diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-add-http_path_forbidden_char-function.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-add-http_path_forbidden_char-function.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e4539c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-add-http_path_forbidden_char-function.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From 1d5e49737cf815f3a65d677c26bbf7ce56112458 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 15:24:54 +0200 +Subject: MINOR: http: add new function http_path_has_forbidden_char() + +As its name implies, this function checks if a path component has any +forbidden headers starting at the designated location. The goal is to +seek from the result of a successful ist_find_range() for more precise +chars. Here we're focusing on 0x00-0x1F, 0x20 and 0x23 to make sure +we're not too strict at this point. + +(cherry picked from commit 30f58f4217d585efeac3d85cb1b695ba53b7760b) + [ad: backported for following fix : BUG/MINOR: h2: reject more chars + from the :path pseudo header] +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit b491940181a88bb6c69ab2afc24b93a50adfa67c) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit f7666e5e43ce63e804ebffdf224d92cfd3367282) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit c699bb17b7e334c9d56e829422e29e5a204615ec) +[wt: adj minor ctx in http.h] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit 0f57ac20b046b70275192651d7b6c978032e6a36) +[wt: adj minor ctx in http.h] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit 921f79588c6180c406e88236228a5be1c5c67c55) +[wt: applied to h2.c like has_forbidden_char since it will be used there] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit cedfa791d1a5fd03ec6b77bfa495341af37a26c3) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +--- + src/h2.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/h2.c b/src/h2.c +index e5351d72e..014e40212 100644 +--- a/src/h2.c ++++ b/src/h2.c +@@ -49,6 +49,26 @@ static int has_forbidden_char(const struct ist ist, const char *start) + return 0; + } + ++/* Looks into for forbidden characters for :path values (0x00..0x1F, ++ * 0x20, 0x23), starting at pointer which must be within . ++ * Returns non-zero if such a character is found, 0 otherwise. When run on ++ * unlikely header match, it's recommended to first check for the presence ++ * of control chars using ist_find_ctl(). ++ */ ++static inline int http_path_has_forbidden_char(const struct ist ist, const char *start) ++{ ++ do { ++ if ((uint8_t)*start <= 0x23) { ++ if ((uint8_t)*start < 0x20) ++ return 1; ++ if ((1U << ((uint8_t)*start & 0x1F)) & ((1<<3) | (1<<0))) ++ return 1; ++ } ++ start++; ++ } while (start < istend(ist)); ++ return 0; ++} ++ + /* Prepare the request line into <*ptr> (stopping at ) from pseudo headers + * stored in . indicates what was found so far. This should be + * called once at the detection of the first general header field or at the end +-- +2.35.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-add-ist_find_range-function.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-add-ist_find_range-function.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..042fb5c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-add-ist_find_range-function.patch @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +From e55c2ade33b74ccf636e18feae0d158683bc1b34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 15:23:19 +0200 +Subject: MINOR: ist: add new function ist_find_range() to find a character + range + +This looks up the character range .. in the input string and +returns a pointer to the first one found. It's essentially the equivalent +of ist_find_ctl() in that it searches by 32 or 64 bits at once, but deals +with a range. + +(cherry picked from commit 197668de975e495f0c0f0e4ff51b96203fa9842d) + [ad: backported for following fix : BUG/MINOR: h2: reject more chars + from the :path pseudo header] +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit 451ac6628acc4b9eed3260501a49c60d4e4d4e55) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit 3468f7f8e04c9c5ca5c985c7511e05e78fe1eded) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit b375df60341c7f7a4904c2d8041a09c66115c754) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit edcff741698c9519dc44f3aa13de421baad7ff43) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit cbac8632582d82a1452ccb3fe3c38196e8ad9f45) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit 77c014ea018b80095329402264ae8887398ef4e8) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +--- + include/common/ist.h | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/include/common/ist.h b/include/common/ist.h +index 986e1df9f..5eb8bf23b 100644 +--- a/include/common/ist.h ++++ b/include/common/ist.h +@@ -407,6 +407,53 @@ static inline const char *ist_find_ctl(const struct ist ist) + return NULL; + } + ++/* Returns a pointer to the first character found that belongs to the ++ * range [min:max] inclusive, or NULL if none is present. The function is ++ * optimized for strings having no such chars by processing up to sizeof(long) ++ * bytes at once on architectures supporting efficient unaligned accesses. ++ * Despite this it is not very fast (~0.43 byte/cycle) and should mostly be ++ * used on low match probability when it can save a call to a much slower ++ * function. Will not work for characters 0x80 and above. It's optimized for ++ * min and max to be known at build time. ++ */ ++static inline const char *ist_find_range(const struct ist ist, unsigned char min, unsigned char max) ++{ ++ const union { unsigned long v; } __attribute__((packed)) *u; ++ const char *curr = (void *)ist.ptr - sizeof(long); ++ const char *last = curr + ist.len; ++ unsigned long l1, l2; ++ ++ /* easier with an exclusive boundary */ ++ max++; ++ ++ do { ++ curr += sizeof(long); ++ if (curr > last) ++ break; ++ u = (void *)curr; ++ /* add 0x.. then subtract ++ * 0x.. to the value to generate a ++ * carry in the lower byte if the byte contains a lower value. ++ * If we generate a bit 7 that was not there, it means the byte ++ * was min..max. ++ */ ++ l2 = u->v; ++ l1 = ~l2 & ((~0UL / 255) * 0x80); /* 0x808080...80 */ ++ l2 += (~0UL / 255) * min; /* 0x.. */ ++ l2 -= (~0UL / 255) * max; /* 0x.. */ ++ } while ((l1 & l2) == 0); ++ ++ last += sizeof(long); ++ if (__builtin_expect(curr < last, 0)) { ++ do { ++ if ((unsigned char)(*curr - min) < (unsigned char)(max - min)) ++ return curr; ++ curr++; ++ } while (curr < last); ++ } ++ return NULL; ++} ++ + /* looks for first occurrence of character in string and returns + * the tail of the string starting with this character, or (ist.end,0) if not + * found. +-- +2.35.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-add-istend-function.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-add-istend-function.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a23c52b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-add-istend-function.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 7a18c6a2887b542896a2a0242189e7035155f0d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christopher Faulet +Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2020 14:37:12 +0200 +Subject: MINOR: ist: Add istend() function to return a pointer to the end of + the string + +istend() is a shortcut to istptr() + istlen(). + +(cherry picked from commit cf26623780bdd66f4fff4154d0e5081082aff89b) +[wt: needed for next fix] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit b12ab9c04a896a90383dbaf5c808a6d9a26cde98) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit 7a62a17abd2cc6f14a3cca47043db0061e2f6664) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +--- + include/common/ist.h | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/include/common/ist.h b/include/common/ist.h +index 5eb8bf23b..fbbfcbef7 100644 +--- a/include/common/ist.h ++++ b/include/common/ist.h +@@ -119,6 +119,12 @@ static inline size_t istlen(const struct ist ist) + return ist.len; + } + ++/* returns the pointer to the end the string */ ++static inline char *istend(const struct ist ist) ++{ ++ return (ist.ptr + ist.len); ++} ++ + /* skips to next character in the string, always stops at the end */ + static inline struct ist istnext(const struct ist ist) + { +-- +2.35.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-doc-clarify-URL-fragment-handling.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-doc-clarify-URL-fragment-handling.