(dir1).st_flags
+                test(dir1, target_is_directory=True)
+                new_flags = os.stat(dir1).st_flags
+                self.assertEqual(new_flags, old_flags)
+
+     @support.cpython_only
+     def test_del_on_collection(self):
+         # A TemporaryDirectory is deleted when garbage collected
+@@ -1385,7 +1488,7 @@ class TestTemporaryDirectory(BaseTestCase):
+ 
+                     tmp2 = os.path.join(tmp.name, 'test_dir')
+                     os.mkdir(tmp2)
+-                    with open(os.path.join(tmp2, "test.txt"), "w") as f:
+                    with open(os.path.join(tmp2, "test0.txt"), "w") as f:
+                         f.write("Hello world!")
+ 
+                     {mod}.tmp = tmp
+@@ -1453,6 +1556,51 @@ class TestTemporaryDirectory(BaseTestCase):
+             self.assertEqual(name, d.name)
+         self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(name))
+ 
+    def test_modes(self):
+        for mode in range(8):
+            mode <<= 6
+            with self.subTest(mode=format(mode, '03o')):
+                d = self.do_create(recurse=3, dirs=2, files=2)
+                with d:
+                    # Change files and directories mode recursively.
+                    for root, dirs, files in os.walk(d.name, topdown=False):
+                        for name in files:
+                            os.chmod(os.path.join(root, name), mode)
+                        os.chmod(root, mode)
+                    d.cleanup()
+                self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(d.name))
+
+    def check_flags(self, flags):
+        # skip the test if these flags are not supported (ex: FreeBSD 13)
+        filename = support.TESTFN
+        try:
+            open(filename, "w").close()
+            try:
+                os.chflags(filename, flags)
+            except OSError as exc:
+                # "OSError: [Errno 45] Operation not supported"
+                self.skipTest(f"chflags() doesn't support flags "
+                              f"{flags:#b}: {exc}")
+            else:
+                os.chflags(filename, 0)
+        finally:
+            support.unlink(filename)
+
+    @unittest.skipUnless(hasattr(os, 'chflags'), 'requires os.lchflags')
+    def test_flags(self):
+        flags = stat.UF_IMMUTABLE | stat.UF_NOUNLINK
+        self.check_flags(flags)
+
+        d = self.do_create(recurse=3, dirs=2, files=2)
+        with d:
+            # Change files and directories flags recursively.
+            for root, dirs, files in os.walk(d.name, topdown=False):
+                for name in files:
+                    os.chflags(os.path.join(root, name), flags)
+                os.chflags(root, flags)
+            d.cleanup()
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(d.name))
+
+ 
+ if __name__ == "__main__":
+     unittest.main()
+-- 
+2.44.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/00427-CVE-2024-0450.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00427-CVE-2024-0450.patch
@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+From 066df4fd454d6ff9be66e80b2a65995b10af174f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Jolly <john.jolly@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 01:51:35 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] bpo-22908: Add seek and tell functionality to ZipExtFile
+ (GH-4966)
+
+This allows for nested zip files, tar files within zip files, zip files within tar files, etc.
+
+Contributed by: John Jolly
+---
+ Doc/library/zipfile.rst                       |  6 +-
+ Lib/test/test_zipfile.py                      | 34 ++++++++
+ Lib/zipfile.py                                | 82 +++++++++++++++++++
+ .../2017-12-21-22-00-11.bpo-22908.cVm89I.rst  |  2 +
+ 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2017-12-21-22-00-11.bpo-22908.cVm89I.rst
+
+diff --git a/Doc/library/zipfile.rst b/Doc/library/zipfile.rst
+index d58efe0b417516..7c9a8c80225491 100644
+--- a/Doc/library/zipfile.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/zipfile.rst
+@@ -246,9 +246,9 @@ ZipFile Objects
+    With *mode* ``'r'`` the file-like object
+    (``ZipExtFile``) is read-only and provides the following methods:
+    :meth:`~io.BufferedIOBase.read`, :meth:`~io.IOBase.readline`,
+-   :meth:`~io.IOBase.readlines`, :meth:`__iter__`,
+-   :meth:`~iterator.__next__`.  These objects can operate independently of
+-   the ZipFile.
+   :meth:`~io.IOBase.readlines`, :meth:`~io.IOBase.seek`,
+   :meth:`~io.IOBase.tell`, :meth:`__iter__`, :meth:`~iterator.__next__`.
+   These objects can operate independently of the ZipFile.
+ 
+    With ``mode='w'``, a writable file handle is returned, which supports the
+    :meth:`~io.BufferedIOBase.write` method.  While a writable file handle is open,
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py b/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py
+index 94db858a1517c4..61c3e349a69ef4 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py
+@@ -1628,6 +1628,40 @@ def test_open_conflicting_handles(self):
+             self.assertEqual(zipf.read('baz'), msg3)
+             self.assertEqual(zipf.namelist(), ['foo', 'bar', 'baz'])
+ 
+    def test_seek_tell(self):
+        # Test seek functionality
+        txt = b"Where's Bruce?"
+        bloc = txt.find(b"Bruce")
+        # Check seek on a file
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(TESTFN, "w") as zipf:
+            zipf.writestr("foo.txt", txt)
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(TESTFN, "r") as zipf:
+            with zipf.open("foo.txt", "r") as fp:
+                fp.seek(bloc, os.SEEK_SET)
+                self.assertEqual(fp.tell(), bloc)
+                fp.seek(-bloc, os.SEEK_CUR)
+                self.assertEqual(fp.tell(), 0)
+                fp.seek(bloc, os.SEEK_CUR)
+                self.assertEqual(fp.tell(), bloc)
+                self.assertEqual(fp.read(5), txt[bloc:bloc+5])
+                fp.seek(0, os.SEEK_END)
+                self.assertEqual(fp.tell(), len(txt))
+        # Check seek on memory file
+        data = io.BytesIO()
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(data, mode="w") as zipf:
+            zipf.writestr("foo.txt", txt)
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(data, mode="r") as zipf:
+            with zipf.open("foo.txt", "r") as fp:
+                fp.seek(bloc, os.SEEK_SET)
+                self.assertEqual(fp.tell(), bloc)
+                fp.seek(-bloc, os.SEEK_CUR)
+                self.assertEqual(fp.tell(), 0)
+                fp.seek(bloc, os.SEEK_CUR)
+                self.assertEqual(fp.tell(), bloc)
+                self.assertEqual(fp.read(5), txt[bloc:bloc+5])
+                fp.seek(0, os.SEEK_END)
+                self.assertEqual(fp.tell(), len(txt))
+
+     def tearDown(self):
+         unlink(TESTFN)
+         unlink(TESTFN2)
+diff --git a/Lib/zipfile.py b/Lib/zipfile.py
+index f9db45f58a2bde..5df7b1bf75b9d9 100644
+--- a/Lib/zipfile.py
+++ b/Lib/zipfile.py
+@@ -696,6 +696,18 @@ def __init__(self, file, pos, close, lock, writing):
+         self._close = close
+         self._lock = lock
+         self._writing = writing
+        self.seekable = file.seekable
+        self.tell = file.tell
+
+    def seek(self, offset, whence=0):
+        with self._lock:
+            if self.writing():
+                raise ValueError("Can't reposition in the ZIP file while "
+                        "there is an open writing handle on it. "
+                        "Close the writing handle before trying to read.")
+            self._file.seek(self._pos)
+            self._pos = self._file.tell()
+            return self._pos
+ 
+     def read(self, n=-1):
+         with self._lock:
+@@ -746,6 +758,9 @@ class ZipExtFile(io.BufferedIOBase):
+     # Read from compressed files in 4k blocks.
+     MIN_READ_SIZE = 4096
+ 
+    # Chunk size to read during seek
+    MAX_SEEK_READ = 1 << 24
+
+     def __init__(self, fileobj, mode, zipinfo, decrypter=None,
+                  close_fileobj=False):
+         self._fileobj = fileobj
+@@ -778,6 +793,17 @@ def __init__(self, fileobj, mode, zipinfo, decrypter=None,
+         else:
+             self._expected_crc = None
+ 
+        self._seekable = False
+        try:
+            if fileobj.seekable():
+                self._orig_compress_start = fileobj.tell()
+                self._orig_compress_size = zipinfo.compress_size
+                self._orig_file_size = zipinfo.file_size
+                self._orig_start_crc = self._running_crc
+                self._seekable = True
+        except AttributeError:
+            pass
+
+     def __repr__(self):
+         result = ['<%s.%s' % (self.__class__.__module__,
+                               self.__class__.__qualname__)]
+@@ -963,6 +989,62 @@ def close(self):
+         finally:
+             super().close()
+ 
+    def seekable(self):
+        return self._seekable
+
+    def seek(self, offset, whence=0):
+        if not self._seekable:
+            raise io.UnsupportedOperation("underlying stream is not seekable")
+        curr_pos = self.tell()
+        if whence == 0: # Seek from start of file
+            new_pos = offset
+        elif whence == 1: # Seek from current position
+            new_pos = curr_pos + offset
+        elif whence == 2: # Seek from EOF
+            new_pos = self._orig_file_size + offset
+        else:
+            raise ValueError("whence must be os.SEEK_SET (0), "
+                             "os.SEEK_CUR (1), or os.SEEK_END (2)")
+
+        if new_pos > self._orig_file_size:
+            new_pos = self._orig_file_size
+
+        if new_pos < 0:
+            new_pos = 0
+
+        read_offset = new_pos - curr_pos
+        buff_offset = read_offset + self._offset
+
+        if buff_offset >= 0 and buff_offset < len(self._readbuffer):
+            # Just move the _offset index if the new position is in the _readbuffer
+            self._offset = buff_offset
+            read_offset = 0
+        elif read_offset < 0:
+            # Position is before the current position. Reset the ZipExtFile
+
+            self._fileobj.seek(self._orig_compress_start)
+            self._running_crc = self._orig_start_crc
+            self._compress_left = self._orig_compress_size
+            self._left = self._orig_file_size
+            self._readbuffer = b''
+            self._offset = 0
+            self._decompressor = zipfile._get_decompressor(self._compress_type)
+            self._eof = False
+            read_offset = new_pos
+
+        while read_offset > 0:
+            read_len = min(self.MAX_SEEK_READ, read_offset)
+            self.read(read_len)
+            read_offset -= read_len
+
+        return self.tell()
+
+    def tell(self):
+        if not self._seekable:
+            raise io.UnsupportedOperation("underlying stream is not seekable")
+        filepos = self._orig_file_size - self._left - len(self._readbuffer) + self._offset
+        return filepos
+
+ 
+ class _ZipWriteFile(io.BufferedIOBase):
+     def __init__(self, zf, zinfo, zip64):
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2017-12-21-22-00-11.bpo-22908.cVm89I.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2017-12-21-22-00-11.bpo-22908.cVm89I.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000000000..4f3cc0166019f1
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2017-12-21-22-00-11.bpo-22908.cVm89I.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Added seek and tell to the ZipExtFile class. This only works if the file
+object used to open the zipfile is seekable.
+
+
+From 55beb125db2942b5362454e05542e9661e964a65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2024 14:29:31 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] gh-109858: Protect zipfile from "quoted-overlap" zipbomb
+ (GH-110016) (GH-113916)
+
+Raise BadZipFile when try to read an entry that overlaps with other entry or
+central directory.
