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krb5/SOURCES/0024-Remove-PKINIT-RSA-supp...

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From c52dea4944820750bf5881891bd92d6f5c7a73c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Sun, 26 Nov 2023 17:42:34 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Remove PKINIT RSA support
RSA mode is no longer needed for interoperability. Reduce the attack
surface of clients and KDCs by removing support for it.
ticket: 9108 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 401f584526e501b68e7516c17d8e467883f8f210)
---
doc/user/user_commands/kinit.rst | 4 -
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h | 2 -
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c | 235 +++-----
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h | 39 --
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 502 ------------------
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c | 2 -
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c | 208 +++-----
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h | 9 -
src/tests/t_pkinit.py | 7 -
src/windows/leash/htmlhelp/html/KINIT.htm | 3 -
10 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 880 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/user/user_commands/kinit.rst b/doc/user/user_commands/kinit.rst
index 5b105e35a5..d947e83cc6 100644
--- a/doc/user/user_commands/kinit.rst
+++ b/doc/user/user_commands/kinit.rst
@@ -193,10 +193,6 @@ OPTIONS
**X509_anchors**\ =\ *value*
specify where to find trusted X509 anchor information
- **flag_RSA_PROTOCOL**\ [**=yes**]
- specify use of RSA, rather than the default Diffie-Hellman
- protocol
-
**disable_freshness**\ [**=yes**]
disable sending freshness tokens (for testing purposes only)
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h
index 66f92d8f03..5ab0f4bc28 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h
@@ -146,7 +146,6 @@ typedef struct _pkinit_plg_opts {
int require_eku; /* require EKU checking (default is true) */
int accept_secondary_eku;/* accept secondary EKU (default is false) */
int allow_upn; /* allow UPN-SAN instead of pkinit-SAN */
- int dh_or_rsa; /* selects DH or RSA based pkinit */
int require_crl_checking; /* require CRL for a CA (default is false) */
int require_freshness; /* require freshness token (default is false) */
int disable_freshness; /* disable freshness token on client for testing */
@@ -160,7 +159,6 @@ typedef struct _pkinit_req_opts {
int require_eku;
int accept_secondary_eku;
int allow_upn;
- int dh_or_rsa;
int require_crl_checking;
int dh_size; /* initial request DH modulus size (default=1024) */
int require_hostname_match;
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
index ea9ba454df..54e7537600 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
@@ -191,7 +191,6 @@ pkinit_as_req_create(krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_pack auth_pack;
krb5_pa_pk_as_req *req = NULL;
krb5_algorithm_identifier **cmstypes = NULL;
- int protocol = reqctx->opts->dh_or_rsa;
pkiDebug("pkinit_as_req_create pa_type = %d\n", reqctx->pa_type);
@@ -214,29 +213,14 @@ pkinit_as_req_create(krb5_context context,
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
- switch(protocol) {
- case DH_PROTOCOL:
- TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_DH(context);
- pkiDebug("as_req: DH key transport algorithm\n");
+ TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_DH(context);
- /* create client-side DH keys */
- retval = client_create_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
- reqctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->idctx,
- reqctx->opts->dh_size, &spki);
- auth_pack.clientPublicValue = spki;
- if (retval != 0) {
- pkiDebug("failed to create dh parameters\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
- break;
- case RSA_PROTOCOL:
- TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_RSA(context);
- pkiDebug("as_req: RSA key transport algorithm\n");
- break;
- default:
- pkiDebug("as_req: unknown key transport protocol %d\n",
- protocol);
- retval = -1;
+ /* create client-side DH keys */
+ retval = client_create_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->cryptoctx,
+ reqctx->idctx, reqctx->opts->dh_size, &spki);
+ auth_pack.clientPublicValue = spki;
+ if (retval != 0) {
+ pkiDebug("failed to create dh parameters\n");
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -553,49 +537,34 @@ pkinit_as_rep_parse(krb5_context context,
return retval;
}
- switch(kdc_reply->choice) {
- case choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo:
- pkiDebug("as_rep: DH key transport algorithm\n");
+ if (kdc_reply->choice != choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo) {
+ pkiDebug("unknown as_rep type %d\n", kdc_reply->choice);
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
- print_buffer_bin(kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.data,
- kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.length, "/tmp/client_kdc_signeddata");
+ print_buffer_bin(kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.data,
+ kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.length,
+ "/tmp/client_kdc_signeddata");
#endif
- if ((retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
- reqctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_SERVER,
- reqctx->opts->require_crl_checking,
- (unsigned char *)
- kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.data,
- kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.length,
- (unsigned char **)&dh_data.data,
- &dh_data.length,
- NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
- pkiDebug("failed to verify pkcs7 signed data\n");
- TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_DH_FAIL(context);
- goto cleanup;
- }
- TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_DH(context);
- break;
- case choice_pa_pk_as_rep_encKeyPack:
- pkiDebug("as_rep: RSA key transport algorithm\n");
- if ((retval = cms_envelopeddata_verify(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
- reqctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->idctx, pa_type,
- reqctx->opts->require_crl_checking,
