diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-Apply-uncrustify-changes-to-.c-.h-files-in-the-Netwo.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-Apply-uncrustify-changes-to-.c-.h-files-in-the-Netwo.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ef1750 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-Apply-uncrustify-changes-to-.c-.h-files-in-the-Netwo.patch @@ -0,0 +1,1735 @@ +From 0f2a885790fe3f397dee527a19ef7753a1961688 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:38:46 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 01/15] Apply uncrustify changes to .c/.h files in the + NetworkPkg package + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Commit: [1/15] 7a6f3c908d076e6497e0c8978785b679a23b83cf + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21844 +CVE: CVE-2022-45231 +Upstream: Merged +Conflicts: This commit is too intrusive to apply completely. We still save + us a lot of problems (git cherry-pick basically bails out) in + the following commits in this series if we apply it on the files + modified by those commits. + +commit d1050b9dff1cace252aff86630bfdb59dff5f507 +Author: Michael Kubacki +Date: Sun Dec 5 14:54:07 2021 -0800 + + NetworkPkg: Apply uncrustify changes + + REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3737 + + Apply uncrustify changes to .c/.h files in the NetworkPkg package + + Cc: Andrew Fish + Cc: Leif Lindholm + Cc: Michael D Kinney + Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki + Reviewed-by: Maciej Rabeda + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h | 312 ++++++------- + NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c | 805 +++++++++++++++++----------------- + NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h | 88 ++-- + 3 files changed, 605 insertions(+), 600 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h +index 5f1bd6fb92..860934a167 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h +@@ -13,82 +13,82 @@ + #define IP6_GET_TICKS(Ms) (((Ms) + IP6_TIMER_INTERVAL_IN_MS - 1) / IP6_TIMER_INTERVAL_IN_MS) + + enum { +- IP6_INF_ROUTER_LIFETIME = 0xFFFF, ++ IP6_INF_ROUTER_LIFETIME = 0xFFFF, + + IP6_MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY = 1000, ///< 1000 milliseconds + IP6_MAX_RTR_SOLICITATIONS = 3, + IP6_RTR_SOLICITATION_INTERVAL = 4000, + +- IP6_MIN_RANDOM_FACTOR_SCALED = 1, +- IP6_MAX_RANDOM_FACTOR_SCALED = 3, +- IP6_RANDOM_FACTOR_SCALE = 2, ++ IP6_MIN_RANDOM_FACTOR_SCALED = 1, ++ IP6_MAX_RANDOM_FACTOR_SCALED = 3, ++ IP6_RANDOM_FACTOR_SCALE = 2, + +- IP6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT = 3, +- IP6_MAX_UNICAST_SOLICIT = 3, +- IP6_MAX_ANYCAST_DELAY_TIME = 1, +- IP6_MAX_NEIGHBOR_ADV = 3, +- IP6_REACHABLE_TIME = 30000, +- IP6_RETRANS_TIMER = 1000, +- IP6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME = 5000, ++ IP6_MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT = 3, ++ IP6_MAX_UNICAST_SOLICIT = 3, ++ IP6_MAX_ANYCAST_DELAY_TIME = 1, ++ IP6_MAX_NEIGHBOR_ADV = 3, ++ IP6_REACHABLE_TIME = 30000, ++ IP6_RETRANS_TIMER = 1000, ++ IP6_DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME = 5000, + +- IP6_MIN_LINK_MTU = 1280, +- IP6_MAX_LINK_MTU = 1500, ++ IP6_MIN_LINK_MTU = 1280, ++ IP6_MAX_LINK_MTU = 1500, + +- IP6_IS_ROUTER_FLAG = 0x80, +- IP6_SOLICITED_FLAG = 0x40, +- IP6_OVERRIDE_FLAG = 0x20, ++ IP6_IS_ROUTER_FLAG = 0x80, ++ IP6_SOLICITED_FLAG = 0x40, ++ IP6_OVERRIDE_FLAG = 0x20, + +- IP6_M_ADDR_CONFIG_FLAG = 0x80, +- IP6_O_CONFIG_FLAG = 0x40, ++ IP6_M_ADDR_CONFIG_FLAG = 0x80, ++ IP6_O_CONFIG_FLAG = 0x40, + +- IP6_ON_LINK_FLAG = 0x80, +- IP6_AUTO_CONFIG_FLAG = 0x40, ++ IP6_ON_LINK_FLAG = 0x80, ++ IP6_AUTO_CONFIG_FLAG = 0x40, + +- IP6_ND_LENGTH = 24, +- IP6_RA_LENGTH = 16, +- IP6_REDITECT_LENGTH = 40, +- IP6_DAD_ENTRY_SIGNATURE = SIGNATURE_32 ('I', 'P', 'D', 'E') ++ IP6_ND_LENGTH = 24, ++ IP6_RA_LENGTH = 16, ++ IP6_REDITECT_LENGTH = 40, ++ IP6_DAD_ENTRY_SIGNATURE = SIGNATURE_32 ('I', 'P', 'D', 'E') + }; + + typedef + VOID + (*IP6_ARP_CALLBACK) ( +- VOID *Context ++ VOID *Context + ); + + typedef struct _IP6_OPTION_HEADER { +- UINT8 Type; +- UINT8 Length; ++ UINT8 Type; ++ UINT8 Length; + } IP6_OPTION_HEADER; + + STATIC_ASSERT (sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) == 2, "IP6_OPTION_HEADER is expected to be exactly 2 bytes long."); + + typedef struct _IP6_ETHE_ADDR_OPTION { +- UINT8 Type; +- UINT8 Length; +- UINT8 EtherAddr[6]; ++ UINT8 Type; ++ UINT8 Length; ++ UINT8 EtherAddr[6]; + } IP6_ETHER_ADDR_OPTION; + + STATIC_ASSERT (sizeof (IP6_ETHER_ADDR_OPTION) == 8, "IP6_ETHER_ADDR_OPTION is expected to be exactly 8 bytes long."); + + typedef struct _IP6_MTU_OPTION { +- UINT8 Type; +- UINT8 Length; +- UINT16 Reserved; +- UINT32 Mtu; ++ UINT8 Type; ++ UINT8 Length; ++ UINT16 Reserved; ++ UINT32 Mtu; + } IP6_MTU_OPTION; + + STATIC_ASSERT (sizeof (IP6_MTU_OPTION) == 8, "IP6_MTU_OPTION is expected to be exactly 8 bytes long."); + + typedef struct _IP6_PREFIX_INFO_OPTION { +- UINT8 Type; +- UINT8 Length; +- UINT8 PrefixLength; +- UINT8 Reserved1; +- UINT32 ValidLifetime; +- UINT32 PreferredLifetime; +- UINT32 Reserved2; +- EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS Prefix; ++ UINT8 Type; ++ UINT8 Length; ++ UINT8 PrefixLength; ++ UINT8 Reserved1; ++ UINT32 ValidLifetime; ++ UINT32 PreferredLifetime; ++ UINT32 Reserved2; ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS Prefix; + } IP6_PREFIX_INFO_OPTION; + + STATIC_ASSERT (sizeof (IP6_PREFIX_INFO_OPTION) == 32, "IP6_PREFIX_INFO_OPTION is expected to be exactly 32 bytes long."); +@@ -102,25 +102,25 @@ VOID + ); + + typedef struct _IP6_DAD_ENTRY { +- UINT32 Signature; +- LIST_ENTRY Link; +- UINT32 MaxTransmit; +- UINT32 Transmit; +- UINT32 Receive; +- UINT32 RetransTick; +- IP6_ADDRESS_INFO *AddressInfo; +- EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS Destination; +- IP6_DAD_CALLBACK Callback; +- VOID *Context; ++ UINT32 Signature; ++ LIST_ENTRY Link; ++ UINT32 MaxTransmit; ++ UINT32 Transmit; ++ UINT32 Receive; ++ UINT32 RetransTick; ++ IP6_ADDRESS_INFO *AddressInfo; ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS Destination; ++ IP6_DAD_CALLBACK Callback; ++ VOID *Context; + } IP6_DAD_ENTRY; + + typedef struct _IP6_DELAY_JOIN_LIST { +- LIST_ENTRY Link; +- UINT32 DelayTime; ///< in tick per 50 milliseconds +- IP6_INTERFACE *Interface; +- IP6_ADDRESS_INFO *AddressInfo; +- IP6_DAD_CALLBACK DadCallback; +- VOID *Context; ++ LIST_ENTRY Link; ++ UINT32 DelayTime; ///< in tick per 50 milliseconds ++ IP6_INTERFACE *Interface; ++ IP6_ADDRESS_INFO *AddressInfo; ++ IP6_DAD_CALLBACK DadCallback; ++ VOID *Context; + } IP6_DELAY_JOIN_LIST; + + typedef struct _IP6_NEIGHBOR_ENTRY { +@@ -142,20 +142,20 @@ typedef struct _IP6_NEIGHBOR_ENTRY { + } IP6_NEIGHBOR_ENTRY; + + typedef struct _IP6_DEFAULT_ROUTER { +- LIST_ENTRY Link; +- INTN RefCnt; +- UINT16 Lifetime; +- EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS Router; +- IP6_NEIGHBOR_ENTRY *NeighborCache; ++ LIST_ENTRY Link; ++ INTN RefCnt; ++ UINT16 Lifetime; ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS Router; ++ IP6_NEIGHBOR_ENTRY *NeighborCache; + } IP6_DEFAULT_ROUTER; + + typedef struct _IP6_PREFIX_LIST_ENTRY { +- LIST_ENTRY Link; +- INTN RefCnt; +- UINT32 ValidLifetime; +- UINT32 PreferredLifetime; +- UINT8 PrefixLength; +- EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS Prefix; ++ LIST_ENTRY Link; ++ INTN RefCnt; ++ UINT32 ValidLifetime; ++ UINT32 PreferredLifetime; ++ UINT8 PrefixLength; ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS Prefix; + } IP6_PREFIX_LIST_ENTRY; + + /** +@@ -172,9 +172,9 @@ typedef struct _IP6_PREFIX_LIST_ENTRY { + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6BuildEfiNeighborCache ( +- IN IP6_PROTOCOL *IpInstance, +- OUT UINT32 *NeighborCount, +- OUT EFI_IP6_NEIGHBOR_CACHE **NeighborCache ++ IN IP6_PROTOCOL *IpInstance, ++ OUT UINT32 *NeighborCount, ++ OUT EFI_IP6_NEIGHBOR_CACHE **NeighborCache + ); + + /** +@@ -210,9 +210,9 @@ Ip6BuildPrefixTable ( + **/ + IP6_DEFAULT_ROUTER * + Ip6CreateDefaultRouter ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Ip6Address, +- IN UINT16 RouterLifetime ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Ip6Address, ++ IN UINT16 RouterLifetime + ); + + /** +@@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ Ip6CreateDefaultRouter ( + **/ + VOID + Ip6DestroyDefaultRouter ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN IP6_DEFAULT_ROUTER *DefaultRouter ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN IP6_DEFAULT_ROUTER *DefaultRouter + ); + + /** +@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ Ip6DestroyDefaultRouter ( + **/ + VOID + Ip6CleanDefaultRouterList ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb + ); + + /** +@@ -251,8 +251,8 @@ Ip6CleanDefaultRouterList ( + **/ + IP6_DEFAULT_ROUTER * + Ip6FindDefaultRouter ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Ip6Address ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Ip6Address + ); + + /** +@@ -289,10 +289,10 @@ Ip6OnDADFinished ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6InitDADProcess ( +- IN IP6_INTERFACE *IpIf, +- IN IP6_ADDRESS_INFO *AddressInfo, +- IN IP6_DAD_CALLBACK Callback OPTIONAL, +- IN VOID *Context OPTIONAL ++ IN IP6_INTERFACE *IpIf, ++ IN IP6_ADDRESS_INFO *AddressInfo, ++ IN IP6_DAD_CALLBACK Callback OPTIONAL, ++ IN VOID *Context OPTIONAL + ); + + /** +@@ -309,9 +309,9 @@ Ip6InitDADProcess ( + **/ + IP6_DAD_ENTRY * + Ip6FindDADEntry ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Target, +- OUT IP6_INTERFACE **Interface OPTIONAL ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Target, ++ OUT IP6_INTERFACE **Interface OPTIONAL + ); + + /** +@@ -334,12 +334,12 @@ Ip6FindDADEntry ( + **/ + IP6_PREFIX_LIST_ENTRY * + Ip6CreatePrefixListEntry ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN BOOLEAN OnLinkOrAuto, +- IN UINT32 ValidLifetime, +- IN UINT32 PreferredLifetime, +- IN UINT8 PrefixLength, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Prefix ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN BOOLEAN OnLinkOrAuto, ++ IN UINT32 ValidLifetime, ++ IN UINT32 PreferredLifetime, ++ IN UINT8 PrefixLength, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Prefix + ); + + /** +@@ -377,10 +377,10 @@ Ip6DestroyPrefixListEntry ( + **/ + IP6_PREFIX_LIST_ENTRY * + Ip6FindPrefixListEntry ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN BOOLEAN OnLinkOrAuto, +- IN UINT8 PrefixLength, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Prefix ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN BOOLEAN OnLinkOrAuto, ++ IN UINT8 PrefixLength, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Prefix + ); + + /** +@@ -393,8 +393,8 @@ Ip6FindPrefixListEntry ( + **/ + VOID + Ip6CleanPrefixListTable ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN LIST_ENTRY *ListHead ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN LIST_ENTRY *ListHead + ); + + /** +@@ -413,10 +413,10 @@ Ip6CleanPrefixListTable ( + **/ + IP6_NEIGHBOR_ENTRY * + Ip6CreateNeighborEntry ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN IP6_ARP_CALLBACK CallBack, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Ip6Address, +- IN EFI_MAC_ADDRESS *LinkAddress OPTIONAL ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN IP6_ARP_CALLBACK CallBack, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Ip6Address, ++ IN EFI_MAC_ADDRESS *LinkAddress OPTIONAL + ); + + /** +@@ -431,8 +431,8 @@ Ip6CreateNeighborEntry ( + **/ + IP6_NEIGHBOR_ENTRY * + Ip6FindNeighborEntry ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Ip6Address ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Ip6Address + ); + + /** +@@ -458,13 +458,13 @@ Ip6FindNeighborEntry ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6FreeNeighborEntry ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN IP6_NEIGHBOR_ENTRY *NeighborCache, +- IN BOOLEAN SendIcmpError, +- IN BOOLEAN FullFree, +- IN EFI_STATUS IoStatus, +- IN IP6_FRAME_TO_CANCEL FrameToCancel OPTIONAL, +- IN VOID *Context OPTIONAL ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN IP6_NEIGHBOR_ENTRY *NeighborCache, ++ IN BOOLEAN SendIcmpError, ++ IN BOOLEAN FullFree, ++ IN EFI_STATUS IoStatus, ++ IN IP6_FRAME_TO_CANCEL FrameToCancel OPTIONAL, ++ IN VOID *Context OPTIONAL + ); + + /** +@@ -493,11 +493,11 @@ Ip6FreeNeighborEntry ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6AddNeighbor ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *TargetIp6Address, +- IN EFI_MAC_ADDRESS *TargetLinkAddress OPTIONAL, +- IN UINT32 Timeout, +- IN BOOLEAN Override ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *TargetIp6Address, ++ IN EFI_MAC_ADDRESS *TargetLinkAddress OPTIONAL, ++ IN UINT32 Timeout, ++ IN BOOLEAN Override + ); + + /** +@@ -521,11 +521,11 @@ Ip6AddNeighbor ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6DelNeighbor ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *TargetIp6Address, +- IN EFI_MAC_ADDRESS *TargetLinkAddress OPTIONAL, +- IN UINT32 Timeout, +- IN BOOLEAN Override ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *TargetIp6Address, ++ IN EFI_MAC_ADDRESS *TargetLinkAddress OPTIONAL, ++ IN UINT32 Timeout, ++ IN BOOLEAN Override + ); + + /** +@@ -544,9 +544,9 @@ Ip6DelNeighbor ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6ProcessNeighborSolicit ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN EFI_IP6_HEADER *Head, +- IN NET_BUF *Packet ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN EFI_IP6_HEADER *Head, ++ IN NET_BUF *Packet + ); + + /** +@@ -564,9 +564,9 @@ Ip6ProcessNeighborSolicit ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6ProcessNeighborAdvertise ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN EFI_IP6_HEADER *Head, +- IN NET_BUF *Packet ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN EFI_IP6_HEADER *Head, ++ IN NET_BUF *Packet + ); + + /** +@@ -584,9 +584,9 @@ Ip6ProcessNeighborAdvertise ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6ProcessRouterAdvertise ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN EFI_IP6_HEADER *Head, +- IN NET_BUF *Packet ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN EFI_IP6_HEADER *Head, ++ IN NET_BUF *Packet + ); + + /** +@@ -607,9 +607,9 @@ Ip6ProcessRouterAdvertise ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6ProcessRedirect ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN EFI_IP6_HEADER *Head, +- IN NET_BUF *Packet ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN EFI_IP6_HEADER *Head, ++ IN NET_BUF *Packet + ); + + /** +@@ -631,11 +631,11 @@ Ip6ProcessRedirect ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6SendRouterSolicit ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN IP6_INTERFACE *Interface OPTIONAL, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *SourceAddress OPTIONAL, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *DestinationAddress OPTIONAL, +- IN EFI_MAC_ADDRESS *SourceLinkAddress OPTIONAL ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN IP6_INTERFACE *Interface OPTIONAL, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *SourceAddress OPTIONAL, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *DestinationAddress OPTIONAL, ++ IN EFI_MAC_ADDRESS *SourceLinkAddress OPTIONAL + ); + + /** +@@ -658,11 +658,11 @@ Ip6SendRouterSolicit ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6SendNeighborSolicit ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *SourceAddress, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *DestinationAddress, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *TargetIp6Address, +- IN EFI_MAC_ADDRESS *SourceLinkAddress OPTIONAL ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *SourceAddress, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *DestinationAddress, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *TargetIp6Address, ++ IN EFI_MAC_ADDRESS *SourceLinkAddress OPTIONAL + ); + + /** +@@ -690,14 +690,14 @@ Ip6SendNeighborSolicit ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6SetAddress ( +- IN IP6_INTERFACE *Interface, +- IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Ip6Addr, +- IN BOOLEAN IsAnycast, +- IN UINT8 PrefixLength, +- IN UINT32 ValidLifetime, +- IN UINT32 PreferredLifetime, +- IN IP6_DAD_CALLBACK DadCallback OPTIONAL, +- IN VOID *Context OPTIONAL ++ IN IP6_INTERFACE *Interface, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *Ip6Addr, ++ IN BOOLEAN IsAnycast, ++ IN UINT8 PrefixLength, ++ IN UINT32 ValidLifetime, ++ IN UINT32 PreferredLifetime, ++ IN IP6_DAD_CALLBACK DadCallback OPTIONAL, ++ IN VOID *Context OPTIONAL + ); + + /** +@@ -712,8 +712,8 @@ Ip6SetAddress ( + VOID + EFIAPI + Ip6NdFasterTimerTicking ( +- IN EFI_EVENT Event, +- IN VOID *Context ++ IN EFI_EVENT Event, ++ IN VOID *Context + ); + + /** +@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ Ip6NdFasterTimerTicking ( + **/ + VOID + Ip6NdTimerTicking ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb + ); + + /** +@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ Ip6NdTimerTicking ( + **/ + VOID + Ip6OnArpResolved ( +- IN VOID *Context ++ IN VOID *Context + ); + + /** +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c +index 6b4b029d14..199eea124d 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c +@@ -28,15 +28,15 @@ + **/ + BOOLEAN + Ip6IsOptionValid ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN NET_BUF *Packet, +- IN UINT8 *Option, +- IN UINT8 OptionLen, +- IN UINT32 Pointer ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN NET_BUF *Packet, ++ IN UINT8 *Option, ++ IN UINT8 OptionLen, ++ IN UINT32 Pointer + ) + { +- UINT8 Offset; +- UINT8 OptionType; ++ UINT8 Offset; ++ UINT8 OptionType; + + Offset = 0; + +@@ -44,68 +44,67 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid ( + OptionType = *(Option + Offset); + + switch (OptionType) { +- case Ip6OptionPad1: +- // +- // It is a Pad1 option +- // +- Offset++; +- break; +- case Ip6OptionPadN: +- // +- // It is a PadN option +- // +- Offset = (UINT8) (Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1) + 2); +- break; +- case Ip6OptionRouterAlert: +- // +- // It is a Router Alert Option +- // +- Offset += 4; +- break; +- default: +- // +- // The highest-order two bits specify the action must be taken if +- // the processing IPv6 node does not recognize the option type. +- // +- switch (OptionType & Ip6OptionMask) { +- case Ip6OptionSkip: +- Offset = (UINT8) (Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1)); ++ case Ip6OptionPad1: ++ // ++ // It is a Pad1 option ++ // ++ Offset++; + break; +- case Ip6OptionDiscard: +- return FALSE; +- case Ip6OptionParameterProblem: +- Pointer = Pointer + Offset + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); +- Ip6SendIcmpError ( +- IpSb, +- Packet, +- NULL, +- &Packet->Ip.Ip6->SourceAddress, +- ICMP_V6_PARAMETER_PROBLEM, +- 2, +- &Pointer +- ); +- return FALSE; +- case Ip6OptionMask: +- if (!IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress)) { +- Pointer = Pointer + Offset + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); +- Ip6SendIcmpError ( +- IpSb, +- Packet, +- NULL, +- &Packet->Ip.Ip6->SourceAddress, +- ICMP_V6_PARAMETER_PROBLEM, +- 2, +- &Pointer +- ); ++ case Ip6OptionPadN: ++ // ++ // It is a PadN option ++ // ++ Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1) + 2); ++ break; ++ case Ip6OptionRouterAlert: ++ // ++ // It is a Router Alert Option ++ // ++ Offset += 4; ++ break; ++ default: ++ // ++ // The highest-order two bits specify the action must be taken if ++ // the processing IPv6 node does not recognize the option type. ++ // ++ switch (OptionType & Ip6OptionMask) { ++ case Ip6OptionSkip: ++ Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1)); ++ break; ++ case Ip6OptionDiscard: ++ return FALSE; ++ case Ip6OptionParameterProblem: ++ Pointer = Pointer + Offset + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); ++ Ip6SendIcmpError ( ++ IpSb, ++ Packet, ++ NULL, ++ &Packet->Ip.Ip6->SourceAddress, ++ ICMP_V6_PARAMETER_PROBLEM, ++ 2, ++ &Pointer ++ ); ++ return FALSE; ++ case Ip6OptionMask: ++ if (!IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress)) { ++ Pointer = Pointer + Offset + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); ++ Ip6SendIcmpError ( ++ IpSb, ++ Packet, ++ NULL, ++ &Packet->Ip.Ip6->SourceAddress, ++ ICMP_V6_PARAMETER_PROBLEM, ++ 2, ++ &Pointer ++ ); ++ } ++ ++ return FALSE; ++ break; + } + +- return FALSE; + break; +- } +- +- break; + } +- + } + + return TRUE; +@@ -125,13 +124,13 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid ( + **/ + BOOLEAN + Ip6IsNDOptionValid ( +- IN UINT8 *Option, +- IN UINT16 OptionLen ++ IN UINT8 *Option, ++ IN UINT16 OptionLen + ) + { +- UINT32 Offset; +- UINT16 Length; +- IP6_OPTION_HEADER *OptionHeader; ++ UINT32 Offset; ++ UINT16 Length; ++ IP6_OPTION_HEADER *OptionHeader; + + if (Option == NULL) { + ASSERT (Option != NULL); +@@ -146,50 +145,54 @@ Ip6IsNDOptionValid ( + // fit within the input buffer. + // + while (Offset + sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) - 1 < OptionLen) { +- OptionHeader = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER*) (Option + Offset); +- Length = (UINT16) OptionHeader->Length * 8; ++ OptionHeader = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)(Option + Offset); ++ Length = (UINT16)OptionHeader->Length * 8; + + switch (OptionHeader->Type) { +- case Ip6OptionPrefixInfo: +- if (Length != 32) { +- return FALSE; +- } +- break; ++ case Ip6OptionPrefixInfo: ++ if (Length != 32) { ++ return FALSE; ++ } + +- case Ip6OptionMtu: +- if (Length != 8) { +- return FALSE; +- } +- break; ++ break; + +- default: +- // RFC 4861 states that Length field cannot be 0. +- if (Length == 0) { +- return FALSE; +- } +- break; ++ case Ip6OptionMtu: ++ if (Length != 8) { ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ // RFC 4861 states that Length field cannot be 0. ++ if (Length == 0) { ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ break; + } + + // + // Check whether recognized options are within the input buffer's scope. + // + switch (OptionHeader->Type) { +- case Ip6OptionEtherSource: +- case Ip6OptionEtherTarget: +- case Ip6OptionPrefixInfo: +- case Ip6OptionRedirected: +- case Ip6OptionMtu: +- if (Offset + Length > (UINT32) OptionLen) { +- return FALSE; +- } +- break; ++ case Ip6OptionEtherSource: ++ case Ip6OptionEtherTarget: ++ case Ip6OptionPrefixInfo: ++ case Ip6OptionRedirected: ++ case Ip6OptionMtu: ++ if (Offset + Length > (UINT32)OptionLen) { ++ return FALSE; ++ } + +- default: +- // +- // Unrecognized options can be either valid (but unused) or invalid +- // (garbage in between or right after valid options). Silently ignore. +- // +- break; ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ // ++ // Unrecognized options can be either valid (but unused) or invalid ++ // (garbage in between or right after valid options). Silently ignore. ++ // ++ break; + } + + // +@@ -202,7 +205,6 @@ Ip6IsNDOptionValid ( + return TRUE; + } + +- + /** + Validate whether the NextHeader is a known valid protocol or one of the user configured + protocols from the upper layer. +@@ -216,18 +218,19 @@ Ip6IsNDOptionValid ( + **/ + BOOLEAN + Ip6IsValidProtocol ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN UINT8 NextHeader ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN UINT8 NextHeader + ) + { +- LIST_ENTRY *Entry; +- IP6_PROTOCOL *IpInstance; +- +- if (NextHeader == EFI_IP_PROTO_TCP || +- NextHeader == EFI_IP_PROTO_UDP || +- NextHeader == IP6_ICMP || +- NextHeader == IP6_ESP +- ) { ++ LIST_ENTRY *Entry; ++ IP6_PROTOCOL *IpInstance; ++ ++ if ((NextHeader == EFI_IP_PROTO_TCP) || ++ (NextHeader == EFI_IP_PROTO_UDP) || ++ (NextHeader == IP6_ICMP) || ++ (NextHeader == IP6_ESP) ++ ) ++ { + return TRUE; + } + +@@ -281,29 +284,29 @@ Ip6IsValidProtocol ( + **/ + BOOLEAN + Ip6IsExtsValid ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb OPTIONAL, +- IN NET_BUF *Packet OPTIONAL, +- IN UINT8 *NextHeader, +- IN UINT8 *ExtHdrs, +- IN UINT32 ExtHdrsLen, +- IN BOOLEAN Rcvd, +- OUT UINT32 *FormerHeader OPTIONAL, +- OUT UINT8 **LastHeader, +- OUT UINT32 *RealExtsLen OPTIONAL, +- OUT UINT32 *UnFragmentLen OPTIONAL, +- OUT BOOLEAN *Fragmented OPTIONAL ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb OPTIONAL, ++ IN NET_BUF *Packet OPTIONAL, ++ IN UINT8 *NextHeader, ++ IN UINT8 *ExtHdrs, ++ IN UINT32 ExtHdrsLen, ++ IN BOOLEAN Rcvd, ++ OUT UINT32 *FormerHeader OPTIONAL, ++ OUT UINT8 **LastHeader, ++ OUT UINT32 *RealExtsLen OPTIONAL, ++ OUT UINT32 *UnFragmentLen OPTIONAL, ++ OUT BOOLEAN *Fragmented OPTIONAL + ) + { +- UINT32 Pointer; +- UINT32 Offset; +- UINT8 *Option; +- UINT8 OptionLen; +- BOOLEAN Flag; +- UINT8 CountD; +- UINT8 CountA; +- IP6_FRAGMENT_HEADER *FragmentHead; +- UINT16 FragmentOffset; +- IP6_ROUTING_HEADER *RoutingHead; ++ UINT32 Pointer; ++ UINT32 Offset; ++ UINT8 *Option; ++ UINT8 OptionLen; ++ BOOLEAN Flag; ++ UINT8 CountD; ++ UINT8 CountA; ++ IP6_FRAGMENT_HEADER *FragmentHead; ++ UINT16 FragmentOffset; ++ IP6_ROUTING_HEADER *RoutingHead; + + if (RealExtsLen != NULL) { + *RealExtsLen = 0; +@@ -319,11 +322,11 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + + *LastHeader = NextHeader; + +- if (ExtHdrs == NULL && ExtHdrsLen == 0) { ++ if ((ExtHdrs == NULL) && (ExtHdrsLen == 0)) { + return TRUE; + } + +- if ((ExtHdrs == NULL && ExtHdrsLen != 0) || (ExtHdrs != NULL && ExtHdrsLen == 0)) { ++ if (((ExtHdrs == NULL) && (ExtHdrsLen != 0)) || ((ExtHdrs != NULL) && (ExtHdrsLen == 0))) { + return FALSE; + } + +@@ -334,236 +337,240 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + CountA = 0; + + while (Offset <= ExtHdrsLen) { +- + switch (*NextHeader) { +- case IP6_HOP_BY_HOP: +- if (Offset != 0) { +- if (!Rcvd) { ++ case IP6_HOP_BY_HOP: ++ if (Offset != 0) { ++ if (!Rcvd) { ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Hop-by-Hop Options header is restricted to appear immediately after an IPv6 header only. ++ // If not, generate a ICMP parameter problem message with code value of 1. ++ // ++ if (Pointer == 0) { ++ Pointer = sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); ++ } else { ++ Pointer = Offset + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); ++ } ++ ++ if ((IpSb != NULL) && (Packet != NULL) && ++ !IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress)) ++ { ++ Ip6SendIcmpError ( ++ IpSb, ++ Packet, ++ NULL, ++ &Packet->Ip.Ip6->SourceAddress, ++ ICMP_V6_PARAMETER_PROBLEM, ++ 1, ++ &Pointer ++ ); ++ } ++ + return FALSE; + } +- // +- // Hop-by-Hop Options header is restricted to appear immediately after an IPv6 header only. +- // If not, generate a ICMP parameter problem message with code value of 1. +- // +- if (Pointer == 0) { +- Pointer = sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); +- } else { +- Pointer = Offset + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); ++ ++ Flag = TRUE; ++ ++ // ++ // Fall through ++ // ++ case IP6_DESTINATION: ++ if (*NextHeader == IP6_DESTINATION) { ++ CountD++; + } + +- if ((IpSb != NULL) && (Packet != NULL) && +- !IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress)) { +- Ip6SendIcmpError ( +- IpSb, +- Packet, +- NULL, +- &Packet->Ip.Ip6->SourceAddress, +- ICMP_V6_PARAMETER_PROBLEM, +- 1, +- &Pointer +- ); ++ if (CountD > 2) { ++ return FALSE; + } +- return FALSE; +- } + +- Flag = TRUE; ++ NextHeader = ExtHdrs + Offset; ++ Pointer = Offset; + +- // +- // Fall through +- // +- case IP6_DESTINATION: +- if (*NextHeader == IP6_DESTINATION) { +- CountD++; +- } ++ Offset++; ++ Option = ExtHdrs + Offset; ++ OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 1) * 8 - 2); ++ Option++; ++ Offset++; + +- if (CountD > 2) { +- return FALSE; +- } ++ if ((IpSb != NULL) && (Packet != NULL) && !Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, Packet, Option, OptionLen, Offset)) { ++ return FALSE; ++ } + +- NextHeader = ExtHdrs + Offset; +- Pointer = Offset; ++ Offset = Offset + OptionLen; + +- Offset++; +- Option = ExtHdrs + Offset; +- OptionLen = (UINT8) ((*Option + 1) * 8 - 2); +- Option++; +- Offset++; ++ if (Flag) { ++ if (UnFragmentLen != NULL) { ++ *UnFragmentLen = Offset; ++ } + +- if (IpSb != NULL && Packet != NULL && !Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, Packet, Option, OptionLen, Offset)) { +- return FALSE; +- } ++ Flag = FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ break; + +- Offset = Offset + OptionLen; ++ case IP6_ROUTING: ++ NextHeader = ExtHdrs + Offset; ++ RoutingHead = (IP6_ROUTING_HEADER *)NextHeader; + +- if (Flag) { +- if (UnFragmentLen != NULL) { +- *UnFragmentLen = Offset; ++ // ++ // Type 0 routing header is defined in RFC2460 and deprecated in RFC5095. ++ // Thus all routing types are processed as unrecognized. ++ // ++ if (RoutingHead->SegmentsLeft == 0) { ++ // ++ // Ignore the routing header and proceed to process the next header. ++ // ++ Offset = Offset + (RoutingHead->HeaderLen + 1) * 8; ++ ++ if (UnFragmentLen != NULL) { ++ *UnFragmentLen = Offset; ++ } ++ } else { ++ // ++ // Discard the packet and send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message ++ // to the packet's source address, pointing to the unrecognized routing ++ // type. ++ // ++ Pointer = Offset + 2 + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); ++ if ((IpSb != NULL) && (Packet != NULL) && ++ !IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress)) ++ { ++ Ip6SendIcmpError ( ++ IpSb, ++ Packet, ++ NULL, ++ &Packet->Ip.Ip6->SourceAddress, ++ ICMP_V6_PARAMETER_PROBLEM, ++ 0, ++ &Pointer ++ ); ++ } ++ ++ return FALSE; + } + +- Flag = FALSE; +- } ++ break; + +- break; ++ case IP6_FRAGMENT: + +- case IP6_ROUTING: +- NextHeader = ExtHdrs + Offset; +- RoutingHead = (IP6_ROUTING_HEADER *) NextHeader; ++ // ++ // RFC2402, AH header should after fragment header. ++ // ++ if (CountA > 1) { ++ return FALSE; ++ } + +- // +- // Type 0 routing header is defined in RFC2460 and deprecated in RFC5095. +- // Thus all routing types are processed as unrecognized. +- // +- if (RoutingHead->SegmentsLeft == 0) { + // +- // Ignore the routing header and proceed to process the next header. ++ // RFC2460, ICMP Parameter Problem message with code 0 should be sent ++ // if the length of a fragment is not a multiple of 8 octets and the M ++ // flag of that fragment is 1, pointing to the Payload length field of the ++ // fragment packet. + // +- Offset = Offset + (RoutingHead->HeaderLen + 1) * 8; ++ if ((IpSb != NULL) && (Packet != NULL) && ((ExtHdrsLen % 8) != 0)) { ++ // ++ // Check whether it is the last fragment. ++ // ++ FragmentHead = (IP6_FRAGMENT_HEADER *)(ExtHdrs + Offset); ++ if (FragmentHead == NULL) { ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ FragmentOffset = NTOHS (FragmentHead->FragmentOffset); ++ ++ if (((FragmentOffset & 0x1) == 0x1) && ++ !IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress)) ++ { ++ Pointer = sizeof (UINT32); ++ Ip6SendIcmpError ( ++ IpSb, ++ Packet, ++ NULL, ++ &Packet->Ip.Ip6->SourceAddress, ++ ICMP_V6_PARAMETER_PROBLEM, ++ 0, ++ &Pointer ++ ); ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (Fragmented != NULL) { ++ *Fragmented = TRUE; ++ } ++ ++ if (Rcvd && (FormerHeader != NULL)) { ++ *FormerHeader = (UINT32)(NextHeader - ExtHdrs); ++ } ++ ++ NextHeader = ExtHdrs + Offset; ++ Offset = Offset + 8; ++ break; + +- if (UnFragmentLen != NULL) { +- *UnFragmentLen = Offset; ++ case IP6_AH: ++ if (++CountA > 1) { ++ return FALSE; + } + +- } else { ++ Option = ExtHdrs + Offset; ++ NextHeader = Option; ++ Option++; + // +- // Discard the packet and send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message +- // to the packet's source address, pointing to the unrecognized routing +- // type. ++ // RFC2402, Payload length is specified in 32-bit words, minus "2". + // +- Pointer = Offset + 2 + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); +- if ((IpSb != NULL) && (Packet != NULL) && +- !IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress)) { +- Ip6SendIcmpError ( +- IpSb, +- Packet, +- NULL, +- &Packet->Ip.Ip6->SourceAddress, +- ICMP_V6_PARAMETER_PROBLEM, +- 0, +- &Pointer +- ); +- } ++ OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 2) * 4); ++ Offset = Offset + OptionLen; ++ break; + ++ case IP6_NO_NEXT_HEADER: ++ *LastHeader = NextHeader; + return FALSE; +- } ++ break; + +- break; ++ default: ++ if (Ip6IsValidProtocol (IpSb, *NextHeader)) { ++ *LastHeader = NextHeader; + +- case IP6_FRAGMENT: ++ if (RealExtsLen != NULL) { ++ *RealExtsLen = Offset; ++ } + +- // +- // RFC2402, AH header should after fragment header. +- // +- if (CountA > 1) { +- return FALSE; +- } ++ return TRUE; ++ } + +- // +- // RFC2460, ICMP Parameter Problem message with code 0 should be sent +- // if the length of a fragment is not a multiple of 8 octets and the M +- // flag of that fragment is 1, pointing to the Payload length field of the +- // fragment packet. +- // +- if (IpSb != NULL && Packet != NULL && (ExtHdrsLen % 8) != 0) { + // +- // Check whether it is the last fragment. ++ // The Next Header value is unrecognized by the node, discard the packet and ++ // send an ICMP parameter problem message with code value of 1. + // +- FragmentHead = (IP6_FRAGMENT_HEADER *) (ExtHdrs + Offset); +- if (FragmentHead == NULL) { +- return FALSE; ++ if (Offset == 0) { ++ // ++ // The Next Header directly follows IPv6 basic header. ++ // ++ Pointer = 6; ++ } else { ++ if (Pointer == 0) { ++ Pointer = sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); ++ } else { ++ Pointer = Offset + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); ++ } + } + +- FragmentOffset = NTOHS (FragmentHead->FragmentOffset); +- +- if (((FragmentOffset & 0x1) == 0x1) && +- !IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress)) { +- Pointer = sizeof (UINT32); ++ if ((IpSb != NULL) && (Packet != NULL) && ++ !IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress)) ++ { + Ip6SendIcmpError ( + IpSb, + Packet, + NULL, + &Packet->Ip.Ip6->SourceAddress, + ICMP_V6_PARAMETER_PROBLEM, +- 0, ++ 1, + &Pointer + ); +- return FALSE; + } +- } +- +- if (Fragmented != NULL) { +- *Fragmented = TRUE; +- } + +- if (Rcvd && FormerHeader != NULL) { +- *FormerHeader = (UINT32) (NextHeader - ExtHdrs); +- } +- +- NextHeader = ExtHdrs + Offset; +- Offset = Offset + 8; +- break; +- +- case IP6_AH: +- if (++CountA > 1) { + return FALSE; +- } +- +- Option = ExtHdrs + Offset; +- NextHeader = Option; +- Option++; +- // +- // RFC2402, Payload length is specified in 32-bit words, minus "2". +- // +- OptionLen = (UINT8) ((*Option + 2) * 4); +- Offset = Offset + OptionLen; +- break; +- +- case IP6_NO_NEXT_HEADER: +- *LastHeader = NextHeader; +- return FALSE; +- break; +- +- default: +- if (Ip6IsValidProtocol (IpSb, *NextHeader)) { +- +- *LastHeader = NextHeader; +- +- if (RealExtsLen != NULL) { +- *RealExtsLen = Offset; +- } +- +- return TRUE; +- } +- +- // +- // The Next Header value is unrecognized by the node, discard the packet and +- // send an ICMP parameter problem message with code value of 1. +- // +- if (Offset == 0) { +- // +- // The Next Header directly follows IPv6 basic header. +- // +- Pointer = 6; +- } else { +- if (Pointer == 0) { +- Pointer = sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); +- } else { +- Pointer = Offset + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); +- } +- } +- +- if ((IpSb != NULL) && (Packet != NULL) && +- !IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress)) { +- Ip6SendIcmpError ( +- IpSb, +- Packet, +- NULL, +- &Packet->Ip.Ip6->SourceAddress, +- ICMP_V6_PARAMETER_PROBLEM, +- 1, +- &Pointer +- ); +- } +- return FALSE; + } + } + +@@ -592,12 +599,12 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6FillHopByHop ( +- OUT UINT8 *Buffer, +- IN OUT UINTN *BufferLen, +- IN UINT8 NextHeader ++ OUT UINT8 *Buffer, ++ IN OUT UINTN *BufferLen, ++ IN UINT8 NextHeader + ) + { +- UINT8 BufferArray[8]; ++ UINT8 BufferArray[8]; + + if (*BufferLen < 8) { + *BufferLen = 8; +@@ -640,23 +647,23 @@ Ip6FillHopByHop ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6FillFragmentHeader ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN UINT8 NextHeader, +- IN UINT8 LastHeader, +- IN UINT8 *ExtHdrs, +- IN UINT32 ExtHdrsLen, +- IN UINT16 FragmentOffset, +- OUT UINT8 **UpdatedExtHdrs ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN UINT8 NextHeader, ++ IN UINT8 LastHeader, ++ IN UINT8 *ExtHdrs, ++ IN UINT32 ExtHdrsLen, ++ IN UINT16 FragmentOffset, ++ OUT UINT8 **UpdatedExtHdrs + ) + { +- UINT32 Length; +- UINT8 *Buffer; +- UINT32 FormerHeader; +- UINT32 Offset; +- UINT32 Part1Len; +- UINT32 HeaderLen; +- UINT8 Current; +- IP6_FRAGMENT_HEADER FragmentHead; ++ UINT32 Length; ++ UINT8 *Buffer; ++ UINT32 FormerHeader; ++ UINT32 Offset; ++ UINT32 Part1Len; ++ UINT32 HeaderLen; ++ UINT8 Current; ++ IP6_FRAGMENT_HEADER FragmentHead; + + if (UpdatedExtHdrs == NULL) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; +@@ -668,82 +675,81 @@ Ip6FillFragmentHeader ( + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + +- Offset = 0; +- Part1Len = 0; +- FormerHeader = 0; +- Current = NextHeader; ++ Offset = 0; ++ Part1Len = 0; ++ FormerHeader = 0; ++ Current = NextHeader; + + while ((ExtHdrs != NULL) && (Offset <= ExtHdrsLen)) { + switch (NextHeader) { +- case IP6_ROUTING: +- case IP6_HOP_BY_HOP: +- case IP6_DESTINATION: +- Current = NextHeader; +- NextHeader = *(ExtHdrs + Offset); ++ case IP6_ROUTING: ++ case IP6_HOP_BY_HOP: ++ case IP6_DESTINATION: ++ Current = NextHeader; ++ NextHeader = *(ExtHdrs + Offset); ++ ++ if ((Current == IP6_DESTINATION) && (NextHeader != IP6_ROUTING)) { ++ // ++ // Destination Options header should occur at most twice, once before ++ // a Routing header and once before the upper-layer header. Here we ++ // find the one before the upper-layer header. Insert the Fragment ++ // Header before it. ++ // ++ CopyMem (Buffer, ExtHdrs, Part1Len); ++ *(Buffer + FormerHeader) = IP6_FRAGMENT; ++ // ++ // Exit the loop. ++ // ++ Offset = ExtHdrsLen + 1; ++ break; ++ } + +- if ((Current == IP6_DESTINATION) && (NextHeader != IP6_ROUTING)) { +- // +- // Destination Options header should occur at most twice, once before +- // a Routing header and once before the upper-layer header. Here we +- // find the one before the upper-layer header. Insert the Fragment +- // Header before it. +- // +- CopyMem (Buffer, ExtHdrs, Part1Len); +- *(Buffer + FormerHeader) = IP6_FRAGMENT; +- // +- // Exit the loop. +- // +- Offset = ExtHdrsLen + 1; ++ FormerHeader = Offset; ++ HeaderLen = (*(ExtHdrs + Offset + 1) + 1) * 8; ++ Part1Len = Part1Len + HeaderLen; ++ Offset = Offset + HeaderLen; + break; +- } +- + +- FormerHeader = Offset; +- HeaderLen = (*(ExtHdrs + Offset + 1) + 1) * 8; +- Part1Len = Part1Len + HeaderLen; +- Offset = Offset + HeaderLen; +- break; +- +- case IP6_FRAGMENT: +- Current = NextHeader; +- +- if (Part1Len != 0) { +- CopyMem (Buffer, ExtHdrs, Part1Len); +- } +- +- *(Buffer + FormerHeader) = IP6_FRAGMENT; +- +- // +- // Exit the loop. +- // +- Offset = ExtHdrsLen + 1; +- break; ++ case IP6_FRAGMENT: ++ Current = NextHeader; + +- case IP6_AH: +- Current = NextHeader; +- NextHeader = *(ExtHdrs + Offset); +- // +- // RFC2402, Payload length is specified in 32-bit words, minus "2". +- // +- HeaderLen = (*(ExtHdrs + Offset + 1) + 2) * 4; +- Part1Len = Part1Len + HeaderLen; +- Offset = Offset + HeaderLen; +- break; ++ if (Part1Len != 0) { ++ CopyMem (Buffer, ExtHdrs, Part1Len); ++ } + +- default: +- if (Ip6IsValidProtocol (IpSb, NextHeader)) { +- Current = NextHeader; +- CopyMem (Buffer, ExtHdrs, Part1Len); + *(Buffer + FormerHeader) = IP6_FRAGMENT; ++ + // + // Exit the loop. + // + Offset = ExtHdrsLen + 1; + break; +- } + +- FreePool (Buffer); +- return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ case IP6_AH: ++ Current = NextHeader; ++ NextHeader = *(ExtHdrs + Offset); ++ // ++ // RFC2402, Payload length is specified in 32-bit words, minus "2". ++ // ++ HeaderLen = (*(ExtHdrs + Offset + 1) + 2) * 4; ++ Part1Len = Part1Len + HeaderLen; ++ Offset = Offset + HeaderLen; ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ if (Ip6IsValidProtocol (IpSb, NextHeader)) { ++ Current = NextHeader; ++ CopyMem (Buffer, ExtHdrs, Part1Len); ++ *(Buffer + FormerHeader) = IP6_FRAGMENT; ++ // ++ // Exit the loop. ++ // ++ Offset = ExtHdrsLen + 1; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ FreePool (Buffer); ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + } + +@@ -778,4 +784,3 @@ Ip6FillFragmentHeader ( + + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } +- +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h +index c81b3fda2f..bd8e223c8a 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h +@@ -10,20 +10,20 @@ + #ifndef __EFI_IP6_OPTION_H__ + #define __EFI_IP6_OPTION_H__ + +-#define IP6_FRAGMENT_OFFSET_MASK (~0x3) ++#define IP6_FRAGMENT_OFFSET_MASK (~0x3) + + typedef struct _IP6_FRAGMENT_HEADER { +- UINT8 NextHeader; +- UINT8 Reserved; +- UINT16 FragmentOffset; +- UINT32 Identification; ++ UINT8 NextHeader; ++ UINT8 Reserved; ++ UINT16 FragmentOffset; ++ UINT32 Identification; + } IP6_FRAGMENT_HEADER; + + typedef struct _IP6_ROUTING_HEADER { +- UINT8 NextHeader; +- UINT8 HeaderLen; +- UINT8 RoutingType; +- UINT8 SegmentsLeft; ++ UINT8 NextHeader; ++ UINT8 HeaderLen; ++ UINT8 RoutingType; ++ UINT8 SegmentsLeft; + } IP6_ROUTING_HEADER; + + typedef enum { +@@ -35,11 +35,11 @@ typedef enum { + Ip6OptionParameterProblem = 0x80, + Ip6OptionMask = 0xc0, + +- Ip6OptionEtherSource = 1, +- Ip6OptionEtherTarget = 2, +- Ip6OptionPrefixInfo = 3, +- Ip6OptionRedirected = 4, +- Ip6OptionMtu = 5 ++ Ip6OptionEtherSource = 1, ++ Ip6OptionEtherTarget = 2, ++ Ip6OptionPrefixInfo = 3, ++ Ip6OptionRedirected = 4, ++ Ip6OptionMtu = 5 + } IP6_OPTION_TYPE; + + /** +@@ -72,17 +72,17 @@ typedef enum { + **/ + BOOLEAN + Ip6IsExtsValid ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb OPTIONAL, +- IN NET_BUF *Packet OPTIONAL, +- IN UINT8 *NextHeader, +- IN UINT8 *ExtHdrs, +- IN UINT32 ExtHdrsLen, +- IN BOOLEAN Rcvd, +- OUT UINT32 *FormerHeader OPTIONAL, +- OUT UINT8 **LastHeader, +- OUT UINT32 *RealExtsLen OPTIONAL, +- OUT UINT32 *UnFragmentLen OPTIONAL, +- OUT BOOLEAN *Fragmented OPTIONAL ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb OPTIONAL, ++ IN NET_BUF *Packet OPTIONAL, ++ IN UINT8 *NextHeader, ++ IN UINT8 *ExtHdrs, ++ IN UINT32 ExtHdrsLen, ++ IN BOOLEAN Rcvd, ++ OUT UINT32 *FormerHeader OPTIONAL, ++ OUT UINT8 **LastHeader, ++ OUT UINT32 *RealExtsLen OPTIONAL, ++ OUT UINT32 *UnFragmentLen OPTIONAL, ++ OUT BOOLEAN *Fragmented OPTIONAL + ); + + /** +@@ -101,9 +101,9 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6FillHopByHop ( +- OUT UINT8 *Buffer, +- IN OUT UINTN *BufferLen, +- IN UINT8 NextHeader ++ OUT UINT8 *Buffer, ++ IN OUT UINTN *BufferLen, ++ IN UINT8 NextHeader + ); + + /** +@@ -127,13 +127,13 @@ Ip6FillHopByHop ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6FillFragmentHeader ( +- IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, +- IN UINT8 NextHeader, +- IN UINT8 LastHeader, +- IN UINT8 *ExtHdrs, +- IN UINT32 ExtHdrsLen, +- IN UINT16 FragmentOffset, +- OUT UINT8 **UpdatedExtHdrs ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN UINT8 NextHeader, ++ IN UINT8 LastHeader, ++ IN UINT8 *ExtHdrs, ++ IN UINT32 ExtHdrsLen, ++ IN UINT16 FragmentOffset, ++ OUT UINT8 **UpdatedExtHdrs + ); + + /** +@@ -155,13 +155,13 @@ Ip6FillFragmentHeader ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Ip6CopyExts ( +- IN UINT8 NextHeader, +- IN UINT8 *ExtHdrs, +- IN UINT8 *LastHeader, +- IN UINT16 FragmentOffset, +- IN UINT32 UnFragmentHdrLen, +- IN OUT UINT8 *Buf, +- IN OUT UINT32 *BufLen ++ IN UINT8 NextHeader, ++ IN UINT8 *ExtHdrs, ++ IN UINT8 *LastHeader, ++ IN UINT16 FragmentOffset, ++ IN UINT32 UnFragmentHdrLen, ++ IN OUT UINT8 *Buf, ++ IN OUT UINT32 *BufLen + ); + + /** +@@ -178,8 +178,8 @@ Ip6CopyExts ( + **/ + BOOLEAN + Ip6IsNDOptionValid ( +- IN UINT8 *Option, +- IN UINT16 OptionLen ++ IN UINT8 *Option, ++ IN UINT16 OptionLen + ); + + #endif +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-migrate-to-OVMF-s-VirtNorFlas.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-migrate-to-OVMF-s-VirtNorFlas.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..43848d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-migrate-to-OVMF-s-VirtNorFlas.patch @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +From 9ef10bbe9a03f22aa5c5ff659012794d37ef9839 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ard Biesheuvel +Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 18:41:22 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 17/18] ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu: migrate to OVMF's + VirtNorFlashDxe + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [19/20] 2160140b0ea566451ab723e941d2ab91e1ad874e + +Switch to the virt specific NorFlashDxe driver implementation that was +added recently. + +Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel +Reviewed-by: Sunil V L +(cherry picked from commit b92298af8218dd074c231947bc95f2be94af663c) +--- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc | 4 ++-- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc | 2 +- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc | 4 ++-- + ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.c | 12 ++++++------ + .../Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf | 4 ++-- + 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +index e6fad9f066..2b23becf30 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ + ArmPlatformLib|ArmPlatformPkg/Library/ArmPlatformLibNull/ArmPlatformLibNull.inf + + TimerLib|ArmPkg/Library/ArmArchTimerLib/ArmArchTimerLib.inf +- NorFlashPlatformLib|ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf ++ VirtNorFlashPlatformLib|ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf + + CapsuleLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibNull/DxeCapsuleLibNull.inf + BootLogoLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/BootLogoLib/BootLogoLib.inf +@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ + + NULL|ArmVirtPkg/Library/ArmVirtTimerFdtClientLib/ArmVirtTimerFdtClientLib.inf + } +- ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/WatchdogTimerDxe/WatchdogTimer.inf + + # +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +index f6a538df72..7c655d384d 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE + + INF ArmPkg/Drivers/ArmGic/ArmGicDxe.inf + INF ArmPkg/Drivers/TimerDxe/TimerDxe.inf +- INF ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashDxe.inf ++ INF OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/WatchdogTimerDxe/WatchdogTimer.inf + + # +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc +index 656c9d99a3..344e2c4ed9 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc +@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ + ArmVirtMemInfoLib|ArmVirtPkg/Library/QemuVirtMemInfoLib/QemuVirtMemInfoLib.inf + + TimerLib|ArmPkg/Library/ArmArchTimerLib/ArmArchTimerLib.inf +- NorFlashPlatformLib|ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf ++ VirtNorFlashPlatformLib|ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf + + CapsuleLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibNull/DxeCapsuleLibNull.inf + BootLogoLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/BootLogoLib/BootLogoLib.inf +@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ + + NULL|ArmVirtPkg/Library/ArmVirtTimerFdtClientLib/ArmVirtTimerFdtClientLib.inf + } +- ArmPlatformPkg/Drivers/NorFlashDxe/NorFlashDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/WatchdogTimerDxe/WatchdogTimer.inf + + # +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.c b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.c +index 271d7f0efb..93a2fed40f 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.c ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.c +@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ + + #include + #include +-#include + #include ++#include + + #include + +@@ -18,19 +18,19 @@ + #define MAX_FLASH_BANKS 4 + + EFI_STATUS +-NorFlashPlatformInitialization ( ++VirtNorFlashPlatformInitialization ( + VOID + ) + { + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +-NOR_FLASH_DESCRIPTION mNorFlashDevices[MAX_FLASH_BANKS]; ++STATIC VIRT_NOR_FLASH_DESCRIPTION mNorFlashDevices[MAX_FLASH_BANKS]; + + EFI_STATUS +-NorFlashPlatformGetDevices ( +- OUT NOR_FLASH_DESCRIPTION **NorFlashDescriptions, +- OUT UINT32 *Count ++VirtNorFlashPlatformGetDevices ( ++ OUT VIRT_NOR_FLASH_DESCRIPTION **NorFlashDescriptions, ++ OUT UINT32 *Count + ) + { + FDT_CLIENT_PROTOCOL *FdtClient; +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf +index 4c3683bf5d..a6b5865be9 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/NorFlashQemuLib/NorFlashQemuLib.inf +@@ -14,17 +14,17 @@ + FILE_GUID = 339B7829-4C5F-4EFC-B2DD-5050E530DECE + MODULE_TYPE = DXE_DRIVER + VERSION_STRING = 1.0 +- LIBRARY_CLASS = NorFlashPlatformLib ++ LIBRARY_CLASS = VirtNorFlashPlatformLib + + [Sources.common] + NorFlashQemuLib.c + + [Packages] + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec +- ArmPlatformPkg/ArmPlatformPkg.dec + ArmPkg/ArmPkg.dec + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtPkg.dec + EmbeddedPkg/EmbeddedPkg.dec ++ OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec + + [LibraryClasses] + BaseLib +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-EmbeddedPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-EmbeddedPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a5d148 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-EmbeddedPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +From f8691984227809170b702f6fd087add1f95ee8fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 16:38:49 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] EmbeddedPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob() + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 66: EmbeddedPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21158 +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Commit: [1/2] 301d3bfe82c39179fb85d510788831aa340212d9 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21158 +CVE: CVE-2022-36765 +Upstream: Merged + +commit aeaee8944f0eaacbf4cdf39279785b9ba4836bb6 +Author: Gua Guo +Date: Thu Jan 11 13:07:50 2024 +0800 + + EmbeddedPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob() + + REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4166 + + Fix integer overflow in various CreateHob instances. + Fixes: CVE-2022-36765 + + The CreateHob() function aligns the requested size to 8 + performing the following operation: + ``` + HobLength = (UINT16)((HobLength + 0x7) & (~0x7)); + ``` + + No checks are performed to ensure this value doesn't + overflow, and could lead to CreateHob() returning a smaller + HOB than requested, which could lead to OOB HOB accesses. + + Reported-by: Marc Beatove + Cc: Leif Lindholm + Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel + Cc: Abner Chang + Cc: John Mathew + Authored-by: Gerd Hoffmann + Signed-off-by: Gua Guo + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c +index b5cc6c5d8f..f4c99369c6 100644 +--- a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c ++++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c +@@ -112,6 +112,13 @@ CreateHob ( + + HandOffHob = GetHobList (); + ++ // ++ // Check Length to avoid data overflow. ++ // ++ if (HobLength > MAX_UINT16 - 0x7) { ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + HobLength = (UINT16)((HobLength + 0x7) & (~0x7)); + + FreeMemory = HandOffHob->EfiFreeMemoryTop - HandOffHob->EfiFreeMemoryBottom; +@@ -161,7 +168,10 @@ BuildResourceDescriptorHob ( + EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR *Hob; + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR, sizeof (EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR)); +- ASSERT(Hob != NULL); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->ResourceType = ResourceType; + Hob->ResourceAttribute = ResourceAttribute; +@@ -403,6 +413,10 @@ BuildModuleHob ( + ((ModuleLength & (EFI_PAGE_SIZE - 1)) == 0)); + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_MODULE)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + CopyGuid (&(Hob->MemoryAllocationHeader.Name), &gEfiHobMemoryAllocModuleGuid); + Hob->MemoryAllocationHeader.MemoryBaseAddress = MemoryAllocationModule; +@@ -450,7 +464,12 @@ BuildGuidHob ( + // + ASSERT (DataLength <= (0xffff - sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE))); + +- Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_GUID_EXTENSION, (UINT16) (sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE) + DataLength)); ++ Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_GUID_EXTENSION, (UINT16)(sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE) + DataLength)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + CopyGuid (&Hob->Name, Guid); + return Hob + 1; + } +@@ -516,6 +535,10 @@ BuildFvHob ( + EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME *Hob; + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress; + Hob->Length = Length; +@@ -548,6 +571,10 @@ BuildFv2Hob ( + EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME2 *Hob; + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV2, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME2)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress; + Hob->Length = Length; +@@ -589,6 +616,10 @@ BuildFv3Hob ( + EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME3 *Hob; + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV3, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME3)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress; + Hob->Length = Length; +@@ -645,6 +676,10 @@ BuildCpuHob ( + EFI_HOB_CPU *Hob; + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_CPU, sizeof (EFI_HOB_CPU)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->SizeOfMemorySpace = SizeOfMemorySpace; + Hob->SizeOfIoSpace = SizeOfIoSpace; +@@ -681,6 +716,10 @@ BuildStackHob ( + ((Length & (EFI_PAGE_SIZE - 1)) == 0)); + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_STACK)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + CopyGuid (&(Hob->AllocDescriptor.Name), &gEfiHobMemoryAllocStackGuid); + Hob->AllocDescriptor.MemoryBaseAddress = BaseAddress; +@@ -761,6 +800,10 @@ BuildMemoryAllocationHob ( + ((Length & (EFI_PAGE_SIZE - 1)) == 0)); + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + ZeroMem (&(Hob->AllocDescriptor.Name), sizeof (EFI_GUID)); + Hob->AllocDescriptor.MemoryBaseAddress = BaseAddress; +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-MdePkg-Introduce-CcMeasurementProtocol-for-CC-Guest-.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-MdePkg-Introduce-CcMeasurementProtocol-for-CC-Guest-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df008db --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-MdePkg-Introduce-CcMeasurementProtocol-for-CC-Guest-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,390 @@ +From b8261ac422ba284249cd4f341d78d058e79960f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 11:56:37 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 03/17] MdePkg: Introduce CcMeasurementProtocol for CC Guest + firmware + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [3/13] 6bf304f8e3bc875024c8fb0a4cd5d2c944f69480 (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154 +CVE: CVE-2022-36763 +Upstream: Merged + +commit e193584da60550008722498442c62ddb77bf27d5 +Author: Min Xu +Date: Sat Dec 11 21:08:40 2021 +0800 + + MdePkg: Introduce CcMeasurementProtocol for CC Guest firmware + + BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3625 + + CC guest is a Confidential Computing guest. If CC Guest firmware + supports measurement and an event is created, CC Guest firmware + is designed to report the event log with the same data structure + in TCG-Platform-Firmware-Profile specification with + EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2 format. + + The CC Guest firmware supports measurement. It is designed to + produce EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL with new GUID + EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_GUID to report event log and provides + hash capability. + + Cc: Michael D Kinney + Cc: Liming Gao + Cc: Zhiguang Liu + Cc: Jiewen Yao + Cc: Jian J Wang + Cc: Ken Lu + Cc: Sami Mujawar + Cc: Gerd Hoffmann + Reviewed-by: Liming Gao + Reviewed-by: Sami Mujawar + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + Signed-off-by: Min Xu + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + MdePkg/Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h | 302 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec | 6 + + 2 files changed, 308 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 MdePkg/Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h + +diff --git a/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h b/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..68029e977f +--- /dev/null ++++ b/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h +@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@ ++/** @file ++ If CC Guest firmware supports measurement and an event is created, ++ CC Guest firmware is designed to report the event log with the same ++ data structure in TCG-Platform-Firmware-Profile specification with ++ EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2 format. ++ ++ The CC Guest firmware supports measurement, the CC Guest Firmware is ++ designed to produce EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL with new GUID ++ EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_GUID to report event log and provides hash ++ capability. ++ ++Copyright (c) 2020 - 2021, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
++SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ ++**/ ++ ++#ifndef CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_H_ ++#define CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_H_ ++ ++#include ++ ++#define EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_GUID \ ++ { 0x96751a3d, 0x72f4, 0x41a6, { 0xa7, 0x94, 0xed, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x67, 0xae, 0x6b }} ++extern EFI_GUID gEfiCcMeasurementProtocolGuid; ++ ++typedef struct _EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL; ++ ++typedef struct { ++ UINT8 Major; ++ UINT8 Minor; ++} EFI_CC_VERSION; ++ ++// ++// EFI_CC Type/SubType definition ++// ++#define EFI_CC_TYPE_NONE 0 ++#define EFI_CC_TYPE_SEV 1 ++#define EFI_CC_TYPE_TDX 2 ++ ++typedef struct { ++ UINT8 Type; ++ UINT8 SubType; ++} EFI_CC_TYPE; ++ ++typedef UINT32 EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_BITMAP; ++typedef UINT32 EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT; ++typedef UINT32 EFI_CC_EVENT_ALGORITHM_BITMAP; ++typedef UINT32 EFI_CC_MR_INDEX; ++ ++// ++// Intel TDX measure register index ++// ++#define TDX_MR_INDEX_MRTD 0 ++#define TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR0 1 ++#define TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR1 2 ++#define TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR2 3 ++#define TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR3 4 ++ ++#define EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2 0x00000002 ++#define EFI_CC_BOOT_HASH_ALG_SHA384 0x00000004 ++ ++// ++// This bit is shall be set when an event shall be extended but not logged. ++// ++#define EFI_CC_FLAG_EXTEND_ONLY 0x0000000000000001 ++// ++// This bit shall be set when the intent is to measure a PE/COFF image. ++// ++#define EFI_CC_FLAG_PE_COFF_IMAGE 0x0000000000000010 ++ ++#pragma pack (1) ++ ++#define EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION 1 ++ ++typedef struct { ++ // ++ // Size of the event header itself (sizeof(EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER)). ++ // ++ UINT32 HeaderSize; ++ // ++ // Header version. For this version of this specification, the value shall be 1. ++ // ++ UINT16 HeaderVersion; ++ // ++ // Index of the MR (measurement register) that shall be extended. ++ // ++ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex; ++ // ++ // Type of the event that shall be extended (and optionally logged). ++ // ++ UINT32 EventType; ++} EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER; ++ ++typedef struct { ++ // ++ // Total size of the event including the Size component, the header and the Event data. ++ // ++ UINT32 Size; ++ EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER Header; ++ UINT8 Event[1]; ++} EFI_CC_EVENT; ++ ++#pragma pack() ++ ++typedef struct { ++ // ++ // Allocated size of the structure ++ // ++ UINT8 Size; ++ // ++ // Version of the EFI_CC_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY structure itself. ++ // For this version of the protocol, the Major version shall be set to 1 ++ // and the Minor version shall be set to 0. ++ // ++ EFI_CC_VERSION StructureVersion; ++ // ++ // Version of the EFI CC Measurement protocol. ++ // For this version of the protocol, the Major version shall be set to 1 ++ // and the Minor version shall be set to 0. ++ // ++ EFI_CC_VERSION ProtocolVersion; ++ // ++ // Supported hash algorithms ++ // ++ EFI_CC_EVENT_ALGORITHM_BITMAP HashAlgorithmBitmap; ++ // ++ // Bitmap of supported event log formats ++ // ++ EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_BITMAP SupportedEventLogs; ++ ++ // ++ // Indicates the CC type ++ // ++ EFI_CC_TYPE CcType; ++} EFI_CC_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY; ++ ++/** ++ The EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL GetCapability function call provides protocol ++ capability information and state information. ++ ++ @param[in] This Indicates the calling context ++ @param[in, out] ProtocolCapability The caller allocates memory for a EFI_CC_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY ++ structure and sets the size field to the size of the structure allocated. ++ The callee fills in the fields with the EFI CC BOOT Service capability ++ information and the current CC information. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Operation completed successfully. ++ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The command was unsuccessful. ++ The ProtocolCapability variable will not be populated. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One or more of the parameters are incorrect. ++ The ProtocolCapability variable will not be populated. ++ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The ProtocolCapability variable is too small to hold the full response. ++ It will be partially populated (required Size field will be set). ++**/ ++typedef ++EFI_STATUS ++(EFIAPI *EFI_CC_GET_CAPABILITY)( ++ IN EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN OUT EFI_CC_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY *ProtocolCapability ++ ); ++ ++/** ++ The EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL Get Event Log function call allows a caller to ++ retrieve the address of a given event log and its last entry. ++ ++ @param[in] This Indicates the calling context ++ @param[in] EventLogFormat The type of the event log for which the information is requested. ++ @param[out] EventLogLocation A pointer to the memory address of the event log. ++ @param[out] EventLogLastEntry If the Event Log contains more than one entry, this is a pointer to the ++ address of the start of the last entry in the event log in memory. ++ @param[out] EventLogTruncated If the Event Log is missing at least one entry because an event would ++ have exceeded the area allocated for events, this value is set to TRUE. ++ Otherwise, the value will be FALSE and the Event Log will be complete. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Operation completed successfully. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One or more of the parameters are incorrect ++ (e.g. asking for an event log whose format is not supported). ++**/ ++typedef ++EFI_STATUS ++(EFIAPI *EFI_CC_GET_EVENT_LOG)( ++ IN EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT EventLogFormat, ++ OUT EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS *EventLogLocation, ++ OUT EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS *EventLogLastEntry, ++ OUT BOOLEAN *EventLogTruncated ++ ); ++ ++/** ++ The EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL HashLogExtendEvent function call provides ++ callers with an opportunity to extend and optionally log events without requiring ++ knowledge of actual CC commands. ++ The extend operation will occur even if this function cannot create an event ++ log entry (e.g. due to the event log being full). ++ ++ @param[in] This Indicates the calling context ++ @param[in] Flags Bitmap providing additional information. ++ @param[in] DataToHash Physical address of the start of the data buffer to be hashed. ++ @param[in] DataToHashLen The length in bytes of the buffer referenced by DataToHash. ++ @param[in] EfiCcEvent Pointer to data buffer containing information about the event. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Operation completed successfully. ++ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The command was unsuccessful. ++ @retval EFI_VOLUME_FULL The extend operation occurred, but the event could not be written to one or more event logs. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One or more of the parameters are incorrect. ++ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The PE/COFF image type is not supported. ++**/ ++typedef ++EFI_STATUS ++(EFIAPI *EFI_CC_HASH_LOG_EXTEND_EVENT)( ++ IN EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN UINT64 Flags, ++ IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS DataToHash, ++ IN UINT64 DataToHashLen, ++ IN EFI_CC_EVENT *EfiCcEvent ++ ); ++ ++/** ++ The EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL MapPcrToMrIndex function call provides callers ++ the info on TPM PCR <-> CC MR mapping information. ++ ++ @param[in] This Indicates the calling context ++ @param[in] PcrIndex TPM PCR index. ++ @param[out] MrIndex CC MR index. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The MrIndex is returned. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The MrIndex is NULL. ++ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The PcrIndex is invalid. ++**/ ++typedef ++EFI_STATUS ++(EFIAPI *EFI_CC_MAP_PCR_TO_MR_INDEX)( ++ IN EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN TCG_PCRINDEX PcrIndex, ++ OUT EFI_CC_MR_INDEX *MrIndex ++ ); ++ ++struct _EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL { ++ EFI_CC_GET_CAPABILITY GetCapability; ++ EFI_CC_GET_EVENT_LOG GetEventLog; ++ EFI_CC_HASH_LOG_EXTEND_EVENT HashLogExtendEvent; ++ EFI_CC_MAP_PCR_TO_MR_INDEX MapPcrToMrIndex; ++}; ++ ++// ++// CC event log ++// ++ ++#pragma pack(1) ++ ++// ++// Crypto Agile Log Entry Format. ++// It is similar with TCG_PCR_EVENT2 except the field of MrIndex and PCRIndex. ++// ++typedef struct { ++ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex; ++ UINT32 EventType; ++ TPML_DIGEST_VALUES Digests; ++ UINT32 EventSize; ++ UINT8 Event[1]; ++} CC_EVENT; ++ ++// ++// EFI CC Event Header ++// It is similar with TCG_PCR_EVENT2_HDR except the field of MrIndex and PCRIndex ++// ++typedef struct { ++ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex; ++ UINT32 EventType; ++ TPML_DIGEST_VALUES Digests; ++ UINT32 EventSize; ++} CC_EVENT_HDR; ++ ++#pragma pack() ++ ++// ++// Log entries after Get Event Log service ++// ++ ++#define EFI_CC_FINAL_EVENTS_TABLE_VERSION 1 ++ ++typedef struct { ++ // ++ // The version of this structure. It shall be set to 1. ++ // ++ UINT64 Version; ++ // ++ // Number of events recorded after invocation of GetEventLog API ++ // ++ UINT64 NumberOfEvents; ++ // ++ // List of events of type CC_EVENT. ++ // ++ // CC_EVENT Event[1]; ++} EFI_CC_FINAL_EVENTS_TABLE; ++ ++#define EFI_CC_FINAL_EVENTS_TABLE_GUID \ ++ {0xdd4a4648, 0x2de7, 0x4665, {0x96, 0x4d, 0x21, 0xd9, 0xef, 0x5f, 0xb4, 0x46}} ++ ++extern EFI_GUID gEfiCcFinalEventsTableGuid; ++ ++#endif +diff --git a/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec b/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec +index 8b18415b10..6389a48338 100644 +--- a/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec ++++ b/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec +@@ -823,6 +823,9 @@ + # + gLinuxEfiInitrdMediaGuid = {0x5568e427, 0x68fc, 0x4f3d, {0xac, 0x74, 0xca, 0x55, 0x52, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x68}} + ++ ## Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h ++ gEfiCcFinalEventsTableGuid = { 0xdd4a4648, 0x2de7, 0x4665, { 0x96, 0x4d, 0x21, 0xd9, 0xef, 0x5f, 0xb4, 0x46 }} ++ + [Guids.IA32, Guids.X64] + ## Include/Guid/Cper.h + gEfiIa32X64ErrorTypeCacheCheckGuid = { 0xA55701F5, 0xE3EF, 0x43de, { 0xAC, 0x72, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x3F, 0xAD, 0x2C }} +@@ -1011,6 +1014,9 @@ + ## Include/Protocol/PcdInfo.h + gGetPcdInfoProtocolGuid = { 0x5be40f57, 0xfa68, 0x4610, { 0xbb, 0xbf, 0xe9, 0xc5, 0xfc, 0xda, 0xd3, 0x65 } } + ++ ## Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h ++ gEfiCcMeasurementProtocolGuid = { 0x96751a3d, 0x72f4, 0x41a6, { 0xa7, 0x94, 0xed, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x67, 0xae, 0x6b }} ++ + # + # Protocols defined in PI1.0. + # +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch index e06e6df..b984c70 100644 --- a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch @@ -1,17 +1,16 @@ -From c1fe45c210fc719f1eedc0b02c357b71d6584971 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From aa66757951e9880df4e21e191142400480aa3908 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 10:35:14 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 2/3] NetworkPkg: : Add Unit tests to CI and create Host Test +Subject: [PATCH 15/17] NetworkPkg: : Add Unit tests to CI and create Host Test DSC RH-Author: Jon Maloy -RH-MergeRequest: 51: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch -RH-Jira: RHEL-21993 -RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 50: CVE-2023-45230 and CVE-2023-45229 +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842 RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen -RH-Commit: [2/3] c2b221c465295c93b2a57064bb17aee08400aa52 (jmaloy/jons_fork) +RH-Commit: [2/4] 6669306e2dbb5aa3e7691d57f4a61685b7cd57b2 (jmaloy/jons_fork) -JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21993 +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21842 CVE: CVE-2023-45230 Upstream: Merged diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Adds-a-SecurityFix.yaml-file.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Adds-a-SecurityFix.yaml-file.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c0ae8b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Adds-a-SecurityFix.yaml-file.patch @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +From ffa1202da2f55c1f540240e8267db9a7ec8d6a60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 11/15] NetworkPkg: : Adds a SecurityFix.yaml file + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Commit: [11/15] 8a46b763887843d00293997bdd7d50ea120104d9 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21852 +CVE: CVE-2022-45235 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 1d0b95f6457d225c5108302a9da74b4ed7aa5a38 +Author: Doug Flick via groups.io +Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:57 2024 +0800 + + NetworkPkg: : Adds a SecurityFix.yaml file + + This creates / adds a security file that tracks the security fixes + found in this package and can be used to find the fixes that were + applied. + + Cc: Saloni Kasbekar + Cc: Zachary Clark-williams + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 123 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..7e900483fe +--- /dev/null ++++ b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml +@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ ++## @file ++# Security Fixes for SecurityPkg ++# ++# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation ++# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++## ++CVE_2023_45229: ++ commit_titles: ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Patch" ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Unit Tests" ++ cve: CVE-2023-45229 ++ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC ++ description: "Bug 01 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Out-of-bounds read when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message" ++ note: ++ files_impacted: ++ - NetworkPkg\Dhcp6Dxe\Dhcp6Io.c ++ - NetworkPkg\Dhcp6Dxe\Dhcp6Impl.h ++ links: ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4534 ++ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45229 ++ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2 ++ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html ++ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html ++CVE_2023_45230: ++ commit_titles: ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch" ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Unit Tests" ++ cve: CVE-2023-45230 ++ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC ++ description: "Bug 02 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option" ++ note: ++ files_impacted: ++ - NetworkPkg\Dhcp6Dxe\Dhcp6Io.c ++ - NetworkPkg\Dhcp6Dxe\Dhcp6Impl.h ++ links: ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4535 ++ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45230 ++ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2 ++ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html ++ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html ++CVE_2023_45231: ++ commit_titles: ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Patch" ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Unit Tests" ++ cve: CVE-2023-45231 ++ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC ++ description: "Bug 03 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Out-of-bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options" ++ note: ++ files_impacted: ++ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c ++ links: ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4536 ++ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45231 ++ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2 ++ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html ++ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html ++CVE_2023_45232: ++ commit_titles: ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Patch" ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Unit Tests" ++ cve: CVE-2023-45232 ++ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC ++ description: "Bug 04 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header" ++ note: ++ files_impacted: ++ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c ++ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h ++ links: ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4537 ++ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45232 ++ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2 ++ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html ++ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html ++CVE_2023_45233: ++ commit_titles: ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Patch" ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Unit Tests" ++ cve: CVE-2023-45233 ++ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC ++ description: "Bug 05 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header " ++ note: This was fixed along with CVE-2023-45233 ++ files_impacted: ++ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c ++ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h ++ links: ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4538 ++ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45233 ++ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2 ++ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html ++ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html ++CVE_2023_45234: ++ commit_titles: ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234 Patch" ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234 Unit Tests" ++ cve: CVE-2023-45234 ++ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC ++ description: "Bug 06 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message" ++ note: ++ files_impacted: ++ - NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c ++ links: ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4539 ++ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45234 ++ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2 ++ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html ++ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html ++CVE_2023_45235: ++ commit_titles: ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Patch" ++ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Unit Tests" ++ cve: CVE-2023-45235 ++ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC ++ description: "Bug 07 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message" ++ note: ++ files_impacted: ++ - NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c ++ - NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h ++ links: ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4540 ++ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45235 ++ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2 ++ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html ++ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes-p2.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes-p2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d51d127 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes-p2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2054 @@ +From f7e6d9e61173d76ab9827e1af62dc9966a21e14c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 17:28:51 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 12/15] NetworkPkg: Apply uncrustify changes + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Commit: [12/15] 880596c246c87181f19fcb0a7a21f4e32d234c13 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21840 +CVE: CVE-2022-45229 +Upstream: Merged +Conflicts: There has already been added two commits after the point where + this commit was added upstream, so we cannot apply that commit, + or even parts of it, directly. Instead, we only introduce the + whitespace changes needed to make future commits touching + the file NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c apply cleanly. + +commit d1050b9dff1cace252aff86630bfdb59dff5f507 +Author: Michael Kubacki +Date: Sun Dec 5 14:54:07 2021 -0800 + + NetworkPkg: Apply uncrustify changes + + REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3737 + + Apply uncrustify changes to .c/.h files in the NetworkPkg package + + Cc: Andrew Fish + Cc: Leif Lindholm + Cc: Michael D Kinney + Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki + Reviewed-by: Maciej Rabeda + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c | 1091 ++++++++++++++++----------------- + 1 file changed, 529 insertions(+), 562 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c +index d680febbf1..3b8feb4a20 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c +@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ + + #include "Dhcp6Impl.h" + +- + /** + Enqueue the packet into the retry list in case of timeout. + +@@ -34,8 +33,8 @@ Dhcp6EnqueueRetry ( + IN EFI_DHCP6_RETRANSMISSION *RetryCtl OPTIONAL + ) + { +- DHCP6_TX_CB *TxCb; +- DHCP6_IA_CB *IaCb; ++ DHCP6_TX_CB *TxCb; ++ DHCP6_IA_CB *IaCb; + + ASSERT (Packet != NULL); + +@@ -55,156 +54,156 @@ Dhcp6EnqueueRetry ( + // + // Save pointer to elapsed-time value so we can update it on retransmits. + // +- TxCb->Elapsed = Elapsed; ++ TxCb->Elapsed = Elapsed; + + // + // Calculate the retransmission according to the message type. + // + switch (Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType) { +- case Dhcp6MsgSolicit: +- // +- // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for solicit packet. +- // Use the default value by rfc-3315 if user doesn't configure. +- // +- if (RetryCtl == NULL) { +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_SOL_IRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_SOL_MRC; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_SOL_MRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = DHCP6_SOL_MRD; +- } else { +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = (RetryCtl->Irt != 0) ? RetryCtl->Irt : DHCP6_SOL_IRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = (RetryCtl->Mrc != 0) ? RetryCtl->Mrc : DHCP6_SOL_MRC; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = (RetryCtl->Mrt != 0) ? RetryCtl->Mrt : DHCP6_SOL_MRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = (RetryCtl->Mrd != 0) ? RetryCtl->Mrd : DHCP6_SOL_MRD; +- } ++ case Dhcp6MsgSolicit: ++ // ++ // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for solicit packet. ++ // Use the default value by rfc-3315 if user doesn't configure. ++ // ++ if (RetryCtl == NULL) { ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_SOL_IRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_SOL_MRC; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_SOL_MRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = DHCP6_SOL_MRD; ++ } else { ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = (RetryCtl->Irt != 0) ? RetryCtl->Irt : DHCP6_SOL_IRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = (RetryCtl->Mrc != 0) ? RetryCtl->Mrc : DHCP6_SOL_MRC; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = (RetryCtl->Mrt != 0) ? RetryCtl->Mrt : DHCP6_SOL_MRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = (RetryCtl->Mrd != 0) ? RetryCtl->Mrd : DHCP6_SOL_MRD; ++ } ++ ++ TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, ++ TRUE, ++ FALSE ++ ); ++ break; + +- TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( ++ case Dhcp6MsgRequest: ++ // ++ // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for request packet. ++ // ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_REQ_IRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_REQ_MRC; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_REQ_MRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = DHCP6_REQ_MRD; ++ TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( + TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, + TRUE, +- FALSE ++ TRUE + ); +- break; +- +- case Dhcp6MsgRequest: +- // +- // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for request packet. +- // +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_REQ_IRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_REQ_MRC; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_REQ_MRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = DHCP6_REQ_MRD; +- TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, +- TRUE, +- TRUE +- ); +- break; +- +- case Dhcp6MsgConfirm: +- // +- // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for confirm packet. +- // +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_CNF_IRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_CNF_MRC; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_CNF_MRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = DHCP6_CNF_MRD; +- TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, +- TRUE, +- TRUE +- ); +- break; +- +- case Dhcp6MsgRenew: +- // +- // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for renew packet. +- // +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_REB_IRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_REB_MRC; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_REB_MRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = IaCb->T2 - IaCb->T1; +- TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, +- TRUE, +- TRUE +- ); +- break; ++ break; + +- case Dhcp6MsgRebind: +- // +- // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for rebind packet. +- // +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_REN_IRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_REN_MRC; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_REN_MRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = IaCb->AllExpireTime - IaCb->T2; +- TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, +- TRUE, +- TRUE +- ); +- break; ++ case Dhcp6MsgConfirm: ++ // ++ // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for confirm packet. ++ // ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_CNF_IRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_CNF_MRC; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_CNF_MRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = DHCP6_CNF_MRD; ++ TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, ++ TRUE, ++ TRUE ++ ); ++ break; + +- case Dhcp6MsgDecline: +- // +- // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for decline packet. +- // +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_DEC_IRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_DEC_MRC; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_DEC_MRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = DHCP6_DEC_MRD; +- TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, +- TRUE, +- TRUE +- ); +- break; ++ case Dhcp6MsgRenew: ++ // ++ // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for renew packet. ++ // ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_REB_IRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_REB_MRC; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_REB_MRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = IaCb->T2 - IaCb->T1; ++ TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, ++ TRUE, ++ TRUE ++ ); ++ break; + +- case Dhcp6MsgRelease: +- // +- // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for release packet. +- // +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_REL_IRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_REL_MRC; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_REL_MRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = DHCP6_REL_MRD; +- TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, +- TRUE, +- TRUE +- ); +- break; ++ case Dhcp6MsgRebind: ++ // ++ // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for rebind packet. ++ // ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_REN_IRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_REN_MRC; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_REN_MRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = IaCb->AllExpireTime - IaCb->T2; ++ TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, ++ TRUE, ++ TRUE ++ ); ++ break; + +- case Dhcp6MsgInfoRequest: +- // +- // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for info-request packet. +- // Use the default value by rfc-3315 if user doesn't configure. +- // +- if (RetryCtl == NULL) { +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_INF_IRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_INF_MRC; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_INF_MRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = DHCP6_INF_MRD; +- } else { +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = (RetryCtl->Irt != 0) ? RetryCtl->Irt : DHCP6_INF_IRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = (RetryCtl->Mrc != 0) ? RetryCtl->Mrc : DHCP6_INF_MRC; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = (RetryCtl->Mrt != 0) ? RetryCtl->Mrt : DHCP6_INF_MRT; +- TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = (RetryCtl->Mrd != 0) ? RetryCtl->Mrd : DHCP6_INF_MRD; +- } ++ case Dhcp6MsgDecline: ++ // ++ // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for decline packet. ++ // ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_DEC_IRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_DEC_MRC; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_DEC_MRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = DHCP6_DEC_MRD; ++ TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, ++ TRUE, ++ TRUE ++ ); ++ break; + +- TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( ++ case Dhcp6MsgRelease: ++ // ++ // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for release packet. ++ // ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_REL_IRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_REL_MRC; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_REL_MRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = DHCP6_REL_MRD; ++ TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( + TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, + TRUE, + TRUE + ); +- break; ++ break; + +- default: +- // +- // Unexpected message type. +- // +- FreePool(TxCb); +- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ case Dhcp6MsgInfoRequest: ++ // ++ // Calculate the retransmission threshold value for info-request packet. ++ // Use the default value by rfc-3315 if user doesn't configure. ++ // ++ if (RetryCtl == NULL) { ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = DHCP6_INF_IRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = DHCP6_INF_MRC; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = DHCP6_INF_MRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = DHCP6_INF_MRD; ++ } else { ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt = (RetryCtl->Irt != 0) ? RetryCtl->Irt : DHCP6_INF_IRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc = (RetryCtl->Mrc != 0) ? RetryCtl->Mrc : DHCP6_INF_MRC; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt = (RetryCtl->Mrt != 0) ? RetryCtl->Mrt : DHCP6_INF_MRT; ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd = (RetryCtl->Mrd != 0) ? RetryCtl->Mrd : DHCP6_INF_MRD; ++ } ++ ++ TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( ++ TxCb->RetryCtl.Irt, ++ TRUE, ++ TRUE ++ ); ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ // ++ // Unexpected message type. ++ // ++ FreePool (TxCb); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + + // +@@ -215,7 +214,6 @@ Dhcp6EnqueueRetry ( + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +- + /** + Dequeue the packet from retry list if reply received or timeout at last. + +@@ -230,40 +228,36 @@ Dhcp6EnqueueRetry ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6DequeueRetry ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN UINT32 PacketXid, +- IN BOOLEAN NeedSignal ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINT32 PacketXid, ++ IN BOOLEAN NeedSignal + ) + { +- LIST_ENTRY *Entry; +- LIST_ENTRY *NextEntry; +- DHCP6_TX_CB *TxCb; +- DHCP6_INF_CB *InfCb; ++ LIST_ENTRY *Entry; ++ LIST_ENTRY *NextEntry; ++ DHCP6_TX_CB *TxCb; ++ DHCP6_INF_CB *InfCb; + + // + // Seek the retransmit node in the retransmit list by packet xid. + // + NET_LIST_FOR_EACH_SAFE (Entry, NextEntry, &Instance->TxList) { +- + TxCb = NET_LIST_USER_STRUCT (Entry, DHCP6_TX_CB, Link); +- ASSERT(TxCb->TxPacket); ++ ASSERT (TxCb->TxPacket); + + if (TxCb->Xid == PacketXid) { +- + if (TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgInfoRequest) { +- + // + // Seek the info-request node in the info-request list by packet xid. + // + NET_LIST_FOR_EACH_SAFE (Entry, NextEntry, &Instance->InfList) { +- + InfCb = NET_LIST_USER_STRUCT (Entry, DHCP6_INF_CB, Link); + + if (InfCb->Xid == PacketXid) { + // + // Remove the info-request node, and signal the event if timeout. + // +- if (InfCb->TimeoutEvent != NULL && NeedSignal) { ++ if ((InfCb->TimeoutEvent != NULL) && NeedSignal) { + gBS->SignalEvent (InfCb->TimeoutEvent); + } + +@@ -272,11 +266,12 @@ Dhcp6DequeueRetry ( + } + } + } ++ + // + // Remove the retransmit node. + // + RemoveEntryList (&TxCb->Link); +- ASSERT(TxCb->TxPacket); ++ ASSERT (TxCb->TxPacket); + FreePool (TxCb->TxPacket); + FreePool (TxCb); + return EFI_SUCCESS; +@@ -286,7 +281,6 @@ Dhcp6DequeueRetry ( + return EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } + +- + /** + Clean up the specific nodes in the retry list. + +@@ -296,24 +290,22 @@ Dhcp6DequeueRetry ( + **/ + VOID + Dhcp6CleanupRetry ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN UINT32 Scope ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINT32 Scope + ) + { +- LIST_ENTRY *Entry; +- LIST_ENTRY *NextEntry; +- DHCP6_TX_CB *TxCb; +- DHCP6_INF_CB *InfCb; ++ LIST_ENTRY *Entry; ++ LIST_ENTRY *NextEntry; ++ DHCP6_TX_CB *TxCb; ++ DHCP6_INF_CB *InfCb; + + // + // Clean up all the stateful messages from the retransmit list. + // +- if (Scope == DHCP6_PACKET_STATEFUL || Scope == DHCP6_PACKET_ALL) { +- ++ if ((Scope == DHCP6_PACKET_STATEFUL) || (Scope == DHCP6_PACKET_ALL)) { + NET_LIST_FOR_EACH_SAFE (Entry, NextEntry, &Instance->TxList) { +- + TxCb = NET_LIST_USER_STRUCT (Entry, DHCP6_TX_CB, Link); +- ASSERT(TxCb->TxPacket); ++ ASSERT (TxCb->TxPacket); + + if (TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType != Dhcp6MsgInfoRequest) { + RemoveEntryList (&TxCb->Link); +@@ -326,15 +318,13 @@ Dhcp6CleanupRetry ( + // + // Clean up all the stateless messages from the retransmit list. + // +- if (Scope == DHCP6_PACKET_STATELESS || Scope == DHCP6_PACKET_ALL) { +- ++ if ((Scope == DHCP6_PACKET_STATELESS) || (Scope == DHCP6_PACKET_ALL)) { + // + // Clean up all the retransmit list for stateless messages. + // + NET_LIST_FOR_EACH_SAFE (Entry, NextEntry, &Instance->TxList) { +- + TxCb = NET_LIST_USER_STRUCT (Entry, DHCP6_TX_CB, Link); +- ASSERT(TxCb->TxPacket); ++ ASSERT (TxCb->TxPacket); + + if (TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgInfoRequest) { + RemoveEntryList (&TxCb->Link); +@@ -347,12 +337,12 @@ Dhcp6CleanupRetry ( + // Clean up all the info-request messages list. + // + NET_LIST_FOR_EACH_SAFE (Entry, NextEntry, &Instance->InfList) { +- + InfCb = NET_LIST_USER_STRUCT (Entry, DHCP6_INF_CB, Link); + + if (InfCb->TimeoutEvent != NULL) { + gBS->SignalEvent (InfCb->TimeoutEvent); + } ++ + RemoveEntryList (&InfCb->Link); + FreePool (InfCb); + } +@@ -371,11 +361,11 @@ Dhcp6CleanupRetry ( + **/ + BOOLEAN + Dhcp6IsValidTxCb ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN DHCP6_TX_CB *TxCb ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN DHCP6_TX_CB *TxCb + ) + { +- LIST_ENTRY *Entry; ++ LIST_ENTRY *Entry; + + NET_LIST_FOR_EACH (Entry, &Instance->TxList) { + if (TxCb == NET_LIST_USER_STRUCT (Entry, DHCP6_TX_CB, Link)) { +@@ -395,15 +385,15 @@ Dhcp6IsValidTxCb ( + **/ + VOID + Dhcp6CleanupSession ( +- IN OUT DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN EFI_STATUS Status ++ IN OUT DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_STATUS Status + ) + { +- UINTN Index; +- EFI_DHCP6_IA *Ia; ++ UINTN Index; ++ EFI_DHCP6_IA *Ia; + +- ASSERT(Instance->Config); +- ASSERT(Instance->IaCb.Ia); ++ ASSERT (Instance->Config); ++ ASSERT (Instance->IaCb.Ia); + + // + // Clean up the retransmit list for stateful messages. +@@ -425,23 +415,23 @@ Dhcp6CleanupSession ( + // + // Reinitialize the Ia fields of the instance. + // +- Instance->UdpSts = Status; +- Instance->AdSelect = NULL; +- Instance->AdPref = 0; +- Instance->Unicast = NULL; +- Instance->IaCb.T1 = 0; +- Instance->IaCb.T2 = 0; +- Instance->IaCb.AllExpireTime = 0; +- Instance->IaCb.LeaseTime = 0; ++ Instance->UdpSts = Status; ++ Instance->AdSelect = NULL; ++ Instance->AdPref = 0; ++ Instance->Unicast = NULL; ++ Instance->IaCb.T1 = 0; ++ Instance->IaCb.T2 = 0; ++ Instance->IaCb.AllExpireTime = 0; ++ Instance->IaCb.LeaseTime = 0; + + // + // Clear start time + // +- Instance->StartTime = 0; ++ Instance->StartTime = 0; + +- Ia = Instance->IaCb.Ia; +- Ia->State = Dhcp6Init; +- Ia->ReplyPacket = NULL; ++ Ia = Instance->IaCb.Ia; ++ Ia->State = Dhcp6Init; ++ Ia->ReplyPacket = NULL; + + // + // Set the addresses as zero lifetime, and then the notify +@@ -461,7 +451,6 @@ Dhcp6CleanupSession ( + } + } + +- + /** + Callback to user when Dhcp6 transmit/receive occurs. + +@@ -477,15 +466,15 @@ Dhcp6CleanupSession ( + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + Dhcp6CallbackUser ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN EFI_DHCP6_EVENT Event, +- IN OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET **Packet ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_DHCP6_EVENT Event, ++ IN OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET **Packet + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *NewPacket; +- EFI_DHCP6_CALLBACK Callback; +- VOID *Context; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *NewPacket; ++ EFI_DHCP6_CALLBACK Callback; ++ VOID *Context; + + ASSERT (Packet != NULL); + ASSERT (Instance->Config != NULL); +@@ -500,7 +489,6 @@ Dhcp6CallbackUser ( + // Callback to user with the new message if has. + // + if (Callback != NULL) { +- + Status = Callback ( + &Instance->Dhcp6, + Context, +@@ -522,7 +510,6 @@ Dhcp6CallbackUser ( + return Status; + } + +- + /** + Update Ia according to the new reply message. + +@@ -535,17 +522,17 @@ Dhcp6CallbackUser ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( +- IN OUT DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet ++ IN OUT DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- UINT8 *Option; +- UINT8 *IaInnerOpt; +- UINT16 IaInnerLen; +- UINT16 StsCode; +- UINT32 T1; +- UINT32 T2; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINT8 *Option; ++ UINT8 *IaInnerOpt; ++ UINT16 IaInnerLen; ++ UINT16 StsCode; ++ UINT32 T1; ++ UINT32 T2; + + ASSERT (Instance->Config != NULL); + // +@@ -618,9 +605,10 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + // and both T1 and T2 are greater than 0, the client discards the IA_NA option and processes + // the remainder of the message as though the server had not included the invalid IA_NA option. + // +- if (T1 > T2 && T2 > 0) { ++ if ((T1 > T2) && (T2 > 0)) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } ++ + IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option); + IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2); + } else { +@@ -674,8 +662,6 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + return Status; + } + +- +- + /** + Seeks the Inner Options from a DHCP6 Option + +@@ -772,9 +758,9 @@ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet, +- OUT UINT8 **Option ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet, ++ OUT UINT8 **Option + ) + { + UINT8 *IaInnerOpt; +@@ -830,7 +816,7 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + // IA option to the end of the DHCP6 option area, thus subtract the space + // up until this option + // +- OptionLen = OptionLen - (*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option); ++ OptionLen = OptionLen - (UINT32)(*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option); + + // + // Seek the inner option +@@ -867,7 +853,7 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + // + // sizeof (option-code + option-len) = 4 + // +- *Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (IaInnerOpt, IaInnerLen, Dhcp6OptStatusCode); ++ *Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (IaInnerOpt, IaInnerLen, Dhcp6OptStatusCode); + if (*Option != NULL) { + StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)((DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (*Option))))); + if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) { +@@ -878,7 +864,6 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +- + /** + Transmit Dhcp6 message by udpio. + +@@ -893,23 +878,23 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6TransmitPacket ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet, +- IN UINT16 *Elapsed ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet, ++ IN UINT16 *Elapsed + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- NET_BUF *Wrap; +- NET_FRAGMENT Frag; +- UDP_END_POINT EndPt; +- DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ NET_BUF *Wrap; ++ NET_FRAGMENT Frag; ++ UDP_END_POINT EndPt; ++ DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; + + Service = Instance->Service; + + // + // Wrap it into a netbuf then send it. + // +- Frag.Bulk = (UINT8 *) &Packet->Dhcp6.Header; ++ Frag.Bulk = (UINT8 *)&Packet->Dhcp6.Header; + Frag.Len = Packet->Length; + + // +@@ -970,7 +955,6 @@ Dhcp6TransmitPacket ( + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +- + /** + Create the solicit message and send it. + +@@ -983,19 +967,19 @@ Dhcp6TransmitPacket ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6SendSolicitMsg ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *UserOpt; +- EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; +- DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; +- UINT8 *Cursor; +- UINT16 *Elapsed; +- UINT32 UserLen; +- UINTN Index; +- UINT16 Length; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *UserOpt; ++ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; ++ DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; ++ UINT8 *Cursor; ++ UINT16 *Elapsed; ++ UINT32 UserLen; ++ UINTN Index; ++ UINT16 Length; + + Service = Instance->Service; + ClientId = Service->ClientId; +@@ -1069,7 +1053,6 @@ Dhcp6SendSolicitMsg ( + // Append user-defined when configurate Dhcp6 service. + // + for (Index = 0; Index < Instance->Config->OptionCount; Index++) { +- + UserOpt = Instance->Config->OptionList[Index]; + Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( + Packet, +@@ -1139,17 +1122,16 @@ ON_ERROR: + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6InitSolicitMsg ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance + ) + { +- Instance->IaCb.T1 = 0; +- Instance->IaCb.T2 = 0; ++ Instance->IaCb.T1 = 0; ++ Instance->IaCb.T2 = 0; + Instance->IaCb.Ia->IaAddressCount = 0; + + return Dhcp6SendSolicitMsg (Instance); + } + +- + /** + Create the request message and send it. + +@@ -1163,31 +1145,31 @@ Dhcp6InitSolicitMsg ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6SendRequestMsg ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *UserOpt; +- EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; +- EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ServerId; +- DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; +- UINT8 *Option; +- UINT8 *Cursor; +- UINT16 *Elapsed; +- UINT32 UserLen; +- UINTN Index; +- UINT16 Length; +- +- ASSERT(Instance->AdSelect != NULL); +- ASSERT(Instance->Config != NULL); +- ASSERT(Instance->IaCb.Ia != NULL); +- ASSERT(Instance->Service != NULL); ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *UserOpt; ++ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; ++ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ServerId; ++ DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; ++ UINT8 *Option; ++ UINT8 *Cursor; ++ UINT16 *Elapsed; ++ UINT32 UserLen; ++ UINTN Index; ++ UINT16 Length; ++ ++ ASSERT (Instance->AdSelect != NULL); ++ ASSERT (Instance->Config != NULL); ++ ASSERT (Instance->IaCb.Ia != NULL); ++ ASSERT (Instance->Service != NULL); + + Service = Instance->Service; + ClientId = Service->ClientId; + +- ASSERT(ClientId != NULL); ++ ASSERT (ClientId != NULL); + + // + // Get the server Id from the selected advertisement message. +@@ -1201,7 +1183,7 @@ Dhcp6SendRequestMsg ( + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +- ServerId = (EFI_DHCP6_DUID *) (Option + 2); ++ ServerId = (EFI_DHCP6_DUID *)(Option + 2); + + // + // Calculate the added length of customized option list. +@@ -1279,7 +1261,6 @@ Dhcp6SendRequestMsg ( + // Append user-defined when configurate Dhcp6 service. + // + for (Index = 0; Index < Instance->Config->OptionCount; Index++) { +- + UserOpt = Instance->Config->OptionList[Index]; + Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( + Packet, +@@ -1334,7 +1315,6 @@ ON_ERROR: + return Status; + } + +- + /** + Create the decline message and send it. + +@@ -1349,20 +1329,20 @@ ON_ERROR: + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6SendDeclineMsg ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN EFI_DHCP6_IA *DecIa ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_DHCP6_IA *DecIa + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *LastReply; +- EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; +- EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ServerId; +- DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; +- UINT8 *Option; +- UINT8 *Cursor; +- UINT16 *Elapsed; +- UINT16 Length; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *LastReply; ++ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; ++ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ServerId; ++ DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; ++ UINT8 *Option; ++ UINT8 *Cursor; ++ UINT16 *Elapsed; ++ UINT16 Length; + + ASSERT (Instance->Config != NULL); + ASSERT (Instance->IaCb.Ia != NULL); +@@ -1390,7 +1370,7 @@ Dhcp6SendDeclineMsg ( + // + // EFI_DHCP6_DUID contains a length field of 2 bytes. + // +- ServerId = (EFI_DHCP6_DUID *) (Option + 2); ++ ServerId = (EFI_DHCP6_DUID *)(Option + 2); + + // + // Create the Dhcp6 packet and initialize common fields. +@@ -1495,7 +1475,6 @@ ON_ERROR: + return Status; + } + +- + /** + Create the release message and send it. + +@@ -1510,30 +1489,30 @@ ON_ERROR: + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6SendReleaseMsg ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN EFI_DHCP6_IA *RelIa ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_DHCP6_IA *RelIa + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *LastReply; +- EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; +- EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ServerId; +- DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; +- UINT8 *Option; +- UINT8 *Cursor; +- UINT16 *Elapsed; +- UINT16 Length; +- +- ASSERT(Instance->Config); +- ASSERT(Instance->IaCb.Ia); ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *LastReply; ++ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; ++ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ServerId; ++ DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; ++ UINT8 *Option; ++ UINT8 *Cursor; ++ UINT16 *Elapsed; ++ UINT16 Length; ++ ++ ASSERT (Instance->Config); ++ ASSERT (Instance->IaCb.Ia); + + Service = Instance->Service; + ClientId = Service->ClientId; + LastReply = Instance->IaCb.Ia->ReplyPacket; + +- ASSERT(ClientId); +- ASSERT(LastReply); ++ ASSERT (ClientId); ++ ASSERT (LastReply); + + // + // Get the server Id from the last reply message. +@@ -1547,7 +1526,7 @@ Dhcp6SendReleaseMsg ( + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +- ServerId = (EFI_DHCP6_DUID *) (Option + 2); ++ ServerId = (EFI_DHCP6_DUID *)(Option + 2); + + // + // Create the Dhcp6 packet and initialize common fields. +@@ -1651,7 +1630,6 @@ ON_ERROR: + return Status; + } + +- + /** + Create the renew/rebind message and send it. + +@@ -1667,33 +1645,33 @@ ON_ERROR: + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN BOOLEAN RebindRequest ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN BOOLEAN RebindRequest + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *LastReply; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *UserOpt; +- EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; +- EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ServerId; +- EFI_DHCP6_STATE State; +- EFI_DHCP6_EVENT Event; +- DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; +- UINT8 *Option; +- UINT8 *Cursor; +- UINT16 *Elapsed; +- UINT32 UserLen; +- UINTN Index; +- UINT16 Length; +- +- ASSERT(Instance->Config); +- ASSERT(Instance->IaCb.Ia); ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *LastReply; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *UserOpt; ++ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; ++ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ServerId; ++ EFI_DHCP6_STATE State; ++ EFI_DHCP6_EVENT Event; ++ DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; ++ UINT8 *Option; ++ UINT8 *Cursor; ++ UINT16 *Elapsed; ++ UINT32 UserLen; ++ UINTN Index; ++ UINT16 Length; + +- Service = Instance->Service; +- ClientId = Service->ClientId; ++ ASSERT (Instance->Config); ++ ASSERT (Instance->IaCb.Ia); + +- ASSERT(ClientId); ++ Service = Instance->Service; ++ ClientId = Service->ClientId; ++ ++ ASSERT (ClientId); + + // + // Calculate the added length of customized option list. +@@ -1774,7 +1752,7 @@ Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg ( + goto ON_ERROR; + } + +- ServerId = (EFI_DHCP6_DUID *) (Option + 2); ++ ServerId = (EFI_DHCP6_DUID *)(Option + 2); + + Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( + Packet, +@@ -1792,7 +1770,6 @@ Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg ( + // Append user-defined when configurate Dhcp6 service. + // + for (Index = 0; Index < Instance->Config->OptionCount; Index++) { +- + UserOpt = Instance->Config->OptionList[Index]; + Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( + Packet, +@@ -1811,8 +1788,8 @@ Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg ( + // + // Callback to user with the packet to be sent and check the user's feedback. + // +- State = (RebindRequest) ? Dhcp6Rebinding : Dhcp6Renewing; +- Event = (RebindRequest) ? Dhcp6EnterRebinding : Dhcp6EnterRenewing; ++ State = (RebindRequest) ? Dhcp6Rebinding : Dhcp6Renewing; ++ Event = (RebindRequest) ? Dhcp6EnterRebinding : Dhcp6EnterRenewing; + + Status = Dhcp6CallbackUser (Instance, Event, &Packet); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +@@ -1885,19 +1862,19 @@ Dhcp6StartInfoRequest ( + IN VOID *CallbackContext OPTIONAL + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- DHCP6_INF_CB *InfCb; +- DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; +- EFI_TPL OldTpl; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ DHCP6_INF_CB *InfCb; ++ DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; ++ EFI_TPL OldTpl; + +- Service = Instance->Service; ++ Service = Instance->Service; + +- OldTpl = gBS->RaiseTPL (TPL_CALLBACK); ++ OldTpl = gBS->RaiseTPL (TPL_CALLBACK); + Instance->UdpSts = EFI_ALREADY_STARTED; + // + // Create and initialize the control block for the info-request. + // +- InfCb = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof(DHCP6_INF_CB)); ++ InfCb = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (DHCP6_INF_CB)); + + if (InfCb == NULL) { + gBS->RestoreTPL (OldTpl); +@@ -1930,7 +1907,7 @@ Dhcp6StartInfoRequest ( + // + // Register receive callback for the stateless exchange process. + // +- Status = UdpIoRecvDatagram( ++ Status = UdpIoRecvDatagram ( + Service->UdpIo, + Dhcp6ReceivePacket, + Service, +@@ -1981,24 +1958,24 @@ Dhcp6SendInfoRequestMsg ( + IN EFI_DHCP6_RETRANSMISSION *Retransmission + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *UserOpt; +- EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; +- DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; +- UINT8 *Cursor; +- UINT16 *Elapsed; +- UINT32 UserLen; +- UINTN Index; +- UINT16 Length; +- +- ASSERT(OptionRequest); ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *UserOpt; ++ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; ++ DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; ++ UINT8 *Cursor; ++ UINT16 *Elapsed; ++ UINT32 UserLen; ++ UINTN Index; ++ UINT16 Length; ++ ++ ASSERT (OptionRequest); + + Service = Instance->Service; + ClientId = Service->ClientId; + UserLen = NTOHS (OptionRequest->OpLen) + 4; + +- ASSERT(ClientId); ++ ASSERT (ClientId); + + // + // Calculate the added length of customized option list. +@@ -2021,7 +1998,7 @@ Dhcp6SendInfoRequestMsg ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType = Dhcp6MsgInfoRequest; + Packet->Dhcp6.Header.TransactionId = Service->Xid++; + +- InfCb->Xid = Packet->Dhcp6.Header.TransactionId; ++ InfCb->Xid = Packet->Dhcp6.Header.TransactionId; + + // + // Assembly Dhcp6 options for info-request message. +@@ -2067,7 +2044,6 @@ Dhcp6SendInfoRequestMsg ( + // Append user-defined when configurate Dhcp6 service. + // + for (Index = 0; Index < OptionCount; Index++) { +- + UserOpt = OptionList[Index]; + Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( + Packet, +@@ -2110,7 +2086,6 @@ ON_ERROR: + return Status; + } + +- + /** + Create the Confirm message and send it. + +@@ -2124,19 +2099,19 @@ ON_ERROR: + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6SendConfirmMsg ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance + ) + { +- UINT8 *Cursor; +- UINTN Index; +- UINT16 Length; +- UINT32 UserLen; +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; +- EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *UserOpt; +- UINT16 *Elapsed; ++ UINT8 *Cursor; ++ UINTN Index; ++ UINT16 Length; ++ UINT32 UserLen; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; ++ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *UserOpt; ++ UINT16 *Elapsed; + + ASSERT (Instance->Config != NULL); + ASSERT (Instance->IaCb.Ia != NULL); +@@ -2263,8 +2238,6 @@ ON_ERROR: + return Status; + } + +- +- + /** + Handle with the Dhcp6 reply message. + +@@ -2279,13 +2252,13 @@ ON_ERROR: + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- UINT8 *Option; +- UINT16 StsCode; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINT8 *Option; ++ UINT16 StsCode; + + ASSERT (Instance->Config != NULL); + ASSERT (Instance->IaCb.Ia != NULL); +@@ -2310,7 +2283,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg ( + Dhcp6OptRapidCommit + ); + +- if ((Option != NULL && !Instance->Config->RapidCommit) || (Option == NULL && Instance->Config->RapidCommit)) { ++ if (((Option != NULL) && !Instance->Config->RapidCommit) || ((Option == NULL) && Instance->Config->RapidCommit)) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +@@ -2318,11 +2291,11 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg ( + // As to a valid reply packet in response to a request/renew/rebind packet, + // ignore the packet if not contains the Ia option + // +- if (Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Requesting || +- Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Renewing || +- Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Rebinding +- ) { +- ++ if ((Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Requesting) || ++ (Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Renewing) || ++ (Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Rebinding) ++ ) ++ { + Option = Dhcp6SeekIaOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, + Packet->Length, +@@ -2347,10 +2320,9 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg ( + // the client considers the decline/release event completed regardless of the + // status code. + // +- if (Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Declining || Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Releasing) { +- ++ if ((Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Declining) || (Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Releasing)) { + if (Instance->IaCb.Ia->IaAddressCount != 0) { +- Instance->IaCb.Ia->State = Dhcp6Bound; ++ Instance->IaCb.Ia->State = Dhcp6Bound; + } else { + ASSERT (Instance->IaCb.Ia->ReplyPacket); + FreePool (Instance->IaCb.Ia->ReplyPacket); +@@ -2373,7 +2345,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg ( + // + // Reset start time for next exchange. + // +- Instance->StartTime = 0; ++ Instance->StartTime = 0; + + Status = EFI_SUCCESS; + goto ON_EXIT; +@@ -2400,7 +2372,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg ( + // + // Reset start time for next exchange. + // +- Instance->StartTime = 0; ++ Instance->StartTime = 0; + + // + // Set bound state and store the reply packet. +@@ -2423,7 +2395,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg ( + // + // For sync, set the success flag out of polling in start/renewrebind. + // +- Instance->UdpSts = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ Instance->UdpSts = EFI_SUCCESS; + + // + // Maybe this is a new round DHCP process due to some reason, such as NotOnLink +@@ -2449,70 +2421,72 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg ( + } + + goto ON_EXIT; +- + } else if (Option != NULL) { + // + // Any error status code option is found. + // + StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)((DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (Option))))); + switch (StsCode) { +- case Dhcp6StsUnspecFail: +- // +- // It indicates the server is unable to process the message due to an +- // unspecified failure condition, so just retry if possible. +- // +- break; +- +- case Dhcp6StsUseMulticast: +- // +- // It indicates the server receives a message via unicast from a client +- // to which the server has not sent a unicast option, so retry it by +- // multi-cast address. +- // +- if (Instance->Unicast != NULL) { +- FreePool (Instance->Unicast); +- Instance->Unicast = NULL; +- } +- break; +- +- case Dhcp6StsNotOnLink: +- if (Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Confirming) { ++ case Dhcp6StsUnspecFail: + // +- // Before initiate new round DHCP, cache the current IA. ++ // It indicates the server is unable to process the message due to an ++ // unspecified failure condition, so just retry if possible. + // +- Status = Dhcp6CacheIa (Instance); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- return Status; +- } ++ break; + ++ case Dhcp6StsUseMulticast: + // +- // Restart S.A.R.R process to acquire new address. ++ // It indicates the server receives a message via unicast from a client ++ // to which the server has not sent a unicast option, so retry it by ++ // multi-cast address. + // +- Status = Dhcp6InitSolicitMsg (Instance); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- return Status; ++ if (Instance->Unicast != NULL) { ++ FreePool (Instance->Unicast); ++ Instance->Unicast = NULL; + } +- } +- break; + +- case Dhcp6StsNoBinding: +- if (Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Renewing || Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Rebinding) { +- // +- // Refer to RFC3315 Chapter 18.1.8, for each IA in the original Renew or Rebind message, the client +- // sends a Request message if the IA contained a Status Code option with the NoBinding status. +- // +- Status = Dhcp6SendRequestMsg(Instance); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- return Status; ++ break; ++ ++ case Dhcp6StsNotOnLink: ++ if (Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Confirming) { ++ // ++ // Before initiate new round DHCP, cache the current IA. ++ // ++ Status = Dhcp6CacheIa (Instance); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return Status; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Restart S.A.R.R process to acquire new address. ++ // ++ Status = Dhcp6InitSolicitMsg (Instance); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return Status; ++ } + } +- } +- break; + +- default: +- // +- // The other status code, just restart solicitation. +- // +- break; ++ break; ++ ++ case Dhcp6StsNoBinding: ++ if ((Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Renewing) || (Instance->IaCb.Ia->State == Dhcp6Rebinding)) { ++ // ++ // Refer to RFC3315 Chapter 18.1.8, for each IA in the original Renew or Rebind message, the client ++ // sends a Request message if the IA contained a Status Code option with the NoBinding status. ++ // ++ Status = Dhcp6SendRequestMsg (Instance); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return Status; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ // ++ // The other status code, just restart solicitation. ++ // ++ break; + } + } + +@@ -2520,7 +2494,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg ( + + ON_EXIT: + +- if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) { ++ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + Status = Dhcp6DequeueRetry ( + Instance, + Packet->Dhcp6.Header.TransactionId, +@@ -2531,7 +2505,6 @@ ON_EXIT: + return Status; + } + +- + /** + Select the appointed Dhcp6 advertisement message. + +@@ -2545,12 +2518,12 @@ ON_EXIT: + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *AdSelect ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *AdSelect + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- UINT8 *Option; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINT8 *Option; + + ASSERT (AdSelect != NULL); + +@@ -2575,7 +2548,7 @@ Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg ( + FALSE + ); + +- if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return Status; + } + +@@ -2583,15 +2556,14 @@ Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg ( + // Check whether there is server unicast option in the selected advertise + // packet, and update it. + // +- Option = Dhcp6SeekOption( ++ Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + AdSelect->Dhcp6.Option, + AdSelect->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptServerUnicast + ); + + if (Option != NULL) { +- +- Instance->Unicast = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof(EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)); ++ Instance->Unicast = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)); + + if (Instance->Unicast == NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; +@@ -2615,7 +2587,6 @@ Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg ( + return Dhcp6SendRequestMsg (Instance); + } + +- + /** + Handle with the Dhcp6 advertisement message. + +@@ -2630,16 +2601,16 @@ Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- UINT8 *Option; +- BOOLEAN Timeout; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINT8 *Option; ++ BOOLEAN Timeout; + +- ASSERT(Instance->Config); +- ASSERT(Instance->IaCb.Ia); ++ ASSERT (Instance->Config); ++ ASSERT (Instance->IaCb.Ia); + + Timeout = FALSE; + +@@ -2649,14 +2620,13 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg ( + // this reply message. Or else, process the advertise messages as normal. + // See details in the section-17.1.4 of rfc-3315. + // +- Option = Dhcp6SeekOption( ++ Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, + Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptRapidCommit + ); + +- if (Option != NULL && Instance->Config->RapidCommit && Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgReply) { +- ++ if ((Option != NULL) && Instance->Config->RapidCommit && (Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgReply)) { + return Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg (Instance, Packet); + } + +@@ -2704,12 +2674,11 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg ( + CopyMem (Instance->AdSelect, Packet, Packet->Size); + + Instance->AdPref = 0xff; +- + } else if (Status == EFI_NOT_READY) { + // + // Not_ready means user wants to continue to receive more advertise packets. + // +- if (Instance->AdPref == 0xff && Instance->AdSelect == NULL) { ++ if ((Instance->AdPref == 0xff) && (Instance->AdSelect == NULL)) { + // + // It's a tricky point. The timer routine set adpref as 0xff if the first + // rt timeout and no advertisement received, which means any advertisement +@@ -2722,13 +2691,13 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg ( + // Check whether the current packet has a 255 preference option or not. + // Take non-preference option as 0 value. + // +- Option = Dhcp6SeekOption( ++ Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, + Packet->Length - 4, + Dhcp6OptPreference + ); + +- if (Instance->AdSelect == NULL || (Option != NULL && *(Option + 4) > Instance->AdPref)) { ++ if ((Instance->AdSelect == NULL) || ((Option != NULL) && (*(Option + 4) > Instance->AdPref))) { + // + // No advertisements received before or preference is more than other + // advertisements received before. Then store the new packet and the +@@ -2755,7 +2724,6 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg ( + // preference is less than other advertisements received before. + // Leave the packet alone. + } +- + } else { + // + // Other error status means termination. +@@ -2768,14 +2736,13 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg ( + // RT has elapsed, or get a highest preference 255 advertise. + // See details in the section-17.1.2 of rfc-3315. + // +- if (Instance->AdPref == 0xff || Timeout) { ++ if ((Instance->AdPref == 0xff) || Timeout) { + Status = Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg (Instance, Instance->AdSelect); + } + + return Status; + } + +- + /** + The Dhcp6 stateful exchange process routine. + +@@ -2785,14 +2752,14 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg ( + **/ + VOID + Dhcp6HandleStateful ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; +- DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; +- UINT8 *Option; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_DHCP6_DUID *ClientId; ++ DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; ++ UINT8 *Option; + + Service = Instance->Service; + ClientId = Service->ClientId; +@@ -2809,14 +2776,14 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateful ( + // + // Discard the packet if not advertisement or reply packet. + // +- if (Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType != Dhcp6MsgAdvertise && Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType != Dhcp6MsgReply) { ++ if ((Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType != Dhcp6MsgAdvertise) && (Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType != Dhcp6MsgReply)) { + goto ON_CONTINUE; + } + + // + // Check whether include client Id or not. + // +- Option = Dhcp6SeekOption( ++ Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, + Packet->Length - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN, + Dhcp6OptClientId +@@ -2829,7 +2796,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateful ( + // + // Check whether include server Id or not. + // +- Option = Dhcp6SeekOption( ++ Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, + Packet->Length - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN, + Dhcp6OptServerId +@@ -2840,35 +2807,36 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateful ( + } + + switch (Instance->IaCb.Ia->State) { +- case Dhcp6Selecting: +- // +- // Handle the advertisement message when in the Dhcp6Selecting state. +- // Do not need check return status, if failed, just continue to the next. +- // +- Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg (Instance, Packet); +- break; +- +- case Dhcp6Requesting: +- case Dhcp6Confirming: +- case Dhcp6Renewing: +- case Dhcp6Rebinding: +- case Dhcp6Releasing: +- case Dhcp6Declining: +- // +- // Handle the reply message when in the Dhcp6Requesting, Dhcp6Renewing +- // Dhcp6Rebinding, Dhcp6Releasing and Dhcp6Declining state. +- // If failed here, it should reset the current session. +- // +- Status = Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg (Instance, Packet); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- goto ON_EXIT; +- } +- break; +- default: +- // +- // Other state has not supported yet. +- // +- break; ++ case Dhcp6Selecting: ++ // ++ // Handle the advertisement message when in the Dhcp6Selecting state. ++ // Do not need check return status, if failed, just continue to the next. ++ // ++ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg (Instance, Packet); ++ break; ++ ++ case Dhcp6Requesting: ++ case Dhcp6Confirming: ++ case Dhcp6Renewing: ++ case Dhcp6Rebinding: ++ case Dhcp6Releasing: ++ case Dhcp6Declining: ++ // ++ // Handle the reply message when in the Dhcp6Requesting, Dhcp6Renewing ++ // Dhcp6Rebinding, Dhcp6Releasing and Dhcp6Declining state. ++ // If failed here, it should reset the current session. ++ // ++ Status = Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg (Instance, Packet); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ break; ++ default: ++ // ++ // Other state has not supported yet. ++ // ++ break; + } + + ON_CONTINUE: +@@ -2887,7 +2855,6 @@ ON_EXIT: + } + } + +- + /** + The Dhcp6 stateless exchange process routine. + +@@ -2897,15 +2864,15 @@ ON_EXIT: + **/ + VOID + Dhcp6HandleStateless ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; +- DHCP6_INF_CB *InfCb; +- UINT8 *Option; +- BOOLEAN IsMatched; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; ++ DHCP6_INF_CB *InfCb; ++ UINT8 *Option; ++ BOOLEAN IsMatched; + + Service = Instance->Service; + Status = EFI_SUCCESS; +@@ -2990,7 +2957,6 @@ ON_EXIT: + } + } + +- + /** + The receive callback function for Dhcp6 exchange process. + +@@ -3003,37 +2969,37 @@ ON_EXIT: + VOID + EFIAPI + Dhcp6ReceivePacket ( +- IN NET_BUF *Udp6Wrap, +- IN UDP_END_POINT *EndPoint, +- IN EFI_STATUS IoStatus, +- IN VOID *Context ++ IN NET_BUF *Udp6Wrap, ++ IN UDP_END_POINT *EndPoint, ++ IN EFI_STATUS IoStatus, ++ IN VOID *Context + ) + { +- EFI_DHCP6_HEADER *Head; +- EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; +- DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; +- DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance; +- DHCP6_TX_CB *TxCb; +- UINT32 Size; +- BOOLEAN IsDispatched; +- BOOLEAN IsStateless; +- LIST_ENTRY *Entry1; +- LIST_ENTRY *Next1; +- LIST_ENTRY *Entry2; +- LIST_ENTRY *Next2; +- EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_DHCP6_HEADER *Head; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet; ++ DHCP6_SERVICE *Service; ++ DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ DHCP6_TX_CB *TxCb; ++ UINT32 Size; ++ BOOLEAN IsDispatched; ++ BOOLEAN IsStateless; ++ LIST_ENTRY *Entry1; ++ LIST_ENTRY *Next1; ++ LIST_ENTRY *Entry2; ++ LIST_ENTRY *Next2; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; + + ASSERT (Udp6Wrap != NULL); + ASSERT (Context != NULL); + +- Service = (DHCP6_SERVICE *) Context; ++ Service = (DHCP6_SERVICE *)Context; + Instance = NULL; + Packet = NULL; + IsDispatched = FALSE; + IsStateless = FALSE; + + if (EFI_ERROR (IoStatus)) { +- return ; ++ return; + } + + if (Udp6Wrap->TotalSize < sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER)) { +@@ -3044,7 +3010,7 @@ Dhcp6ReceivePacket ( + // Copy the net buffer received from upd6 to a Dhcp6 packet. + // + Size = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET) + Udp6Wrap->TotalSize; +- Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *) AllocateZeroPool (Size); ++ Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)AllocateZeroPool (Size); + + if (Packet == NULL) { + goto ON_CONTINUE; +@@ -3052,7 +3018,7 @@ Dhcp6ReceivePacket ( + + Packet->Size = Size; + Head = &Packet->Dhcp6.Header; +- Packet->Length = NetbufCopy (Udp6Wrap, 0, Udp6Wrap->TotalSize, (UINT8 *) Head); ++ Packet->Length = NetbufCopy (Udp6Wrap, 0, Udp6Wrap->TotalSize, (UINT8 *)Head); + + if (Packet->Length == 0) { + goto ON_CONTINUE; +@@ -3062,11 +3028,9 @@ Dhcp6ReceivePacket ( + // Dispatch packet to right instance by transaction id. + // + NET_LIST_FOR_EACH_SAFE (Entry1, Next1, &Service->Child) { +- + Instance = NET_LIST_USER_STRUCT (Entry1, DHCP6_INSTANCE, Link); + + NET_LIST_FOR_EACH_SAFE (Entry2, Next2, &Instance->TxList) { +- + TxCb = NET_LIST_USER_STRUCT (Entry2, DHCP6_TX_CB, Link); + + if (Packet->Dhcp6.Header.TransactionId == TxCb->Xid) { +@@ -3077,7 +3041,8 @@ Dhcp6ReceivePacket ( + if (TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgInfoRequest) { + IsStateless = TRUE; + } +- IsDispatched = TRUE; ++ ++ IsDispatched = TRUE; + break; + } + } +@@ -3107,11 +3072,11 @@ ON_CONTINUE: + + if (!IsDispatched) { + Status = UdpIoRecvDatagram ( +- Service->UdpIo, +- Dhcp6ReceivePacket, +- Service, +- 0 +- ); ++ Service->UdpIo, ++ Dhcp6ReceivePacket, ++ Service, ++ 0 ++ ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + NET_LIST_FOR_EACH_SAFE (Entry1, Next1, &Service->Child) { + Instance = NET_LIST_USER_STRUCT (Entry1, DHCP6_INSTANCE, Link); +@@ -3143,7 +3108,7 @@ ON_CONTINUE: + **/ + BOOLEAN + Dhcp6LinkMovDetect ( +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance + ) + { + UINT32 InterruptStatus; +@@ -3152,7 +3117,7 @@ Dhcp6LinkMovDetect ( + EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL *Snp; + + ASSERT (Instance != NULL); +- Snp = Instance->Service->Snp; ++ Snp = Instance->Service->Snp; + MediaPresent = Instance->MediaPresent; + + // +@@ -3177,10 +3142,10 @@ Dhcp6LinkMovDetect ( + if (!MediaPresent && Instance->MediaPresent) { + return TRUE; + } ++ + return FALSE; + } + +- + /** + The timer routine of the Dhcp6 instance for each second. + +@@ -3191,28 +3156,27 @@ Dhcp6LinkMovDetect ( + VOID + EFIAPI + Dhcp6OnTimerTick ( +- IN EFI_EVENT Event, +- IN VOID *Context ++ IN EFI_EVENT Event, ++ IN VOID *Context + ) + { +- LIST_ENTRY *Entry; +- LIST_ENTRY *NextEntry; +- DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance; +- DHCP6_TX_CB *TxCb; +- DHCP6_IA_CB *IaCb; +- UINT32 LossTime; +- EFI_STATUS Status; ++ LIST_ENTRY *Entry; ++ LIST_ENTRY *NextEntry; ++ DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ DHCP6_TX_CB *TxCb; ++ DHCP6_IA_CB *IaCb; ++ UINT32 LossTime; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; + + ASSERT (Context != NULL); + +- Instance = (DHCP6_INSTANCE *) Context; ++ Instance = (DHCP6_INSTANCE *)Context; + + // + // 1. Loop the tx list, count live time of every tx packet to check whether + // need re-transmit or not. + // + NET_LIST_FOR_EACH_SAFE (Entry, NextEntry, &Instance->TxList) { +- + TxCb = NET_LIST_USER_STRUCT (Entry, DHCP6_TX_CB, Link); + + TxCb->TickTime++; +@@ -3221,7 +3185,7 @@ Dhcp6OnTimerTick ( + // + // Handle the first rt in the transmission of solicit specially. + // +- if ((TxCb->RetryCnt == 0 || TxCb->SolicitRetry) && TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgSolicit) { ++ if (((TxCb->RetryCnt == 0) || TxCb->SolicitRetry) && (TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgSolicit)) { + if (Instance->AdSelect == NULL) { + // + // Set adpref as 0xff here to indicate select any advertisement +@@ -3238,9 +3202,11 @@ Dhcp6OnTimerTick ( + } else if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + TxCb->RetryCnt++; + } ++ + return; + } + } ++ + // + // Increase the retry count for the packet and add up the total loss time. + // +@@ -3250,7 +3216,7 @@ Dhcp6OnTimerTick ( + // + // Check whether overflow the max retry count limit for this packet + // +- if (TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc != 0 && TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc < TxCb->RetryCnt) { ++ if ((TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc != 0) && (TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrc < TxCb->RetryCnt)) { + Status = EFI_NO_RESPONSE; + goto ON_CLOSE; + } +@@ -3258,7 +3224,7 @@ Dhcp6OnTimerTick ( + // + // Check whether overflow the max retry duration for this packet + // +- if (TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd != 0 && TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd <= TxCb->RetryLos) { ++ if ((TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd != 0) && (TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd <= TxCb->RetryLos)) { + Status = EFI_NO_RESPONSE; + goto ON_CLOSE; + } +@@ -3275,7 +3241,7 @@ Dhcp6OnTimerTick ( + TRUE + ); + +- if (TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt != 0 && TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt < TxCb->RetryExp) { ++ if ((TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt != 0) && (TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt < TxCb->RetryExp)) { + TxCb->RetryExp = Dhcp6CalculateExpireTime ( + TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrt, + TRUE, +@@ -3288,7 +3254,7 @@ Dhcp6OnTimerTick ( + // duration time. + // + LossTime = TxCb->RetryLos + TxCb->RetryExp; +- if (TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd != 0 && TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd < LossTime) { ++ if ((TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd != 0) && (TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd < LossTime)) { + TxCb->RetryExp = TxCb->RetryCtl.Mrd - TxCb->RetryLos; + } + +@@ -3314,22 +3280,19 @@ Dhcp6OnTimerTick ( + // + IaCb = &Instance->IaCb; + +- if (Instance->Config == NULL || IaCb->Ia == NULL) { ++ if ((Instance->Config == NULL) || (IaCb->Ia == NULL)) { + return; + } + +- if (IaCb->Ia->State == Dhcp6Bound || IaCb->Ia->State == Dhcp6Renewing || IaCb->Ia->State == Dhcp6Rebinding) { +- ++ if ((IaCb->Ia->State == Dhcp6Bound) || (IaCb->Ia->State == Dhcp6Renewing) || (IaCb->Ia->State == Dhcp6Rebinding)) { + IaCb->LeaseTime++; + +- if (IaCb->LeaseTime > IaCb->T2 && IaCb->Ia->State == Dhcp6Bound) { ++ if ((IaCb->LeaseTime > IaCb->T2) && (IaCb->Ia->State == Dhcp6Bound)) { + // + // Exceed t2, send rebind packet to extend the Ia lease. + // + Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg (Instance, TRUE); +- +- } else if (IaCb->LeaseTime > IaCb->T1 && IaCb->Ia->State == Dhcp6Bound) { +- ++ } else if ((IaCb->LeaseTime > IaCb->T1) && (IaCb->Ia->State == Dhcp6Bound)) { + // + // Exceed t1, send renew packet to extend the Ia lease. + // +@@ -3347,28 +3310,32 @@ Dhcp6OnTimerTick ( + + return; + +- ON_CLOSE: ++ON_CLOSE: + + if (Dhcp6IsValidTxCb (Instance, TxCb) && +- TxCb->TxPacket != NULL && +- (TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgInfoRequest || +- TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgRenew || +- TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgConfirm) +- ) { ++ (TxCb->TxPacket != NULL) && ++ ((TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgInfoRequest) || ++ (TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgRenew) || ++ (TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgConfirm)) ++ ) ++ { + // + // The failure of renew/Confirm will still switch to the bound state. + // + if ((TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgRenew) || +- (TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgConfirm)) { ++ (TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgConfirm)) ++ { + ASSERT (Instance->IaCb.Ia); + Instance->IaCb.Ia->State = Dhcp6Bound; + } ++ + // + // The failure of info-request will return no response. + // + if (TxCb->TxPacket->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType == Dhcp6MsgInfoRequest) { + Instance->UdpSts = EFI_NO_RESPONSE; + } ++ + Dhcp6DequeueRetry ( + Instance, + TxCb->Xid, +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-chang1.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes.patch similarity index 96% rename from SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-chang1.patch rename to SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes.patch index fc1e9ef..2bf3ddf 100644 --- a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-chang1.patch +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes.patch @@ -1,16 +1,16 @@ -From 0e3b45af841f875aa1a0131ca9f4573ebd8e61fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From daa72dcc870f9488f2afccdaa2341f24b1269abc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 15:22:22 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 1/3] NetworkPkg: Apply uncrustify changes +Subject: [PATCH 06/15] NetworkPkg: Apply uncrustify changes RH-Author: Jon Maloy -RH-MergeRequest: 60: NetworkPkg: Apply uncrustify changes -RH-Jira: RHEL-22002 +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen -RH-Commit: [1/3] 221e6ef42cbd107383bb2b80e8f7763b6e81f5f9 (jmaloy/jons_fork) +RH-Commit: [6/15] 823604dd0cad46a8ae5796cde6d1683aa23f1be5 -JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-22002 +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21850 CVE: CVE-2022-45234 Upstream: Merged Conflicts: This patch is too intrusive to apply at once in its entirety, @@ -1933,5 +1933,5 @@ index 8d71143b79..425e0cf806 100644 // Check the selected offer whether BINL retry is needed. // -- -2.41.0 +2.39.3 diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Packet-Length-is-not-updated-bef.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Packet-Length-is-not-updated-bef.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e37b524 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Packet-Length-is-not-updated-bef.patch @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +From 649fe647114ca5dee84b0c55106ee58a9703984f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 15/15] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: Packet-Length is not updated + before appending + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Commit: [15/15] bc7ef287311bb3f757bc26f8921875566bcb5917 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21840 +CVE: CVE-2023-45229 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 75deaf5c3c0d164c61653258c331151241bb69d8 +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Tue Feb 13 10:46:02 2024 -0800 + + NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: Packet-Length is not updated before appending + + In order for Dhcp6AppendIaAddrOption (..) to safely append the IA + Address option, the Packet-Length field must be updated before appending + the option. + + Cc: Saloni Kasbekar + Cc: Zachary Clark-williams + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar + Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c | 10 +++++----- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c +index e172ffc2a2..c23eff8766 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c +@@ -948,6 +948,11 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( + *PacketCursor += sizeof (T2); + } + ++ // ++ // Update the packet length ++ // ++ Packet->Length += BytesNeeded; ++ + // + // Fill all the addresses belong to the Ia + // +@@ -959,11 +964,6 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( + } + } + +- // +- // Update the packet length +- // +- Packet->Length += BytesNeeded; +- + // + // Fill the value of Ia option length + // +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Removes-duplicate-check-and-repl.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Removes-duplicate-check-and-repl.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a928fa2 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Removes-duplicate-check-and-repl.patch @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +From 4bf844922a963cb20fb1e72ca11a65a673992ca2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 14/15] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: Removes duplicate check and + replaces with macro + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Commit: [14/15] a943400f9267b219bf1fd202534500f82a2a4c56 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21840 +CVE: CVE-2023-45229 +Upstream: Merged + +commit af3fad99d6088881562e50149f414f76a5be0140 +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Tue Feb 13 10:46:01 2024 -0800 + + NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: Removes duplicate check and replaces with macro + + Removes duplicate check after merge + + > + > // + > // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet + > // + > if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option) + > || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - + sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER)))) + > { + > return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + > } + > + + Converts the check to a macro and replaces all instances of the check + with the macro + + Cc: Saloni Kasbekar + Cc: Zachary Clark-williams + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar + Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c | 43 +++++++++++++----------------- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c +index 484c360a96..e172ffc2a2 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c +@@ -10,6 +10,15 @@ + + #include "Dhcp6Impl.h" + ++// ++// Verifies the packet cursor is within the packet ++// otherwise it is invalid ++// ++#define IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR(PacketCursor, Packet) \ ++ (((*PacketCursor) < (Packet)->Dhcp6.Option) || \ ++ ((*PacketCursor) >= (Packet)->Dhcp6.Option + ((Packet)->Size - sizeof(EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))) \ ++ ) \ ++ + + /** + Generate client Duid in the format of Duid-llt. +@@ -662,9 +671,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendOption ( + // + // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet + // +- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option) +- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER)))) +- { ++ if (IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR (PacketCursor, Packet)) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + +@@ -681,15 +688,6 @@ Dhcp6AppendOption ( + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +- // +- // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet +- // +- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option) +- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER)))) +- { +- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; +- } +- + WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, OptType); + *PacketCursor += DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE; + WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, OptLen); +@@ -768,9 +766,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaAddrOption ( + // + // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet + // +- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option) +- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER)))) +- { ++ if (IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR (PacketCursor, Packet)) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + +@@ -902,9 +898,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( + // + // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet + // +- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option) +- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER)))) +- { ++ if (IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR (PacketCursor, Packet)) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + +@@ -966,14 +960,14 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( + } + + // +- // Fill the value of Ia option length ++ // Update the packet length + // +- *Len = HTONS ((UINT16)(*PacketCursor - (UINT8 *)Len - 2)); ++ Packet->Length += BytesNeeded; + + // +- // Update the packet length ++ // Fill the value of Ia option length + // +- Packet->Length += BytesNeeded; ++ *Len = HTONS ((UINT16)(*PacketCursor - (UINT8 *)Len - 2)); + + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } +@@ -982,6 +976,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( + Append the appointed Elapsed time option to Buf, and move Buf to the end. + + @param[in, out] Packet A pointer to the packet, on success Packet->Length ++ will be updated. + @param[in, out] PacketCursor The pointer in the packet, on success PacketCursor + will be moved to the end of the option. + @param[in] Instance The pointer to the Dhcp6 instance. +@@ -1037,9 +1032,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendETOption ( + // + // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet + // +- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option) +- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER)))) +- { ++ if (IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR (PacketCursor, Packet)) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Pa.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Pa.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dcf5bb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Pa.patch @@ -0,0 +1,621 @@ +From a115d0a66c3e73c60b74ec6d09e3759da89e919b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2024 17:57:07 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 17/17] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 + Patch + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 50: CVE-2023-45230 and CVE-2023-45229 +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842 +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Commit: [4/4] 3daf69000f78416ee1f1bad0b6ceb01ed28a84a5 (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21840 +CVE: CVE-2023-45229 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 1dbb10cc52dc8ef49bb700daa1cefc76b26d52e0 +Author: Doug Flick via groups.io +Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:46 2024 +0800 + + NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Patch + + REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4534 + + Bug Details: + PixieFail Bug #1 + CVE-2023-45229 + CVSS 6.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N + CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read + + Change Overview: + + Introduce Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe which performs checks before seeking + the Inner Option from a DHCP6 Option. + + > + > EFI_STATUS + > Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe ( + > IN UINT16 IaType, + > IN UINT8 *Option, + > IN UINT32 OptionLen, + > OUT UINT8 **IaInnerOpt, + > OUT UINT16 *IaInnerLen + > ); + > + + Lots of code cleanup to improve code readability. + + Cc: Saloni Kasbekar + Cc: Zachary Clark-williams + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h | 138 ++++++++++++++++++--- + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++----------- + 2 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h +index ec0ed5d8f5..e759ab9a62 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h +@@ -47,6 +47,20 @@ typedef struct _DHCP6_INSTANCE DHCP6_INSTANCE; + #define DHCP6_SERVICE_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32 ('D', 'H', '6', 'S') + #define DHCP6_INSTANCE_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32 ('D', 'H', '6', 'I') + ++#define DHCP6_PACKET_ALL 0 ++#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATEFUL 1 ++#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATELESS 2 ++ ++#define DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE 1024 ++ ++#define DHCP6_PORT_CLIENT 546 ++#define DHCP6_PORT_SERVER 547 ++ ++#define DHCP_CHECK_MEDIA_WAITING_TIME EFI_TIMER_PERIOD_SECONDS(20) ++ ++#define DHCP6_INSTANCE_FROM_THIS(Instance) CR ((Instance), DHCP6_INSTANCE, Dhcp6, DHCP6_INSTANCE_SIGNATURE) ++#define DHCP6_SERVICE_FROM_THIS(Service) CR ((Service), DHCP6_SERVICE, ServiceBinding, DHCP6_SERVICE_SIGNATURE) ++ + // + // For more information on DHCP options see RFC 8415, Section 21.1 + // +@@ -61,12 +75,10 @@ typedef struct _DHCP6_INSTANCE DHCP6_INSTANCE; + // | (option-len octets) | + // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + // +-#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE (sizeof(UINT16)) +-#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN (sizeof(UINT16)) ++#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE (sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpCode)) ++#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN (sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpLen)) + +-// + // Combined size of Code and Length +-// + #define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN (DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE + \ + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN) + +@@ -75,34 +87,122 @@ STATIC_ASSERT ( + "Combined size of Code and Length must be 4 per RFC 8415" + ); + +-// + // Offset to the length is just past the code +-// +-#define DHCP6_OPT_LEN_OFFSET(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE) ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE) + STATIC_ASSERT ( +- DHCP6_OPT_LEN_OFFSET (0) == 2, ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (0) == 2, + "Offset of length is + 2 past start of option" + ); + +-#define DHCP6_OPT_DATA_OFFSET(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN) ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN) + STATIC_ASSERT ( +- DHCP6_OPT_DATA_OFFSET (0) == 4, ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (0) == 4, + "Offset to option data should be +4 from start of option" + ); ++// ++// Identity Association options (both NA (Non-Temporary) and TA (Temporary Association)) ++// are defined in RFC 8415 and are a deriviation of a TLV stucture ++// For more information on IA_NA see Section 21.4 ++// For more information on IA_TA see Section 21.5 ++// ++// ++// The format of IA_NA and IA_TA option: ++// ++// 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | OPTION_IA_NA | option-len | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | IAID (4 octets) | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | T1 (only for IA_NA) | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | T2 (only for IA_NA) | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | | ++// . IA_NA-options/IA_TA-options . ++// . . ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// ++#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID (sizeof(UINT32)) ++#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL (sizeof(UINT32)) + +-#define DHCP6_PACKET_ALL 0 +-#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATEFUL 1 +-#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATELESS 2 ++// Combined size of IAID, T1, and T2 ++#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2 (DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2 == 12, ++ "Combined size of IAID, T1, T2 must be 12 per RFC 8415" ++ ); + +-#define DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE 1024 ++// This is the size of IA_TA without options ++#define DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA (DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA == 8, ++ "Minimum combined size of IA_TA per RFC 8415" ++ ); + +-#define DHCP6_PORT_CLIENT 546 +-#define DHCP6_PORT_SERVER 547 ++// Offset to a IA_TA inner option ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT(a) (a + DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (0) == 8, ++ "Offset of IA_TA Inner option is + 8 past start of option" ++ ); + +-#define DHCP_CHECK_MEDIA_WAITING_TIME EFI_TIMER_PERIOD_SECONDS(20) ++// This is the size of IA_NA without options (16) ++#define DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2 ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA == 16, ++ "Minimum combined size of IA_TA per RFC 8415" ++ ); + +-#define DHCP6_INSTANCE_FROM_THIS(Instance) CR ((Instance), DHCP6_INSTANCE, Dhcp6, DHCP6_INSTANCE_SIGNATURE) +-#define DHCP6_SERVICE_FROM_THIS(Service) CR ((Service), DHCP6_SERVICE, ServiceBinding, DHCP6_SERVICE_SIGNATURE) ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT(a) (a + DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (0) == 16, ++ "Offset of IA_NA Inner option is + 16 past start of option" ++ ); ++ ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1(a) (a + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1 (0) == 8, ++ "Offset of IA_NA Inner option is + 8 past start of option" ++ ); ++ ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2(a) (a + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN +\ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2 (0) == 12, ++ "Offset of IA_NA Inner option is + 12 past start of option" ++ ); ++ ++// ++// For more information see RFC 8415 Section 21.13 ++// ++// The format of the Status Code Option: ++// ++// 0 1 2 3 ++// 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | OPTION_STATUS_CODE | option-len | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | status-code | | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | ++// . . ++// . status-message . ++// . . ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (0) == 4, ++ "Offset of status is + 4 past start of option" ++ ); + + extern EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS mAllDhcpRelayAndServersAddress; + extern EFI_DHCP6_PROTOCOL gDhcp6ProtocolTemplate; +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c +index 2976684aba..d680febbf1 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c +@@ -611,8 +611,8 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + // The inner options still start with 2 bytes option-code and 2 bytes option-len. + // + if (Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type == Dhcp6OptIana) { +- T1 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) (Option + 8))); +- T2 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) (Option + 12))); ++ T1 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1 (Option)))); ++ T2 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2 (Option)))); + // + // Refer to RFC3155 Chapter 22.4. If a client receives an IA_NA with T1 greater than T2, + // and both T1 and T2 are greater than 0, the client discards the IA_NA option and processes +@@ -621,13 +621,14 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + if (T1 > T2 && T2 > 0) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +- IaInnerOpt = Option + 16; +- IaInnerLen = (UINT16) (NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (Option + 2))) - 12); ++ IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option); ++ IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2); + } else { + T1 = 0; + T2 = 0; +- IaInnerOpt = Option + 8; +- IaInnerLen = (UINT16) (NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (Option + 2))) - 4); ++ ++ IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option); ++ IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID); + } + + // +@@ -653,7 +654,7 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (IaInnerOpt, IaInnerLen, Dhcp6OptStatusCode); + + if (Option != NULL) { +- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (Option + 4))); ++ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))); + if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +@@ -675,6 +676,87 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + + + ++/** ++ Seeks the Inner Options from a DHCP6 Option ++ ++ @param[in] IaType The type of the IA option. ++ @param[in] Option The pointer to the DHCP6 Option. ++ @param[in] OptionLen The length of the DHCP6 Option. ++ @param[out] IaInnerOpt The pointer to the IA inner option. ++ @param[out] IaInnerLen The length of the IA inner option. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Seek the inner option successfully. ++ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The OptionLen is invalid. On Error, ++ the pointers are not modified ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe ( ++ IN UINT16 IaType, ++ IN UINT8 *Option, ++ IN UINT32 OptionLen, ++ OUT UINT8 **IaInnerOpt, ++ OUT UINT16 *IaInnerLen ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT16 IaInnerLenTmp; ++ UINT8 *IaInnerOptTmp; ++ ++ if (Option == NULL) { ++ ASSERT (Option != NULL); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (IaInnerOpt == NULL) { ++ ASSERT (IaInnerOpt != NULL); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (IaInnerLen == NULL) { ++ ASSERT (IaInnerLen != NULL); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIana) { ++ // Verify we have a fully formed IA_NA ++ if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option); ++ ++ // Verify the IaInnerLen is valid. ++ IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option))); ++ if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ IaInnerLenTmp -= DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2; ++ } else if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIata) { ++ // Verify the OptionLen is valid. ++ if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option); ++ ++ // Verify the IaInnerLen is valid. ++ IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))); ++ if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ IaInnerLenTmp -= DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID; ++ } else { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ *IaInnerOpt = IaInnerOptTmp; ++ *IaInnerLen = IaInnerLenTmp; ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ + /** + Seek StatusCode Option in package. A Status Code option may appear in the + options field of a DHCP message and/or in the options field of another option. +@@ -695,9 +777,15 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + OUT UINT8 **Option + ) + { +- UINT8 *IaInnerOpt; +- UINT16 IaInnerLen; +- UINT16 StsCode; ++ UINT8 *IaInnerOpt; ++ UINT16 IaInnerLen; ++ UINT16 StsCode; ++ UINT32 OptionLen; ++ ++ // OptionLen is the length of the Options excluding the DHCP header. ++ // Length of the EFI_DHCP6_PACKET from the first byte of the Header field to the last ++ // byte of the Option[] field. ++ OptionLen = Packet->Length - sizeof (Packet->Dhcp6.Header); + + // + // Seek StatusCode option directly in DHCP message body. That is, search in +@@ -705,12 +793,12 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + // + *Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - 4, ++ OptionLen, + Dhcp6OptStatusCode + ); + + if (*Option != NULL) { +- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (*Option + 4))); ++ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (*Option)))); + if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +@@ -721,7 +809,7 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + // + *Option = Dhcp6SeekIaOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), ++ OptionLen, + &Instance->Config->IaDescriptor + ); + if (*Option == NULL) { +@@ -729,52 +817,35 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + } + + // +- // The format of the IA_NA option is: ++ // Calculate the distance from Packet->Dhcp6.Option to the IA option. + // +- // 0 1 2 3 +- // 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | OPTION_IA_NA | option-len | +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | IAID (4 octets) | +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | T1 | +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | T2 | +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | | +- // . IA_NA-options . +- // . . +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++ // Packet->Size and Packet->Length are both UINT32 type, and Packet->Size is ++ // the size of the whole packet, including the DHCP header, and Packet->Length ++ // is the length of the DHCP message body, excluding the DHCP header. + // +- // The format of the IA_TA option is: ++ // (*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option) is the number of bytes from the start of ++ // DHCP6 option area to the start of the IA option. + // +- // 0 1 2 3 +- // 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | OPTION_IA_TA | option-len | +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | IAID (4 octets) | +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | | +- // . IA_TA-options . +- // . . +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++ // Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe() is searching starting from the start of the ++ // IA option to the end of the DHCP6 option area, thus subtract the space ++ // up until this option + // ++ OptionLen = OptionLen - (*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option); + + // +- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId) = 8 +- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1) = 12 +- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1 + T2) = 16 ++ // Seek the inner option + // +- // The inner options still start with 2 bytes option-code and 2 bytes option-len. +- // +- if (Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type == Dhcp6OptIana) { +- IaInnerOpt = *Option + 16; +- IaInnerLen = (UINT16) (NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (*Option + 2))) - 12); +- } else { +- IaInnerOpt = *Option + 8; +- IaInnerLen = (UINT16) (NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (*Option + 2))) - 4); ++ if (EFI_ERROR ( ++ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe ( ++ Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type, ++ *Option, ++ OptionLen, ++ &IaInnerOpt, ++ &IaInnerLen ++ ) ++ )) ++ { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + + // +@@ -798,7 +869,7 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + // + *Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (IaInnerOpt, IaInnerLen, Dhcp6OptStatusCode); + if (*Option != NULL) { +- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (*Option + 4))); ++ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)((DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (*Option))))); + if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +@@ -1123,7 +1194,7 @@ Dhcp6SendRequestMsg ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Instance->AdSelect->Dhcp6.Option, +- Instance->AdSelect->Length - 4, ++ Instance->AdSelect->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptServerId + ); + if (Option == NULL) { +@@ -1309,7 +1380,7 @@ Dhcp6SendDeclineMsg ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + LastReply->Dhcp6.Option, +- LastReply->Length - 4, ++ LastReply->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptServerId + ); + if (Option == NULL) { +@@ -1469,7 +1540,7 @@ Dhcp6SendReleaseMsg ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + LastReply->Dhcp6.Option, +- LastReply->Length - 4, ++ LastReply->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptServerId + ); + if (Option == NULL) { +@@ -1695,7 +1766,7 @@ Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg ( + + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + LastReply->Dhcp6.Option, +- LastReply->Length - 4, ++ LastReply->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptServerId + ); + if (Option == NULL) { +@@ -2235,7 +2306,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - 4, ++ Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptRapidCommit + ); + +@@ -2383,7 +2454,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg ( + // + // Any error status code option is found. + // +- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) (Option + 4))); ++ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)((DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (Option))))); + switch (StsCode) { + case Dhcp6StsUnspecFail: + // +@@ -2514,7 +2585,7 @@ Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption( + AdSelect->Dhcp6.Option, +- AdSelect->Length - 4, ++ AdSelect->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptServerUnicast + ); + +@@ -2526,7 +2597,7 @@ Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg ( + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + +- CopyMem (Instance->Unicast, Option + 4, sizeof(EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)); ++ CopyMem (Instance->Unicast, DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (Option), sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)); + } + + // +@@ -2580,7 +2651,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - 4, ++ Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptRapidCommit + ); + +@@ -2676,7 +2747,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg ( + CopyMem (Instance->AdSelect, Packet, Packet->Size); + + if (Option != NULL) { +- Instance->AdPref = *(Option + 4); ++ Instance->AdPref = *(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (Option)); + } + } else { + // +@@ -2747,11 +2818,11 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateful ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - 4, ++ Packet->Length - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN, + Dhcp6OptClientId + ); + +- if (Option == NULL || CompareMem (Option + 4, ClientId->Duid, ClientId->Length) != 0) { ++ if ((Option == NULL) || (CompareMem (DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (Option), ClientId->Duid, ClientId->Length) != 0)) { + goto ON_CONTINUE; + } + +@@ -2760,7 +2831,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateful ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - 4, ++ Packet->Length - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN, + Dhcp6OptServerId + ); + +@@ -2865,7 +2936,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateless ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - 4, ++ Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptServerId + ); + +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Re.