+(cherry picked from commit 66363b9a7b9fe7c99eba3a185b74c5fdbf842eba)
+---
+ Lib/test/test_zipfile.py                      | 60 +++++++++++++++++++
+ Lib/zipfile.py                                | 12 ++++
+ ...-09-28-13-15-51.gh-issue-109858.43e2dg.rst |  3 +
+ 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-09-28-13-15-51.gh-issue-109858.43e2dg.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py b/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py
+index 7f82586..0379909 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py
+@@ -1644,6 +1644,66 @@ class OtherTests(unittest.TestCase):
+                 fp.seek(0, os.SEEK_END)
+                 self.assertEqual(fp.tell(), len(txt))
+ 
+    @requires_zlib
+    def test_full_overlap(self):
+        data = (
+            b'PK\x03\x04\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0lH\x05\xe2\x1e'
+            b'8\xbb\x10\x00\x00\x00\t\x04\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00a\xed'
+            b'\xc0\x81\x08\x00\x00\x00\xc00\xd6\xfbK\\d\x0b`P'
+            b'K\x01\x02\x14\x00\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0lH\x05\xe2'
+            b'\x1e8\xbb\x10\x00\x00\x00\t\x04\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+            b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00aPK'
+            b'\x01\x02\x14\x00\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0lH\x05\xe2\x1e'
+            b'8\xbb\x10\x00\x00\x00\t\x04\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+            b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00bPK\x05'
+            b'\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x02\x00^\x00\x00\x00/\x00\x00'
+            b'\x00\x00\x00'
+        )
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(data), 'r') as zipf:
+            self.assertEqual(zipf.namelist(), ['a', 'b'])
+            zi = zipf.getinfo('a')
+            self.assertEqual(zi.header_offset, 0)
+            self.assertEqual(zi.compress_size, 16)
+            self.assertEqual(zi.file_size, 1033)
+            zi = zipf.getinfo('b')
+            self.assertEqual(zi.header_offset, 0)
+            self.assertEqual(zi.compress_size, 16)
+            self.assertEqual(zi.file_size, 1033)
+            self.assertEqual(len(zipf.read('a')), 1033)
+            with self.assertRaisesRegex(zipfile.BadZipFile, 'File name.*differ'):
+                zipf.read('b')
+
+    @requires_zlib
+    def test_quoted_overlap(self):
+        data = (
+            b'PK\x03\x04\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0lH\x05Y\xfc'
+            b'8\x044\x00\x00\x00(\x04\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00a\x00'
+            b'\x1f\x00\xe0\xffPK\x03\x04\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0l'
+            b'H\x05\xe2\x1e8\xbb\x10\x00\x00\x00\t\x04\x00\x00\x01\x00'
+            b'\x00\x00b\xed\xc0\x81\x08\x00\x00\x00\xc00\xd6\xfbK\\'
+            b'd\x0b`PK\x01\x02\x14\x00\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0'
+            b'lH\x05Y\xfc8\x044\x00\x00\x00(\x04\x00\x00\x01'
+            b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+            b'\x00aPK\x01\x02\x14\x00\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0l'
+            b'H\x05\xe2\x1e8\xbb\x10\x00\x00\x00\t\x04\x00\x00\x01\x00'
+            b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00$\x00\x00\x00'
+            b'bPK\x05\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x02\x00^\x00\x00'
+            b'\x00S\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+        )
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(data), 'r') as zipf:
+            self.assertEqual(zipf.namelist(), ['a', 'b'])
+            zi = zipf.getinfo('a')
+            self.assertEqual(zi.header_offset, 0)
+            self.assertEqual(zi.compress_size, 52)
+            self.assertEqual(zi.file_size, 1064)
+            zi = zipf.getinfo('b')
+            self.assertEqual(zi.header_offset, 36)
+            self.assertEqual(zi.compress_size, 16)
+            self.assertEqual(zi.file_size, 1033)
+            with self.assertRaisesRegex(zipfile.BadZipFile, 'Overlapped entries'):
+                zipf.read('a')
+            self.assertEqual(len(zipf.read('b')), 1033)
+
+     def tearDown(self):
+         unlink(TESTFN)
+         unlink(TESTFN2)
+diff --git a/Lib/zipfile.py b/Lib/zipfile.py
+index 0ab9fac..e6d7676 100644
+--- a/Lib/zipfile.py
+++ b/Lib/zipfile.py
+@@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ class ZipInfo (object):
+         'compress_size',
+         'file_size',
+         '_raw_time',
+        '_end_offset',
+     )
+ 
+     def __init__(self, filename="NoName", date_time=(1980,1,1,0,0,0)):
+@@ -376,6 +377,7 @@ class ZipInfo (object):
+         self.volume = 0                 # Volume number of file header
+         self.internal_attr = 0          # Internal attributes
+         self.external_attr = 0          # External file attributes
+        self._end_offset = None         # Start of the next local header or central directory
+         # Other attributes are set by class ZipFile:
+         # header_offset         Byte offset to the file header
+         # CRC                   CRC-32 of the uncompressed file
+@@ -1346,6 +1348,12 @@ class ZipFile:
+             if self.debug > 2:
+                 print("total", total)
+ 
+        end_offset = self.start_dir
+        for zinfo in sorted(self.filelist,
+                            key=lambda zinfo: zinfo.header_offset,
+                            reverse=True):
+            zinfo._end_offset = end_offset
+            end_offset = zinfo.header_offset
+ 
+     def namelist(self):
+         """Return a list of file names in the archive."""
+@@ -1500,6 +1508,10 @@ class ZipFile:
+                     'File name in directory %r and header %r differ.'
+                     % (zinfo.orig_filename, fname))
+ 
+            if (zinfo._end_offset is not None and
+                zef_file.tell() + zinfo.compress_size > zinfo._end_offset):
+                raise BadZipFile(f"Overlapped entries: {zinfo.orig_filename!r} (possible zip bomb)")
+
+             # check for encrypted flag & handle password
+             is_encrypted = zinfo.flag_bits & 0x1
+             zd = None
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-09-28-13-15-51.gh-issue-109858.43e2dg.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-09-28-13-15-51.gh-issue-109858.43e2dg.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..be279ca
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-09-28-13-15-51.gh-issue-109858.43e2dg.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Protect :mod:`zipfile` from "quoted-overlap" zipbomb. It now raises
+BadZipFile when try to read an entry that overlaps with other entry or
+central directory.
+-- 
+2.44.0
+
--- a/SOURCES/00431-cve-2024-4032.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00431-cve-2024-4032.patch
@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 May 2024 11:58:20 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 00431: CVE-2024-4032: incorrect IPv4 and IPv6 private ranges
+
+Upstream issue: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/113171
+
+Backported from 3.8.
+---
+ Doc/library/ipaddress.rst                     | 43 ++++++++-
+ Doc/tools/susp-ignored.csv                    |  8 ++
+ Lib/ipaddress.py                              | 95 +++++++++++++++----
+ Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py                    | 52 ++++++++++
+ ...-03-14-01-38-44.gh-issue-113171.VFnObz.rst |  9 ++
+ 5 files changed, 186 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-03-14-01-38-44.gh-issue-113171.VFnObz.rst
+
+diff --git a/Doc/library/ipaddress.rst b/Doc/library/ipaddress.rst
+index 4ce1ed1ced..18613babc9 100644
+--- a/Doc/library/ipaddress.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/ipaddress.rst
+@@ -166,18 +166,53 @@ write code that handles both IP versions correctly.  Address objects are
+ 
+    .. attribute:: is_private
+ 
+-      ``True`` if the address is allocated for private networks.  See
+      ``True`` if the address is defined as not globally reachable by
+       iana-ipv4-special-registry_ (for IPv4) or iana-ipv6-special-registry_
+-      (for IPv6).
+      (for IPv6) with the following exceptions:
+
+      * ``is_private`` is ``False`` for the shared address space (``100.64.0.0/10``)
+      * For IPv4-mapped IPv6-addresses the ``is_private`` value is determined by the
+        semantics of the underlying IPv4 addresses and the following condition holds
+        (see :attr:`IPv6Address.ipv4_mapped`)::
+
+            address.is_private == address.ipv4_mapped.is_private
+
+      ``is_private`` has value opposite to :attr:`is_global`, except for the shared address space
+      (``100.64.0.0/10`` range) where they are both ``False``.
+
+      .. versionchanged:: 3.8.20
+
+         Fixed some false positives and false negatives.
+
+         * ``192.0.0.0/24`` is considered private with the exception of ``192.0.0.9/32`` and
+           ``192.0.0.10/32`` (previously: only the ``192.0.0.0/29`` sub-range was considered private).
+         * ``64:ff9b:1::/48`` is considered private.
+         * ``2002::/16`` is considered private.
+         * There are exceptions within ``2001::/23`` (otherwise considered private): ``2001:1::1/128``,
+           ``2001:1::2/128``, ``2001:3::/32``, ``2001:4:112::/48``, ``2001:20::/28``, ``2001:30::/28``.
+           The exceptions are not considered private.
+ 
+    .. attribute:: is_global
+ 
+-      ``True`` if the address is allocated for public networks.  See
+      ``True`` if the address is defined as globally reachable by
+       iana-ipv4-special-registry_ (for IPv4) or iana-ipv6-special-registry_
+-      (for IPv6).
+      (for IPv6) with the following exception:
+
+      For IPv4-mapped IPv6-addresses the ``is_private`` value is determined by the
+      semantics of the underlying IPv4 addresses and the following condition holds
+      (see :attr:`IPv6Address.ipv4_mapped`)::
+
+         address.is_global == address.ipv4_mapped.is_global
+
+      ``is_global`` has value opposite to :attr:`is_private`, except for the shared address space
+      (``100.64.0.0/10`` range) where they are both ``False``.
+ 
+       .. versionadded:: 3.4
+ 
+      .. versionchanged:: 3.8.20
+
+         Fixed some false positives and false negatives, see :attr:`is_private` for details.
+
+    .. attribute:: is_unspecified
+ 
+       ``True`` if the address is unspecified.  See :RFC:`5735` (for IPv4)
+diff --git a/Doc/tools/susp-ignored.csv b/Doc/tools/susp-ignored.csv
+index ed434ce77d..6bc0741b12 100644
+--- a/Doc/tools/susp-ignored.csv
+++ b/Doc/tools/susp-ignored.csv
+@@ -160,6 +160,14 @@ library/ipaddress,,:db00,2001:db00::0/24
+ library/ipaddress,,::,2001:db00::0/24
+ library/ipaddress,,:db00,2001:db00::0/ffff:ff00::
+ library/ipaddress,,::,2001:db00::0/ffff:ff00::
+library/ipaddress,,:ff9b,64:ff9b:1::/48
+library/ipaddress,,::,64:ff9b:1::/48
+library/ipaddress,,::,2001::
+library/ipaddress,,::,2001:1::
+library/ipaddress,,::,2001:3::
+library/ipaddress,,::,2001:4:112::
+library/ipaddress,,::,2001:20::
+library/ipaddress,,::,2001:30::
+ library/itertools,,:step,elements from seq[start:stop:step]
+ library/itertools,,:stop,elements from seq[start:stop:step]
+ library/logging.handlers,,:port,host:port
+diff --git a/Lib/ipaddress.py b/Lib/ipaddress.py
+index 98492136ca..55d4d62d70 100644
+--- a/Lib/ipaddress.py
+++ b/Lib/ipaddress.py
+@@ -1302,18 +1302,41 @@ class IPv4Address(_BaseV4, _BaseAddress):
+     @property
+     @functools.lru_cache()
+     def is_private(self):
+-        """Test if this address is allocated for private networks.