- (unsigned char *)
- kdc_reply->u.encKeyPack.data,
- kdc_reply->u.encKeyPack.length,
- (unsigned char **)&dh_data.data,
- &dh_data.length)) != 0) {
- pkiDebug("failed to verify pkcs7 enveloped data\n");
- TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_RSA_FAIL(context);
- goto cleanup;
- }
- TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_RSA(context);
- break;
- default:
- pkiDebug("unknown as_rep type %d\n", kdc_reply->choice);
- retval = -1;
+ retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
+ reqctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->idctx,
+ CMS_SIGN_SERVER,
+ reqctx->opts->require_crl_checking,
+ (unsigned char *)
+ kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.data,
+ kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.length,
+ (unsigned char **)&dh_data.data,
+ &dh_data.length,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (retval) {
+ pkiDebug("failed to verify pkcs7 signed data\n");
+ TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_DH_FAIL(context);
goto cleanup;
}
+ TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_DH(context);
+
retval = krb5_build_principal_ext(context, &kdc_princ,
request->server->realm.length,
request->server->realm.data,
@@ -632,116 +601,54 @@ pkinit_as_rep_parse(krb5_context context,
OCTETDATA_TO_KRB5DATA(&dh_data, &k5data);
- switch(kdc_reply->choice) {
- case choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo:
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
- print_buffer_bin(dh_data.data, dh_data.length,
- "/tmp/client_dh_key");
+ print_buffer_bin(dh_data.data, dh_data.length, "/tmp/client_dh_key");
#endif
- if ((retval = k5int_decode_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info(&k5data,
- &kdc_dh)) != 0) {
- pkiDebug("failed to decode kdc_dh_key_info\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- /* client after KDC reply */
- if ((retval = client_process_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
- reqctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->idctx,
- (unsigned char *)
- kdc_dh->subjectPublicKey.data,
- kdc_dh->subjectPublicKey.length,
- &client_key, &client_key_len)) != 0) {
- pkiDebug("failed to process dh params\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- /* If we have a KDF algorithm ID, call the algorithm agility KDF... */
- if (kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.kdfID) {
- secret.length = client_key_len;
- secret.data = (char *)client_key;
-
- retval = pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(context, &secret,
- kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.kdfID,
- request->client, request->server,
- etype, encoded_request,
- (krb5_data *)as_rep, key_block);
-
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("failed to create key pkinit_alg_agility_kdf %s\n",
- error_message(retval));
- goto cleanup;
- }
- TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_KDF_ALG(context, kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.kdfID,
- key_block);
+ retval = k5int_decode_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info(&k5data, &kdc_dh);
+ if (retval) {
+ pkiDebug("failed to decode kdc_dh_key_info\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
- /* ...otherwise, use the older octetstring2key function. */
- } else {
+ /* client after KDC reply */
+ retval = client_process_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->cryptoctx,
+ reqctx->idctx,
+ (unsigned char *)kdc_dh->subjectPublicKey.data,
+ kdc_dh->subjectPublicKey.length, &client_key,
+ &client_key_len);
+ if (retval) {
+ pkiDebug("failed to process dh params\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
- retval = pkinit_octetstring2key(context, etype, client_key,
- client_key_len, key_block);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("failed to create key pkinit_octetstring2key %s\n",
- error_message(retval));
- goto cleanup;
- }
- TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_KDF_OS2K(context, key_block);
- }
+ /* If we have a KDF algorithm ID, call the algorithm agility KDF. */
+ if (kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.kdfID) {
+ secret.length = client_key_len;
+ secret.data = (char *)client_key;
- break;
- case choice_pa_pk_as_rep_encKeyPack:
-#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
- print_buffer_bin(dh_data.data, dh_data.length,
- "/tmp/client_key_pack");
-#endif
- retval = k5int_decode_krb5_reply_key_pack(&k5data, &key_pack);
+ retval = pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(context, &secret,
+ kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.kdfID,
+ request->client, request->server,
+ etype, encoded_request,
+ (krb5_data *)as_rep, key_block);
if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("failed to decode reply_key_pack\n");
+ pkiDebug("failed to create key pkinit_alg_agility_kdf %s\n",
+ error_message(retval));
goto cleanup;
}
- retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context,
- key_pack->asChecksum.checksum_type,
- &key_pack->replyKey,
- KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM,
- encoded_request, &cksum);
+ TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_KDF_ALG(context, kdc_reply->u.dh_Info.kdfID,
+ key_block);
+
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, use the older octetstring2key function. */
+ retval = pkinit_octetstring2key(context, etype, client_key,
+ client_key_len, key_block);
if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("failed to make a checksum\n");
+ pkiDebug("failed to create key pkinit_octetstring2key %s\n",
+ error_message(retval));
goto cleanup;
}
-
- if ((cksum.length != key_pack->asChecksum.length) ||
- k5_bcmp(cksum.contents, key_pack->asChecksum.contents,
- cksum.length) != 0) {
- TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_CHECKSUM_FAIL(context, &cksum,
- &key_pack->asChecksum);
- pkiDebug("failed to match the checksums\n");
-#ifdef DEBUG_CKSUM
- pkiDebug("calculating checksum on buf size (%d)\n",
- encoded_request->length);
- print_buffer(encoded_request->data, encoded_request->length);
- pkiDebug("encrypting key (%d)\n", key_pack->replyKey.length);
