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491 lines
21 KiB
491 lines
21 KiB
diff -up ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review ./lib/freebl/dh.c
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--- ./lib/freebl/dh.c.fips-review 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
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+++ ./lib/freebl/dh.c 2024-06-12 12:04:10.639360404 -0700
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@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ cleanup:
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PRBool
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KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, SECItem *subPrime)
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{
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- mp_int p, q, y, r;
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+ mp_int p, q, y, r, psub1;
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mp_err err;
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int cmp = 1; /* default is false */
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if (!Y || !prime || !subPrime) {
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@@ -456,13 +456,30 @@ KEA_Verify(SECItem *Y, SECItem *prime, S
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MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0;
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MP_DIGITS(&y) = 0;
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MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0;
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+ MP_DIGITS(&psub1) = 0;
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CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&p));
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CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q));
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CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&y));
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CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
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+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&psub1));
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SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*prime, &p);
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SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*subPrime, &q);
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SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*Y, &y);
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+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_sub_d(&p, 1, &psub1));
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+ /*
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+ * We check that the public value isn't zero (which isn't in the
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+ * group), one (subgroup of order one) or p-1 (subgroup of order 2). We
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+ * also check that the public value is less than p, to avoid being fooled
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+ * by values like p+1 or 2*p-1.
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+ * This check is required by SP-800-56Ar3. It's also done in derive,
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+ * but this is only called in various FIPS cases, so put it here to help
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+ * reviewers find it.
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+ */
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+ if (mp_cmp_d(&y, 1) <= 0 ||
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+ mp_cmp(&y, &psub1) >= 0) {
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+ err = MP_BADARG;
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+ goto cleanup;
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+ }
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/* compute r = y**q mod p */
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CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&y, &q, &p, &r));
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/* compare to 1 */
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@@ -472,6 +489,7 @@ cleanup:
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mp_clear(&q);
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mp_clear(&y);
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mp_clear(&r);
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+ mp_clear(&psub1);
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if (err) {
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MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
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return PR_FALSE;
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diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
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--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.fips-review 2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
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+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c 2024-06-12 13:06:35.410551333 -0700
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@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
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#include "prprf.h"
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#include "prenv.h"
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+#include "prerror.h"
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#define __PASTE(x, y) x##y
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#define BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMech, typeSize) (!pMech->pParameter || pMech->ulParameterLen < typeSize)
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@@ -4882,6 +4883,10 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
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* handle the base object stuff
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*/
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crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
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+ /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated
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+ * key length against fips requirements */
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+ key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
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+ session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
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sftk_FreeSession(session);
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if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
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crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
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@@ -4889,9 +4894,6 @@ NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessi
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if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
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crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
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}
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- /* we need to do this check at the end, so we can check the generated key length against
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- * fips requirements */
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- key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE, key);
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if (crv == CKR_OK) {
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*phKey = key->handle;
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}
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@@ -5199,60 +5201,68 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
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if (isDerivable) {
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SFTKAttribute *pubAttribute = NULL;
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- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKey;
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PRBool isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
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- CK_RV crv2;
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- CK_OBJECT_CLASS secret = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
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- CK_KEY_TYPE generic = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
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- CK_ULONG keyLen = 128;
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- CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
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- CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
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- { CKA_CLASS, &secret, sizeof(secret) },
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- { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &generic, sizeof(generic) },
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- { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &keyLen, sizeof(keyLen) },
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- { CKA_DERIVE, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue) }
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- };
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- CK_ULONG templateCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(template);
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- CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS ecParams;
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+ NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lowPrivKey = NULL;
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+ ECPrivateKey *ecPriv;
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+ SECItem *lowPubValue = NULL;
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+ SECItem item;
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+ SECStatus rv;
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crv = CKR_OK; /*paranoia, already get's set before we drop to the end */
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- /* FIPS 140-2 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key.