+        """``True`` if the address is defined as not globally reachable by
+        iana-ipv4-special-registry_ (for IPv4) or iana-ipv6-special-registry_
+        (for IPv6) with the following exceptions:
+ 
+-        Returns:
+-            A boolean, True if the address is reserved per
+-            iana-ipv4-special-registry.
+        * ``is_private`` is ``False`` for ``100.64.0.0/10``
+        * For IPv4-mapped IPv6-addresses the ``is_private`` value is determined by the
+            semantics of the underlying IPv4 addresses and the following condition holds
+            (see :attr:`IPv6Address.ipv4_mapped`)::
+ 
+                address.is_private == address.ipv4_mapped.is_private
+
+        ``is_private`` has value opposite to :attr:`is_global`, except for the ``100.64.0.0/10``
+        IPv4 range where they are both ``False``.
+         """
+-        return any(self in net for net in self._constants._private_networks)
+        return (
+            any(self in net for net in self._constants._private_networks)
+            and all(self not in net for net in self._constants._private_networks_exceptions)
+        )
+ 
+     @property
+     @functools.lru_cache()
+     def is_global(self):
+        """``True`` if the address is defined as globally reachable by
+        iana-ipv4-special-registry_ (for IPv4) or iana-ipv6-special-registry_
+        (for IPv6) with the following exception:
+
+        For IPv4-mapped IPv6-addresses the ``is_private`` value is determined by the
+        semantics of the underlying IPv4 addresses and the following condition holds
+        (see :attr:`IPv6Address.ipv4_mapped`)::
+
+            address.is_global == address.ipv4_mapped.is_global
+
+        ``is_global`` has value opposite to :attr:`is_private`, except for the ``100.64.0.0/10``
+        IPv4 range where they are both ``False``.
+        """
+         return self not in self._constants._public_network and not self.is_private
+ 
+     @property
+@@ -1548,13 +1571,15 @@ class _IPv4Constants:
+ 
+     _public_network = IPv4Network('100.64.0.0/10')
+ 
+    # Not globally reachable address blocks listed on
+    # https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml
+     _private_networks = [
+         IPv4Network('0.0.0.0/8'),
+         IPv4Network('10.0.0.0/8'),
+         IPv4Network('127.0.0.0/8'),
+         IPv4Network('169.254.0.0/16'),
+         IPv4Network('172.16.0.0/12'),
+-        IPv4Network('192.0.0.0/29'),
+        IPv4Network('192.0.0.0/24'),
+         IPv4Network('192.0.0.170/31'),
+         IPv4Network('192.0.2.0/24'),
+         IPv4Network('192.168.0.0/16'),
+@@ -1565,6 +1590,11 @@ class _IPv4Constants:
+         IPv4Network('255.255.255.255/32'),
+         ]
+ 
+    _private_networks_exceptions = [
+        IPv4Network('192.0.0.9/32'),
+        IPv4Network('192.0.0.10/32'),
+    ]
+
+     _reserved_network = IPv4Network('240.0.0.0/4')
+ 
+     _unspecified_address = IPv4Address('0.0.0.0')
+@@ -1953,23 +1983,42 @@ class IPv6Address(_BaseV6, _BaseAddress):
+     @property
+     @functools.lru_cache()
+     def is_private(self):
+-        """Test if this address is allocated for private networks.
+        """``True`` if the address is defined as not globally reachable by
+        iana-ipv4-special-registry_ (for IPv4) or iana-ipv6-special-registry_
+        (for IPv6) with the following exceptions:
+ 
+-        Returns:
+-            A boolean, True if the address is reserved per
+-            iana-ipv6-special-registry.
+        * ``is_private`` is ``False`` for ``100.64.0.0/10``
+        * For IPv4-mapped IPv6-addresses the ``is_private`` value is determined by the
+            semantics of the underlying IPv4 addresses and the following condition holds
+            (see :attr:`IPv6Address.ipv4_mapped`)::
+ 
+                address.is_private == address.ipv4_mapped.is_private
+
+        ``is_private`` has value opposite to :attr:`is_global`, except for the ``100.64.0.0/10``
+        IPv4 range where they are both ``False``.
+         """
+-        return any(self in net for net in self._constants._private_networks)
+        ipv4_mapped = self.ipv4_mapped
+        if ipv4_mapped is not None:
+            return ipv4_mapped.is_private
+        return (
+            any(self in net for net in self._constants._private_networks)
+            and all(self not in net for net in self._constants._private_networks_exceptions)
+        )
+ 
+     @property
+     def is_global(self):
+-        """Test if this address is allocated for public networks.
+        """``True`` if the address is defined as globally reachable by
+        iana-ipv4-special-registry_ (for IPv4) or iana-ipv6-special-registry_
+        (for IPv6) with the following exception:
+ 
+-        Returns:
+-            A boolean, true if the address is not reserved per
+-            iana-ipv6-special-registry.
+        For IPv4-mapped IPv6-addresses the ``is_private`` value is determined by the
+        semantics of the underlying IPv4 addresses and the following condition holds
+        (see :attr:`IPv6Address.ipv4_mapped`)::
+ 
+            address.is_global == address.ipv4_mapped.is_global
+
+        ``is_global`` has value opposite to :attr:`is_private`, except for the ``100.64.0.0/10``
+        IPv4 range where they are both ``False``.
+         """
+         return not self.is_private
+ 
+@@ -2236,19 +2285,31 @@ class _IPv6Constants:
+ 
+     _multicast_network = IPv6Network('ff00::/8')
+ 
+    # Not globally reachable address blocks listed on
+    # https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-registry/iana-ipv6-special-registry.xhtml
+     _private_networks = [
+         IPv6Network('::1/128'),
+         IPv6Network('::/128'),
+         IPv6Network('::ffff:0:0/96'),
+        IPv6Network('64:ff9b:1::/48'),
+         IPv6Network('100::/64'),
+         IPv6Network('2001::/23'),
+-        IPv6Network('2001:2::/48'),
+         IPv6Network('2001:db8::/32'),
+-        IPv6Network('2001:10::/28'),
+        # IANA says N/A, let's consider it not globally reachable to be safe
+        IPv6Network('2002::/16'),
+         IPv6Network('fc00::/7'),
+         IPv6Network('fe80::/10'),
+         ]
+ 
+    _private_networks_exceptions = [
+        IPv6Network('2001:1::1/128'),
+        IPv6Network('2001:1::2/128'),
+        IPv6Network('2001:3::/32'),
+        IPv6Network('2001:4:112::/48'),
+        IPv6Network('2001:20::/28'),
+        IPv6Network('2001:30::/28'),
+    ]
+
+     _reserved_networks = [
+         IPv6Network('::/8'), IPv6Network('100::/8'),
+         IPv6Network('200::/7'), IPv6Network('400::/6'),
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py b/Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py
+index 7de444af4a..716846b2ae 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_ipaddress.py
+@@ -1665,6 +1665,10 @@ class IpaddrUnitTest(unittest.TestCase):
+         self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_address(
+                 '172.31.255.255').is_private)
+         self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_address('172.32.0.0').is_private)
+        self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('192.0.0.0').is_global)
+        self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('192.0.0.9').is_global)
+        self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('192.0.0.10').is_global)
+        self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('192.0.0.255').is_global)
+ 
+         self.assertEqual(True,
+                          ipaddress.ip_address('169.254.100.200').is_link_local)
+@@ -1680,6 +1684,40 @@ class IpaddrUnitTest(unittest.TestCase):
+         self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_address('128.0.0.0').is_loopback)
+         self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network('0.0.0.0').is_unspecified)
+ 
+    def testPrivateNetworks(self):
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("0.0.0.0/0").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_network("1.0.0.0/8").is_private)
+
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("0.0.0.0/8").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("192.0.0.0/29").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_network("192.0.0.9/32").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("192.0.0.170/31").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("192.0.2.0/24").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("198.18.0.0/15").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("198.51.100.0/24").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("203.0.113.0/24").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("240.0.0.0/4").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("255.255.255.255/32").is_private)
+
+        self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_network("::/0").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_network("::ff/128").is_private)
+
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("::1/128").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("::/128").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("::ffff:0:0/96").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("100::/64").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("2001:2::/48").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_network("2001:3::/48").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("2001:db8::/32").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("2001:10::/28").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7").is_private)
+        self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network("fe80::/10").is_private)
+
+     def testReservedIpv6(self):
+ 
+         self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network('ffff::').is_multicast)
+@@ -1753,6 +1791,20 @@ class IpaddrUnitTest(unittest.TestCase):
+         self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_address('0::0').is_unspecified)
+         self.assertEqual(False, ipaddress.ip_address('::1').is_unspecified)
+ 
+        self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('64:ff9b:1::').is_global)
+        self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('2001::').is_global)
+        self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:1::1').is_global)
+        self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:1::2').is_global)
+        self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:2::').is_global)
+        self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:3::').is_global)
+        self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:4::').is_global)
+        self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:4:112::').is_global)
+        self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:10::').is_global)
+        self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:20::').is_global)
+        self.assertTrue(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:30::').is_global)
+        self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('2001:40::').is_global)
+        self.assertFalse(ipaddress.ip_address('2002::').is_global)
+
+         # some generic IETF reserved addresses
+         self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_address('100::').is_reserved)
+         self.assertEqual(True, ipaddress.ip_network('4000::1/128').is_reserved)
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-03-14-01-38-44.gh-issue-113171.VFnObz.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-03-14-01-38-44.gh-issue-113171.VFnObz.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..f9a72473be
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-03-14-01-38-44.gh-issue-113171.VFnObz.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+Fixed various false positives and false negatives in
+
+* :attr:`ipaddress.IPv4Address.is_private` (see these docs for details)
+* :attr:`ipaddress.IPv4Address.is_global`
+* :attr:`ipaddress.IPv6Address.is_private`
+* :attr:`ipaddress.IPv6Address.is_global`
+
+Also in the corresponding :class:`ipaddress.IPv4Network` and :class:`ipaddress.IPv6Network`
+attributes.
--- a/SOURCES/00435-cve-2024-6923.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00435-cve-2024-6923.patch
@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
+From 6c97acbb39693b94606b499f0c472fba2f5fd274 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Tom=C3=A1=C5=A1=20Hrn=C4=8Diar?= <thrnciar@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 10:44:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 00435: gh-121650: Encode newlines in headers, and verify 
+ headers are sound (GH-122233)
+
+Per RFC 2047:
+
+> [...] these encoding schemes allow the
+> encoding of arbitrary octet values, mail readers that implement this
+> decoding should also ensure that display of the decoded data on the
+> recipient's terminal will not cause unwanted side-effects
+
+It seems that the "quoted-word" scheme is a valid way to include
+a newline character in a header value, just like we already allow
+undecodable bytes or control characters.
+They do need to be properly quoted when serialized to text, though.
+
+This should fail for custom fold() implementations that aren't careful
+about newlines.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 097633981879b3c9de9a1dd120d3aa585ecc2384)
+
+This patch also contains modified commit cherry picked from
+c5bba853d5e7836f6d4340e18721d3fb3a6ee0f7.
