import openssh-8.7p1-24.el9_1

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+SOURCES/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
+SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz
+SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz

.openssh.metadata

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+dbb35b4e9ae3f72b930a82c6fd5e83e9dcd7b193 SOURCES/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
+8719032c1e47732c8fdb14adfb24b5e9e71de802 SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz
+66dd8274346fd006ff40f525c082cfb701085b5f SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz

SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2021-04-19 13:57:11.720113536 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2021-04-19 13:59:29.842163204 +0200
+@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+ 
+ 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
+ 	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
+-	    "Could not grab %s. A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
+-	    "on your session.", what);
++	    "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
++	    "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "
++	    "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping "
++	    "on your session.\n"
++	    "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
++	    "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
+ 	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+ 
+ 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));

SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ #include <X11/Xlib.h>
++#include <glib.h>
+ #include <gtk/gtk.h>
+ #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+ #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
+@@ -81,14 +82,25 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++static void
++move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress)
++{
++	gdouble step;
++	g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
++	
++	step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1);
++	gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step);
++	gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
++}
++
+ static int
+ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+ {
+ 	const char *failed;
+ 	char *passphrase, *local;
+ 	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+ 	int buttons, default_response;
+-	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
++	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
+ 	GdkGrabStatus status;
+ 	GdkColor fg, bg;
+ 	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
+@@ -104,14 +116,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+ 
+ 	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
++		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
++		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
++		    FALSE, 0);
++		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
++
+		entry = gtk_entry_new();
+		if (fg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+		if (bg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+		gtk_box_pack_start(
+-		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
+-		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
++		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
++		gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
+ 		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+ 		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+ 		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
+ 			    G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
+ 		}
++
++		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
++		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
++		    hbox, FALSE, FALSE, 8);
++		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
++
++		progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
++
++		gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress),
++		    "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
++		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
++		    TRUE, 5);
++		gtk_widget_show(progress);
++		g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
++				 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
++
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Grab focus */

SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
+--- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe	2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c	2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
+@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
+ 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
+ 
++	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
++
+ 	read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
+ 	read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
+--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1	2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200
+@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information.
+ .Nm
+ exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
+ if an error occurred.
++.Sh IPV6
++IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr scp 1 ,
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
+--- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8	2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200
+@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
+ started last).
+ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+ .El
++.Sh IPV6
++IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr scp 1 ,
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,

SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp	2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in
+ 
+ struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
+ {
+-	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ecbctx;
+ 	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ };
+ 
+@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char
+ {
+ 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+ 	size_t n = 0;
+-	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
++	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
+ 
+ 	if (len == 0)
+ 		return (1);
+ 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
+ 		return (0);
+ 
+-	while ((len--) > 0) {
++	for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) {
++		u_int r,a,b;
++
+ 		if (n == 0) {
+-			AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
+-			ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			int outl, i, buflen;
++
++			buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf));
++
++			for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
++				memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++				ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			}
++
++			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl,
++				ctrbuf, buflen);
+ 		}
+-		*(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
+-		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++
++		memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a));
++		memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b));
++		r = a ^ b;
++		memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r));
++		src += sizeof(a);
++		dest += sizeof(r);
++
++		n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf);
+ 	}
++	memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf));
++	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+ 	return (1);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co
+ 		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
+ 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
+ 	}
+-	if (key != NULL)
+-		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+-		    &c->aes_ctx);
++
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx);
++
++	if (key != NULL) {
++		const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
++		switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) {
++			case 128:
++				cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
++				break;
++			case 192:
++				cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
++				break;
++			case 256:
++				cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
++				break;
++			default:
++				fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length");
++		}
++		if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL))
++			fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption");
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0);
++	}
+ 	if (iv != NULL)
+ 		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ 	return (1);
+@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+ 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+ 
+ 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
+ 		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+ 		free(c);
+ 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);

SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index d98fa67..25d347b 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -638,7 +638,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
+-			addargs(&alist, "-n");
++			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
++				addargs(&alist, "-t");
++			else
++				addargs(&alist, "-n");
+ 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
+ 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
+ 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.179006811 +0200
+@@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ void
+ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
+     int on_stderr)
+ {
++	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
++}
++
++void
++log_init_handler(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
+ #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+ #endif
+@@ -206,8 +211,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	log_handler = NULL;
+-	log_handler_ctx = NULL;
++	if (reset_handler) {
++		log_handler = NULL;
++		log_handler_ctx = NULL;
++	}
+ 
+ 	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
+ 	if (on_stderr)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.179006811 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h	2021-05-06 11:34:22.349925757 +0200
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
+ 
+ void     log_init(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
++void     log_init_handler(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
+ LogLevel log_level_get(void);
+ int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
+ int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.153006607 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-06 11:33:37.671575348 +0200
+@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
+ 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ 
++	pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
++
+ 	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+ 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ 	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
+@@ -408,6 +410,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ 
++	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
++
+ 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+@@ -480,7 +484,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+ 	/* Log it */
+ 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
+-	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
++	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
+ 	free(msg);
+@@ -1868,13 +1872,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
+ 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
+ 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
+ 
++	mon->m_state = "";
++
+ 	return mon;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
++monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir)
+ {
+-	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
++	struct stat dev_log_stat;
++	char *dev_log_path;
++	int do_logfds = 0;
++
++	if (chroot_dir != NULL) {
++		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
++
++		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
++			debug_f("/dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", chroot_dir);
++			do_logfds = 1;
++		}
++		free(dev_log_path);
++	}
++	monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds);
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.153006607 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-05-06 11:32:25.180006819 +0200
+@@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct monitor {
+ 	int			 m_log_sendfd;
+ 	struct kex		**m_pkex;
+ 	pid_t			 m_pid;
++	char		*m_state;
+ };
+ 
+ struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
+-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
++void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *);
+ 
+ struct Authctxt;
+ void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.166006709 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
+@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
+ 
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
++static int have_dev_log = 1;
+ 
+ /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
+ static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
+@@ -661,6 +662,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
+ 	int ret;
+ 	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
+ 	char session_type[1024];
++	struct stat dev_log_stat;
+ 
+ 	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
+ 		original_command = command;
+@@ -720,6 +722,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
+ 			tty += 5;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
++		have_dev_log = 0;
++	}
++
+ 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ 	    session_type,
+ 	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
+@@ -1524,14 +1530,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
+-	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
+-	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+-	 * descriptors open.
+-	 */
+-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1665,8 +1663,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+ 			exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+-
+ 	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
+ 
+ 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+@@ -1691,9 +1687,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
++		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
+ 	}
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
++	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
++	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
++	 * descriptors open.
++	 */
++	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
++
+ 	fflush(NULL);
+ 
+ 	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h	2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
+@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
+ 
+ struct passwd;
+ 
+-int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
++int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
+ void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
+@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
++sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
+ {
+ 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
+ 	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 	extern char *__progname;
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
++	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+ 
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
++	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
+@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
++	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
+ }
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.177006795 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.182006834 +0200
+@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* New socket pair */
+-	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
++	monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory);
+ 
+ 	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+@@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+ 
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
++	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
++	pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
++
++	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1)
++		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+--- a/scp.c	
++++ a/scp.c	
+@@ -1084,6 +1084,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			free(vect[0]);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
++			errno = ENOTDIR;
++			goto bad;
++		}
+ 		omode = mode;
+ 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
+ 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
+-- 

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
+ #include "servconf.h"
+ #include "port-linux.h"
++#include "misc.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
+@@ -445,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ void
+ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ {
+-	security_context_t *ctx;
++	char *ctx;
+ 
+ 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+@@ -461,6 +462,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++void
++sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void)
++{
++	int len;
++	char line[1024], *preauth_context = NULL, *cp, *arg;
++	const char *contexts_path;
++	FILE *contexts_file;
++	struct stat sb;
++
++	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
++	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
++		debug3_f("Failed to get the path to SELinux context");
++		return;
++	}
++
++	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
++		debug_f("Failed to open SELinux context file");
++		return;
++	}
++
++	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
++	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
++		logit_f("SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
++		    " and not writable by anyone else");
++		fclose(contexts_file);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), contexts_file)) {
++		/* Strip trailing whitespace */
++		for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
++			if (strchr(" \t\r\n", line[len]) == NULL)
++				break;
++			line[len] = '\0';
++		}
++
++		if (line[0] == '\0')
++			continue;
++
++		cp = line;
++		arg = strdelim(&cp);
++		if (arg && *arg == '\0')
++			arg = strdelim(&cp);
++
++		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
++			arg = strdelim(&cp);
++			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
++				debug_f("privsep_preauth is empty");
++				fclose(contexts_file);
++				return;
++			}
++			preauth_context = xstrdup(arg);
++		}
++	}
++	fclose(contexts_file);
++
++	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
++		debug_f("Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
++		    " SELinux context file");
++		return;
++	}
++
++	ssh_selinux_change_context(preauth_context);
++	free(preauth_context);
++}
++
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
+ 	strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
+ 	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
+ 		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
+-	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
++	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'",
+ 	    oldctx, newctx);
+ 	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
+ 		do_log2(log_level, "%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
+		    __func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
++void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
++	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Demote the child */

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 15:18:40.628216102 +0100
+@@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 	FILE *fp;
+ 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 	char *line = NULL;
+-	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+ 	int found_principal = 0;
+@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 
+ 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+-	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
++	if ( !options.enable_k5users || (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1))) {
+                 return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
+                                         k5login_exists);
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:35:36.354401156 +0100
+@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
++	options->enable_k5users = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+@@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ #endif
+ 	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
+ 		options->use_kuserok = 1;
++	if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
++		options->enable_k5users = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+-	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
++	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ 	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+ 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssEnablek5users:
++		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+	case sMatch:
+		if (cmdline)
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
+@@ -2320,6 +2330,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ # endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:18:40.629216102 +0100
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
+	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
+						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+ 	int	use_kuserok;
++	int		enable_k5users;
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.630216103 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:36:21.607408435 +0100
+@@ -628,6 +628,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
++.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
++Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
++access control. Further details are described in
++.Xr ksu 1 .
++The default is
++.Cm no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+ Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
+ doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+ #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
+@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
+ 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+-		text[0] = '\0';
+-		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+-			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+-			    " %2.2x", opts[i]);
+-		fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
+-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
++		i = 0;
++		do {
++			switch (opts[i]) {
++				case 0:
++				case 1:
++					++i;
++					break;
++				case 130:
++				case 133:
++				case 134:
++					i += opts[i + 1];
++					break;
++				default:
++				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
++			 	 * source routing options. */
++					text[0] = '\0';
++					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
++						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
++							" %2.2x", opts[i]);
++					fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP options:%.800s",
++						ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
++			}
++		} while (i < option_size);
+ 	}
+ 	return;
+ #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 413b845..54dd383 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ #ifdef HEIMDAL
+@@ -56,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ # include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++/* all commands are allowed by default */
++char **k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL;
++
++static int ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists();
++static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *,
++    int);
++
+ static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
+ 
+ /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
+@@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ 	krb5_principal princ;
+ 	int retval;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
++	int k5login_exists;
+ 
+ 	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
+ 		return 0;
+@@ -99,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+-	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) {
++	/* krb5_kuserok() returns 1 if .k5login DNE and this is self-login.
++	 * We have to make sure to check .k5users in that case. */
++	k5login_exists = ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists();
++	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
++	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
++	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
++	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+ 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+ 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
++		name, k5login_exists)) {
++		retval = 1;
++		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
++		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
++		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+ 	} else
+ 		retval = 0;
+ 
+@@ -110,6 +133,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
++/* Test for existence of .k5login.
++ * We need this as part of our .k5users check, because krb5_kuserok()
++ * returns success if .k5login DNE and user is logging in as himself.
++ * With .k5login absent and .k5users present, we don't want absence
++ * of .k5login to authorize self-login.  (absence of both is required)
++ * Returns 1 if .k5login is available, 0 otherwise.
++ */
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
++{
++	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
++	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
++
++	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
++	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
++}
++
++/* check .k5users for login or command authorization
++ * Returns 1 if principal is authorized, 0 otherwise.
++ * If principal is authorized, (global) k5users_allowed_cmds may be populated.
++ */
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
++    const char *luser, int k5login_exists)
++{
++	FILE *fp;
++	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
++	char *line = NULL;
++	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
++	struct stat st;
++	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
++	int found_principal = 0;
++	int ncommands = 0, allcommands = 0;
++	u_long linenum = 0;
++	size_t linesize = 0;
++
++	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
++	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
++	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
++		return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
++		    sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
++		    (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
++	}
++	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
++		int saved_errno = errno;
++		/* 2nd access check to ease debugging if file perms are wrong.
++		 * But we don't want to report this if .k5users simply DNE. */
++		if (access(file, F_OK) == 0) {
++			logit("User %s fopen %s failed: %s",
++			    pw->pw_name, file, strerror(saved_errno));
++		}
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* .k5users must be owned either by the user or by root */
++	if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) == -1) {
++		/* can happen, but very wierd error so report it */
++		logit("User %s fstat %s failed: %s",
++		    pw->pw_name, file, strerror(errno));
++		fclose(fp);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	if (!(st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0)) {
++		logit("User %s %s is not owned by root or user",
++		    pw->pw_name, file);
++		fclose(fp);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* .k5users must be a regular file.  krb5_kuserok() doesn't do this
++	  * check, but we don't want to be deficient if they add a check. */
++	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
++		logit("User %s %s is not a regular file", pw->pw_name, file);
++		fclose(fp);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* file exists; initialize k5users_allowed_cmds (to none!) */
++	k5users_allowed_cmds = xcalloc(++ncommands,
++	    sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
++
++	/* Check each line.  ksu allows unlimited length lines. */
++	while (!allcommands && getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) {
++		linenum++;
++		char *token;
++
++		/* we parse just like ksu, even though we could do better */
++		if ((token = strtok(line, " \t\n")) == NULL)
++			continue;
++		if (strcmp(name, token) == 0) {
++			/* we matched on client principal */
++			found_principal = 1;
++			if ((token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n")) == NULL) {
++				/* only shell is allowed */
++				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
++				    xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
++				k5users_allowed_cmds =
++				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
++					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
++				break;
++			}
++			/* process the allowed commands */
++			while (token) {
++				if (strcmp(token, "*") == 0) {
++					allcommands = 1;
++					break;
++				}
++				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
++				    xstrdup(token);
++				k5users_allowed_cmds =
++				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
++					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
++				token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n");
++			}
++		}
++       }
++	free(line);
++	if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
++		/* terminate vector */
++		k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = NULL;
++		/* if all commands are allowed, free vector */
++		if (allcommands) {
++			int i;
++			for (i = 0; i < ncommands; i++) {
++				free(k5users_allowed_cmds[i]);
++			}
++			free(k5users_allowed_cmds);
++			k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL;
++		}
++	}
++	fclose(fp);
++	return found_principal;
++}
++ 
+ 
+ /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
+  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -789,6 +789,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		command = auth_opts->force_command;
+ 		forced = "(key-option)";
+ 	}
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#ifdef KRB5 /* k5users_allowed_cmds only available w/ GSSAPI+KRB5 */
++	else if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
++		const char *match = command;
++		int allowed = 0, i = 0;
++
++		if (!match)
++			match = s->pw->pw_shell;
++		while (k5users_allowed_cmds[i]) {
++			if (strcmp(match, k5users_allowed_cmds[i++]) == 0) {
++				debug("Allowed command '%.900s'", match);
++				allowed = 1;
++				break;
++			}
++		}
++		if (!allowed) {
++			debug("command '%.900s' not allowed", match);
++			return 1;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ 	s->forced = 0;
+ 	if (forced != NULL) {
+ 		s->forced = 1;
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index 0374c88..509109a 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
+ #  endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */
+ 
+ # endif /* !HEIMDAL */
++
++/* .k5users support */
++extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
++
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+ 
+ /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
+ The client tries to authenticate itself using
+ host-based authentication,
+ public key authentication,
++GSSAPI authentication,
+ challenge-response authentication,
+ or password authentication.
+ .Pp
+@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
+ but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+ rlogin/rsh.
+ .Pp
++.It Pa ~/.k5login
++.It Pa ~/.k5users
++These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
++Further details are described in
++.Xr ksu 1 .
++.Pp
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/
+ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
+ and authentication information.

