diff --git a/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2006-20001.patch b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2006-20001.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26c9363 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2006-20001.patch @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +diff --git a/modules/dav/main/util.c b/modules/dav/main/util.c +index 1ae5914027c..3f7822fc931 100644 +--- a/modules/dav/main/util.c ++++ b/modules/dav/main/util.c +@@ -801,8 +801,14 @@ static dav_error * dav_process_if_header(request_rec *r, dav_if_header **p_ih) + "for the same state."); + } + condition = DAV_IF_COND_NOT; ++ list += 2; ++ } ++ else { ++ return dav_new_error(r->pool, HTTP_BAD_REQUEST, ++ DAV_ERR_IF_UNK_CHAR, 0, ++ "Invalid \"If:\" header: " ++ "Unexpected character in List"); + } +- list += 2; + break; + + case ' ': diff --git a/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-36760.patch b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-36760.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a34c30 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-36760.patch @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +From 5efc9507c487c37dfe2a279a4a0335cad701cd5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Covener +Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:19:07 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] cleanup on error + +git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1906540 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 +--- + modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c +index 9cd7adbcbbf..07f37392d88 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c +@@ -255,6 +255,8 @@ static int ap_proxy_ajp_request(apr_pool_t *p, request_rec *r, + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10396) + "%s Transfer-Encoding is not supported", + tenc); ++ /* We had a failure: Close connection to backend */ ++ conn->close = 1; + return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR; + } + } else { diff --git a/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-37436.patch b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-37436.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26311e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-37436.patch @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +From 8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Covener +Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:20:09 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1906539 from trunk: + +fail on bad header + +Submitted By: covener +Reviewed By: covener, rpluem, gbechis + + +git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1906541 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 +--- + modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + server/protocol.c | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c +index d74ae054ac9..ec4e7fb06b5 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c +@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ static void process_proxy_header(request_rec *r, proxy_dir_conf *c, + * any sense at all, since we depend on buffer still containing + * what was read by ap_getline() upon return. + */ +-static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, ++static apr_status_t ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + char *buffer, int size, + conn_rec *c, int *pread_len) + { +@@ -820,19 +820,26 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + rc = ap_proxygetline(tmp_bb, buffer, size, rr, + AP_GETLINE_FOLD | AP_GETLINE_NOSPC_EOL, &len); + +- if (len <= 0) +- break; + +- if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) { +- /* The header could not fit in the provided buffer, warn. +- * XXX: falls through with the truncated header, 5xx instead? +- */ +- int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2; +- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124) +- "header size is over the limit allowed by " +- "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). " +- "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'", +- size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc); ++ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS) { ++ if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) { ++ int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2; ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124) ++ "header size is over the limit allowed by " ++ "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). " ++ "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'", ++ size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc); ++ } ++ else { ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10404) ++ "Error reading headers from backend"); ++ } ++ r->headers_out = NULL; ++ return rc; ++ } ++ ++ if (len <= 0) { ++ break; + } + else { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, r, "%s", buffer); +@@ -855,7 +862,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + if (psc->badopt == bad_error) { + /* Nope, it wasn't even an extra HTTP header. Give up. */ + r->headers_out = NULL; +- return; ++ return APR_EINVAL; + } + else if (psc->badopt == bad_body) { + /* if we've already started loading headers_out, then +@@ -869,13 +876,13 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + "in headers returned by %s (%s)", + r->uri, r->method); + *pread_len = len; +- return; ++ return APR_SUCCESS; + } + else { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01099) + "No HTTP headers returned by %s (%s)", + r->uri, r->method); +- return; ++ return APR_SUCCESS; + } + } + } +@@ -905,6 +912,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + process_proxy_header(r, dconf, buffer, value); + saw_headers = 1; + } ++ return APR_SUCCESS; + } + + +@@ -1218,10 +1226,10 @@ int ap_proxy_http_process_response(proxy_http_req_t *req) + "Set-Cookie", NULL); + + /* shove the headers direct into r->headers_out */ +- ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size, +- origin, &pread_len); ++ rc = ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size, ++ origin, &pread_len); + +- if (r->headers_out == NULL) { ++ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS || r->headers_out == NULL) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01106) + "bad HTTP/%d.%d header returned by %s (%s)", + major, minor, r->uri, r->method); +diff --git a/server/protocol.c b/server/protocol.c +index 7adc7f75c10..6f9540ad1de 100644 +--- a/server/protocol.c ++++ b/server/protocol.c +@@ -508,6 +508,8 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline_core(char **s, apr_size_t n, + /* PR#43039: We shouldn't accept NULL bytes within the line */ + bytes_handled = strlen(*s); + if (bytes_handled < *read) { ++ ap_log_data(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, ap_server_conf, ++ "NULL bytes in header", *s, *read, 0); + *read = bytes_handled; + if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) { + rv = APR_EINVAL; diff --git a/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2023-25690.patch b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2023-25690.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4835b5c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2023-25690.patch @@ -0,0 +1,407 @@ +diff --git a/docs/manual/rewrite/flags.html.en b/docs/manual/rewrite/flags.html.en +index 7cd4990..2242312 100644 +--- a/docs/manual/rewrite/flags.html.en ++++ b/docs/manual/rewrite/flags.html.en +@@ -85,10 +85,6 @@ of how you might use them.