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- * The easiest way to do this is to do a derive operation, which checks
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- * the validity of the key */
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-
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+ /* FIPS 140-3 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key
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+ * by recalculating the public can an compare it to our own public
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+ * key. */
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+ lowPrivKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(privateKey, keyType, &crv);
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+ if (lowPrivKey == NULL) {
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+ return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
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+ }
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+ /* recalculate the public key from the private key */
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switch (keyType) {
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- case CKK_DH:
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- mech.mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE;
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- pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
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- if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
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- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
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- }
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- mech.pParameter = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
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- mech.ulParameterLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
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- break;
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- case CKK_EC:
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- mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
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- pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
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- if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
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- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
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- }
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- ecParams.kdf = CKD_NULL;
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- ecParams.ulSharedDataLen = 0;
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- ecParams.pSharedData = NULL;
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- ecParams.ulPublicDataLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
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- ecParams.pPublicData = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
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- mech.pParameter = &ecParams;
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- mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ecParams);
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- break;
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- default:
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- return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
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+ case CKK_DH:
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+ rv = DH_Derive(&lowPrivKey->u.dh.base, &lowPrivKey->u.dh.prime,
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+ &lowPrivKey->u.dh.privateValue, &item, 0);
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+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
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+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
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+ }
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+ lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&item);
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+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&item, PR_FALSE);
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+ pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
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+ break;
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+ case CKK_EC:
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+ rv = EC_NewKeyFromSeed(&lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPriv,
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+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.data,
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+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.privateValue.len);
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+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
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+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
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+ }
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+ /* make sure it has the same encoding */
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+ if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
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+ lowPrivKey->u.ec.ecParams.type != ec_params_named) {
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+ lowPubValue = SECITEM_DupItem(&ecPriv->publicValue);
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+ } else {
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+ lowPubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &ecPriv->publicValue,
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+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));;
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+ }
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+ pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
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+ /* clear out our generated private key */
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+ PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
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+ break;
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+ default:
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+ return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
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}
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- crv = NSC_DeriveKey(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle, template, templateCount, &newKey);
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- if (crv != CKR_OK) {
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- sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
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- return crv;
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+ /* now compare new public key with our already generated key */
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+ if ((pubAttribute == NULL) || (lowPubValue == NULL) ||
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+ (pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen != lowPubValue->len) ||
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+ (PORT_Memcmp(pubAttribute->attrib.pValue, lowPubValue->data,
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+ lowPubValue->len) != 0)) {
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+ if (pubAttribute) sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
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+ if (lowPubValue) SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
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+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
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+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
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}
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+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(lowPubValue, PR_TRUE);
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+
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/* FIPS requires full validation, but in fipx mode NSC_Derive
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* only does partial validation with approved primes, now handle
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* full validation */
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@@ -5260,44 +5270,78 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION
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SECItem pubKey;
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SECItem prime;
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SECItem subPrime;
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+ SECItem base;
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+ SECItem generator;
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const SECItem *subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
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pubKey.data = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
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pubKey.len = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
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- prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
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- prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
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+ base.data = prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
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+ base.len = prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
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crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
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if (crv != CKR_OK) {
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goto done;
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}
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- crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
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+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &base, privateKey, CKA_BASE);
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+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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/* we ignore the return code an only look at the length */
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- if (subPrime.len == 0) {
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- /* subprime not supplied, In this case look it up.
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- * This only works with approved primes, but in FIPS mode
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- * that's the only kine of prime that will get here */
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- subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, isFIPS);
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- if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
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- crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
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+ /* do we have a known prime ? */
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+ subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, &generator, isFIPS);
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+ if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
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+ if (subPrime.len == 0) {
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+ /* if not a known prime, subprime must be supplied */
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+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
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+ goto done;
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+ } else {
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+ /* not a known prime, check for primality of prime
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+ * and subPrime */
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+ if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&prime)) {
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+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+ if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&subPrime)) {
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+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+ /* if we aren't using a defined group, make sure base is in the
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+ * subgroup. If it's not, then our key could fail or succeed sometimes.
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+ * This makes the failure reliable */
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+ if (!KEA_Verify(&base, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
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+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
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+ } else {
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+ /* we're using a known group, make sure we are using the known generator for that group */
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+ if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&generator, &base) != 0) {
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+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
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goto done;
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}
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+ if (subPrime.len != 0) {
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+ /* we have a known prime and a supplied subPrime,
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+ * make sure the subPrime matches the subPrime for
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+ * the known Prime */
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+ if (SECITEM_CompareItem(subPrimePtr, &subPrime) != 0) {
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+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+ }
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}
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if (!KEA_Verify(&pubKey, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
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- crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
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+ crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
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}
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done:
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+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&base, PR_FALSE);
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SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&subPrime, PR_FALSE);
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SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&prime, PR_FALSE);
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}
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/* clean up before we return */
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sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
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- crv2 = NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, newKey);
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if (crv != CKR_OK) {
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return crv;
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}
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- if (crv2 != CKR_OK) {
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- return crv2;
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- }
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}
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return CKR_OK;
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@@ -5925,8 +5969,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
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* created and linked.