+
+This commit was backported to simplify the backport of the other commit
+fixing CVE. The only modification is a removal of one test case which
+tests multiple changes in Python 3.7 and it wasn't working properly
+with Python 3.6 where we backported only one change.
+
+Co-authored-by: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com>
+Co-authored-by: Bas Bloemsaat <bas@bloemsaat.org>
+Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
+Co-authored-by: bsiem <52461103+bsiem@users.noreply.github.com>
+---
+ Doc/library/email.errors.rst                  |  6 ++
+ Doc/library/email.policy.rst                  | 18 ++++++
+ Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py             |  9 +++
+ Lib/email/_policybase.py                      |  8 +++
+ Lib/email/errors.py                           |  4 ++
+ Lib/email/generator.py                        | 16 ++++-
+ Lib/test/test_email/test_generator.py         | 62 +++++++++++++++++++
+ Lib/test/test_email/test_headerregistry.py    | 16 +++++
+ Lib/test/test_email/test_policy.py            | 26 ++++++++
+ .../2019-07-09-11-20-21.bpo-37482.auzvev.rst  |  1 +
+ ...-07-27-16-10-41.gh-issue-121650.nf6oc9.rst |  5 ++
+ 11 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2019-07-09-11-20-21.bpo-37482.auzvev.rst
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-07-27-16-10-41.gh-issue-121650.nf6oc9.rst
+
+diff --git a/Doc/library/email.errors.rst b/Doc/library/email.errors.rst
+index 511ad16..7e51f74 100644
+--- a/Doc/library/email.errors.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/email.errors.rst
+@@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ The following exception classes are defined in the :mod:`email.errors` module:
+    :class:`~email.mime.image.MIMEImage`).
+ 
+ 
+.. exception:: HeaderWriteError()
+
+   Raised when an error occurs when the :mod:`~email.generator` outputs
+   headers.
+
+
+ Here is the list of the defects that the :class:`~email.parser.FeedParser`
+ can find while parsing messages.  Note that the defects are added to the message
+ where the problem was found, so for example, if a message nested inside a
+diff --git a/Doc/library/email.policy.rst b/Doc/library/email.policy.rst
+index 8e70762..8617b2e 100644
+--- a/Doc/library/email.policy.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/email.policy.rst
+@@ -229,6 +229,24 @@ added matters.  To illustrate::
+ 
+       .. versionadded:: 3.6
+ 
+
+   .. attribute:: verify_generated_headers
+
+      If ``True`` (the default), the generator will raise
+      :exc:`~email.errors.HeaderWriteError` instead of writing a header
+      that is improperly folded or delimited, such that it would
+      be parsed as multiple headers or joined with adjacent data.
+      Such headers can be generated by custom header classes or bugs
+      in the ``email`` module.
+
+      As it's a security feature, this defaults to ``True`` even in the
+      :class:`~email.policy.Compat32` policy.
+      For backwards compatible, but unsafe, behavior, it must be set to
+      ``False`` explicitly.
+
+      .. versionadded:: 3.8.20
+
+
+    The following :class:`Policy` method is intended to be called by code using
+    the email library to create policy instances with custom settings:
+ 
+diff --git a/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py b/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py
+index 9815e4e..dab4cbb 100644
+--- a/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py
+++ b/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py
+@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ TOKEN_ENDS = TSPECIALS | WSP
+ ASPECIALS = TSPECIALS | set("*'%")
+ ATTRIBUTE_ENDS = ASPECIALS | WSP
+ EXTENDED_ATTRIBUTE_ENDS = ATTRIBUTE_ENDS - set('%')
+NLSET = {'\n', '\r'}
+SPECIALSNL = SPECIALS | NLSET
+ 
+ def quote_string(value):
+     return '"'+str(value).replace('\\', '\\\\').replace('"', r'\"')+'"'
+@@ -2608,6 +2610,13 @@ def _refold_parse_tree(parse_tree, *, policy):
+             wrap_as_ew_blocked -= 1
+             continue
+         tstr = str(part)
+        if not want_encoding:
+            if part.token_type == 'ptext':
+                # Encode if tstr contains special characters.
+                want_encoding = not SPECIALSNL.isdisjoint(tstr)
+            else:
+                # Encode if tstr contains newlines.
+                want_encoding = not NLSET.isdisjoint(tstr)
+         try:
+             tstr.encode(encoding)
+             charset = encoding
+diff --git a/Lib/email/_policybase.py b/Lib/email/_policybase.py
+index c9cbadd..d1f4821 100644
+--- a/Lib/email/_policybase.py
+++ b/Lib/email/_policybase.py
+@@ -157,6 +157,13 @@ class Policy(_PolicyBase, metaclass=abc.ABCMeta):
+     message_factory     -- the class to use to create new message objects.
+                            If the value is None, the default is Message.
+ 
+    verify_generated_headers
+                        -- if true, the generator verifies that each header
+                           they are properly folded, so that a parser won't
+                           treat it as multiple headers, start-of-body, or
+                           part of another header.
+                           This is a check against custom Header & fold()
+                           implementations.
+     """
+ 
+     raise_on_defect = False
+@@ -165,6 +172,7 @@ class Policy(_PolicyBase, metaclass=abc.ABCMeta):
+     max_line_length = 78
+     mangle_from_ = False
+     message_factory = None
+    verify_generated_headers = True
+ 
+     def handle_defect(self, obj, defect):
+         """Based on policy, either raise defect or call register_defect.
+diff --git a/Lib/email/errors.py b/Lib/email/errors.py
+index d28a680..1a0d5c6 100644
+--- a/Lib/email/errors.py
+++ b/Lib/email/errors.py
+@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ class CharsetError(MessageError):
+     """An illegal charset was given."""
+ 
+ 
+class HeaderWriteError(MessageError):
+    """Error while writing headers."""
+
+
+ # These are parsing defects which the parser was able to work around.
+ class MessageDefect(ValueError):
+     """Base class for a message defect."""
+diff --git a/Lib/email/generator.py b/Lib/email/generator.py
+index ae670c2..6deb95b 100644
+--- a/Lib/email/generator.py
+++ b/Lib/email/generator.py
+@@ -14,12 +14,14 @@ import random
+ from copy import deepcopy
+ from io import StringIO, BytesIO
+ from email.utils import _has_surrogates
+from email.errors import HeaderWriteError
+ 
+ UNDERSCORE = '_'
+ NL = '\n'  # XXX: no longer used by the code below.
+ 
+ NLCRE = re.compile(r'\r\n|\r|\n')
+ fcre = re.compile(r'^From ', re.MULTILINE)
+NEWLINE_WITHOUT_FWSP = re.compile(r'\r\n[^ \t]|\r[^ \n\t]|\n[^ \t]')
+ 
+ 
+ 
+@@ -219,7 +221,19 @@ class Generator:
+ 
+     def _write_headers(self, msg):
+         for h, v in msg.raw_items():
+-            self.write(self.policy.fold(h, v))
+            folded = self.policy.fold(h, v)
+            if self.policy.verify_generated_headers:
+                linesep = self.policy.linesep
+                if not folded.endswith(self.policy.linesep):
+                    raise HeaderWriteError(
+                        f'folded header does not end with {linesep!r}: {folded!r}')
+                folded_no_linesep = folded
+                if folded.endswith(linesep):
+                    folded_no_linesep = folded[:-len(linesep)]
+                if NEWLINE_WITHOUT_FWSP.search(folded_no_linesep):
+                    raise HeaderWriteError(
+                        f'folded header contains newline: {folded!r}')
+            self.write(folded)
+         # A blank line always separates headers from body
+         self.write(self._NL)
+ 
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_email/test_generator.py b/Lib/test/test_email/test_generator.py
+index c1aeaef..cdf1075 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_email/test_generator.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test_generator.py
+@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ from email import message_from_string, message_from_bytes
+ from email.message import EmailMessage
+ from email.generator import Generator, BytesGenerator
+ from email import policy
+import email.errors
+ from test.test_email import TestEmailBase, parameterize
+ 
+ 
+@@ -215,6 +216,44 @@ class TestGeneratorBase:
+         g.flatten(msg)
+         self.assertEqual(s.getvalue(), self.typ(expected))
+ 
+    def test_keep_encoded_newlines(self):
+        msg = self.msgmaker(self.typ(textwrap.dedent("""\
+            To: nobody
+            Subject: Bad subject=?UTF-8?Q?=0A?=Bcc: injection@example.com
+
+            None
+            """)))
+        expected = textwrap.dedent("""\
+            To: nobody
+            Subject: Bad subject=?UTF-8?Q?=0A?=Bcc: injection@example.com
+
+            None
+            """)
+        s = self.ioclass()
+        g = self.genclass(s, policy=self.policy.clone(max_line_length=80))
+        g.flatten(msg)
+        self.assertEqual(s.getvalue(), self.typ(expected))
+
+    def test_keep_long_encoded_newlines(self):
+        msg = self.msgmaker(self.typ(textwrap.dedent("""\
+            To: nobody
+            Subject: Bad subject =?UTF-8?Q?=0A?=Bcc: injection@example.com
+
+            None
+            """)))
+        expected = textwrap.dedent("""\
+            To: nobody
+            Subject: Bad subject \n\
+             =?utf-8?q?=0A?=Bcc:
+             injection@example.com
+
+            None
+            """)
+        s = self.ioclass()
+        g = self.genclass(s, policy=self.policy.clone(max_line_length=30))
+        g.flatten(msg)
+        self.assertEqual(s.getvalue(), self.typ(expected))
+
+ 
+ class TestGenerator(TestGeneratorBase, TestEmailBase):
+ 
+@@ -223,6 +262,29 @@ class TestGenerator(TestGeneratorBase, TestEmailBase):
+     ioclass = io.StringIO
+     typ = str
+ 
+    def test_verify_generated_headers(self):
+        """gh-121650: by default the generator prevents header injection"""
+        class LiteralHeader(str):
+            name = 'Header'
+            def fold(self, **kwargs):
+                return self
+
+        for text in (
+            'Value\r\nBad Injection\r\n',
+            'NoNewLine'
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(text=text):
+                message = message_from_string(
+                    "Header: Value\r\n\r\nBody",
+                    policy=self.policy,
+                )
+
+                del message['Header']
+                message['Header'] = LiteralHeader(text)
+
+                with self.assertRaises(email.errors.HeaderWriteError):
+                    message.as_string()
+
+ 
+ class TestBytesGenerator(TestGeneratorBase, TestEmailBase):
+ 
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_email/test_headerregistry.py b/Lib/test/test_email/test_headerregistry.py
+index 30ce0ba..d5004b3 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_email/test_headerregistry.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test_headerregistry.py
+@@ -1527,6 +1527,22 @@ class TestAddressAndGroup(TestEmailBase):
+ 
+ class TestFolding(TestHeaderBase):
+ 
+    def test_address_display_names(self):
+        """Test the folding and encoding of address headers."""