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,484 @@
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/misc.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
+@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ 			_exit(1);
+ 		}
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
++			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
++			    strerror(errno));
++			_exit(127);
++		}
++#endif
+ 		if (env != NULL)
+ 			execve(av[0], av, env);
+ 		else
+diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+--- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
++++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
++The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
++of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
++polyinstantiation of home directories and SELinux MLS policy enabled.
++
++To use ssh-keycat, set these options in /etc/ssh/sshd_config file:
++        AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat
++        AuthorizedKeysCommandUser root
++
++Do not forget to enable public key authentication:
++        PubkeyAuthentication yes
++
++
+diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
+--- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200
++++ openssh/Makefile.in	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
++SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+ GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
+ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
++KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
+ LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+ LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
+ AR=@AR@
+@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ 
+ .SUFFIXES: .lo
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ XMSS_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh-xmss.o \
+@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
+ ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
+ 
++ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
++
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
+@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
++int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
+@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern int inetd_flag;
+ extern int rexeced_flag;
+ 
++/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
++int
++sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
++{
++	static int enabled = -1;
++
++	if (enabled == -1) {
++		enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
++		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
++	}
++
++	return (enabled);
++}
++
+ /* Send audit message */
+ static int
+ sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
+@@ -308,7 +322,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 
+ /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
+ {
+ 	const char *reqlvl;
+ 	char *role;
+@@ -319,16 +333,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+ 
+ 	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+ 
+-	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
++	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+ 
+ 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ 		use_current = "1";
+ 	} else {
+ 		use_current = "";
+-		rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
++		rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
+ 	}
+ 
+-	rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
++	rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
+ 
+ 	if (role != NULL)
+ 		free(role);
+@@ -336,6 +350,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+ 	return rv;
+ }
+ 
++static int
++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++{
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
++}
++
++static int
++do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
++{
++	return setenv(name, value, 1);
++}
++
++int
++sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
++{
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
++}
++
+ /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+ void
+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+@@ -344,7 +376,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
+ 
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+@@ -415,7 +447,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ {
+ 	security_context_t *ctx;
+ 
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
+diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c
+--- openssh/platform.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.147849633 +0200
++++ openssh/platform.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
+@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p
+ {
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
+-	(void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
++	(void)sshd_selinux_enabled();
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
+--- openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
++++ openssh/ssh-keycat.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
++/*
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
++ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
++ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
++ *    written permission.
++ *
++ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
++ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
++ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
++ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
++ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
++ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
++ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
++ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
++ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
++ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2011 Red Hat, Inc.
++ * Written by Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>
++*/
++
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
++
++#include "config.h"
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <pwd.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
++#include <stdint.h>
++#endif
++
++#include <security/pam_appl.h>
++
++#include "uidswap.h"
++#include "misc.h"
++
++#define ERR_USAGE 1
++#define ERR_PAM_START 2
++#define ERR_OPEN_SESSION 3
++#define ERR_CLOSE_SESSION 4
++#define ERR_PAM_END 5
++#define ERR_GETPWNAM 6
++#define ERR_MEMORY 7
++#define ERR_OPEN 8
++#define ERR_FILE_MODE 9
++#define ERR_FDOPEN 10
++#define ERR_STAT 11
++#define ERR_WRITE 12
++#define ERR_PAM_PUTENV 13
++#define BUFLEN 4096
++
++/* Just ignore the messages in the conversation function */
++static int
++dummy_conv(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msgm,
++	   struct pam_response **response, void *appdata_ptr)
++{
++	struct pam_response *rsp;
++
++	(void)msgm;
++	(void)appdata_ptr;
++
++	if (num_msg <= 0)
++		return PAM_CONV_ERR;
++
++	/* Just allocate the array as empty responses */
++	rsp = calloc (num_msg, sizeof (struct pam_response));
++	if (rsp == NULL)
++		return PAM_CONV_ERR;
++
++	*response = rsp;
++	return PAM_SUCCESS;
++}
++
++static struct pam_conv conv = {
++	dummy_conv,
++	NULL
++};
++
++char *
++make_auth_keys_name(const struct passwd *pwd)
++{
++	char *fname;
++
++	if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.ssh/authorized_keys", pwd->pw_dir) < 0)
++		return NULL;
++
++	return fname;
++}
++
++int
++dump_keys(const char *user)
++{
++	struct passwd *pwd;
++	int fd = -1;
++	FILE *f = NULL;
++	char *fname = NULL;
++	int rv = 0;
++	char buf[BUFLEN];
++	size_t len;
++	struct stat st;
++
++	if ((pwd = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
++		return ERR_GETPWNAM;
++	}
++
++	if ((fname = make_auth_keys_name(pwd)) == NULL) {
++		return ERR_MEMORY;
++	}
++
++	temporarily_use_uid(pwd);
++
++	if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_NOFOLLOW, 0)) < 0) {
++		rv = ERR_OPEN;
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
++		rv = ERR_STAT;
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || 
++		(st.st_uid != pwd->pw_uid && st.st_uid != 0)) {
++		rv = ERR_FILE_MODE;
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	unset_nonblock(fd);
++
++	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
++		rv = ERR_FDOPEN;
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	fd = -1;
++
++	while ((len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f)) > 0) {
++		rv = fwrite(buf, 1, len, stdout) != len ? ERR_WRITE : 0;
++	}
++
++fail:
++	if (fd != -1)
++		close(fd);
++	if (f != NULL)
++		fclose(f);
++	free(fname);
++	restore_uid();
++	return rv;
++}
++
++static const char *env_names[] = { "SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED",
++	"SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED",
++	"SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE"
++};
++
++extern char **environ;
++
++int
++set_pam_environment(pam_handle_t *pamh)
++{
++	int i;
++	size_t j;
++
++	for (j = 0; j < sizeof(env_names)/sizeof(env_names[0]); ++j) {
++		int len = strlen(env_names[j]);
++
++		for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; ++i) {
++			if (strncmp(env_names[j], environ[i], len) == 0 &&
++			    environ[i][len] == '=') {
++				if (pam_putenv(pamh, environ[i]) != PAM_SUCCESS)
++					return ERR_PAM_PUTENV;
++			}
++		}
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++main(int argc, char *argv[])
++{
++	pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
++	int retval;
++	int ev = 0;
++
++	if (argc != 2) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <user-name>\n", argv[0]);
++		return ERR_USAGE;
++	}
++
++	retval = pam_start("ssh-keycat", argv[1], &conv, &pamh);
++	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
++		return ERR_PAM_START;
++	}
++
++	ev = set_pam_environment(pamh);
++	if (ev != 0)
++		goto finish;
++
++	retval = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
++	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
++		ev = ERR_OPEN_SESSION;
++		goto finish;
++	}
++
++	ev = dump_keys(argv[1]);
++
++	retval = pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
++	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
++		ev = ERR_CLOSE_SESSION;
++	}
++
++finish:
++	retval = pam_end (pamh,retval);
++	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
++		ev = ERR_PAM_END;
++	}
++	return ev;
++}
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -2952,6 +2952,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 			PAM_MSG="yes"
+ 
+ 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
++			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
+ 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
+ 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
+ 
+@@ -3105,6 +3106,7 @@
+ 					;;
+ 				*)
+ 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
++					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
+ 					;;
+ 				esac
+ 			fi
+@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ 	fi ]
+ )
+ AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
++AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
+ 
+ # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+ KRB5_MSG="no"
+@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
+ if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+ echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
+ fi
++if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
++echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
++fi
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c
+--- openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2020-02-14 01:40:54.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c	2020-02-17 11:55:12.841729758 +0100
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
++#include <grp.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -101,7 +102,19 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filen
+ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
+ #endif
++
+ 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
++		if (st.st_mode & 040) {
++			struct group *gr;
++
++			if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) {
++				/* The only additional bit is read
++				 * for ssh_keys group, which is fine */
++				if ((st.st_mode & 077) == 040 ) {
++					return 0;
++				}
++			}
++		}
+ 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
+ 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
+@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions	 options;
+ 
++int
++ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client,
++                 int k5login_exists)
++{
++	if (options.use_kuserok || !k5login_exists)
++		return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
++	else {
++		char kuser[65];
++
++		if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
++			return 0;
++		return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
++	}
++}
++
+ static int
+ krb5_init(void *context)
+ {
+@@ -160,8 +175,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+-	    authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
++	/* Use !options.use_kuserok here to make ssh_krb5_kuserok() not
++	 * depend on the existance of .k5login */
++	if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name, !options.use_kuserok)) {
+ 		problem = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
+     int);
+ 
+ static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
++extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
+ 
+@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+  */
+ 
++/* The purpose of the function is to find out if a Kerberos principal is
++ * allowed to log in as the given local user. This is a general problem with
++ * Kerberized services because by design the Kerberos principals are
++ * completely independent from the local user names. This is one of the
++ * reasons why Kerberos is working well on different operating systems like
++ * Windows and UNIX/Linux. Nevertheless a relationship between a Kerberos
++ * principal and a local user name must be established because otherwise every
++ * access would be granted for every principal with a valid ticket.
++ *
++ * Since it is a general issue libkrb5 provides some functions for
++ * applications to find out about the relationship between the Kerberos
++ * principal and a local user name. They are krb5_kuserok() and
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname().
++ *
++ * krb5_kuserok() can be used to "Determine if a principal is authorized to
++ * log in as a local user" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this
++ * function). Which is exactly what we are looking for and should be the
++ * preferred choice. It accepts the Kerberos principal and a local user name
++ * and let libkrb5 or its plugins determine if they relate to each other or
++ * not.
++ *
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() can use used to "Convert a principal name to a
++ * local name" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this function). It
++ * accepts a Kerberos principle and returns a local name and it is up to the
++ * application to do any additional checks. There are two issues using
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). First, since POSIX user names are case
++ * sensitive, the calling application in general has no other choice than
++ * doing a case-sensitive string comparison between the name returned by
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() and the name used at the login prompt. When the
++ * users are provided by a case in-sensitive server, e.g. Active Directory,
++ * this might lead to login failures because the user typing the name at the
++ * login prompt might not be aware of the right case. Another issue might be
++ * caused if there are multiple alias names available for a single user. E.g.
++ * the canonical name of a user is user@group.department.example.com but there
++ * exists a shorter login name, e.g. user@example.com, to safe typing at the
++ * login prompt. Here krb5_aname_to_localname() can only return the canonical
++ * name, but if the short alias is used at the login prompt authentication
++ * will fail as well. All this can be avoided by using krb5_kuserok() and
++ * configuring krb5.conf or using a suitable plugin to meet the needs of the
++ * given environment.
++ *
++ * The Fedora and RHEL version of openssh contain two patches which modify the
++ * access control behavior:
++ *  - openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
++ *  - openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
++ *
++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch adds a new option KerberosUseKuserok for
++ * sshd_config which controls if krb5_kuserok() is used to check if the
++ * principle is authorized or if krb5_aname_to_localname() should be used.
++ * The reason to add this patch was that krb5_kuserok() by default checks if
++ * a .k5login file exits in the users home-directory. With this the user can
++ * give access to his account for any given principal which might be
++ * in violation with company policies and it would be useful if this can be
++ * rejected. Nevertheless the patch ignores the fact that krb5_kuserok() does
++ * no only check .k5login but other sources as well and checking .k5login can
++ * be disabled for all applications in krb5.conf as well. With this new
++ * option KerberosUseKuserok set to 'no' (and this is the default for RHEL7
++ * and Fedora 21) openssh can only use krb5_aname_to_localname() with the
++ * restrictions mentioned above.
++ *
++ * openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch adds a ksu like behaviour to ssh, i.e. when
++ * using GSSAPI authentication only commands configured in the .k5user can be
++ * executed. Here the wrong assumption that krb5_kuserok() only checks
++ * .k5login is made as well. In contrast ksu checks .k5login directly and
++ * does not use krb5_kuserok() which might be more useful for the given
++ * purpose. Additionally this patch is not synced with
++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch.
++ *
++ * The current patch tries to restore the usage of krb5_kuserok() so that e.g.
++ * localauth plugins can be used. It does so by adding a forth parameter to
++ * ssh_krb5_kuserok() which indicates whether .k5login exists or not. If it
++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() is called even if KerberosUseKuserok is set
++ * to 'no' because the intent of the option is to not check .k5login and if it
++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() returns a result without checking .k5login.
++ * If .k5login does exists and KerberosUseKuserok is 'no' we fall back to
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). This is in my point of view an acceptable
++ * limitation and does not break the current behaviour.
++ *
++ * Additionally with this patch ssh_krb5_kuserok() is called in
++ * ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok() instead of only krb5_aname_to_localname() is
++ * neither .k5login nor .k5users exists to allow plugin evaluation via
++ * krb5_kuserok() as well.
++ *
++ * I tried to keep the patch as minimal as possible, nevertheless I see some
++ * areas for improvement which, if they make sense, have to be evaluated
++ * carefully because they might change existing behaviour and cause breaks
++ * during upgrade:
++ * - I wonder if disabling .k5login usage make sense in sshd or if it should
++ *   be better disabled globally in krb5.conf
++ * - if really needed openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch should be fixed to really
++ *   only disable checking .k5login and maybe .k5users
++ * - the ksu behaviour should be configurable and maybe check the .k5login and
++ *   .k5users files directly like ksu itself does
++ * - to make krb5_aname_to_localname() more useful an option for sshd to use
++ *   the canonical name (the one returned by getpwnam()) instead of the name
++ *   given at the login prompt might be useful */
++
+ static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ {
+@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+ 	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
+ 	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
+ 	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
+-	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
++	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
++			&& k5login_exists) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+ 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+ 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+ 	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
+-		return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
+-		    sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
+-		    (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
++                return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
++                                        k5login_exists);
+ 	}
+ 	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ 		int saved_errno = errno;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:11:52.278133344 +0100
+@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
++	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ 		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
+ #endif
++	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
++		options->use_kuserok = 1;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
+ 	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+		}
+		break;
+
++	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
++		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+	case sMatch:
+		if (cmdline)
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
+@@ -2309,6 +2319,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
+ # endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 14:36:07.645465936 +0100
+@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ 	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
+ 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
++	int	use_kuserok;
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.637465940 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:14:03.117162222 +0100
+@@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+ .Cm no
+ can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
+ user account.
++.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
++Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
++The default is
++.Cm yes .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm IPQoS ,
+ .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
+ .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
++.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
+ .Cm LogLevel ,
+ .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
+ .Cm MaxSessions ,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.631465943 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 14:36:07.646465935 +0100
+@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+ #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
++#KerberosUseKuserok yes
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.972122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
++void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
+@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+ 	debug3_f("done");
+ }
+ 
++void
++sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
++{
++	security_context_t *ctx;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++
++	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
++		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
++		return;
++	}
++	if (ctx != NULL) {
++		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
++		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
++			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
++		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
++			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
++		freecon(ctx);
++	}
++}
++
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
+@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 
+ 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
+ 
+-	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
++	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+ 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
+@@ -1361,6 +1361,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ 			free(tmp);
+ 			free(chroot_path);
+@@ -1396,6 +1399,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+ 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (in_chroot == 0)
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
+@@ -1413,9 +1421,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ 		fprintf(stderr,
+ 		    "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		setexeccon(NULL);
+-#endif
+ #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+ 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
+ 		    (char *)NULL);
+@@ -1625,9 +1630,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+-#endif
+ 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
+@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Demote the child */
+ 	if (privsep_chroot) {
+ 		/* Change our root directory */
+@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+ 	if (1) {
++#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
++	if (0) {
++		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
+ #else
+ 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
+ #endif

SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,554 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/addr.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/addr.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
+@@ -312,8 +312,10 @@ addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n
+ 	if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
++	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
++		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ 		return -1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ 	    n) == -1) {
+@@ -336,12 +338,16 @@ addr_sa_pton(const char *h, const char *
+ 	if (h == NULL || getaddrinfo(h, s, &hints, &ai) != 0)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
++	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
++		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ 		return -1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (sa != NULL) {
+-		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen)
++		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen) {
++			freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ 			return -1;
++		}
+ 		memcpy(sa, &ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.724967756 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
+@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
+ 		umask(old_umask);
+ 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
+ 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ 			close(tmpfd);
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
+@@ -706,6 +708,7 @@ serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char *
+ 		return r;
+ 	}
+ 	/* success */
++	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100
+@@ -1875,7 +1875,7 @@ channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh,
+ 		debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
+ 		    c->self, strerror(err));
+ 		/* Try next address, if any */
+-		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
++		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) >= 0) {
+ 			close(c->sock);
+ 			c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
+ 			channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt);
+@@ -3804,7 +3804,7 @@ int
+ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
+ {
+ 	int r, success = 0, idx = -1;
+-	char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path;
++	char *host_to_connect = NULL, *listen_host = NULL, *listen_path = NULL;
+ 	int port_to_connect, listen_port;
+ 
+ 	/* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
+@@ -3832,7 +3832,6 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct
+ 	success = 1;
+ 	if (success) {
+ 		/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
+-		host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL;
+ 		port_to_connect = listen_port = 0;
+ 		if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
+ 			host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path);
+@@ -3853,6 +3852,9 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct
+ 		    host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
+ 		    listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL);
+ 	}
++	free(host_to_connect);
++	free(listen_host);
++	free(listen_path);
+ 	return idx;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/dns.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/dns.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
+		    &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
+			error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
+			freerrset(fingerprints);
++				free(dnskey_digest);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity	2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c	2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
+@@ -167,8 +167,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
+-
++#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
+ 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
++#pragma pop
+ 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, st
+ 	sshkey_free(key);
+ 	sshbuf_free(copy);
+ 	sshbuf_free(sect);
++	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1261,6 +1262,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1271,6 +1273,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1282,6 +1285,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity	2021-03-24 13:18:53.793225885 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c	2021-03-24 13:21:27.948404751 +0100
+@@ -690,9 +690,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+ # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+ # endif
+@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
+ 
+ 	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
+ 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
+ 	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
+ 
+@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
+ 	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
+ 
+ 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
+ 
+ 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c	2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100
+@@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
+ 	}
+ 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(nullfd);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+@@ -2511,6 +2513,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdou
+ 	}
+ 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(devnull);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.784968173 +0100
+@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t
+ 	else
+ 		logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
+ 		    strerror(errno));
++	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
+ }
+ 
+ static unsigned long
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
+@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ 		;
+ 
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
+ 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+-
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
+ 	return (0);
+ 
+  error:
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
+@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
+ 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+ 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
+ 		error_f("cannot allocate fds for pty");
+-		if (tmp1 > 0)
++		if (tmp1 >= 0)
+ 			close(tmp1);
+-		if (tmp2 > 0)
+-			close(tmp2);
++		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
++			close(tmp2);*/
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	close(tmp1);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
+ 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ 	u_int16_t *portp;
+ 	u_int16_t port;
+-	socklen_t salen;
++	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:36:11.357288009 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c	2021-08-30 16:37:21.791897976 +0200
+@@ -113,13 +113,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
++		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2_f("reading");
+ 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.778968131 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.785968180 +0100
+@@ -1847,6 +1847,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
+ 			} else if (r != 0) {
+ 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+ 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
++				free(arg2);
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			free(arg2);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:23:35.389741329 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-08-30 16:27:04.854555296 +0200
+@@ -186,11 +186,11 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+ 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
+ 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 	if (do_cmd_pid2 > 1) {
+ 		kill(do_cmd_pid2, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (signo)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
+@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ 			/* increase optional counter */
+-			if (intptr != NULL)
+-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
++			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
++  			 if (intptr != NULL)
++				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2021-08-30 16:28:22.416226981 +0200
+@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		debug_f("invalid tun");
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
++	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
+ 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
+ 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
+ 			goto done;
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.777968124 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/session.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
+@@ -1223,12 +1223,14 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+ 	/* Environment specified by admin */
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
+ 		cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
++		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
+ 		if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
+ 			/* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
+ 			fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
+ 		}
+ 		*value++ = '\0';
+ 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
++		free(cp);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
+--- a/sftp.c	2022-06-30 10:43:13.914058913 +0200
++++ b/sftp.c	2022-06-30 10:48:17.243997888 +0200
+@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ 	pid = sshpid;
+ 	if (pid > 1) {
+ 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	_exit(1);
+@@ -768,6 +768,8 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		}
++		free(abs_dst);
++		abs_dst = NULL;
+ 	}
+ 
+ out:
+@@ -991,6 +993,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, co
+ 		if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
+ 			if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
+ 				error("no stat information for %s", fname);
++				free(fname);
+ 				continue;
+ 			}
+ 			lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
+diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
+index 9de9afa20f..ea98d9f8d0 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.c
++++ b/sftp-client.c
+@@ -2195,6 +2195,7 @@ handle_dest_replies(struct sftp_conn *to, const char *to_path, int synchronous,
+ 		(*nreqsp)--;
+ 	}
+ 	debug3_f("done: %u outstanding replies", *nreqsp);
++	sshbuf_free(msg);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+index 18d1949112..6380c4dd23 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.c
++++ b/sftp-server.c
+@@ -1553,6 +1553,7 @@ process_extended_expand(u_int32_t id)
+ 			npath = xstrdup(path + 2);
+ 			free(path);
+ 			xasprintf(&path, "%s/%s", cwd, npath);
++			free(npath);
+ 		} else {
+ 			/* ~user expansions */
+ 			if (tilde_expand(path, pw->pw_uid, &npath) != 0) {
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
+@@ -1256,6 +1256,7 @@ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, s
+ 		freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i]));
+ 	}
+ 	free(rks);
++	free(device);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
+@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
+ 
+ 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
+ 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
+ 			return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		/* validate also provider from URI */
+@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 
+ 	/* drop */
+-	setegid(getgid());
+-	setgid(getgid());
++	(void) setegid(getgid());
++	(void) setgid(getgid());
+ 
+ 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.779968138 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
+@@ -1746,6 +1746,7 @@ control_persist_detach(void)
+ 		close(muxserver_sock);
+ 		muxserver_sock = -1;
+ 		options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
++		/* coverity[leaked_handle: FALSE]*/
+ 		muxclient(options.control_path);
+ 		/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
+ 		fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
+@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
+ 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+-		if (box != NULL)
++		if (box != NULL) {
+ 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
++			free(box);
++		}
+ 
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 			explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ 		}
+ 	}
++
++	if (fdset != NULL)
++		free(fdset);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -2519,8 +2524,11 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	if (newstr)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
+-	else
++	else {
+ 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++		free(gss);
++	     }
++	     /* coverity[leaked_storage: FALSE]*/
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.780968145 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
+@@ -2332,6 +2332,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw,
+ 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+ 			if (r != 0)
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
++			freezero(blob, blen);
++			blob = NULL;
++			blen = 0;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
+ 				cp += 4;
+@@ -2879,6 +2882,7 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
+ 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
+ 			start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
+ 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
++			free(checkpoint);
+ 			checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
+ 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
+ 			generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
+@@ -2920,6 +2924,9 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
+ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++	free(checkpoint);
++	if (in != stdin)
++		fclose(in);
+ }
+ 
+ static char *
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
+@@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, s
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+ 			ssh_digest_free(ctx);
++			ctx = NULL;
+ 			errno = oerrno;
+ 			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ 			goto out;

SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
+ .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
+ .Op Fl u Ar umask
++.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms
+ .Ek
+ .Nm
+ .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
+@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@ Sets an explicit
+ .Xr umask 2
+ to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
+ user's default mask.
++.It Fl m Ar force_file_perms
++Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
++of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
++777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Using both -m and -u switches makes the
++umask (-u) effective only for newly created directories and explicit mode (-m)
++for newly created files.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ On some systems,
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
+@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+ /* Version of client */
+ static u_int version;
+ 
++/* Force file permissions */
++int permforce = 0;
++long permforcemode;
++
+ /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
+ static int init_done;
+ 
+@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	Attrib a;
+ 	char *name;
+ 	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
++	mode_t old_umask = 0;
+ 
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
+@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
+ 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
+ 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
++	if (permforce == 1) {   /* Force perm if -m is set */
++		mode = permforcemode;
++		old_umask = umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
++	}	
+ 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+ 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+ 	if (readonly &&
+@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	if (permforce == 1)
++		(void) umask(old_umask); /* restore umask to something sane */
+ 	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ 		send_status(id, status);
+ 	free(name);
+@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ 	fprintf(stderr,
+ 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
+ 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
+-	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n"
++	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
+ 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
+ 	    __progname, __progname);
+ 	exit(1);
+@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+ 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+-	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
++	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		case 'Q':
+ 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
+@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+ 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
+ 			break;
++		case 'm':
++			/* Force permissions on file received via sftp */
++			permforce = 1;
++			permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
++			if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 ||
++			    *cp != '\0' || (permforcemode == 0 &&
++			    errno != 0))
++				fatal("Invalid file mode \"%s\"", optarg);
++			break;
+ 		case 'h':
+ 		default:
+ 			sftp_server_usage();