+

B (escape backreferences)

+

The [B] flag instructs RewriteRule to escape non-alphanumeric + characters before applying the transformation.

+-

In 2.4.26 and later, you can limit the escaping to specific characters +-in backreferences by listing them: [B=#?;]. Note: The space +-character can be used in the list of characters to escape, but it cannot be +-the last character in the list.

+ +

mod_rewrite has to unescape URLs before mapping them, + so backreferences are unescaped at the time they are applied. +@@ -120,6 +116,16 @@ when the backend may break if presented with an unescaped URL.

+ +

An alternative to this flag is using a RewriteCond to capture against %{THE_REQUEST} which will capture + strings in the encoded form.

++ ++

In 2.4.26 and later, you can limit the escaping to specific characters ++in backreferences by listing them: [B=#?;]. Note: The space ++character can be used in the list of characters to escape, but you must quote ++the entire third argument of RewriteRule ++and the space must not be the last character in the list.

++ ++
# Escape spaces and question marks.
++RewriteRule "^search/(.*)$" "/search.php?term=$1" "[B= ?]"
++ +
top
+
+

BNP|backrefnoplus (don't escape space to +)

+diff --git a/modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c b/modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c +index 9439965..5195cee 100644 +--- a/modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c ++++ b/modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c +@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static const char* really_last_key = "rewrite_really_last"; + #define RULEFLAG_END (1<<17) + #define RULEFLAG_ESCAPENOPLUS (1<<18) + #define RULEFLAG_QSLAST (1<<19) ++#define RULEFLAG_QSNONE (1<<20) /* programattic only */ + + /* return code of the rewrite rule + * the result may be escaped - or not +@@ -769,11 +770,19 @@ static char *escape_absolute_uri(apr_pool_t *p, char *uri, unsigned scheme) + * split out a QUERY_STRING part from + * the current URI string + */ +-static void splitout_queryargs(request_rec *r, int qsappend, int qsdiscard, +- int qslast) ++static void splitout_queryargs(request_rec *r, int flags) + { + char *q; + int split, skip; ++ int qsappend = flags & RULEFLAG_QSAPPEND; ++ int qsdiscard = flags & RULEFLAG_QSDISCARD; ++ int qslast = flags & RULEFLAG_QSLAST; ++ ++ if (flags & RULEFLAG_QSNONE) { ++ rewritelog((r, 2, NULL, "discarding query string, no parse from substitution")); ++ r->args = NULL; ++ return; ++ } + + /* don't touch, unless it's a scheme for which a query string makes sense. + * See RFC 1738 and RFC 2368. +@@ -798,7 +807,7 @@ static void splitout_queryargs(request_rec *r, int qsappend, int qsdiscard, + olduri = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, r->filename); + *q++ = '\0'; + if (qsappend) { +- if (*q) { ++ if (*q) { + r->args = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, q, "&" , r->args, NULL); + } + } +@@ -806,9 +815,9 @@ static void splitout_queryargs(request_rec *r, int qsappend, int qsdiscard, + r->args = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, q); + } + +- if (r->args) { ++ if (r->args) { + len = strlen(r->args); +- ++ + if (!len) { + r->args = NULL; + } +@@ -2761,7 +2770,7 @@ static apr_status_t rewritelock_remove(void *data) + * XXX: what an inclined parser. Seems we have to leave it so + * for backwards compat. *sigh* + */ +-static int parseargline(char *str, char **a1, char **a2, char **a3) ++static int parseargline(char *str, char **a1, char **a2, char **a2_end, char **a3) + { + char quote; + +@@ -2812,8 +2821,10 @@ static int parseargline(char *str, char **a1, char **a2, char **a3) + + if (!*str) { + *a3 = NULL; /* 3rd argument is optional */ ++ *a2_end = str; + return 0; + } ++ *a2_end = str; + *str++ = '\0'; + + while (apr_isspace(*str)) { +@@ -3353,7 +3364,7 @@ static const char *cmd_rewritecond(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf, + rewrite_server_conf *sconf; + rewritecond_entry *newcond; + ap_regex_t *regexp; +- char *a1 = NULL, *a2 = NULL, *a3 = NULL; ++ char *a1 = NULL, *a2 = NULL, *a2_end, *a3 = NULL; + const char *err; + + sconf = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config, &rewrite_module); +@@ -3371,7 +3382,7 @@ static const char *cmd_rewritecond(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf, + * of the argument line. So we can use a1 .. a3 without + * copying them again. + */ +- if (parseargline(str, &a1, &a2, &a3)) { ++ if (parseargline(str, &a1, &a2, &a2_end, &a3)) { + return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "RewriteCond: bad argument line '", str, + "'", NULL); + } +@@ -3779,7 +3790,7 @@ static const char *cmd_rewriterule(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf, + rewrite_server_conf *sconf; + rewriterule_entry *newrule; + ap_regex_t *regexp; +- char *a1 = NULL, *a2 = NULL, *a3 = NULL; ++ char *a1 = NULL, *a2 = NULL, *a2_end, *a3 = NULL; + const char *err; + + sconf = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config, &rewrite_module); +@@ -3793,7 +3804,7 @@ static const char *cmd_rewriterule(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf, + } + + /* parse the argument line ourself */ +- if (parseargline(str, &a1, &a2, &a3)) { ++ if (parseargline(str, &a1, &a2, &a2_end, &a3)) { + return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "RewriteRule: bad argument line '", str, + "'", NULL); + } +@@ -3840,6 +3851,16 @@ static const char *cmd_rewriterule(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf, + newrule->flags |= RULEFLAG_NOSUB; + } + ++ if (*(a2_end-1) == '?') { ++ /* a literal ? at the end of the unsubstituted rewrite rule */ ++ newrule->flags |= RULEFLAG_QSNONE; ++ } ++ else if (newrule->flags & RULEFLAG_QSDISCARD) { ++ if (NULL == ap_strchr(newrule->output, '?')) { ++ newrule->flags |= RULEFLAG_QSNONE; ++ } ++ } ++ + /* now, if the server or per-dir config holds an + * array of RewriteCond entries, we take it for us + * and clear the array +@@ -4245,9 +4266,7 @@ static int apply_rewrite_rule(rewriterule_entry *p, rewrite_ctx *ctx) + r->path_info = NULL; + } + +- splitout_queryargs(r, p->flags & RULEFLAG_QSAPPEND, +- p->flags & RULEFLAG_QSDISCARD, +- p->flags & RULEFLAG_QSLAST); ++ splitout_queryargs(r, p->flags); + + /* Add the previously stripped per-directory location prefix, unless + * (1) it's an absolute URL path and +@@ -4729,6 +4748,17 @@ static int hook_uri2file(request_rec *r) + unsigned skip; + apr_size_t flen; + ++ if (r->args && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(r->args))) { ++ /* ++ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args. ++ * Correct encoding was missed. ++ */ ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10410) ++ "Rewritten query string contains control " ++ "characters or spaces"); ++ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; ++ } ++ + if (ACTION_STATUS == rulestatus) { + int n = r->status; + +@@ -5013,6 +5043,17 @@ static int hook_fixup(request_rec *r) + if (rulestatus) { + unsigned skip; + ++ if (r->args && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(r->args))) { ++ /* ++ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args. ++ * Correct encoding was missed. ++ */ ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10411) ++ "Rewritten query string contains control " ++ "characters or spaces"); ++ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; ++ } ++ + if (ACTION_STATUS == rulestatus) { + int n = r->status; + +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy.c +index 5759513..d64739b 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy.c +@@ -960,6 +960,8 @@ PROXY_DECLARE(int) ap_proxy_trans_match(request_rec *r, struct proxy_alias *ent, + } + + if (found) { ++ unsigned int encoded = ent->flags & PROXYPASS_MAP_ENCODED; ++ + /* A proxy module is assigned this URL, check whether it's interested + * in the request itself (e.g. proxy_wstunnel cares about Upgrade + * requests only, and could hand over to proxy_http otherwise). +@@ -979,6 +981,9 @@ PROXY_DECLARE(int) ap_proxy_trans_match(request_rec *r, struct proxy_alias *ent, + if (ent->flags & PROXYPASS_NOQUERY) { + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "proxy-noquery", "1"); + } ++ if (encoded) { ++ apr_table_setn(r->notes, "proxy-noencode", "1"); ++ } + + if (servlet_uri) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, r, APLOGNO(10248) +@@ -992,13 +997,13 @@ PROXY_DECLARE(int) ap_proxy_trans_match(request_rec *r, struct proxy_alias *ent, + */ + AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(strlen(r->uri) >= strlen(servlet_uri)); + strcpy(r->uri, servlet_uri); +- return DONE; + } +- +- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, r, APLOGNO(03464) +- "URI path '%s' matches proxy handler '%s'", r->uri, +- found); +- return OK; ++ else { ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE1, 0, r, APLOGNO(03464) ++ "URI path '%s' matches proxy handler '%s'", r->uri, ++ found); ++ } ++ return (encoded) ? DONE : OK; + } + + return HTTP_CONTINUE; +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c +index d34fc57..1978425 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c +@@ -65,11 +65,25 @@ static int proxy_ajp_canon(request_rec *r, char *url) + if (apr_table_get(r->notes, "proxy-nocanon")) { + path = url; /* this is the raw path */ + } ++ else if (apr_table_get(r->notes, "proxy-noencode")) { ++ path = url; /* this is the encoded path already */ ++ search = r->args; ++ } + else { + path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), enc_path, 0, + r->proxyreq); + search = r->args; + } ++ if (search && *ap_scan_vchar_obstext(search)) { ++ /* ++ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args. ++ * Correct encoding was missed. ++ */ ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10406) ++ "To be forwarded query string contains control " ++ "characters or spaces"); ++ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; ++ } + if (path == NULL) + return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; + +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_balancer.