+        for name, result in (
+                ('Foo Bar, France', '"Foo Bar, France"'),
+                ('Foo Bar (France)', '"Foo Bar (France)"'),
+                ('Foo Bar, España', 'Foo =?utf-8?q?Bar=2C_Espa=C3=B1a?='),
+                ('Foo Bar (España)', 'Foo Bar =?utf-8?b?KEVzcGHDsWEp?='),
+                ('Foo, Bar España', '=?utf-8?q?Foo=2C_Bar_Espa=C3=B1a?='),
+                ('Foo, Bar [España]', '=?utf-8?q?Foo=2C_Bar_=5BEspa=C3=B1a=5D?='),
+                ('Foo Bär, France', 'Foo =?utf-8?q?B=C3=A4r=2C?= France'),
+                ('Foo Bär <France>', 'Foo =?utf-8?q?B=C3=A4r_=3CFrance=3E?='),
+                ):
+            h = self.make_header('To', Address(name, addr_spec='a@b.com'))
+            self.assertEqual(h.fold(policy=policy.default),
+                                    'To: %s <a@b.com>\n' % result)
+
+     def test_short_unstructured(self):
+         h = self.make_header('subject', 'this is a test')
+         self.assertEqual(h.fold(policy=policy.default),
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_email/test_policy.py b/Lib/test/test_email/test_policy.py
+index 8fecb8a..6793422 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_email/test_policy.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test_policy.py
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ class PolicyAPITests(unittest.TestCase):
+         'raise_on_defect':          False,
+         'mangle_from_':             True,
+         'message_factory':          None,
+        'verify_generated_headers': True,
+         }
+     # These default values are the ones set on email.policy.default.
+     # If any of these defaults change, the docs must be updated.
+@@ -237,6 +238,31 @@ class PolicyAPITests(unittest.TestCase):
+                          email.policy.EmailPolicy.header_factory)
+         self.assertEqual(newpolicy.__dict__, {'raise_on_defect': True})
+ 
+    def test_verify_generated_headers(self):
+        """Turning protection off allows header injection"""
+        policy = email.policy.default.clone(verify_generated_headers=False)
+        for text in (
+            'Header: Value\r\nBad: Injection\r\n',
+            'Header: NoNewLine'
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(text=text):
+                message = email.message_from_string(
+                    "Header: Value\r\n\r\nBody",
+                    policy=policy,
+                )
+                class LiteralHeader(str):
+                    name = 'Header'
+                    def fold(self, **kwargs):
+                        return self
+
+                del message['Header']
+                message['Header'] = LiteralHeader(text)
+
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    message.as_string(),
+                    f"{text}\nBody",
+                )
+
+     # XXX: Need subclassing tests.
+     # For adding subclassed objects, make sure the usual rules apply (subclass
+     # wins), but that the order still works (right overrides left).
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2019-07-09-11-20-21.bpo-37482.auzvev.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2019-07-09-11-20-21.bpo-37482.auzvev.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e09ff63
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2019-07-09-11-20-21.bpo-37482.auzvev.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Fix serialization of display name in originator or destination address fields with both encoded words and special chars.
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-07-27-16-10-41.gh-issue-121650.nf6oc9.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-07-27-16-10-41.gh-issue-121650.nf6oc9.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..83dd28d
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-07-27-16-10-41.gh-issue-121650.nf6oc9.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+:mod:`email` headers with embedded newlines are now quoted on output. The
+:mod:`~email.generator` will now refuse to serialize (write) headers that
+are unsafely folded or delimited; see
+:attr:`~email.policy.Policy.verify_generated_headers`. (Contributed by Bas
+Bloemsaat and Petr Viktorin in :gh:`121650`.)
+-- 
+2.45.2
+
--- a/SOURCES/00437-cve-2024-6232.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00437-cve-2024-6232.patch
@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Seth Michael Larson <seth@python.org>
+Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2024 10:41:42 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] 00437: CVE-2024-6232 Remove backtracking when parsing tarfile
+ headers
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+* Remove backtracking when parsing tarfile headers
+* Rewrite PAX header parsing to be stricter
+* Optimize parsing of GNU extended sparse headers v0.0
+
+(cherry picked from commit 34ddb64d088dd7ccc321f6103d23153256caa5d4)
+
+Co-authored-by: Seth Michael Larson <seth@python.org>
+Co-authored-by: Kirill Podoprigora <kirill.bast9@mail.ru>
+Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
+Co-authored-by: Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
+---
+ Lib/tarfile.py                                | 104 +++++++++++-------
+ Lib/test/test_tarfile.py                      |  42 +++++++
+ ...-07-02-13-39-20.gh-issue-121285.hrl-yI.rst |   2 +
+ 3 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-07-02-13-39-20.gh-issue-121285.hrl-yI.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py
+index c18590325a..ee1bf37bfd 100755
+--- a/Lib/tarfile.py
+++ b/Lib/tarfile.py
+@@ -846,6 +846,9 @@ _NAMED_FILTERS = {
+ # Sentinel for replace() defaults, meaning "don't change the attribute"
+ _KEEP = object()
+ 
+# Header length is digits followed by a space.
+_header_length_prefix_re = re.compile(br"([0-9]{1,20}) ")
+
+ class TarInfo(object):
+     """Informational class which holds the details about an
+        archive member given by a tar header block.
+@@ -1371,41 +1374,60 @@ class TarInfo(object):
+         else:
+             pax_headers = tarfile.pax_headers.copy()
+ 
+-        # Check if the pax header contains a hdrcharset field. This tells us
+-        # the encoding of the path, linkpath, uname and gname fields. Normally,
+-        # these fields are UTF-8 encoded but since POSIX.1-2008 tar
+-        # implementations are allowed to store them as raw binary strings if
+-        # the translation to UTF-8 fails.
+-        match = re.search(br"\d+ hdrcharset=([^\n]+)\n", buf)
+-        if match is not None:
+-            pax_headers["hdrcharset"] = match.group(1).decode("utf-8")
+-
+-        # For the time being, we don't care about anything other than "BINARY".
+-        # The only other value that is currently allowed by the standard is
+-        # "ISO-IR 10646 2000 UTF-8" in other words UTF-8.
+-        hdrcharset = pax_headers.get("hdrcharset")
+-        if hdrcharset == "BINARY":
+-            encoding = tarfile.encoding
+-        else:
+-            encoding = "utf-8"
+-
+         # Parse pax header information. A record looks like that:
+         # "%d %s=%s\n" % (length, keyword, value). length is the size
+         # of the complete record including the length field itself and
+-        # the newline. keyword and value are both UTF-8 encoded strings.
+-        regex = re.compile(br"(\d+) ([^=]+)=")
+        # the newline.
+         pos = 0
+-        while True:
+-            match = regex.match(buf, pos)
+        encoding = None
+        raw_headers = []
+        while len(buf) > pos and buf[pos] != 0x00:
+            match = _header_length_prefix_re.match(buf, pos)
+             if not match:
+-                break
+                raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header")
+            try:
+                length = int(match.group(1))
+            except ValueError:
+                raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header")
+            # Headers must be at least 5 bytes, shortest being '5 x=\n'.
+            # Value is allowed to be empty.
+            if length < 5:
+                raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header")
+            if pos + length > len(buf):
+                raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header")
+ 
+-            length, keyword = match.groups()
+-            length = int(length)
+-            if length == 0:
+            header_value_end_offset = match.start(1) + length - 1  # Last byte of the header
+            keyword_and_value = buf[match.end(1) + 1:header_value_end_offset]
+            raw_keyword, equals, raw_value = keyword_and_value.partition(b"=")
+
+            # Check the framing of the header. The last character must be '\n' (0x0A)
+            if not raw_keyword or equals != b"=" or buf[header_value_end_offset] != 0x0A:
+                 raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header")
+-            value = buf[match.end(2) + 1:match.start(1) + length - 1]
+            raw_headers.append((length, raw_keyword, raw_value))
+
+            # Check if the pax header contains a hdrcharset field. This tells us
+            # the encoding of the path, linkpath, uname and gname fields. Normally,
+            # these fields are UTF-8 encoded but since POSIX.1-2008 tar
+            # implementations are allowed to store them as raw binary strings if
+            # the translation to UTF-8 fails. For the time being, we don't care about
+            # anything other than "BINARY". The only other value that is currently
+            # allowed by the standard is "ISO-IR 10646 2000 UTF-8" in other words UTF-8.
+            # Note that we only follow the initial 'hdrcharset' setting to preserve
+            # the initial behavior of the 'tarfile' module.
+            if raw_keyword == b"hdrcharset" and encoding is None:
+                if raw_value == b"BINARY":
+                    encoding = tarfile.encoding
+                else:  # This branch ensures only the first 'hdrcharset' header is used.
+                    encoding = "utf-8"
+
+            pos += length
+
+        # If no explicit hdrcharset is set, we use UTF-8 as a default.
+        if encoding is None:
+            encoding = "utf-8"
+ 
+        # After parsing the raw headers we can decode them to text.
+        for length, raw_keyword, raw_value in raw_headers:
+             # Normally, we could just use "utf-8" as the encoding and "strict"
+             # as the error handler, but we better not take the risk. For
+             # example, GNU tar <= 1.23 is known to store filenames it cannot
+@@ -1413,17 +1435,16 @@ class TarInfo(object):
+             # hdrcharset=BINARY header).
+             # We first try the strict standard encoding, and if that fails we
+             # fall back on the user's encoding and error handler.
+-            keyword = self._decode_pax_field(keyword, "utf-8", "utf-8",
+            keyword = self._decode_pax_field(raw_keyword, "utf-8", "utf-8",
+                     tarfile.errors)
+             if keyword in PAX_NAME_FIELDS:
+-                value = self._decode_pax_field(value, encoding, tarfile.encoding,
+                value = self._decode_pax_field(raw_value, encoding, tarfile.encoding,
+                         tarfile.errors)
+             else:
+-                value = self._decode_pax_field(value, "utf-8", "utf-8",
+                value = self._decode_pax_field(raw_value, "utf-8", "utf-8",
+                         tarfile.errors)
+ 
+             pax_headers[keyword] = value
+-            pos += length
+ 
+         # Fetch the next header.
+         try:
+@@ -1438,7 +1459,7 @@ class TarInfo(object):
+ 
+         elif "GNU.sparse.size" in pax_headers:
+             # GNU extended sparse format version 0.0.
+-            self._proc_gnusparse_00(next, pax_headers, buf)
+            self._proc_gnusparse_00(next, raw_headers)
+ 
+         elif pax_headers.get("GNU.sparse.major") == "1" and pax_headers.get("GNU.sparse.minor") == "0":
+             # GNU extended sparse format version 1.0.
+@@ -1460,15 +1481,24 @@ class TarInfo(object):
+ 
+         return next
+ 
+-    def _proc_gnusparse_00(self, next, pax_headers, buf):
+    def _proc_gnusparse_00(self, next, raw_headers):
+         """Process a GNU tar extended sparse header, version 0.0.
+         """
+         offsets = []
+-        for match in re.finditer(br"\d+ GNU.sparse.offset=(\d+)\n", buf):
+-            offsets.append(int(match.group(1)))
+         numbytes = []
+-        for match in re.finditer(br"\d+ GNU.sparse.numbytes=(\d+)\n", buf):
+-            numbytes.append(int(match.group(1)))
+        for _, keyword, value in raw_headers:
+            if keyword == b"GNU.sparse.offset":
+                try:
+                    offsets.append(int(value.decode()))
+                except ValueError:
+                    raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header")
+
+            elif keyword == b"GNU.sparse.numbytes":
+                try:
+                    numbytes.append(int(value.decode()))
+                except ValueError:
+                    raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header")
+
+         next.sparse = list(zip(offsets, numbytes))
+ 
+     def _proc_gnusparse_01(self, next, pax_headers):
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+index f261048615..04ef000e71 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+@@ -1046,6 +1046,48 @@ class PaxReadTest(LongnameTest, ReadTest, unittest.TestCase):
+         finally:
+             tar.close()
+ 
+    def test_pax_header_bad_formats(self):
+        # The fields from the pax header have priority over the
+        # TarInfo.