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8eedd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-doc-clarify-URL-fragment-handling.patch @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +From 379a330ad8a56f6cf1031ff2cd3a093ead7e8585 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 19:35:25 +0200 +Subject: DOC: clarify the handling of URL fragments in requests + +We indicate in path/pathq/url that they may contain '#' if the frontend +is configured with "option accept-invalid-http-request", and that option +mentions the fragment as well. + +(cherry picked from commit 7ab4949ef107a7088777f954de800fe8cf727796) + [ad: backported as a companion to BUG/MINOR: h1: do not accept '#' as + part of the URI component] +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit 965fb74eb180ab4f275ef907e018128e7eee0e69) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit e9903d6073ce9ff0ed8b304700e9d2b435ed8050) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit c47814a58ec153a526e8e9e822cda6e66cef5cc2) +[wt: minor ctx adj] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit 3706e1754b925e56951b604cce63f3bb290ed838) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit b5062da485e78f4448a617a0f8b67dc5b23065d5) +[wt: dropped pathq] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit 1ee98d04314d35b694206195b8399c501776afc5) +[wt: allow to run with version 1.8] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +--- + doc/configuration.txt | 15 ++++++++++++--- + reg-tests/http-rules/fragment_in_uri.vtc | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt +index b30aaa9fb..c0607519a 100644 +--- a/doc/configuration.txt ++++ b/doc/configuration.txt +@@ -5433,7 +5433,8 @@ no option accept-invalid-http-request + remaining ones are blocked by default unless this option is enabled. This + option also relaxes the test on the HTTP version, it allows HTTP/0.9 requests + to pass through (no version specified) and multiple digits for both the major +- and the minor version. ++ and the minor version. Finally, this option also allows incoming URLs to ++ contain fragment references ('#' after the path). + + This option should never be enabled by default as it hides application bugs + and open security breaches. It should only be deployed after a problem has +@@ -15328,7 +15329,11 @@ path : string + information from databases and keep them in caches. Note that with outgoing + caches, it would be wiser to use "url" instead. With ACLs, it's typically + used to match exact file names (e.g. "/login.php"), or directory parts using +- the derivative forms. See also the "url" and "base" fetch methods. ++ the derivative forms. See also the "url" and "base" fetch methods. Please ++ note that any fragment reference in the URI ('#' after the path) is strictly ++ forbidden by the HTTP standard and will be rejected. However, if the frontend ++ receiving the request has "option accept-invalid-http-request", then this ++ fragment part will be accepted and will also appear in the path. + + ACL derivatives : + path : exact string match +@@ -15502,7 +15507,11 @@ url : string + "path" is preferred over using "url", because clients may send a full URL as + is normally done with proxies. The only real use is to match "*" which does + not match in "path", and for which there is already a predefined ACL. See +- also "path" and "base". ++ also "path" and "base". Please note that any fragment reference in the URI ++ ('#' after the path) is strictly forbidden by the HTTP standard and will be ++ rejected. However, if the frontend receiving the request has "option ++ accept-invalid-http-request", then this fragment part will be accepted and ++ will also appear in the url. + + ACL derivatives : + url : exact string match +diff --git a/reg-tests/http-rules/fragment_in_uri.vtc b/reg-tests/http-rules/fragment_in_uri.vtc +index 621751356..8de0adeb2 100644 +--- a/reg-tests/http-rules/fragment_in_uri.vtc ++++ b/reg-tests/http-rules/fragment_in_uri.vtc +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + varnishtest "check for fragments in URL" +-#REQUIRE_VERSION=2.0 ++#REQUIRE_VERSION=1.8 + + # This reg-test checks that '#' is properly blocked in requests + +-- +2.35.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-pass-accept-invalid-http-request-parser.