- print_buffer(key_pack->replyKey.contents,
- key_pack->replyKey.length);
- pkiDebug("received checksum type=%d size=%d ",
- key_pack->asChecksum.checksum_type,
- key_pack->asChecksum.length);
- print_buffer(key_pack->asChecksum.contents,
- key_pack->asChecksum.length);
- pkiDebug("expected checksum type=%d size=%d ",
- cksum.checksum_type, cksum.length);
- print_buffer(cksum.contents, cksum.length);
-#endif
- goto cleanup;
- } else
- pkiDebug("checksums match\n");
-
- krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, &key_pack->replyKey,
- key_block);
- TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_RSA_KEY(context, key_block, &cksum);
-
- break;
- default:
- pkiDebug("unknown as_rep type %d\n", kdc_reply->choice);
- goto cleanup;
+ TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_KDF_OS2K(context, key_block);
}
retval = 0;
@@ -1286,7 +1193,6 @@ pkinit_client_req_init(krb5_context context,
reqctx->opts->require_eku = plgctx->opts->require_eku;
reqctx->opts->accept_secondary_eku = plgctx->opts->accept_secondary_eku;
- reqctx->opts->dh_or_rsa = plgctx->opts->dh_or_rsa;
reqctx->opts->allow_upn = plgctx->opts->allow_upn;
reqctx->opts->require_crl_checking = plgctx->opts->require_crl_checking;
reqctx->opts->disable_freshness = plgctx->opts->disable_freshness;
@@ -1457,11 +1363,6 @@ handle_gic_opt(krb5_context context,
retval = add_string_to_array(context, &plgctx->idopts->anchors, value);
if (retval)
return retval;
- } else if (strcmp(attr, "flag_RSA_PROTOCOL") == 0) {
- if (strcmp(value, "yes") == 0) {
- pkiDebug("Setting flag to use RSA_PROTOCOL\n");
- plgctx->opts->dh_or_rsa = RSA_PROTOCOL;
- }
} else if (strcmp(attr, "disable_freshness") == 0) {
if (strcmp(value, "yes") == 0)
plgctx->opts->disable_freshness = 1;
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
index 8bdbea8e95..04199b45a4 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
@@ -181,45 +181,6 @@ krb5_error_code cms_signeddata_verify
int *is_signed); /* OUT
receives whether message is signed */
-/*
- * this function creates a CMS message where eContentType is EnvelopedData
- */
-krb5_error_code cms_envelopeddata_create
- (krb5_context context, /* IN */
- pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, /* IN */
- pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, /* IN */
- pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, /* IN */
- krb5_preauthtype pa_type, /* IN */
- unsigned char *key_pack, /* IN
- contains DER encoded ReplyKeyPack */
- unsigned int key_pack_len, /* IN
- contains length of key_pack */
- unsigned char **envel_data, /* OUT
- receives DER encoded encKeyPack */
- unsigned int *envel_data_len); /* OUT
- receives length of envel_data */
-
-/*
- * this function creates a CMS message where eContentType is EnvelopedData
- */
-krb5_error_code cms_envelopeddata_verify
- (krb5_context context, /* IN */
- pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, /* IN */
- pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, /* IN */
- pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, /* IN */
- krb5_preauthtype pa_type, /* IN */
- int require_crl_checking, /* IN
- specifies whether CRL checking should be
- strictly enforced */
- unsigned char *envel_data, /* IN
- contains DER encoded encKeyPack */
- unsigned int envel_data_len, /* IN
- contains length of envel_data */
- unsigned char **signed_data, /* OUT
- receives ReplyKeyPack */
- unsigned int *signed_data_len); /* OUT
- receives length of signed_data */
-
/*
* This function retrieves the signer's identity, in a form that could
* be passed back in to a future invocation of this module as a candidate
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
index af3fa9ee8b..980a89edc1 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
@@ -66,26 +66,14 @@ static krb5_error_code create_signature
(unsigned char **, unsigned int *, unsigned char *, unsigned int,
EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-static krb5_error_code pkinit_decode_data
-(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context cryptoctx,
- const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len, uint8_t **decoded,
- unsigned int *decoded_len);
-
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
static void print_dh(DH *, char *);
static void print_pubkey(BIGNUM *, char *);
#endif
-static int prepare_enc_data
-(const uint8_t *indata, int indata_len, uint8_t **outdata, int *outdata_len);
-
static int openssl_callback (int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
static int openssl_callback_ignore_crls (int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
-static int pkcs7_decrypt
-(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, PKCS7 *p7,
- unsigned char **data_out, unsigned int *len_out);
-
static ASN1_OBJECT * pkinit_pkcs7type2oid
(pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, int pkcs7_type);
@@ -115,20 +103,12 @@ static krb5_error_code pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11
(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len);
-static krb5_error_code pkinit_decode_data_pkcs11
-(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
- const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len, uint8_t **decoded_data,
- unsigned int *decoded_data_len);
#endif /* WITHOUT_PKCS11 */
static krb5_error_code pkinit_sign_data_fs
(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len);
-static krb5_error_code pkinit_decode_data_fs
-(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
- const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len, uint8_t **decoded_data,
- unsigned int *decoded_data_len);
static krb5_error_code
create_krb5_invalidCertificates(krb5_context context,
@@ -140,10 +120,6 @@ create_krb5_invalidCertificates(krb5_context context,
static krb5_error_code
create_identifiers_from_stack(STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids);
-static int
-wrap_signeddata(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
- unsigned char **out, unsigned int *out_len);
-
static const char *
pkcs11err(int err);
@@ -2177,175 +2153,6 @@ cleanup:
return retval;
}
-krb5_error_code