SOURCES/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c
+--- openssh/servconf.c.sshdt	2015-06-24 11:42:29.041078704 +0200
++++ openssh/servconf.c	2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200
+@@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
+-	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
++	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);

SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:35:52.697685772 +0100
+@@ -1107,4 +1107,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
+ 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
+ 	sshbuf_free(m);
+ }
++
++int mm_forward_audit_messages(int fdin)
++{
++	u_char buf[4];
++	u_int blen, msg_len;
++	struct sshbuf *m;
++	int r, ret = 0;
++
++	debug3_f("entering");
++	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++	do {
++		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
++		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
++			break;
++		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
++			error_f("Failed to read the buffer from child");
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++
++		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
++		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
++			fatal_f("read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len);
++		sshbuf_reset(m);
++		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
++			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
++			error_f("Failed to read the the buffer content from the child");
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
++		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
++			error_f("Failed to write the message to the monitor");
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++	} while (1);
++	sshbuf_free(m);
++	return ret;
++}
++void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int fd)
++{
++	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
++}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h	2016-12-23 16:35:52.698685772 +0100
+@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++int mm_forward_audit_messages(int);
++void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.695685771 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 16:37:26.339730596 +0100
+@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
+ login_cap_t *lc;
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++int paudit[2];
++#endif
++
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
+ static int have_dev_log = 1;
+@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++void child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh);
++
+ #define USE_PIPES 1
+ /*
+  * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
+@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
+ 		close(err[0]);
+ #endif
+ 
++		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
++
+ 		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
+ 		do_child(ssh, s, command);
+ 		/* NOTREACHED */
+@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+ 		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
+ 		close(ttyfd);
+ 
++		/* Do this early, so we will not block large MOTDs */
++		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
++
+ 		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
+ #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ 		do_login(ssh, s, command);
+@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	}
+ 	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
+ 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
++	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
++		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ #endif
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ 		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
+@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	 */
+ 	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	close(paudit[1]);
++	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
++		/*
++		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
++		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
++		 * because the messages might get mixed up.
++		 * Continue after the pipe gets closed (all messages sent).
++		 */
++		ret = mm_forward_audit_messages(paudit[0]);
++	}
++	close(paudit[0]);
++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
++
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
+ }
+ 
++void
++child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	int pparent = paudit[1];
++	close(paudit[0]);
++	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
++	if (use_privsep)
++		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
++#endif
++
++	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
++	/*
++	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
++	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
++	 * which we can't do using one-way pipe.
++	 */
++	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
++	/* XXX this will clean the rest but should not audit anymore */
++	/* packet_clear_keys(ssh); */
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	/* Notify parent that we are done */
++	close(pparent);
++#endif
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
+  * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
+@@ -1554,13 +1608,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 
+ 	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+ 
+-	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+-	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+-	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+-	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+-	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
+-
+ 	/* Force a password change */
+ 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ 		do_setusercontext(pw);

SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -375,5 +375,21 @@ cleanup:
+ 		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ 	}
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Reads  k5login_directory  option from the  krb5.conf
++ */
++krb5_error_code
++ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx, char **k5login_directory) {
++	profile_t p;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	return profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "k5login_directory", NULL, NULL,
++		k5login_directory);
++}
+ #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+ krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx,
++	char **k5login_directory);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
+ {
+ 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
++	char *k5login_directory = NULL;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
++	debug3_f("k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", k5login_directory, ret);
++	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
++		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
++		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
++		 */
++		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
++	} else {
++		/* If set, the library will look for a local user's k5login file
++		 * within the named directory, with a filename corresponding to the
++		 * local username.
++		 */
++		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s%s%s", k5login_directory, 
++			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
++			pw->pw_name);
++	}
++	debug_f("Checking existence of file %s", file);
+ 
+-	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
+ These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
+ Further details are described in
+ .Xr ksu 1 .
++The location of the k5login file depends on the configuration option
++.Cm k5login_directory
++in the
++.Xr krb5.conf 5 .
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/
+ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration

SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open.
+
+All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new
+sshd process to handle a new client connection is
+spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem
+without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the
+files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the
+closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop.
+
+Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
+ 	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
+ 	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
+ 		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
++#ifdef __s390__
++		{
++		    /*
++		     * the filedescriptors used to communicate with
++		     * the device drivers to provide hardware support
++		     * should survive. HF <freude@de.ibm.com>
++		     */
++		    char fpath[PATH_MAX], lpath[PATH_MAX];
++		    len = snprintf(fpath, sizeof(fpath), "%s/%s",
++				   fdpath, dent->d_name);
++		    if (len > 0 && (size_t)len <= sizeof(fpath)) {
++			len = readlink(fpath, lpath, sizeof(lpath));
++			if (len > 0) {
++			    lpath[len] = 0;
++			    if (strstr(lpath, "dev/z90crypt")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/zcrypt")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/prandom")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/shm/icastats"))
++				fd = -1;
++			}
++		    }
++		    if (fd >= 0)
++			(void) close((int) fd);
++		}
++#else
+ 		(void) close((int) fd);
++#endif
+ 	}
+ 	(void) closedir(dirp);
+ 	return;
+

SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c	2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200
+@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
++connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname, int len)
+ {
+ 	int sock;
+ 	struct sockaddr_un addr;
+ 
++	if (len <= 0)
++		return -1;
+ 	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ 	if (sock == -1)
+ 		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ 	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+ 	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+-	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
+-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
++	if (len > sizeof addr.sun_path)
++		len = sizeof addr.sun_path;
++	memcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, len);
++	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof addr - (sizeof addr.sun_path - len) ) == 0)
+ 		return sock;
+ 	close(sock);
+-	error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
+ 	return -1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int
+ connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
+ {
+ 	char buf[1024];
+-	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
+-	return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
++	int len, ret;
++	len = snprintf(buf + 1, sizeof (buf) - 1, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
++#ifdef linux
++	/* try abstract socket first */
++	buf[0] = '\0';
++	if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf, len + 1)) >= 0)
++		return ret;
++#endif
++	if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf + 1, len)) >= 0)
++		return ret;
++	error("connect %.100s: %.100s", buf + 1, strerror(errno));
++	return -1;
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef __APPLE__

SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
+@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
+ #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
+ 
+ /* -- X11 forwarding */
+-/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+-#define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
++/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
++#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
+ 
+ /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
+ typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
+@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
+  */
+ int
+ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+-    int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection,
++    int x11_use_localhost, int x11_max_displays, int single_connection,
+     u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
+ {
+ 	Channel *nc = NULL;
+@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 	if (chanids == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
++	/* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
++	x11_max_displays = x11_max_displays + x11_display_offset;
++
+ 	for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
+-	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
++	    display_number < x11_max_displays;
+ 	    display_number++) {
+-		port = 6000 + display_number;
++		port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number;
++		if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */
++			break;
+ 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 		hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
+ 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
+@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 		if (num_socks > 0)
+ 			break;
+ 	}
+-	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
++	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) {
+ 		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 	hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
+ 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
++	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number);
+ 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
+ 		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 		/* Connect it to the display. */
+ 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+ 			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+-			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
++			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ 			close(sock);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 	}
+ 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ 	if (!ai) {
+-		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+-		    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
++		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
++		    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	set_nodelay(sock);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
+@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
+ 
+ void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
+ int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
+-int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
++int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+ void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
+ 	    const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:47:27.320519121 +0100
+@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->print_lastlog = -1;
+ 	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
+ 	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
++	options->x11_max_displays = -1;
+ 	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
+ 	options->permit_tty = -1;
+ 	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
+@@ -243,6 +244,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
+ 	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
+ 		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
++	if (options->x11_max_displays == -1)
++		options->x11_max_displays = DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS;
+ 	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
+ 		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
+ 	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+-	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
++	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
+ 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
+ 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+ 	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
+@@ -540,6 +543,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "x11maxdisplays", sX11MaxDisplays, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1316,6 +1320,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 			*intptr = value;
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sX11MaxDisplays:
++		intptr = &options->x11_max_displays;
++		goto parse_int;
++
+ 	case sX11UseLocalhost:
+ 		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_max_displays);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
+@@ -2315,6 +2324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
++	dump_cfg_int(sX11MaxDisplays, o->x11_max_displays);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.140506636 +0100
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
+ 
+ #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
+ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
++#define DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS	1000 /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+ 
+ /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
+ #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
+@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
+ 	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
+ 					 * searching at */
++	int 	x11_max_displays; /* Number of displays to search */
+ 	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
+ 	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
+ 	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.136506636 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
+@@ -2518,8 +2518,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
+-	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
+-	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
++	    options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
++	    s->single_connection, &s->display_number,
++	    &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
+ 		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
+@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
+ .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+ .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
++.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
+ .Cm X11Forwarding
+ and
+ .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
+@@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
+ X11 forwarding.
+ This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
+ The default is 10.
++.It Cm X11MaxDisplays
++Specifies the maximum number of displays available for
++.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
++X11 forwarding.
++This prevents sshd from exhausting local ports.
++The default is 1000.
+ .It Cm X11Forwarding
+ Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
+ The argument must be

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
+
+    systemd stuff
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+ 
++# Check whether user wants systemd support
++SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
++	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
++	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
++		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
++			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
++			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
++				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
++				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
++				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
++				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
++				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
++				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
++				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
++			else
++				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
++			fi
++		fi
++	fi ]
++)
++
++
+ # Looking for programs, paths and files
+ 
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+ echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+ echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
++echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
+ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e0d4923
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/contrib/sshd.service
+@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
++[Unit]
++Description=OpenSSH server daemon
++Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
++After=network.target
++
++[Service]
++Type=notify
++ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
++ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
++KillMode=process
++Restart=on-failure
++RestartPreventExitStatus=255
++
++[Install]
++WantedBy=multi-user.target
++
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
+ #include <prot.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
++#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
++		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
++		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
++#endif
++
+ 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+ 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+ 		    &newsock, config_s);

SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
+and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
+implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
+crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
+this is only need on s390 architecture.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_futex
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
+ #endif
+@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+ #endif
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
+crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
+Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+ #endif
+-- 1.9.1
+1.9.1
+diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox	2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100
++++ openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2017-12-12 13:59:14.842784083 +0100
+@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_gettid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+ #endif
+

SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+ 
+ /* import */
+ extern ServerOptions options;
++extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ 
+ static char *
+ format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
+@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
+ 	    ac, av, &f,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
++	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	uid_swapped = 1;
+@@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
+ 	    ac, av, &f,
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
++	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	uid_swapped = 1;
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/misc.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
+ pid_t
+ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+     int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
+-    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs)
++    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs,
++    privrestore_fn *restore_privs, int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	FILE *f = NULL;
+ 	struct stat st;
+@@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			_exit(1);
+ 		}
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
+ 			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
+ 			    strerror(errno));
+ 			_exit(127);
+diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
+--- openssh/misc.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
+ pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
+-    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *);
++    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *, int, void *);
+ 
+ typedef struct arglist arglist;
+ struct arglist {
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const ch
+ 
+ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+-void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+-int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
+ void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+-extern ServerOptions options;
+-extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+-extern int inetd_flag;
+-extern int rexeced_flag;
+-
+ /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+ int
+ sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
+@@ -223,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level,
++    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	*role = NULL;
+ 	*level = NULL;
+@@ -241,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role,
+ 
+ /* Return the default security context for the given username */
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+-	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
++sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, security_context_t *default_sc,
++    security_context_t *user_sc, int inetd, Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	char *sename, *lvl;
+ 	char *role;
+@@ -250,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 	context_t con = NULL;
+ 
+-	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+ 	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
+@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 
+ 	if (r == 0) {
+ 		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
+-		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++		if (inetd) {
+ 			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
+ 
+ 			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
+@@ -333,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 
+ /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
++sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *), int inetd,
++    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	const char *reqlvl;
+ 	char *role;
+@@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
+ 
+-	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
+ 
+ 	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+ 
+-	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++	if (inetd) {
+ 		use_current = "1";
+ 	} else {
+ 		use_current = "";
+@@ -362,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(int inetd,
++    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+-	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(pam_setenv, inetd, the_authctxt);
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -374,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
++sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
+ {
+-	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
++	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv, inetd, authctxt);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+ void
+-sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
++sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, int inetd,
++    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), void *the_authctxt, int use_pam)
+ {
+ 	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
++	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
+ 
+ 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+-	if (options.use_pam) {
++	if (use_pam) {
+ 		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
+-		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
+ 			switch (security_getenforce()) {
+ 			case -1:
+ 				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
+@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
+ 
+-	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
++	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
+ 	if (r >= 0) {
+ 		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
+ 		if (r < 0) {
+diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
+--- openssh/platform.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
++++ openssh/platform.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
+@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
+ 
+ extern int use_privsep;
+ extern ServerOptions options;
++extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ 
+ void
+ platform_pre_listen(void)
+@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+ 	}
+ #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    options.use_pam);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
+ static int test_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+-static int inetd_flag = 0;
++int inetd_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
+ static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
+@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
+ static int saved_argc;
+ 
+ /* re-exec */
+-static int rexeced_flag = 0;
++int rexeced_flag = 0;
+ static int rexec_flag = 1;
+ static int rexec_argc = 0;
+ static char **rexec_argv;
+@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    options.use_pam);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor	2021-02-24 00:12:03.065325046 +0100
++++ openssh/sshconnect.c	2021-02-24 00:12:12.126449544 +0100
+@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *h
+ 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
+-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0)
++	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);

SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,635 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.c	2021-05-06 12:12:10.107634472 +0200
+@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
+ 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
+ 	struct dhgroup dhg;
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		verbose("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
++		    " Falling back to known groups.");
++		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
++	}
++
+ 	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
+ 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
+ 		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
+@@ -502,4 +508,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
+ 	return 8192;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
++ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
++ */
++int
++dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
++{
++	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
++	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
++	DH *known = NULL;
++	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
++
++	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
++	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
++
++	if (bits <= 3072) {
++		known = dh_new_group14();
++	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
++		known = dh_new_group16();
++	} else {
++		known = dh_new_group18();
++	}
++
++	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
++
++	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
++	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
++		rv = 1;
++	}
++
++	DH_free(known);
++	return rv;
++}
++
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.h	2021-05-06 12:11:28.393298005 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
+ 
+ int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+ int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
++int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
+ 
+ u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
+ void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.489926807 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
+@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+-			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++			if (FIPS_mode())
++				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
++			else
++				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ 			free(s);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
+ 
+ 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
+@@ -57,6 +57,18 @@
+ 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
+ 	"ssh-rsa"
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
++	"rsa-sha2-512," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256"
++
+ #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+ 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+ 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+@@ -78,6 +92,27 @@
+ 
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
++	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
++	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
++	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
++	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
++#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++	"hmac-sha1," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512," \
++	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
++
+ /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
+ #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
+ 	"ssh-ed25519," \
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.428926336 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200
+@@ -2538,11 +2538,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.463926606 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200
+@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #ifdef __NR_open
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_socket
++	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_openat
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.455926545 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200
+@@ -226,11 +226,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #endif
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+@@ -1516,6 +1517,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		exit(0);
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
+ 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
+ 	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.485926777 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.501926900 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
+ #include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+-		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+-		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+-		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+-
+-		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+-			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+-		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+-			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
+-			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
+-			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
+-			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
+-				free(gss_host);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
++			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
++				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
++				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
++				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
++					free(gss_host);
++					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
++				}
++			} else {
+ 				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+ 			}
+-		} else {
+-			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+-		}
+ 
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+-		if (gss) {
+-			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+-
+-			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+-			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+-			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,null", orig);
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
++			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++			if (gss) {
++				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++
++				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++				    "%s,null", orig);
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
+ #include <grp.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -1619,6 +1621,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #endif
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+ 
++	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
+ 	saved_argc = ac;
+ 	rexec_argc = ac;
+@@ -1931,6 +1931,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		    &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+ 			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
+ 			    options.host_key_files[i]);
++		if (FIPS_mode() && key != NULL && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519_SK
++				||  sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519)) {
++		    logit_f("sshd: Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode, skipping %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
++		    sshkey_free(key);
++		    key = NULL;
++		    continue;
++		}
+ 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
+ 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
+ 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
+@@ -2110,6 +2113,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+ 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	 * unmounted if desired.
+@@ -2494,10 +2501,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+ 		orig = NULL;
+ 
+-	if (options.gss_keyex)
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+-	else
+-		gss = NULL;
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (gss && orig)
+ 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.502926908 +0200
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
+ #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "match.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh-sk.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_XMSS
+@@ -285,6 +285,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai
+ 	for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
+ 		if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
+ 			continue;
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			switch (kt->type) {
++			case KEY_ED25519:
++			case KEY_ED25519_SK:
++			case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++			case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
++			     continue;
++			     break;
++			default:
++			     break;
++			}
++		}
+ 		if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
+@@ -1503,6 +1503,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **c
+ 		return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
+ 	}
+ 
++	switch (type) {
++	case KEY_ED25519:
++	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
++	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    sshkey_free(k);
++		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		}
++		break;
++	default:
++		break;
++	}
+ 	/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
+ 	ret->type = type;
+ 	if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) {
+@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
+		goto out;
+
+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
++		if (FIPS_mode())
++			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -2916,6 +2916,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ 	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		}
++		/* Fallthrough */
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ 		r = sshsk_sign(sk_provider, key, sigp, lenp, data,
+@@ -2973,6 +2978,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 		return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
+ 	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ 	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		}
+ 		return ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+ 		    compat, detailsp);
+ #ifdef WITH_XMSS
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.503926916 +0200
+@@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		if (type == KEY_DSA)
++			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		if (type == KEY_ED25519 || type == KEY_ED25519_SK)
++			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	}
+ 	switch (type) {
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
+@@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			first = 1;
+ 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
+ 		}
++		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
++
++		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
++		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
++			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
++			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
++			goto next;
++		}
++
+ 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
+ 		fflush(stdout);
+-		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
+ 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
+ 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
+ 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:11:21.973519913 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c	2022-07-11 16:25:31.172187365 +0200
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -115,10 +116,20 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -186,11 +197,21 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -285,12 +306,22 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:53:41.428343304 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c	2022-07-11 16:56:09.284663661 +0200
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+@@ -52,6 +53,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *ke
+ 	    key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
+ 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
+ 	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+@@ -108,6 +113,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *
+ 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
+ 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;

SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,633 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.345143341 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+ 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+ 	char		*krb5_ccname;
++	int		 krb5_set_env;
+ #endif
+ 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+ 
+@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-05-06 11:28:40.195242317 +0200
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <krb5.h>
++#include <profile.h>
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions	 options;
+ 
+@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ #endif
+ 	krb5_error_code problem;
+ 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+-	int len;
++	char *ticket_name = NULL;
+ 	char *client, *platform_client;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
+ 
+@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+-	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
++	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
++	     &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env);
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ 		goto out;
+ #endif
+ 
+-	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
++	problem = krb5_cc_get_full_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
++	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &ticket_name);
+ 
+-	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+-	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+-	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+-	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xstrdup(ticket_name);
++	krb5_free_string(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket_name);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+-	if (options.use_pam)
++	if (options.use_pam && authctxt->krb5_set_env)
+ 		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ void
+ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
++	struct stat krb5_ccname_stat;
++	char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end;
++
+ 	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
+ 	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
+-		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
++		krb5_context ctx = authctxt->krb5_ctx;
++		krb5_cccol_cursor cursor;
++		krb5_ccache ccache;
++		int ret;
++
++		krb5_cc_destroy(ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ 		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
++
++		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_new(ctx, &cursor);
++		if (ret)
++			goto out;
++
++		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_next(ctx, cursor, &ccache);
++		if (ret == 0 && ccache != NULL) {
++			/* There is at least one other ccache in collection
++			 * we can switch to */
++			krb5_cc_switch(ctx, ccache);
++		} else if (authctxt->krb5_ccname != NULL) {
++			/* Clean up the collection too */
++			strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10);
++			krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1;
++			*krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0';
++			if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) {
++
++				strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary");
++
++				if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) {
++					if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) {
++						krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/');
++						*krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0';
++						if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1)
++							debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s",
++							    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
++					}
++					else
++						debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s",
++						    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
++				}
++			}
++		}
++		krb5_cccol_cursor_free(ctx, &cursor);
+ 	}
++out:
+ 	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
+ 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
+ 		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
+@@ -238,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-#ifndef HEIMDAL
++
++#if !defined(HEIMDAL)
++int
++ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
++	char *src, *old;
++	va_list ap;
++	int i;
++
++	va_start(ap, fmt);
++	i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap);
++	va_end(ap);
++
++	if (i == -1 || src == NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	old = *dsc;
++
++	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
++	if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
++		free(src);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	free(old);
++	free(src);
++
++	return i;
++}
++
++int
++ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
++	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
++
++	debug3_f("called, template = %s", template);
++	if (template == NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template);
++	r = xstrdup("");
++
++	while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) {
++
++		*p_n++ = '\0';
++		if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
++			goto cleanup;
++
++		if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 ||
++			strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) {
++			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
++			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1)
++				goto cleanup;
++			continue;
++		}
++		else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) {
++			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
++			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1)
++				goto cleanup;
++			continue;
++		} else {
++			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
++			*p_o = '\0';
++			debug_f("unsupported token %s in %s", p_n, template);
++			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
++		goto cleanup;
++
++	*result = r;
++	free(tmp_template);
++	return 0;
++
++cleanup:
++	free(r);
++	free(tmp_template);
++	return -1;
++}
++
++krb5_error_code
++ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
++	profile_t p;
++	int ret = 0;
++	char *value = NULL;
++
++	debug3_f("called");
++	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value);
++	if (ret || !value)
++		return ret;
++
++	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
++
++	debug3_f("returning with ccname = %s", *ccname);
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ krb5_error_code
+-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
++ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
++	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
++	char *ccname = NULL;
+ 	mode_t old_umask;
++	char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL;
+ 
+-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+-		return ENOMEM;
+-
+-	old_umask = umask(0177);
+-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+-	oerrno = errno;
+-	umask(old_umask);
+-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
+-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+-		return oerrno;
+-	}
++	debug3_f("called");
++	if (need_environment)
++		*need_environment = 0;
++	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
++	if (ret || !ccname || options.kerberos_unique_ccache) {
++		/* Otherwise, go with the old method */
++		if (ccname)
++			free(ccname);
++		ccname = NULL;
++
++		ret = asprintf(&ccname,
++		    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
++		if (ret < 0)
++			return ENOMEM;
+ 
+-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
++		old_umask = umask(0177);
++		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ 		oerrno = errno;
+-		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++		umask(old_umask);
++		if (tmpfd == -1) {
++			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			return oerrno;
++		}
++
++		if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
++			oerrno = errno;
++			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			close(tmpfd);
++			return oerrno;
++		}
++		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
++		if (need_environment)
++			*need_environment = 1;
+ 		close(tmpfd);
+-		return oerrno;
+ 	}
+-	close(tmpfd);
+ 
+-	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
++	debug3_f("setting default ccname to %s", ccname);
++	/* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
++	ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	if ((colon = strstr(ccname, ":")) != NULL) {
++		type_len = colon - ccname;
++		type = malloc((type_len + 1) * sizeof(char));
++		if (type == NULL)
++			return ENOMEM;
++		strncpy(type, ccname, type_len);
++		type[type_len] = 0;
++	} else {
++		type = strdup(ccname);
++	}
++
++	/* If we have a credential cache from krb5.conf, we need to switch
++	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
++	 */
++	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
++		debug3_f("calling cc_new_unique(%s)", ccname);
++		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
++		free(type);
++		if (ret)
++			return ret;
++
++		debug3_f("calling cc_switch()");
++		return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
++	} else {
++		/* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
++		 * it is already unique from above or the type does not support
++		 * collections
++		 */
++		free(type);
++		debug3_f("calling cc_resolve(%s)", ccname);
++		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
++	}
+ }
+ #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.374143558 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200
+@@ -413,13 +413,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ }
+ 
+ /* As user */
+-void
++int
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
++		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+ 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
++
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
+@@ -499,9 +501,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
+ 	char *envstr;
+ #endif
+ 
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
+  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
+ 
+-static void
++static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+ 	krb5_ccache ccache;
+@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+ 	const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
++	int set_env = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (client->creds == NULL) {
+ 		debug("No credentials stored");
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef HEIMDAL
+ # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
+@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 		krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ # endif
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ #else
+-	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
++	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, &ccache, &set_env)) != 0) {
+ 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+-		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg);
++		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ #endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
+ 
+@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+ 		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
+@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+ 		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+ 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 	    client->creds, ccache))) {
+ 		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
+ 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
+ 	new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
+-
+-	client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+-#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+-	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
+-	client->store.filename = NULL;
+-#else
+-	if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
+-		new_ccname++;
+ 	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
+-	if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
+-		char *p;
+-		p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
+-		if (p)
+-			*p = '\0';
++
++	if (set_env) {
++		client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+ 	}
+ 	if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
+ 		client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
+-#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+-	if (options.use_pam)
++	if (options.use_pam && set_env)
+ 		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 
+ 	client->store.data = krb_context;
+ 
+-	return;
++	return set_env;
+ }
+ 
+ int
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.377143580 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.388143662 +0200
+@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
++	options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
+ 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+@@ -359,6 +360,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
+ 	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
+ 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
++	if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1)
++		options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+@@ -506,7 +509,8 @@ typedef enum {
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
++	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+@@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct {
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1573,6 +1579,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+ 		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sKerberosUniqueCCache:
++		intptr = &options->kerberos_unique_ccache;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sGssAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2891,6 +2901,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ # ifdef USE_AFS
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
+ # endif
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.377143580 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-05-06 11:15:36.397143729 +0200
+@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 						 * file on logout. */
+ 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
++	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
++						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.397143729 +0200
+@@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+ 	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
+ 	 * the child's environment as they see fit
+ 	 */
+-	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
++	if (s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
++		ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Set basic environment. */
+@@ -1114,7 +1115,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ #ifdef KRB5
+-	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
++	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname && s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
+ 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
+ 		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.380143602 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200
+@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	if (options.gss_authentication) {
+ 		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+-		ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
++		authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+ 		restore_uid();
+ 	}
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.380143602 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200
+@@ -939,6 +939,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+ file on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
++.It Cm KerberosUniqueCCache
++Specifies whether to store the acquired tickets in the per-session credential
++cache under /tmp/ or whether to use per-user credential cache as configured in
++.Pa /etc/krb5.conf .
++The default value
++.Cm no
++can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
++user account.
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200
+@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);

SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
+--- openssh/ssh_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/ssh_config	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
+@@ -43,3 +43,10 @@
+ #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+ #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+ #   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
++#
++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
++# To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a  *.conf
++#  file under  /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/  which will be automatically
++# included below. For more information, see manual page for
++#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
++Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
+--- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
++++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
++# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
++# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
++Match final all
++	# Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined:
++	Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config
++
++	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
++
++# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
++# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
++# mode correctly we set this to yes.
++	ForwardX11Trusted yes
++
++# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
++# Host *.local
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config.0	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
+@@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 
+      SyslogFacility
+              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+-             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+-             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
+-             default is AUTH.
++             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
++             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
++             The default is AUTH.
+ 
+      TCPKeepAlive
+              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config.5	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
+@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
+ .It Cm SyslogFacility
+ Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+ .Xr sshd 8 .
+-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
++The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+ LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+ The default is AUTH.
+ .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config
+--- openssh/sshd_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config	2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100
+@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
+ # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
+ # default value.
+
++# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
++#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
++Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
++
++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
++# SELinux about this change.
++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
++#
+ #Port 22
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
+--- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
++# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
++# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
++# write it before this block or include it before this file.
++# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
++Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
++
++SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
++
++ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
++
++GSSAPIAuthentication yes
++GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
++
++UsePAM yes
++
++X11Forwarding yes
++
++# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
++# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
++PrintMotd no
++

SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
+@@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
+ 	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
+ 
++	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
++	if (! options.use_pam)
++		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several problems.");
++
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
+ 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.098735121 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
+@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
++# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several
++# problems.
+ #UsePAM no
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes

SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,867 @@
+diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
+--- openssh/auth2.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.815430916 +0200
+@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+ 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	char *role = NULL;
++#endif
+ 	int r, authenticated = 0;
+ 	double tstart = monotime_double();
+ 
+@@ -268,6 +271,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
++		*role++ = 0;
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = 0;
+ 
+@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+-		if (use_privsep)
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
++#endif
++		if (use_privsep) {
+ 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			mm_inform_authrole(role);
++#endif
++		}
+ 		userauth_banner(ssh);
+ 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+ 			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2-gss.c	2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
+@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ 	int r, authenticated = 0;
++	char *micuser;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+ 	const char *displayname;
+@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ 	mic.value = p;
+ 	mic.length = len;
+-	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if (authctxt->role && authctxt->role[0] != 0)
++		xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
++	else
++#endif
++		micuser = authctxt->user;
++	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service,
+ 	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
+ 
+ 	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
+@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
++	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
++		free(micuser);
+ 	free(mic.value);
+ 
+ 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
+@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	/* reconstruct packet */
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	    (authctxt->role
++	    ? ( (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1)) != 0 ||
++	        (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user))) != 0 ||
++	        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '/') != 0) ||
++	        (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role))) != 0)
++	    : (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0) ||
++#else
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
++#endif
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
+diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2018-08-22 11:17:07.331483958 +0200
+@@ -169,9 +169,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			goto done;
+ 		}
+ 		/* reconstruct packet */
+-		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
++		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 		    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+-		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
++		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "",
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		    authctxt->role ? "/" : "",
++		    authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : ""
++#else
++		    "", ""
++#endif
++		    );
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+diff -up openssh/auth.h.role-mls openssh/auth.h
+--- openssh/auth.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
+@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	char		*service;
+ 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+ 	char		*style;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	char		*role;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
+ 	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
+diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth-pam.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
+@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
+  * during the ssh authentication process.
+  */
+ int
+-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 1;
+ 	char *compound;
+diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
+--- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
+ void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
+ void do_pam_setcred(int );
+ void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
+ char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+ char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+ void free_pam_environment(char **);
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/misc.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
+@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ char *
+ colon(char *cp)
+ {
+ 	int flag = 0;
++	int start = 1;
+ 
+ 	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -557,6 +558,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+ 			return (cp);
+ 		if (*cp == '/')
+ 			return NULL;
++		if (start) {
++		/* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
++			if (*cp == '/')
++				return (0);
++			if (*cp != '.')
++				start = 0;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-21 14:21:56.719414087 +0200
+@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, st
+ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++int mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
++#endif
+ int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
++#endif
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -803,6 +809,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, in
+ 
+ 	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
++#endif
+ 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -877,6 +886,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method,
+ 	return found;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++int
++mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
++{
++	int r;
++	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
++
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
++		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	debug3_f("role=%s", authctxt->role);
++
++	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
++		free(authctxt->role);
++		authctxt->role = NULL;
++	}
++
++	return (0);
++}
++#endif
++
+ int
+ mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ {
+@@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *b;
+ 	const u_char *p;
+-	char *userstyle, *cp;
++	char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	u_char type;
+ 	int r, fail = 0;
+@@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
+ 		fail++;
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
++	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
++		*s = '\0';
+ 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+@@ -1317,7 +1348,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *b;
+ 	const u_char *p;
+-	char *cp, *userstyle;
++	char *cp, *s, *userstyle;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	int r, fail = 0;
+ 	u_char type;
+@@ -1338,6 +1370,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
+ 		fail++;
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
++	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
++		*s = '\0';
+ 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
+--- openssh/monitor.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/monitor.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
+@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
++#endif
++
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
++++ openssh/monitor_wrap.c	2018-08-22 11:21:47.938747968 +0200
+@@ -390,6 +390,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
+ 	sshbuf_free(m);
+ }
+ 
++/* Inform the privileged process about role */
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++void
++mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
++{
++	int r;
++	struct sshbuf *m;
++
++	debug3_f("entering");
++
++	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
++		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m);
++
++	sshbuf_free(m);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* Do the password authentication */
+ int
+ mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
+diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
++++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h	2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200
+@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
+     const char *, u_int compat);
+ void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
++#endif
+ struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
+ 	port-prngd.o \
+ 	port-solaris.o \
+ 	port-net.o \
+-	port-uw.o
++	port-uw.o \
++	port-linux-sshd.o
+ 
+ .c.o:
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -100,37 +100,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 	return sc;
+ }
+ 
+-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+-void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+-{
+-	char *user_ctx = NULL;
+-
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+-		return;
+-
+-	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+-
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+-	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+-		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+-		case -1:
+-			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+-		case 0:
+-			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+-			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+-		}
+-	}
+-	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+-		freecon(user_ctx);
+-
+-	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+-}
+-
+ /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+@@ -145,7 +114,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+ 
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
++	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
++		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 
+ 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+ 
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
++
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
++ * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support for sshd at present
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++
++#include "log.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "port-linux.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include <selinux/selinux.h>
++#include <selinux/context.h>
++#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
++#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
++
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++#include <libaudit.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#endif
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
++
++/* Send audit message */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
++		       security_context_t selected_context)
++{
++	int rc=0;
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++	char *msg = NULL;
++	int audit_fd = audit_open();
++	security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
++	security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
++	rc = -1;
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++					errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++				return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
++		error("Error connecting to audit system.");
++		return rc;
++	}
++	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
++		error("Error translating default context.");
++		default_raw = NULL;
++	}
++	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
++		error("Error translating selected context.");
++		selected_raw = NULL;
++	}
++	if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
++		     default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
++		     selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
++		error("Error allocating memory.");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
++				   msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
++		error("Error sending audit message.");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	rc = 0;
++      out:
++	free(msg);
++	freecon(default_raw);
++	freecon(selected_raw);
++	close(audit_fd);
++#endif
++	return rc;
++}
++
++static int
++mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
++{
++	struct av_decision avd;
++	int retval;
++	access_vector_t bit;
++	security_class_t class;
++
++	debug_f("src:%s dst:%s", src, dst);
++	class = string_to_security_class("context");
++	if (!class) {
++		error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context");
++		return 1;
++	}
++	bit = string_to_av_perm(class, "contains");
++	if (!bit) {
++		error("string_to_av_perm failed to translate av perm contains");
++		return 1;
++	}
++	retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, class, bit, &avd);
++	if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
++		return 0;
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static int
++get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
++	security_context_t *sc) {
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++	        /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his 
++	           allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
++	           range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
++#endif
++		if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++			*sc = NULL;
++			return -1;
++		}
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	}
++#endif
++	if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
++		context_t con;
++		char *type=NULL;
++		if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
++			error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
++				role);
++			goto out;
++		}
++		con = context_new(*sc);
++		if (!con) {
++			goto out;
++		}
++		context_role_set(con, role);
++		context_type_set(con, type);
++		freecon(*sc);
++		*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++		context_free(con);
++		if (!*sc)
++			return -1;
++	}
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
++		/* verify that the requested range is obtained */
++		context_t con;
++		security_context_t obtained_raw;
++		security_context_t requested_raw;
++		con = context_new(*sc);
++		if (!con) {
++			goto out;
++		}
++		context_range_set(con, lvl);
++		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
++			context_free(con);
++			goto out;
++		}
++		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
++			freecon(obtained_raw);
++			context_free(con);
++			goto out;
++		}
++
++		debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
++			obtained_raw, requested_raw);
++		if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
++			/* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
++			freecon(requested_raw);
++			freecon(obtained_raw);
++			freecon(*sc);
++			*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++			context_free(con);
++			return -1;
++		}
++		freecon(requested_raw);
++		freecon(obtained_raw);
++		context_free(con);
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++      out:
++	freecon(*sc);
++	*sc = NULL;
++	return -1;
++}
++
++static void
++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
++{
++	*role = NULL;
++	*level = NULL;
++	if (the_authctxt) {
++		if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
++			char *slash;
++			*role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
++			if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
++				*slash = '\0';
++				*level = slash + 1;
++			}
++		}
++	}
++}
++
++/* Return the default security context for the given username */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
++	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
++{
++	char *sename, *lvl;
++	char *role;
++	const char *reqlvl;
++	int r = 0;
++	context_t con = NULL;
++
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++
++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
++	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
++		sename = NULL;
++		lvl = NULL;
++	}
++#else
++	sename = pwname;
++	lvl = "";
++#endif
++
++	if (r == 0) {
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++		r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
++#else
++		r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
++#endif
++	}
++
++	if (r == 0) {
++		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
++		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
++
++			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
++				fatal("failed to allocate security context");
++
++			if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
++				fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
++			reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
++			freecon(sshdsc);
++			if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
++			    /* we actually don't change level */
++			    reqlvl = "";
++
++			debug_f("current connection level '%s'", reqlvl);
++
++		}
++
++		if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
++			r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
++
++			if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
++				security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
++				if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
++					if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
++						default_level_sc = *default_sc;
++				}
++				/* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
++				if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
++					logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
++				} else {
++					r = -1;
++					error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
++				}
++				if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
++					freecon(default_level_sc);
++			}
++		} else {
++			*user_sc = *default_sc;
++		}
++	}
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Failed to get default SELinux security "
++		    "context for %s", pwname);
++	}
++
++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
++	free(sename);
++	free(lvl);
++#endif
++
++	if (role != NULL)
++		free(role);
++	if (con)
++		context_free(con);
++
++	return (r);
++}
++
++/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++{
++	const char *reqlvl;
++	char *role;
++	char *use_current;
++	int rv;
++
++	debug3_f("setting execution context");
++
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++
++	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
++
++	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++		use_current = "1";
++	} else {
++		use_current = "";
++		rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
++	}
++
++	rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
++
++	if (role != NULL)
++		free(role);
++
++	return rv;
++}
++
++/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
++void
++sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
++{
++	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
++	int r = 0;
++	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++
++	if (options.use_pam) {
++		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
++			switch (security_getenforce()) {
++			case -1:
++				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
++			case 0:
++				error_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
++			break;
++			default:
++				fatal_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.");
++			}
++		}
++		return;
++	}
++
++	debug3_f("setting execution context");
++
++	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
++	if (r >= 0) {
++		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
++		if (r < 0) {
++			error_f("Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
++			    user_ctx, pwname);
++		}
++#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
++		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
++			error_f("Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
++			    user_ctx, pwname);
++		}
++#endif
++	}
++	if (user_ctx == NULL) {
++		user_ctx = default_ctx;
++	}
++	if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
++		/* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
++		   a failure */
++		sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
++	}
++	if (r < 0) {
++		switch (security_getenforce()) {
++		case -1:
++			fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
++		case 0:
++			error_f("ELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
++			break;
++		default:
++			fatal_f("SELinux failure. Aborting connection.");
++		}
++	}
++	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
++		freecon(user_ctx);
++	if (default_ctx != NULL)
++		freecon(default_ctx);
++
++	debug3_f("done");
++}
++
++#endif
++#endif
++
+diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
+--- openssh/platform.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/platform.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+ 	}
+ #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
+@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		restore_uid();
+ 	}
+ #endif
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++#endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+ 		do_pam_setcred(1);

SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 60682c68..9344806e 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
+-			addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
++			addargs(&alist,
++			    /* IPv6 address needs to be enclosed with sqare brackets */
++			    strchr(host, ':') != NULL ? "%s%s[%s]:%s" : "%s%s%s:%s",
+ 			    tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
+ 			    thost, targ);
+ 			if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
+