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-pass-accept-invalid-http-request-parser.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..13e3b70 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-pass-accept-invalid-http-request-parser.patch @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +From 5f9b9c909399b51498ddabb39341416381fc06a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 15:38:28 +0200 +Subject: MINOR: h2: pass accept-invalid-http-request down the request parser + +We're adding a new argument "relaxed" to h2_make_htx_request() so that +we can control its level of acceptance of certain invalid requests at +the proxy level with "option accept-invalid-http-request". The goal +will be to add deactivable checks that are still desirable to have by +default. For now no test is subject to it. + +(cherry picked from commit d93a00861d714313faa0395ff9e2acb14b0a2fca) + [ad: backported for following fix : BUG/MINOR: h2: reject more chars + from the :path pseudo header] +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit b6be1a4f858eb6602490c192235114c1a163fef9) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit 26fa3a285df0748fc79e73e552161268b66fb527) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit 014945a1508f43e88ac4e89950fa9037e4fb0679) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit f86e994f5fb5851cd6e4f7f6b366e37765014b9f) +[wt: adjusted ctx in h2.h] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit d87aeb80c45cc504274188f0e5048148f3c4f2ff) +[wt: extended to h2_make_h1_request() as well for legacy mode] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit f2436eab7d21bab3d85cb750023a1770411f716e) +[wt: only kept the legacy mode part (h2-to-h1)] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +--- + include/common/h2.h | 2 +- + src/h2.c | 6 +++++- + src/mux_h2.c | 3 ++- + 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/common/h2.h b/include/common/h2.h +index 0cecc2d4e..ef15f3cda 100644 +--- a/include/common/h2.h ++++ b/include/common/h2.h +@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ enum h2_err { + + /* various protocol processing functions */ + +-int h2_make_h1_request(struct http_hdr *list, char *out, int osize, unsigned int *msgf); ++int h2_make_h1_request(struct http_hdr *list, char *out, int osize, unsigned int *msgf, int relaxed); + + /* + * Some helpful debugging functions. +diff --git a/src/h2.c b/src/h2.c +index 014e40212..cb40b2e1b 100644 +--- a/src/h2.c ++++ b/src/h2.c +@@ -166,8 +166,12 @@ static int h2_prepare_h1_reqline(uint32_t fields, struct ist *phdr, char **ptr, + * + * The Cookie header will be reassembled at the end, and for this, the + * will be used to create a linked list, so its contents may be destroyed. ++ * ++ * When is non-nul, some non-dangerous checks will be ignored. This ++ * is in order to satisfy "option accept-invalid-http-request" for ++ * interoperability purposes. + */ +-int h2_make_h1_request(struct http_hdr *list, char *out, int osize, unsigned int *msgf) ++int h2_make_h1_request(struct http_hdr *list, char *out, int osize, unsigned int *msgf, int relaxed) + { + struct ist phdr_val[H2_PHDR_NUM_ENTRIES]; + char *out_end = out + osize; +diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c +index 79e70f60b..ecd9c59f8 100644 +--- a/src/mux_h2.c ++++ b/src/mux_h2.c +@@ -2844,7 +2844,8 @@ static int h2_frt_decode_headers(struct h2s *h2s, struct buffer *buf, int count) + + /* OK now we have our header list in */ + msgf = (h2c->dff & H2_F_DATA_END_STREAM) ? 0 : H2_MSGF_BODY; +- outlen = h2_make_h1_request(list, bi_end(buf), try, &msgf); ++ outlen = h2_make_h1_request(list, bi_end(buf), try, &msgf, ++ !!(((const struct session *)h2c->conn->owner)->fe->options2 & PR_O2_REQBUG_OK)); + + if (outlen < 0) { + h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_COMPRESSION_ERROR); +-- +2.35.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-regtest-verify-pound-char-URI.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-regtest-verify-pound-char-URI.