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1 Commits (b5de6bd83004a35bd0632d184866570f70f2bf61)
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date |
---|---|---|---|
Clemens Lang | 389313b118 |
FIPS: Disable SHA1 signs and EVP_PKEY_{sign,verify}
1. Deny SHA-1 signature verification in FIPS provider For RHEL, we already disable SHA-1 signatures by default in the default provider, so it is unexpected that the FIPS provider would have a more lenient configuration in this regard. Additionally, we do not think continuing to accept SHA-1 signatures is a good idea due to the published chosen-prefix collision attacks. As a consequence, disable verification of SHA-1 signatures in the FIPS provider. This requires adjusting a few tests that would otherwise fail: - 30-test_acvp: Remove the test vectors that use SHA-1. - 30-test_evp: Mark tests in evppkey_rsa_common.txt and evppkey_ecdsa.txt that use SHA-1 digests as "Availablein = default", which will not run them when the FIPS provider is enabled. - 80-test_cms: Re-generate all certificates in test/smime-certificates using the mksmime-certs.sh script, because most of them were signed with SHA-1 and thus fail verification in the FIPS provider. Keep smec3.pem, which was used to sign static test data in test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/ciphertext_from_1_1_1.cms, which would otherwise no longer verify. Note that smec3.pem was signed with a smroot.pem, which was now re-generated. This does not affect the test. Fix some other tests by explicitly running them in the default provider, where SHA-1 is available. - 80-test_ssl_old: Skip tests that rely on SSLv3 and SHA-1 when run with the FIPS provider. 2. Disable EVP_PKEY_{sign,verify} in FIPS provider The APIs to compute both digest and signature in one step, EVP_DigestSign*/EVP_DigestVerify* and EVP_Sign*/EVP_Verify*, should be used instead. This ensures that the digest is computed inside of the FIPS module, and that only approved digests are used. Update documentation for EVP_PKEY_{sign,verify} to reflect this. Since the KATs use EVP_PKEY_sign/EVP_PKEY_verify, modify the tests to set the OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT parameter and use EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex and EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex where these parameters can be passed on creation and allow EVP_PKEY_sign/EVP_PKEY_verify when this parameter is set and evaluates as true. Move tests that use the EVP_PKEY API to only run in the default provider, since they would fail in the FIPS provider. This also affects a number of CMS tests where error handling is insufficient and failure to sign would only show up when verifying the CMS structure due to a parse error. Resolves: rhbz#2087147 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> |
3 years ago |