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,502 @@
+diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+--- a/ssh_config.5	2022-07-12 15:05:22.550013071 +0200
++++ b/ssh_config.5	2022-07-12 15:17:20.016704545 +0200
+@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@
+ .Qq *.c.example.com
+ domains.
+ .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
+ by certificate authorities (CAs).
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+@@ -445,20 +441,25 @@
+ (the default),
+ the check will not be executed.
+ .It Cm Ciphers
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
+ Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The supported ciphers are:
+ .Bd -literal -offset indent
+@@ -474,13 +475,6 @@
+ chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+ .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
+@@ -874,6 +868,11 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
+ key exchange. Possible values are
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+@@ -886,10 +885,8 @@
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+-The default is
+-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
++.Pp
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+@@ -1219,29 +1216,25 @@
+ and
+ .Cm pam .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+-.Ed
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q kex .
+@@ -1351,37 +1344,33 @@
+ file.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
+ .It Cm MACs
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
+ in order of preference.
+ The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The algorithms that contain
+ .Qq -etm
+ calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
+ These are considered safer and their use recommended.
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q mac .
+ .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+@@ -1553,37 +1542,25 @@
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key
+ authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default
+-instead of replacing it.
++character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default instead of replacing it.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-.Ed
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
+diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+--- a/sshd_config.5	2022-07-12 15:05:22.535012771 +0200
++++ b/sshd_config.5	2022-07-12 15:15:33.394809258 +0200
+@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@
+ then no banner is displayed.
+ By default, no banner is displayed.
+ .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
+ by certificate authorities (CAs).
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@
+ indicating not to
+ .Xr chroot 2 .
+ .It Cm Ciphers
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed.
+ Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The supported ciphers are:
+ .Pp
+@@ -490,13 +491,6 @@
+ chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+ .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+@@ -685,21 +679,22 @@
+ .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+ needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
+ key exchange. Possible values are
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-gss-gex-sha1-,
+-gss-group1-sha1-,
+-gss-group14-sha1-,
+-gss-group14-sha256-,
+-gss-group16-sha512-,
+-gss-nistp256-sha256-,
++gss-gex-sha1-
++gss-group1-sha1-
++gss-group14-sha1-
++gss-group14-sha256-
++gss-group16-sha512-
++gss-nistp256-sha256-
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+-.Pp
+-The default is
+-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
+@@ -799,26 +794,13 @@
+ .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ environment variable.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the host key signature algorithms
+ that the server offers.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
+ .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
+@@ -965,20 +947,25 @@
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ The supported algorithms are:
+ .Pp
+ .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+@@ -1010,15 +997,6 @@
+ sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
+ .It Cm ListenAddress
+@@ -1104,21 +1082,26 @@
+ file.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
+ .It Cm MACs
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
+ The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The algorithms that contain
+ .Qq -etm
+@@ -1161,15 +1144,6 @@
+ umac-128-etm@openssh.com
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q mac .
+ .It Cm Match
+@@ -1548,37 +1522,25 @@
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-.Ed
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol	2021-03-18 17:41:34.472404994 +0100
++++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-18 17:41:55.255538761 +0100
+@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+ 		lnum++;
+ 		cp = line;
+-		cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
++		cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
+ 		/* Trim leading space and comments */
+ 		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+ 		if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,720 @@
+From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures
+
+---
+ digest-openssl.c |  16 ++++
+ digest.h         |   6 ++
+ ssh-dss.c        |  65 ++++++++++------
+ ssh-ecdsa.c      |  69 ++++++++++-------
+ ssh-rsa.c        | 193 +++++++++--------------------------------------
+ sshkey.c         |  77 +++++++++++++++++++
+ sshkey.h         |   4 +
+ 7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
+index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
+--- a/digest-openssl.c
++++ b/digest-openssl.c
+@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
+ 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
+ };
+ 
++const EVP_MD *
++ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type)
++{
++	switch (digest_type) {
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
++		return EVP_sha1();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
++		return EVP_sha256();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
++		return EVP_sha384();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
++		return EVP_sha512();
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
+ static const struct ssh_digest *
+ ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
+ {
+diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
+index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644
+--- a/digest.h
++++ b/digest.h
+@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
+ struct sshbuf;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx;
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
++const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
++#endif
++
+ /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
+ int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
+ 
+diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
+index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
+--- a/ssh-dss.c
++++ b/ssh-dss.c
+@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int
+ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ {
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
+-	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
++	u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
++	size_t rlen, slen;
++	int len;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
++	u_char *sigb = NULL;
++	const u_char *psig = NULL;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+ 	if (lenp != NULL)
+@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	if (dlen == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
++	    data, datalen);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	if (ret < 0) {
+ 		goto out;
++	}
+ 
+-	if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
++	psig = sigb;
++	if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++	free(sigb);
++	sigb = NULL;
+ 
+ 	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+ 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
+@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		*lenp = len;
+ 	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
++	free(sigb);
+ 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	return ret;
+@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ {
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
+-	size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
++	u_char *sigblob = NULL;
++	size_t len, slen;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ 	char *ktype = NULL;
++	u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
+ 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	if (dlen == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+ 	/* fetch signature */
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	}
+ 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
+ 
+-	/* sha1 the data */
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+-
+-	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
+-	case 1:
+-		ret = 0;
+-		break;
+-	case 0:
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++	}
++	if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+-	default:
++	}
++	psig = sigb;
++	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
++	    sigb, slen);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
++	free(sigb);
+ 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ 	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
+ 	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
+diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
+index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
+--- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
++++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
+@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int
+ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ {
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
++	unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
++	const unsigned char *psig;
+ 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+ 	int hash_alg;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+-	size_t len, dlen;
++	int len;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+-	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
+-	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
++	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
++	    datalen);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	if (ret < 0) {
+ 		goto out;
++	}
+ 
+-	if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
++	psig = sigb;
++	if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-
+ 	if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		*lenp = len;
+ 	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
++	free(sigb);
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	sshbuf_free(bb);
+ 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ {
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
+-	int hash_alg;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+-	size_t dlen;
++	int hash_alg, len;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	char *ktype = NULL;
++	unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
+ 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+-	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
+-	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
++	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+ 	/* fetch signature */
+@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	}
+ 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
+ 
+-	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
++	/* Figure out the length */
++	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++	psig = sigb;
++	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
++	}
+ 
+-	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
+-	case 1:
+-		ret = 0;
+-		break;
+-	case 0:
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ 		goto out;
+-	default:
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	}
++
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
++		ret =  SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ 
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
++	free(sigb);
+ 	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
+index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
+--- a/ssh-rsa.c
++++ b/ssh-rsa.c
+@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
+-static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
++static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
+ 
+ static const char *
+ rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
+@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
+ 	return -1;
+ }
+ 
+-static int
+-rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
+-{
+-	switch (type) {
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+-		return NID_sha1;
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+-		return NID_sha256;
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+-		return NID_sha512;
+-	default:
+-		return -1;
+-	}
+-}
+-
+ int
+ ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
+ {
+@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int
+ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
+ {
+-	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
+-	size_t slen = 0;
+-	u_int dlen, len;
+-	int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	u_char *sig = NULL;
++	int len, slen = 0;
++	int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (lenp != NULL)
+@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
+ 	else
+ 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident);
++
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+-		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+-	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-
+-	/* hash the data */
+-	nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
+-	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+-		goto out;
++	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
++		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 
+-	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
++	    datalen);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	if (ret < 0) {
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+ 	if (len < slen) {
+ 		size_t diff = slen - len;
+ 		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
+@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++
+ 	/* encode signature */
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		*lenp = len;
+ 	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ 	freezero(sig, slen);
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	return ret;
+@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+     const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+     const char *alg)
+ {
+-	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	char *sigtype = NULL;
+ 	int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen;
++	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ 	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
+ 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
++	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
+ 		len = modlen;
+ 	}
+-	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+-		goto out;
++	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ 
+-	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
+-	    key->rsa);
+  out:
+ 	freezero(sigblob, len);
+ 	free(sigtype);
+@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * See:
+- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
+- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
+- */
+-
+-/*
+- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
+- *	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
+- */
+-static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
+-	0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
+-	0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
+-	0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
+-	0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
+-	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+-	0x04, 0x14  /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
+-};
+-
+-/*
+- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
+- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
+- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
+- *      id-sha256(1) }
+- */
+-static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
+-	0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
+-	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
+-	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
+-	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
+-	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+-	0x04, 0x20  /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
+-};
+-
+-/*
+- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
+- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
+- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
+- *      id-sha256(3) }
+- */
+-static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
+-	0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
+-	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
+-	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
+-	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
+-	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+-	0x04, 0x40  /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
+-};
+-
+ static int
+-rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
++openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
++    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+ {
+-	switch (hash_alg) {
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+-		*oidp = id_sha1;
+-		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
+-		break;
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+-		*oidp = id_sha256;
+-		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
+-		break;
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+-		*oidp = id_sha512;
+-		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
+-		break;
+-	default:
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	}
+-	return 0;
+-}
++	size_t rsasize = 0;
++	const RSA *rsa;
++	int ret;
+ 
+-static int
+-openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
+-    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
+-{
+-	size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
+-	int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
+-	const u_char *oid = NULL;
+-	u_char *decrypted = NULL;
+-
+-	if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
+-		return ret;
+-	ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+-	if (hashlen != hlen) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
++	rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
+ 	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
+ 	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
+ 	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
+-	if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
+-	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
+-	if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
+-	oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
+-	hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
+-	if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
+-	ret = 0;
++
++	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen,
++	    sigbuf, siglen);
++
+ done:
+-	freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type)
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++int
++sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
++    int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
++{
++	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	u_char *sig = NULL;
++	int ret, slen, len;
++
++	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
++
++	slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
++	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++
++	len = slen;
++	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto error;
++	}
++	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
++	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
++	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto error;
++	}
++
++	*sigp = sig;
++	*lenp = len;
++	/* Now owned by the caller */
++	sig = NULL;
++	ret = 0;
++
++error:
++	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
++	free(sig);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++int
++sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
++    size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
++{
++	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	int ret;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
++	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto done;
++	}
++	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
++	switch (ret) {
++	case 1:
++		ret = 0;
++		break;
++	case 0:
++		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++		break;
++	default:
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		break;
++	}
++
++done:
++	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
+ int
+ sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
+diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
+index a91e60436..270901a87 100644
+--- a/sshkey.h
++++ b/sshkey.h
+@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
+ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
+ int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
+ char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
++int		 sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
++    int *, const u_char *, size_t);
++int		 sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
++    size_t, u_char *, int);
+ 
+ int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
+ int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
+

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+commit 2c3ef499bfffce3cfd315edeebf202850ba4e00a
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Tue Apr 16 15:35:18 2019 +0200
+
+    Use the new OpenSSL KDF
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 2a455e4e..e01c3d43 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -2712,6 +2712,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ 		HMAC_CTX_init \
+ 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
+ 		RSA_get_default_method \
++		EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id \
+ 	])
+ 
+ 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
++# include <openssl/kdf.h>
++# endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "ssh.h"
+@@ -942,6 +945,95 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
++static const EVP_MD *
++digest_to_md(int digest_type)
++{
++	switch (digest_type) {
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
++		return EVP_sha1();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
++		return EVP_sha256();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
++		return EVP_sha384();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
++		return EVP_sha512();
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static int
++derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
++    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	u_char *key = NULL;
++	int r, key_len;
++
++	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
++	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
++	if (!ctx) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg));
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
++	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret));
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, hash, hashlen);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE, id);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
++	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id));
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
++	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
++	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
++#endif
++	*keyp = key;
++	key = NULL;
++	r = 0;
++
++out:
++	free (key);
++	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
++	if (r < 0) {
++		return r;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++#else
+ static int
+ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
+@@ -1004,6 +1096,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+ 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
++#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID */
+ 
+ #define NKEYS	6
+ int
+

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors	2021-03-31 17:03:15.618592347 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c	2021-03-31 17:06:58.115220014 +0200
+@@ -511,7 +511,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+ 		goto auth_fail;
+ 
+ 	if (!do_pam_account()) {
+-		sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
++		/* Preserve PAM_PERM_DENIED and PAM_USER_UNKNOWN.
++		 * Backward compatibility for other errors. */
++		if (sshpam_err != PAM_PERM_DENIED
++			&& sshpam_err != PAM_USER_UNKNOWN)
++			sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+ 		goto auth_fail;
+ 	}
+ 	if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+@@ -568,8 +572,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+ 	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
+-	if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+-		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer);
++	if (sshpam_err == PAM_PERM_DENIED
++		|| sshpam_err == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN
++		|| sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
++		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer);
+ 	else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
+ 		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
+ 	else
+@@ -856,10 +862,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
+ 			plen++;
+ 			free(msg);
+ 			break;
++		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
++		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
+ 		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
++			sshpam_account_status = 0;
++			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+ 		case PAM_MAXTRIES:
+-			if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+-				sshpam_account_status = 0;
+ 			if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+ 				sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
+ 			/* FALLTHROUGH */

SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
+--- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
++++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-uint32_t
++uint32_t __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_api_version(void)
+ {
+ 	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
+@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+     const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+     struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
+@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+     const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+     uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+     struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
+ {

SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+--- a/channels.c
++++ b/channels.c
+@@ -3933,16 +3933,26 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+ 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
+ 			if (x11_use_localhost)
+ 				set_reuseaddr(sock);
+ 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+ 				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
+ 				    strerror(errno));
+ 				close(sock);
++
++				/* do not remove successfully opened
++				 * sockets if the request failed because
++				 * the protocol IPv4/6 is not available
++				 * (e.g. IPv6 may be disabled while being
++				 * supported)
++				 */
++				if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno)
++    					continue;
++
+ 				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
+ 					close(socks[n]);
+ 				num_socks = 0;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
+ 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
+ 				break;

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evpgenkey.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c.evpgenrsa openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c.evpgenrsa	2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c	2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200
+@@ -1657,7 +1657,8 @@ sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k)
+ static int
+ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap)
+ {
+-	RSA *private = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *f4 = NULL;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+@@ -1667,20 +1668,42 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
+ 	    bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 	*rsap = NULL;
+-	if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL
++		|| (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL || !BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4)) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
+-	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, f4) <= 0)
++		goto out;
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
++	*rsap = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(res);
++	if (*rsap) {
++		ret = 0;
++	} else {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	*rsap = private;
+-	private = NULL;
+-	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	RSA_free(private);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(res);
+ 	BN_free(f4);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+@@ -1820,7 +1820,8 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k)
+ static int
+ ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap)
+ {
+-	EC_KEY *private;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+ 	if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL)
+@@ -1828,20 +1829,29 @@ ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, i
+ 	if ((*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 	*ecdsap = NULL;
+-	if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) {
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) {
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_group_name(ctx, OBJ_nid2sn(*nid)) <= 0
++	   || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
++	*ecdsap = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(res);
++	if (*ecdsap) {
++		EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(*ecdsap, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
++		ret = 0;
++	} else {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+-	*ecdsap = private;
+-	private = NULL;
+-	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	EC_KEY_free(private);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(res);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-find-principals-fix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.find-princ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.find-princ	2021-11-29 15:27:03.032070863 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-11-29 15:27:34.736342968 +0100
+@@ -2700,7 +2700,8 @@ sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, siz
+ 	time_t now;
+ 
+ 	*verify_timep = 0;
+-	*print_pubkey = 0;
++	if (print_pubkey)
++		*print_pubkey = 0;
+ 	for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ 		if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "verify-time=", 12) == 0) {
+ 			if (parse_absolute_time(opts[i] + 12,

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-gssapi-auth.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff --color -rup a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+--- a/monitor.c	2022-07-11 15:11:28.146863144 +0200
++++ b/monitor.c	2022-07-11 15:15:35.726655877 +0200
+@@ -376,8 +376,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
+ 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
+ 			auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
+ 			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
+-			if (!partial && !authenticated)
++			if (!partial && !authenticated) {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++				/* If gssapi-with-mic failed, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC is disabled.
++				 * We have to reenable it to try again for gssapi-keyex */
++				if (strcmp(auth_method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 && options.gss_keyex)
++					monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++#endif
+ 				authctxt->failures++;
++			}
+ 			if (authenticated || partial) {
+ 				auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
+ 				    auth_method, auth_submethod);

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-host-based-auth.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+--- a/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-11 17:00:02.618575727 +0200
++++ b/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-11 17:03:05.096085690 +0200
+@@ -2288,9 +2288,9 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL ||
+ 			    authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ 				continue;
+-			if (match_pattern_list(
++			if (!sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(
+ 			    sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]),
+-			    authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1)
++			    authctxt->active_ktype))
+ 				continue;
+ 			/* we take and free the key */
+ 			private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i];
+@@ -2316,7 +2316,8 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	debug_f("trying hostkey %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
++	debug_f("trying hostkey %s %s using sigalg %s",
++		sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp, authctxt->active_ktype);
+ 
+ 	/* figure out a name for the client host */
+ 	lname = get_local_name(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+diff --color -rup a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+--- a/sshkey.c	2022-07-11 17:00:02.609575554 +0200
++++ b/sshkey.c	2022-07-11 17:12:30.905976443 +0200
+@@ -252,6 +252,29 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *n
+ 	return -1;
+ }
+ 
++int
++sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(const char *keyname, const char *sigalgs)
++{
++	int ktype;
++
++	if (sigalgs == NULL || *sigalgs == '\0' ||
++	    (ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(keyname)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
++		return 0;
++	else if (ktype == KEY_RSA) {
++		return match_pattern_list("ssh-rsa", sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
++		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
++		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", sigalgs, 0) == 1;
++	} else if (ktype == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
++		return match_pattern_list("ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
++		    sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
++		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
++		    sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
++		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com",
++		    sigalgs, 0) == 1;
++	} else
++		return match_pattern_list(keyname, sigalgs, 0) == 1;
++}
++
+ char *
+ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
+ {
+diff --color -rup a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
+--- a/sshkey.h	2022-07-11 17:00:02.603575438 +0200
++++ b/sshkey.h	2022-07-11 17:13:01.052556879 +0200
+@@ -194,6 +194,10 @@ int	 sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey
+ int	 sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
+ int	 sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
+ int	 sshkey_type_plain(int);
++
++/* Returns non-zero if key name match sigalgs pattern list. (handles RSA) */
++int	 sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(const char *, const char *);
++
+ int	 sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *);
+ int	 sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *);
+ int	 sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *);
+diff --color -rup a/ssh-keysign.c b/ssh-keysign.c
+--- a/ssh-keysign.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ b/ssh-keysign.c	2022-07-11 17:00:23.306973667 +0200
+@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
+ static int
+-valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret,
++valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret, char **pkalgp,
+     u_char *data, size_t datalen)
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *b;
+@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *h
+ 
+ 	if (ret != NULL)
+ 		*ret = NULL;
++	if (pkalgp != NULL)
++		*pkalgp = NULL;
+ 	fail = 0;
+ 
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
+@@ -122,8 +124,6 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *h
+ 		fail++;
+ 	} else if (key->type != pktype)
+ 		fail++;
+-	free(pkalg);
+-	free(pkblob);
+ 
+ 	/* client host name, handle trailing dot */
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
+@@ -154,8 +154,19 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *h
+ 
+ 	if (fail)
+ 		sshkey_free(key);
+-	else if (ret != NULL)
+-		*ret = key;
++	else {
++		if (ret != NULL) {
++			*ret = key;
++			key = NULL;
++		}
++		if (pkalgp != NULL) {
++			*pkalgp = pkalg;
++			pkalg = NULL;
++		}
++	}
++	sshkey_free(key);
++	free(pkalg);
++	free(pkblob);
+ 
+ 	return (fail ? -1 : 0);
+ }
+@@ -170,7 +181,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	struct passwd *pw;
+ 	int r, key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd;
+ 	u_char *signature, *data, rver;
+-	char *host, *fp;
++	char *host, *fp, *pkalg;
+ 	size_t slen, dlen;
+ 
+ 	if (pledge("stdio rpath getpw dns id", NULL) != 0)
+@@ -258,7 +269,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_r(r, "%s: buffer error", __progname);
+-	if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0)
++	if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, &pkalg, data, dlen) < 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: not a valid request", __progname);
+ 	free(host);
+ 
+@@ -279,7 +290,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen,
+-	    NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
++	    pkalg, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_r(r, "%s: sshkey_sign failed", __progname);
+ 	free(data);
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+--- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c.orig	2022-04-12 15:47:03.815044607 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c	2022-04-12 15:48:12.464963511 +0200
+@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+-#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
++#if (!defined HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/param.h>
+