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c67f99f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-regtest-verify-pound-char-URI.patch @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +From 2d848a09fb7a1fb661a418cc07c59496d7eb6b3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 19:53:51 +0200 +Subject: REGTESTS: http-rules: verify that we block '#' by default for + normalize-uri + +Since we now block fragments by default, let's add an extra test there +to confirm that it's blocked even when stripping it. + +(cherry picked from commit 4d0175b54b2b4eeb01aa6e31282b0a5b0d7d8ace) + [ad: backported to test conformance of BUG/MINOR: h1: do not accept '#' + as part of the URI component] +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit b3f26043df74c661155566a0abd56103e8116078) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit 41d161ccbbfa846b4b17ed0166ff08f6bf0c3ea1) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit b6b330eb117d520a890e5b3cd623eaa73479db1b) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit 73b9b13ac2654ef5384789685e3d65ca5f2f880a) +[wt: rewrote the test for 2.2 without normalize-uri and called it + fragments-in-uri] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit dbf47600f63ffe161ce08d2f0faef7e0deb32b6e) +[wt: removed tune.idle-pool.shared from global section] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit f04fec9f3efe7f8b70fbe72d6a4473f01699728c) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +--- + reg-tests/http-rules/fragment_in_uri.vtc | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 reg-tests/http-rules/fragment_in_uri.vtc + +diff --git a/reg-tests/http-rules/fragment_in_uri.vtc b/reg-tests/http-rules/fragment_in_uri.vtc +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000..621751356 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/reg-tests/http-rules/fragment_in_uri.vtc +@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ ++varnishtest "check for fragments in URL" ++#REQUIRE_VERSION=2.0 ++ ++# This reg-test checks that '#' is properly blocked in requests ++ ++feature ignore_unknown_macro ++ ++server s1 { ++ rxreq ++ txresp -hdr "connection: close" ++} -start ++ ++haproxy h1 -conf { ++ global ++ ++ defaults ++ mode http ++ timeout connect 1s ++ timeout client 1s ++ timeout server 1s ++ ++ frontend fe_fragment_block ++ bind "fd@${fe_fragment_block}" ++ default_backend be ++ ++ backend be ++ server s1 ${s1_addr}:${s1_port} ++ ++} -start ++ ++client c11 -connect ${h1_fe_fragment_block_sock} { ++ txreq -url "/#foo" ++ rxresp ++ expect resp.status == 400 ++} -run +-- +2.35.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-reject-chars-from-path-pseudo-header.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-reject-chars-from-path-pseudo-header.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d1d950e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-reject-chars-from-path-pseudo-header.patch @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +From d81b4c952dae3468e73f4df701c62ac3a8644ba0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 15:40:49 +0200 +Subject: BUG/MINOR: h2: reject more chars from the :path pseudo header + +This is the h2 version of this previous fix: + + BUG/MINOR: h1: do not accept '#' as part of the URI component + +In addition to the current NUL/CR/LF, this will also reject all other +control chars, the space and '#' from the :path pseudo-header, to avoid +taking the '#' for a part of the path. It's still possible to fall back +to the previous behavior using "option accept-invalid-http-request". + +This patch modifies the request parser to change the ":path" pseudo header +validation function with a new one that rejects 0x00-0x1F (control chars), +space and '#'. This way such chars will be dropped early in the chain, and +the search for '#' doesn't incur a second pass over the header's value. + +This should be progressively backported to stable versions, along with the +following commits it relies on: + + REGTESTS: http-rules: add accept-invalid-http-request for normalize-uri tests + REORG: http: move has_forbidden_char() from h2.c to http.h + MINOR: ist: add new function ist_find_range() to find a character range + MINOR: http: add new function http_path_has_forbidden_char() + MINOR: h2: pass accept-invalid-http-request down the request parser + +(cherry picked from commit b3119d4fb4588087e2483a80b01d322683719e29) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit 462a8600ce9e478573a957e046b446a7dcffd286) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit 648e59e30723b8fd4e71aab02cb679f6ea7446e7) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit c8e07f2fd8b5462527f102f7145d6027c0d041da) +[wt: minor ctx adjustments] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit af232e47e6264122bed3681210b054ff38ec8de8) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit e0c9008874b89621449f7ff3e9bc6db4e94fac6d) +[wt: note: added as well for legacy mode, though since h2 is turned + to h1 in this mode, this will be rejected anyway] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit ad05bf865cdc77e1c48d2e608ef8c39bd6c08c31) +[wt: dropped the htx part] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +--- + src/h2.c | 12 +++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/h2.c b/src/h2.c +index cb40b2e1b..ff8ae4572 100644 +--- a/src/h2.c ++++ b/src/h2.c +@@ -208,9 +208,15 @@ int h2_make_h1_request(struct http_hdr *list, char *out, int osize, unsigned int + /* RFC7540#10.3: intermediaries forwarding to HTTP/1 must take care of + * rejecting NUL, CR and LF characters. + */ +- ctl = ist_find_ctl(list[idx].v); +- if (unlikely(ctl) && has_forbidden_char(list[idx].v, ctl)) +- goto fail; ++ if (phdr == H2_PHDR_IDX_PATH && !relaxed) { ++ ctl = ist_find_range(list[idx].v, 0, '#'); ++ if (unlikely(ctl) && http_path_has_forbidden_char(list[idx].v, ctl)) ++ goto fail; ++ } else { ++ ctl = ist_find_ctl(list[idx].v); ++ if (unlikely(ctl) && has_forbidden_char(list[idx].v, ctl)) ++ goto fail; ++ } + + if (phdr > 0 && phdr < H2_PHDR_NUM_ENTRIES) { + /* insert a pseudo header by its index (in phdr) and value (in value) */ +-- +2.35.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-reject-pound-char-URI-component.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-reject-pound-char-URI-component.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ccc7ef0 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2023-45539-reject-pound-char-URI-component.patch @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +From 4e98c0c1d36104ed426d3b198a176e1a5df814fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 16:17:22 +0200 +Subject: BUG/MINOR: h1: do not accept '#' as part of the URI component + +Seth Manesse and Paul Plasil reported that the "path" sample fetch +function incorrectly accepts '#' as part of the path component. This +can in some cases lead to misrouted requests for rules that would apply +on the suffix: + + use_backend static if { path_end .png .jpg .gif .css .js } + +Note that this behavior can be selectively configured using +"normalize-uri fragment-encode" and "normalize-uri fragment-strip". + +The problem is that while the RFC says that this '#' must never be +emitted, as often it doesn't suggest how servers should handle it. A +diminishing number of servers still do accept it and trim it silently, +while others are rejecting it, as indicated in the conversation below +with other implementers: + + https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/2023JulSep/0070.html + +Looking at logs from publicly exposed servers, such requests appear at +a rate of roughly 1 per million and only come from attacks or poorly +written web crawlers incorrectly following links found on various pages. + +Thus it looks like the best solution to this problem is to simply reject +such ambiguous requests by default, and include this in the list of +controls that can be disabled using "option accept-invalid-http-request". + +We're already rejecting URIs containing any control char anyway, so we +should also reject '#'. + +In the H1 parser for the H1_MSG_RQURI state, there is an accelerated +parser for bytes 0x21..0x7e that has been tightened to 0x24..0x7e (it +should not impact perf since 0x21..0x23 are not supposed to appear in +a URI anyway). This way '#' falls through the fine-grained filter and +we can add the special case for it also conditionned by a check on the +proxy's option "accept-invalid-http-request", with no overhead for the +vast majority of valid URIs. Here this information is available through +h1m->err_pos that's set to -2 when the option is here (so we don't need +to change the API to expose the proxy). Example with a trivial GET +through netcat: + + [08/Aug/2023:16:16:52.651] frontend layer1 (#2): invalid request + backend (#-1), server (#-1), event #0, src 