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83 lines
3.0 KiB
83 lines
3.0 KiB
From d9a832a2edbf95d664b07791f77a22ac3dfb95f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= <ppisar@redhat.com>
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Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 12:11:04 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2018-15127 (Heap out-of-bounds write in
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rfbserver.c:rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer())
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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This patch contains the following three upstream patches squashed
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together and ported to 0.9.11 version:
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commit 502821828ed00b4a2c4bef90683d0fd88ce495de
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Author: Christian Beier <dontmind@freeshell.org>
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Date: Sun Oct 21 20:21:30 2018 +0200
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LibVNCServer: fix heap out-of-bound write access
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Closes #243
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commit 15bb719c03cc70f14c36a843dcb16ed69b405707
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Author: Christian Beier <dontmind@freeshell.org>
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Date: Sun Jan 6 15:13:56 2019 +0100
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Error out in rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer if length can not be allocated
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re #273
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commit 09e8fc02f59f16e2583b34fe1a270c238bd9ffec
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Author: Petr Písař <ppisar@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon Jan 7 10:40:01 2019 +0100
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Limit lenght to INT_MAX bytes in rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer()
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This ammends 15bb719c03cc70f14c36a843dcb16ed69b405707 fix for a heap
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out-of-bound write access in rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer() when
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reading a transfered file content in a server. The former fix did not
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work on platforms with a 32-bit int type (expected by rfbReadExact()).
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CVE-2018-15127
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<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/243>
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<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/273>
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Signed-off-by: Petr Písař <ppisar@redhat.com>
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---
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libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
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1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
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index b50a7f4..1b4dd97 100644
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--- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
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+++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
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@@ -1471,11 +1471,24 @@ char *rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer(rfbClientPtr cl, uint32_t length)
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int n=0;
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FILEXFER_ALLOWED_OR_CLOSE_AND_RETURN("", cl, NULL);
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+
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/*
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- rfbLog("rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer(%dlen)\n", length);
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+ We later alloc length+1, which might wrap around on 32-bit systems if length equals
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+ 0XFFFFFFFF, i.e. SIZE_MAX for 32-bit systems. On 64-bit systems, a length of 0XFFFFFFFF
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+ will safely be allocated since this check will never trigger and malloc() can digest length+1
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+ without problems as length is a uint32_t.
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+ We also later pass length to rfbReadExact() that expects a signed int type and
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+ that might wrap on platforms with a 32-bit int type if length is bigger
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+ than 0X7FFFFFFF.
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*/
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+ if(length == SIZE_MAX || length > INT_MAX) {
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+ rfbErr("rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer: too big file transfer length requested: %u", (unsigned int)length);
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+ rfbCloseClient(cl);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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if (length>0) {
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- buffer=malloc(length+1);
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+ buffer=malloc((size_t)length+1);
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if (buffer!=NULL) {
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if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, (char *)buffer, length)) <= 0) {
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if (n != 0)
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--
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2.17.2
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