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Re.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ea1b84f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Re.patch @@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ +From 1b58858f28a364a8f8fa897a78db7ced068719dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 13/15] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 + Related Patch + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Commit: [13/15] 904fd82592208d0ca42bbb64f437691a5bdfd0b6 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21840 +CVE: CVE-2023-45229 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 1c440a5eceedc64e892877eeac0f1a4938f5abbb +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Tue Feb 13 10:46:00 2024 -0800 + + NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Related Patch + + REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4673 + REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4534 + + This was not part of the Quarkslab bugs however the same pattern + as CVE-2023-45229 exists in Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo. + + This patch replaces the code in question with the safe function + created to patch CVE-2023-45229 + + > + > if (EFI_ERROR ( + > Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe ( + > Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type, + > Option, + > OptionLen, + > &IaInnerOpt, + > &IaInnerLen + > ) + > )) + > { + > return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + > } + > + + Additionally corrects incorrect usage of macro to read the status + + > - StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN + (Option))); + > + StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *) + DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (Option)); + + Cc: Saloni Kasbekar + Cc: Zachary Clark-williams + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar + Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h | 22 +++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c +index 3b8feb4a20..a9bffae353 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c +@@ -528,13 +528,23 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + { + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINT8 *Option; ++ UINT32 OptionLen; + UINT8 *IaInnerOpt; + UINT16 IaInnerLen; + UINT16 StsCode; + UINT32 T1; + UINT32 T2; + ++ T1 = 0; ++ T2 = 0; ++ + ASSERT (Instance->Config != NULL); ++ ++ // OptionLen is the length of the Options excluding the DHCP header. ++ // Length of the EFI_DHCP6_PACKET from the first byte of the Header field to the last ++ // byte of the Option[] field. ++ OptionLen = Packet->Length - sizeof (Packet->Dhcp6.Header); ++ + // + // If the reply was received in response to a solicit with rapid commit option, + // request, renew or rebind message, the client updates the information it has +@@ -549,13 +559,29 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekIaOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), ++ OptionLen, + &Instance->Config->IaDescriptor + ); + if (Option == NULL) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + ++ // ++ // Calculate the distance from Packet->Dhcp6.Option to the IA option. ++ // ++ // Packet->Size and Packet->Length are both UINT32 type, and Packet->Size is ++ // the size of the whole packet, including the DHCP header, and Packet->Length ++ // is the length of the DHCP message body, excluding the DHCP header. ++ // ++ // (*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option) is the number of bytes from the start of ++ // DHCP6 option area to the start of the IA option. ++ // ++ // Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe() is searching starting from the start of the ++ // IA option to the end of the DHCP6 option area, thus subtract the space ++ // up until this option ++ // ++ OptionLen = OptionLen - (UINT32)(Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option); ++ + // + // The format of the IA_NA option is: + // +@@ -591,32 +617,32 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + // + + // +- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId) = 8 +- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1) = 12 +- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1 + T2) = 16 +- // +- // The inner options still start with 2 bytes option-code and 2 bytes option-len. ++ // Seek the inner option + // ++ if (EFI_ERROR ( ++ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe ( ++ Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type, ++ Option, ++ OptionLen, ++ &IaInnerOpt, ++ &IaInnerLen ++ ) ++ )) ++ { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ + if (Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type == Dhcp6OptIana) { + T1 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1 (Option)))); + T2 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2 (Option)))); + // + // Refer to RFC3155 Chapter 22.4. If a client receives an IA_NA with T1 greater than T2, + // and both T1 and T2 are greater than 0, the client discards the IA_NA option and processes +- // the remainder of the message as though the server had not included the invalid IA_NA option. ++ // the remainder of the message as though the server had not included the invalid IA_NA option. + // + if ((T1 > T2) && (T2 > 0)) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +- +- IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option); +- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2); +- } else { +- T1 = 0; +- T2 = 0; +- +- IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option); +- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID); + } + + // +@@ -642,7 +668,7 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (IaInnerOpt, IaInnerLen, Dhcp6OptStatusCode); + + if (Option != NULL) { +- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))); ++ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (Option)))); + if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +@@ -703,15 +729,21 @@ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe ( + } + + if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIana) { ++ // + // Verify we have a fully formed IA_NA ++ // + if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + ++ // ++ // Get the IA Inner Option and Length + // + IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option); + ++ // + // Verify the IaInnerLen is valid. ++ // + IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option))); + if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +@@ -719,14 +751,18 @@ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe ( + + IaInnerLenTmp -= DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2; + } else if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIata) { ++ // + // Verify the OptionLen is valid. ++ // + if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + + IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option); + ++ // + // Verify the IaInnerLen is valid. ++ // + IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))); + if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h +index 554f0f5e5d..8c0d282bca 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h +@@ -218,4 +218,26 @@ Dhcp6OnTimerTick ( + IN VOID *Context + ); + ++/** ++ Seeks the Inner Options from a DHCP6 Option ++ ++ @param[in] IaType The type of the IA option. ++ @param[in] Option The pointer to the DHCP6 Option. ++ @param[in] OptionLen The length of the DHCP6 Option. ++ @param[out] IaInnerOpt The pointer to the IA inner option. ++ @param[out] IaInnerLen The length of the IA inner option. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Seek the inner option successfully. ++ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The OptionLen is invalid. On Error, ++ the pointers are not modified ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe ( ++ IN UINT16 IaType, ++ IN UINT8 *Option, ++ IN UINT32 OptionLen, ++ OUT UINT8 **IaInnerOpt, ++ OUT UINT16 *IaInnerLen ++ ); ++ + #endif +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch index 13da096..f4ee0d4 100644 --- a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch @@ -1,16 +1,16 @@ -From b77856122fdf9928a44a2d2715c67d629fdcd647 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 1ef9758121ee50437322d84ce394279e38a7055f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 10:35:14 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 1/3] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch +Subject: [PATCH 14/17] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 + Patch RH-Author: Jon Maloy -RH-MergeRequest: 51: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch -RH-Jira: RHEL-21993 -RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 50: CVE-2023-45230 and CVE-2023-45229 +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842 RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen -RH-Commit: [1/3] fd847768217905003d065a542a020985c976b7ab (jmaloy/jons_fork) +RH-Commit: [1/4] 26695f0c8bd1032ba04179cb9281f753fcff2c92 (jmaloy/jons_fork) -JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21993 +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21842 CVE: CVE-2023-45230 Upstream: Merged Conflicts: Only whitespace issues caused by the 'uncrustify' tool. diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch index ccef9e0..e7e40c1 100644 --- a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch @@ -1,17 +1,16 @@ -From 6156d5f9f05f5620e8bcdd9e0d641d85db031e67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From f5274b449181cb37efce0f08ed5d75a6bf6e54a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 10:35:14 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 3/3] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Unit - Tests +Subject: [PATCH 16/17] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 + Unit Tests RH-Author: Jon Maloy -RH-MergeRequest: 51: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch -RH-Jira: RHEL-21993 -RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 50: CVE-2023-45230 and CVE-2023-45229 +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842 RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen -RH-Commit: [3/3] fce1c72df05d0e611aa2dc0203bae058bb0a0868 (jmaloy/jons_fork) +RH-Commit: [3/4] 43b8569c0586c7dbf66b19c5db335d0ce05829de (jmaloy/jons_fork) -JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21993 +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21842 CVE: CVE-2023-45230 Upstream: Merged diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Patc.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Patc.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b87ded2 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Patc.patch @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +From e3f153773bd2ca13ee4869187f1711840fc8afc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:51:09 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 02/15] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Patch + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Commit: [2/15] 61eaf6aac61b774c3a8ace54af8abd607651d2db + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21844 +CVE: CVE-2022-45231 +Upstream: Merged + +commit bbfee34f4188ac00371abe1389ae9c9fb989a0cd +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:48 2024 +0800 + + NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Patch + + REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4536 + + Bug Overview: + PixieFail Bug #3 + CVE-2023-45231 + CVSS 6.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N + CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read + + Out-of-bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated + options + + Change Overview: + + Adds a check to prevent truncated options from being parsed + + // + + // Cannot process truncated options. + + // Cannot process options with a length of 0 as there is no Type + field. + + // + + if (OptionLen < sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)) { + + return FALSE; + + } + + Cc: Saloni Kasbekar + Cc: Zachary Clark-williams + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c +index 199eea124d..8718d5d875 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c +@@ -137,6 +137,14 @@ Ip6IsNDOptionValid ( + return FALSE; + } + ++ // ++ // Cannot process truncated options. ++ // Cannot process options with a length of 0 as there is no Type field. ++ // ++ if (OptionLen < sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)) { ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ + Offset = 0; + + // +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Unit.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Unit.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..35eaa36 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Unit.patch @@ -0,0 +1,277 @@ +From e8200dda7752d21794b2268efe9e957958ffef29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 12:24:44 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 03/15] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Unit + Tests + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Commit: [3/15] ca554677a3397423073d3bb4774f856b2329ae9c + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21844 +CVE: CVE-2022-45231 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 6f77463d72807ec7f4ed6518c3dac29a1040df9f +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:49 2024 +0800 + + NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Unit Tests + + REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4536 + + Validates that the patch for... + + Out-of-bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated + options + + .. has been fixed + + Tests the following function to ensure that an out of bounds read does + not occur + Ip6OptionValidation + + Cc: Saloni Kasbekar + Cc: Zachary Clark-williams + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp | 20 +++ + .../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf | 42 ++++++ + .../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp | 129 ++++++++++++++++++ + NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc | 1 + + 4 files changed, 192 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp + create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf + create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..6ebfd5fdfb +--- /dev/null ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp +@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ ++/** @file ++ Acts as the main entry point for the tests for the Ip6Dxe module. ++ ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++#include ++ ++//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++// Run the tests ++//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++int ++main ( ++ int argc, ++ char *argv[] ++ ) ++{ ++ testing::InitGoogleTest (&argc, argv); ++ return RUN_ALL_TESTS (); ++} +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..6e4de0745f +--- /dev/null ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf +@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ ++## @file ++# Unit test suite for the Ip6Dxe using Google Test ++# ++# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
++# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++## ++[Defines] ++ INF_VERSION = 0x00010017 ++ BASE_NAME = Ip6DxeUnitTest ++ FILE_GUID = 4F05D17D-D3E7-4AAE-820C-576D46D2D34A ++ VERSION_STRING = 1.0 ++ MODULE_TYPE = HOST_APPLICATION ++# ++# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools. ++# ++# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 AARCH64 ++# ++[Sources] ++ Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp ++ Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp ++ ../Ip6Option.c ++ ++[Packages] ++ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec ++ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec ++ UnitTestFrameworkPkg/UnitTestFrameworkPkg.dec ++ NetworkPkg/NetworkPkg.dec ++ ++[LibraryClasses] ++ GoogleTestLib ++ DebugLib ++ NetLib ++ PcdLib ++ ++[Protocols] ++ gEfiDhcp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid ++ ++[Pcd] ++ gEfiNetworkPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDhcp6UidType ++ ++[Guids] ++ gZeroGuid +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..f2cd90e1a9 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp +@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ ++/** @file ++ Tests for Ip6Option.c. ++ ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++#include ++ ++extern "C" { ++ #include ++ #include ++ #include ++ #include "../Ip6Impl.h" ++ #include "../Ip6Option.h" ++} ++ ++///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++// Defines ++/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++ ++#define IP6_PREFIX_INFO_OPTION_DATA_LEN 32 ++#define OPTION_HEADER_IP6_PREFIX_DATA_LEN (sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + IP6_PREFIX_INFO_OPTION_DATA_LEN) ++ ++//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++// Symbol Definitions ++// These functions are not directly under test - but required to compile ++//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++UINT32 mIp6Id; ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++Ip6SendIcmpError ( ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN NET_BUF *Packet, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *SourceAddress OPTIONAL, ++ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *DestinationAddress, ++ IN UINT8 Type, ++ IN UINT8 Code, ++ IN UINT32 *Pointer OPTIONAL ++ ) ++{ ++ // .. ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++// Ip6OptionValidation Tests ++//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++ ++// Define a fixture for your tests if needed ++class Ip6OptionValidationTest : public ::testing::Test { ++protected: ++ // Add any setup code if needed ++ virtual void ++ SetUp ( ++ ) ++ { ++ // Initialize any resources or variables ++ } ++ ++ // Add any cleanup code if needed ++ virtual void ++ TearDown ( ++ ) ++ { ++ // Clean up any resources or variables ++ } ++}; ++ ++// Test Description: ++// Null option should return false ++TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, NullOptionShouldReturnFalse) { ++ UINT8 *option = nullptr; ++ UINT16 optionLen = 10; // Provide a suitable length ++ ++ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen)); ++} ++ ++// Test Description: ++// Truncated option should return false ++TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, TruncatedOptionShouldReturnFalse) { ++ UINT8 option[] = { 0x01 }; // Provide a truncated option ++ UINT16 optionLen = 1; ++ ++ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen)); ++} ++ ++// Test Description: ++// Ip6OptionPrefixInfo Option with zero length should return false ++TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, OptionWithZeroLengthShouldReturnFalse) { ++ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader; ++ ++ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPrefixInfo; ++ optionHeader.Length = 0; ++ UINT8 option[sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)]; ++ ++ CopyMem (option, &optionHeader, sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)); ++ UINT16 optionLen = sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER); ++ ++ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen)); ++} ++ ++// Test Description: ++// Ip6OptionPrefixInfo Option with valid length should return true ++TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, ValidPrefixInfoOptionShouldReturnTrue) { ++ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader; ++ ++ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPrefixInfo; ++ optionHeader.Length = 4; // Length 4 * 8 = 32 ++ UINT8 option[OPTION_HEADER_IP6_PREFIX_DATA_LEN]; ++ ++ CopyMem (option, &optionHeader, sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)); ++ ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, IP6_PREFIX_INFO_OPTION_DATA_LEN)); ++} ++ ++// Test Description: ++// Ip6OptionPrefixInfo Option with invalid length should return false ++TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, InvalidPrefixInfoOptionLengthShouldReturnFalse) { ++ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader; ++ ++ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPrefixInfo; ++ optionHeader.Length = 3; // Length 3 * 8 = 24 (Invalid) ++ UINT8 option[sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)]; ++ ++ CopyMem (option, &optionHeader, sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)); ++ UINT16 optionLen = sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER); ++ ++ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen)); ++} +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc +index 20bc90b172..ab7c2857b6 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + # Build HOST_APPLICATION that tests NetworkPkg + # + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf ++ NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf + + # Despite these library classes being listed in [LibraryClasses] below, they are not needed for the host-based unit tests. + [LibraryClasses] +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Patc.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Patc.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a7b6eb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Patc.patch @@ -0,0 +1,377 @@ +From 23b31a16bbb789f4c251b1d2f23334210a9fb545 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:51:09 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 04/15] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Patch + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Commit: [4/15] 48c273e43a6275c7eae3223c4ffa433f4d6531a4 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21846 +CVE: CVE-2022-45232 +Upstream: Merged + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21848 +CVE: CVE-2022-45233 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 4df0229ef992d4f2721a8508787ebf9dc81fbd6e +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:50 2024 +0800 + + NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Patch + + REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4537 + REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4538 + + Bug Details: + PixieFail Bug #4 + CVE-2023-45232 + CVSS 7.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H + CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') + + Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options + header + + PixieFail Bug #5 + CVE-2023-45233 + CVSS 7.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H + CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') + + Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options + header + + Change Overview: + + Most importantly this change corrects the following incorrect math + and cleans up the code. + + > // It is a PadN option + > // + > - Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1) + 2); + > + OptDataLen = ((EFI_IP6_OPTION *)(Option + Offset))->Length; + > + Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen); + + > case Ip6OptionSkip: + > - Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1)); + > OptDataLen = ((EFI_IP6_OPTION *)(Option + Offset))->Length; + > Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen); + + Additionally, this change also corrects incorrect math where the calling + function was calculating the HDR EXT optionLen as a uint8 instead of a + uint16 + + > - OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 1) * 8 - 2); + > + OptionLen = IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (*Option) - + IP6_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_NEXT_HDR_AND_LEN; + + Additionally this check adds additional logic to santize the incoming + data + + Cc: Saloni Kasbekar + Cc: Zachary Clark-williams + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++ + NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h +index 860934a167..bf64e9114e 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h +@@ -56,13 +56,48 @@ VOID + VOID *Context + ); + ++// ++// Per RFC8200 Section 4.2 ++// ++// Two of the currently-defined extension headers -- the Hop-by-Hop ++// Options header and the Destination Options header -- carry a variable ++// number of type-length-value (TLV) encoded "options", of the following ++// format: ++// ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - - ++// | Option Type | Opt Data Len | Option Data ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - - ++// ++// Option Type 8-bit identifier of the type of option. ++// ++// Opt Data Len 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the Option ++// Data field of this option, in octets. ++// ++// Option Data Variable-length field. Option-Type-specific ++// data. ++// + typedef struct _IP6_OPTION_HEADER { ++ /// ++ /// identifier of the type of option. ++ /// + UINT8 Type; ++ /// ++ /// Length of the Option Data field of this option, in octets. ++ /// + UINT8 Length; ++ /// ++ /// Option-Type-specific data. ++ /// + } IP6_OPTION_HEADER; + + STATIC_ASSERT (sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) == 2, "IP6_OPTION_HEADER is expected to be exactly 2 bytes long."); + ++#define IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET(offset, length) (offset + sizeof(IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + length) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (0, 0) == 2, ++ "The next option is minimally the combined size of the option tag and length" ++ ); ++ + typedef struct _IP6_ETHE_ADDR_OPTION { + UINT8 Type; + UINT8 Length; +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c +index 8718d5d875..fd97ce116f 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c +@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ + @param[in] IpSb The IP6 service data. + @param[in] Packet The to be validated packet. + @param[in] Option The first byte of the option. +- @param[in] OptionLen The length of the whole option. ++ @param[in] OptionLen The length of all options, expressed in byte length of octets. ++ Maximum length is 2046 bytes or ((n + 1) * 8) - 2 where n is 255. + @param[in] Pointer Identifies the octet offset within + the invoking packet where the error was detected. + +@@ -31,12 +32,33 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid ( + IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, + IN NET_BUF *Packet, + IN UINT8 *Option, +- IN UINT8 OptionLen, ++ IN UINT16 OptionLen, + IN UINT32 Pointer + ) + { +- UINT8 Offset; +- UINT8 OptionType; ++ UINT16 Offset; ++ UINT8 OptionType; ++ UINT8 OptDataLen; ++ ++ if (Option == NULL) { ++ ASSERT (Option != NULL); ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ if ((OptionLen <= 0) || (OptionLen > IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH)) { ++ ASSERT (OptionLen > 0 && OptionLen <= IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH); ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ if (Packet == NULL) { ++ ASSERT (Packet != NULL); ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ if (IpSb == NULL) { ++ ASSERT (IpSb != NULL); ++ return FALSE; ++ } + + Offset = 0; + +@@ -54,7 +76,8 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid ( + // + // It is a PadN option + // +- Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1) + 2); ++ OptDataLen = ((IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)(Option + Offset))->Length; ++ Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen); + break; + case Ip6OptionRouterAlert: + // +@@ -69,7 +92,8 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid ( + // + switch (OptionType & Ip6OptionMask) { + case Ip6OptionSkip: +- Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1)); ++ OptDataLen = ((IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)(Option + Offset))->Length; ++ Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen); + break; + case Ip6OptionDiscard: + return FALSE; +@@ -308,7 +332,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + UINT32 Pointer; + UINT32 Offset; + UINT8 *Option; +- UINT8 OptionLen; ++ UINT16 OptionLen; + BOOLEAN Flag; + UINT8 CountD; + UINT8 CountA; +@@ -385,6 +409,36 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + // Fall through + // + case IP6_DESTINATION: ++ // ++ // See https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2460#section-4.2 page 23 ++ // ++ // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++ // | Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | | ++ // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + ++ // | | ++ // . . ++ // . Options . ++ // . . ++ // | | ++ // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++ // ++ // ++ // Next Header 8-bit selector. Identifies the type of header ++ // immediately following the Destination Options ++ // header. Uses the same values as the IPv4 ++ // Protocol field [RFC-1700 et seq.]. ++ // ++ // Hdr Ext Len 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the ++ // Destination Options header in 8-octet units, not ++ // including the first 8 octets. ++ // ++ // Options Variable-length field, of length such that the ++ // complete Destination Options header is an ++ // integer multiple of 8 octets long. Contains one ++ // or more TLV-encoded options, as described in ++ // section 4.2. ++ // ++ + if (*NextHeader == IP6_DESTINATION) { + CountD++; + } +@@ -398,7 +452,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + + Offset++; + Option = ExtHdrs + Offset; +- OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 1) * 8 - 2); ++ OptionLen = IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (*Option) - sizeof (IP6_EXT_HDR); + Option++; + Offset++; + +@@ -430,7 +484,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + // + // Ignore the routing header and proceed to process the next header. + // +- Offset = Offset + (RoutingHead->HeaderLen + 1) * 8; ++ Offset = Offset + IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (RoutingHead->HeaderLen); + + if (UnFragmentLen != NULL) { + *UnFragmentLen = Offset; +@@ -441,7 +495,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + // to the packet's source address, pointing to the unrecognized routing + // type. + // +- Pointer = Offset + 2 + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); ++ Pointer = Offset + sizeof (IP6_EXT_HDR) + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); + if ((IpSb != NULL) && (Packet != NULL) && + !IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress)) + { +@@ -527,7 +581,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + // + // RFC2402, Payload length is specified in 32-bit words, minus "2". + // +- OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 2) * 4); ++ OptionLen = ((UINT16)(*Option + 2) * 4); + Offset = Offset + OptionLen; + break; + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h +index bd8e223c8a..fb07c28f5a 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h +@@ -12,6 +12,77 @@ + + #define IP6_FRAGMENT_OFFSET_MASK (~0x3) + ++// ++// For more information see RFC 8200, Section 4.3, 4.4, and 4.6 ++// ++// This example format is from section 4.6 ++// This does not apply to fragment headers ++// ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + ++// | | ++// . . ++// . Header-Specific Data . ++// . . ++// | | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// ++// Next Header 8-bit selector. Identifies the type of ++// header immediately following the extension ++// header. Uses the same values as the IPv4 ++// Protocol field [IANA-PN]. ++// ++// Hdr Ext Len 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the ++// Destination Options header in 8-octet units, ++// not including the first 8 octets. ++ ++// ++// These defines apply to the following: ++// 1. Hop by Hop ++// 2. Routing ++// 3. Destination ++// ++typedef struct _IP6_EXT_HDR { ++ /// ++ /// The Next Header field identifies the type of header immediately ++ /// ++ UINT8 NextHeader; ++ /// ++ /// The Hdr Ext Len field specifies the length of the Hop-by-Hop Options ++ /// ++ UINT8 HdrExtLen; ++ /// ++ /// Header-Specific Data ++ /// ++} IP6_EXT_HDR; ++ ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ sizeof (IP6_EXT_HDR) == 2, ++ "The combined size of Next Header and Len is two 8 bit fields" ++ ); ++ ++// ++// IPv6 extension headers contain an 8-bit length field which describes the size of ++// the header. However, the length field only includes the size of the extension ++// header options, not the size of the first 8 bytes of the header. Therefore, in ++// order to calculate the full size of the extension header, we add 1 (to account ++// for the first 8 bytes omitted by the length field reporting) and then multiply ++// by 8 (since the size is represented in 8-byte units). ++// ++// a is the length field of the extension header (UINT8) ++// The result may be up to 2046 octets (UINT16) ++// ++#define IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN(a) (((UINT16)((UINT8)(a)) + 1) * 8) ++ ++// This is the maxmimum length permissible by a extension header ++// Length is UINT8 of 8 octets not including the first 8 octets ++#define IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH (IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (MAX_UINT8) - sizeof(IP6_EXT_HDR)) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH == 2046, ++ "Maximum data length is ((MAX_UINT8 + 1) * 8) - 2" ++ ); ++ + typedef struct _IP6_FRAGMENT_HEADER { + UINT8 NextHeader; + UINT8 Reserved; +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Unit.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Unit.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1add20a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Unit.patch @@ -0,0 +1,430 @@ +From 2bd8bc051f6394f2ab3c22649c54ecbed5d636cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 20:25:29 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 05/15] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Unit + Tests + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Commit: [5/15] 624365d403df25927ab0514b0e25faea7376def8 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21846 +CVE: CVE-2022-45232 +Upstream: Merged + +commit c9c87f08dd6ace36fa843424522c3558a8374cac +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:51 2024 +0800 + + NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Unit Tests + + REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4537 + REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4538 + + Unit tests to confirm that.. + Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options + header + + and + + Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options + header + + ... have been patched + + This patch tests the following functions: + Ip6IsOptionValid + + Cc: Saloni Kasbekar + Cc: Zachary Clark-williams + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf | 10 +- + .../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp | 278 ++++++++++++++++++ + .../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h | 40 +++ + 3 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf +index 6e4de0745f..ba29dbabad 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf +@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ + ## @file +-# Unit test suite for the Ip6Dxe using Google Test ++# Unit test suite for the Ip6DxeGoogleTest using Google Test + # + # Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
+ # SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + ## + [Defines] + INF_VERSION = 0x00010017 +- BASE_NAME = Ip6DxeUnitTest +- FILE_GUID = 4F05D17D-D3E7-4AAE-820C-576D46D2D34A ++ BASE_NAME = Ip6DxeGoogleTest ++ FILE_GUID = AE39981C-B7FE-41A8-A9C2-F41910477CA3 + VERSION_STRING = 1.0 + MODULE_TYPE = HOST_APPLICATION + # +@@ -16,9 +16,11 @@ + # VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 AARCH64 + # + [Sources] ++ ../Ip6Option.c ++ Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h + Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp + Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp +- ../Ip6Option.c ++ Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h + + [Packages] + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp +index f2cd90e1a9..29f8a4a96e 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp +@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ extern "C" { + #include + #include "../Ip6Impl.h" + #include "../Ip6Option.h" ++ #include "Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h" + } + + ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +@@ -127,3 +128,280 @@ TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, InvalidPrefixInfoOptionLengthShouldReturnFalse) + + EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen)); + } ++ ++//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++// Ip6IsOptionValid Tests ++//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++ ++// Define a fixture for your tests if needed ++class Ip6IsOptionValidTest : public ::testing::Test { ++protected: ++ // Add any setup code if needed ++ virtual void ++ SetUp ( ++ ) ++ { ++ // Initialize any resources or variables ++ } ++ ++ // Add any cleanup code if needed ++ virtual void ++ TearDown ( ++ ) ++ { ++ // Clean up any resources or variables ++ } ++}; ++ ++// Test Description ++// Verify that a NULL option is Invalid ++TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, NullOptionShouldReturnTrue) { ++ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 }; ++ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work ++ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above ++ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = NULL; ++ ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 }; ++ ++ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress; ++ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress; ++ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header; ++ ++ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, NULL, 0, 0)); ++} ++ ++// Test Description ++// Verify that an unknown option with a length of 0 and type of does not cause an infinite loop ++TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyNoInfiniteLoopOnUnknownOptionLength0) { ++ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 }; ++ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work ++ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above ++ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de; ++ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it ++ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode; ++ ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 }; ++ ++ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress; ++ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress; ++ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header; ++ ++ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader; ++ ++ optionHeader.Type = 23; // Unknown Option ++ optionHeader.Length = 0; // This will cause an infinite loop if the function is not working correctly ++ ++ // This should be a valid option even though the length is 0 ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0)); ++} ++ ++// Test Description ++// Verify that an unknown option with a length of 1 and type of does not cause an infinite loop ++TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyNoInfiniteLoopOnUnknownOptionLength1) { ++ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 }; ++ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work ++ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above ++ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de; ++ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it ++ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode; ++ ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 }; ++ ++ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress; ++ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress; ++ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header; ++ ++ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader; ++ ++ optionHeader.Type = 23; // Unknown Option ++ optionHeader.Length = 1; // This will cause an infinite loop if the function is not working correctly ++ ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0)); ++} ++ ++// Test Description ++// Verify that an unknown option with a length of 2 and type of does not cause an infinite loop ++TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyIpSkipUnknownOption) { ++ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 }; ++ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work ++ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above ++ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de; ++ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it ++ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode; ++ ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 }; ++ ++ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress; ++ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress; ++ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header; ++ ++ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader; ++ ++ optionHeader.Type = 23; // Unknown Option ++ optionHeader.Length = 2; // Valid length for an unknown option ++ ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0)); ++} ++ ++// Test Description ++// Verify that Ip6OptionPad1 is valid with a length of 0 ++TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyIp6OptionPad1) { ++ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 }; ++ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work ++ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above ++ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de; ++ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it ++ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode; ++ ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 }; ++ ++ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress; ++ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress; ++ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header; ++ ++ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader; ++ ++ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPad1; ++ optionHeader.Length = 0; ++ ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0)); ++} ++ ++// Test Description ++// Verify that Ip6OptionPadN doesn't overflow with various lengths ++TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyIp6OptionPadN) { ++ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 }; ++ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work ++ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above ++ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de; ++ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it ++ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode; ++ ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 }; ++ ++ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress; ++ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress; ++ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header; ++ ++ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader; ++ ++ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPadN; ++ optionHeader.Length = 0xFF; ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0)); ++ ++ optionHeader.Length = 0xFE; ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0)); ++ ++ optionHeader.Length = 0xFD; ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0)); ++ ++ optionHeader.Length = 0xFC; ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0)); ++} ++ ++// Test Description ++// Verify an unknown option doesn't cause an infinite loop with various lengths ++TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyNoInfiniteLoopOnUnknownOptionLengthAttemptOverflow) { ++ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 }; ++ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work ++ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above ++ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de; ++ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it ++ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode; ++ ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 }; ++ ++ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress; ++ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress; ++ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header; ++ ++ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader; ++ ++ optionHeader.Type = 23; // Unknown Option ++ optionHeader.Length = 0xFF; ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0)); ++ ++ optionHeader.Length = 0xFE; ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0)); ++ ++ optionHeader.Length = 0xFD; ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0)); ++ ++ optionHeader.Length = 0xFC; ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0)); ++} ++ ++// Test Description ++// Verify that the function supports multiple options ++TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, MultiOptionSupport) { ++ UINT16 HdrLen; ++ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 }; ++ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work ++ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above ++ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de; ++ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it ++ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode; ++ ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 }; ++ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 }; ++ ++ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress; ++ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress; ++ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header; ++ ++ UINT8 ExtHdr[1024] = { 0 }; ++ UINT8 *Cursor = ExtHdr; ++ IP6_OPTION_HEADER *Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)ExtHdr; ++ ++ // Let's start chaining options ++ ++ Option->Type = 23; // Unknown Option ++ Option->Length = 0xFC; ++ ++ Cursor += sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + 0xFC; ++ ++ Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)Cursor; ++ Option->Type = Ip6OptionPad1; ++ ++ Cursor += sizeof (1); ++ ++ // Type and length aren't processed, instead it just moves the pointer forward by 4 bytes ++ Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)Cursor; ++ Option->Type = Ip6OptionRouterAlert; ++ Option->Length = 4; ++ ++ Cursor += sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + 4; ++ ++ Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)Cursor; ++ Option->Type = Ip6OptionPadN; ++ Option->Length = 0xFC; ++ ++ Cursor += sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + 0xFC; ++ ++ Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)Cursor; ++ Option->Type = Ip6OptionRouterAlert; ++ Option->Length = 4; ++ ++ Cursor += sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + 4; ++ ++ // Total 524 ++ ++ HdrLen = (UINT16)(Cursor - ExtHdr); ++ ++ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, ExtHdr, HdrLen, 0)); ++} +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..0509b6ae30 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h +@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ ++/** @file ++ Exposes the functions needed to test the Ip6Option module. ++ ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++ ++#ifndef IP6_OPTION_HEADER_GOOGLE_TEST_H_ ++#define IP6_OPTION_HEADER_GOOGLE_TEST_H_ ++ ++#include ++#include "../Ip6Impl.h" ++ ++/** ++ Validate the IP6 option format for both the packets we received ++ and that we will transmit. It will compute the ICMPv6 error message fields ++ if the option is malformatted. ++ ++ @param[in] IpSb The IP6 service data. ++ @param[in] Packet The to be validated packet. ++ @param[in] Option The first byte of the option. ++ @param[in] OptionLen The length of the whole option. ++ @param[in] Pointer Identifies the octet offset within ++ the invoking packet where the error was detected. ++ ++ ++ @retval TRUE The option is properly formatted. ++ @retval FALSE The option is malformatted. ++ ++**/ ++BOOLEAN ++Ip6IsOptionValid ( ++ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, ++ IN NET_BUF *Packet, ++ IN UINT8 *Option, ++ IN UINT16 OptionLen, ++ IN UINT32 Pointer ++ ); ++ ++#endif // __IP6_OPTION_HEADER_GOOGLE_TEST_H__ +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECUR-PATCH-CVE-2023-45234.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523.patch similarity index 91% rename from SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECUR-PATCH-CVE-2023-45234.patch rename to SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523.patch index 3af6219..8e6f603 100644 --- a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECUR-PATCH-CVE-2023-45234.patch +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523.patch @@ -1,17 +1,17 @@ -From 02266fef2b5320a41f79cebd4b6c5a83f1036427 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 38baf93892ec464490b6fe611c23b014f574344b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 2/3] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234 +Subject: [PATCH 07/15] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234 Patch RH-Author: Jon Maloy -RH-MergeRequest: 60: NetworkPkg: Apply uncrustify changes -RH-Jira: RHEL-22002 +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen -RH-Commit: [2/3] 3d71d4ca4e6cc0deb9af78b3b7901a93120de210 (jmaloy/jons_fork) +RH-Commit: [7/15] c1baa0b2facbf0b63a90a0bfd55264af9f893098 -JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-22002 +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21850 CVE: CVE-2022-45234 Upstream: Merged @@ -164,5 +164,5 @@ index 425e0cf806..2b2d372889 100644 if (Cache6->OfferType == PxeOfferTypeDhcpBinl) { -- -2.41.0 +2.39.3 diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECUR-PATCH-CVE-2023-45234_U.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p2.patch similarity index 94% rename from SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECUR-PATCH-CVE-2023-45234_U.patch rename to SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p2.patch index b5cefa6..aac0738 100644 --- a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECUR-PATCH-CVE-2023-45234_U.patch +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p2.patch @@ -1,17 +1,17 @@ -From 35e5b7bfce3e681396e135895982efbe1738abe5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From fd1bc6ff10a45123b0ec7f9ae3354ad3713bc532 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 3/3] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234 +Subject: [PATCH 08/15] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234 Unit Tests RH-Author: Jon Maloy -RH-MergeRequest: 60: NetworkPkg: Apply uncrustify changes -RH-Jira: RHEL-22002 +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen -RH-Commit: [3/3] c9a2a4b0845baab4528dfab21dbc9f508318f301 (jmaloy/jons_fork) +RH-Commit: [8/15] f88ebc7fa79ce4fe615dd79c42fedee0a0da7a0b -JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-22002 +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21850 CVE: CVE-2022-45234 Upstream: Merged @@ -42,26 +42,25 @@ Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:53 2024 +0800 Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy --- - NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc | 2 + + NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc | 1 + .../GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp | 300 ++++++++++++++++++ .../GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h | 50 +++ .../GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.cpp | 19 ++ .../GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf | 48 +++ - 5 files changed, 419 insertions(+) + 5 files changed, 418 insertions(+) create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.cpp create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc -index 20bc90b172..c8a991e5c1 100644 +index ab7c2857b6..c8a991e5c1 100644 --- a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc +++ b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc -@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ - # Build HOST_APPLICATION that tests NetworkPkg +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ # NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf -+ NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf + NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf + NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf # Despite these library classes being listed in [LibraryClasses] below, they are not needed for the host-based unit tests. @@ -508,5 +507,5 @@ index 0000000000..301dcdf611 +[Guids] + gZeroGuid -- -2.41.0 +2.39.3 diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p3.