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-mem-leak.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+diff --color -rup a/compat.c b/compat.c
+--- a/compat.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ b/compat.c	2022-07-14 17:39:23.770268440 +0200
+@@ -157,11 +157,12 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
+ 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
+ }
+ 
++/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+ char *
+ compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *cipher_prop)
+ {
+ 	if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
+-		return cipher_prop;
++		return xstrdup(cipher_prop);
+ 	debug2_f("original cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop);
+ 	if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_denylist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+@@ -171,11 +172,12 @@ compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh,
+ 	return cipher_prop;
+ }
+ 
++/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+ char *
+ compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *pkalg_prop)
+ {
+ 	if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
+-		return pkalg_prop;
++		return xstrdup(pkalg_prop);
+ 	debug2_f("original public key proposal: %s", pkalg_prop);
+ 	if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_denylist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+@@ -185,21 +187,26 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, c
+ 	return pkalg_prop;
+ }
+ 
++/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+ char *
+ compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *p)
+ {
++	char *cp = NULL;
++
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
+-		return p;
++		return xstrdup(p);
+ 	debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
+ 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
+ 		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
+ 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
++		cp = p;
+ 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
+ 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
+ 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
+ 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
++		free(cp);
+ 	}
+ 	debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", p);
+ 	if (*p == '\0')
+diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+--- a/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 17:38:43.241496549 +0200
++++ b/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 17:39:23.772268479 +0200
+@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ 	char *s, *all_key;
++	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
+ 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+@@ -252,10 +253,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 
+ 	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+-	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
++	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
+ 	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] =
+@@ -264,12 +264,12 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+ 	if (use_known_hosts_order) {
+ 		/* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
+-		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
+ 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh,
+ 		    order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo));
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
+-		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
+ 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -383,6 +383,10 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+ #endif
++	/* Free only parts of proposal that were dynamically allocated here. */
++	free(prop_kex);
++	free(prop_enc);
++	free(prop_hostkey);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff --color -rup a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+--- a/sshd.c	2022-07-14 17:38:43.242496568 +0200
++++ b/sshd.c	2022-07-14 17:42:07.616388978 +0200
+@@ -2493,14 +2493,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
+ 	struct kex *kex;
++	char *hostkey_types = NULL;
++	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
+ 	    options.kex_algorithms);
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
+-	    options.ciphers);
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
+-	    options.ciphers);
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
++	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
++	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+ 
+@@ -2513,8 +2514,10 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
+ 		    options.rekey_interval);
+ 
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
+-	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
++	hostkey_types = list_hostkey_types();
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
++	    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, hostkey_types);
++	free(hostkey_types);
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	{
+@@ -2606,6 +2609,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "send test");
+ #endif
++	free(prop_kex);
++	free(prop_enc);
++	free(prop_hostkey);
+ 	debug("KEX done");
+ }
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+diff --color -ru a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+--- a/clientloop.c	2022-06-29 16:35:06.677597259 +0200
++++ b/clientloop.c	2022-06-29 16:40:29.737926205 +0200
+@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ #endif
+ 
++/* Permitted RSA signature algorithms for UpdateHostkeys proofs */
++#define HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS	"rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
++
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
+ 
+@@ -2110,8 +2113,10 @@
+ 	struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
+ 	size_t i, ndone;
+ 	struct sshbuf *signdata;
+-	int r, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype;
++	int r, plaintype;
+ 	const u_char *sig;
++	const char *rsa_kexalg = NULL;
++	char *alg = NULL;
+ 	size_t siglen;
+ 
+ 	if (ctx->nnew == 0)
+@@ -2122,9 +2127,9 @@
+ 		hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+-	kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
+-	    sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
+-
++	if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
++	    ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
++		rsa_kexalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
+ 	if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ 	/*
+@@ -2135,6 +2140,7 @@
+ 	for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+ 		if (ctx->keys_match[i])
+ 			continue;
++		plaintype = sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type);
+ 		/* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */
+ 		sshbuf_reset(signdata);
+ 		if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata,
+@@ -2148,19 +2154,33 @@
+ 			error_fr(r, "parse sig");
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
++		if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &alg)) != 0) {
++			error_fr(r, "server gave unintelligible signature "
++				"for %s key %zu", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
++			goto out;
++		}
+ 		/*
+-		 * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
+-		 * during KEX to the default (SHA1).
++		 * Special case for RSA keys: if a RSA hostkey was negotiated,
++		 * then use its signature type for verification of RSA hostkey
++		 * proofs. Otherwise, accept only RSA-SHA256/512 signatures.
+ 		 */
+-		use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
+-		    sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type) == KEY_RSA;
+-		debug3_f("verify %s key %zu using %s sigalg",
+-		    sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i,
+-		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : "default");
++		if (plaintype == KEY_RSA && rsa_kexalg == NULL &&
++		    match_pattern_list(alg, HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS, 0) != 1) {
++			debug_f("server used untrusted RSA signature algorithm "
++				"%s for key %zu, disregarding", alg, i);
++			free(alg);
++			/* zap the key from the list */
++			sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]);
++			ctx->keys[i] = NULL;
++			ndone++;
++			continue;
++		}
++		debug3_f("verify %s key %zu using sigalg %s",
++			sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i, alg);
++		free(alg);
+ 		if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen,
+ 		    sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata),
+-		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0,
+-		    NULL)) != 0) {
++		    plaintype == KEY_RSA ? rsa_kexalg : NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) {
+ 			error_fr(r, "server gave bad signature for %s key %zu",
+ 			    sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
+ 			goto out;
+diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
+index a035b381..bd49e3ac 100644
+--- a/hostfile.c
++++ b/hostfile.c
+@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip,
+ 	/* Re-add the requested keys */
+ 	want = HKF_MATCH_HOST | (ip == NULL ? 0 : HKF_MATCH_IP);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+-		if ((want & ctx.match_keys[i]) == want)
++		if (keys[i] == NULL || (want & ctx.match_keys[i]) == want)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg,
+ 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+diff --color -ru a/kex.c b/kex.c
+--- a/kex.c	2022-06-29 16:35:06.775599179 +0200
++++ b/kex.c	2022-06-29 16:42:00.839710940 +0200
+@@ -959,6 +959,18 @@
+ 	return (1);
+ }
+ 
++/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
++static int
++has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
++{
++	char *cp;
++
++	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
++		return 0;
++	free(cp);
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ static int
+ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+@@ -994,6 +1006,16 @@
+ 		free(ext);
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
++	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
++		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++		    "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
++			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED;
++		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++		    "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
++			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED;
++	}
++
+ 	/* Algorithm Negotiation */
+ 	if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+ 	    sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
+diff --color -ru a/kex.h b/kex.h
+--- a/kex.h	2022-06-29 16:35:06.766599003 +0200
++++ b/kex.h	2022-06-29 16:42:24.199168567 +0200
+@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@
+ 
+ #define KEX_INIT_SENT	0x0001
+ #define KEX_INITIAL	0x0002
++#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED      0x0008 /* only set in server for now */
++#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED      0x0010 /* only set in server for now */
+ 
+ struct sshenc {
+ 	char	*name;
+diff --color -ru a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+--- a/serverloop.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ b/serverloop.c	2022-06-29 16:45:05.902336428 +0200
+@@ -684,16 +684,18 @@
+ 	struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
+ 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
+-	int r, ndx, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype, success = 0;
++	int r, ndx, success = 0;
+ 	const u_char *blob;
++	const char *sigalg, *kex_rsa_sigalg = NULL;
+ 	u_char *sig = 0;
+ 	size_t blen, slen;
+ 
+ 	if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+ 
+-	kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
+-	    sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
++	if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
++	    ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
++		kex_rsa_sigalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
+ 	while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
+ 		sshkey_free(key);
+ 		key = NULL;
+@@ -726,16 +728,24 @@
+ 		 * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
+ 		 * during KEX to the default (SHA1).
+ 		 */
+-		use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
+-		    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA;
++		sigalg = NULL;
++		if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
++			if (kex_rsa_sigalg != NULL)
++				sigalg = kex_rsa_sigalg;
++			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED)
++				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
++				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
++		}
++		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
++		sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
+ 		    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(sigbuf,
+ 		    ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
+-		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf),
+-		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL)) != 0 ||
++		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), sigalg)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
+ 			error_fr(r, "assemble signature");
+ 			goto out;

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
+diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
+index 36b9d2f5..6b517db4 100644
+--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -119,6 +119,11 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+ 		    "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
++	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
++	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++		logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
++		goto done;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+ 		debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index 962fd342..5d59febc 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -175,6 +175,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+ 		    "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
++	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
++	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++		logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
++		goto done;
++	}
+ 	key_s = format_key(key);
+ 	if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
+ 		ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 7f26c680..42be690b 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
+ 	oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+ 	oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump,
+-	oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand,
++	oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand, oRequiredRSASize,
+ 	oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
+ } OpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -320,6 +320,8 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
+ 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
++	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
++	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
+ 
+ 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
+ };
+@@ -2176,6 +2177,10 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
+ 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case oRequiredRSASize:
++		intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
++		goto parse_int;
++
+ 	case oDeprecated:
+ 		debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
+ 		    filename, linenum, keyword);
+@@ -2423,6 +2428,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL;
+ 	options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL;
+ 	options->known_hosts_command = NULL;
++	options->required_rsa_size = -1;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -2619,6 +2625,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 	if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
+ 		options->sk_provider = xstrdup("$SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
+ #endif
++	if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
++		options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
+ 
+ 	/* Expand KEX name lists */
+ 	all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
+@@ -3308,6 +3316,7 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
+ 	dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval);
++	dump_cfg_int(oRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
+ 
+ 	/* String options */
+ 	dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address);
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+index f647bd42..ffb5ec4f 100644
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 
+ 	char   *known_hosts_command;
+ 
++	int	required_rsa_size;	/* minimum size of RSA keys */
++
+ 	char	*ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
+ }       Options;
+ 
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 29df0463..423772b1 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+ 	options->disable_forwarding = -1;
+ 	options->expose_userauth_info = -1;
++	options->required_rsa_size = -1;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
+@@ -441,6 +442,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 		options->expose_userauth_info = 0;
+ 	if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
+ 		options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
++	if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
++		options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
+ 
+ 	assemble_algorithms(options);
+ 
+@@ -517,6 +520,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
+ 	sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
+ 	sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
++	sRequiredRSASize,
+ 	sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -676,6 +680,8 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
+ 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -2438,6 +2443,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sRequiredRSASize:
++		intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
++		goto parse_int;
++
+ 	case sDeprecated:
+ 	case sIgnore:
+ 	case sUnsupported:
+@@ -2610,6 +2619,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(required_rsa_size);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
+@@ -2874,6 +2884,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
++	dump_cfg_int(sRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
+ 	dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
+ 
+ 	/* formatted integer arguments */
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 8a04463e..9346155c 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int	expose_userauth_info;
+ 	u_int64_t timing_secret;
+ 	char   *sk_provider;
++	int	required_rsa_size;	/* minimum size of RSA keys */
+ }       ServerOptions;
+ 
+ /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 559bf2af..25be53d5 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -516,14 +516,22 @@ resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and
+- * fatal()ing for others.
++ * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and either
++ * discarding the key or fatal()ing for others.
+  */
+ static void
+-check_load(int r, const char *path, const char *message)
++check_load(int r, struct sshkey **k, const char *path, const char *message)
+ {
+ 	switch (r) {
+ 	case 0:
++		/* Check RSA keys size and discard if undersized */
++		if (k != NULL && *k != NULL &&
++		    (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(*k,
++		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++			error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
++			free(*k);
++			*k = NULL;
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+ 	case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
+@@ -1578,7 +1586,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
+ 		fatal_f("pubkey out of array bounds"); \
+ 	check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \
+-	    p, "pubkey"); \
++	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "pubkey"); \
+ } while (0)
+ #define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
+ 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
+@@ -1586,7 +1594,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
+ 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
+ 		fatal_f("cert out of array bounds"); \
+-	check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), p, "cert"); \
++	check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), \
++	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "cert"); \
+ } while (0)
+ 
+ 		if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) {
+@@ -2244,7 +2253,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
+ 		free(cp);
+ 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
+-		    filename, "pubkey");
++		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
+ 		debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
+ 		    public ? public->type : -1);
+ 		free(options.identity_files[i]);
+@@ -2284,7 +2293,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 			continue;
+ 		xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
+ 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL),
+-		    filename, "pubkey");
++		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
+ 		debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
+ 		    public ? public->type : -1);
+ 		if (public == NULL) {
+@@ -2315,7 +2324,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 		free(cp);
+ 
+ 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
+-		    filename, "certificate");
++		    &public, filename, "certificate");
+ 		debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename,
+ 		    public ? public->type : -1);
+ 		free(options.certificate_files[i]);
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index f9bd19ea..58fe98db 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info;
+ static int
+ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
++	int r;
++
++	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(hostkey,
++	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0)
++		fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key");
+ 	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
+ 	    xxx_conn_info) == -1)
+ 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
+@@ -1606,6 +1611,13 @@ load_identity_file(Identity *id)
+ 			private = NULL;
+ 			quit = 1;
+ 		}
++		if (!quit && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(private,
++		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++			debug_fr(r, "Skipping key %s", id->filename);
++			sshkey_free(private);
++			private = NULL;
++			quit = 1;
++		}
+ 		if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
+ 		    !(id->key && id->isprivate))
+ 			maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment,
+@@ -1752,6 +1764,12 @@ pubkey_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+		close(agent_fd);
+	} else {
+ 		for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) {
++			if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(idlist->keys[j],
++			    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++				debug_fr(r, "ignoring %s agent key",
++				    sshkey_ssh_name(idlist->keys[j]));
++				continue;
++			}
+ 			found = 0;
+ 			TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
+ 				/*
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 17eee9d8..395ef493 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1870,6 +1870,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 				fatal_r(r, "Could not demote key: \"%s\"",
+ 				    options.host_key_files[i]);
+ 		}
++		if (pubkey != NULL && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(pubkey,
++		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++			error_fr(r, "Host key %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
++			sshkey_free(pubkey);
++			sshkey_free(key);
++			continue;
++		}
+ 		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
+ 		sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
+ 
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index ed2b5dff..77093235 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -2365,18 +2365,24 @@ cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf)
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+-static int
+-check_rsa_length(const RSA *rsa)
++int
++sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *k, int min_size)
+ {
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
++	int nbits;
+ 
+-	RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
++	if (k == NULL || k->rsa == NULL ||
++	    (k->type != KEY_RSA && k->type != KEY_RSA_CERT))
++		return 0;
++	RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
++	nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa_n);
++	if (nbits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
++	    (min_size > 0 && nbits < min_size))
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+-#endif
+ 
+ static int
+ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
+@@ -2439,7 +2445,7 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
+-		if ((ret = check_rsa_length(key->rsa)) != 0)
++		if ((ret = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key, 0)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+ #ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ 		RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
+@@ -3642,7 +3648,7 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
+-		if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0)
++		if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(k, 0)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+ 		if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+@@ -4644,7 +4650,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+ 			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+-		if ((r = check_rsa_length(prv->rsa)) != 0)
++		if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(prv, 0)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+ 	} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
+ 	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
+diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
+index 094815e0..be254e6b 100644
+--- a/sshkey.h
++++ b/sshkey.h
+@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ int	sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+ int	sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob,
+     int type, struct sshkey **pubkeyp);
+ 
++int sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *, int);
+ /* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */
+ int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *, const BIGNUM *);
+ 
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index b4956aec..e255b9b9 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
++++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -571,6 +571,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It RemoteCommand
+ .It RemoteForward
+ .It RequestTTY
++.It RequiredRSASize
+ .It SendEnv
+ .It ServerAliveInterval
+ .It ServerAliveCountMax
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 24a46460..d1ede18e 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -1634,6 +1634,17 @@ and
+ .Fl T
+ flags for
+ .Xr ssh 1 .
++.It Cm RequiredRSASize
++Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
++.Xr ssh 1
++will accept.
++User authentication keys smaller than this limit will be ignored.
++Servers that present host keys smaller than this limit will cause the
++connection to be terminated.
++The default is
++.Cm 1024
++bits.
++Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
+ .It Cm RevokedHostKeys
+ Specifies revoked host public keys.
+ Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication.
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 867a747d..f5a06637 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1596,6 +1596,16 @@ is
+ .Cm default none ,
+ which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
+ of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
++.It Cm RequiredRSASize
++Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
++.Xr sshd 8
++will accept.
++User and host-based authentication keys smaller than this limit will be
++refused.
++The default is
++.Cm 1024
++bits.
++Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
+ .It Cm RevokedKeys
+ Specifies revoked public keys file, or
+ .Cm none