-cms_envelopeddata_create(krb5_context context,
- pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
- pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
- pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
- krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
- unsigned char *key_pack,
- unsigned int key_pack_len,
- unsigned char **out,
- unsigned int *out_len)
-{
-
- krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
- PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
- BIO *in = NULL;
- unsigned char *p = NULL, *signed_data = NULL, *enc_data = NULL;
- int signed_data_len = 0, enc_data_len = 0, flags = PKCS7_BINARY;
- STACK_OF(X509) *encerts = NULL;
- const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
-
- retval = cms_signeddata_create(context, plgctx, reqctx, idctx,
- CMS_ENVEL_SERVER, key_pack, key_pack_len,
- &signed_data,
- (unsigned int *)&signed_data_len);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 signed data\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- /* check we have client's certificate */
- if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) {
- retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- encerts = sk_X509_new_null();
- sk_X509_push(encerts, reqctx->received_cert);
-
- cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- prepare_enc_data(signed_data, signed_data_len, &enc_data,
- &enc_data_len);
- retval = BIO_write(in, enc_data, enc_data_len);
- if (retval != enc_data_len) {
- pkiDebug("BIO_write only wrote %d\n", retval);
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(encerts, in, cipher, flags);
- if (p7 == NULL) {
- retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to encrypt PKCS7 object"));
- goto cleanup;
- }
- p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
-
- *out_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
- if (!*out_len || (p = *out = malloc(*out_len)) == NULL) {
- retval = ENOMEM;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
- if (!retval) {
- retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to DER encode PKCS7"));
- goto cleanup;
- }
- retval = 0;
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
- print_buffer_bin(*out, *out_len, "/tmp/kdc_enveloped_data");
-#endif
-
-cleanup:
- if (p7 != NULL)
- PKCS7_free(p7);
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- free(signed_data);
- free(enc_data);
- if (encerts != NULL)
- sk_X509_free(encerts);
-
- return retval;
-}
-
-krb5_error_code
-cms_envelopeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
- pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
- pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
- pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
- krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
- int require_crl_checking,
- unsigned char *enveloped_data,
- unsigned int enveloped_data_len,
- unsigned char **data,
- unsigned int *data_len)
-{
- krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
- PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
- const unsigned char *p = enveloped_data;
- unsigned int tmp_buf_len = 0, tmp_buf2_len = 0, vfy_buf_len = 0;
- unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL, *tmp_buf2 = NULL, *vfy_buf = NULL;
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
- print_buffer_bin(enveloped_data, enveloped_data_len,
- "/tmp/client_envelopeddata");
-#endif
- /* decode received PKCS7 message */
- if ((p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, (int)enveloped_data_len)) == NULL) {
- retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to decode PKCS7"));
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- /* verify that the received message is PKCS7 EnvelopedData message */
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
- pkiDebug("Expected id-enveloped PKCS7 msg (received type = %d)\n",
- OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type));
- krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- /* decrypt received PKCS7 message */
- if (pkcs7_decrypt(context, id_cryptoctx, p7, &tmp_buf, &tmp_buf_len)) {
- pkiDebug("PKCS7 decryption successful\n");
- } else {
- retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to decrypt PKCS7 message"));
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
- print_buffer_bin(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack");
-#endif
- /* verify PKCS7 SignedData message */
- /* Wrap the signed data to make decoding easier in the verify routine. */
- retval = wrap_signeddata(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &tmp_buf2, &tmp_buf2_len);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("failed to encode signeddata\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
- vfy_buf = tmp_buf2;
- vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf2_len;
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
- print_buffer_bin(vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack2");
-#endif
-
- retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
- id_cryptoctx, CMS_ENVEL_SERVER,
- require_crl_checking,
- vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len,
- data, data_len, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-
- if (!retval)
- pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Success\n");
- else {
- pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Failure\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- retval = 0;
-
-cleanup:
-
- if (p7 != NULL)
- PKCS7_free(p7);
- free(tmp_buf);
- free(tmp_buf2);
-
- return retval;
-}
-
static krb5_error_code
crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
@@ -3396,70 +3203,6 @@ pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx, int pkcs7_type)
}
-static int
-wrap_signeddata(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
- unsigned char **out, unsigned int *out_len)
-{
-
- unsigned int orig_len = 0, oid_len = 0, tot_len = 0;
- ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
- unsigned char *p = NULL;
-
- /* Get length to wrap the original data with SEQUENCE tag */
- tot_len = orig_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)data_len, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