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_balancer.c +index 3304c93..f1a3c62 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_balancer.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_balancer.c +@@ -102,11 +102,25 @@ static int proxy_balancer_canon(request_rec *r, char *url) + if (apr_table_get(r->notes, "proxy-nocanon")) { + path = url; /* this is the raw path */ + } ++ else if (apr_table_get(r->notes, "proxy-noencode")) { ++ path = url; /* this is the encoded path already */ ++ search = r->args; ++ } + else { + path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), enc_path, 0, + r->proxyreq); + search = r->args; + } ++ if (search && *ap_scan_vchar_obstext(search)) { ++ /* ++ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args. ++ * Correct encoding was missed. ++ */ ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10407) ++ "To be forwarded query string contains control " ++ "characters or spaces"); ++ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; ++ } + if (path == NULL) + return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; + +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_fcgi.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_fcgi.c +index 3382b9b..a89b9a9 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_fcgi.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_fcgi.c +@@ -92,8 +92,9 @@ static int proxy_fcgi_canon(request_rec *r, char *url) + host = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, "[", host, "]", NULL); + } + +- if (apr_table_get(r->notes, "proxy-nocanon")) { +- path = url; /* this is the raw path */ ++ if (apr_table_get(r->notes, "proxy-nocanon") ++ || apr_table_get(r->notes, "proxy-noencode")) { ++ path = url; /* this is the raw/encoded path */ + } + else { + path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), enc_path, 0, +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c +index 0392ac7..c4d7db0 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c +@@ -121,11 +121,25 @@ static int proxy_http_canon(request_rec *r, char *url) + if (apr_table_get(r->notes, "proxy-nocanon")) { + path = url; /* this is the raw path */ + } ++ else if (apr_table_get(r->notes, "proxy-noencode")) { ++ path = url; /* this is the encoded path already */ ++ search = r->args; ++ } + else { + path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), + enc_path, 0, r->proxyreq); + search = r->args; + } ++ if (search && *ap_scan_vchar_obstext(search)) { ++ /* ++ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args. ++ * Correct encoding was missed. ++ */ ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10408) ++ "To be forwarded query string contains control " ++ "characters or spaces"); ++ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; ++ } + break; + case PROXYREQ_PROXY: + path = url; +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_uwsgi.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_uwsgi.c +index e02450e..1b23904 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_uwsgi.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_uwsgi.c +@@ -84,8 +84,14 @@ static int uwsgi_canon(request_rec *r, char *url) + host = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, "[", host, "]", NULL); + } + +- path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), enc_path, 0, +- r->proxyreq); ++ if (apr_table_get(r->notes, "proxy-nocanon") ++ || apr_table_get(r->notes, "proxy-noencode")) { ++ path = url; /* this is the raw/encoded path */ ++ } ++ else { ++ path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), enc_path, 0, ++ r->proxyreq); ++ } + if (!path) { + return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; + } +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_wstunnel.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_wstunnel.c +index c29ded1..3a68b85 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_wstunnel.