+        pax_header_replacements = (
+            b" foo=bar\n",
+            b"0 \n",
+            b"1 \n",
+            b"2 \n",
+            b"3 =\n",
+            b"4 =a\n",
+            b"1000000 foo=bar\n",
+            b"0 foo=bar\n",
+            b"-12 foo=bar\n",
+            b"000000000000000000000000036 foo=bar\n",
+        )
+        pax_headers = {"foo": "bar"}
+
+        for replacement in pax_header_replacements:
+            with self.subTest(header=replacement):
+                tar = tarfile.open(tmpname, "w", format=tarfile.PAX_FORMAT,
+                                   encoding="iso8859-1")
+                try:
+                    t = tarfile.TarInfo()
+                    t.name = "pax"  # non-ASCII
+                    t.uid = 1
+                    t.pax_headers = pax_headers
+                    tar.addfile(t)
+                finally:
+                    tar.close()
+
+                with open(tmpname, "rb") as f:
+                    data = f.read()
+                    self.assertIn(b"11 foo=bar\n", data)
+                    data = data.replace(b"11 foo=bar\n", replacement)
+
+                with open(tmpname, "wb") as f:
+                    f.truncate()
+                    f.write(data)
+
+                with self.assertRaisesRegex(tarfile.ReadError, r"file could not be opened successfully"):
+                    tarfile.open(tmpname, encoding="iso8859-1")
+
+ 
+ class WriteTestBase(TarTest):
+     # Put all write tests in here that are supposed to be tested
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-07-02-13-39-20.gh-issue-121285.hrl-yI.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-07-02-13-39-20.gh-issue-121285.hrl-yI.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..81f918bfe2
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-07-02-13-39-20.gh-issue-121285.hrl-yI.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Remove backtracking from tarfile header parsing for ``hdrcharset``, PAX, and
+GNU sparse headers.
--- a/SOURCES/00443-gh-124651-quote-template-strings-in-venv-activation-scripts.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00443-gh-124651-quote-template-strings-in-venv-activation-scripts.patch
@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Victor Stinner <vstinner@python.org>
+Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2024 14:11:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 00443: gh-124651: Quote template strings in `venv` activation
+ scripts
+
+(cherry picked from 3.9)
+---
+ Lib/test/test_venv.py                         | 82 +++++++++++++++++++
+ Lib/venv/__init__.py                          | 42 ++++++++--
+ Lib/venv/scripts/common/activate              |  8 +-
+ Lib/venv/scripts/posix/activate.csh           |  8 +-
+ Lib/venv/scripts/posix/activate.fish          |  8 +-
+ ...-09-28-02-03-04.gh-issue-124651.bLBGtH.rst |  1 +
+ 6 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-09-28-02-03-04.gh-issue-124651.bLBGtH.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_venv.py b/Lib/test/test_venv.py
+index 842470fef0..67fdcd86bb 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_venv.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_venv.py
+@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ import struct
+ import subprocess
+ import sys
+ import tempfile
+import shlex
+import shutil
+ from test.support import (captured_stdout, captured_stderr, requires_zlib,
+                           can_symlink, EnvironmentVarGuard, rmtree)
+ import unittest
+@@ -80,6 +82,10 @@ class BaseTest(unittest.TestCase):
+             result = f.read()
+         return result
+ 
+    def assertEndsWith(self, string, tail):
+        if not string.endswith(tail):
+            self.fail(f"String {string!r} does not end with {tail!r}")
+
+ class BasicTest(BaseTest):
+     """Test venv module functionality."""
+ 
+@@ -293,6 +299,82 @@ class BasicTest(BaseTest):
+             'import sys; print(sys.executable)'])
+         self.assertEqual(out.strip(), envpy.encode())
+ 
+    # gh-124651: test quoted strings
+    @unittest.skipIf(os.name == 'nt', 'contains invalid characters on Windows')
+    def test_special_chars_bash(self):
+        """
+        Test that the template strings are quoted properly (bash)
+        """
+        rmtree(self.env_dir)
+        bash = shutil.which('bash')
+        if bash is None:
+            self.skipTest('bash required for this test')
+        env_name = '"\';&&$e|\'"'
+        env_dir = os.path.join(os.path.realpath(self.env_dir), env_name)
+        builder = venv.EnvBuilder(clear=True)
+        builder.create(env_dir)
+        activate = os.path.join(env_dir, self.bindir, 'activate')
+        test_script = os.path.join(self.env_dir, 'test_special_chars.sh')
+        with open(test_script, "w") as f:
+            f.write(f'source {shlex.quote(activate)}\n'
+                    'python -c \'import sys; print(sys.executable)\'\n'
+                    'python -c \'import os; print(os.environ["VIRTUAL_ENV"])\'\n'
+                    'deactivate\n')
+        out, err = check_output([bash, test_script])
+        lines = out.splitlines()
+        self.assertTrue(env_name.encode() in lines[0])
+        self.assertEndsWith(lines[1], env_name.encode())
+
+    # gh-124651: test quoted strings
+    @unittest.skipIf(os.name == 'nt', 'contains invalid characters on Windows')
+    def test_special_chars_csh(self):
+        """
+        Test that the template strings are quoted properly (csh)
+        """
+        rmtree(self.env_dir)
+        csh = shutil.which('tcsh') or shutil.which('csh')
+        if csh is None:
+            self.skipTest('csh required for this test')
+        env_name = '"\';&&$e|\'"'
+        env_dir = os.path.join(os.path.realpath(self.env_dir), env_name)
+        builder = venv.EnvBuilder(clear=True)
+        builder.create(env_dir)
+        activate = os.path.join(env_dir, self.bindir, 'activate.csh')
+        test_script = os.path.join(self.env_dir, 'test_special_chars.csh')
+        with open(test_script, "w") as f:
+            f.write(f'source {shlex.quote(activate)}\n'
+                    'python -c \'import sys; print(sys.executable)\'\n'
+                    'python -c \'import os; print(os.environ["VIRTUAL_ENV"])\'\n'
+                    'deactivate\n')
+        out, err = check_output([csh, test_script])
+        lines = out.splitlines()
+        self.assertTrue(env_name.encode() in lines[0])
+        self.assertEndsWith(lines[1], env_name.encode())
+
+    # gh-124651: test quoted strings on Windows
+    @unittest.skipUnless(os.name == 'nt', 'only relevant on Windows')
+    def test_special_chars_windows(self):
+        """
+        Test that the template strings are quoted properly on Windows
+        """
+        rmtree(self.env_dir)
+        env_name = "'&&^$e"
+        env_dir = os.path.join(os.path.realpath(self.env_dir), env_name)
+        builder = venv.EnvBuilder(clear=True)
+        builder.create(env_dir)
+        activate = os.path.join(env_dir, self.bindir, 'activate.bat')
+        test_batch = os.path.join(self.env_dir, 'test_special_chars.bat')
+        with open(test_batch, "w") as f:
+            f.write('@echo off\n'
+                    f'"{activate}" & '
+                    f'{self.exe} -c "import sys; print(sys.executable)" & '
+                    f'{self.exe} -c "import os; print(os.environ[\'VIRTUAL_ENV\'])" & '
+                    'deactivate')
+        out, err = check_output([test_batch])
+        lines = out.splitlines()
+        self.assertTrue(env_name.encode() in lines[0])
+        self.assertEndsWith(lines[1], env_name.encode())
+
+     @unittest.skipUnless(os.name == 'nt', 'only relevant on Windows')
+     def test_unicode_in_batch_file(self):
+         """
+diff --git a/Lib/venv/__init__.py b/Lib/venv/__init__.py
+index 716129d139..0c44dfd07d 100644
+--- a/Lib/venv/__init__.py
+++ b/Lib/venv/__init__.py
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import shutil
+ import subprocess
+ import sys
+ import types
+import shlex
+ 
+ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+ 
+@@ -280,11 +281,41 @@ class EnvBuilder:
+         :param context: The information for the environment creation request
+                         being processed.
+         """
+-        text = text.replace('__VENV_DIR__', context.env_dir)
+-        text = text.replace('__VENV_NAME__', context.env_name)
+-        text = text.replace('__VENV_PROMPT__', context.prompt)
+-        text = text.replace('__VENV_BIN_NAME__', context.bin_name)
+-        text = text.replace('__VENV_PYTHON__', context.env_exe)
+        replacements = {
+            '__VENV_DIR__': context.env_dir,
+            '__VENV_NAME__': context.env_name,
+            '__VENV_PROMPT__': context.prompt,
+            '__VENV_BIN_NAME__': context.bin_name,
+            '__VENV_PYTHON__': context.env_exe,
+        }
+
+        def quote_ps1(s):
+            """
+            This should satisfy PowerShell quoting rules [1], unless the quoted
+            string is passed directly to Windows native commands [2].
+            [1]: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_quoting_rules
+            [2]: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_parsing#passing-arguments-that-contain-quote-characters
+            """
+            s = s.replace("'", "''")
+            return f"'{s}'"
+
+        def quote_bat(s):
+            return s
+
+        # gh-124651: need to quote the template strings properly
+        quote = shlex.quote
+        script_path = context.script_path
+        if script_path.endswith('.ps1'):
+            quote = quote_ps1
+        elif script_path.endswith('.bat'):
+            quote = quote_bat
+        else:
+            # fallbacks to POSIX shell compliant quote
+            quote = shlex.quote
+
+        replacements = {key: quote(s) for key, s in replacements.items()}
+        for key, quoted in replacements.items():
+            text = text.replace(key, quoted)
+         return text
+ 
+     def install_scripts(self, context, path):
+@@ -321,6 +352,7 @@ class EnvBuilder:
+                 with open(srcfile, 'rb') as f:
+                     data = f.read()
+                 if not srcfile.endswith('.exe'):
+                    context.script_path = srcfile
+                     try:
+                         data = data.decode('utf-8')
+                         data = self.replace_variables(data, context)
+diff --git a/Lib/venv/scripts/common/activate b/Lib/venv/scripts/common/activate
+index fff0765af5..c2e2f968fa 100644
+--- a/Lib/venv/scripts/common/activate
+++ b/Lib/venv/scripts/common/activate
+@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@ deactivate () {
+ # unset irrelevant variables
+ deactivate nondestructive
+ 
+-VIRTUAL_ENV="__VENV_DIR__"
+VIRTUAL_ENV=__VENV_DIR__
+ export VIRTUAL_ENV
+ 
+ _OLD_VIRTUAL_PATH="$PATH"
+-PATH="$VIRTUAL_ENV/__VENV_BIN_NAME__:$PATH"
+PATH="$VIRTUAL_ENV/"__VENV_BIN_NAME__":$PATH"
+ export PATH
+ 
+ # unset PYTHONHOME if set
+@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ fi
+ 
+ if [ -z "${VIRTUAL_ENV_DISABLE_PROMPT:-}" ] ; then
+     _OLD_VIRTUAL_PS1="${PS1:-}"
+-    if [ "x__VENV_PROMPT__" != x ] ; then
+-	PS1="__VENV_PROMPT__${PS1:-}"
+    if [ "x"__VENV_PROMPT__ != x ] ; then
+	PS1=__VENV_PROMPT__"${PS1:-}"
+     else
+     if [ "`basename \"$VIRTUAL_ENV\"`" = "__" ] ; then
+         # special case for Aspen magic directories
+diff --git a/Lib/venv/scripts/posix/activate.csh b/Lib/venv/scripts/posix/activate.csh
+index b0c7028a92..0e90d54008 100644
+--- a/Lib/venv/scripts/posix/activate.csh
+++ b/Lib/venv/scripts/posix/activate.csh
+@@ -8,17 +8,17 @@ alias deactivate 'test $?_OLD_VIRTUAL_PATH != 0 && setenv PATH "$_OLD_VIRTUAL_PA
+ # Unset irrelevant variables.