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..beaa36f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ +From 0016db53099ba979617f376fe1104fefada4fa29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 09/15] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 + Patch + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Commit: [9/15] c48c060b87761537ee526e1f8a9e5993eb1a0381 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21852 +CVE: CVE-2022-45235 +Upstream: Merged + +commit fac297724e6cc343430cd0104e55cd7a96d1151e +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:55 2024 +0800 + + NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Patch + + REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4540 + + Bug Details: + PixieFail Bug #7 + CVE-2023-45235 + CVSS 8.3 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H + CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of + a Memory Buffer + + Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy + Advertise message + + Change Overview: + + Performs two checks + + 1. Checks that the length of the duid is accurate + > + // + > + // Check that the minimum and maximum requirements are met + > + // + > + if ((OpLen < PXEBC_MIN_SIZE_OF_DUID) || + (OpLen > PXEBC_MAX_SIZE_OF_DUID)) { + > + Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + > + goto ON_ERROR; + > + } + + 2. Ensures that the amount of data written to the buffer is tracked and + never exceeds that + > + // + > + // Check that the option length is valid. + > + // + > + if ((DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN) + > DiscoverLenNeeded) { + > + Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + > + goto ON_ERROR; + > + } + + Additional code clean up and fix for memory leak in case Option was NULL + + Cc: Saloni Kasbekar + Cc: Zachary Clark-williams + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++------ + NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h | 17 ++++++ + 2 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c +index 2b2d372889..7fd1281c11 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c +@@ -887,6 +887,7 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService ( + EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *IndexOffer; + UINT8 *Option; ++ UINTN DiscoverLenNeeded; + + PxeBc = &Private->PxeBc; + Request = Private->Dhcp6Request; +@@ -899,7 +900,8 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService ( + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +- Discover = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET)); ++ DiscoverLenNeeded = sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET); ++ Discover = AllocateZeroPool (DiscoverLenNeeded); + if (Discover == NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } +@@ -924,16 +926,34 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService ( + DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID + ); + if (Option == NULL) { +- return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // + // Add Server ID Option. + // + OpLen = NTOHS (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)Option)->OpLen); +- CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, Option, OpLen + 4); +- DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + 4); +- DiscoverLen += (OpLen + 4); ++ ++ // ++ // Check that the minimum and maximum requirements are met ++ // ++ if ((OpLen < PXEBC_MIN_SIZE_OF_DUID) || (OpLen > PXEBC_MAX_SIZE_OF_DUID)) { ++ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Check that the option length is valid. ++ // ++ if ((DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN) > DiscoverLenNeeded) { ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, Option, OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ DiscoverLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); + } + + while (RequestLen < Request->Length) { +@@ -944,16 +964,24 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService ( + (OpCode != DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID) + ) + { ++ // ++ // Check that the option length is valid. ++ // ++ if (DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN > DiscoverLenNeeded) { ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } ++ + // + // Copy all the options except IA option and Server ID + // +- CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + 4); +- DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + 4); +- DiscoverLen += (OpLen + 4); ++ CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ DiscoverLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); + } + +- RequestOpt += (OpLen + 4); +- RequestLen += (OpLen + 4); ++ RequestOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ RequestLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); + } + + // +@@ -2154,6 +2182,7 @@ PxeBcDhcp6Discover ( + UINT16 OpLen; + UINT32 Xid; + EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINTN DiscoverLenNeeded; + + PxeBc = &Private->PxeBc; + Mode = PxeBc->Mode; +@@ -2169,7 +2198,8 @@ PxeBcDhcp6Discover ( + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +- Discover = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET)); ++ DiscoverLenNeeded = sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET); ++ Discover = AllocateZeroPool (DiscoverLenNeeded); + if (Discover == NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } +@@ -2185,22 +2215,37 @@ PxeBcDhcp6Discover ( + DiscoverLen = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER); + RequestLen = DiscoverLen; + ++ // ++ // The request packet is generated by the UEFI network stack. In the DHCP4 DORA and DHCP6 SARR sequence, ++ // the first (discover in DHCP4 and solicit in DHCP6) and third (request in both DHCP4 and DHCP6) are ++ // generated by the DHCP client (the UEFI network stack in this case). By the time this function executes, ++ // the DHCP sequence already has been executed once (see UEFI Specification Figures 24.2 and 24.3), with ++ // Private->Dhcp6Request being a cached copy of the DHCP6 request packet that UEFI network stack previously ++ // generated and sent. ++ // ++ // Therefore while this code looks like it could overflow, in practice it's not possible. ++ // + while (RequestLen < Request->Length) { + OpCode = NTOHS (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)RequestOpt)->OpCode); + OpLen = NTOHS (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)RequestOpt)->OpLen); + if ((OpCode != EFI_DHCP6_IA_TYPE_NA) && + (OpCode != EFI_DHCP6_IA_TYPE_TA)) + { ++ if (DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN > DiscoverLenNeeded) { ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } ++ + // + // Copy all the options except IA option. + // +- CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + 4); +- DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + 4); +- DiscoverLen += (OpLen + 4); ++ CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ DiscoverLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); + } + +- RequestOpt += (OpLen + 4); +- RequestLen += (OpLen + 4); ++ RequestOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ RequestLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); + } + + Status = PxeBc->UdpWrite ( +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h +index ae4be775e8..47eb8cc0c0 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h +@@ -35,6 +35,23 @@ + #define PXEBC_ADDR_START_DELIMITER '[' + #define PXEBC_ADDR_END_DELIMITER ']' + ++// ++// A DUID consists of a 2-octet type code represented in network byte ++// order, followed by a variable number of octets that make up the ++// actual identifier. The length of the DUID (not including the type ++// code) is at least 1 octet and at most 128 octets. ++// ++#define PXEBC_MIN_SIZE_OF_DUID (sizeof(UINT16) + 1) ++#define PXEBC_MAX_SIZE_OF_DUID (sizeof(UINT16) + 128) ++ ++// ++// This define represents the combineds code and length field from ++// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3315#section-22.1 ++// ++#define PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN \ ++ (sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpCode) + \ ++ sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpLen)) ++ + #define GET_NEXT_DHCP6_OPTION(Opt) \ + (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *) ((UINT8 *) (Opt) + \ + sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION) + (NTOHS ((Opt)->OpLen)) - 1) +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p4.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8380050 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,409 @@ +From 80b34c0f56228353c174f9ff739d0755c62d76cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 10/15] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 + Unit Tests + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 56: Pixiefail issues in NetworkPkg package +RH-Jira: RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Commit: [10/15] 5dbf3f771506ff9a0c28827c568d04e825572658 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21852 +CVE: CVE-2022-45235 +Upstream: Merged + +commit ff2986358f75d8f58ef08a66fe673539c9c48f41 +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:56 2024 +0800 + + NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Unit Tests + + REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4540 + + Unit tests to confirm that the bug.. + + Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy + Advertise message + + ..has been patched. + + This patch contains unit tests for the following functions: + PxeBcRequestBootService + PxeBcDhcp6Discover + + Cc: Saloni Kasbekar + Cc: Zachary Clark-williams + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc | 5 +- + .../GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp | 278 +++++++++++++++++- + .../GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h | 18 ++ + 3 files changed, 298 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc +index c8a991e5c1..1010a80a15 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc +@@ -26,7 +26,10 @@ + # + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf + NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf +- NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf ++ NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf { ++ ++ UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib|MdePkg/Test/Mock/Library/GoogleTest/MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib/MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.inf ++ } + + # Despite these library classes being listed in [LibraryClasses] below, they are not needed for the host-based unit tests. + [LibraryClasses] +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp +index 8260eeee50..bd423ebadf 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp ++++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp +@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@ + Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation + SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + **/ +-#include ++#include ++#include ++#include + + extern "C" { + #include +@@ -19,7 +21,8 @@ extern "C" { + // Definitions + /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + +-#define PACKET_SIZE (1500) ++#define PACKET_SIZE (1500) ++#define REQUEST_OPTION_LENGTH (120) + + typedef struct { + UINT16 OptionCode; // The option code for DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID (e.g., 0x03) +@@ -76,6 +79,26 @@ MockConfigure ( + } + + // Needed by PxeBcSupport ++EFI_STATUS ++PxeBcDns6 ( ++ IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private, ++ IN CHAR16 *HostName, ++ OUT EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *IpAddress ++ ) ++{ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++UINT32 ++PxeBcBuildDhcp6Options ( ++ IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private, ++ OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION **OptList, ++ IN UINT8 *Buffer ++ ) ++{ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + QueueDpc ( +@@ -159,6 +182,10 @@ TEST_F (PxeBcHandleDhcp6OfferTest, BasicUsageTest) { + ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcHandleDhcp6Offer (&(PxeBcHandleDhcp6OfferTest::Private)), EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); + } + ++/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++// PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses Tests ++/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++ + class PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest : public ::testing::Test { + public: + PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA Private = { 0 }; +@@ -298,3 +325,250 @@ TEST_F (PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest, MultipleDnsEntries) { + FreePool (Private.DnsServer); + } + } ++ ++/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++// PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest Test Cases ++/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++ ++class PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest : public ::testing::Test { ++public: ++ PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA Private = { 0 }; ++ EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL Udp6Read; ++ ++protected: ++ // Add any setup code if needed ++ virtual void ++ SetUp ( ++ ) ++ { ++ Private.Dhcp6Request = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)AllocateZeroPool (PACKET_SIZE); ++ ++ // Need to setup the EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_PROTOCOL ++ // The function under test really only needs the following: ++ // UdpWrite ++ // UdpRead ++ ++ Private.PxeBc.UdpWrite = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_WRITE)MockUdpWrite; ++ Private.PxeBc.UdpRead = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_READ)MockUdpRead; ++ ++ // Need to setup EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL ++ // The function under test really only needs the following: ++ // Configure ++ ++ Udp6Read.Configure = (EFI_UDP6_CONFIGURE)MockConfigure; ++ Private.Udp6Read = &Udp6Read; ++ } ++ ++ // Add any cleanup code if needed ++ virtual void ++ TearDown ( ++ ) ++ { ++ if (Private.Dhcp6Request != NULL) { ++ FreePool (Private.Dhcp6Request); ++ } ++ ++ // Clean up any resources or variables ++ } ++}; ++ ++TEST_F (PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest, ServerDiscoverBasicUsageTest) { ++ PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private.OfferBuffer[0].Dhcp6.OfferType = PxeOfferTypeProxyBinl; ++ ++ DHCP6_OPTION_SERVER_ID Server = { 0 }; ++ ++ Server.OptionCode = HTONS (DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID); ++ Server.OptionLen = HTONS (16); // valid length ++ UINT8 Index = 0; ++ ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)&Private.OfferBuffer[Index].Dhcp6.Packet.Offer; ++ ++ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Packet->Dhcp6.Option); ++ ++ CopyMem (Cursor, &Server, sizeof (Server)); ++ Cursor += sizeof (Server); ++ ++ // Update the packet length ++ Packet->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Packet); ++ Packet->Size = PACKET_SIZE; ++ ++ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcRequestBootService (&(PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private), Index), EFI_SUCCESS); ++} ++ ++TEST_F (PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest, AttemptDiscoverOverFlowExpectFailure) { ++ PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private.OfferBuffer[0].Dhcp6.OfferType = PxeOfferTypeProxyBinl; ++ ++ DHCP6_OPTION_SERVER_ID Server = { 0 }; ++ ++ Server.OptionCode = HTONS (DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID); ++ Server.OptionLen = HTONS (1500); // This length would overflow without a check ++ UINT8 Index = 0; ++ ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)&Private.OfferBuffer[Index].Dhcp6.Packet.Offer; ++ ++ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Packet->Dhcp6.Option); ++ ++ CopyMem (Cursor, &Server, sizeof (Server)); ++ Cursor += sizeof (Server); ++ ++ // Update the packet length ++ Packet->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Packet); ++ Packet->Size = PACKET_SIZE; ++ ++ // This is going to be stopped by the duid overflow check ++ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcRequestBootService (&(PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private), Index), EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER); ++} ++ ++TEST_F (PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest, RequestBasicUsageTest) { ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION RequestOpt = { 0 }; // the data section doesn't really matter ++ ++ RequestOpt.OpCode = HTONS (0x1337); ++ RequestOpt.OpLen = 0; // valid length ++ ++ UINT8 Index = 0; ++ ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)&Private.Dhcp6Request[Index]; ++ ++ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Packet->Dhcp6.Option); ++ ++ CopyMem (Cursor, &RequestOpt, sizeof (RequestOpt)); ++ Cursor += sizeof (RequestOpt); ++ ++ // Update the packet length ++ Packet->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Packet); ++ Packet->Size = PACKET_SIZE; ++ ++ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcRequestBootService (&(PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private), Index), EFI_SUCCESS); ++} ++ ++TEST_F (PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest, AttemptRequestOverFlowExpectFailure) { ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION RequestOpt = { 0 }; // the data section doesn't really matter ++ ++ RequestOpt.OpCode = HTONS (0x1337); ++ RequestOpt.OpLen = 1500; // this length would overflow without a check ++ ++ UINT8 Index = 0; ++ ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)&Private.Dhcp6Request[Index]; ++ ++ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Packet->Dhcp6.Option); ++ ++ CopyMem (Cursor, &RequestOpt, sizeof (RequestOpt)); ++ Cursor += sizeof (RequestOpt); ++ ++ // Update the packet length ++ Packet->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Packet); ++ Packet->Size = PACKET_SIZE; ++ ++ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcRequestBootService (&(PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private), Index), EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES); ++} ++ ++/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++// PxeBcDhcp6Discover Test ++/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// ++ ++class PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest : public ::testing::Test { ++public: ++ PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA Private = { 0 }; ++ EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL Udp6Read; ++ ++protected: ++ MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib RtServicesMock; ++ ++ // Add any setup code if needed ++ virtual void ++ SetUp ( ++ ) ++ { ++ Private.Dhcp6Request = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)AllocateZeroPool (PACKET_SIZE); ++ ++ // Need to setup the EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_PROTOCOL ++ // The function under test really only needs the following: ++ // UdpWrite ++ // UdpRead ++ ++ Private.PxeBc.UdpWrite = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_WRITE)MockUdpWrite; ++ Private.PxeBc.UdpRead = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_READ)MockUdpRead; ++ ++ // Need to setup EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL ++ // The function under test really only needs the following: ++ // Configure ++ ++ Udp6Read.Configure = (EFI_UDP6_CONFIGURE)MockConfigure; ++ Private.Udp6Read = &Udp6Read; ++ } ++ ++ // Add any cleanup code if needed ++ virtual void ++ TearDown ( ++ ) ++ { ++ if (Private.Dhcp6Request != NULL) { ++ FreePool (Private.Dhcp6Request); ++ } ++ ++ // Clean up any resources or variables ++ } ++}; ++ ++// Test Description ++// This will cause an overflow by an untrusted packet during the option parsing ++TEST_F (PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest, BasicOverflowTest) { ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestIp = { 0 }; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION RequestOpt = { 0 }; // the data section doesn't really matter ++ ++ RequestOpt.OpCode = HTONS (0x1337); ++ RequestOpt.OpLen = HTONS (0xFFFF); // overflow ++ ++ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Private.Dhcp6Request->Dhcp6.Option); ++ ++ CopyMem (Cursor, &RequestOpt, sizeof (RequestOpt)); ++ Cursor += sizeof (RequestOpt); ++ ++ Private.Dhcp6Request->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Private.Dhcp6Request); ++ ++ EXPECT_CALL (RtServicesMock, gRT_GetTime) ++ .WillOnce (::testing::Return (0)); ++ ++ ASSERT_EQ ( ++ PxeBcDhcp6Discover ( ++ &(PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest::Private), ++ 0, ++ NULL, ++ FALSE, ++ (EFI_IP_ADDRESS *)&DestIp ++ ), ++ EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ ); ++} ++ ++// Test Description ++// This will test that we can handle a packet with a valid option length ++TEST_F (PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest, BasicUsageTest) { ++ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestIp = { 0 }; ++ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION RequestOpt = { 0 }; // the data section doesn't really matter ++ ++ RequestOpt.OpCode = HTONS (0x1337); ++ RequestOpt.OpLen = HTONS (0x30); ++ ++ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Private.Dhcp6Request->Dhcp6.Option); ++ ++ CopyMem (Cursor, &RequestOpt, sizeof (RequestOpt)); ++ Cursor += sizeof (RequestOpt); ++ ++ Private.Dhcp6Request->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Private.Dhcp6Request); ++ ++ EXPECT_CALL (RtServicesMock, gRT_GetTime) ++ .WillOnce (::testing::Return (0)); ++ ++ ASSERT_EQ ( ++ PxeBcDhcp6Discover ( ++ &(PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest::Private), ++ 0, ++ NULL, ++ FALSE, ++ (EFI_IP_ADDRESS *)&DestIp ++ ), ++ EFI_SUCCESS ++ ); ++} +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h +index b17c314791..0d825e4425 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h +@@ -47,4 +47,22 @@ PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses ( + IN PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE *Cache6 + ); + ++/** ++ Build and send out the request packet for the bootfile, and parse the reply. ++ ++ @param[in] Private The pointer to PxeBc private data. ++ @param[in] Index PxeBc option boot item type. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully discovered the boot file. ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to allocate resources. ++ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't get the PXE reply packet. ++ @retval Others Failed to discover the boot file. ++ ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++PxeBcRequestBootService ( ++ IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private, ++ IN UINT32 Index ++ ); ++ + #endif // PXE_BC_DHCP6_GOOGLE_TEST_H_ +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-ValidateFvHeader-unwritten-s.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-ValidateFvHeader-unwritten-s.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..adf5b38 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-ValidateFvHeader-unwritten-s.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From f2aeff31924f6d070d7f8b87550dc6d9820531ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:04 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 15/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: ValidateFvHeader: unwritten + state is EOL too + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [17/20] 37220c700ea816c815e0612031e10b7d466b71a2 + +It is possible to find variable entries with State being 0xff, i.e. not +updated since flash block erase. This indicates the variable driver +could not complete the header write while appending a new entry, and +therefore State was not set to VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY. + +This can only happen at the end of the variable list, so treat this as +additional "end of variable list" condition. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-6-kraxel@redhat.com> +(cherry picked from commit 735d0a5e2e25c1577bf9bea7826da937ca38169d) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c +index acc4a413ee..f8e71f88c1 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c +@@ -302,6 +302,11 @@ ValidateFvHeader ( + break; + } + ++ if (VarHeader->State == 0xff) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: end of var list (unwritten state)\n", __func__)); ++ break; ++ } ++ + VarName = NULL; + switch (VarHeader->State) { + // usage: State = VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-a-loop-for-NorFlashWrite.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-a-loop-for-NorFlashWrite.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4fc7c3e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-a-loop-for-NorFlashWrite.patch @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From 00d9e2d6cb03afeef5a1110d6f1fae1389a06f7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 13/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: add a loop for + NorFlashWriteBuffer calls. + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [15/20] 72004a196ea61d627ab528573db657dd7db16de2 + +Replace the two NorFlashWriteBuffer() calls with a loop containing a +single NorFlashWriteBuffer() call. + +With the changes in place the code is able to handle updates larger +than two P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES blocks, even though the patch +does not actually change the size limit. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-4-kraxel@redhat.com> +(cherry picked from commit 28ffd726894f11a587a6ac7f71a4c4af341e24d2) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 21 ++++++++------------- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +index 88a4d2c23f..3d1343b381 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +@@ -521,6 +521,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + UINTN BlockAddress; + UINT8 *OrigData; + UINTN Start, End; ++ UINT32 Index, Count; + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock(Parameters: Lba=%ld, Offset=0x%x, *NumBytes=0x%x, Buffer @ 0x%08x)\n", Lba, Offset, *NumBytes, Buffer)); + +@@ -621,23 +622,17 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + goto Exit; + } + +- Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer ( +- Instance, +- BlockAddress + Start, +- P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES, +- Instance->ShadowBuffer +- ); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- goto Exit; +- } +- +- if ((End - Start) > P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES) { ++ Count = (End - Start) / P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES; ++ for (Index = 0; Index < Count; Index++) { + Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer ( + Instance, +- BlockAddress + Start + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES, ++ BlockAddress + Start + Index * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES, + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES, +- Instance->ShadowBuffer + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES ++ Instance->ShadowBuffer + Index * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto Exit; ++ } + } + + Exit: +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-casts-to-UINTN-and-UINT3.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-casts-to-UINTN-and-UINT3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2494899 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-casts-to-UINTN-and-UINT3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From e8150ee7fdf1421d2e2801c901e0196496ef599e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:00 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 11/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: add casts to UINTN and UINT32 +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [13/20] fa695acadb9d693242b5221d2bc1958b929718e7 + +This is needed to avoid bit operations being applied to signed integers. + +Suggested-by: László Érsek +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-2-kraxel@redhat.com> +(cherry picked from commit 0395045ae307c43a41f72ca9a8bf4eb8f16b2fe0) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +index 1afd60ce66..7f4743b003 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + // contents, while checking whether the old version had any bits cleared + // that we want to set. In that case, we will need to erase the block first. + for (CurOffset = 0; CurOffset < *NumBytes; CurOffset++) { +- if (~OrigData[CurOffset] & Buffer[CurOffset]) { ++ if (~(UINT32)OrigData[CurOffset] & (UINT32)Buffer[CurOffset]) { + goto DoErase; + } + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h +index b7f5d208b2..455eafacc2 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h +@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ + #define P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES ((UINTN)128) + #define P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_WORDS (P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES/((UINTN)4)) + #define MAX_BUFFERED_PROG_ITERATIONS 10000000 +-#define BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS 0x7F ++#define BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS ((UINTN)0x7F) + + // CFI Addresses + #define P30_CFI_ADDR_QUERY_UNIQUE_QRY 0x10 +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-allow-larger-writes-without-.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-allow-larger-writes-without-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f30a257 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-allow-larger-writes-without-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From 0193a89b0db837da31301bc1edb8382927842978 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:03 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 14/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: allow larger writes without + block erase + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [16/20] 27ac63b90eb5e6fdc00cbc5a9105c3178ee559cd + +Raise the limit for writes without block erase from two to four +P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES blocks. With this in place almost all efi +variable updates are handled without block erase. With the old limit +some variable updates (with device paths) took the block erase code +path. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-5-kraxel@redhat.com> +(cherry picked from commit b25733c97442513890ae6bb8e10fd340f13844a7) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +index 3d1343b381..3d1d20daa1 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +@@ -550,13 +550,15 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; + } + +- // Pick P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES (== 128 bytes) as a good start for word +- // operations as opposed to erasing the block and writing the data regardless +- // if an erase is really needed. It looks like most individual NV variable +- // writes are smaller than 128 bytes. +- // To avoid pathological cases were a 2 byte write is disregarded because it +- // occurs right at a 128 byte buffered write alignment boundary, permit up to +- // twice the max buffer size, and perform two writes if needed. ++ // Pick 4 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES (== 512 bytes) as a good ++ // start for word operations as opposed to erasing the block and ++ // writing the data regardless if an erase is really needed. ++ // ++ // Many NV variable updates are small enough for a a single ++ // P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES block write. In case the update is ++ // larger than a single block, or the update crosses a ++ // P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES boundary (as shown in the diagram ++ // below), or both, we might have to write two or more blocks. + // + // 0 128 256 + // [----------------|----------------] +@@ -578,7 +580,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + Start = Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS; + End = ALIGN_VALUE (Offset + *NumBytes, P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES); + +- if ((End - Start) <= (2 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) { ++ if ((End - Start) <= (4 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) { + // Check to see if we need to erase before programming the data into NOR. + // If the destination bits are only changing from 1s to 0s we can just write. + // After a block is erased all bits in the block is set to 1. +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-array-mode-switch-afte.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-array-mode-switch-afte.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc64a93 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-array-mode-switch-afte.patch @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +From 20ba071dabad6b0f5663083a017799b7a6e684c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ard Biesheuvel +Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 17:34:09 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 05/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: avoid array mode switch after + each word write + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [7/20] 274f2ed71a6d5d3f6497129ee3c62f494cc2f067 + +NorFlashWriteSingleWord() switches into programming mode and back into +array mode for every single word that it writes. Under KVM, this +involves tearing down the read-only memslot, and setting it up again, +which is costly and unnecessary. + +Instead, move the array mode switch into the callers, and only make the +switch when the writing is done. + +Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel +Reviewed-by: Sunil V L +(cherry picked from commit ca01e6216a8d1a26c69018e216d1dc3f88a819a4) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 12 +++--------- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c | 3 +++ + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +index f41d9d372f..0a5c5d48c7 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +@@ -205,9 +205,6 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleWord ( + SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_CLEAR_STATUS_REGISTER); + } + +- // Put device back into Read Array mode +- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); +- + return Status; + } + +@@ -286,8 +283,7 @@ NorFlashWriteBuffer ( + + // The buffer was not available for writing + if (WaitForBuffer == 0) { +- Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +- goto EXIT; ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + + // From now on we work in 32-bit words +@@ -337,10 +333,6 @@ NorFlashWriteBuffer ( + SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_CLEAR_STATUS_REGISTER); + } + +-EXIT: +- // Put device back into Read Array mode +- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); +- + return Status; + } + +@@ -739,6 +731,8 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + } + + TempStatus = NorFlashWriteSingleWord (Instance, WordAddr, WordToWrite); ++ // Put device back into Read Array mode ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); + if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c +index 2ceda22635..f9a41f6aab 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c +@@ -280,6 +280,9 @@ NorFlashWriteFullBlock ( + } + + EXIT: ++ // Put device back into Read Array mode ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); ++ + if (!EfiAtRuntime ()) { + // Interruptions can resume. + gBS->RestoreTPL (OriginalTPL); +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-switching-between-mode.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-switching-between-mode.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..783b96f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-switching-between-mode.patch @@ -0,0 +1,303 @@ +From 67e26db39c0ec90c164634251da761f649546529 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ard Biesheuvel +Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 17:58:07 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 06/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: avoid switching between modes + in a tight loop + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [8/20] 4923b0fb1586d7955be466b90dce5f790da704ff + +Currently, when dealing with small updates that can be written out +directly (i.e., if they only involve clearing bits and not setting bits, +as the latter requires a block level erase), we iterate over the data +one word at a time, read the old value, compare it, write the new value, +and repeat, unless we encountered a value that we cannot write (0->1 +transition), in which case we fall back to a block level operation. + +This is inefficient for two reasons: +- reading and writing a word at a time involves switching between array +and programming mode for every word of data, which is +disproportionately costly when running under KVM; +- we end up writing some data twice, as we may not notice that a block +erase is needed until after some data has been written to flash. + +So replace this sequence with a single read of up to twice the buffered +write maximum size, followed by one or two buffered writes if the data +can be written directly. Otherwise, fall back to the existing block +level sequence, but without writing out part of the data twice. + +Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel +Reviewed-by: Sunil V L +(cherry picked from commit 25589c4a76e7e3668fd6f794dd1827e958b6719c) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 214 +++++++++---------------- + 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 138 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +index 0a5c5d48c7..0343131a54 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +@@ -576,23 +576,20 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + IN UINT8 *Buffer + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS TempStatus; +- UINT32 Tmp; +- UINT32 TmpBuf; +- UINT32 WordToWrite; +- UINT32 Mask; +- BOOLEAN DoErase; +- UINTN BytesToWrite; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; + UINTN CurOffset; +- UINTN WordAddr; + UINTN BlockSize; + UINTN BlockAddress; +- UINTN PrevBlockAddress; +- +- PrevBlockAddress = 0; ++ UINT8 *OrigData; + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock(Parameters: Lba=%ld, Offset=0x%x, *NumBytes=0x%x, Buffer @ 0x%08x)\n", Lba, Offset, *NumBytes, Buffer)); + ++ // Check we did get some memory. Buffer is BlockSize. ++ if (Instance->ShadowBuffer == NULL) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbWrite: ERROR - Buffer not ready\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ + // Cache the block size to avoid de-referencing pointers all the time + BlockSize = Instance->BlockSize; + +@@ -612,148 +609,89 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; + } + +- // Pick 128bytes as a good start for word operations as opposed to erasing the +- // block and writing the data regardless if an erase is really needed. +- // It looks like most individual NV variable writes are smaller than 128bytes. +- if (*NumBytes <= 128) { ++ // Pick P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES (== 128 bytes) as a good start for word ++ // operations as opposed to erasing the block and writing the data regardless ++ // if an erase is really needed. It looks like most individual NV variable ++ // writes are smaller than 128 bytes. ++ // To avoid pathological cases were a 2 byte write is disregarded because it ++ // occurs right at a 128 byte buffered write alignment boundary, permit up to ++ // twice the max buffer size, and perform two writes if needed. ++ if ((*NumBytes + (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS)) <= (2 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) { + // Check to see if we need to erase before programming the data into NOR. + // If the destination bits are only changing from 1s to 0s we can just write. + // After a block is erased all bits in the block is set to 1. + // If any byte requires us to erase we just give up and rewrite all of it. +- DoErase = FALSE; +- BytesToWrite = *NumBytes; +- CurOffset = Offset; +- +- while (BytesToWrite > 0) { +- // Read full word from NOR, splice as required. A word is the smallest +- // unit we can write. +- TempStatus = NorFlashRead (Instance, Lba, CurOffset & ~(0x3), sizeof (Tmp), &Tmp); +- if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) { +- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +- } + +- // Physical address of word in NOR to write. +- WordAddr = (CurOffset & ~(0x3)) + GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS ( +- Instance->RegionBaseAddress, +- Lba, +- BlockSize +- ); +- // The word of data that is to be written. +- TmpBuf = *((UINT32 *)(Buffer + (*NumBytes - BytesToWrite))); +- +- // First do word aligned chunks. +- if ((CurOffset & 0x3) == 0) { +- if (BytesToWrite >= 4) { +- // Is the destination still in 'erased' state? +- if (~Tmp != 0) { +- // Check to see if we are only changing bits to zero. +- if ((Tmp ^ TmpBuf) & TmpBuf) { +- DoErase = TRUE; +- break; +- } +- } +- +- // Write this word to NOR +- WordToWrite = TmpBuf; +- CurOffset += sizeof (TmpBuf); +- BytesToWrite -= sizeof (TmpBuf); +- } else { +- // BytesToWrite < 4. Do small writes and left-overs +- Mask = ~((~0) << (BytesToWrite * 8)); +- // Mask out the bytes we want. +- TmpBuf &= Mask; +- // Is the destination still in 'erased' state? +- if ((Tmp & Mask) != Mask) { +- // Check to see if we are only changing bits to zero. +- if ((Tmp ^ TmpBuf) & TmpBuf) { +- DoErase = TRUE; +- break; +- } +- } +- +- // Merge old and new data. Write merged word to NOR +- WordToWrite = (Tmp & ~Mask) | TmpBuf; +- CurOffset += BytesToWrite; +- BytesToWrite = 0; +- } +- } else { +- // Do multiple words, but starting unaligned. +- if (BytesToWrite > (4 - (CurOffset & 0x3))) { +- Mask = ((~0) << ((CurOffset & 0x3) * 8)); +- // Mask out the bytes we want. +- TmpBuf &= Mask; +- // Is the destination still in 'erased' state? +- if ((Tmp & Mask) != Mask) { +- // Check to see if we are only changing bits to zero. +- if ((Tmp ^ TmpBuf) & TmpBuf) { +- DoErase = TRUE; +- break; +- } +- } +- +- // Merge old and new data. Write merged word to NOR +- WordToWrite = (Tmp & ~Mask) | TmpBuf; +- BytesToWrite -= (4 - (CurOffset & 0x3)); +- CurOffset += (4 - (CurOffset & 0x3)); +- } else { +- // Unaligned and fits in one word. +- Mask = (~((~0) << (BytesToWrite * 8))) << ((CurOffset & 0x3) * 8); +- // Mask out the bytes we want. +- TmpBuf = (TmpBuf << ((CurOffset & 0x3) * 8)) & Mask; +- // Is the destination still in 'erased' state? +- if ((Tmp & Mask) != Mask) { +- // Check to see if we are only changing bits to zero. +- if ((Tmp ^ TmpBuf) & TmpBuf) { +- DoErase = TRUE; +- break; +- } +- } +- +- // Merge old and new data. Write merged word to NOR +- WordToWrite = (Tmp & ~Mask) | TmpBuf; +- CurOffset += BytesToWrite; +- BytesToWrite = 0; +- } ++ // Read the old version of the data into the shadow buffer ++ Status = NorFlashRead ( ++ Instance, ++ Lba, ++ Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS, ++ (*NumBytes | BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS) + 1, ++ Instance->ShadowBuffer ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // Make OrigData point to the start of the old version of the data inside ++ // the word aligned buffer ++ OrigData = Instance->ShadowBuffer + (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS); ++ ++ // Update the buffer containing the old version of the data with the new ++ // contents, while checking whether the old version had any bits cleared ++ // that we want to set. In that case, we will need to erase the block first. ++ for (CurOffset = 0; CurOffset < *NumBytes; CurOffset++) { ++ if (~OrigData[CurOffset] & Buffer[CurOffset]) { ++ goto DoErase; + } + +- // +- // Write the word to NOR. +- // ++ OrigData[CurOffset] = Buffer[CurOffset]; ++ } + +- BlockAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS (Instance->RegionBaseAddress, Lba, BlockSize); +- if (BlockAddress != PrevBlockAddress) { +- TempStatus = NorFlashUnlockSingleBlockIfNecessary (Instance, BlockAddress); +- if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) { +- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +- } ++ // ++ // Write the updated buffer to NOR. ++ // ++ BlockAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS (Instance->RegionBaseAddress, Lba, BlockSize); + +- PrevBlockAddress = BlockAddress; +- } ++ // Unlock the block if we have to ++ Status = NorFlashUnlockSingleBlockIfNecessary (Instance, BlockAddress); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto Exit; ++ } + +- TempStatus = NorFlashWriteSingleWord (Instance, WordAddr, WordToWrite); +- // Put device back into Read Array mode +- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); +- if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) { +- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +- } ++ Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer ( ++ Instance, ++ BlockAddress + (Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS), ++ P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES, ++ Instance->ShadowBuffer ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto Exit; + } + +- // Exit if we got here and could write all the data. Otherwise do the +- // Erase-Write cycle. +- if (!DoErase) { +- return EFI_SUCCESS; ++ if ((*NumBytes + (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS)) > P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES) { ++ BlockAddress += P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES; ++ ++ Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer ( ++ Instance, ++ BlockAddress + (Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS), ++ P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES, ++ Instance->ShadowBuffer + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES ++ ); + } +- } + +- // Check we did get some memory. Buffer is BlockSize. +- if (Instance->ShadowBuffer == NULL) { +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbWrite: ERROR - Buffer not ready\n")); +- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++Exit: ++ // Put device back into Read Array mode ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); ++ ++ return Status; + } + ++DoErase: + // Read NOR Flash data into shadow buffer +- TempStatus = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer); +- if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) { ++ Status = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +@@ -762,8 +700,8 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + CopyMem ((VOID *)((UINTN)Instance->ShadowBuffer + Offset), Buffer, *NumBytes); + + // Write the modified buffer back to the NorFlash +- TempStatus = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer); +- if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) { ++ Status = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clarify-block-write-logic-fi.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clarify-block-write-logic-fi.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ac5c14 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clarify-block-write-logic-fi.patch @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +From f136d4895b1477a56b916a76448ba76e67b08163 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 12/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: clarify block write logic & + fix shadowbuffer reads + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [14/20] 38009625e5f189166f7a93e236576140a7ccb393 + +Introduce 'Start' and 'End' variables to make it easier to follow the +logic and code flow. Also add a ascii art diagram (based on a +suggestion by Laszlo). + +This also fixes the 'Size' calculation for the NorFlashRead() call. +Without this patch the code will read only one instead of two +P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES blocks in case '*NumBytes' is smaller than +P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES but 'Offset + *NumBytes' is not, i.e. the +update range crosses a P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES boundary. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-3-kraxel@redhat.com> +(cherry picked from commit 35d8ea8097794b522149688b5cfaf8364bc44d54) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +index 7f4743b003..88a4d2c23f 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +@@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + UINTN BlockSize; + UINTN BlockAddress; + UINT8 *OrigData; ++ UINTN Start, End; + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock(Parameters: Lba=%ld, Offset=0x%x, *NumBytes=0x%x, Buffer @ 0x%08x)\n", Lba, Offset, *NumBytes, Buffer)); + +@@ -555,7 +556,28 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + // To avoid pathological cases were a 2 byte write is disregarded because it + // occurs right at a 128 byte buffered write alignment boundary, permit up to + // twice the max buffer size, and perform two writes if needed. +- if ((*NumBytes + (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS)) <= (2 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) { ++ // ++ // 0 128 256 ++ // [----------------|----------------] ++ // ^ ^ ^ ^ ++ // | | | | ++ // | | | End, the next "word" boundary beyond ++ // | | | the (logical) update ++ // | | | ++ // | | (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS) + NumBytes; ++ // | | i.e., the relative offset inside (or just past) ++ // | | the *double-word* such that it is the ++ // | | *exclusive* end of the (logical) update. ++ // | | ++ // | Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS; i.e., Offset within the "word"; ++ // | this is where the (logical) update is supposed to start ++ // | ++ // Start = Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS; i.e., Offset truncated to "word" boundary ++ ++ Start = Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS; ++ End = ALIGN_VALUE (Offset + *NumBytes, P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES); ++ ++ if ((End - Start) <= (2 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) { + // Check to see if we need to erase before programming the data into NOR. + // If the destination bits are only changing from 1s to 0s we can just write. + // After a block is erased all bits in the block is set to 1. +@@ -565,8 +587,8 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + Status = NorFlashRead ( + Instance, + Lba, +- Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS, +- (*NumBytes | BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS) + 1, ++ Start, ++ End - Start, + Instance->ShadowBuffer + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +@@ -601,7 +623,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + + Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer ( + Instance, +- BlockAddress + (Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS), ++ BlockAddress + Start, + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES, + Instance->ShadowBuffer + ); +@@ -609,12 +631,10 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + goto Exit; + } + +- if ((*NumBytes + (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS)) > P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES) { +- BlockAddress += P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES; +- ++ if ((End - Start) > P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES) { + Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer ( + Instance, +- BlockAddress + (Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS), ++ BlockAddress + Start + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES, + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES, + Instance->ShadowBuffer + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES + ); +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clone-ArmPlatformPkg-s-NOR-f.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clone-ArmPlatformPkg-s-NOR-f.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..41975ab --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clone-ArmPlatformPkg-s-NOR-f.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2973 @@ +From 3d6a0e0d3323c8b98a56e69ed01b6634dd480f25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ard Biesheuvel +Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 16:41:43 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 01/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: clone ArmPlatformPkg's NOR + flash driver + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [3/20] f78caae529b7f943a5d4838cb906546373de4c54 + +QEMU's mach-virt is loosely based on ARM Versatile Express, and inherits +its NOR flash driver, which is now being used on other QEMU emulated +architectures as well. + +In order to permit ourselves the freedom to optimize this driver for +use under KVM emulation, let's clone it into OvmfPkg, so we have a +version we can hack without the risk of regressing bare metal platforms. + +The cloned version is mostly identical to the original, but it depends +on the newly added VirtNorFlashPlatformLib library class instead of the +original one from ArmPlatformPkg. Beyond that, only cosmetic changes +related to #include order etc were made. + +Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel +Reviewed-by: Sunil V L +(cherry picked from commit c1ff81f7990be88c9e98ca3be65178057d8aae77) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 991 ++++++++++++++++++ + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h | 422 ++++++++ + .../VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c | 123 +++ + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c | 506 +++++++++ + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf | 72 ++ + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c | 777 ++++++++++++++ + 6 files changed, 2891 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c + create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h + create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c + create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c + create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf + create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..12fa720dad +--- /dev/null ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +@@ -0,0 +1,991 @@ ++/** @file NorFlash.c ++ ++ Copyright (c) 2011 - 2020, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
++ Copyright (c) 2020, Linaro, Ltd. All rights reserved.
++ ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ ++**/ ++ ++#include ++ ++#include "VirtNorFlash.h" ++ ++// ++// Global variable declarations ++// ++extern NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE **mNorFlashInstances; ++extern UINT32 mNorFlashDeviceCount; ++ ++UINT32 ++NorFlashReadStatusRegister ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINTN SR_Address ++ ) ++{ ++ // Prepare to read the status register ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_STATUS_REGISTER); ++ return MmioRead32 (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress); ++} ++ ++STATIC ++BOOLEAN ++NorFlashBlockIsLocked ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINTN BlockAddress ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 LockStatus; ++ ++ // Send command for reading device id ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 2, P30_CMD_READ_DEVICE_ID); ++ ++ // Read block lock status ++ LockStatus = MmioRead32 (CREATE_NOR_ADDRESS (BlockAddress, 2)); ++ ++ // Decode block lock status ++ LockStatus = FOLD_32BIT_INTO_16BIT (LockStatus); ++ ++ if ((LockStatus & 0x2) != 0) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashBlockIsLocked: WARNING: Block LOCKED DOWN\n")); ++ } ++ ++ return ((LockStatus & 0x1) != 0); ++} ++ ++STATIC ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashUnlockSingleBlock ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINTN BlockAddress ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 LockStatus; ++ ++ // Raise the Task Priority Level to TPL_NOTIFY to serialise all its operations ++ // and to protect shared data structures. ++ ++ if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdNorFlashCheckBlockLocked) == TRUE) { ++ do { ++ // Request a lock setup ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_LOCK_BLOCK_SETUP); ++ ++ // Request an unlock ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_UNLOCK_BLOCK); ++ ++ // Send command for reading device id ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 2, P30_CMD_READ_DEVICE_ID); ++ ++ // Read block lock status ++ LockStatus = MmioRead32 (CREATE_NOR_ADDRESS (BlockAddress, 2)); ++ ++ // Decode block lock status ++ LockStatus = FOLD_32BIT_INTO_16BIT (LockStatus); ++ } while ((LockStatus & 0x1) == 1); ++ } else { ++ // Request a lock setup ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_LOCK_BLOCK_SETUP); ++ ++ // Request an unlock ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_UNLOCK_BLOCK); ++ ++ // Wait until the status register gives us the all clear ++ do { ++ LockStatus = NorFlashReadStatusRegister (Instance, BlockAddress); ++ } while ((LockStatus & P30_SR_BIT_WRITE) != P30_SR_BIT_WRITE); ++ } ++ ++ // Put device back into Read Array mode ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "UnlockSingleBlock: BlockAddress=0x%08x\n", BlockAddress)); ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashUnlockSingleBlockIfNecessary ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINTN BlockAddress ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ Status = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ ++ if (NorFlashBlockIsLocked (Instance, BlockAddress)) { ++ Status = NorFlashUnlockSingleBlock (Instance, BlockAddress); ++ } ++ ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++/** ++ * The following function presumes that the block has already been unlocked. ++ **/ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashEraseSingleBlock ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINTN BlockAddress ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINT32 StatusRegister; ++ ++ Status = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ ++ // Request a block erase and then confirm it ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_BLOCK_ERASE_SETUP); ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_BLOCK_ERASE_CONFIRM); ++ ++ // Wait until the status register gives us the all clear ++ do { ++ StatusRegister = NorFlashReadStatusRegister (Instance, BlockAddress); ++ } while ((StatusRegister & P30_SR_BIT_WRITE) != P30_SR_BIT_WRITE); ++ ++ if (StatusRegister & P30_SR_BIT_VPP) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EraseSingleBlock(BlockAddress=0x%08x: VPP Range Error\n", BlockAddress)); ++ Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if ((StatusRegister & (P30_SR_BIT_ERASE | P30_SR_BIT_PROGRAM)) == (P30_SR_BIT_ERASE | P30_SR_BIT_PROGRAM)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EraseSingleBlock(BlockAddress=0x%08x: Command Sequence Error\n", BlockAddress)); ++ Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (StatusRegister & P30_SR_BIT_ERASE) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EraseSingleBlock(BlockAddress=0x%08x: Block Erase Error StatusRegister:0x%X\n", BlockAddress, StatusRegister)); ++ Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (StatusRegister & P30_SR_BIT_BLOCK_LOCKED) { ++ // The debug level message has been reduced because a device lock might happen. In this case we just retry it ... ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "EraseSingleBlock(BlockAddress=0x%08x: Block Locked Error\n", BlockAddress)); ++ Status = EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED; ++ } ++ ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ // Clear the Status Register ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_CLEAR_STATUS_REGISTER); ++ } ++ ++ // Put device back into Read Array mode ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); ++ ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashWriteSingleWord ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINTN WordAddress, ++ IN UINT32 WriteData ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINT32 StatusRegister; ++ ++ Status = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ ++ // Request a write single word command ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (WordAddress, 0, P30_CMD_WORD_PROGRAM_SETUP); ++ ++ // Store the word into NOR Flash; ++ MmioWrite32 (WordAddress, WriteData); ++ ++ // Wait for the write to complete and then check for any errors; i.e. check the Status Register ++ do { ++ // Prepare to read the status register ++ StatusRegister = NorFlashReadStatusRegister (Instance, WordAddress); ++ // The chip is busy while the WRITE bit is not asserted ++ } while ((StatusRegister & P30_SR_BIT_WRITE) != P30_SR_BIT_WRITE); ++ ++ // Perform a full status check: ++ // Mask the relevant bits of Status Register. ++ // Everything should be zero, if not, we have a problem ++ ++ if (StatusRegister & P30_SR_BIT_VPP) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteSingleWord(WordAddress:0x%X): VPP Range Error\n", WordAddress)); ++ Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (StatusRegister & P30_SR_BIT_PROGRAM) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteSingleWord(WordAddress:0x%X): Program Error\n", WordAddress)); ++ Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (StatusRegister & P30_SR_BIT_BLOCK_LOCKED) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteSingleWord(WordAddress:0x%X): Device Protect Error\n", WordAddress)); ++ Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ // Clear the Status Register ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_CLEAR_STATUS_REGISTER); ++ } ++ ++ // Put device back into Read Array mode ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); ++ ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Writes data to the NOR Flash using the Buffered Programming method. ++ * ++ * The maximum size of the on-chip buffer is 32-words, because of hardware restrictions. ++ * Therefore this function will only handle buffers up to 32 words or 128 bytes. ++ * To deal with larger buffers, call this function again. ++ * ++ * This function presumes that both the TargetAddress and the TargetAddress+BufferSize ++ * exist entirely within the NOR Flash. Therefore these conditions will not be checked here. ++ * ++ * In buffered programming, if the target address not at the beginning of a 32-bit word boundary, ++ * then programming time is doubled and power consumption is increased. ++ * Therefore, it is a requirement to align buffer writes to 32-bit word boundaries. ++ * i.e. the last 4 bits of the target start address must be zero: 0x......00 ++ */ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashWriteBuffer ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINTN TargetAddress, ++ IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, ++ IN UINT32 *Buffer ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINTN BufferSizeInWords; ++ UINTN Count; ++ volatile UINT32 *Data; ++ UINTN WaitForBuffer; ++ BOOLEAN BufferAvailable; ++ UINT32 StatusRegister; ++ ++ WaitForBuffer = MAX_BUFFERED_PROG_ITERATIONS; ++ BufferAvailable = FALSE; ++ ++ // Check that the target address does not cross a 32-word boundary. ++ if ((TargetAddress & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS) != 0) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // Check there are some data to program ++ if (BufferSizeInBytes == 0) { ++ return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; ++ } ++ ++ // Check that the buffer size does not exceed the maximum hardware buffer size on chip. ++ if (BufferSizeInBytes > P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES) { ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // Check that the buffer size is a multiple of 32-bit words ++ if ((BufferSizeInBytes % 4) != 0) { ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // Pre-programming conditions checked, now start the algorithm. ++ ++ // Prepare the data destination address ++ Data = (UINT32 *)TargetAddress; ++ ++ // Check the availability of the buffer ++ do { ++ // Issue the Buffered Program Setup command ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (TargetAddress, 0, P30_CMD_BUFFERED_PROGRAM_SETUP); ++ ++ // Read back the status register bit#7 from the same address ++ if (((*Data) & P30_SR_BIT_WRITE) == P30_SR_BIT_WRITE) { ++ BufferAvailable = TRUE; ++ } ++ ++ // Update the loop counter ++ WaitForBuffer--; ++ } while ((WaitForBuffer > 0) && (BufferAvailable == FALSE)); ++ ++ // The buffer was not available for writing ++ if (WaitForBuffer == 0) { ++ Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ goto EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ // From now on we work in 32-bit words ++ BufferSizeInWords = BufferSizeInBytes / (UINTN)4; ++ ++ // Write the word count, which is (buffer_size_in_words - 1), ++ // because word count 0 means one word. ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (TargetAddress, 0, (BufferSizeInWords - 1)); ++ ++ // Write the data to the NOR Flash, advancing each address by 4 bytes ++ for (Count = 0; Count < BufferSizeInWords; Count++, Data++, Buffer++) { ++ MmioWrite32 ((UINTN)Data, *Buffer); ++ } ++ ++ // Issue the Buffered Program Confirm command, to start the programming operation ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_BUFFERED_PROGRAM_CONFIRM); ++ ++ // Wait for the write to complete and then check for any errors; i.e. check the Status Register ++ do { ++ StatusRegister = NorFlashReadStatusRegister (Instance, TargetAddress); ++ // The chip is busy while the WRITE bit is not asserted ++ } while ((StatusRegister & P30_SR_BIT_WRITE) != P30_SR_BIT_WRITE); ++ ++ // Perform a full status check: ++ // Mask the relevant bits of Status Register. ++ // Everything should be zero, if not, we have a problem ++ ++ Status = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ ++ if (StatusRegister & P30_SR_BIT_VPP) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteBuffer(TargetAddress:0x%X): VPP Range Error\n", TargetAddress)); ++ Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (StatusRegister & P30_SR_BIT_PROGRAM) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteBuffer(TargetAddress:0x%X): Program Error\n", TargetAddress)); ++ Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (StatusRegister & P30_SR_BIT_BLOCK_LOCKED) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteBuffer(TargetAddress:0x%X): Device Protect Error\n", TargetAddress)); ++ Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ // Clear the Status Register ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_CLEAR_STATUS_REGISTER); ++ } ++ ++EXIT: ++ // Put device back into Read Array mode ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); ++ ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashWriteBlocks ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, ++ IN VOID *Buffer ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 *pWriteBuffer; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_LBA CurrentBlock; ++ UINT32 BlockSizeInWords; ++ UINT32 NumBlocks; ++ UINT32 BlockCount; ++ ++ Status = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ ++ // The buffer must be valid ++ if (Buffer == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if (Instance->Media.ReadOnly == TRUE) { ++ return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED; ++ } ++ ++ // We must have some bytes to read ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: BufferSizeInBytes=0x%x\n", BufferSizeInBytes)); ++ if (BufferSizeInBytes == 0) { ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // The size of the buffer must be a multiple of the block size ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: BlockSize in bytes =0x%x\n", Instance->Media.BlockSize)); ++ if ((BufferSizeInBytes % Instance->Media.BlockSize) != 0) { ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // All blocks must be within the device ++ NumBlocks = ((UINT32)BufferSizeInBytes) / Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: NumBlocks=%d, LastBlock=%ld, Lba=%ld.\n", NumBlocks, Instance->Media.LastBlock, Lba)); ++ ++ if ((Lba + NumBlocks) > (Instance->Media.LastBlock + 1)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: ERROR - Write will exceed last block.\n")); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ BlockSizeInWords = Instance->Media.BlockSize / 4; ++ ++ // Because the target *Buffer is a pointer to VOID, we must put all the data into a pointer ++ // to a proper data type, so use *ReadBuffer ++ pWriteBuffer = (UINT32 *)Buffer; ++ ++ CurrentBlock = Lba; ++ for (BlockCount = 0; BlockCount < NumBlocks; BlockCount++, CurrentBlock++, pWriteBuffer = pWriteBuffer + BlockSizeInWords) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: Writing block #%d\n", (UINTN)CurrentBlock)); ++ ++ Status = NorFlashWriteFullBlock (Instance, CurrentBlock, pWriteBuffer, BlockSizeInWords); ++ ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: Exit Status = \"%r\".\n", Status)); ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++#define BOTH_ALIGNED(a, b, align) ((((UINTN)(a) | (UINTN)(b)) & ((align) - 1)) == 0) ++ ++/** ++ Copy Length bytes from Source to Destination, using aligned accesses only. ++ Note that this implementation uses memcpy() semantics rather then memmove() ++ semantics, i.e., SourceBuffer and DestinationBuffer should not overlap. ++ ++ @param DestinationBuffer The target of the copy request. ++ @param SourceBuffer The place to copy from. ++ @param Length The number of bytes to copy. ++ ++ @return Destination ++ ++**/ ++STATIC ++VOID * ++AlignedCopyMem ( ++ OUT VOID *DestinationBuffer, ++ IN CONST VOID *SourceBuffer, ++ IN UINTN Length ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT8 *Destination8; ++ CONST UINT8 *Source8; ++ UINT32 *Destination32; ++ CONST UINT32 *Source32; ++ UINT64 *Destination64; ++ CONST UINT64 *Source64; ++ ++ if (BOTH_ALIGNED (DestinationBuffer, SourceBuffer, 8) && (Length >= 8)) { ++ Destination64 = DestinationBuffer; ++ Source64 = SourceBuffer; ++ while (Length >= 8) { ++ *Destination64++ = *Source64++; ++ Length -= 8; ++ } ++ ++ Destination8 = (UINT8 *)Destination64; ++ Source8 = (CONST UINT8 *)Source64; ++ } else if (BOTH_ALIGNED (DestinationBuffer, SourceBuffer, 4) && (Length >= 4)) { ++ Destination32 = DestinationBuffer; ++ Source32 = SourceBuffer; ++ while (Length >= 4) { ++ *Destination32++ = *Source32++; ++ Length -= 4; ++ } ++ ++ Destination8 = (UINT8 *)Destination32; ++ Source8 = (CONST UINT8 *)Source32; ++ } else { ++ Destination8 = DestinationBuffer; ++ Source8 = SourceBuffer; ++ } ++ ++ while (Length-- != 0) { ++ *Destination8++ = *Source8++; ++ } ++ ++ return DestinationBuffer; ++} ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashReadBlocks ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, ++ OUT VOID *Buffer ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 NumBlocks; ++ UINTN StartAddress; ++ ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_BLKIO, ++ "NorFlashReadBlocks: BufferSize=0x%xB BlockSize=0x%xB LastBlock=%ld, Lba=%ld.\n", ++ BufferSizeInBytes, ++ Instance->Media.BlockSize, ++ Instance->Media.LastBlock, ++ Lba ++ )); ++ ++ // The buffer must be valid ++ if (Buffer == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // Return if we have not any byte to read ++ if (BufferSizeInBytes == 0) { ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++ } ++ ++ // The size of the buffer must be a multiple of the block size ++ if ((BufferSizeInBytes % Instance->Media.BlockSize) != 0) { ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // All blocks must be within the device ++ NumBlocks = ((UINT32)BufferSizeInBytes) / Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ ++ if ((Lba + NumBlocks) > (Instance->Media.LastBlock + 1)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashReadBlocks: ERROR - Read will exceed last block\n")); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // Get the address to start reading from ++ StartAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS ( ++ Instance->RegionBaseAddress, ++ Lba, ++ Instance->Media.BlockSize ++ ); ++ ++ // Put the device into Read Array mode ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); ++ ++ // Readout the data ++ AlignedCopyMem (Buffer, (VOID *)StartAddress, BufferSizeInBytes); ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashRead ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN Offset, ++ IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, ++ OUT VOID *Buffer ++ ) ++{ ++ UINTN StartAddress; ++ ++ // The buffer must be valid ++ if (Buffer == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // Return if we have not any byte to read ++ if (BufferSizeInBytes == 0) { ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++ } ++ ++ if (((Lba * Instance->Media.BlockSize) + Offset + BufferSizeInBytes) > Instance->Size) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashRead: ERROR - Read will exceed device size.\n")); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // Get the address to start reading from ++ StartAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS ( ++ Instance->RegionBaseAddress, ++ Lba, ++ Instance->Media.BlockSize ++ ); ++ ++ // Put the device into Read Array mode ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); ++ ++ // Readout the data ++ AlignedCopyMem (Buffer, (VOID *)(StartAddress + Offset), BufferSizeInBytes); ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/* ++ Write a full or portion of a block. It must not span block boundaries; that is, ++ Offset + *NumBytes <= Instance->Media.BlockSize. ++*/ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN Offset, ++ IN OUT UINTN *NumBytes, ++ IN UINT8 *Buffer ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS TempStatus; ++ UINT32 Tmp; ++ UINT32 TmpBuf; ++ UINT32 WordToWrite; ++ UINT32 Mask; ++ BOOLEAN DoErase; ++ UINTN BytesToWrite; ++ UINTN CurOffset; ++ UINTN WordAddr; ++ UINTN BlockSize; ++ UINTN BlockAddress; ++ UINTN PrevBlockAddress; ++ ++ PrevBlockAddress = 0; ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock(Parameters: Lba=%ld, Offset=0x%x, *NumBytes=0x%x, Buffer @ 0x%08x)\n", Lba, Offset, *NumBytes, Buffer)); ++ ++ // Detect WriteDisabled state ++ if (Instance->Media.ReadOnly == TRUE) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock: ERROR - Can not write: Device is in WriteDisabled state.\n")); ++ // It is in WriteDisabled state, return an error right away ++ return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; ++ } ++ ++ // Cache the block size to avoid de-referencing pointers all the time ++ BlockSize = Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ ++ // The write must not span block boundaries. ++ // We need to check each variable individually because adding two large values together overflows. ++ if ((Offset >= BlockSize) || ++ (*NumBytes > BlockSize) || ++ ((Offset + *NumBytes) > BlockSize)) ++ { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock: ERROR - EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE: (Offset=0x%x + NumBytes=0x%x) > BlockSize=0x%x\n", Offset, *NumBytes, BlockSize)); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // We must have some bytes to write ++ if (*NumBytes == 0) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock: ERROR - EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE: (Offset=0x%x + NumBytes=0x%x) > BlockSize=0x%x\n", Offset, *NumBytes, BlockSize)); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // Pick 128bytes as a good start for word operations as opposed to erasing the ++ // block and writing the data regardless if an erase is really needed. ++ // It looks like most individual NV variable writes are smaller than 128bytes. ++ if (*NumBytes <= 128) { ++ // Check to see if we need to erase before programming the data into NOR. ++ // If the destination bits are only changing from 1s to 0s we can just write. ++ // After a block is erased all bits in the block is set to 1. ++ // If any byte requires us to erase we just give up and rewrite all of it. ++ DoErase = FALSE; ++ BytesToWrite = *NumBytes; ++ CurOffset = Offset; ++ ++ while (BytesToWrite > 0) { ++ // Read full word from NOR, splice as required. A word is the smallest ++ // unit we can write. ++ TempStatus = NorFlashRead (Instance, Lba, CurOffset & ~(0x3), sizeof (Tmp), &Tmp); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // Physical address of word in NOR to write. ++ WordAddr = (CurOffset & ~(0x3)) + GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS ( ++ Instance->RegionBaseAddress, ++ Lba, ++ BlockSize ++ ); ++ // The word of data that is to be written. ++ TmpBuf = *((UINT32 *)(Buffer + (*NumBytes - BytesToWrite))); ++ ++ // First do word aligned chunks. ++ if ((CurOffset & 0x3) == 0) { ++ if (BytesToWrite >= 4) { ++ // Is the destination still in 'erased' state? ++ if (~Tmp != 0) { ++ // Check to see if we are only changing bits to zero. ++ if ((Tmp ^ TmpBuf) & TmpBuf) { ++ DoErase = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ // Write this word to NOR ++ WordToWrite = TmpBuf; ++ CurOffset += sizeof (TmpBuf); ++ BytesToWrite -= sizeof (TmpBuf); ++ } else { ++ // BytesToWrite < 4. Do small writes and left-overs ++ Mask = ~((~0) << (BytesToWrite * 8)); ++ // Mask out the bytes we want. ++ TmpBuf &= Mask; ++ // Is the destination still in 'erased' state? ++ if ((Tmp & Mask) != Mask) { ++ // Check to see if we are only changing bits to zero. ++ if ((Tmp ^ TmpBuf) & TmpBuf) { ++ DoErase = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ // Merge old and new data. Write merged word to NOR ++ WordToWrite = (Tmp & ~Mask) | TmpBuf; ++ CurOffset += BytesToWrite; ++ BytesToWrite = 0; ++ } ++ } else { ++ // Do multiple words, but starting unaligned. ++ if (BytesToWrite > (4 - (CurOffset & 0x3))) { ++ Mask = ((~0) << ((CurOffset & 0x3) * 8)); ++ // Mask out the bytes we want. ++ TmpBuf &= Mask; ++ // Is the destination still in 'erased' state? ++ if ((Tmp & Mask) != Mask) { ++ // Check to see if we are only changing bits to zero. ++ if ((Tmp ^ TmpBuf) & TmpBuf) { ++ DoErase = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ // Merge old and new data. Write merged word to NOR ++ WordToWrite = (Tmp & ~Mask) | TmpBuf; ++ BytesToWrite -= (4 - (CurOffset & 0x3)); ++ CurOffset += (4 - (CurOffset & 0x3)); ++ } else { ++ // Unaligned and fits in one word. ++ Mask = (~((~0) << (BytesToWrite * 8))) << ((CurOffset & 0x3) * 8); ++ // Mask out the bytes we want. ++ TmpBuf = (TmpBuf << ((CurOffset & 0x3) * 8)) & Mask; ++ // Is the destination still in 'erased' state? ++ if ((Tmp & Mask) != Mask) { ++ // Check to see if we are only changing bits to zero. ++ if ((Tmp ^ TmpBuf) & TmpBuf) { ++ DoErase = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ // Merge old and new data. Write merged word to NOR ++ WordToWrite = (Tmp & ~Mask) | TmpBuf; ++ CurOffset += BytesToWrite; ++ BytesToWrite = 0; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Write the word to NOR. ++ // ++ ++ BlockAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS (Instance->RegionBaseAddress, Lba, BlockSize); ++ if (BlockAddress != PrevBlockAddress) { ++ TempStatus = NorFlashUnlockSingleBlockIfNecessary (Instance, BlockAddress); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ PrevBlockAddress = BlockAddress; ++ } ++ ++ TempStatus = NorFlashWriteSingleWord (Instance, WordAddr, WordToWrite); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ // Exit if we got here and could write all the data. Otherwise do the ++ // Erase-Write cycle. ++ if (!DoErase) { ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ // Check we did get some memory. Buffer is BlockSize. ++ if (Instance->ShadowBuffer == NULL) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbWrite: ERROR - Buffer not ready\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // Read NOR Flash data into shadow buffer ++ TempStatus = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) { ++ // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // Put the data at the appropriate location inside the buffer area ++ CopyMem ((VOID *)((UINTN)Instance->ShadowBuffer + Offset), Buffer, *NumBytes); ++ ++ // Write the modified buffer back to the NorFlash ++ TempStatus = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) { ++ // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/* ++ Although DiskIoDxe will automatically install the DiskIO protocol whenever ++ we install the BlockIO protocol, its implementation is sub-optimal as it reads ++ and writes entire blocks using the BlockIO protocol. In fact we can access ++ NOR flash with a finer granularity than that, so we can improve performance ++ by directly producing the DiskIO protocol. ++*/ ++ ++/** ++ Read BufferSize bytes from Offset into Buffer. ++ ++ @param This Protocol instance pointer. ++ @param MediaId Id of the media, changes every time the media is replaced. ++ @param Offset The starting byte offset to read from ++ @param BufferSize Size of Buffer ++ @param Buffer Buffer containing read data ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The data was read correctly from the device. ++ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The device reported an error while performing the read. ++ @retval EFI_NO_MEDIA There is no media in the device. ++ @retval EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED The MediaId does not match the current device. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The read request contains device addresses that are not ++ valid for the device. ++ ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashDiskIoReadDisk ( ++ IN EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN UINT32 MediaId, ++ IN UINT64 DiskOffset, ++ IN UINTN BufferSize, ++ OUT VOID *Buffer ++ ) ++{ ++ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ UINT32 BlockSize; ++ UINT32 BlockOffset; ++ EFI_LBA Lba; ++ ++ Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_DISKIO_THIS (This); ++ ++ if (MediaId != Instance->Media.MediaId) { ++ return EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED; ++ } ++ ++ BlockSize = Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ Lba = (EFI_LBA)DivU64x32Remainder (DiskOffset, BlockSize, &BlockOffset); ++ ++ return NorFlashRead (Instance, Lba, BlockOffset, BufferSize, Buffer); ++} ++ ++/** ++ Writes a specified number of bytes to a device. ++ ++ @param This Indicates a pointer to the calling context. ++ @param MediaId ID of the medium to be written. ++ @param Offset The starting byte offset on the logical block I/O device to write. ++ @param BufferSize The size in bytes of Buffer. The number of bytes to write to the device. ++ @param Buffer A pointer to the buffer containing the data to be written. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The data was written correctly to the device. ++ @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED The device can not be written to. ++ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The device reported an error while performing the write. ++ @retval EFI_NO_MEDIA There is no media in the device. ++ @retval EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED The MediaId does not match the current device. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The write request contains device addresses that are not ++ valid for the device. ++ ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashDiskIoWriteDisk ( ++ IN EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN UINT32 MediaId, ++ IN UINT64 DiskOffset, ++ IN UINTN BufferSize, ++ IN VOID *Buffer ++ ) ++{ ++ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ UINT32 BlockSize; ++ UINT32 BlockOffset; ++ EFI_LBA Lba; ++ UINTN RemainingBytes; ++ UINTN WriteSize; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_DISKIO_THIS (This); ++ ++ if (MediaId != Instance->Media.MediaId) { ++ return EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED; ++ } ++ ++ BlockSize = Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ Lba = (EFI_LBA)DivU64x32Remainder (DiskOffset, BlockSize, &BlockOffset); ++ ++ RemainingBytes = BufferSize; ++ ++ // Write either all the remaining bytes, or the number of bytes that bring ++ // us up to a block boundary, whichever is less. ++ // (DiskOffset | (BlockSize - 1)) + 1) rounds DiskOffset up to the next ++ // block boundary (even if it is already on one). ++ WriteSize = MIN (RemainingBytes, ((DiskOffset | (BlockSize - 1)) + 1) - DiskOffset); ++ ++ do { ++ if (WriteSize == BlockSize) { ++ // Write a full block ++ Status = NorFlashWriteFullBlock (Instance, Lba, Buffer, BlockSize / sizeof (UINT32)); ++ } else { ++ // Write a partial block ++ Status = NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (Instance, Lba, BlockOffset, &WriteSize, Buffer); ++ } ++ ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return Status; ++ } ++ ++ // Now continue writing either all the remaining bytes or single blocks. ++ RemainingBytes -= WriteSize; ++ Buffer = (UINT8 *)Buffer + WriteSize; ++ Lba++; ++ BlockOffset = 0; ++ WriteSize = MIN (RemainingBytes, BlockSize); ++ } while (RemainingBytes); ++ ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashReset ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance ++ ) ++{ ++ // As there is no specific RESET to perform, ensure that the devices is in the default Read Array mode ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/** ++ Fixup internal data so that EFI can be call in virtual mode. ++ Call the passed in Child Notify event and convert any pointers in ++ lib to virtual mode. ++ ++ @param[in] Event The Event that is being processed ++ @param[in] Context Event Context ++**/ ++VOID ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashVirtualNotifyEvent ( ++ IN EFI_EVENT Event, ++ IN VOID *Context ++ ) ++{ ++ UINTN Index; ++ ++ for (Index = 0; Index < mNorFlashDeviceCount; Index++) { ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->DeviceBaseAddress); ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->RegionBaseAddress); ++ ++ // Convert BlockIo protocol ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->BlockIoProtocol.FlushBlocks); ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->BlockIoProtocol.ReadBlocks); ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->BlockIoProtocol.Reset); ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->BlockIoProtocol.WriteBlocks); ++ ++ // Convert Fvb ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->FvbProtocol.EraseBlocks); ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->FvbProtocol.GetAttributes); ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->FvbProtocol.GetBlockSize); ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->FvbProtocol.GetPhysicalAddress); ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->FvbProtocol.Read); ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->FvbProtocol.SetAttributes); ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->FvbProtocol.Write); ++ ++ if (mNorFlashInstances[Index]->ShadowBuffer != NULL) { ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->ShadowBuffer); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return; ++} +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..e46522a198 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h +@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@ ++/** @file NorFlash.h ++ ++ Copyright (c) 2011 - 2014, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.
++ ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ ++**/ ++ ++#ifndef __VIRT_NOR_FLASH__ ++#define __VIRT_NOR_FLASH__ ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#define NOR_FLASH_ERASE_RETRY 10 ++ ++// Device access macros ++// These are necessary because we use 2 x 16bit parts to make up 32bit data ++ ++#define HIGH_16_BITS 0xFFFF0000 ++#define LOW_16_BITS 0x0000FFFF ++#define LOW_8_BITS 0x000000FF ++ ++#define FOLD_32BIT_INTO_16BIT(value) ( ( value >> 16 ) | ( value & LOW_16_BITS ) ) ++ ++#define GET_LOW_BYTE(value) ( value & LOW_8_BITS ) ++#define GET_HIGH_BYTE(value) ( GET_LOW_BYTE( value >> 16 ) ) ++ ++// Each command must be sent simultaneously to both chips, ++// i.e. at the lower 16 bits AND at the higher 16 bits ++#define CREATE_NOR_ADDRESS(BaseAddr, OffsetAddr) ((BaseAddr) + ((OffsetAddr) << 2)) ++#define CREATE_DUAL_CMD(Cmd) ( ( Cmd << 16) | ( Cmd & LOW_16_BITS) ) ++#define SEND_NOR_COMMAND(BaseAddr, Offset, Cmd) MmioWrite32 (CREATE_NOR_ADDRESS(BaseAddr,Offset), CREATE_DUAL_CMD(Cmd)) ++#define GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS(BaseAddr, Lba, LbaSize) ( BaseAddr + (UINTN)((Lba) * LbaSize) ) ++ ++// Status Register Bits ++#define P30_SR_BIT_WRITE (BIT7 << 16 | BIT7) ++#define P30_SR_BIT_ERASE_SUSPEND (BIT6 << 16 | BIT6) ++#define P30_SR_BIT_ERASE (BIT5 << 16 | BIT5) ++#define P30_SR_BIT_PROGRAM (BIT4 << 16 | BIT4) ++#define P30_SR_BIT_VPP (BIT3 << 16 | BIT3) ++#define P30_SR_BIT_PROGRAM_SUSPEND (BIT2 << 16 | BIT2) ++#define P30_SR_BIT_BLOCK_LOCKED (BIT1 << 16 | BIT1) ++#define P30_SR_BIT_BEFP (BIT0 << 16 | BIT0) ++ ++// Device Commands for Intel StrataFlash(R) Embedded Memory (P30) Family ++ ++// On chip buffer size for buffered programming operations ++// There are 2 chips, each chip can buffer up to 32 (16-bit)words, and each word is 2 bytes. ++// Therefore the total size of the buffer is 2 x 32 x 2 = 128 bytes ++#define P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES ((UINTN)128) ++#define P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_WORDS (P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES/((UINTN)4)) ++#define MAX_BUFFERED_PROG_ITERATIONS 10000000 ++#define BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS 0x7F ++ ++// CFI Addresses ++#define P30_CFI_ADDR_QUERY_UNIQUE_QRY 0x10 ++#define P30_CFI_ADDR_VENDOR_ID 0x13 ++ ++// CFI Data ++#define CFI_QRY 0x00595251 ++ ++// READ Commands ++#define P30_CMD_READ_DEVICE_ID 0x0090 ++#define P30_CMD_READ_STATUS_REGISTER 0x0070 ++#define P30_CMD_CLEAR_STATUS_REGISTER 0x0050 ++#define P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY 0x00FF ++#define P30_CMD_READ_CFI_QUERY 0x0098 ++ ++// WRITE Commands ++#define P30_CMD_WORD_PROGRAM_SETUP 0x0040 ++#define P30_CMD_ALTERNATE_WORD_PROGRAM_SETUP 0x0010 ++#define P30_CMD_BUFFERED_PROGRAM_SETUP 0x00E8 ++#define P30_CMD_BUFFERED_PROGRAM_CONFIRM 0x00D0 ++#define P30_CMD_BEFP_SETUP 0x0080 ++#define P30_CMD_BEFP_CONFIRM 0x00D0 ++ ++// ERASE Commands ++#define P30_CMD_BLOCK_ERASE_SETUP 0x0020 ++#define P30_CMD_BLOCK_ERASE_CONFIRM 0x00D0 ++ ++// SUSPEND Commands ++#define P30_CMD_PROGRAM_OR_ERASE_SUSPEND 0x00B0 ++#define P30_CMD_SUSPEND_RESUME 0x00D0 ++ ++// BLOCK LOCKING / UNLOCKING Commands ++#define P30_CMD_LOCK_BLOCK_SETUP 0x0060 ++#define P30_CMD_LOCK_BLOCK 0x0001 ++#define P30_CMD_UNLOCK_BLOCK 0x00D0 ++#define P30_CMD_LOCK_DOWN_BLOCK 0x002F ++ ++// PROTECTION Commands ++#define P30_CMD_PROGRAM_PROTECTION_REGISTER_SETUP 0x00C0 ++ ++// CONFIGURATION Commands ++#define P30_CMD_READ_CONFIGURATION_REGISTER_SETUP 0x0060 ++#define P30_CMD_READ_CONFIGURATION_REGISTER 0x0003 ++ ++#define NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32('n', 'o', 'r', '0') ++#define INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, FvbProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE) ++#define INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, BlockIoProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE) ++#define INSTANCE_FROM_DISKIO_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, DiskIoProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE) ++ ++typedef struct _NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE; ++ ++#pragma pack (1) ++typedef struct { ++ VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH Vendor; ++ UINT8 Index; ++ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL End; ++} NOR_FLASH_DEVICE_PATH; ++#pragma pack () ++ ++struct _NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE { ++ UINT32 Signature; ++ EFI_HANDLE Handle; ++ ++ UINTN DeviceBaseAddress; ++ UINTN RegionBaseAddress; ++ UINTN Size; ++ EFI_LBA StartLba; ++ ++ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL BlockIoProtocol; ++ EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA Media; ++ EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL DiskIoProtocol; ++ ++ EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL FvbProtocol; ++ VOID *ShadowBuffer; ++ ++ NOR_FLASH_DEVICE_PATH DevicePath; ++}; ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashReadCfiData ( ++ IN UINTN DeviceBaseAddress, ++ IN UINTN CFI_Offset, ++ IN UINT32 NumberOfBytes, ++ OUT UINT32 *Data ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashWriteBuffer ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINTN TargetAddress, ++ IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, ++ IN UINT32 *Buffer ++ ); ++ ++// ++// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.Reset ++// ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashBlockIoReset ( ++ IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN BOOLEAN ExtendedVerification ++ ); ++ ++// ++// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.ReadBlocks ++// ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashBlockIoReadBlocks ( ++ IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN UINT32 MediaId, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, ++ OUT VOID *Buffer ++ ); ++ ++// ++// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.WriteBlocks ++// ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashBlockIoWriteBlocks ( ++ IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN UINT32 MediaId, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, ++ IN VOID *Buffer ++ ); ++ ++// ++// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.FlushBlocks ++// ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks ( ++ IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This ++ ); ++ ++// ++// DiskIO Protocol function EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL.ReadDisk ++// ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashDiskIoReadDisk ( ++ IN EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN UINT32 MediaId, ++ IN UINT64 Offset, ++ IN UINTN BufferSize, ++ OUT VOID *Buffer ++ ); ++ ++// ++// DiskIO Protocol function EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL.WriteDisk ++// ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashDiskIoWriteDisk ( ++ IN EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN UINT32 MediaId, ++ IN UINT64 Offset, ++ IN UINTN BufferSize, ++ IN VOID *Buffer ++ ); ++ ++// ++// NorFlashFvbDxe.c ++// ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbGetAttributes ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ OUT EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2 *Attributes ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbSetAttributes ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN OUT EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2 *Attributes ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbGetPhysicalAddress ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ OUT EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS *Address ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbGetBlockSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ OUT UINTN *BlockSize, ++ OUT UINTN *NumberOfBlocks ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbRead ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN Offset, ++ IN OUT UINTN *NumBytes, ++ IN OUT UINT8 *Buffer ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbWrite ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN Offset, ++ IN OUT UINTN *NumBytes, ++ IN UINT8 *Buffer ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbEraseBlocks ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ ... ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++ValidateFvHeader ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++InitializeFvAndVariableStoreHeaders ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance ++ ); ++ ++VOID ++EFIAPI ++FvbVirtualNotifyEvent ( ++ IN EFI_EVENT Event, ++ IN VOID *Context ++ ); ++ ++// ++// NorFlashDxe.c ++// ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashWriteFullBlock ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINT32 *DataBuffer, ++ IN UINT32 BlockSizeInWords ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashUnlockAndEraseSingleBlock ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINTN BlockAddress ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashCreateInstance ( ++ IN UINTN NorFlashDeviceBase, ++ IN UINTN NorFlashRegionBase, ++ IN UINTN NorFlashSize, ++ IN UINT32 Index, ++ IN UINT32 BlockSize, ++ IN BOOLEAN SupportFvb, ++ OUT NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE **NorFlashInstance ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashFvbInitialize ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance ++ ); ++ ++// ++// NorFlash.c ++// ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN Offset, ++ IN OUT UINTN *NumBytes, ++ IN UINT8 *Buffer ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashWriteBlocks ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, ++ IN VOID *Buffer ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashReadBlocks ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, ++ OUT VOID *Buffer ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashRead ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN Offset, ++ IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, ++ OUT VOID *Buffer ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashWrite ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN Offset, ++ IN OUT UINTN *NumBytes, ++ IN UINT8 *Buffer ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashReset ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashEraseSingleBlock ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINTN BlockAddress ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashUnlockSingleBlockIfNecessary ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINTN BlockAddress ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashWriteSingleWord ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINTN WordAddress, ++ IN UINT32 WriteData ++ ); ++ ++VOID ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashVirtualNotifyEvent ( ++ IN EFI_EVENT Event, ++ IN VOID *Context ++ ); ++ ++#endif /* __VIRT_NOR_FLASH__ */ +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..ecf152e355 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c +@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ ++/** @file NorFlashBlockIoDxe.c ++ ++ Copyright (c) 2011-2013, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.
++ ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ ++**/ ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "VirtNorFlash.h" ++ ++// ++// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.Reset ++// ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashBlockIoReset ( ++ IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN BOOLEAN ExtendedVerification ++ ) ++{ ++ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ ++ Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS (This); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashBlockIoReset(MediaId=0x%x)\n", This->Media->MediaId)); ++ ++ return NorFlashReset (Instance); ++} ++ ++// ++// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.ReadBlocks ++// ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashBlockIoReadBlocks ( ++ IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN UINT32 MediaId, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, ++ OUT VOID *Buffer ++ ) ++{ ++ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA *Media; ++ ++ if (This == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS (This); ++ Media = This->Media; ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashBlockIoReadBlocks(MediaId=0x%x, Lba=%ld, BufferSize=0x%x bytes (%d kB), BufferPtr @ 0x%08x)\n", MediaId, Lba, BufferSizeInBytes, BufferSizeInBytes, Buffer)); ++ ++ if (!Media) { ++ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } else if (!Media->MediaPresent) { ++ Status = EFI_NO_MEDIA; ++ } else if (Media->MediaId != MediaId) { ++ Status = EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED; ++ } else if ((Media->IoAlign > 2) && (((UINTN)Buffer & (Media->IoAlign - 1)) != 0)) { ++ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } else { ++ Status = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, BufferSizeInBytes, Buffer); ++ } ++ ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++// ++// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.WriteBlocks ++// ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashBlockIoWriteBlocks ( ++ IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN UINT32 MediaId, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, ++ IN VOID *Buffer ++ ) ++{ ++ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS (This); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashBlockIoWriteBlocks(MediaId=0x%x, Lba=%ld, BufferSize=0x%x bytes, BufferPtr @ 0x%08x)\n", MediaId, Lba, BufferSizeInBytes, Buffer)); ++ ++ if ( !This->Media->MediaPresent ) { ++ Status = EFI_NO_MEDIA; ++ } else if ( This->Media->MediaId != MediaId ) { ++ Status = EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED; ++ } else if ( This->Media->ReadOnly ) { ++ Status = EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED; ++ } else { ++ Status = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, BufferSizeInBytes, Buffer); ++ } ++ ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++// ++// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.FlushBlocks ++// ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks ( ++ IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This ++ ) ++{ ++ // No Flush required for the NOR Flash driver ++ // because cache operations are not permitted. ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks: Function NOT IMPLEMENTED (not required).\n")); ++ ++ // Nothing to do so just return without error ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..819425545e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c +@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@ ++/** @file NorFlashDxe.c ++ ++ Copyright (c) 2011 - 2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
++ ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ ++**/ ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "VirtNorFlash.h" ++ ++STATIC EFI_EVENT mNorFlashVirtualAddrChangeEvent; ++ ++// ++// Global variable declarations ++// ++NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE **mNorFlashInstances; ++UINT32 mNorFlashDeviceCount; ++UINTN mFlashNvStorageVariableBase; ++EFI_EVENT mFvbVirtualAddrChangeEvent; ++ ++NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE mNorFlashInstanceTemplate = { ++ NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE, // Signature ++ NULL, // Handle ... NEED TO BE FILLED ++ ++ 0, // DeviceBaseAddress ... NEED TO BE FILLED ++ 0, // RegionBaseAddress ... NEED TO BE FILLED ++ 0, // Size ... NEED TO BE FILLED ++ 0, // StartLba ++ ++ { ++ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL_REVISION2, // Revision ++ NULL, // Media ... NEED TO BE FILLED ++ NorFlashBlockIoReset, // Reset; ++ NorFlashBlockIoReadBlocks, // ReadBlocks ++ NorFlashBlockIoWriteBlocks, // WriteBlocks ++ NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks // FlushBlocks ++ }, // BlockIoProtocol ++ ++ { ++ 0, // MediaId ... NEED TO BE FILLED ++ FALSE, // RemovableMedia ++ TRUE, // MediaPresent ++ FALSE, // LogicalPartition ++ FALSE, // ReadOnly ++ FALSE, // WriteCaching; ++ 0, // BlockSize ... NEED TO BE FILLED ++ 4, // IoAlign ++ 0, // LastBlock ... NEED TO BE FILLED ++ 0, // LowestAlignedLba ++ 1, // LogicalBlocksPerPhysicalBlock ++ }, // Media; ++ ++ { ++ EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL_REVISION, // Revision ++ NorFlashDiskIoReadDisk, // ReadDisk ++ NorFlashDiskIoWriteDisk // WriteDisk ++ }, ++ ++ { ++ FvbGetAttributes, // GetAttributes ++ FvbSetAttributes, // SetAttributes ++ FvbGetPhysicalAddress, // GetPhysicalAddress ++ FvbGetBlockSize, // GetBlockSize ++ FvbRead, // Read ++ FvbWrite, // Write ++ FvbEraseBlocks, // EraseBlocks ++ NULL, // ParentHandle ++ }, // FvbProtoccol; ++ NULL, // ShadowBuffer ++ { ++ { ++ { ++ HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH, ++ HW_VENDOR_DP, ++ { ++ (UINT8)(OFFSET_OF (NOR_FLASH_DEVICE_PATH, End)), ++ (UINT8)(OFFSET_OF (NOR_FLASH_DEVICE_PATH, End) >> 8) ++ } ++ }, ++ { 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, { 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0 } ++ }, // GUID ... NEED TO BE FILLED ++ }, ++ 0, // Index ++ { ++ END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE, ++ END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE, ++ { sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL), 0 } ++ } ++ } // DevicePath ++}; ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashCreateInstance ( ++ IN UINTN NorFlashDeviceBase, ++ IN UINTN NorFlashRegionBase, ++ IN UINTN NorFlashSize, ++ IN UINT32 Index, ++ IN UINT32 BlockSize, ++ IN BOOLEAN SupportFvb, ++ OUT NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE **NorFlashInstance ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ ++ ASSERT (NorFlashInstance != NULL); ++ ++ Instance = AllocateRuntimeCopyPool (sizeof (NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE), &mNorFlashInstanceTemplate); ++ if (Instance == NULL) { ++ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ } ++ ++ Instance->DeviceBaseAddress = NorFlashDeviceBase; ++ Instance->RegionBaseAddress = NorFlashRegionBase; ++ Instance->Size = NorFlashSize; ++ ++ Instance->BlockIoProtocol.Media = &Instance->Media; ++ Instance->Media.MediaId = Index; ++ Instance->Media.BlockSize = BlockSize; ++ Instance->Media.LastBlock = (NorFlashSize / BlockSize)-1; ++ ++ CopyGuid (&Instance->DevicePath.Vendor.Guid, &gEfiCallerIdGuid); ++ Instance->DevicePath.Index = (UINT8)Index; ++ ++ Instance->ShadowBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (BlockSize); ++ if (Instance->ShadowBuffer == NULL) { ++ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ } ++ ++ if (SupportFvb) { ++ NorFlashFvbInitialize (Instance); ++ ++ Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces ( ++ &Instance->Handle, ++ &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid, ++ &Instance->DevicePath, ++ &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid, ++ &Instance->BlockIoProtocol, ++ &gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid, ++ &Instance->FvbProtocol, ++ NULL ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ FreePool (Instance); ++ return Status; ++ } ++ } else { ++ Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces ( ++ &Instance->Handle, ++ &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid, ++ &Instance->DevicePath, ++ &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid, ++ &Instance->BlockIoProtocol, ++ &gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid, ++ &Instance->DiskIoProtocol, ++ NULL ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ FreePool (Instance); ++ return Status; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ *NorFlashInstance = Instance; ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++/** ++ * This function unlock and erase an entire NOR Flash block. ++ **/ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashUnlockAndEraseSingleBlock ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN UINTN BlockAddress ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINTN Index; ++ EFI_TPL OriginalTPL; ++ ++ if (!EfiAtRuntime ()) { ++ // Raise TPL to TPL_HIGH to stop anyone from interrupting us. ++ OriginalTPL = gBS->RaiseTPL (TPL_HIGH_LEVEL); ++ } else { ++ // This initialization is only to prevent the compiler to complain about the ++ // use of uninitialized variables ++ OriginalTPL = TPL_HIGH_LEVEL; ++ } ++ ++ Index = 0; ++ // The block erase might fail a first time (SW bug ?). Retry it ... ++ do { ++ // Unlock the block if we have to ++ Status = NorFlashUnlockSingleBlockIfNecessary (Instance, BlockAddress); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ Status = NorFlashEraseSingleBlock (Instance, BlockAddress); ++ Index++; ++ } while ((Index < NOR_FLASH_ERASE_RETRY) && (Status == EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED)); ++ ++ if (Index == NOR_FLASH_ERASE_RETRY) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EraseSingleBlock(BlockAddress=0x%08x: Block Locked Error (try to erase %d times)\n", BlockAddress, Index)); ++ } ++ ++ if (!EfiAtRuntime ()) { ++ // Interruptions can resume. ++ gBS->RestoreTPL (OriginalTPL); ++ } ++ ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashWriteFullBlock ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINT32 *DataBuffer, ++ IN UINT32 BlockSizeInWords ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINTN WordAddress; ++ UINT32 WordIndex; ++ UINTN BufferIndex; ++ UINTN BlockAddress; ++ UINTN BuffersInBlock; ++ UINTN RemainingWords; ++ EFI_TPL OriginalTPL; ++ UINTN Cnt; ++ ++ Status = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ ++ // Get the physical address of the block ++ BlockAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS (Instance->RegionBaseAddress, Lba, BlockSizeInWords * 4); ++ ++ // Start writing from the first address at the start of the block ++ WordAddress = BlockAddress; ++ ++ if (!EfiAtRuntime ()) { ++ // Raise TPL to TPL_HIGH to stop anyone from interrupting us. ++ OriginalTPL = gBS->RaiseTPL (TPL_HIGH_LEVEL); ++ } else { ++ // This initialization is only to prevent the compiler to complain about the ++ // use of uninitialized variables ++ OriginalTPL = TPL_HIGH_LEVEL; ++ } ++ ++ Status = NorFlashUnlockAndEraseSingleBlock (Instance, BlockAddress); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "WriteSingleBlock: ERROR - Failed to Unlock and Erase the single block at 0x%X\n", BlockAddress)); ++ goto EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ // To speed up the programming operation, NOR Flash is programmed using the Buffered Programming method. ++ ++ // Check that the address starts at a 32-word boundary, i.e. last 7 bits must be zero ++ if ((WordAddress & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS) == 0x00) { ++ // First, break the entire block into buffer-sized chunks. ++ BuffersInBlock = (UINTN)(BlockSizeInWords * 4) / P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES; ++ ++ // Then feed each buffer chunk to the NOR Flash ++ // If a buffer does not contain any data, don't write it. ++ for (BufferIndex = 0; ++ BufferIndex < BuffersInBlock; ++ BufferIndex++, WordAddress += P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES, DataBuffer += P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_WORDS ++ ) ++ { ++ // Check the buffer to see if it contains any data (not set all 1s). ++ for (Cnt = 0; Cnt < P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_WORDS; Cnt++) { ++ if (~DataBuffer[Cnt] != 0 ) { ++ // Some data found, write the buffer. ++ Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer ( ++ Instance, ++ WordAddress, ++ P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES, ++ DataBuffer ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ ++ // Finally, finish off any remaining words that are less than the maximum size of the buffer ++ RemainingWords = BlockSizeInWords % P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_WORDS; ++ ++ if (RemainingWords != 0) { ++ Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer (Instance, WordAddress, (RemainingWords * 4), DataBuffer); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto EXIT; ++ } ++ } ++ } else { ++ // For now, use the single word programming algorithm ++ // It is unlikely that the NOR Flash will exist in an address which falls within a 32 word boundary range, ++ // i.e. which ends in the range 0x......01 - 0x......7F. ++ for (WordIndex = 0; WordIndex < BlockSizeInWords; WordIndex++, DataBuffer++, WordAddress = WordAddress + 4) { ++ Status = NorFlashWriteSingleWord (Instance, WordAddress, *DataBuffer); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto EXIT; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ ++EXIT: ++ if (!EfiAtRuntime ()) { ++ // Interruptions can resume. ++ gBS->RestoreTPL (OriginalTPL); ++ } ++ ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NOR FLASH Programming [WriteSingleBlock] failed at address 0x%08x. Exit Status = \"%r\".\n", WordAddress, Status)); ++ } ++ ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashInitialise ( ++ IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, ++ IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINT32 Index; ++ VIRT_NOR_FLASH_DESCRIPTION *NorFlashDevices; ++ BOOLEAN ContainVariableStorage; ++ ++ Status = VirtNorFlashPlatformInitialization (); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashInitialise: Fail to initialize Nor Flash devices\n")); ++ return Status; ++ } ++ ++ Status = VirtNorFlashPlatformGetDevices (&NorFlashDevices, &mNorFlashDeviceCount); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashInitialise: Fail to get Nor Flash devices\n")); ++ return Status; ++ } ++ ++ mNorFlashInstances = AllocateRuntimePool (sizeof (NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *) * mNorFlashDeviceCount); ++ ++ for (Index = 0; Index < mNorFlashDeviceCount; Index++) { ++ // Check if this NOR Flash device contain the variable storage region ++ ++ if (PcdGet64 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64) != 0) { ++ ContainVariableStorage = ++ (NorFlashDevices[Index].RegionBaseAddress <= PcdGet64 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64)) && ++ (PcdGet64 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64) + PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize) <= ++ NorFlashDevices[Index].RegionBaseAddress + NorFlashDevices[Index].Size); ++ } else { ++ ContainVariableStorage = ++ (NorFlashDevices[Index].RegionBaseAddress <= PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase)) && ++ (PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase) + PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize) <= ++ NorFlashDevices[Index].RegionBaseAddress + NorFlashDevices[Index].Size); ++ } ++ ++ Status = NorFlashCreateInstance ( ++ NorFlashDevices[Index].DeviceBaseAddress, ++ NorFlashDevices[Index].RegionBaseAddress, ++ NorFlashDevices[Index].Size, ++ Index, ++ NorFlashDevices[Index].BlockSize, ++ ContainVariableStorage, ++ &mNorFlashInstances[Index] ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashInitialise: Fail to create instance for NorFlash[%d]\n", Index)); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Register for the virtual address change event ++ // ++ Status = gBS->CreateEventEx ( ++ EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL, ++ TPL_NOTIFY, ++ NorFlashVirtualNotifyEvent, ++ NULL, ++ &gEfiEventVirtualAddressChangeGuid, ++ &mNorFlashVirtualAddrChangeEvent ++ ); ++ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++NorFlashFvbInitialize ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINT32 FvbNumLba; ++ EFI_BOOT_MODE BootMode; ++ UINTN RuntimeMmioRegionSize; ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashFvbInitialize\n")); ++ ASSERT ((Instance != NULL)); ++ ++ // ++ // Declare the Non-Volatile storage as EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME ++ // ++ ++ // Note: all the NOR Flash region needs to be reserved into the UEFI Runtime memory; ++ // even if we only use the small block region at the top of the NOR Flash. ++ // The reason is when the NOR Flash memory is set into program mode, the command ++ // is written as the base of the flash region (ie: Instance->DeviceBaseAddress) ++ RuntimeMmioRegionSize = (Instance->RegionBaseAddress - Instance->DeviceBaseAddress) + Instance->Size; ++ ++ Status = gDS->AddMemorySpace ( ++ EfiGcdMemoryTypeMemoryMappedIo, ++ Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, ++ RuntimeMmioRegionSize, ++ EFI_MEMORY_UC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME ++ ); ++ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ Status = gDS->SetMemorySpaceAttributes ( ++ Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, ++ RuntimeMmioRegionSize, ++ EFI_MEMORY_UC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME ++ ); ++ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ mFlashNvStorageVariableBase = (PcdGet64 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64) != 0) ? ++ PcdGet64 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64) : PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase); ++ ++ // Set the index of the first LBA for the FVB ++ Instance->StartLba = (mFlashNvStorageVariableBase - Instance->RegionBaseAddress) / Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ ++ BootMode = GetBootModeHob (); ++ if (BootMode == BOOT_WITH_DEFAULT_SETTINGS) { ++ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } else { ++ // Determine if there is a valid header at the beginning of the NorFlash ++ Status = ValidateFvHeader (Instance); ++ } ++ ++ // Install the Default FVB header if required ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ // There is no valid header, so time to install one. ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: The FVB Header is not valid.\n", __FUNCTION__)); ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_INFO, ++ "%a: Installing a correct one for this volume.\n", ++ __FUNCTION__ ++ )); ++ ++ // Erase all the NorFlash that is reserved for variable storage ++ FvbNumLba = (PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize) + PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingSize) + PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize)) / Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ ++ Status = FvbEraseBlocks (&Instance->FvbProtocol, (EFI_LBA)0, FvbNumLba, EFI_LBA_LIST_TERMINATOR); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return Status; ++ } ++ ++ // Install all appropriate headers ++ Status = InitializeFvAndVariableStoreHeaders (Instance); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return Status; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // The driver implementing the variable read service can now be dispatched; ++ // the varstore headers are in place. ++ // ++ Status = gBS->InstallProtocolInterface ( ++ &gImageHandle, ++ &gEdkiiNvVarStoreFormattedGuid, ++ EFI_NATIVE_INTERFACE, ++ NULL ++ ); ++ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ // ++ // Register for the virtual address change event ++ // ++ Status = gBS->CreateEventEx ( ++ EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL, ++ TPL_NOTIFY, ++ FvbVirtualNotifyEvent, ++ NULL, ++ &gEfiEventVirtualAddressChangeGuid, ++ &mFvbVirtualAddrChangeEvent ++ ); ++ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ return Status; ++} +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..1bf50e4823 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf +@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ ++#/** @file ++# ++# Component description file for NorFlashDxe module ++# ++# Copyright (c) 2011 - 2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
++# ++# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++# ++#**/ ++ ++[Defines] ++ INF_VERSION = 1.29 ++ BASE_NAME = VirtNorFlashDxe ++ FILE_GUID = e452cabd-5fe1-4d97-8161-e80ed6a409a8 ++ MODULE_TYPE = DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER ++ VERSION_STRING = 1.0 ++ ENTRY_POINT = NorFlashInitialise ++ ++[Sources.common] ++ VirtNorFlash.c ++ VirtNorFlash.h ++ VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c ++ VirtNorFlashDxe.c ++ VirtNorFlashFvb.c ++ ++[Packages] ++ ArmPlatformPkg/ArmPlatformPkg.dec ++ EmbeddedPkg/EmbeddedPkg.dec ++ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec ++ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec ++ OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec ++ ++[LibraryClasses] ++ BaseLib ++ DebugLib ++ DxeServicesTableLib ++ HobLib ++ IoLib ++ UefiBootServicesTableLib ++ UefiDriverEntryPoint ++ UefiLib ++ UefiRuntimeLib ++ VirtNorFlashPlatformLib ++ ++[Guids] ++ gEdkiiNvVarStoreFormattedGuid ## PRODUCES ## PROTOCOL ++ gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid ++ gEfiEventVirtualAddressChangeGuid ++ gEfiSystemNvDataFvGuid ++ gEfiVariableGuid ++ ++[Protocols] ++ gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid ++ gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid ++ gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid ++ gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid ++ ++[Pcd.common] ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64 ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase64 ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingSize ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase64 ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize ++ ++ gArmPlatformTokenSpaceGuid.PcdNorFlashCheckBlockLocked ++ ++[Depex] ++ gEfiCpuArchProtocolGuid +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..c824e0a0fb +--- /dev/null ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c +@@ -0,0 +1,777 @@ ++/*++ @file NorFlashFvbDxe.c ++ ++ Copyright (c) 2011 - 2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
++ ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ ++ --*/ ++ ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "VirtNorFlash.h" ++ ++extern UINTN mFlashNvStorageVariableBase; ++/// ++/// The Firmware Volume Block Protocol is the low-level interface ++/// to a firmware volume. File-level access to a firmware volume ++/// should not be done using the Firmware Volume Block Protocol. ++/// Normal access to a firmware volume must use the Firmware ++/// Volume Protocol. Typically, only the file system driver that ++/// produces the Firmware Volume Protocol will bind to the ++/// Firmware Volume Block Protocol. ++/// ++ ++/** ++ Initialises the FV Header and Variable Store Header ++ to support variable operations. ++ ++ @param[in] Ptr - Location to initialise the headers ++ ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++InitializeFvAndVariableStoreHeaders ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ VOID *Headers; ++ UINTN HeadersLength; ++ EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *FirmwareVolumeHeader; ++ VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *VariableStoreHeader; ++ UINT32 NvStorageFtwSpareSize; ++ UINT32 NvStorageFtwWorkingSize; ++ UINT32 NvStorageVariableSize; ++ UINT64 NvStorageFtwSpareBase; ++ UINT64 NvStorageFtwWorkingBase; ++ UINT64 NvStorageVariableBase; ++ ++ HeadersLength = sizeof (EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER) + sizeof (EFI_FV_BLOCK_MAP_ENTRY) + sizeof (VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER); ++ Headers = AllocateZeroPool (HeadersLength); ++ ++ NvStorageFtwWorkingSize = PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingSize); ++ NvStorageFtwSpareSize = PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize); ++ NvStorageVariableSize = PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize); ++ ++ NvStorageFtwSpareBase = (PcdGet64 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase64) != 0) ? ++ PcdGet64 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase64) : PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase); ++ NvStorageFtwWorkingBase = (PcdGet64 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase64) != 0) ? ++ PcdGet64 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase64) : PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase); ++ NvStorageVariableBase = (PcdGet64 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64) != 0) ? ++ PcdGet64 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64) : PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase); ++ ++ // FirmwareVolumeHeader->FvLength is declared to have the Variable area AND the FTW working area AND the FTW Spare contiguous. ++ if ((NvStorageVariableBase + NvStorageVariableSize) != NvStorageFtwWorkingBase) { ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_ERROR, ++ "%a: NvStorageFtwWorkingBase is not contiguous with NvStorageVariableBase region\n", ++ __FUNCTION__ ++ )); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if ((NvStorageFtwWorkingBase + NvStorageFtwWorkingSize) != NvStorageFtwSpareBase) { ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_ERROR, ++ "%a: NvStorageFtwSpareBase is not contiguous with NvStorageFtwWorkingBase region\n", ++ __FUNCTION__ ++ )); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // Check if the size of the area is at least one block size ++ if ((NvStorageVariableSize <= 0) || (NvStorageVariableSize / Instance->Media.BlockSize <= 0)) { ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_ERROR, ++ "%a: NvStorageVariableSize is 0x%x, should be atleast one block size\n", ++ __FUNCTION__, ++ NvStorageVariableSize ++ )); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if ((NvStorageFtwWorkingSize <= 0) || (NvStorageFtwWorkingSize / Instance->Media.BlockSize <= 0)) { ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_ERROR, ++ "%a: NvStorageFtwWorkingSize is 0x%x, should be atleast one block size\n", ++ __FUNCTION__, ++ NvStorageFtwWorkingSize ++ )); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if ((NvStorageFtwSpareSize <= 0) || (NvStorageFtwSpareSize / Instance->Media.BlockSize <= 0)) { ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_ERROR, ++ "%a: NvStorageFtwSpareSize is 0x%x, should be atleast one block size\n", ++ __FUNCTION__, ++ NvStorageFtwSpareSize ++ )); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // Ensure the Variable area Base Addresses are aligned on a block size boundaries ++ if ((NvStorageVariableBase % Instance->Media.BlockSize != 0) || ++ (NvStorageFtwWorkingBase % Instance->Media.BlockSize != 0) || ++ (NvStorageFtwSpareBase % Instance->Media.BlockSize != 0)) ++ { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: NvStorage Base addresses must be aligned to block size boundaries", __FUNCTION__)); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER ++ // ++ FirmwareVolumeHeader = (EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *)Headers; ++ CopyGuid (&FirmwareVolumeHeader->FileSystemGuid, &gEfiSystemNvDataFvGuid); ++ FirmwareVolumeHeader->FvLength = ++ PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize) + ++ PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingSize) + ++ PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize); ++ FirmwareVolumeHeader->Signature = EFI_FVH_SIGNATURE; ++ FirmwareVolumeHeader->Attributes = (EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2)( ++ EFI_FVB2_READ_ENABLED_CAP | // Reads may be enabled ++ EFI_FVB2_READ_STATUS | // Reads are currently enabled ++ EFI_FVB2_STICKY_WRITE | // A block erase is required to flip bits into EFI_FVB2_ERASE_POLARITY ++ EFI_FVB2_MEMORY_MAPPED | // It is memory mapped ++ EFI_FVB2_ERASE_POLARITY | // After erasure all bits take this value (i.e. '1') ++ EFI_FVB2_WRITE_STATUS | // Writes are currently enabled ++ EFI_FVB2_WRITE_ENABLED_CAP // Writes may be enabled ++ ); ++ FirmwareVolumeHeader->HeaderLength = sizeof (EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER) + sizeof (EFI_FV_BLOCK_MAP_ENTRY); ++ FirmwareVolumeHeader->Revision = EFI_FVH_REVISION; ++ FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[0].NumBlocks = Instance->Media.LastBlock + 1; ++ FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[0].Length = Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[1].NumBlocks = 0; ++ FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[1].Length = 0; ++ FirmwareVolumeHeader->Checksum = CalculateCheckSum16 ((UINT16 *)FirmwareVolumeHeader, FirmwareVolumeHeader->HeaderLength); ++ ++ // ++ // VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER ++ // ++ VariableStoreHeader = (VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *)((UINTN)Headers + FirmwareVolumeHeader->HeaderLength); ++ CopyGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid); ++ VariableStoreHeader->Size = PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize) - FirmwareVolumeHeader->HeaderLength; ++ VariableStoreHeader->Format = VARIABLE_STORE_FORMATTED; ++ VariableStoreHeader->State = VARIABLE_STORE_HEALTHY; ++ ++ // Install the combined super-header in the NorFlash ++ Status = FvbWrite (&Instance->FvbProtocol, 0, 0, &HeadersLength, Headers); ++ ++ FreePool (Headers); ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++/** ++ Check the integrity of firmware volume header. ++ ++ @param[in] FwVolHeader - A pointer to a firmware volume header ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS - The firmware volume is consistent ++ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND - The firmware volume has been corrupted. ++ ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++ValidateFvHeader ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT16 Checksum; ++ EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *FwVolHeader; ++ VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *VariableStoreHeader; ++ UINTN VariableStoreLength; ++ UINTN FvLength; ++ ++ FwVolHeader = (EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *)Instance->RegionBaseAddress; ++ ++ FvLength = PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize) + PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingSize) + ++ PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize); ++ ++ // ++ // Verify the header revision, header signature, length ++ // Length of FvBlock cannot be 2**64-1 ++ // HeaderLength cannot be an odd number ++ // ++ if ( (FwVolHeader->Revision != EFI_FVH_REVISION) ++ || (FwVolHeader->Signature != EFI_FVH_SIGNATURE) ++ || (FwVolHeader->FvLength != FvLength) ++ ) ++ { ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_INFO, ++ "%a: No Firmware Volume header present\n", ++ __FUNCTION__ ++ )); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ ++ // Check the Firmware Volume Guid ++ if ( CompareGuid (&FwVolHeader->FileSystemGuid, &gEfiSystemNvDataFvGuid) == FALSE ) { ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_INFO, ++ "%a: Firmware Volume Guid non-compatible\n", ++ __FUNCTION__ ++ )); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ ++ // Verify the header checksum ++ Checksum = CalculateSum16 ((UINT16 *)FwVolHeader, FwVolHeader->HeaderLength); ++ if (Checksum != 0) { ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_INFO, ++ "%a: FV checksum is invalid (Checksum:0x%X)\n", ++ __FUNCTION__, ++ Checksum ++ )); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ ++ VariableStoreHeader = (VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *)((UINTN)FwVolHeader + FwVolHeader->HeaderLength); ++ ++ // Check the Variable Store Guid ++ if (!CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiVariableGuid) && ++ !CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid)) ++ { ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_INFO, ++ "%a: Variable Store Guid non-compatible\n", ++ __FUNCTION__ ++ )); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ ++ VariableStoreLength = PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize) - FwVolHeader->HeaderLength; ++ if (VariableStoreHeader->Size != VariableStoreLength) { ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_INFO, ++ "%a: Variable Store Length does not match\n", ++ __FUNCTION__ ++ )); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/** ++ The GetAttributes() function retrieves the attributes and ++ current settings of the block. ++ ++ @param This Indicates the EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL instance. ++ ++ @param Attributes Pointer to EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2 in which the attributes and ++ current settings are returned. ++ Type EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2 is defined in EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The firmware volume attributes were returned. ++ ++ **/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbGetAttributes ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ OUT EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2 *Attributes ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2 FlashFvbAttributes; ++ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ ++ Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS (This); ++ ++ FlashFvbAttributes = (EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2)( ++ ++ EFI_FVB2_READ_ENABLED_CAP | // Reads may be enabled ++ EFI_FVB2_READ_STATUS | // Reads are currently enabled ++ EFI_FVB2_STICKY_WRITE | // A block erase is required to flip bits into EFI_FVB2_ERASE_POLARITY ++ EFI_FVB2_MEMORY_MAPPED | // It is memory mapped ++ EFI_FVB2_ERASE_POLARITY // After erasure all bits take this value (i.e. '1') ++ ++ ); ++ ++ // Check if it is write protected ++ if (Instance->Media.ReadOnly != TRUE) { ++ FlashFvbAttributes = FlashFvbAttributes | ++ EFI_FVB2_WRITE_STATUS | // Writes are currently enabled ++ EFI_FVB2_WRITE_ENABLED_CAP; // Writes may be enabled ++ } ++ ++ *Attributes = FlashFvbAttributes; ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbGetAttributes(0x%X)\n", *Attributes)); ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/** ++ The SetAttributes() function sets configurable firmware volume attributes ++ and returns the new settings of the firmware volume. ++ ++ ++ @param This Indicates the EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL instance. ++ ++ @param Attributes On input, Attributes is a pointer to EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2 ++ that contains the desired firmware volume settings. ++ On successful return, it contains the new settings of ++ the firmware volume. ++ Type EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2 is defined in EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The firmware volume attributes were returned. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The attributes requested are in conflict with the capabilities ++ as declared in the firmware volume header. ++ ++ **/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbSetAttributes ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN OUT EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2 *Attributes ++ ) ++{ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbSetAttributes(0x%X) is not supported\n", *Attributes)); ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++} ++ ++/** ++ The GetPhysicalAddress() function retrieves the base address of ++ a memory-mapped firmware volume. This function should be called ++ only for memory-mapped firmware volumes. ++ ++ @param This Indicates the EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL instance. ++ ++ @param Address Pointer to a caller-allocated ++ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS that, on successful ++ return from GetPhysicalAddress(), contains the ++ base address of the firmware volume. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The firmware volume base address was returned. ++ ++ @retval EFI_NOT_SUPPORTED The firmware volume is not memory mapped. ++ ++ **/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbGetPhysicalAddress ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ OUT EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS *Address ++ ) ++{ ++ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ ++ Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS (This); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbGetPhysicalAddress(BaseAddress=0x%08x)\n", Instance->RegionBaseAddress)); ++ ++ ASSERT (Address != NULL); ++ ++ *Address = mFlashNvStorageVariableBase; ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/** ++ The GetBlockSize() function retrieves the size of the requested ++ block. It also returns the number of additional blocks with ++ the identical size. The GetBlockSize() function is used to ++ retrieve the block map (see EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER). ++ ++ ++ @param This Indicates the EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL instance. ++ ++ @param Lba Indicates the block for which to return the size. ++ ++ @param BlockSize Pointer to a caller-allocated UINTN in which ++ the size of the block is returned. ++ ++ @param NumberOfBlocks Pointer to a caller-allocated UINTN in ++ which the number of consecutive blocks, ++ starting with Lba, is returned. All ++ blocks in this range have a size of ++ BlockSize. ++ ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The firmware volume base address was returned. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The requested LBA is out of range. ++ ++ **/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbGetBlockSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ OUT UINTN *BlockSize, ++ OUT UINTN *NumberOfBlocks ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ ++ Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS (This); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbGetBlockSize(Lba=%ld, BlockSize=0x%x, LastBlock=%ld)\n", Lba, Instance->Media.BlockSize, Instance->Media.LastBlock)); ++ ++ if (Lba > Instance->Media.LastBlock) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbGetBlockSize: ERROR - Parameter LBA %ld is beyond the last Lba (%ld).\n", Lba, Instance->Media.LastBlock)); ++ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } else { ++ // This is easy because in this platform each NorFlash device has equal sized blocks. ++ *BlockSize = (UINTN)Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ *NumberOfBlocks = (UINTN)(Instance->Media.LastBlock - Lba + 1); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbGetBlockSize: *BlockSize=0x%x, *NumberOfBlocks=0x%x.\n", *BlockSize, *NumberOfBlocks)); ++ ++ Status = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ } ++ ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++/** ++ Reads the specified number of bytes into a buffer from the specified block. ++ ++ The Read() function reads the requested number of bytes from the ++ requested block and stores them in the provided buffer. ++ Implementations should be mindful that the firmware volume ++ might be in the ReadDisabled state. If it is in this state, ++ the Read() function must return the status code ++ EFI_ACCESS_DENIED without modifying the contents of the ++ buffer. The Read() function must also prevent spanning block ++ boundaries. If a read is requested that would span a block ++ boundary, the read must read up to the boundary but not ++ beyond. The output parameter NumBytes must be set to correctly ++ indicate the number of bytes actually read. The caller must be ++ aware that a read may be partially completed. ++ ++ @param This Indicates the EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL instance. ++ ++ @param Lba The starting logical block index from which to read. ++ ++ @param Offset Offset into the block at which to begin reading. ++ ++ @param NumBytes Pointer to a UINTN. ++ At entry, *NumBytes contains the total size of the buffer. ++ At exit, *NumBytes contains the total number of bytes read. ++ ++ @param Buffer Pointer to a caller-allocated buffer that will be used ++ to hold the data that is read. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The firmware volume was read successfully, and contents are ++ in Buffer. ++ ++ @retval EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE Read attempted across an LBA boundary. ++ On output, NumBytes contains the total number of bytes ++ returned in Buffer. ++ ++ @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The firmware volume is in the ReadDisabled state. ++ ++ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The block device is not functioning correctly and could not be read. ++ ++ **/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbRead ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN Offset, ++ IN OUT UINTN *NumBytes, ++ IN OUT UINT8 *Buffer ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS TempStatus; ++ UINTN BlockSize; ++ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ ++ Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS (This); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbRead(Parameters: Lba=%ld, Offset=0x%x, *NumBytes=0x%x, Buffer @ 0x%08x)\n", Instance->StartLba + Lba, Offset, *NumBytes, Buffer)); ++ ++ TempStatus = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ ++ // Cache the block size to avoid de-referencing pointers all the time ++ BlockSize = Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbRead: Check if (Offset=0x%x + NumBytes=0x%x) <= BlockSize=0x%x\n", Offset, *NumBytes, BlockSize)); ++ ++ // The read must not span block boundaries. ++ // We need to check each variable individually because adding two large values together overflows. ++ if ((Offset >= BlockSize) || ++ (*NumBytes > BlockSize) || ++ ((Offset + *NumBytes) > BlockSize)) ++ { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbRead: ERROR - EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE: (Offset=0x%x + NumBytes=0x%x) > BlockSize=0x%x\n", Offset, *NumBytes, BlockSize)); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // We must have some bytes to read ++ if (*NumBytes == 0) { ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // Decide if we are doing full block reads or not. ++ if (*NumBytes % BlockSize != 0) { ++ TempStatus = NorFlashRead (Instance, Instance->StartLba + Lba, Offset, *NumBytes, Buffer); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ } else { ++ // Read NOR Flash data into shadow buffer ++ TempStatus = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Instance->StartLba + Lba, BlockSize, Buffer); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (TempStatus)) { ++ // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/** ++ Writes the specified number of bytes from the input buffer to the block. ++ ++ The Write() function writes the specified number of bytes from ++ the provided buffer to the specified block and offset. If the ++ firmware volume is sticky write, the caller must ensure that ++ all the bits of the specified range to write are in the ++ EFI_FVB_ERASE_POLARITY state before calling the Write() ++ function, or else the result will be unpredictable. This ++ unpredictability arises because, for a sticky-write firmware ++ volume, a write may negate a bit in the EFI_FVB_ERASE_POLARITY ++ state but cannot flip it back again. Before calling the ++ Write() function, it is recommended for the caller to first call ++ the EraseBlocks() function to erase the specified block to ++ write. A block erase cycle will transition bits from the ++ (NOT)EFI_FVB_ERASE_POLARITY state back to the ++ EFI_FVB_ERASE_POLARITY state. Implementations should be ++ mindful that the firmware volume might be in the WriteDisabled ++ state. If it is in this state, the Write() function must ++ return the status code EFI_ACCESS_DENIED without modifying the ++ contents of the firmware volume. The Write() function must ++ also prevent spanning block boundaries. If a write is ++ requested that spans a block boundary, the write must store up ++ to the boundary but not beyond. The output parameter NumBytes ++ must be set to correctly indicate the number of bytes actually ++ written. The caller must be aware that a write may be ++ partially completed. All writes, partial or otherwise, must be ++ fully flushed to the hardware before the Write() service ++ returns. ++ ++ @param This Indicates the EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL instance. ++ ++ @param Lba The starting logical block index to write to. ++ ++ @param Offset Offset into the block at which to begin writing. ++ ++ @param NumBytes The pointer to a UINTN. ++ At entry, *NumBytes contains the total size of the buffer. ++ At exit, *NumBytes contains the total number of bytes actually written. ++ ++ @param Buffer The pointer to a caller-allocated buffer that contains the source for the write. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The firmware volume was written successfully. ++ ++ @retval EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE The write was attempted across an LBA boundary. ++ On output, NumBytes contains the total number of bytes ++ actually written. ++ ++ @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The firmware volume is in the WriteDisabled state. ++ ++ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The block device is malfunctioning and could not be written. ++ ++ ++ **/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbWrite ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN Offset, ++ IN OUT UINTN *NumBytes, ++ IN UINT8 *Buffer ++ ) ++{ ++ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ ++ Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS (This); ++ ++ return NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (Instance, Instance->StartLba + Lba, Offset, NumBytes, Buffer); ++} ++ ++/** ++ Erases and initialises a firmware volume block. ++ ++ The EraseBlocks() function erases one or more blocks as denoted ++ by the variable argument list. The entire parameter list of ++ blocks must be verified before erasing any blocks. If a block is ++ requested that does not exist within the associated firmware ++ volume (it has a larger index than the last block of the ++ firmware volume), the EraseBlocks() function must return the ++ status code EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER without modifying the contents ++ of the firmware volume. Implementations should be mindful that ++ the firmware volume might be in the WriteDisabled state. If it ++ is in this state, the EraseBlocks() function must return the ++ status code EFI_ACCESS_DENIED without modifying the contents of ++ the firmware volume. All calls to EraseBlocks() must be fully ++ flushed to the hardware before the EraseBlocks() service ++ returns. ++ ++ @param This Indicates the EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL ++ instance. ++ ++ @param ... The variable argument list is a list of tuples. ++ Each tuple describes a range of LBAs to erase ++ and consists of the following: ++ - An EFI_LBA that indicates the starting LBA ++ - A UINTN that indicates the number of blocks to erase. ++ ++ The list is terminated with an EFI_LBA_LIST_TERMINATOR. ++ For example, the following indicates that two ranges of blocks ++ (5-7 and 10-11) are to be erased: ++ EraseBlocks (This, 5, 3, 10, 2, EFI_LBA_LIST_TERMINATOR); ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The erase request successfully completed. ++ ++ @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The firmware volume is in the WriteDisabled state. ++ ++ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The block device is not functioning correctly and could not be written. ++ The firmware device may have been partially erased. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One or more of the LBAs listed in the variable argument list do ++ not exist in the firmware volume. ++ ++ **/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++FvbEraseBlocks ( ++ IN CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL *This, ++ ... ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ VA_LIST Args; ++ UINTN BlockAddress; // Physical address of Lba to erase ++ EFI_LBA StartingLba; // Lba from which we start erasing ++ UINTN NumOfLba; // Number of Lba blocks to erase ++ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; ++ ++ Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS (This); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbEraseBlocks()\n")); ++ ++ Status = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ ++ // Detect WriteDisabled state ++ if (Instance->Media.ReadOnly == TRUE) { ++ // Firmware volume is in WriteDisabled state ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbEraseBlocks: ERROR - Device is in WriteDisabled state.\n")); ++ return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; ++ } ++ ++ // Before erasing, check the entire list of parameters to ensure all specified blocks are valid ++ ++ VA_START (Args, This); ++ do { ++ // Get the Lba from which we start erasing ++ StartingLba = VA_ARG (Args, EFI_LBA); ++ ++ // Have we reached the end of the list? ++ if (StartingLba == EFI_LBA_LIST_TERMINATOR) { ++ // Exit the while loop ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ // How many Lba blocks are we requested to erase? ++ NumOfLba = VA_ARG (Args, UINTN); ++ ++ // All blocks must be within range ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_BLKIO, ++ "FvbEraseBlocks: Check if: ( StartingLba=%ld + NumOfLba=%Lu - 1 ) > LastBlock=%ld.\n", ++ Instance->StartLba + StartingLba, ++ (UINT64)NumOfLba, ++ Instance->Media.LastBlock ++ )); ++ if ((NumOfLba == 0) || ((Instance->StartLba + StartingLba + NumOfLba - 1) > Instance->Media.LastBlock)) { ++ VA_END (Args); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbEraseBlocks: ERROR - Lba range goes past the last Lba.\n")); ++ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ goto EXIT; ++ } ++ } while (TRUE); ++ ++ VA_END (Args); ++ ++ // ++ // To get here, all must be ok, so start erasing ++ // ++ VA_START (Args, This); ++ do { ++ // Get the Lba from which we start erasing ++ StartingLba = VA_ARG (Args, EFI_LBA); ++ ++ // Have we reached the end of the list? ++ if (StartingLba == EFI_LBA_LIST_TERMINATOR) { ++ // Exit the while loop ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ // How many Lba blocks are we requested to erase? ++ NumOfLba = VA_ARG (Args, UINTN); ++ ++ // Go through each one and erase it ++ while (NumOfLba > 0) { ++ // Get the physical address of Lba to erase ++ BlockAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS ( ++ Instance->RegionBaseAddress, ++ Instance->StartLba + StartingLba, ++ Instance->Media.BlockSize ++ ); ++ ++ // Erase it ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbEraseBlocks: Erasing Lba=%ld @ 0x%08x.\n", Instance->StartLba + StartingLba, BlockAddress)); ++ Status = NorFlashUnlockAndEraseSingleBlock (Instance, BlockAddress); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ VA_END (Args); ++ Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ goto EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ // Move to the next Lba ++ StartingLba++; ++ NumOfLba--; ++ } ++ } while (TRUE); ++ ++ VA_END (Args); ++ ++EXIT: ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++/** ++ Fixup internal data so that EFI can be call in virtual mode. ++ Call the passed in Child Notify event and convert any pointers in ++ lib to virtual mode. ++ ++ @param[in] Event The Event that is being processed ++ @param[in] Context Event Context ++**/ ++VOID ++EFIAPI ++FvbVirtualNotifyEvent ( ++ IN EFI_EVENT Event, ++ IN VOID *Context ++ ) ++{ ++ EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mFlashNvStorageVariableBase); ++ return; ++} +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-drop-block-I-O-protocol-impl.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-drop-block-I-O-protocol-impl.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8c0128 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-drop-block-I-O-protocol-impl.patch @@ -0,0 +1,504 @@ +From 8cf16599ade30de07c9b51f90d2208046f74fee6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ard Biesheuvel +Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 17:12:08 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 04/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: drop block I/O protocol + implementation + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [6/20] 6843078997a30c2818e0d53a90fb7f6accb89aaf + +We never boot from NOR flash, and generally rely on the firmware volume +PI protocols to expose the contents. So drop the block I/O protocol +implementation from VirtNorFlashDxe. + +Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel +Reviewed-by: Sunil V L +(cherry picked from commit 83f11f957240ead9b135a778316330762b0a3acb) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 49 ++++++------------ + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h | 54 ++------------------ + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c | 40 +++------------ + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf | 1 - + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c | 55 ++++++++------------- + 5 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +index 1094d48f7d..f41d9d372f 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +@@ -366,10 +366,6 @@ NorFlashWriteBlocks ( + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + +- if (Instance->Media.ReadOnly == TRUE) { +- return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED; +- } +- + // We must have some bytes to read + DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: BufferSizeInBytes=0x%x\n", BufferSizeInBytes)); + if (BufferSizeInBytes == 0) { +@@ -377,22 +373,22 @@ NorFlashWriteBlocks ( + } + + // The size of the buffer must be a multiple of the block size +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: BlockSize in bytes =0x%x\n", Instance->Media.BlockSize)); +- if ((BufferSizeInBytes % Instance->Media.BlockSize) != 0) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: BlockSize in bytes =0x%x\n", Instance->BlockSize)); ++ if ((BufferSizeInBytes % Instance->BlockSize) != 0) { + return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; + } + + // All blocks must be within the device +- NumBlocks = ((UINT32)BufferSizeInBytes) / Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ NumBlocks = ((UINT32)BufferSizeInBytes) / Instance->BlockSize; + +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: NumBlocks=%d, LastBlock=%ld, Lba=%ld.\n", NumBlocks, Instance->Media.LastBlock, Lba)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: NumBlocks=%d, LastBlock=%ld, Lba=%ld.\n", NumBlocks, Instance->LastBlock, Lba)); + +- if ((Lba + NumBlocks) > (Instance->Media.LastBlock + 1)) { ++ if ((Lba + NumBlocks) > (Instance->LastBlock + 1)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteBlocks: ERROR - Write will exceed last block.\n")); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + +- BlockSizeInWords = Instance->Media.BlockSize / 4; ++ BlockSizeInWords = Instance->BlockSize / 4; + + // Because the target *Buffer is a pointer to VOID, we must put all the data into a pointer + // to a proper data type, so use *ReadBuffer +@@ -489,8 +485,8 @@ NorFlashReadBlocks ( + DEBUG_BLKIO, + "NorFlashReadBlocks: BufferSize=0x%xB BlockSize=0x%xB LastBlock=%ld, Lba=%ld.\n", + BufferSizeInBytes, +- Instance->Media.BlockSize, +- Instance->Media.LastBlock, ++ Instance->BlockSize, ++ Instance->LastBlock, + Lba + )); + +@@ -505,14 +501,14 @@ NorFlashReadBlocks ( + } + + // The size of the buffer must be a multiple of the block size +- if ((BufferSizeInBytes % Instance->Media.BlockSize) != 0) { ++ if ((BufferSizeInBytes % Instance->BlockSize) != 0) { + return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; + } + + // All blocks must be within the device +- NumBlocks = ((UINT32)BufferSizeInBytes) / Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ NumBlocks = ((UINT32)BufferSizeInBytes) / Instance->BlockSize; + +- if ((Lba + NumBlocks) > (Instance->Media.LastBlock + 1)) { ++ if ((Lba + NumBlocks) > (Instance->LastBlock + 1)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashReadBlocks: ERROR - Read will exceed last block\n")); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } +@@ -521,7 +517,7 @@ NorFlashReadBlocks ( + StartAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS ( + Instance->RegionBaseAddress, + Lba, +- Instance->Media.BlockSize ++ Instance->BlockSize + ); + + // Put the device into Read Array mode +@@ -554,7 +550,7 @@ NorFlashRead ( + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +- if (((Lba * Instance->Media.BlockSize) + Offset + BufferSizeInBytes) > Instance->Size) { ++ if (((Lba * Instance->BlockSize) + Offset + BufferSizeInBytes) > Instance->Size) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashRead: ERROR - Read will exceed device size.\n")); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } +@@ -563,7 +559,7 @@ NorFlashRead ( + StartAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS ( + Instance->RegionBaseAddress, + Lba, +- Instance->Media.BlockSize ++ Instance->BlockSize + ); + + // Put the device into Read Array mode +@@ -577,7 +573,7 @@ NorFlashRead ( + + /* + Write a full or portion of a block. It must not span block boundaries; that is, +- Offset + *NumBytes <= Instance->Media.BlockSize. ++ Offset + *NumBytes <= Instance->BlockSize. + */ + EFI_STATUS + NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( +@@ -605,15 +601,8 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock(Parameters: Lba=%ld, Offset=0x%x, *NumBytes=0x%x, Buffer @ 0x%08x)\n", Lba, Offset, *NumBytes, Buffer)); + +- // Detect WriteDisabled state +- if (Instance->Media.ReadOnly == TRUE) { +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock: ERROR - Can not write: Device is in WriteDisabled state.