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*/
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crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey, session);
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- sftk_FreeSession(session);
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if (crv != CKR_OK) {
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+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
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sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
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NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
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sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
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@@ -5968,6 +6012,7 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
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}
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if (crv != CKR_OK) {
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+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
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NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
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sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
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NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
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@@ -5977,6 +6022,8 @@ NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hS
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/* we need to do this check at the end to make sure the generated key meets the key length requirements */
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privateKey->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_NSS_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, privateKey);
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publicKey->isFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
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+ session->lastOpWasFIPS = privateKey->isFIPS;
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+ sftk_FreeSession(session);
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*phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
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*phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
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@@ -8610,7 +8657,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
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/* if the prime is an approved prime, we can skip all the other
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* checks. */
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- subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, isFIPS);
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+ subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, NULL, isFIPS);
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if (subPrime == NULL) {
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SECItem dhSubPrime;
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/* If the caller set the subprime value, it means that
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@@ -8792,6 +8839,7 @@ NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession
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secretlen = tmp.len;
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} else {
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secretlen = keySize;
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+ key->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
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crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
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&tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
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mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
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diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h
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--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h.fips-review 2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
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+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11i.h 2024-06-12 12:04:10.640360416 -0700
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@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ char **NSC_ModuleDBFunc(unsigned long fu
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/* dh verify functions */
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/* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes, and if so return
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* it's subprime value */
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-const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS);
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+const SECItem *sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *generator, PRBool isFIPS);
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/* check if dhSubPrime claims dhPrime is a safe prime. */
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SECStatus sftk_IsSafePrime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *dhSubPrime, PRBool *isSafe);
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/* map an operation Attribute to a Mechanism flag */
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diff -up ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c
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--- ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c.fips-review 2024-06-12 12:04:10.638360392 -0700
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+++ ./lib/softoken/pkcs11u.c 2024-06-12 12:04:10.640360416 -0700
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@@ -2409,15 +2409,27 @@ sftk_handleSpecial(SFTKSlot *slot, CK_ME
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switch (mechInfo->special) {
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case SFTKFIPSDH: {
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SECItem dhPrime;
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+ SECItem dhBase;
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+ SECItem dhGenerator;
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+ PRBool val = PR_FALSE;
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const SECItem *dhSubPrime;
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CK_RV crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime,
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source, CKA_PRIME);
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if (crv != CKR_OK) {
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return PR_FALSE;
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}
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- dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, PR_TRUE);
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+ crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhBase, source, CKA_BASE);
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+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
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+ return PR_FALSE;
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+ }
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+ dhSubPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, &dhGenerator, PR_TRUE);
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+ val = (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
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+ if (val && (SECITEM_CompareItem(&dhBase, &dhGenerator) != 0)) {
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+ val = PR_FALSE;
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+ }
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SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
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- return (dhSubPrime) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
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+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhBase, PR_FALSE);
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+ return val;
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}
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case SFTKFIPSNone:
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return PR_FALSE;
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diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c
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--- ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c.fips-review 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
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+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkdhverify.c 2024-06-12 12:04:10.641360427 -0700
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@@ -6726,11 +6726,20 @@ static const SECItem subprime_tls_8192 =
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(unsigned char *)subprime_tls_8192_data,
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sizeof(subprime_tls_8192_data) };
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+/* generator for all the groups is 2 */
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+static const unsigned char generator_2_data[] = { 2 };
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+
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+
|
|
+static const SECItem generator_2 =
|
|
+ { siBuffer,
|
|
+ (unsigned char *)generator_2_data,
|
|
+ sizeof(generator_2_data) };
|
|
+
|
|
/*
|
|
* verify that dhPrime matches one of our known primes
|
|
*/
|
|
const SECItem *
|
|
-sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PRBool isFIPS)
|
|
+sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, SECItem *g, PRBool isFIPS)
|
|
{
|
|
/* use the length to decide which primes to check */
|
|
switch (dhPrime->len) {
|
|
@@ -6741,56 +6750,67 @@ sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(SECItem *dhPrime, PR
|
|
}
|
|
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_1536,
|
|
sizeof(prime_ike_1536)) == 0) {
|
|
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
return &subprime_ike_1536;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case 2048 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
|
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_2048,
|
|
sizeof(prime_tls_2048)) == 0) {
|
|
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
return &subprime_tls_2048;
|
|
}
|
|
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_2048,
|
|
sizeof(prime_ike_2048)) == 0) {
|
|
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
return &subprime_ike_2048;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case 3072 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
|
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_3072,
|
|
sizeof(prime_tls_3072)) == 0) {
|
|
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
return &subprime_tls_3072;
|
|
}
|
|
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_3072,
|
|
sizeof(prime_ike_3072)) == 0) {
|
|
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
return &subprime_ike_3072;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case 4096 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
|
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_4096,
|
|
sizeof(prime_tls_4096)) == 0) {
|
|
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
return &subprime_tls_4096;
|
|
}
|
|
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_4096,
|
|
sizeof(prime_ike_4096)) == 0) {
|
|
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
return &subprime_ike_4096;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case 6144 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
|
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_6144,
|
|
sizeof(prime_tls_6144)) == 0) {
|
|
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
return &subprime_tls_6144;
|
|
}
|
|
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_6144,
|
|
sizeof(prime_ike_6144)) == 0) {
|
|
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
return &subprime_ike_6144;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case 8192 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE:
|
|
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_tls_8192,
|
|
sizeof(prime_tls_8192)) == 0) {
|
|
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
return &subprime_tls_8192;
|
|
}
|
|
if (PORT_Memcmp(dhPrime->data, prime_ike_8192,
|
|
sizeof(prime_ike_8192)) == 0) {
|
|
+ if (g) *g = generator_2;
|
|
return &subprime_ike_8192;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
diff -up ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c
|
|
--- ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c.fips-review 2024-06-07 09:26:03.000000000 -0700
|
|
+++ ./lib/softoken/sftkike.c 2024-06-12 12:04:10.641360427 -0700
|
|
@@ -516,6 +516,11 @@ sftk_ike_prf(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
+ /* ikev1 isn't validated, if we use this function in ikev1 mode,
|
|
+ * mark the resulting key as not FIPS */
|
|
+ if (!params->bRekey) {
|
|
+ outKey->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
|
|
+ }
|
|
crv = prf_init(&context, inKey->attrib.pValue,
|
|
inKey->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
|
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|