-
- /* Add the signedData OID and adjust lengths */
- oid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
- oid_len = i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, NULL);
-
- tot_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(orig_len+oid_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
-
- p = *out = malloc(tot_len);
- if (p == NULL) return -1;
-
- ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)(orig_len+oid_len),
- V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
-
- i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, &p);
-
- ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)data_len, 0, V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
- memcpy(p, data, data_len);
-
- *out_len = tot_len;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-prepare_enc_data(const uint8_t *indata, int indata_len, uint8_t **outdata,
- int *outdata_len)
-{
- int tag, class;
- long tlen, slen;
- const uint8_t *p = indata, *oldp;
-
- if (ASN1_get_object(&p, &slen, &tag, &class, indata_len) & 0x80)
- return EINVAL;
- if (tag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- return EINVAL;
-
- oldp = p;
- if (ASN1_get_object(&p, &tlen, &tag, &class, slen) & 0x80)
- return EINVAL;
- p += tlen;
- slen -= (p - oldp);
-
- if (ASN1_get_object(&p, &tlen, &tag, &class, slen) & 0x80)
- return EINVAL;
-
- *outdata = malloc(tlen);
- if (*outdata == NULL)
- return ENOMEM;
- memcpy(*outdata, p, tlen);
- *outdata_len = tlen;
- return 0;
-}
-
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
static struct plugin_file_handle *
load_pkcs11_module(krb5_context context, const char *modname,
@@ -3778,169 +3521,6 @@ pkinit_find_private_key(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
}
#endif
-static krb5_error_code
-pkinit_decode_data_fs(krb5_context context,
- pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
- const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len,
- uint8_t **decoded_data, unsigned int *decoded_data_len)
-{
- X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs,
- id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = id_cryptoctx->my_key;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- uint8_t *buf = NULL;
- size_t buf_len = 0;
- int ok;
-
- *decoded_data = NULL;
- *decoded_data_len = 0;
-
- if (cert != NULL && !X509_check_private_key(cert, pkey)) {
- pkiDebug("private key does not match certificate\n");
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
- }
-
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- if (ctx == NULL)
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
-
- ok = EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto cleanup;
-
- /* Get the length of the eventual output. */
- ok = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &buf_len, data, data_len);
- if (!ok) {
- pkiDebug("unable to decrypt received data\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- buf = malloc(buf_len);
- if (buf == NULL) {
- ok = 0;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- ok = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, buf, &buf_len, data, data_len);
- if (!ok) {
- pkiDebug("unable to decrypt received data\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- *decoded_data = buf;
- *decoded_data_len = buf_len;
- buf = NULL;
-cleanup:
- zapfree(buf, buf_len);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
- return ok ? 0 : KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
-}
-
-#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
-/*
- * When using the ActivCard Linux pkcs11 library (v2.0.1), the decrypt function
- * fails. By inserting an extra function call, which serves nothing but to
- * change the stack, we were able to work around the issue. If the ActivCard
- * library is fixed in the future, this function can be inlined back into the
- * caller.
- */
-static CK_RV
-pkinit_C_Decrypt(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
- CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
- CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
- CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
- CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
-{
- CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
-
- rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx->session, pEncryptedData,
- ulEncryptedDataLen, pData, pulDataLen);
- if (rv == CKR_OK) {
- pkiDebug("pData %p *pulDataLen %d\n", (void *) pData,
- (int) *pulDataLen);
- }
- return rv;
-}
-
-static krb5_error_code
-pkinit_decode_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
- pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
- const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len,
- uint8_t **decoded_data,
- unsigned int *decoded_data_len)
-{
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
- CK_ULONG len;
- CK_MECHANISM mech;
- uint8_t *cp;
- int r;
-
- *decoded_data = NULL;
- *decoded_data_len = 0;
-
- if (pkinit_open_session(context, id_cryptoctx)) {
- pkiDebug("can't open pkcs11 session\n");
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
- }
-
- pkinit_find_private_key(id_cryptoctx, CKA_DECRYPT, &obj);
-
- mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
- mech.pParameter = NULL;
- mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-
- if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_DecryptInit(id_cryptoctx->session, &mech,
- obj)) != CKR_OK) {
- pkiDebug("C_DecryptInit: 0x%x\n", (int) r);
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
- }
- pkiDebug("data_len = %d\n", data_len);
- cp = malloc((size_t) data_len);
- if (cp == NULL)
- return ENOMEM;
- len = data_len;
- pkiDebug("session %p edata %p edata_len %d data %p datalen @%p %d\n",
- (void *) id_cryptoctx->session, (void *) data, (int) data_len,
- (void *) cp, (void *) &len, (int) len);
- r = pkinit_C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx, (CK_BYTE_PTR) data, (CK_ULONG) data_len,
- cp, &len);
- if (r != CKR_OK) {
- pkiDebug("C_Decrypt: %s\n", pkcs11err(r));
- if (r == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
- pkiDebug("decrypt %d needs %d\n", (int) data_len, (int) len);
