From addc2c283b55077befa6e683e0d7397bb668f712 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: MSVSphere Packaging Team Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2024 03:09:26 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] import libproxy-0.4.15-5.5.el8_10 --- .../libproxy-0.4.15-fix-CVE-2020-25219.patch | 57 ++++++++++++ ...proxy-0.4.15-fix-pac-buffer-overflow.patch | 93 +++++++++++++++++++ SPECS/libproxy.spec | 17 +++- 3 files changed, 166 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 SOURCES/libproxy-0.4.15-fix-CVE-2020-25219.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/libproxy-0.4.15-fix-pac-buffer-overflow.patch diff --git a/SOURCES/libproxy-0.4.15-fix-CVE-2020-25219.patch b/SOURCES/libproxy-0.4.15-fix-CVE-2020-25219.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..03cfbc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/libproxy-0.4.15-fix-CVE-2020-25219.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From a83dae404feac517695c23ff43ce1e116e2bfbe0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Catanzaro +Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 11:12:02 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite url::recvline to be nonrecursive + +This function processes network input. It's semi-trusted, because the +PAC ought to be trusted. But we still shouldn't allow it to control how +far we recurse. A malicious PAC can cause us to overflow the stack by +sending a sufficiently-long line without any '\n' character. + +Also, this function failed to properly handle EINTR, so let's fix that +too, for good measure. + +Fixes #134 +--- + libproxy/url.cpp | 28 ++++++++++++++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp +index ee776b2..68d69cd 100644 +--- a/libproxy/url.cpp ++++ b/libproxy/url.cpp +@@ -388,16 +388,24 @@ string url::to_string() const { + return m_orig; + } + +-static inline string recvline(int fd) { +- // Read a character. +- // If we don't get a character, return empty string. +- // If we are at the end of the line, return empty string. +- char c = '\0'; +- +- if (recv(fd, &c, 1, 0) != 1 || c == '\n') +- return ""; +- +- return string(1, c) + recvline(fd); ++static string recvline(int fd) { ++ string line; ++ int ret; ++ ++ // Reserve arbitrary amount of space to avoid small memory reallocations. ++ line.reserve(128); ++ ++ do { ++ char c; ++ ret = recv(fd, &c, 1, 0); ++ if (ret == 1) { ++ if (c == '\n') ++ return line; ++ line += c; ++ } ++ } while (ret == 1 || (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR)); ++ ++ return line; + } + + char* url::get_pac() { diff --git a/SOURCES/libproxy-0.4.15-fix-pac-buffer-overflow.patch b/SOURCES/libproxy-0.4.15-fix-pac-buffer-overflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9290833 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/libproxy-0.4.15-fix-pac-buffer-overflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +From 4411b523545b22022b4be7d0cac25aa170ae1d3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fei Li +Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 02:18:37 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer overflow when PAC is enabled + +The bug was found on Windows 10 (MINGW64) when PAC is enabled. It turned +out to be the large PAC file (more than 102400 bytes) returned by a +local proxy program with no content-length present. +--- + libproxy/url.cpp | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- + 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp +index ee776b2..8684086 100644 +--- a/libproxy/url.cpp ++++ b/libproxy/url.cpp +@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ using namespace std; + #define PAC_MIME_TYPE_FB "text/plain" + + // This is the maximum pac size (to avoid memory attacks) +-#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 102400 ++#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 0x800000 + // This is the default block size to use when receiving via HTTP + #define PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE 512 + +@@ -478,15 +478,13 @@ char* url::get_pac() { + } + + // Get content +- unsigned int recvd = 0; +- buffer = new char[PAC_MAX_SIZE]; +- memset(buffer, 0, PAC_MAX_SIZE); ++ std::vector dynamic_buffer; + do { + unsigned int chunk_length; + + if (chunked) { + // Discard the empty line if we received a previous chunk +- if (recvd > 0) recvline(sock); ++ if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) recvline(sock); + + // Get the chunk-length line as an integer + if (sscanf(recvline(sock).c_str(), "%x", &chunk_length) != 1 || chunk_length == 0) break; +@@ -498,21 +496,41 @@ char* url::get_pac() { + + if (content_length >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) break; + +- while (content_length == 0 || recvd != content_length) { +- int r = recv(sock, buffer + recvd, +- content_length == 0 ? PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE +- : content_length - recvd, 0); ++ while (content_length == 0 || dynamic_buffer.size() != content_length) { ++ // Calculate length to recv ++ unsigned int length_to_read = PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ if (content_length > 0) ++ length_to_read = content_length - dynamic_buffer.size(); ++ ++ // Prepare buffer ++ dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() + length_to_read); ++ ++ int r = recv(sock, dynamic_buffer.data() + dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read, length_to_read, 0); ++ ++ // Shrink buffer to fit ++ if (r >= 0) ++ dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read + r); ++ ++ // PAC size too large, discard ++ if (dynamic_buffer.size() >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) { ++ chunked = false; ++ dynamic_buffer.clear(); ++ break; ++ } ++ + if (r <= 0) { + chunked = false; + break; + } +- recvd += r; + } + } while (chunked); + +- if (content_length != 0 && string(buffer).size() != content_length) { +- delete[] buffer; +- buffer = NULL; ++ if (content_length == 0 || content_length == dynamic_buffer.size()) { ++ buffer = new char[dynamic_buffer.size() + 1]; ++ if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) { ++ memcpy(buffer, dynamic_buffer.data(), dynamic_buffer.size()); ++ } ++ buffer[dynamic_buffer.size()] = '\0'; + } + } + diff --git a/SPECS/libproxy.spec b/SPECS/libproxy.spec index 52155bf..43fc49a 100644 --- a/SPECS/libproxy.spec +++ b/SPECS/libproxy.spec @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Name: libproxy Version: 0.4.15 -Release: 5.2%{?dist} +Release: 5.5%{?dist} Summary: A library handling all the details of proxy configuration Group: System Environment/Libraries @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ Source0: https://github.com/libproxy/%{name}/archive/%{version}.tar.gz Source1: proxy.1 Patch1: libproxy-0.4.11-crash.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1880350 +Patch2: libproxy-0.4.15-fix-CVE-2020-25219.patch + +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1883584 +Patch3: libproxy-0.4.15-fix-pac-buffer-overflow.patch + BuildRequires: libmodman-devel >= 2.0.1 BuildRequires: cmake >= 2.6.0 @@ -181,6 +187,15 @@ make test %changelog +* Thu Aug 15 2024 Michael Santana - 0.4.15-5.5 +- Bump up version number + +* Tue Jul 30 2024 Michael Santana - 0.4.15-5.4 +- Fix PAC buffer overflow (#1869639) + +* Tue Jul 30 2024 Michael Santana - 0.4.15-5.3 +- Fix CVE-2020-25219 (#1880349) + * Wed Jul 26 2023 MSVSphere Packaging Team - 0.4.15-5.2 - Rebuilt for MSVSphere 8.8