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+diff --color -rup a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+--- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2022-07-14 11:58:12.172786060 +0200
+@@ -13,8 +13,12 @@ r=$?
+ grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+ echo "HostKeyAgent $SSH_AUTH_SOCK" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+ 
++PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS=`$SSH -G "example.com" | \
++    grep -i "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" | cut -d ' ' -f2- | tr "," "|"`
++SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
++
+ trace "load hostkeys"
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+ 	(
+ 		printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
+@@ -31,7 +35,7 @@ cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_host
+ unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ 
+ for ps in yes; do
+-	for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++	for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 		verbose "key type $k privsep=$ps"
+ 		cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 		echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+--- a/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 10:10:07.262975710 +0200
++++ b/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 10:10:32.068452067 +0200
+@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ 	char *s, *all_key;
++	char *hostkeyalgs = NULL, *pkalg = NULL;
+ 	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
+ 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
+ 
+@@ -264,14 +265,19 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+ 	if (use_known_hosts_order) {
+ 		/* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
+-		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
+-		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh,
+-		    order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo));
++		if ((hostkeyalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo)) == NULL)
++			fatal_f("order_hostkeyalgs");
++		pkalg = match_filter_allowlist(hostkeyalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++		free(hostkeyalgs);
+ 	} else {
+-		/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
+-		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
+-		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
++		/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms */
++		pkalg = match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
+ 	}
++	if (pkalg == NULL)
++		fatal_f("match_filter_allowlist");
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
++	    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, pkalg);
++	free(pkalg);
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.scp-sftpdirs	2022-02-07 12:31:07.407740407 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2022-02-07 12:31:07.409740424 +0100
+@@ -1324,7 +1324,7 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
+ 
+ 	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
+ 		if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
+-		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
++		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
+ 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
+ 				src, abs_dst);
+ 			errs = 1;
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c.scp-sftpdirs	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c	2022-02-07 12:47:59.117516131 +0100
+@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 
+ /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
+ static char *
+-do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
++do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir)
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	u_int expected_id, count, id;
+@@ -1012,9 +1012,38 @@ do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *con
+ 
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+-		error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
+-		sshbuf_free(msg);
+-		return NULL;
++		if ((status == SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) && create_dir)  {
++			memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
++			if ((r = do_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) {
++				sshbuf_free(msg);
++				return NULL;
++			}
++
++			send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH,
++					path, strlen(path));
++
++			get_msg(conn, msg);
++			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
++					(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
++				fatal_fr(r, "parse");
++
++			if (id != expected_id)
++				fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
++
++			if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
++				u_int status;
++
++				if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
++					fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
++				error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
++				sshbuf_free(msg);
++				return NULL;
++			}
++		} else {
++			error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
++			sshbuf_free(msg);
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+ 		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+ 		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+@@ -1039,9 +1067,9 @@ do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *con
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+-do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
++do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
+ {
+-	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
++	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -1055,9 +1083,9 @@ do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, c
+ {
+ 	if (!can_expand_path(conn)) {
+ 		debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
+-		return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
++		return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0);
+ 	}
+-	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
++	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -1807,7 +1835,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, con
+ 	char *src_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
++	if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2115,12 +2143,12 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
+ int
+ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+-    int follow_link_flag)
++    int follow_link_flag, int create_dir)
+ {
+ 	char *dst_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
++	if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2557,7 +2585,7 @@ crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, st
+ 	char *from_path_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
++	if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", from_path);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h.scp-sftpdirs	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h	2022-02-07 12:31:07.410740433 +0100
+@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, cons
+ int do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
+-char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
++char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
+ char *do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+ int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int,
+-    int, int);
++    int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c.scp-sftpdirs	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c	2022-02-07 12:31:07.411740442 +0100
+@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ 			if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+@@ -1577,7 +1577,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn
+ 		if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
+ 			path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
+ 		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+-		if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
++		if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 			err = 1;
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+@@ -2160,7 +2160,7 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn,
+ 	}
+ #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+ 
+-	remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".");
++	remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".", 0);
+ 	if (remote_path == NULL)
+ 		fatal("Need cwd");
+ 	startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-clears-file.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+diff --color -rup a/scp.c b/scp.c
+--- a/scp.c	2022-07-26 14:51:40.560120817 +0200
++++ b/scp.c	2022-07-26 14:52:37.118213004 +0200
+@@ -1324,12 +1324,12 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
+ 
+ 	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
+ 		if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
+-		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
++		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
+ 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
+ 				src, abs_dst);
+ 			errs = 1;
+ 		}
+-	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0) {
++	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
+ 		error("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst);
+ 		errs = 1;
+ 	}
+@@ -1566,11 +1566,11 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
+ 		debug("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+ 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && iamrecursive) {
+ 			if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+-			    pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) == -1)
++			    pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+-			    pflag, 0, 0) == -1)
++			    pflag, 0, 0, 1) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		}
+ 		free(abs_dst);
+diff --color -rup a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+--- a/sftp.c	2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
++++ b/sftp.c	2022-07-26 14:52:37.119213023 +0200
+@@ -666,12 +666,12 @@ process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ 			if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		}
+ 		free(abs_dst);
+@@ -760,12 +760,12 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ 			if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+diff --color -rup a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
+--- a/sftp-client.c	2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
++++ b/sftp-client.c	2022-07-26 15:09:54.825295533 +0200
+@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ progress_meter_path(const char *path)
+ int
+ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path,
+     const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag,
+-    int fsync_flag)
++    int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag)
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	u_char *handle;
+@@ -1498,8 +1498,8 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 	    &handle, &handle_len) != 0)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	local_fd = open(local_path,
+-	    O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
++	local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT |
++	((resume_flag || inplace_flag) ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
+ 	if (local_fd == -1) {
+ 		error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s",
+ 		    local_path, strerror(errno));
+@@ -1661,8 +1661,11 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 	/* Sanity check */
+ 	if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL)
+ 		fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue");
+-	/* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */
+-	if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
++	/*
++	 * Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt,
++	 * or unconditionally if writing in place.
++	 */
++	if (inplace_flag || read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
+ 		if (reordered && resume_flag) {
+ 			error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
+ 			    "server reordered requests", local_path);
+@@ -1724,7 +1727,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ static int
+ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
+-    int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag)
++    int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
+ {
+ 	int i, ret = 0;
+ 	SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries;
+@@ -1781,7 +1784,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
+ 			if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+ 			    depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
+ 			    print_flag, resume_flag,
+-			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
++			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1)
+ 				ret = -1;
+ 		} else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ||
+ 		    (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm))) {
+@@ -1793,7 +1796,8 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
+ 			if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+ 			    S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ? NULL :
+ 			    &(dir_entries[i]->a),
+-			    preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) {
++			    preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag,
++			    inplace_flag) == -1) {
+ 				error("Download of file %s to %s failed",
+ 				    new_src, new_dst);
+ 				ret = -1;
+@@ -1831,7 +1835,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
+ int
+ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag,
+-    int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag)
++    int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
+ {
+ 	char *src_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+@@ -1843,26 +1847,25 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, con
+ 
+ 	ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0,
+ 	    dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag,
+-	    follow_link_flag);
++	    follow_link_flag, inplace_flag);
+ 	free(src_canon);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path,
+-    const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
++    const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume,
++    int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag)
+ {
+ 	int r, local_fd;
+-	u_int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+-	u_int id;
+-	u_char type;
++	u_int openmode, id, status = SSH2_FX_OK, reordered = 0;
+ 	off_t offset, progress_counter;
+-	u_char *handle, *data;
++	u_char type, *handle, *data;
+ 	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	struct stat sb;
+-	Attrib a, *c = NULL;
+-	u_int32_t startid;
+-	u_int32_t ackid;
++	Attrib a, t, *c = NULL;
++	u_int32_t startid, ackid;
++	u_int64_t highwater = 0;
+ 	struct request *ack = NULL;
+ 	struct requests acks;
+ 	size_t handle_len;
+@@ -1913,10 +1916,15 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++	openmode = SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT;
++	if (resume)
++		openmode |= SSH2_FXF_APPEND;
++	else if (!inplace_flag)
++		openmode |= SSH2_FXF_TRUNC;
++
+ 	/* Send open request */
+-	if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|
+-	    (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC),
+-	    &a, &handle, &handle_len) != 0) {
++	if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", openmode, &a,
++	    &handle, &handle_len) != 0) {
+ 		close(local_fd);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -1999,6 +2007,12 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
+ 			    ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset);
+ 			++ackid;
+ 			progress_counter += ack->len;
++			if (!reordered && ack->offset <= highwater)
++				highwater = ack->offset + ack->len;
++			else if (!reordered && ack->offset > highwater) {
++				debug3_f("server reordered ACKs");
++				reordered = 1;
++			}
+ 			free(ack);
+ 		}
+ 		offset += len;
+@@ -2017,6 +2031,14 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
+ 		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (inplace_flag || (resume && (status != SSH2_FX_OK || interrupted))) {
++		debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater);
++		attrib_clear(&t);
++		t.flags = SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
++		t.size = highwater;
++		do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &t);
++	}
++
+ 	if (close(local_fd) == -1) {
+ 		error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+ 		    strerror(errno));
+@@ -2041,7 +2063,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
+ static int
+ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+-    int follow_link_flag)
++    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 	DIR *dirp;
+@@ -2119,12 +2141,13 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
+ 
+ 			if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+ 			    depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume,
+-			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
++			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1)
+ 				ret = -1;
+ 		} else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode) ||
+ 		    (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode))) {
+ 			if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+-			    preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) {
++			    preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag,
++			    inplace_flag) == -1) {
+ 				error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!",
+ 				    new_src, new_dst);
+ 				ret = -1;
+@@ -2144,7 +2167,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
+ int
+ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+-    int follow_link_flag, int create_dir)
++    int follow_link_flag, int create_dir, int inplace_flag)
+ {
+ 	char *dst_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+@@ -2155,7 +2178,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag,
+-	    print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag);
++	    print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag);
+ 
+ 	free(dst_canon);
+ 	return ret;
+diff --color -rup a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
+--- a/sftp-client.h	2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
++++ b/sftp-client.h	2022-07-26 14:52:37.120213042 +0200
+@@ -138,28 +138,29 @@ int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_c
+  * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+  * if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+-    Attrib *, int, int, int);
++int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *,
++    int, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+-    Attrib *, int, int, int, int, int);
++int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *,
++    int, int, int, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+  * if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int);
++int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
++    int, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int,
+-    int, int, int);
++int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
++    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp	2021-09-16 11:37:57.240171687 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h	2021-09-16 11:42:29.183427917 +0200
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
+ #define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key"
+ #define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
+ #define _PATH_DH_MODULI			SSHDIR "/moduli"
++#define _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH		SSHDIR "/disable_scp"
+ 
+ #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
+ #define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM		"/usr/bin/ssh"
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
+--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp	2021-09-16 12:09:02.646714578 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.1	2021-09-16 12:26:49.978628226 +0200
+@@ -278,6 +278,13 @@ to print debugging messages about their
+ This is helpful in
+ debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+ .El
++.Pp
++Usage of SCP protocol can be blocked by creating a world-readable
++.Ar /etc/ssh/disable_scp
++file. If this file exists, when SCP protocol is in use (either remotely or 
++via the
++.Fl O
++option), the program will exit.
+ .Sh EXIT STATUS
+ .Ex -std scp
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp	2021-09-16 11:42:56.013650519 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-09-16 11:53:03.249713836 +0200
+@@ -596,6 +596,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	if (iamremote)
+ 		mode = MODE_SCP;
+ 
++	if (mode == MODE_SCP) {
++		FILE *f = fopen(_PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH, "r");
++		if (f != NULL) {
++			fclose(f);
++			fatal("SCP protocol is forbidden via %s", _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH);
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
+index 68aac04b..a96e95ad 100644
+--- a/scp.1
++++ b/scp.1
+@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
+ .\"
+ .\" Created: Sun May  7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
+ .\"
+-.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.100 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $
++.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.101 2021/09/08 23:31:39 djm Exp $
+ .\"
+-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 11 2021 $
++.Dd $Mdocdate: September 8 2021 $
+ .Dt SCP 1
+ .Os
+ .Sh NAME
+@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
+ .Nd OpenSSH secure file copy
+ .Sh SYNOPSIS
+ .Nm scp
+-.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTv
++.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrTv
+ .Op Fl c Ar cipher
+ .Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
+ .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+@@ -37,9 +37,6 @@ It uses
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the
+ same security as a login session.
+-The scp protocol requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
+-.Xr glob 3
+-pattern matching.
+ .Pp
+ .Nm
+ will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
+@@ -79,7 +76,9 @@ The options are as follows:
+ Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host.
+ Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote
+ hosts.
+-Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (the default), this option
++Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (via the
++.Fl O
++flag), this option
+ selects batch mode for the second host as
+ .Nm
+ cannot ask for passwords or passphrases for both hosts.
+@@ -146,9 +145,10 @@ Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+ .It Fl O
+ Use the legacy SCP protocol for file transfers instead of the SFTP protocol.
+ Forcing the use of the SCP protocol may be necessary for servers that do
+-not implement SFTP or for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
+-wildcard patterns.
+-This mode is the default.
++not implement SFTP, for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
++wildcard patterns and for expanding paths with a
++.Sq ~
++prefix for older SFTP servers.
+ .It Fl o Ar ssh_option
+ Can be used to pass options to
+ .Nm ssh
+@@ -258,16 +258,6 @@ to use for the encrypted connection.
+ The program must understand
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ options.
+-.It Fl s
+-Use the SFTP protocol for file transfers instead of the legacy SCP protocol.
+-Using SFTP avoids invoking a shell on the remote side and provides
+-more predictable filename handling, as the SCP protocol
+-relied on the remote shell for expanding
+-.Xr glob 3
+-wildcards.
+-.Pp
+-A near-future release of OpenSSH will make the SFTP protocol the default.
+-This option will be deleted before the end of 2022.
+ .It Fl T
+ Disable strict filename checking.
+ By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
+@@ -299,11 +289,23 @@ debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+ .Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+ .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
+ .Xr sshd 8
++.Sh CAVEATS
++The original scp protocol (selected by the
++.Fl O
++flag) requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
++.Xr glob 3
++pattern matching.
++This requires careful quoting of any characters that have special meaning to
++the remote shell, such as quote characters.
+ .Sh HISTORY
+ .Nm
+ is based on the rcp program in
+ .Bx
+ source code from the Regents of the University of California.
++.Pp
++Since OpenSSH 8.8 (8.7 in Red Hat/Fedora builds),
++.Nm
++has use the SFTP protocol for transfers by default.
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ .An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi
+ .An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index e039350c..c7cf7529 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.232 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.233 2021/09/08 23:31:39 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * scp - secure remote copy.  This is basically patched BSD rcp which
+  * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
+@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	const char *errstr;
+ 	extern char *optarg;
+ 	extern int optind;
+-	enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SCP;
++	enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SFTP;
+ 	char *sftp_direct = NULL;
+ 
+ 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+@@ -1983,7 +1983,7 @@ void
+ usage(void)
+ {
+ 	(void) fprintf(stderr,
+-	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
++	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
+ 	    "           [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit]\n"
+ 	    "           [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] source ... target\n");
+ 	exit(1);

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sftpscp-dir-create.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.sftpdirs	2022-02-02 14:11:12.553447509 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2022-02-02 14:12:56.081316414 +0100
+@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "progressmeter.h"
+ #include "utf8.h"
++#include "sftp.h"
+ 
+ #include "sftp-common.h"
+ #include "sftp-client.h"
+@@ -660,7 +661,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	 * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked
+ 	 * and no error has occurred yet
+ 	 */
+-	if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) {
++	if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && (mode == MODE_SFTP || errs == 0)) {
+ 		if (remin != -1)
+ 		    (void) close(remin);
+ 		if (remout != -1)
+@@ -1264,13 +1265,18 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_
+ static char *
+ prepare_remote_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
++	size_t nslash;
++
+ 	/* Handle ~ prefixed paths */
+-	if (*path != '~')
+-		return xstrdup(path);
+ 	if (*path == '\0' || strcmp(path, "~") == 0)
+ 		return xstrdup(".");
+-	if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0)
+-		return xstrdup(path + 2);
++	if (*path != '~')
++		return xstrdup(path);
++	if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0) {
++		if ((nslash = strspn(path + 2, "/")) == strlen(path + 2))
++			return xstrdup(".");
++		return xstrdup(path + 2 + nslash);
++	}
+ 	if (can_expand_path(conn))
+ 		return do_expand_path(conn, path);
+ 	/* No protocol extension */
+@@ -1282,10 +1288,16 @@ void
+ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn)
+ {
+ 	char *target = NULL, *filename = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL;
+-	int target_is_dir;
+-
++	int src_is_dir, target_is_dir;
++	Attrib a;
++	struct stat st;
++
++	memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
++	if (stat(src, &st) != 0)
++		fatal("stat local \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
++	src_is_dir = S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
+ 	if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL)
+-		fatal("basename %s: %s", src, strerror(errno));
++		fatal("basename \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * No need to glob here - the local shell already took care of
+@@ -1295,8 +1307,12 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
+ 		cleanup_exit(255);
+ 	target_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, target);
+ 	if (targetshouldbedirectory && !target_is_dir) {
+-		fatal("Target is not a directory, but more files selected "
+-		    "for upload");
++		debug("target directory \"%s\" does not exist", target);
++		a.flags = SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
++		a.perm = st.st_mode | 0700; /* ensure writable */
++		if (do_mkdir(conn, target, &a, 1) != 0)
++			cleanup_exit(255); /* error already logged */
++		target_is_dir = 1;
+ 	}
+ 	if (target_is_dir)
+ 		abs_dst = path_append(target, filename);
+@@ -1306,14 +1322,17 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
+ 	}
+ 	debug3_f("copying local %s to remote %s", src, abs_dst);
+ 
+-	if (local_is_dir(src) && iamrecursive) {
++	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
+ 		if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
+ 		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
+-			fatal("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
++			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
+ 				src, abs_dst);
++			errs = 1;
+ 		}
+-	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0)
+-		fatal("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst);
++	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0) {
++		error("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst);
++		errs = 1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	free(abs_dst);
+ 	free(target);
+@@ -1487,14 +1506,15 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
+ 	char *abs_dst = NULL;
+ 	glob_t g;
+ 	char *filename, *tmp = NULL;
+-	int i, r, err = 0;
++	int i, r, err = 0, dst_is_dir;
++	struct stat st;
+ 
+ 	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Here, we need remote glob as SFTP can not depend on remote shell
+ 	 * expansions
+ 	 */
+-
+ 	if ((abs_src = prepare_remote_path(conn, src)) == NULL) {
+ 		err = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -1510,11 +1530,24 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && !local_is_dir(dst)) {
+-		error("Multiple files match pattern, but destination "
+-		    "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
+-		err = -1;
+-		goto out;
++	if ((r = stat(dst, &st)) != 0)
++		debug2_f("stat local \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno));
++	dst_is_dir = r == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
++
++	if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && !dst_is_dir) {
++		if (r == 0) {
++			error("Multiple files match pattern, but destination "
++			    "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
++			err = -1;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		debug2_f("creating destination \"%s\"", dst);
++		if (mkdir(dst, 0777) != 0) {
++			error("local mkdir \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno));
++			err = -1;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		dst_is_dir = 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+@@ -1525,7 +1558,7 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (local_is_dir(dst))
++		if (dst_is_dir)
+ 			abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
+ 		else
+ 			abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
+@@ -1551,7 +1584,8 @@ out:
+ 	free(tmp);
+ 	globfree(&g);
+ 	if (err == -1) {
+-		fatal("Failed to download file '%s'", src);
++		error("Failed to download '%s'", src);
++		errs = 1;
+ 	}
+ }
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+diff --color -ru a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+--- a/ssh.1	2022-07-12 11:47:51.307295880 +0200
++++ b/ssh.1	2022-07-12 11:50:28.793363263 +0200
+@@ -493,6 +493,7 @@
+ .It AddressFamily
+ .It BatchMode
+ .It BindAddress
++.It BindInterface
+ .It CanonicalDomains
+ .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+ .It CanonicalizeHostname
+@@ -510,6 +511,7 @@
+ .It ControlPath
+ .It ControlPersist
+ .It DynamicForward
++.It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EscapeChar
+ .It ExitOnForwardFailure
+ .It FingerprintHash
+@@ -538,6 +540,8 @@
+ .It IdentitiesOnly
+ .It IdentityAgent
+ .It IdentityFile
++.It IgnoreUnknown
++.It Include
+ .It IPQoS
+ .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+ .It KbdInteractiveDevices
+@@ -546,6 +550,7 @@
+ .It LocalCommand
+ .It LocalForward
+ .It LogLevel
++.It LogVerbose
+ .It MACs
+ .It Match
+ .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+@@ -566,6 +571,8 @@
+ .It RemoteCommand
+ .It RemoteForward
+ .It RequestTTY
++.It RevokedHostKeys
++.It SecurityKeyProvider
+ .It RequiredRSASize
+ .It SendEnv
+ .It ServerAliveInterval
+@@ -575,6 +582,7 @@
+ .It StreamLocalBindMask
+ .It StreamLocalBindUnlink
+ .It StrictHostKeyChecking
++.It SyslogFacility
+ .It TCPKeepAlive
+ .It Tunnel
+ .It TunnelDevice

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
+ #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+ # include <paths.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
++#include <grp.h>
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
+ #include <net/if.h>
+@@ -2695,6 +2696,12 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+ 		}
+ 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ 
++		if (geteuid() == 0 &&
++		    initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
++			error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
++			    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
++			_exit(1);
++		}
+ 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
+ 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+ 			    strerror(errno));

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz.asc

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
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++ZYbmF5ZQNMcdR9zZ+QV+ykv6y4SG1+rPI9/Ufo/ZZp5jRnsq+M=
+=xI/+
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+authfd.c
+authfd.h
+atomicio.c
+atomicio.h
+bufaux.c
+bufbn.c
+buffer.h
+buffer.c
+cleanup.c
+cipher.h
+compat.h
+entropy.c
+entropy.h
+fatal.c
+includes.h
+kex.h
+key.c
+key.h
+log.c
+log.h
+match.h
+misc.c
+misc.h
+pathnames.h
+platform.h
+rsa.h
+ssh-dss.c
+ssh-rsa.c
+ssh.h
+ssh2.h
+uidswap.c
+uidswap.h
+uuencode.c
+uuencode.h
+xmalloc.c
+xmalloc.h