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
- }
- pkiDebug("decrypt %d -> %d\n", (int) data_len, (int) len);
- *decoded_data_len = len;
- *decoded_data = cp;
-
- return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-krb5_error_code
-pkinit_decode_data(krb5_context context,
- pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
- const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len,
- uint8_t **decoded_data, unsigned int *decoded_data_len)
-{
- krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
-
- *decoded_data = NULL;
- *decoded_data_len = 0;
-
- if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1)
- retval = pkinit_decode_data_fs(context, id_cryptoctx, data, data_len,
- decoded_data, decoded_data_len);
-#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
- else
- retval = pkinit_decode_data_pkcs11(context, id_cryptoctx, data,
- data_len, decoded_data, decoded_data_len);
-#endif
-
- return retval;
-}
-
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_sign_data_fs(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
@@ -5615,88 +5195,6 @@ cleanup:
return retval;
}
-/* Originally based on OpenSSL's PKCS7_dataDecode(), now modified to remove the
- * use of BIO objects and to fit the PKINIT internal interfaces. */
-static int
-pkcs7_decrypt(krb5_context context,
- pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, PKCS7 *p7,
- unsigned char **data_out, unsigned int *len_out)
-{
- krb5_error_code ret;
- int ok = 0, plaintext_len = 0, final_len;
- unsigned int keylen = 0, eklen = 0, blocksize;
- unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL, *plaintext = NULL, *use_key;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data_body = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
- const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR *enc_alg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
- STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
- PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
-
- *data_out = NULL;
- *len_out = 0;
-
- p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
-
- /* RFC 4556 section 3.2.3.2 requires that there be exactly one
- * recipientInfo. */
- if (sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk) != 1) {
- pkiDebug("invalid number of EnvelopedData RecipientInfos\n");
- return 0;
- }
- ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, 0);
-
- evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
- if (evp_cipher == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
- keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(evp_cipher);
- blocksize = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(evp_cipher);
-
- evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- if (evp_ctx == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit(evp_ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL) ||
- EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx, enc_alg->parameter) <= 0)
- goto cleanup;
-
- /* Generate a random symmetric key to avoid exposing timing data if RSA
- * decryption fails the padding check. */
- tkey = malloc(keylen);
- if (tkey == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey))
- goto cleanup;
-
- /* Decrypt the secret key with the private key. */
- ret = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx,
- ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ri->enc_key),
- ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), &ek, &eklen);
- use_key = (ret || eklen != keylen) ? tkey : ek;
-
- /* Allocate a plaintext buffer and decrypt data_body into it. */
- plaintext = malloc(data_body->length + blocksize);
- if (plaintext == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit(evp_ctx, NULL, use_key, NULL))
- goto cleanup;
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(evp_ctx, plaintext, &plaintext_len,
- data_body->data, data_body->length))
- goto cleanup;
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal(evp_ctx, plaintext + plaintext_len, &final_len))
- goto cleanup;
- plaintext_len += final_len;
-
- *len_out = plaintext_len;
- *data_out = plaintext;
- plaintext = NULL;
- ok = 1;
-
-cleanup:
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
- zapfree(plaintext, plaintext_len);
- zapfree(ek, eklen);
- zapfree(tkey, keylen);
- return ok;
-}
-
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
static void
print_dh(DH * dh, char *msg)
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c
index 4c3d46bf5a..19db695a4d 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ pkinit_init_req_opts(pkinit_req_opts **reqopts)
opts->require_eku = 1;
opts->accept_secondary_eku = 0;
opts->allow_upn = 0;
- opts->dh_or_rsa = DH_PROTOCOL;
opts->require_crl_checking = 0;
opts->dh_size = PKINIT_DEFAULT_DH_MIN_BITS;
@@ -79,7 +78,6 @@ pkinit_init_plg_opts(pkinit_plg_opts **plgopts)
opts->require_eku = 1;
opts->accept_secondary_eku = 0;
- opts->dh_or_rsa = DH_PROTOCOL;
opts->allow_upn = 0;
opts->require_crl_checking = 0;
opts->require_freshness = 0;
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
index 768a4e559f..aab21f951c 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
@@ -821,132 +821,55 @@ pkinit_server_return_padata(krb5_context context,
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
- /* let's assume it's RSA. we'll reset it to DH if needed */
- rep->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_encKeyPack;
- if (reqctx->rcv_auth_pack != NULL &&
- reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->clientPublicValue.length > 0) {
- rep->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo;
-
- pkiDebug("received DH key delivery AS REQ\n");
- retval = server_process_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
- reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
- &dh_pubkey, &dh_pubkey_len,
- &server_key, &server_key_len);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("failed to process/create dh parameters\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- /*
- * This is DH, so don't generate the key until after we
- * encode the reply, because the encoded reply is needed
- * to generate the key in some cases.