127.0.0.1:50812 + buffer starts at 0 (including 0 out), 16361 free, + len 23, wraps at 16336, error at position 7 + H1 connection flags 0x00000000, H1 stream flags 0x00000810 + H1 msg state MSG_RQURI(4), H1 msg flags 0x00001400 + H1 chunk len 0 bytes, H1 body len 0 bytes : + + 00000 GET /aa#bb HTTP/1.0\r\n + 00021 \r\n + +This should be progressively backported to all stable versions along with +the following patch: + + REGTESTS: http-rules: add accept-invalid-http-request for normalize-uri tests + +Similar fixes for h2 and h3 will come in followup patches. + +Thanks to Seth Manesse and Paul Plasil for reporting this problem with +detailed explanations. + +(cherry picked from commit 2eab6d354322932cfec2ed54de261e4347eca9a6) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit 9bf75c8e22a8f2537f27c557854a8803087046d0) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit 9facd01c9ac85fe9bcb331594b80fa08e7406552) +Signed-off-by: Amaury Denoyelle +(cherry picked from commit 832b672eee54866c7a42a1d46078cc9ae0d544d9) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit e5a741f94977840c58775b38f8ed830207f7e4d0) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit 178cea76b1c9d9413afa6961b6a4576fcb5b26fa) +[wt: applied the same to http_parse_reqline() in http_msg.c] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit 4ad6fd9eeb3078685fffdc58f1c6d4eb97e05d98) +[wt: dropped the HTX part, adapted the legacy one in http_msg.c] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +--- + src/h1.c | 13 ++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/h1.c b/src/h1.c +index d3a20c2ed..57be42f31 100644 +--- a/src/h1.c ++++ b/src/h1.c +@@ -341,11 +341,11 @@ const char *http_parse_reqline(struct http_msg *msg, + defined(__ARM_ARCH_7A__) + /* speedup: skip bytes not between 0x21 and 0x7e inclusive */ + while (ptr <= end - sizeof(int)) { +- int x = *(int *)ptr - 0x21212121; ++ int x = *(int *)ptr - 0x24242424; + if (x & 0x80808080) + break; + +- x -= 0x5e5e5e5e; ++ x -= 0x5b5b5b5b; + if (!(x & 0x80808080)) + break; + +@@ -357,8 +357,15 @@ const char *http_parse_reqline(struct http_msg *msg, + goto http_msg_ood; + } + http_msg_rquri2: +- if (likely((unsigned char)(*ptr - 33) <= 93)) /* 33 to 126 included */ ++ if (likely((unsigned char)(*ptr - 33) <= 93)) { /* 33 to 126 included */ ++ if (*ptr == '#') { ++ if (msg->err_pos < -1) /* PR_O2_REQBUG_OK not set */ ++ goto invalid_char; ++ if (msg->err_pos == -1) /* PR_O2_REQBUG_OK set: just log */ ++ msg->err_pos = ptr - msg_start; ++ } + EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_rquri2, http_msg_ood, state, HTTP_MSG_RQURI); ++ } + + if (likely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr))) { + msg->sl.rq.u_l = ptr - msg_start - msg->sl.rq.u; +-- +2.35.3 + diff --git a/SPECS/haproxy.spec b/SPECS/haproxy.spec index c204a06..84be157 100644 --- a/SPECS/haproxy.spec +++ b/SPECS/haproxy.spec @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Name: haproxy Version: 1.8.27 -Release: 5%{?dist} +Release: 5%{?dist}.1 Summary: HAProxy reverse proxy for high availability environments Group: System Environment/Daemons @@ -24,6 +24,14 @@ Source5: halog.1 Patch0: rhbz1838319-mworker-fix-again-copy_argv.patch Patch1: rhbz1941446-fix-short-http-responses.patch +Patch2: CVE-2023-45539-reject-pound-char-URI-component.patch +Patch3: CVE-2023-45539-regtest-verify-pound-char-URI.patch +Patch4: CVE-2023-45539-doc-clarify-URL-fragment-handling.patch +Patch5: CVE-2023-45539-add-ist_find_range-function.patch +Patch6: CVE-2023-45539-add-istend-function.patch +Patch7: CVE-2023-45539-add-http_path_forbidden_char-function.patch +Patch8: CVE-2023-45539-pass-accept-invalid-http-request-parser.patch +Patch9: CVE-2023-45539-reject-chars-from-path-pseudo-header.patch BuildRequires: lua-devel BuildRequires: pcre-devel @@ -55,6 +63,14 @@ availability environments. Indeed, it can: %setup -q %patch0 -p1 %patch1 -p1 +%patch2 -p1 +%patch3 -p1 +%patch4 -p1 +%patch5 -p1 +%patch6 -p1 +%patch7 -p1 +%patch8 -p1 +%patch9 -p1 %build regparm_opts= @@ -142,6 +158,9 @@ exit 0 %{_mandir}/man1/* %changelog +* Thu Sep 05 2024 Ryan O'Hara - 1.8.27-5.1 +- Reject "#" as part of URI path component (CVE-2023-45539, RHEL-18168) + * Tue Jul 25 2023 MSVSphere Packaging Team - 1.8.27-5 - Rebuilt for MSVSphere 8.8