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,992 @@
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+  * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
+  */
+ 
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
+                 case EOF:
+                 case '\0':
+                     if (len > 0) { 
+-                        argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
+-                        argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
++                        argv = xreallocarray(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
++                        argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
+                         strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
+                         memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
+                         len = 0;
+@@ -106,9 +107,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *
+ {
+     size_t i;
+     for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]);
++        free(argv[i]);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv);
++    free(argv);
+     return;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ 
+@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+ struct identity {
+     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
+-    Key *key;           /* public/private key */
++    struct sshkey *key;           /* public/private key */
+     char    *filename;      /* comment for agent-only keys */
+     int tried;
+     int isprivate;      /* key points to the private key */
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.421001434 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
+ #include "get_command_line.h"
+ extern char **environ;
+ 
++#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101
++
+ /* 
+  * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
+  * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
+@@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+     if (count == 0)
+         return NULL;
+    
+-    buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
++    buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
+     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+         strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");
+         strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);
+@@ -87,21 +89,25 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)
++agent_action(struct sshbuf **buf, char ** action, size_t count)
+ {
+     size_t i;
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf);
++    int r;
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count);
++    if ((*buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*buf, count)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*buf, action[i])) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-void
+-pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
++static void
++pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(struct sshbuf ** session_id2, const char * user,
+                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+     u_char *cookie = NULL;
+@@ -114,22 +120,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     char ** reported_argv = NULL;
+     size_t count = 0;
+     char * action_logbuf = NULL;
+-    Buffer action_agentbuf;
++    struct sshbuf *action_agentbuf = NULL;
+     uint8_t free_logbuf = 0;
+     char * retc;
+     int32_t reti;
++    int r;
+ 
+-    rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
++    rnd = arc4random();
+     cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);
+     while (cookie_len < 16) { 
+         cookie_len += 16;                                          /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */
+     }
+ 
+-    cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
++    cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len);
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {
+         if (i % 4 == 0) {
+-            rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
++            rnd = arc4random();
+         }
+         cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
+         rnd >>= 8;
+@@ -144,7 +151,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     }
+     else {
+         action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
++        if ((action_agentbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) /* stays empty, means unavailable */
++            fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+     }
+     
+     /*
+@@ -161,35 +169,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
+     time(&ts);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2);
++    if ((*session_id2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
+-    if(retc)
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
+-    else
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_string(*session_id2, cookie, cookie_len)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, user)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, ruser)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, servicename)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    if (retc) {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, pwd)) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    } else {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    }
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(*session_id2, action_agentbuf)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+     if (free_logbuf) { 
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf);
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
++        free(action_logbuf);
++        sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf);
++    }
++    /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
++    if (reti >= 0) {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    } else {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+     }
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
+-    if(reti >= 0)
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
+-    else
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
++    /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+     free(cookie);
+     return;
+@@ -278,7 +290,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
+ 
+ 	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
+ 	auth->fd = sock;
+-	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
++	if ((auth->identities = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++           fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 	auth->howmany = 0;
+ 
+ 	return auth;
+@@ -287,9 +300,9 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
+ int
+ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+-    Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
++    struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
+     Identity *id;
+-    Key *key;
++    struct sshkey *key;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
+     char *comment;
+     uint8_t retval = 0;
+@@ -299,31 +312,30 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+ 
+     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
++        verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
+         {
+             if(key != NULL) {
+-                id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
++                id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+                 id->key = key;
+                 id->filename = comment;
+                 id->ac = ac;
+-                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
++                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
+                     retval = 1;
+                 }
+-                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
+-                pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
+-                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
++                free(id->filename);
++                key_free(id->key);
++                free(id);
+                 if(retval == 1)
+                     break;
+             }
+         }
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2);
++        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
+         ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
+     }
+     else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
++        verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
+     }
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */
+     EVP_cleanup();
+     return retval;
+ }
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.423001461 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2020-09-23 10:53:10.631727657 +0200
+@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+  * a patch 8-)
+  */
+ #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
+-    __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename);
++    __progname = xstrdup(servicename);
+ #endif
+ 
+     for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {
+@@ -132,11 +132,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ #endif
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
++    log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
+     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user);
+     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
++    verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
+ 
+     if(ruser_ptr) {
+         strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
+@@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
+         if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {
+             strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
++            verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
+         } else
+ #endif
+         {
+             if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
++                verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
+                 goto cleanexit;
+             }
+             strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
+@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ 
+     /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */
+     if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
++        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
+         goto cleanexit;
+     }
+     if( ! getpwnam(user) ) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
++        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
+         goto cleanexit;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+          */
+         parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
+     } else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+-        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
++        verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
++        authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+      */
+ 
+     if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++        verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+ 
+         /*
+          * Attempt to read data from the sshd if we're being called as an auth agent.
+@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+         const char* ssh_user_auth = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AUTH_INFO_0");
+         int sshd_service = strncasecmp(servicename, sshd_service_name, sizeof(sshd_service_name) - 1);
+         if (sshd_service == 0 && ssh_user_auth != NULL) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
++            verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
+             if (userauth_pubkey_from_pam(ruser, ssh_user_auth) > 0) {
+                 retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+-                pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++                logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+                 goto cleanexit;
+             }
+         }
+@@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+          * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
+          */
+         if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++            logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+             retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+         } else {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++            logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+         }
+     } else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
++        logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
+     }
+ 
+ cleanexit:
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+ 
+-#include "identity.h"
+ #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
+ 
+ extern char *authorized_keys_file;
+@@ -117,12 +116,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+         } else {
+             slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/');
+             if(!slash_ptr)
+-                pamsshagentauth_fatal
++                fatal
+                     ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
+ 
+             owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
+             if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1))
+-                pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
++                fatal("Username too long");
+ 
+             strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
+             if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
+@@ -130,11 +129,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+                     getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
+         }
+         authorized_keys_file =
+-            pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
++            tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
+                                                   authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
+         strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file,
+                 sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
++        free(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
+                                                               percent_expand
+                                                               later, we'd step
+                                                               on this, so free
+@@ -150,13 +149,13 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+     strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, "."));
+ #endif
+     authorized_keys_file =
+-        pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
++        percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
+                                        getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname,
+                                        "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)
++pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
+     return
+         pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
+ #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
+ 
+ #include "identity.h"
+-int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *);
++int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, struct sshkey *);
+ void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -45,44 +45,46 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "digest.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+ #include "uidswap.h"
+-
+-#include "identity.h"
++#include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ /* return 1 if user allows given key */
+ /* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */
+ static int
+-pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key)
++pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
+-    char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
++    char *line = NULL;
+     int found_key = 0;
+     u_long linenum = 0;
+-    Key *found;
++    struct sshkey *found;
+     char *fp;
++    size_t linesize = 0;
+ 
+     found_key = 0;
+-    found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type);
++    found = sshkey_new(key->type);
+ 
+-    while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
++    while ((getline(&line, &linesize, f)) != -1) {
+         char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */
+ 
++        linenum++;
+         /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+         for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
+         if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+             continue;
+ 
+-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
++        if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
+             /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
+             int quoted = 0;
+ 
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
++            verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
+             /* key_options = cp; */
+             for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+                 if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+@@ -92,26 +94,27 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+             }
+             /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
+             for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
+-            if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
++            if(sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
++                verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
+                 /* still no key? advance to next line */
+                 continue;
+             }
+         }
+-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) {
++        if(sshkey_equal(found, key)) {
+             found_key = 1;
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
++            logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
+                                   linenum);
+-            fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
+-                                  pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);
+-            pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp);
++            fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
++            logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
++                                  sshkey_type(found), fp);
++            free(fp);
+             break;
+         }
+     }
+-    pamsshagentauth_key_free(found);
++    free(line);
++    sshkey_free(found);
+     if(!found_key)
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found");
++        verbose("key not found");
+     return found_key;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -120,19 +123,19 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+  */
+ int
+-pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key * key, char *file)
++pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey * key, char *file)
+ {
+     FILE *f;
+     int found_key = 0;
+     struct stat st;
+-    char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
++    char buf[256];
+ 
+     /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
++    verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
+ 
+     /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
+     if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file);
++        verbose("File not found: %s", file);
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
+ 
+     if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
+         fclose(f);
+-        pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
++        logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
+ int
+ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command,
+                           char *authorized_keys_command_user,
+-                          struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key)
++                          struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
+     FILE *f;
+     int ok, found_key = 0;
+@@ -187,44 +190,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+     else {
+         pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);
+         if(pw == NULL) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
++            error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
+                  authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));
+             return 0;
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ 
+     if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror
++        error
+             ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
+              authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+         goto out;
+     }
+     if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path
+        (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
++        error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+     /* open the pipe and read the keys */
+     if(pipe(p) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
++    debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
+                           authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);
+ 
+     /* 
+      * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
+      * run cleanup_exit() code.
+      */
+-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
++    restore_uid();
+ 
+     switch ((pid = fork())) {
+     case -1:                                              /* error */
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         close(p[0]);
+         close(p[1]);
+         return 0;
+@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+         /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */
+         if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
++            error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+         if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1
+            || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++            error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+ #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
+@@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ #else
+         if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+ #endif
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
++            error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ #else
+         if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+ #endif
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
++            error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+@@ -270,18 +273,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+         /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we
+            should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+         _exit(127);
+     default:                                              /* parent */
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ 
+     close(p[1]);
+     if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         close(p[0]);
+         /* Don't leave zombie child */
+         while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+@@ -292,22 +295,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+     while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+         if(errno != EINTR) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
++            error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             goto out;
+         }
+     }
+     if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
+         goto out;
+     } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+         goto out;
+     }
+     found_key = ok;
+   out:
+-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
++    restore_uid();
+     return found_key;
+ }
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
+ #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
+ 
+ #include "identity.h"
+-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *);
+-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *);
++int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, char *);
++int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ 
+ 
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 	int comparehome = 0;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
++    verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
+ 
+ 	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
+ 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
+@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+-		pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
++		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+ 
+-		pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
++		verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
+ 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+ 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+ 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 
+ 		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
+ 		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
+-			pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
++			verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
+ 			    buf);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+@@ -48,54 +49,59 @@
+ #include "identity.h"
+ #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
+ 
++#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST          54
++
+ /* extern u_char  *session_id2;
+ extern uint8_t  session_id_len;
+  */
+ 
+ int
+-userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2)
++userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, struct sshbuf * session_id2)
+ {
+-    Buffer          b = { 0 };
++    struct sshbuf  *b = NULL;
+     char           *pkalg = NULL;
+     u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
+-    u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;
+-    int             authenticated = 0;
++    size_t          blen = 0, slen = 0;
++    int             r, authenticated = 0;
+ 
+-    pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
++    pkalg = (char *) sshkey_ssh_name(id->key);
+ 
+     /* first test if this key is even allowed */
+     if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))
+-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
+ 
+-    if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
+-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++    if(sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) != 0)
++        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
+ 
+     /* construct packet to sign and test */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
++    if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2))) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ruser)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth")) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+-    if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0)
++    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
+         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+ 
+     /* test for correct signature */
+-    if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
++    if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0)
+         authenticated = 1;
+ 
+   user_auth_clean_exit:
+     /* if(&b != NULL) */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b);
++    sshbuf_free(b);
++  user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer:
+     if(sig != NULL)
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(sig);
++        free(sig);
+     if(pkblob != NULL)
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
++        free(pkblob);
+     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+     return authenticated;
+ }
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
+ #ifndef _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
+ #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
+ 
+-#include <identity.h>
+-int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, Buffer *);
++#include "identity.h"
++int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, struct sshbuf *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_uudecode(const char *src
+ 	/* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
+ 	*p = '\0';
+ 	len = pamsshagentauth___b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
+-	pamsshagentauth_xfree(encoded);
++	xfree(encoded);
+ 	return len;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
+ 		fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+-	buf = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(2*len);
++	buf = malloc(2*len);
+ 	n = pamsshagentauth_uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ 		fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
+@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
+ 	}
+ 	if (i % 70 != 69)
+ 		fprintf(fp, "\n");
+-	pamsshagentauth_xfree(buf);
++	free(buf);
+ }
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c.compat	2020-09-23 11:32:30.783695267 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c	2020-09-23 11:33:21.383389036 +0200
+@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ 
+ #include "defines.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include <includes.h>
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ 
+ #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
+@@ -42,28 +42,28 @@
+     int authenticated = 0;
+     const char method[] = "publickey ";
+ 
+-    char* ai = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
++    char* ai = xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
+     char* saveptr;
+ 
+     char* auth_line = strtok_r(ai, "\n", &saveptr);
+     while (auth_line != NULL) {
+         if (strncmp(auth_line, method, sizeof(method) - 1) == 0) {
+             char* key_str = auth_line + sizeof(method) - 1;
+-            Key* key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
++            struct sshkey* key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+             if (key == NULL) {
+                 continue;
+             }
+-            int r = pamsshagentauth_key_read(key, &key_str);
++            int r = sshkey_read(key, &key_str);
+             if (r == 1) {
+                 if (pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, key)) {
+                     authenticated = 1;
+-                    pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
++                    sshkey_free(key);
+                     break;
+                 }
+             } else {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
++                verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
+             }
+-            pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
++            sshkey_free(key);
+         }
+         auth_line = strtok_r(NULL, "\n", &saveptr);
+     }

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
++++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+@@ -158,11 +158,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user,
+ int
+ pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
++    struct passwd *pw;
+     return
+-        pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
+-                                          key, authorized_keys_file)
+-        || pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key,
+-                                             authorized_keys_file)
++        ( (pw = getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)) &&
++            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
++        || ((pw = getpwuid(0)) &&
++            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
+         || pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command,
+                                                      authorized_keys_command_user,
+                                                      getpwnam(ruser), key);

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid	2017-02-07 15:41:53.172334151 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 15:41:53.174334149 +0100
+@@ -238,17 +238,26 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	errno = 0; 
+-	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
+-	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
+-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
++	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
++	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
++	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
+ 		close(sock);
+-        if(errno == EACCES)
+-		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
++		error("seteuid(%lu) failed with error: %s",
++		    (unsigned long) uid, strerror(errno));
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
++		close(sock);
++		sock = -1;
++		if(errno == EACCES)
++			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
++	}
+ 
+-	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
+-
++	/* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
++	if (0 != seteuid(0)) {
++		fatal("setuid(0) failed with error: %s", strerror(errno));
++		return -1;
++	}
+ 	return sock;
+ }
+ 

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4-rsasha2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.rsasha2 openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.rsasha2	2022-07-15 15:08:12.865585410 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2022-07-15 15:16:25.164282372 +0200
+@@ -87,8 +87,13 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
+         (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
+         fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+-    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
+-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++    if (sshkey_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA
++	&& ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), "rsa-sha2-256", 0) == 0) {
++	/* Do nothing */
++    } else {
++        if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
++            goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++    }
+ 
+     /* test for correct signature */
+     if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0)

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
+--- openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility	2014-03-31 19:35:17.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2016-01-22 15:22:40.984469774 +0100
+@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ char           *__progname;
+ extern char    *__progname;
+ #endif
+ 
+-PAM_EXTERN int
++PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
+ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+ {
+     char          **argv_ptr;
+@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ cleanexit:
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-PAM_EXTERN int
++PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
+ pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+ {
+     UNUSED(pamh);

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
+ typedef struct identity Identity;
+ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+ 
++typedef struct {
++       int     fd;
++       struct sshbuf *identities;
++       int     howmany;
++}      AuthenticationConnection;
++
+ struct identity {
+     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -291,36 +292,43 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+ {
+     struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
+     Identity *id;
+-    struct sshkey *key;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
+-    char *comment;
+     uint8_t retval = 0;
+     uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
++    struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
++    int r;
++    unsigned int i;
+ 
+     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+ 
+     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
+         verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+-        for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
+-        {
+-            if(key != NULL) {
++        if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(ac->fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
++            if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
++               fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
++                               "protocol %d: %s\n", 2, ssh_err(r));
++        } else {
++            for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++)
++            {
++              if (idlist->keys[i] != NULL) {
+                 id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+-                id->key = key;
+-                id->filename = comment;
++                id->key = idlist->keys[i];
++                id->filename = idlist->comments[i];
+                 id->ac = ac;
+                 if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
+                     retval = 1;
+                 }
+-                free(id->filename);
+-                key_free(id->key);
+                 free(id);
+                 if(retval == 1)
+                     break;
+-            }
+-        }
++              }
++            }
+-        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
+-        ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
++            sshbuf_free(session_id2);
++            ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
++        }
++        ssh_close_authentication_socket(ac->fd);
++        free(ac);
+     }
+     else {
+         verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.422739032 +0200
+@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
+         (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
+         fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+-    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
++    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
+         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+ 
+     /* test for correct signature */

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 14:29:41.626116675 +0100
+@@ -43,12 +43,31 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "ssh.h"
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#include <sys/un.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
+ 
+ #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
+ #include "identity.h"
+ #include "get_command_line.h"
+ extern char **environ;
+ 
++/* 
++ * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
++ * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
++ * to drop effective UID when connecting to the socket. 
++ *
++ * If the cause of error is EACCES, because we verified we would not have that 
++ * problem initially, we can safely assume that somebody is attempting to find a 
++ * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated.
++ */
++
+ static char *
+ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+ {
+@@ -85,7 +104,7 @@ void
+ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
+                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+-    char *cookie = NULL;
++    u_char *cookie = NULL;
+     uint8_t i = 0;
+     uint32_t rnd = 0;
+     uint8_t cookie_len;
+@@ -112,7 +131,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+         if (i % 4 == 0) {
+             rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
+         }
+-        cookie[i] = (char) rnd;
++        cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
+         rnd >>= 8;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -177,6 +196,86 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+ }
+ 
+ int
++ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid)
++{
++	const char *authsocket;
++	int sock;
++	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
++	struct stat sock_st;
++
++	authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
++	if (!authsocket)
++		return -1;
++
++	/* Advisory only; seteuid ensures no race condition; but will only log if we see EACCES */
++	if( stat(authsocket,&sock_st) == 0) {
++		if(uid != 0 && sock_st.st_uid != uid) {
++			fatal("uid %lu attempted to open an agent socket owned by uid %lu", (unsigned long) uid, (unsigned long) sock_st.st_uid);
++			return -1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	/* 
++	 * Ensures that the EACCES tested for below can _only_ happen if somebody 
++	 * is attempting to race the stat above to bypass authentication.
++	 */
++	if( (sock_st.st_mode & S_IWUSR) != S_IWUSR || (sock_st.st_mode & S_IRUSR) != S_IRUSR) {
++		error("ssh-agent socket has incorrect permissions for owner");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
++	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
++
++	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++	if (sock < 0)
++		return -1;
++
++	/* close on exec */
++	if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
++		close(sock);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	errno = 0; 
++	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
++	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
++	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
++		close(sock);
++        if(errno == EACCES)
++		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
++
++	return sock;
++}
++
++AuthenticationConnection *
++ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid_t uid)
++{
++	AuthenticationConnection *auth;
++	int sock;
++
++	sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid);
++
++	/*
++	 * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection.  This happens if we
++	 * exited due to a timeout.
++	 */
++	if (sock < 0)
++		return NULL;
++
++	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
++	auth->fd = sock;
++	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
++	auth->howmany = 0;
++
++	return auth;
++}
++
++int
+ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+     Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
+@@ -190,7 +289,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+ 
+-    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) {
++    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
+         pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
+         {
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in	2017-02-07 14:40:14.407566921 +0100
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ PATHS=
+ CC=@CC@
+ LD=@LD@
+ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+ LIBS=@LIBS@
+ AR=@AR@
+ AWK=@AWK@
+@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+ PERL=@PERL@
+ SED=@SED@
+ ENT=@ENT@
+-LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+-LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
++LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
++LDFLAGS_SHARED =-Wl,-z,defs @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
+ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ 
+ INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bu
+ 
+ ED25519OBJS=ed25519-donna/ed25519.o
+ 
+-PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o
++PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o secure_filename.o
+ 
+ 
+ MANPAGES_IN	= pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
+@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
+ .c.o:
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+ 
+-LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
++LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
+ $(LIBCOMPAT): always
+ 	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
+ always:
+ 
+-pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
+-	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam
++pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o ../ssh-sk-client.o
++	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) ../ssh-sk-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o $(LIBS) -lpam
+ 
+ $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+ 	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8

SOURCES/ssh-agent.service

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Requires SSH_AUTH_SOCK="$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/ssh-agent.socket"
+# set in environment, handled for example in plasma via
+# /etc/xdg/plasma-workspace/env/ssh-agent.sh
+[Unit]
+ConditionEnvironment=!SSH_AGENT_PID
+Description=OpenSSH key agent
+Documentation=man:ssh-agent(1) man:ssh-add(1) man:ssh(1)
+
+[Service]
+Environment=SSH_AUTH_SOCK=%t/ssh-agent.socket
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -a $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+PassEnvironment=SSH_AGENT_PID
+SuccessExitStatus=2
+Type=forking

SOURCES/ssh-keycat.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+# pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule
+session    required     pam_selinux.so close
+session    required     pam_loginuid.so
+# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context
+session    required     pam_selinux.so open env_params
+session    required     pam_namespace.so
+

SOURCES/sshd-keygen

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+# Create the host keys for the OpenSSH server.
+KEYTYPE=$1
+case $KEYTYPE in
+	"dsa") ;& # disabled in FIPS
+	"ed25519")
+		FIPS=/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
+		if [[ -r "$FIPS" && $(cat $FIPS) == "1" ]]; then
+			exit 0
+		fi ;;
+	"rsa") ;; # always ok
+	"ecdsa") ;;
+	*) # wrong argument
+		exit 12 ;;
+esac
+KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_${KEYTYPE}_key
+
+KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen
+if [[ ! -x $KEYGEN ]]; then
+	exit 13
+fi
+
+# remove old keys
+rm -f $KEY{,.pub}
+
+# create new keys
+if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+# sanitize permissions
+/usr/bin/chgrp ssh_keys $KEY
+/usr/bin/chmod 640 $KEY
+/usr/bin/chmod 644 $KEY.pub
+if [[ -x /usr/sbin/restorecon ]]; then
+	/usr/sbin/restorecon $KEY{,.pub}
+fi
+
+exit 0

SOURCES/sshd-keygen.target

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+[Unit]
+Wants=sshd-keygen@rsa.service
+Wants=sshd-keygen@ecdsa.service
+Wants=sshd-keygen@ed25519.service
+PartOf=sshd.service

SOURCES/sshd-keygen@.service

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenSSH %i Server Key Generation
+ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_%i_key
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
+ExecStart=/usr/libexec/openssh/sshd-keygen %i
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=sshd-keygen.target

SOURCES/sshd.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+auth       substack     password-auth
+auth       include      postlogin
+account    required     pam_sepermit.so
+account    required     pam_nologin.so
+account    include      password-auth
+password   include      password-auth
+# pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule
+session    required     pam_selinux.so close
+session    required     pam_loginuid.so
+# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context
+session    required     pam_selinux.so open env_params
+session    required     pam_namespace.so
+session    optional     pam_keyinit.so force revoke
+session    optional     pam_motd.so
+session    include      password-auth
+session    include      postlogin

SOURCES/sshd.service

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenSSH server daemon
+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
+After=network.target sshd-keygen.target
+Wants=sshd-keygen.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=notify
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
+KillMode=process
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=42s
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

SOURCES/sshd.socket

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenSSH Server Socket
+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
+Conflicts=sshd.service
+
+[Socket]
+ListenStream=22
+Accept=yes
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=sockets.target

SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Configuration file for the sshd service.
+
+# The server keys are automatically generated if they are missing.
+# To change the automatic creation, adjust sshd.service options for
+# example using  systemctl enable sshd-keygen@dsa.service  to allow creation
+# of DSA key or  systemctl mask sshd-keygen@rsa.service  to disable RSA key
+# creation.

SOURCES/sshd@.service

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenSSH per-connection server daemon
+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
+Wants=sshd-keygen.target
+After=sshd-keygen.target
+
+[Service]
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
+ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS
+StandardInput=socket