+ deactivate nondestructive
+ 
+-setenv VIRTUAL_ENV "__VENV_DIR__"
+setenv VIRTUAL_ENV __VENV_DIR__
+ 
+ set _OLD_VIRTUAL_PATH="$PATH"
+-setenv PATH "$VIRTUAL_ENV/__VENV_BIN_NAME__:$PATH"
+setenv PATH "$VIRTUAL_ENV/"__VENV_BIN_NAME__":$PATH"
+ 
+ 
+ set _OLD_VIRTUAL_PROMPT="$prompt"
+ 
+ if (! "$?VIRTUAL_ENV_DISABLE_PROMPT") then
+-    if ("__VENV_NAME__" != "") then
+-        set env_name = "__VENV_NAME__"
+    if (__VENV_NAME__ != "") then
+        set env_name = __VENV_NAME__
+     else
+         if (`basename "VIRTUAL_ENV"` == "__") then
+             # special case for Aspen magic directories
+diff --git a/Lib/venv/scripts/posix/activate.fish b/Lib/venv/scripts/posix/activate.fish
+index 4d4f0bd7a4..0407f9c7be 100644
+--- a/Lib/venv/scripts/posix/activate.fish
+++ b/Lib/venv/scripts/posix/activate.fish
+@@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ end
+ # unset irrelevant variables
+ deactivate nondestructive
+ 
+-set -gx VIRTUAL_ENV "__VENV_DIR__"
+set -gx VIRTUAL_ENV __VENV_DIR__
+ 
+ set -gx _OLD_VIRTUAL_PATH $PATH
+-set -gx PATH "$VIRTUAL_ENV/__VENV_BIN_NAME__" $PATH
+set -gx PATH "$VIRTUAL_ENV/"__VENV_BIN_NAME__ $PATH
+ 
+ # unset PYTHONHOME if set
+ if set -q PYTHONHOME
+@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ if test -z "$VIRTUAL_ENV_DISABLE_PROMPT"
+         set -l old_status $status
+ 
+         # Prompt override?
+-        if test -n "__VENV_PROMPT__"            
+-            printf "%s%s" "__VENV_PROMPT__" (set_color normal)
+        if test -n __VENV_PROMPT__            
+            printf "%s%s" __VENV_PROMPT__ (set_color normal)
+         else
+             # ...Otherwise, prepend env
+             set -l _checkbase (basename "$VIRTUAL_ENV")
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-09-28-02-03-04.gh-issue-124651.bLBGtH.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-09-28-02-03-04.gh-issue-124651.bLBGtH.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..17fc917139
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-09-28-02-03-04.gh-issue-124651.bLBGtH.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Properly quote template strings in :mod:`venv` activation scripts.
--- a/SOURCES/00444-security-fix-for-cve-2024-11168.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/00444-security-fix-for-cve-2024-11168.patch
@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
+ <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 May 2023 23:35:24 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] 00444: Security fix for CVE-2024-11168
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+gh-103848: Adds checks to ensure that bracketed hosts found by urlsplit are of IPv6 or IPvFuture format (GH-103849)
+
+Tests are adjusted because Python <3.9 don't support scoped IPv6 addresses.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 29f348e232e82938ba2165843c448c2b291504c5)
+
+Co-authored-by: JohnJamesUtley <81572567+JohnJamesUtley@users.noreply.github.com>
+Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
+Co-authored-by: Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
+---
+ Lib/test/test_urlparse.py                     | 26 +++++++++++++++++++
+ Lib/urllib/parse.py                           | 15 +++++++++++
+ ...-04-26-09-54-25.gh-issue-103848.aDSnpR.rst |  2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-04-26-09-54-25.gh-issue-103848.aDSnpR.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
+index 7fd61ffea9..090d2f17bf 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
+@@ -1076,6 +1076,32 @@ class UrlParseTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
+         self.assertEqual(p2.scheme, 'tel')
+         self.assertEqual(p2.path, '+31641044153')
+ 
+    def test_invalid_bracketed_hosts(self):
+        self.assertRaises(ValueError, urllib.parse.urlsplit, 'Scheme://user@[192.0.2.146]/Path?Query')
+        self.assertRaises(ValueError, urllib.parse.urlsplit, 'Scheme://user@[important.com:8000]/Path?Query')
+        self.assertRaises(ValueError, urllib.parse.urlsplit, 'Scheme://user@[v123r.IP]/Path?Query')
+        self.assertRaises(ValueError, urllib.parse.urlsplit, 'Scheme://user@[v12ae]/Path?Query')
+        self.assertRaises(ValueError, urllib.parse.urlsplit, 'Scheme://user@[v.IP]/Path?Query')
+        self.assertRaises(ValueError, urllib.parse.urlsplit, 'Scheme://user@[v123.]/Path?Query')
+        self.assertRaises(ValueError, urllib.parse.urlsplit, 'Scheme://user@[v]/Path?Query')
+        self.assertRaises(ValueError, urllib.parse.urlsplit, 'Scheme://user@[0439:23af::2309::fae7:1234]/Path?Query')
+        self.assertRaises(ValueError, urllib.parse.urlsplit, 'Scheme://user@[0439:23af:2309::fae7:1234:2342:438e:192.0.2.146]/Path?Query')
+        self.assertRaises(ValueError, urllib.parse.urlsplit, 'Scheme://user@]v6a.ip[/Path')
+
+    def test_splitting_bracketed_hosts(self):
+        p1 = urllib.parse.urlsplit('scheme://user@[v6a.ip]/path?query')
+        self.assertEqual(p1.hostname, 'v6a.ip')
+        self.assertEqual(p1.username, 'user')
+        self.assertEqual(p1.path, '/path')
+        p2 = urllib.parse.urlsplit('scheme://user@[0439:23af:2309::fae7]/path?query')
+        self.assertEqual(p2.hostname, '0439:23af:2309::fae7')
+        self.assertEqual(p2.username, 'user')
+        self.assertEqual(p2.path, '/path')
+        p3 = urllib.parse.urlsplit('scheme://user@[0439:23af:2309::fae7:1234:192.0.2.146]/path?query')
+        self.assertEqual(p3.hostname, '0439:23af:2309::fae7:1234:192.0.2.146')
+        self.assertEqual(p3.username, 'user')
+        self.assertEqual(p3.path, '/path')
+
+     def test_telurl_params(self):
+         p1 = urllib.parse.urlparse('tel:123-4;phone-context=+1-650-516')
+         self.assertEqual(p1.scheme, 'tel')
+diff --git a/Lib/urllib/parse.py b/Lib/urllib/parse.py
+index 717e990997..bf186b7984 100644
+--- a/Lib/urllib/parse.py
+++ b/Lib/urllib/parse.py
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ It serves as a useful guide when making changes.
+ import os
+ import sys
+ import collections
+import ipaddress
+ 
+ __all__ = ["urlparse", "urlunparse", "urljoin", "urldefrag",
+            "urlsplit", "urlunsplit", "urlencode", "parse_qs",
+@@ -425,6 +426,17 @@ def _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(url):
+         url = url.replace(b, "")
+     return url
+ 
+# Valid bracketed hosts are defined in
+# https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#page-49 and https://url.spec.whatwg.org/
+def _check_bracketed_host(hostname):
+    if hostname.startswith('v'):
+        if not re.match(r"\Av[a-fA-F0-9]+\..+\Z", hostname):
+            raise ValueError(f"IPvFuture address is invalid")
+    else:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname) # Throws Value Error if not IPv6 or IPv4
+        if isinstance(ip, ipaddress.IPv4Address):
+            raise ValueError(f"An IPv4 address cannot be in brackets")
+
+ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
+     """Parse a URL into 5 components:
+     <scheme>://<netloc>/<path>?<query>#<fragment>
+@@ -480,6 +492,9 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
+         if (('[' in netloc and ']' not in netloc) or
+                 (']' in netloc and '[' not in netloc)):
+             raise ValueError("Invalid IPv6 URL")
+        if '[' in netloc and ']' in netloc:
+            bracketed_host = netloc.partition('[')[2].partition(']')[0]
+            _check_bracketed_host(bracketed_host)
+     if allow_fragments and '#' in url:
+         url, fragment = url.split('#', 1)
+     if '?' in url:
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-04-26-09-54-25.gh-issue-103848.aDSnpR.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-04-26-09-54-25.gh-issue-103848.aDSnpR.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..81e5904aa6
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-04-26-09-54-25.gh-issue-103848.aDSnpR.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Add checks to ensure that ``[`` bracketed ``]`` hosts found by
+:func:`urllib.parse.urlsplit` are of IPv6 or IPvFuture format.
--- a/SPECS/python3.spec
+++ b/SPECS/python3.spec
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ URL: https://www.python.org/
 #  WARNING  When rebasing to a new Python version,
 #           remember to update the python3-docs package as well
 Version: %{pybasever}.8
-Release: 51%{?dist}
+Release: 69%{?dist}
 License: Python


@ -158,6 +158,12 @@ License: Python
 %global py_INSTSONAME_optimized libpython%{LDVERSION_optimized}.so.%{py_SOVERSION}
 %global py_INSTSONAME_debug     libpython%{LDVERSION_debug}.so.%{py_SOVERSION}

+# The -O flag for the compiler, optimized builds
+# https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Python_built_with_gcc_O3
+%global optflags_optimized -O3
+# The -O flag for the compiler, debug builds
+%global optflags_debug -Og
+
 # Disable automatic bytecompilation. The python3 binary is not yet be
 # available in /usr/bin when Python is built. Also, the bytecompilation fails
 # on files that test invalid syntax.
@ -765,6 +771,153 @@ Patch387: 00387-cve-2020-10735-prevent-dos-by-very-large-int.patch
 # the behavior to linear.
 Patch394: 00394-cve-2022-45061-cpu-denial-of-service-via-inefficient-idna-decoder.patch

+# 00397 #
+# Add filters for tarfile extraction (CVE-2007-4559, PEP-706)
+# The first patches in the file backport the upstream fix:
+# - https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/104583
+#   (see the linked issue for merged backports)
+# Next-to-last patch fixes determination of symlink targets, which were treated
+#   as relative to the root of the archive,
+#   rather than the directory containing the symlink.
+#   Not yet upstream as of this writing.