- */
-
- dhkey_info.subjectPublicKey.length = dh_pubkey_len;
- dhkey_info.subjectPublicKey.data = (char *)dh_pubkey;
- dhkey_info.nonce = request->nonce;
- dhkey_info.dhKeyExpiration = 0;
-
- retval = k5int_encode_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info(&dhkey_info,
- &encoded_dhkey_info);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("encode_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info failed\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
-#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
- print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)encoded_dhkey_info->data,
- encoded_dhkey_info->length,
- "/tmp/kdc_dh_key_info");
-#endif
-
- retval = cms_signeddata_create(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
- reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
- CMS_SIGN_SERVER,
- (unsigned char *)
- encoded_dhkey_info->data,
- encoded_dhkey_info->length,
- (unsigned char **)
- &rep->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.data,
- &rep->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.length);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 signed data\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- } else {
- pkiDebug("received RSA key delivery AS REQ\n");
-
- init_krb5_reply_key_pack(&key_pack);
- if (key_pack == NULL) {
- retval = ENOMEM;
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ if (reqctx->rcv_auth_pack == NULL ||
+ reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->clientPublicValue.length == 0) {
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ k5_setmsg(context, retval, _("Unsupported PKINIT RSA request"));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
- retval = krb5_c_make_random_key(context, enctype, &key_pack->replyKey);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("unable to make a session key\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ rep->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo;
- retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, 0, &key_pack->replyKey,
- KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM,
- req_pkt, &key_pack->asChecksum);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("unable to calculate AS REQ checksum\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
-#ifdef DEBUG_CKSUM
- pkiDebug("calculating checksum on buf size = %d\n", req_pkt->length);
- print_buffer(req_pkt->data, req_pkt->length);
- pkiDebug("checksum size = %d\n", key_pack->asChecksum.length);
- print_buffer(key_pack->asChecksum.contents,
- key_pack->asChecksum.length);
- pkiDebug("encrypting key (%d)\n", key_pack->replyKey.length);
- print_buffer(key_pack->replyKey.contents, key_pack->replyKey.length);
-#endif
+ retval = server_process_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->cryptoctx,
+ plgctx->idctx, &dh_pubkey, &dh_pubkey_len,
+ &server_key, &server_key_len);
+ if (retval) {
+ pkiDebug("failed to process/create dh parameters\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
- retval = k5int_encode_krb5_reply_key_pack(key_pack,
- &encoded_key_pack);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("failed to encode reply_key_pack\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ dhkey_info.subjectPublicKey.length = dh_pubkey_len;
+ dhkey_info.subjectPublicKey.data = (char *)dh_pubkey;
+ dhkey_info.nonce = request->nonce;
+ dhkey_info.dhKeyExpiration = 0;
- rep->choice = choice_pa_pk_as_rep_encKeyPack;
- retval = cms_envelopeddata_create(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
- reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
- padata->pa_type,
- (unsigned char *)
- encoded_key_pack->data,
- encoded_key_pack->length,
- (unsigned char **)
- &rep->u.encKeyPack.data,
- &rep->u.encKeyPack.length);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 enveloped data: %s\n",
- error_message(retval));
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ retval = k5int_encode_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info(&dhkey_info,
+ &encoded_dhkey_info);
+ if (retval) {
+ pkiDebug("encode_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info failed\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
- print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)encoded_key_pack->data,
- encoded_key_pack->length,
- "/tmp/kdc_key_pack");
- print_buffer_bin(rep->u.encKeyPack.data, rep->u.encKeyPack.length,
- "/tmp/kdc_enc_key_pack");
+ print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)encoded_dhkey_info->data,
+ encoded_dhkey_info->length, "/tmp/kdc_dh_key_info");
#endif
- retval = cb->replace_reply_key(context, rock, &key_pack->replyKey,
- FALSE);
- if (retval)
- goto cleanup;
+ retval = cms_signeddata_create(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
+ reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
+ CMS_SIGN_SERVER,
+ (unsigned char *)encoded_dhkey_info->data,
+ encoded_dhkey_info->length,
+ (unsigned char **)
+ &rep->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.data,
+ &rep->u.dh_Info.dhSignedData.length);
+ if (retval) {
+ pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 signed data\n");
+ goto cleanup;
}
- if (rep->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo &&
- ((reqctx->rcv_auth_pack != NULL &&
- reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->supportedKDFs != NULL))) {
-
+ if (reqctx->rcv_auth_pack != NULL &&
+ reqctx->rcv_auth_pack->supportedKDFs != NULL) {
/* If using the alg-agility KDF, put the algorithm in the reply
* before encoding it.