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_wstunnel.c +@@ -111,11 +111,25 @@ static int proxy_wstunnel_canon(request_rec *r, char *url) + if (apr_table_get(r->notes, "proxy-nocanon")) { + path = url; /* this is the raw path */ + } ++ else if (apr_table_get(r->notes, "proxy-noencode")) { ++ path = url; /* this is the encoded path already */ ++ search = r->args; ++ } + else { + path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), enc_path, 0, + r->proxyreq); + search = r->args; + } ++ if (search && *ap_scan_vchar_obstext(search)) { ++ /* ++ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args. ++ * Correct encoding was missed. ++ */ ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10409) ++ "To be forwarded query string contains control " ++ "characters or spaces"); ++ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; ++ } + if (path == NULL) + return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; + diff --git a/SOURCES/httpd-init.service b/SOURCES/httpd-init.service index 3074778..704c314 100644 --- a/SOURCES/httpd-init.service +++ b/SOURCES/httpd-init.service @@ -8,5 +8,6 @@ ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/pki/tls/private/localhost.key [Service] Type=oneshot RemainAfterExit=no +PrivateTmp=true ExecStart=/usr/libexec/httpd-ssl-gencerts diff --git a/SOURCES/httpd-ssl-gencerts b/SOURCES/httpd-ssl-gencerts index 350f5b5..5c271f7 100755 --- a/SOURCES/httpd-ssl-gencerts +++ b/SOURCES/httpd-ssl-gencerts @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ sscg -q \ --cert-file /etc/pki/tls/certs/localhost.crt \ --cert-key-file /etc/pki/tls/private/localhost.key \ --ca-file /etc/pki/tls/certs/localhost.crt \ + --dhparams-file /tmp/dhparams.pem \ --lifetime 365 \ --hostname $FQDN \ --email root@$FQDN diff --git a/SPECS/httpd.spec b/SPECS/httpd.spec index bbea741..d7b1ab3 100644 --- a/SPECS/httpd.spec +++ b/SPECS/httpd.spec @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Summary: Apache HTTP Server Name: httpd Version: 2.4.53 -Release: 7%{?dist}.inferit +Release: 7%{?dist}.5.inferit URL: https://httpd.apache.org/ Source0: https://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-%{version}.tar.bz2 Source1: https://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-%{version}.tar.bz2.asc @@ -130,6 +130,14 @@ Patch204: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-29404.patch Patch205: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-30522.patch # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2095018 Patch206: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-30556.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2161773 +Patch207: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-37436.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2161774 +Patch208: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2006-20001.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2161777 +Patch209: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-36760.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2176209 +Patch210: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2023-25690.patch License: ASL 2.0 BuildRequires: gcc, autoconf, pkgconfig, findutils, xmlto @@ -160,6 +168,7 @@ Requires: httpd-filesystem = %{version}-%{release} Requires(pre): httpd-filesystem Conflicts: apr < 1.5.0-1 Conflicts: httpd < 2.4.53-3 +Conflicts: mod_http2 < 1.15.19-3%{?dist}.4 Obsoletes: mod_proxy_uwsgi < 2.0.17.1-2 %description core @@ -304,6 +313,10 @@ written in the Lua programming language. %patch204 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-29404 %patch205 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-30522 %patch206 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-30556 +%patch207 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-37436 +%patch208 -p1 -b .CVE-2006-20001 +%patch209 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-36760 +%patch210 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-25690 # Patch in the vendor string sed -i '/^#define PLATFORM/s/Unix/%{vstring}/' os/unix/os.h @@ -865,12 +878,24 @@ exit $rv %{_rpmconfigdir}/macros.d/macros.httpd %changelog +* Thu Mar 16 2023 Luboš Uhliarik - 2.4.53-7.5 +- Resolves: #2177751 - CVE-2023-25690 httpd: HTTP request splitting with + mod_rewrite and mod_proxy + * Tue Apr 11 2023 Alexey Lyubimov - 2.4.53-7 - MSVSphere 9.1 changes, symlinking and creating alias for test-page-background.png * Wed Mar 15 2023 MSVSphere Packaging Team - 2.4.53-7 - Rebuilt for MSVSphere 9.1. +* Tue Jan 31 2023 Luboš Uhliarik - 2.4.53-7.1 +- Resolves: #2165975 - prevent sscg creating /dhparams.pem +- Resolves: #2165970 - CVE-2006-20001 httpd: mod_dav: out-of-bounds read/write + of zero byte +- Resolves: #2165973 - CVE-2022-37436 httpd: mod_proxy: HTTP response splitting +- Resolves: #2165974 - CVE-2022-36760 httpd: mod_proxy_ajp: Possible request + smuggling + * Wed Jul 20 2022 Luboš Uhliarik - 2.4.53-7 - Resolves: #2094997 - CVE-2022-26377 httpd: mod_proxy_ajp: Possible request smuggling