+# The last patch is Red Hat configuration, see KB for documentation:
+# - https://access.redhat.com/articles/7004769
+Patch397: 00397-tarfile-filter.patch
+
+# 00399 #
+# CVE-2023-24329
+#
+# gh-102153: Start stripping C0 control and space chars in `urlsplit` (GH-102508)
+#
+# `urllib.parse.urlsplit` has already been respecting the WHATWG spec a bit GH-25595.
+#
+# This adds more sanitizing to respect the "Remove any leading C0 control or space from input" [rule](https://url.spec.whatwg.org/GH-url-parsing:~:text=Remove%%20any%%20leading%%20and%%20trailing%%20C0%%20control%%20or%%20space%%20from%%20input.) in response to [CVE-2023-24329](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-24329).
+#
+# Backported from Python 3.12
+Patch399: 00399-cve-2023-24329.patch
+
+# 00404 #
+# CVE-2023-40217
+#
+# Security fix for CVE-2023-40217: Bypass TLS handshake on closed sockets
+# Resolved upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/108310
+# Fixups added on top:
+# https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/108352
+# https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/108408
+#
+# Backported from Python 3.8
+Patch404: 00404-cve-2023-40217.patch
+
+# 00408 #
+# CVE-2022-48560
+#
+# Security fix for CVE-2022-48560: python3: use after free in heappushpop()
+# of heapq module
+# Resolved upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/83602
+Patch408: 00408-CVE-2022-48560.patch
+
+# 00413 #
+# CVE-2022-48564
+#
+# DoS when processing malformed Apple Property List files in binary format
+# Resolved upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/a63234c49b2fbfb6f0aca32525e525ce3d43b2b4
+Patch413: 00413-CVE-2022-48564.patch
+
+# 00414 #
+#
+# Skip test_pair() and test_speech128() of test_zlib on s390x since
+# they fail if zlib uses the s390x hardware accelerator.
+Patch414: 00414-skip_test_zlib_s390x.patch
+
+# 00415 #
+# [CVE-2023-27043] gh-102988: Reject malformed addresses in email.parseaddr() (#111116)
+#
+# Detect email address parsing errors and return empty tuple to
+# indicate the parsing error (old API). Add an optional 'strict'
+# parameter to getaddresses() and parseaddr() functions. Patch by
+# Thomas Dwyer.
+#
+# Upstream PR: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/111116
+#
+# Second patch implmenets the possibility to restore the old behavior via
+# config file or environment variable.
+Patch415: 00415-cve-2023-27043-gh-102988-reject-malformed-addresses-in-email-parseaddr-111116.patch
+
+# 00422 #
+# gh-115133: Fix tests for XMLPullParser with Expat 2.6.0
+#
+# Feeding the parser by too small chunks defers parsing to prevent
+# CVE-2023-52425. Future versions of Expat may be more reactive. 
+#
+# Patch rebased because the CVE fix is backported to older expat in RHEL.
+Patch422: 00422-gh-115133-fix-tests-for-xmlpullparser-with-expat-2-6-0.patch
+
+# 426 #
+# CVE-2023-6597
+#
+# Path traversal on tempfile.TemporaryDirectory
+#
+# Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/91133
+# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2023-6597
+#
+# To backport the fix cleanly the patch contains also this rebased commit:
+#  Fix permission errors in TemporaryDirectory cleanup
+#    https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/e9b51c0ad81da1da11ae65840ac8b50a8521373c
+Patch426: 00426-CVE-2023-6597.patch
+
+# 427 #
+# CVE-2024-0450
+#
+# The zipfile module is vulnerable to zip-bombs leading to denial of service.
+#
+# Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/109858
+# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2024-0450
+#
+# To backport the fix cleanly also this change is backported:
+# Add seek and tell functionality to ZipExtFile
+#   https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/066df4fd454d6ff9be66e80b2a65995b10af174f
+#
+# Patch rebased from 3.8.
+Patch427: 00427-CVE-2024-0450.patch
+
+# 00431 #
+# CVE-2024-4032: incorrect IPv4 and IPv6 private ranges
+#
+# Upstream issue: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/113171
+#
+# Backported from 3.8.
+Patch431: 00431-cve-2024-4032.patch
+
+# 00435 #
+# CVE-2024-6923: encode newlines in email headers
+#
+# Upstream issue: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/121650
+#
+# Backported from 3.8.
+Patch435: 00435-cve-2024-6923.patch
+
+# 00437 #
+# CVE-2024-6232: tarfile: ReDos via excessive backtracking while parsing header values
+#
+# Upstream issue: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/121285
+#
+# Cherry-picked from 3.8.
+Patch437: 00437-cve-2024-6232.patch
+
+# 00443 # 49e939f29e3551ec4e7bdb2cc8b8745e3d1fca35
+# gh-124651: Quote template strings in `venv` activation scripts
+#
+# (cherry picked from 3.9)
+Patch443: 00443-gh-124651-quote-template-strings-in-venv-activation-scripts.patch
+
+# 00444 # fed0071c8c86599091f93967a5fa2cce42ceb840
+# Security fix for CVE-2024-11168
+#
+# gh-103848: Adds checks to ensure that bracketed hosts found by urlsplit are of IPv6 or IPvFuture format (GH-103849)
+#
+# Tests are adjusted because Python <3.9 don't support scoped IPv6 addresses.
+Patch444: 00444-security-fix-for-cve-2024-11168.patch
+
 # (New patches go here ^^^)
 #
 # When adding new patches to "python" and "python3" in Fedora, EL, etc.,
@ -788,6 +941,14 @@ Conflicts: python3 < 3.6.6-13
 # depend on python(abi). Provide that here.
 Provides: python(abi) = %{pybasever}

+# With https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNFConditionalFilelists
+# it is no longer possible to Require paths from %%_libexecdir
+# However, python3-dnf requires this path
+# and that breaks the mock bootstrap chroot for rhel-8 on on Fedora 40+.
+# Fixes https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-48605
+# Fixes https://pagure.io/releng/issue/12199
+Provides: %{_libexecdir}/platform-python
+
 Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}

 %if %{with rpmwheels}
@ -979,6 +1140,7 @@ configuration, browsers, and other dialogs.
 %package tkinter
 Summary: A GUI toolkit for Python
 Requires: platform-python = %{version}-%{release}
+Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}

 %description tkinter
 The Tkinter (Tk interface) library is a graphical user interface toolkit for
@ -1110,6 +1272,21 @@ git apply %{PATCH351}
 %patch386 -p1
 %patch387 -p1
 %patch394 -p1
+%patch397 -p1
+%patch399 -p1
+%patch404 -p1
+%patch408 -p1
+%patch413 -p1
+%patch414 -p1
+%patch415 -p1
+%patch422 -p1
+%patch426 -p1
+%patch427 -p1
+%patch431 -p1
+%patch435 -p1
+%patch437 -p1
+%patch443 -p1
+%patch444 -p1

 # Remove files that should be generated by the build
 # (This is after patching, so that we can use patches directly from upstream)
@ -1216,12 +1393,12 @@ BuildPython() {
 %if %{with debug_build}
 BuildPython debug \
  "--without-ensurepip --with-pydebug" \
-  "-Og"
+  "%{optflags_debug}"
 %endif # with debug_build

 BuildPython optimized \
  "--without-ensurepip %{optimizations_flag}" \
-  ""
+  "%{optflags_optimized}"

 # ======================================================
 # Installing the built code:
@ -1338,14 +1515,14 @@ EOF
 %if %{with debug_build}
 InstallPython debug \
  %{py_INSTSONAME_debug} \
-  -O0 \
+  "%{optflags_debug}" \
  %{LDVERSION_debug}
 %endif # with debug_build

 # Now the optimized build:
 InstallPython optimized \
  %{py_INSTSONAME_optimized} \
-  "" \
+  "%{optflags_optimized}" \
  %{LDVERSION_optimized}

 # Install directories for additional packages
@ -2041,6 +2218,80 @@ fi
 # ======================================================

 %changelog
+* Thu Nov 14 2024 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-69
+- Security fix for CVE-2024-11168
+Resolves: RHEL-67252
+
+* Tue Nov 05 2024 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-68
+- Security fix for CVE-2024-9287
+Resolves: RHEL-64878
+
+* Thu Sep 05 2024 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-67
+- Security fix for CVE-2024-6232
+Resolves: RHEL-57399
+
+* Mon Aug 19 2024 Tomáš Hrnčiar <thrnciar@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-66
+- Security fix for CVE-2024-6923
+Resolves: RHEL-53065
+
+* Wed Jul 24 2024 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-65
+- Build Python with -O3
+- https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Python_built_with_gcc_O3
+
+* Thu Jul 18 2024 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-64
+- Add explicit RPM Provides for /usr/libexec/platform-python
+Resolves: RHEL-48605
+
+* Thu Jul 04 2024 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-63
+- Security fix for CVE-2024-4032
+Resolves: RHEL-44060
+
+* Wed Apr 24 2024 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-62
+- Security fix for CVE-2024-0450
+Resolves: RHEL-33683
+
+* Wed Apr 24 2024 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-61
+- Security fix for CVE-2023-6597
+Resolves: RHEL-33671
+
+* Wed Apr 24 2024 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-60
+- Fix build with expat with fixed CVE-2023-52425
+Related: RHEL-33671
+
+* Thu Jan 04 2024 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-59
+- Security fix for CVE-2023-27043
+Resolves: RHEL-20610
+
+* Tue Dec 12 2023 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-58
+- Security fix for CVE-2022-48564
+Resolves: RHEL-16674
+- Skip tests failing on s390x
+Resolves: RHEL-19252
+
+* Thu Nov 23 2023 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-57
+- Security fix for CVE-2022-48560
+Resolves: RHEL-16707
+
+* Thu Sep 07 2023 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-56
+- Security fix for CVE-2023-40217
+Resolves: RHEL-3041
+
+* Wed Aug 09 2023 Petr Viktorin <pviktori@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-55
+- Fix symlink handling in the fix for CVE-2007-4559
+Resolves: rhbz#263261
+
+* Fri Jul 07 2023 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-54
+- Bump release for rebuild
+Resolves: rhbz#2173917
+
+* Fri Jun 30 2023 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-53
+- Security fix for CVE-2023-24329
+Resolves: rhbz#2173917
+
+* Tue Jun 06 2023 Petr Viktorin <pviktori@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-52
+- Add filters for tarfile extraction (CVE-2007-4559, PEP-706)
+Resolves: rhbz#263261
+
 * Tue Jan 24 2023 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-51
 - Properly strip the LTO bytecode from python.o
 Resolves: rhbz#2137707
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
MSVSphere Packaging Team	3a8211ae5f	import python3-3.6.8-69.el8_10	2 months ago
MSVSphere Packaging Team	cfce98bdaa	import python3-3.6.8-67.el8_10	4 months ago
MSVSphere Packaging Team	65d5367437	import python3-3.6.8-62.el8_10	8 months ago
MSVSphere Packaging Team	38636dfda0	import python3-3.6.8-56.el8_9.3	1 year ago
MSVSphere Packaging Team	1521baa1b7	import python3-3.6.8-56.el8_9.2	1 year ago
MSVSphere Packaging Team	6ad02b3763	import python3-3.6.8-56.el8_9	1 year ago
MSVSphere Packaging Team	9a0a6ab27c	import python3-3.6.8-51.el8_8.2	1 year ago
MSVSphere Packaging Team	eefbb19e96	import python3-3.6.8-51.el8_8.1	1 year ago