*/
@@ -973,41 +896,36 @@ pkinit_server_return_padata(krb5_context context,
"/tmp/kdc_as_rep");
#endif
- /* If this is DH, we haven't computed the key yet, so do it now. */
- if (rep->choice == choice_pa_pk_as_rep_dhInfo) {
-
- /* If mutually supported KDFs were found, use the algorithm agility
- * KDF. */
- if (rep->u.dh_Info.kdfID) {
- secret.data = (char *)server_key;
- secret.length = server_key_len;
+ /* If mutually supported KDFs were found, use the algorithm agility KDF. */
+ if (rep->u.dh_Info.kdfID) {
+ secret.data = (char *)server_key;
+ secret.length = server_key_len;
- retval = pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(context, &secret,
- rep->u.dh_Info.kdfID,
- request->client, request->server,
- enctype, req_pkt, out_data,
- &reply_key);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("pkinit_alg_agility_kdf failed: %s\n",
- error_message(retval));
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ retval = pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(context, &secret, rep->u.dh_Info.kdfID,
+ request->client, request->server,
+ enctype, req_pkt, out_data,
+ &reply_key);
+ if (retval) {
+ pkiDebug("pkinit_alg_agility_kdf failed: %s\n",
+ error_message(retval));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
- /* Otherwise, use the older octetstring2key() function */
- } else {
- retval = pkinit_octetstring2key(context, enctype, server_key,
+ /* Otherwise, use the older octetstring2key() function */
+ } else {
+ retval = pkinit_octetstring2key(context, enctype, server_key,
server_key_len, &reply_key);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("pkinit_octetstring2key failed: %s\n",
- error_message(retval));
- goto cleanup;
- }
- }
- retval = cb->replace_reply_key(context, rock, &reply_key, FALSE);
- if (retval)
+ if (retval) {
+ pkiDebug("pkinit_octetstring2key failed: %s\n",
+ error_message(retval));
goto cleanup;
+ }
}
+ retval = cb->replace_reply_key(context, rock, &reply_key, FALSE);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+
*send_pa = malloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
if (*send_pa == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
index 5ee39c085c..d385759145 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
@@ -58,19 +58,10 @@
TRACE(c, "PKINIT client verified DH reply")
#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_DH_FAIL(c) \
TRACE(c, "PKINIT client could not verify DH reply")
-#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_RSA(c) \
- TRACE(c, "PKINIT client verified RSA reply")
-#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_RSA_KEY(c, keyblock, cksum) \
- TRACE(c, "PKINIT client retrieved reply key {keyblock} from RSA " \
- "reply (checksum {cksum})", keyblock, cksum)
-#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_RSA_FAIL(c) \
- TRACE(c, "PKINIT client could not verify RSA reply")
#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_CHECKSUM(c, cksum) \
TRACE(c, "PKINIT client computed kdc-req-body checksum {cksum}", cksum)
#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_DH(c) \
TRACE(c, "PKINIT client making DH request")
-#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_RSA(c) \
- TRACE(c, "PKINIT client making RSA request")
#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_SAN_CONFIG_DNSNAME(c, host) \
TRACE(c, "PKINIT client config accepts KDC dNSName SAN {str}", host)
#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_SAN_MATCH_DNSNAME(c, host) \
diff --git a/src/tests/t_pkinit.py b/src/tests/t_pkinit.py
index ec2356ea22..62e6c426d3 100755
--- a/src/tests/t_pkinit.py
+++ b/src/tests/t_pkinit.py
@@ -179,13 +179,6 @@ id_conf = {'realms': {'$realm': {'pkinit_identities': [file_identity + 'X',
id_env = realm.special_env('idconf', False, krb5_conf=id_conf)
realm.kinit(realm.user_princ, expected_trace=msgs, env=id_env)
-# Try again using RSA instead of DH.
-mark('FILE identity, no password, RSA')
-realm.pkinit(realm.user_princ, flags=['-X', 'flag_RSA_PROTOCOL=yes'],
- expected_trace=('PKINIT client making RSA request',
- 'PKINIT client verified RSA reply'))
-realm.klist(realm.user_princ)
-
# Test a DH parameter renegotiation by temporarily setting a 4096-bit
# minimum on the KDC. (Preauth type 16 is PKINIT PA_PK_AS_REQ;
# 109 is PKINIT TD_DH_PARAMETERS; 133 is FAST PA-FX-COOKIE.)
diff --git a/src/windows/leash/htmlhelp/html/KINIT.htm b/src/windows/leash/htmlhelp/html/KINIT.htm
index eeee211a6e..46cb4a3ad8 100644
--- a/src/windows/leash/htmlhelp/html/KINIT.htm
+++ b/src/windows/leash/htmlhelp/html/KINIT.htm
@@ -146,9 +146,6 @@ default credentials cache may vary between systems. If the <b>KRB5CCNAME</b> en
<th id="th2"> <span class="command"> <b>-S</b> <i>service</i><b>_</b><i>name</i></span></th>
<td> specify an alternate service name to use when getting initial
tickets.</td></tr>
- <tr>
- <th id="th2"> <span class="command"> <b>flag_RSA_PROTOCOL</b>[=yes] </span></th>
-<td> specify use of RSA, rather than the default Diffie-Hellman protocol. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<h2>ENVIRONMENT</h2>
--
2.46.0
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