\n")); +- // It is in WriteDisabled state, return an error right away +- return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; +- } +- + // Cache the block size to avoid de-referencing pointers all the time +- BlockSize = Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ BlockSize = Instance->BlockSize; + + // The write must not span block boundaries. + // We need to check each variable individually because adding two large values together overflows. +@@ -819,12 +808,6 @@ NorFlashVirtualNotifyEvent ( + EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->DeviceBaseAddress); + EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->RegionBaseAddress); + +- // Convert BlockIo protocol +- EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->BlockIoProtocol.FlushBlocks); +- EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->BlockIoProtocol.ReadBlocks); +- EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->BlockIoProtocol.Reset); +- EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->BlockIoProtocol.WriteBlocks); +- + // Convert Fvb + EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->FvbProtocol.EraseBlocks); + EfiConvertPointer (0x0, (VOID **)&mNorFlashInstances[Index]->FvbProtocol.GetAttributes); +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h +index 7733ee02ee..b7f5d208b2 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h +@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ + + #include + +-#include + #include + + #include +@@ -108,8 +107,7 @@ + #define P30_CMD_READ_CONFIGURATION_REGISTER 0x0003 + + #define NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32('n', 'o', 'r', '0') +-#define INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, FvbProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE) +-#define INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, BlockIoProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE) ++#define INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, FvbProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE) + + typedef struct _NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE; + +@@ -129,9 +127,8 @@ struct _NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE { + UINTN RegionBaseAddress; + UINTN Size; + EFI_LBA StartLba; +- +- EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL BlockIoProtocol; +- EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA Media; ++ EFI_LBA LastBlock; ++ UINT32 BlockSize; + + EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL FvbProtocol; + VOID *ShadowBuffer; +@@ -155,51 +152,6 @@ NorFlashWriteBuffer ( + IN UINT32 *Buffer + ); + +-// +-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.Reset +-// +-EFI_STATUS +-EFIAPI +-NorFlashBlockIoReset ( +- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, +- IN BOOLEAN ExtendedVerification +- ); +- +-// +-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.ReadBlocks +-// +-EFI_STATUS +-EFIAPI +-NorFlashBlockIoReadBlocks ( +- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, +- IN UINT32 MediaId, +- IN EFI_LBA Lba, +- IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, +- OUT VOID *Buffer +- ); +- +-// +-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.WriteBlocks +-// +-EFI_STATUS +-EFIAPI +-NorFlashBlockIoWriteBlocks ( +- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, +- IN UINT32 MediaId, +- IN EFI_LBA Lba, +- IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, +- IN VOID *Buffer +- ); +- +-// +-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.FlushBlocks +-// +-EFI_STATUS +-EFIAPI +-NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks ( +- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This +- ); +- + // + // NorFlashFvbDxe.c + // +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c +index 4875b057d5..2ceda22635 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c +@@ -34,29 +34,8 @@ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE mNorFlashInstanceTemplate = { + 0, // RegionBaseAddress ... NEED TO BE FILLED + 0, // Size ... NEED TO BE FILLED + 0, // StartLba +- +- { +- EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL_REVISION2, // Revision +- NULL, // Media ... NEED TO BE FILLED +- NorFlashBlockIoReset, // Reset; +- NorFlashBlockIoReadBlocks, // ReadBlocks +- NorFlashBlockIoWriteBlocks, // WriteBlocks +- NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks // FlushBlocks +- }, // BlockIoProtocol +- +- { +- 0, // MediaId ... NEED TO BE FILLED +- FALSE, // RemovableMedia +- TRUE, // MediaPresent +- FALSE, // LogicalPartition +- FALSE, // ReadOnly +- FALSE, // WriteCaching; +- 0, // BlockSize ... NEED TO BE FILLED +- 4, // IoAlign +- 0, // LastBlock ... NEED TO BE FILLED +- 0, // LowestAlignedLba +- 1, // LogicalBlocksPerPhysicalBlock +- }, // Media; ++ 0, // LastBlock ++ 0, // BlockSize + + { + FvbGetAttributes, // GetAttributes +@@ -115,11 +94,8 @@ NorFlashCreateInstance ( + Instance->DeviceBaseAddress = NorFlashDeviceBase; + Instance->RegionBaseAddress = NorFlashRegionBase; + Instance->Size = NorFlashSize; +- +- Instance->BlockIoProtocol.Media = &Instance->Media; +- Instance->Media.MediaId = Index; +- Instance->Media.BlockSize = BlockSize; +- Instance->Media.LastBlock = (NorFlashSize / BlockSize)-1; ++ Instance->BlockSize = BlockSize; ++ Instance->LastBlock = (NorFlashSize / BlockSize) - 1; + + CopyGuid (&Instance->DevicePath.Vendor.Guid, &gEfiCallerIdGuid); + Instance->DevicePath.Index = (UINT8)Index; +@@ -136,8 +112,6 @@ NorFlashCreateInstance ( + &Instance->Handle, + &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid, + &Instance->DevicePath, +- &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid, +- &Instance->BlockIoProtocol, + &gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid, + &Instance->FvbProtocol, + NULL +@@ -151,8 +125,6 @@ NorFlashCreateInstance ( + &Instance->Handle, + &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid, + &Instance->DevicePath, +- &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid, +- &Instance->BlockIoProtocol, + NULL + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +@@ -434,7 +406,7 @@ NorFlashFvbInitialize ( + PcdGet64 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64) : PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase); + + // Set the index of the first LBA for the FVB +- Instance->StartLba = (mFlashNvStorageVariableBase - Instance->RegionBaseAddress) / Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ Instance->StartLba = (mFlashNvStorageVariableBase - Instance->RegionBaseAddress) / Instance->BlockSize; + + BootMode = GetBootModeHob (); + if (BootMode == BOOT_WITH_DEFAULT_SETTINGS) { +@@ -455,7 +427,7 @@ NorFlashFvbInitialize ( + )); + + // Erase all the NorFlash that is reserved for variable storage +- FvbNumLba = (PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize) + PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingSize) + PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize)) / Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ FvbNumLba = (PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize) + PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingSize) + PcdGet32 (PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize)) / Instance->BlockSize; + + Status = FvbEraseBlocks (&Instance->FvbProtocol, (EFI_LBA)0, FvbNumLba, EFI_LBA_LIST_TERMINATOR); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf +index 53e9d58204..2a3d4a218e 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf +@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ + [Sources.common] + VirtNorFlash.c + VirtNorFlash.h +- VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c + VirtNorFlashDxe.c + VirtNorFlashFvb.c + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c +index c824e0a0fb..cc5eefaaf3 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c +@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ InitializeFvAndVariableStoreHeaders ( + } + + // Check if the size of the area is at least one block size +- if ((NvStorageVariableSize <= 0) || (NvStorageVariableSize / Instance->Media.BlockSize <= 0)) { ++ if ((NvStorageVariableSize <= 0) || (NvStorageVariableSize / Instance->BlockSize <= 0)) { + DEBUG (( + DEBUG_ERROR, + "%a: NvStorageVariableSize is 0x%x, should be atleast one block size\n", +@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ InitializeFvAndVariableStoreHeaders ( + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + +- if ((NvStorageFtwWorkingSize <= 0) || (NvStorageFtwWorkingSize / Instance->Media.BlockSize <= 0)) { ++ if ((NvStorageFtwWorkingSize <= 0) || (NvStorageFtwWorkingSize / Instance->BlockSize <= 0)) { + DEBUG (( + DEBUG_ERROR, + "%a: NvStorageFtwWorkingSize is 0x%x, should be atleast one block size\n", +@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ InitializeFvAndVariableStoreHeaders ( + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + +- if ((NvStorageFtwSpareSize <= 0) || (NvStorageFtwSpareSize / Instance->Media.BlockSize <= 0)) { ++ if ((NvStorageFtwSpareSize <= 0) || (NvStorageFtwSpareSize / Instance->BlockSize <= 0)) { + DEBUG (( + DEBUG_ERROR, + "%a: NvStorageFtwSpareSize is 0x%x, should be atleast one block size\n", +@@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ InitializeFvAndVariableStoreHeaders ( + } + + // Ensure the Variable area Base Addresses are aligned on a block size boundaries +- if ((NvStorageVariableBase % Instance->Media.BlockSize != 0) || +- (NvStorageFtwWorkingBase % Instance->Media.BlockSize != 0) || +- (NvStorageFtwSpareBase % Instance->Media.BlockSize != 0)) ++ if ((NvStorageVariableBase % Instance->BlockSize != 0) || ++ (NvStorageFtwWorkingBase % Instance->BlockSize != 0) || ++ (NvStorageFtwSpareBase % Instance->BlockSize != 0)) + { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: NvStorage Base addresses must be aligned to block size boundaries", __FUNCTION__)); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; +@@ -149,8 +149,8 @@ InitializeFvAndVariableStoreHeaders ( + ); + FirmwareVolumeHeader->HeaderLength = sizeof (EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER) + sizeof (EFI_FV_BLOCK_MAP_ENTRY); + FirmwareVolumeHeader->Revision = EFI_FVH_REVISION; +- FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[0].NumBlocks = Instance->Media.LastBlock + 1; +- FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[0].Length = Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[0].NumBlocks = Instance->LastBlock + 1; ++ FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[0].Length = Instance->BlockSize; + FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[1].NumBlocks = 0; + FirmwareVolumeHeader->BlockMap[1].Length = 0; + FirmwareVolumeHeader->Checksum = CalculateCheckSum16 ((UINT16 *)FirmwareVolumeHeader, FirmwareVolumeHeader->HeaderLength); +@@ -284,9 +284,6 @@ FvbGetAttributes ( + ) + { + EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2 FlashFvbAttributes; +- NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; +- +- Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS (This); + + FlashFvbAttributes = (EFI_FVB_ATTRIBUTES_2)( + +@@ -294,17 +291,12 @@ FvbGetAttributes ( + EFI_FVB2_READ_STATUS | // Reads are currently enabled + EFI_FVB2_STICKY_WRITE | // A block erase is required to flip bits into EFI_FVB2_ERASE_POLARITY + EFI_FVB2_MEMORY_MAPPED | // It is memory mapped +- EFI_FVB2_ERASE_POLARITY // After erasure all bits take this value (i.e. '1') ++ EFI_FVB2_ERASE_POLARITY | // After erasure all bits take this value (i.e. '1') ++ EFI_FVB2_WRITE_STATUS | // Writes are currently enabled ++ EFI_FVB2_WRITE_ENABLED_CAP // Writes may be enabled + + ); + +- // Check if it is write protected +- if (Instance->Media.ReadOnly != TRUE) { +- FlashFvbAttributes = FlashFvbAttributes | +- EFI_FVB2_WRITE_STATUS | // Writes are currently enabled +- EFI_FVB2_WRITE_ENABLED_CAP; // Writes may be enabled +- } +- + *Attributes = FlashFvbAttributes; + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbGetAttributes(0x%X)\n", *Attributes)); +@@ -418,15 +410,15 @@ FvbGetBlockSize ( + + Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS (This); + +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbGetBlockSize(Lba=%ld, BlockSize=0x%x, LastBlock=%ld)\n", Lba, Instance->Media.BlockSize, Instance->Media.LastBlock)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbGetBlockSize(Lba=%ld, BlockSize=0x%x, LastBlock=%ld)\n", Lba, Instance->BlockSize, Instance->LastBlock)); + +- if (Lba > Instance->Media.LastBlock) { +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbGetBlockSize: ERROR - Parameter LBA %ld is beyond the last Lba (%ld).\n", Lba, Instance->Media.LastBlock)); ++ if (Lba > Instance->LastBlock) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbGetBlockSize: ERROR - Parameter LBA %ld is beyond the last Lba (%ld).\n", Lba, Instance->LastBlock)); + Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } else { + // This is easy because in this platform each NorFlash device has equal sized blocks. +- *BlockSize = (UINTN)Instance->Media.BlockSize; +- *NumberOfBlocks = (UINTN)(Instance->Media.LastBlock - Lba + 1); ++ *BlockSize = (UINTN)Instance->BlockSize; ++ *NumberOfBlocks = (UINTN)(Instance->LastBlock - Lba + 1); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbGetBlockSize: *BlockSize=0x%x, *NumberOfBlocks=0x%x.\n", *BlockSize, *NumberOfBlocks)); + +@@ -498,7 +490,7 @@ FvbRead ( + TempStatus = EFI_SUCCESS; + + // Cache the block size to avoid de-referencing pointers all the time +- BlockSize = Instance->Media.BlockSize; ++ BlockSize = Instance->BlockSize; + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "FvbRead: Check if (Offset=0x%x + NumBytes=0x%x) <= BlockSize=0x%x\n", Offset, *NumBytes, BlockSize)); + +@@ -669,13 +661,6 @@ FvbEraseBlocks ( + + Status = EFI_SUCCESS; + +- // Detect WriteDisabled state +- if (Instance->Media.ReadOnly == TRUE) { +- // Firmware volume is in WriteDisabled state +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbEraseBlocks: ERROR - Device is in WriteDisabled state.\n")); +- return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED; +- } +- + // Before erasing, check the entire list of parameters to ensure all specified blocks are valid + + VA_START (Args, This); +@@ -698,9 +683,9 @@ FvbEraseBlocks ( + "FvbEraseBlocks: Check if: ( StartingLba=%ld + NumOfLba=%Lu - 1 ) > LastBlock=%ld.\n", + Instance->StartLba + StartingLba, + (UINT64)NumOfLba, +- Instance->Media.LastBlock ++ Instance->LastBlock + )); +- if ((NumOfLba == 0) || ((Instance->StartLba + StartingLba + NumOfLba - 1) > Instance->Media.LastBlock)) { ++ if ((NumOfLba == 0) || ((Instance->StartLba + StartingLba + NumOfLba - 1) > Instance->LastBlock)) { + VA_END (Args); + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FvbEraseBlocks: ERROR - Lba range goes past the last Lba.\n")); + Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; +@@ -733,7 +718,7 @@ FvbEraseBlocks ( + BlockAddress = GET_NOR_BLOCK_ADDRESS ( + Instance->RegionBaseAddress, + Instance->StartLba + StartingLba, +- Instance->Media.BlockSize ++ Instance->BlockSize + ); + + // Erase it +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-map-flash-memory-as-uncachea.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-map-flash-memory-as-uncachea.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8eff08e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-map-flash-memory-as-uncachea.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +From 15415de9a228e74ff1847777a29f1531754b03b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 19:00:23 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 08/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: map flash memory as + uncacheable + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [10/20] 40ca967bead9ec5c98c528bfe0757f75f3d3352f + +Switching from the ArmPlatformPkg/NorFlashDxe driver to the +OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe driver had the side effect that flash address +space got registered as EFI_MEMORY_WC instead of EFI_MEMORY_UC. + +That confuses the linux kernel's numa code, seems this makes kernel +consider the flash being node memory. "lsmem" changes from ... + + RANGE SIZE STATE REMOVABLE BLOCK + 0x0000000040000000-0x000000013fffffff 4G online yes 8-39 + +... to ... + + RANGE SIZE STATE REMOVABLE BLOCK + 0x0000000000000000-0x0000000007ffffff 128M online yes 0 + 0x0000000040000000-0x000000013fffffff 4G online yes 8-39 + +... and in the kernel log got new error lines: + + NUMA: Warning: invalid memblk node 512 [mem 0x0000000004000000-0x0000000007ffffff] + NUMA: Faking a node at [mem 0x0000000004000000-0x000000013fffffff] + +Changing the attributes back to EFI_MEMORY_UC fixes this. + +Fixes: b92298af8218 ("ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu: migrate to OVMF's VirtNorFlashDxe") +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel +(cherry picked from commit e5ec3ba409b5baa9cf429cc25fdf3c8d1b8dcef0) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c +index ff3121af2a..f9a41f6aab 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c +@@ -394,14 +394,14 @@ NorFlashFvbInitialize ( + EfiGcdMemoryTypeMemoryMappedIo, + Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, + RuntimeMmioRegionSize, +- EFI_MEMORY_WC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME ++ EFI_MEMORY_UC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME + ); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + Status = gDS->SetMemorySpaceAttributes ( + Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, + RuntimeMmioRegionSize, +- EFI_MEMORY_WC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME ++ EFI_MEMORY_UC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME + ); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-move-DoErase-code-block-into.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-move-DoErase-code-block-into.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da9eafb --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-move-DoErase-code-block-into.patch @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +From 791c26a4a172b4a609a708db8018411ab653de4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:05 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 16/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: move DoErase code block into + new function + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [18/20] 10f4685bfcb0c5423e392b4cf0e8633cd25b46b4 + +Move the DoErase code block into a separate function, call the function +instead of jumping around with goto. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-7-kraxel@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit b481b00f593ef37695ee14271453320ed02a1256) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +index 3d1d20daa1..e6aaed27ce 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +@@ -502,6 +502,38 @@ NorFlashRead ( + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + ++STATIC ++EFI_STATUS ++NorFlashWriteSingleBlockWithErase ( ++ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ IN EFI_LBA Lba, ++ IN UINTN Offset, ++ IN OUT UINTN *NumBytes, ++ IN UINT8 *Buffer ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ // Read NOR Flash data into shadow buffer ++ Status = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, Instance->BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // Put the data at the appropriate location inside the buffer area ++ CopyMem ((VOID *)((UINTN)Instance->ShadowBuffer + Offset), Buffer, *NumBytes); ++ ++ // Write the modified buffer back to the NorFlash ++ Status = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, Instance->BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ + /* + Write a full or portion of a block. It must not span block boundaries; that is, + Offset + *NumBytes <= Instance->BlockSize. +@@ -607,7 +639,14 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + // that we want to set. In that case, we will need to erase the block first. + for (CurOffset = 0; CurOffset < *NumBytes; CurOffset++) { + if (~(UINT32)OrigData[CurOffset] & (UINT32)Buffer[CurOffset]) { +- goto DoErase; ++ Status = NorFlashWriteSingleBlockWithErase ( ++ Instance, ++ Lba, ++ Offset, ++ NumBytes, ++ Buffer ++ ); ++ return Status; + } + + OrigData[CurOffset] = Buffer[CurOffset]; +@@ -636,33 +675,22 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + goto Exit; + } + } +- +-Exit: +- // Put device back into Read Array mode +- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); +- ++ } else { ++ Status = NorFlashWriteSingleBlockWithErase ( ++ Instance, ++ Lba, ++ Offset, ++ NumBytes, ++ Buffer ++ ); + return Status; + } + +-DoErase: +- // Read NOR Flash data into shadow buffer +- Status = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses +- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +- } +- +- // Put the data at the appropriate location inside the buffer area +- CopyMem ((VOID *)((UINTN)Instance->ShadowBuffer + Offset), Buffer, *NumBytes); +- +- // Write the modified buffer back to the NorFlash +- Status = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses +- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +- } ++Exit: ++ // Put device back into Read Array mode ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); + +- return EFI_SUCCESS; ++ return Status; + } + + EFI_STATUS +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-CheckBlockLocked-feat.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-CheckBlockLocked-feat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2fdee8e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-CheckBlockLocked-feat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +From 03e0a729a5c3ebcab8806d136cd8908627bd91c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ard Biesheuvel +Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 16:45:02 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 02/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: remove CheckBlockLocked + feature + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [4/20] 990bdf373801df8107d8a6ec4db3fb93e5a6ad68 + +We inherited a feature from the ArmPlatformPkg version of this driver +that never gets enabled. Let's remove it. + +Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel +Reviewed-by: Sunil V L +(cherry picked from commit 0a64106c566273ff8ef951d56ddfa972fe65bd6c) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 35 +++++---------------- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf | 3 -- + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +index 12fa720dad..59a562efdf 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +@@ -65,35 +65,16 @@ NorFlashUnlockSingleBlock ( + // Raise the Task Priority Level to TPL_NOTIFY to serialise all its operations + // and to protect shared data structures. + +- if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdNorFlashCheckBlockLocked) == TRUE) { +- do { +- // Request a lock setup +- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_LOCK_BLOCK_SETUP); ++ // Request a lock setup ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_LOCK_BLOCK_SETUP); + +- // Request an unlock +- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_UNLOCK_BLOCK); ++ // Request an unlock ++ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_UNLOCK_BLOCK); + +- // Send command for reading device id +- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 2, P30_CMD_READ_DEVICE_ID); +- +- // Read block lock status +- LockStatus = MmioRead32 (CREATE_NOR_ADDRESS (BlockAddress, 2)); +- +- // Decode block lock status +- LockStatus = FOLD_32BIT_INTO_16BIT (LockStatus); +- } while ((LockStatus & 0x1) == 1); +- } else { +- // Request a lock setup +- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_LOCK_BLOCK_SETUP); +- +- // Request an unlock +- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_UNLOCK_BLOCK); +- +- // Wait until the status register gives us the all clear +- do { +- LockStatus = NorFlashReadStatusRegister (Instance, BlockAddress); +- } while ((LockStatus & P30_SR_BIT_WRITE) != P30_SR_BIT_WRITE); +- } ++ // Wait until the status register gives us the all clear ++ do { ++ LockStatus = NorFlashReadStatusRegister (Instance, BlockAddress); ++ } while ((LockStatus & P30_SR_BIT_WRITE) != P30_SR_BIT_WRITE); + + // Put device back into Read Array mode + SEND_NOR_COMMAND (BlockAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf +index 1bf50e4823..53e9d58204 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf +@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ + VirtNorFlashFvb.c + + [Packages] +- ArmPlatformPkg/ArmPlatformPkg.dec + EmbeddedPkg/EmbeddedPkg.dec + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec + MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec +@@ -66,7 +65,5 @@ + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize + +- gArmPlatformTokenSpaceGuid.PcdNorFlashCheckBlockLocked +- + [Depex] + gEfiCpuArchProtocolGuid +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-disk-I-O-protocol-imp.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-disk-I-O-protocol-imp.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9319925 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-disk-I-O-protocol-imp.patch @@ -0,0 +1,386 @@ +From 56041232238e4e4d3c8d703b27f51b0bc70fd5c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ard Biesheuvel +Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 16:50:05 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 03/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: remove disk I/O protocol + implementation + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [5/20] 0551c3f56f43396cfdc380127565e89d69eb29a3 + +We only use NOR flash for firmware volumes, either for executable images +or for the variable store. So we have no need for exposing disk I/O on +top of the NOR flash partitions so let's remove it. + +Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel +Reviewed-by: Sunil V L +(cherry picked from commit 68d234989b2d6bd8f255577e08bf8be0b1d197bb) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 129 ------------------ + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h | 29 ---- + .../VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c | 123 ----------------- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c | 8 -- + 4 files changed, 289 deletions(-) + delete mode 100644 OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +index 59a562efdf..1094d48f7d 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +@@ -788,135 +788,6 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock ( + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +-/* +- Although DiskIoDxe will automatically install the DiskIO protocol whenever +- we install the BlockIO protocol, its implementation is sub-optimal as it reads +- and writes entire blocks using the BlockIO protocol. In fact we can access +- NOR flash with a finer granularity than that, so we can improve performance +- by directly producing the DiskIO protocol. +-*/ +- +-/** +- Read BufferSize bytes from Offset into Buffer. +- +- @param This Protocol instance pointer. +- @param MediaId Id of the media, changes every time the media is replaced. +- @param Offset The starting byte offset to read from +- @param BufferSize Size of Buffer +- @param Buffer Buffer containing read data +- +- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The data was read correctly from the device. +- @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The device reported an error while performing the read. +- @retval EFI_NO_MEDIA There is no media in the device. +- @retval EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED The MediaId does not match the current device. +- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The read request contains device addresses that are not +- valid for the device. +- +-**/ +-EFI_STATUS +-EFIAPI +-NorFlashDiskIoReadDisk ( +- IN EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, +- IN UINT32 MediaId, +- IN UINT64 DiskOffset, +- IN UINTN BufferSize, +- OUT VOID *Buffer +- ) +-{ +- NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; +- UINT32 BlockSize; +- UINT32 BlockOffset; +- EFI_LBA Lba; +- +- Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_DISKIO_THIS (This); +- +- if (MediaId != Instance->Media.MediaId) { +- return EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED; +- } +- +- BlockSize = Instance->Media.BlockSize; +- Lba = (EFI_LBA)DivU64x32Remainder (DiskOffset, BlockSize, &BlockOffset); +- +- return NorFlashRead (Instance, Lba, BlockOffset, BufferSize, Buffer); +-} +- +-/** +- Writes a specified number of bytes to a device. +- +- @param This Indicates a pointer to the calling context. +- @param MediaId ID of the medium to be written. +- @param Offset The starting byte offset on the logical block I/O device to write. +- @param BufferSize The size in bytes of Buffer. The number of bytes to write to the device. +- @param Buffer A pointer to the buffer containing the data to be written. +- +- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The data was written correctly to the device. +- @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED The device can not be written to. +- @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The device reported an error while performing the write. +- @retval EFI_NO_MEDIA There is no media in the device. +- @retval EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED The MediaId does not match the current device. +- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The write request contains device addresses that are not +- valid for the device. +- +-**/ +-EFI_STATUS +-EFIAPI +-NorFlashDiskIoWriteDisk ( +- IN EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, +- IN UINT32 MediaId, +- IN UINT64 DiskOffset, +- IN UINTN BufferSize, +- IN VOID *Buffer +- ) +-{ +- NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; +- UINT32 BlockSize; +- UINT32 BlockOffset; +- EFI_LBA Lba; +- UINTN RemainingBytes; +- UINTN WriteSize; +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- +- Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_DISKIO_THIS (This); +- +- if (MediaId != Instance->Media.MediaId) { +- return EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED; +- } +- +- BlockSize = Instance->Media.BlockSize; +- Lba = (EFI_LBA)DivU64x32Remainder (DiskOffset, BlockSize, &BlockOffset); +- +- RemainingBytes = BufferSize; +- +- // Write either all the remaining bytes, or the number of bytes that bring +- // us up to a block boundary, whichever is less. +- // (DiskOffset | (BlockSize - 1)) + 1) rounds DiskOffset up to the next +- // block boundary (even if it is already on one). +- WriteSize = MIN (RemainingBytes, ((DiskOffset | (BlockSize - 1)) + 1) - DiskOffset); +- +- do { +- if (WriteSize == BlockSize) { +- // Write a full block +- Status = NorFlashWriteFullBlock (Instance, Lba, Buffer, BlockSize / sizeof (UINT32)); +- } else { +- // Write a partial block +- Status = NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (Instance, Lba, BlockOffset, &WriteSize, Buffer); +- } +- +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- return Status; +- } +- +- // Now continue writing either all the remaining bytes or single blocks. +- RemainingBytes -= WriteSize; +- Buffer = (UINT8 *)Buffer + WriteSize; +- Lba++; +- BlockOffset = 0; +- WriteSize = MIN (RemainingBytes, BlockSize); +- } while (RemainingBytes); +- +- return Status; +-} +- + EFI_STATUS + NorFlashReset ( + IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h +index e46522a198..7733ee02ee 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h +@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ + #include + + #include +-#include + #include + + #include +@@ -111,7 +110,6 @@ + #define NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32('n', 'o', 'r', '0') + #define INSTANCE_FROM_FVB_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, FvbProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE) + #define INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, BlockIoProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE) +-#define INSTANCE_FROM_DISKIO_THIS(a) CR(a, NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE, DiskIoProtocol, NOR_FLASH_SIGNATURE) + + typedef struct _NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE; + +@@ -134,7 +132,6 @@ struct _NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE { + + EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL BlockIoProtocol; + EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA Media; +- EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL DiskIoProtocol; + + EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK2_PROTOCOL FvbProtocol; + VOID *ShadowBuffer; +@@ -203,32 +200,6 @@ NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks ( + IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This + ); + +-// +-// DiskIO Protocol function EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL.ReadDisk +-// +-EFI_STATUS +-EFIAPI +-NorFlashDiskIoReadDisk ( +- IN EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, +- IN UINT32 MediaId, +- IN UINT64 Offset, +- IN UINTN BufferSize, +- OUT VOID *Buffer +- ); +- +-// +-// DiskIO Protocol function EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL.WriteDisk +-// +-EFI_STATUS +-EFIAPI +-NorFlashDiskIoWriteDisk ( +- IN EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, +- IN UINT32 MediaId, +- IN UINT64 Offset, +- IN UINTN BufferSize, +- IN VOID *Buffer +- ); +- + // + // NorFlashFvbDxe.c + // +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c +deleted file mode 100644 +index ecf152e355..0000000000 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashBlockIoDxe.c ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@ +-/** @file NorFlashBlockIoDxe.c +- +- Copyright (c) 2011-2013, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.
+- +- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +- +-**/ +- +-#include +-#include +- +-#include "VirtNorFlash.h" +- +-// +-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.Reset +-// +-EFI_STATUS +-EFIAPI +-NorFlashBlockIoReset ( +- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, +- IN BOOLEAN ExtendedVerification +- ) +-{ +- NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; +- +- Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS (This); +- +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashBlockIoReset(MediaId=0x%x)\n", This->Media->MediaId)); +- +- return NorFlashReset (Instance); +-} +- +-// +-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.ReadBlocks +-// +-EFI_STATUS +-EFIAPI +-NorFlashBlockIoReadBlocks ( +- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, +- IN UINT32 MediaId, +- IN EFI_LBA Lba, +- IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, +- OUT VOID *Buffer +- ) +-{ +- NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA *Media; +- +- if (This == NULL) { +- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; +- } +- +- Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS (This); +- Media = This->Media; +- +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashBlockIoReadBlocks(MediaId=0x%x, Lba=%ld, BufferSize=0x%x bytes (%d kB), BufferPtr @ 0x%08x)\n", MediaId, Lba, BufferSizeInBytes, BufferSizeInBytes, Buffer)); +- +- if (!Media) { +- Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; +- } else if (!Media->MediaPresent) { +- Status = EFI_NO_MEDIA; +- } else if (Media->MediaId != MediaId) { +- Status = EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED; +- } else if ((Media->IoAlign > 2) && (((UINTN)Buffer & (Media->IoAlign - 1)) != 0)) { +- Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; +- } else { +- Status = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, BufferSizeInBytes, Buffer); +- } +- +- return Status; +-} +- +-// +-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.WriteBlocks +-// +-EFI_STATUS +-EFIAPI +-NorFlashBlockIoWriteBlocks ( +- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This, +- IN UINT32 MediaId, +- IN EFI_LBA Lba, +- IN UINTN BufferSizeInBytes, +- IN VOID *Buffer +- ) +-{ +- NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance; +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- +- Instance = INSTANCE_FROM_BLKIO_THIS (This); +- +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashBlockIoWriteBlocks(MediaId=0x%x, Lba=%ld, BufferSize=0x%x bytes, BufferPtr @ 0x%08x)\n", MediaId, Lba, BufferSizeInBytes, Buffer)); +- +- if ( !This->Media->MediaPresent ) { +- Status = EFI_NO_MEDIA; +- } else if ( This->Media->MediaId != MediaId ) { +- Status = EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED; +- } else if ( This->Media->ReadOnly ) { +- Status = EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED; +- } else { +- Status = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, BufferSizeInBytes, Buffer); +- } +- +- return Status; +-} +- +-// +-// BlockIO Protocol function EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL.FlushBlocks +-// +-EFI_STATUS +-EFIAPI +-NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks ( +- IN EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *This +- ) +-{ +- // No Flush required for the NOR Flash driver +- // because cache operations are not permitted. +- +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashBlockIoFlushBlocks: Function NOT IMPLEMENTED (not required).\n")); +- +- // Nothing to do so just return without error +- return EFI_SUCCESS; +-} +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c +index 819425545e..4875b057d5 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c +@@ -58,12 +58,6 @@ NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE mNorFlashInstanceTemplate = { + 1, // LogicalBlocksPerPhysicalBlock + }, // Media; + +- { +- EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL_REVISION, // Revision +- NorFlashDiskIoReadDisk, // ReadDisk +- NorFlashDiskIoWriteDisk // WriteDisk +- }, +- + { + FvbGetAttributes, // GetAttributes + FvbSetAttributes, // SetAttributes +@@ -159,8 +153,6 @@ NorFlashCreateInstance ( + &Instance->DevicePath, + &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid, + &Instance->BlockIoProtocol, +- &gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid, +- &Instance->DiskIoProtocol, + NULL + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variable2.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variable2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..106b9db --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variable2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +From c4d2144caff4eddb7021752fce6c2dec6d5e1632 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 12:29:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 10/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: sanity-check variables + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [12/20] 2ad3957478b82a4ca29249ceb9620f97c591a1fe + +Extend the ValidateFvHeader function, additionally to the header checks +walk over the list of variables and sanity check them. + +In case we find inconsistencies indicating variable store corruption +return EFI_NOT_FOUND so the variable store will be re-initialized. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Message-Id: <20240109112902.30002-4-kraxel@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +[lersek@redhat.com: fix StartId initialization/assignment coding style] +(cherry picked from commit 4a443f73fd67ca8caaf0a3e1a01f8231b330d2e0) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf | 1 + + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c | 149 +++++++++++++++++++- + 2 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf +index 2a3d4a218e..f549400280 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf +@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ + DxeServicesTableLib + HobLib + IoLib ++ SafeIntLib + UefiBootServicesTableLib + UefiDriverEntryPoint + UefiLib +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c +index c503272a2b..acc4a413ee 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c +@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + + #include +@@ -185,11 +186,12 @@ ValidateFvHeader ( + IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance + ) + { +- UINT16 Checksum; +- EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *FwVolHeader; +- VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *VariableStoreHeader; +- UINTN VariableStoreLength; +- UINTN FvLength; ++ UINT16 Checksum; ++ CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *FwVolHeader; ++ CONST VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *VariableStoreHeader; ++ UINTN VarOffset; ++ UINTN VariableStoreLength; ++ UINTN FvLength; + + FwVolHeader = (EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *)Instance->RegionBaseAddress; + +@@ -258,6 +260,143 @@ ValidateFvHeader ( + return EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } + ++ // ++ // check variables ++ // ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: checking variables\n", __func__)); ++ VarOffset = sizeof (*VariableStoreHeader); ++ for ( ; ;) { ++ UINTN VarHeaderEnd; ++ UINTN VarNameEnd; ++ UINTN VarEnd; ++ UINTN VarPadding; ++ CONST AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_HEADER *VarHeader; ++ CONST CHAR16 *VarName; ++ CONST CHAR8 *VarState; ++ RETURN_STATUS Status; ++ ++ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarOffset, sizeof (*VarHeader), &VarHeaderEnd); ++ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__)); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ ++ if (VarHeaderEnd >= VariableStoreHeader->Size) { ++ if (VarOffset <= VariableStoreHeader->Size - sizeof (UINT16)) { ++ CONST UINT16 *StartId; ++ ++ StartId = (VOID *)((UINTN)VariableStoreHeader + VarOffset); ++ if (*StartId == 0x55aa) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: startid at invalid location\n", __func__)); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: end of var list (no space left)\n", __func__)); ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ VarHeader = (VOID *)((UINTN)VariableStoreHeader + VarOffset); ++ if (VarHeader->StartId != 0x55aa) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: end of var list (no startid)\n", __func__)); ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ VarName = NULL; ++ switch (VarHeader->State) { ++ // usage: State = VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY ++ case VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY: ++ VarState = "header-ok"; ++ VarName = L""; ++ break; ++ ++ // usage: State = VAR_ADDED ++ case VAR_ADDED: ++ VarState = "ok"; ++ break; ++ ++ // usage: State &= VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION ++ case VAR_ADDED &VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION: ++ VarState = "del-in-transition"; ++ break; ++ ++ // usage: State &= VAR_DELETED ++ case VAR_ADDED &VAR_DELETED: ++ case VAR_ADDED &VAR_DELETED &VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION: ++ VarState = "deleted"; ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_ERROR, ++ "%a: invalid variable state: 0x%x\n", ++ __func__, ++ VarHeader->State ++ )); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ ++ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarHeaderEnd, VarHeader->NameSize, &VarNameEnd); ++ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__)); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ ++ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarNameEnd, VarHeader->DataSize, &VarEnd); ++ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__)); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ ++ if (VarEnd > VariableStoreHeader->Size) { ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_ERROR, ++ "%a: invalid variable size: 0x%Lx + 0x%Lx + 0x%x + 0x%x > 0x%x\n", ++ __func__, ++ (UINT64)VarOffset, ++ (UINT64)(sizeof (*VarHeader)), ++ VarHeader->NameSize, ++ VarHeader->DataSize, ++ VariableStoreHeader->Size ++ )); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ ++ if (((VarHeader->NameSize & 1) != 0) || ++ (VarHeader->NameSize < 4)) ++ { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: invalid name size\n", __func__)); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ ++ if (VarName == NULL) { ++ VarName = (VOID *)((UINTN)VariableStoreHeader + VarHeaderEnd); ++ if (VarName[VarHeader->NameSize / 2 - 1] != L'\0') { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: name is not null terminated\n", __func__)); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_VERBOSE, ++ "%a: +0x%04Lx: name=0x%x data=0x%x guid=%g '%s' (%a)\n", ++ __func__, ++ (UINT64)VarOffset, ++ VarHeader->NameSize, ++ VarHeader->DataSize, ++ &VarHeader->VendorGuid, ++ VarName, ++ VarState ++ )); ++ ++ VarPadding = (4 - (VarEnd & 3)) & 3; ++ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarEnd, VarPadding, &VarOffset); ++ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__)); ++ return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ } ++ } ++ + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/old2.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variables.patch similarity index 94% rename from SOURCES/old2.patch rename to SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variables.patch index 6dc7312..f94ca10 100644 --- a/SOURCES/old2.patch +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variables.patch @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ -From bfdee279c563129ad1847a081e9b675e322e0788 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From c4eef747624d41aaa09dc64ccafdb84bf1fe656e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 12:29:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: sanity-check variables RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann -RH-MergeRequest: 41: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: sanity-check variables -RH-Jira: RHEL-20351 -RH-Acked-by: Jon Maloy -RH-Commit: [2/2] da1ecd33775421c2cd77e3b0c1bea94de3aca22d +RH-MergeRequest: 42: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: sanity-check variables +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [2/2] 56ff961f754d517c0e27ccf46a95b228efe7ab4b Extend the ValidateFvHeader function, additionally to the header checks walk over the list of variables and sanity check them. diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariable2.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariable2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a735619 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariable2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 1444157aad1b98ce9c1193ef109011b084113890 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 12:29:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 09/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: stop accepting + gEfiVariableGuid +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [11/20] c7b9cd1b716e1b8163b8094fbea8117241901815 + +Only accept gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid when checking the variable +store header in ValidateFvHeader(). + +The edk2 code base has been switched to use the authenticated varstore +format unconditionally (even in case secure boot is not used or +supported) a few years ago. + +Suggested-by: László Érsek +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20240109112902.30002-3-kraxel@redhat.com> +(cherry picked from commit ae22b2f136bcbd27135a5f4dd76d3a68a172d00e) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c | 4 +--- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c +index cc5eefaaf3..c503272a2b 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c +@@ -239,9 +239,7 @@ ValidateFvHeader ( + VariableStoreHeader = (VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *)((UINTN)FwVolHeader + FwVolHeader->HeaderLength); + + // Check the Variable Store Guid +- if (!CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiVariableGuid) && +- !CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid)) +- { ++ if (!CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid)) { + DEBUG (( + DEBUG_INFO, + "%a: Variable Store Guid non-compatible\n", +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/old.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariableG.patch similarity index 87% rename from SOURCES/old.patch rename to SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariableG.patch index 8af0d39..a3b6933 100644 --- a/SOURCES/old.patch +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariableG.patch @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From 2dbfc91269fd944aeb82e0f9178e0ab278ccf0da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From abe5b633eaae333190fb742af3fa15968f02a92e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerd Hoffmann Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 12:29:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: stop accepting gEfiVariableGuid @@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann -RH-MergeRequest: 41: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: sanity-check variables -RH-Jira: RHEL-20351 -RH-Acked-by: Jon Maloy -RH-Commit: [1/2] c39aca9d2933518dff4216f585fdfcc492f08673 +RH-MergeRequest: 42: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: sanity-check variables +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [1/2] 790f895bd180bc2c4b957a7a3c7d07e9107dd74b Only accept gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid when checking the variable store header in ValidateFvHeader(). diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-use-EFI_MEMORY_WC-and-drop-A.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-use-EFI_MEMORY_WC-and-drop-A.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a61f223 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-use-EFI_MEMORY_WC-and-drop-A.patch @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +From e65da48afdabc9a5cba1c212b4323898b91ef2a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ard Biesheuvel +Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 18:16:18 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 07/18] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: use EFI_MEMORY_WC and drop + AlignedCopyMem() + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [9/20] 0c01619eff8282d08e05fae8c37175b944449f59 + +NOR flash emulation under KVM involves switching between two modes, +where array mode is backed by a read-only memslot, and programming mode +is fully emulated, i.e., the memory region is not backed by anything, +and the faulting accesses are forwarded to the VMM by the hypervisor, +which translates them into NOR flash programming commands. + +Normally, we are limited to the use of device attributes when mapping +such regions, given that the programming mode has MMIO semantics. +However, when running under KVM, the chosen memory attributes only take +effect when in array mode, since no memory mapping exists otherwise. + +This means we can tune the memory mapping so it behaves a bit more like +a ROM, by switching to EFI_MEMORY_WC attributes. This means we no longer +need a special CopyMem() implementation that avoids unaligned accesses +at all cost. + +Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel +Reviewed-by: Sunil V L +(cherry picked from commit 789a723285533f35652ebd6029976e2ddc955655) +--- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 65 +---------------------- + OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c | 4 +- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +index 0343131a54..1afd60ce66 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c +@@ -401,67 +401,6 @@ NorFlashWriteBlocks ( + return Status; + } + +-#define BOTH_ALIGNED(a, b, align) ((((UINTN)(a) | (UINTN)(b)) & ((align) - 1)) == 0) +- +-/** +- Copy Length bytes from Source to Destination, using aligned accesses only. +- Note that this implementation uses memcpy() semantics rather then memmove() +- semantics, i.e., SourceBuffer and DestinationBuffer should not overlap. +- +- @param DestinationBuffer The target of the copy request. +- @param SourceBuffer The place to copy from. +- @param Length The number of bytes to copy. +- +- @return Destination +- +-**/ +-STATIC +-VOID * +-AlignedCopyMem ( +- OUT VOID *DestinationBuffer, +- IN CONST VOID *SourceBuffer, +- IN UINTN Length +- ) +-{ +- UINT8 *Destination8; +- CONST UINT8 *Source8; +- UINT32 *Destination32; +- CONST UINT32 *Source32; +- UINT64 *Destination64; +- CONST UINT64 *Source64; +- +- if (BOTH_ALIGNED (DestinationBuffer, SourceBuffer, 8) && (Length >= 8)) { +- Destination64 = DestinationBuffer; +- Source64 = SourceBuffer; +- while (Length >= 8) { +- *Destination64++ = *Source64++; +- Length -= 8; +- } +- +- Destination8 = (UINT8 *)Destination64; +- Source8 = (CONST UINT8 *)Source64; +- } else if (BOTH_ALIGNED (DestinationBuffer, SourceBuffer, 4) && (Length >= 4)) { +- Destination32 = DestinationBuffer; +- Source32 = SourceBuffer; +- while (Length >= 4) { +- *Destination32++ = *Source32++; +- Length -= 4; +- } +- +- Destination8 = (UINT8 *)Destination32; +- Source8 = (CONST UINT8 *)Source32; +- } else { +- Destination8 = DestinationBuffer; +- Source8 = SourceBuffer; +- } +- +- while (Length-- != 0) { +- *Destination8++ = *Source8++; +- } +- +- return DestinationBuffer; +-} +- + EFI_STATUS + NorFlashReadBlocks ( + IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance, +@@ -516,7 +455,7 @@ NorFlashReadBlocks ( + SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); + + // Readout the data +- AlignedCopyMem (Buffer, (VOID *)StartAddress, BufferSizeInBytes); ++ CopyMem (Buffer, (VOID *)StartAddress, BufferSizeInBytes); + + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } +@@ -558,7 +497,7 @@ NorFlashRead ( + SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY); + + // Readout the data +- AlignedCopyMem (Buffer, (VOID *)(StartAddress + Offset), BufferSizeInBytes); ++ CopyMem (Buffer, (VOID *)(StartAddress + Offset), BufferSizeInBytes); + + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c +index f9a41f6aab..ff3121af2a 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.c +@@ -394,14 +394,14 @@ NorFlashFvbInitialize ( + EfiGcdMemoryTypeMemoryMappedIo, + Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, + RuntimeMmioRegionSize, +- EFI_MEMORY_UC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME ++ EFI_MEMORY_WC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME + ); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + Status = gDS->SetMemorySpaceAttributes ( + Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, + RuntimeMmioRegionSize, +- EFI_MEMORY_UC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME ++ EFI_MEMORY_WC | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME + ); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-clone-NorFlashPlatformLib-into-VirtNorFlashP.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-clone-NorFlashPlatformLib-into-VirtNorFlashP.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..178b1e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-OvmfPkg-clone-NorFlashPlatformLib-into-VirtNorFlashP.patch @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +From 59fb955aa77b75345f7828bf9f83764adf4bed46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ard Biesheuvel +Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 18:35:10 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 18/18] OvmfPkg: clone NorFlashPlatformLib into + VirtNorFlashPlatformLib + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 43: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe backport +RH-Jira: RHEL-17587 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [20/20] 50ea104b99a997d7d08c1fdef617df1d930ffae6 + +Create a new library class in Ovmf that duplicates the existing +NorFlashPlatformLib, but which will be tied to the VirtNorFlashDxe +driver that will be introduced in a subsequent patch. This allows us to +retire the original from ArmPlatformPkg. + +Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel +Reviewed-by: Sunil V L +(cherry picked from commit 16bf588b604a9f190accb71ada715b81756c94e2) +--- + .../Include/Library/VirtNorFlashPlatformLib.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 4 +++ + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Library/VirtNorFlashPlatformLib.h + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/VirtNorFlashPlatformLib.h b/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/VirtNorFlashPlatformLib.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..8f5b5e972d +--- /dev/null ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/VirtNorFlashPlatformLib.h +@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ ++/** @file ++ ++ Copyright (c) 2011-2012, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.
++ ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ ++ **/ ++ ++#ifndef __VIRT_NOR_FLASH_PLATFORM_LIB__ ++#define __VIRT_NOR_FLASH_PLATFORM_LIB__ ++ ++typedef struct { ++ UINTN DeviceBaseAddress; // Start address of the Device Base Address (DBA) ++ UINTN RegionBaseAddress; // Start address of one single region ++ UINTN Size; ++ UINTN BlockSize; ++} VIRT_NOR_FLASH_DESCRIPTION; ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++VirtNorFlashPlatformInitialization ( ++ VOID ++ ); ++ ++EFI_STATUS ++VirtNorFlashPlatformGetDevices ( ++ OUT VIRT_NOR_FLASH_DESCRIPTION **NorFlashDescriptions, ++ OUT UINT32 *Count ++ ); ++ ++#endif /* __VIRT_NOR_FLASH_PLATFORM_LIB__ */ +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec +index 340d83f794..e65ebd81c8 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec +@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@ + # transports. + VirtioMmioDeviceLib|Include/Library/VirtioMmioDeviceLib.h + ++ ## @libraryclass Provides a Nor flash interface. ++ # ++ VirtNorFlashPlatformLib|Include/Library/VirtNorFlashPlatformLib.h ++ + ## @libraryclass Invoke Xen hypercalls + # + XenHypercallLib|Include/Library/XenHypercallLib.h +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Adding-CVE-2022-36763-to-SecurityFixes.y.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Adding-CVE-2022-36763-to-SecurityFixes.y.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2f31b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Adding-CVE-2022-36763-to-SecurityFixes.y.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From 2794a967f43f2bbdfcd2cb5197ac8cad4b13c3de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:20:52 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 08/17] SecurityPkg: Adding CVE 2022-36763 to + SecurityFixes.yaml + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [8/13] 74117caf760e403566f6511332b2c0f41483f28c (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154 +Upstream: Merged +CVE: CVE-2022-36763 + +commit 1ddcb9fc6b4164e882687b031e8beacfcf7df29e +Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] +Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:03 2024 +0800 + + SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36763 to SecurityFixes.yaml + + This creates / adds a security file that tracks the security fixes + found in this package and can be used to find the fixes that were + applied. + + Cc: Jiewen Yao + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..f9e3e7be74 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml +@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ ++## @file ++# Security Fixes for SecurityPkg ++# ++# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation ++# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++## ++CVE_2022_36763: ++ commit_titles: ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2Measurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763" ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763" ++ - "SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36763 to SecurityFixes.yaml" ++ cve: CVE-2022-36763 ++ date_reported: 2022-10-25 11:31 UTC ++ description: (CVE-2022-36763) - Heap Buffer Overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() ++ note: This patch is related to and supersedes TCBZ2168 ++ files_impacted: ++ - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++ - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c ++ links: ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4117 ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2168 ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1990 +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-OPTIONAL-keyword-usage-style.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-OPTIONAL-keyword-usage-style.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bc3723f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-OPTIONAL-keyword-usage-style.patch @@ -0,0 +1,403 @@ +From e2ccaef3baa2eb045019558c325bb94cabf65e1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 11:56:37 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 02/17] SecurityPkg: Change OPTIONAL keyword usage style + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [2/13] 6a2141d871e3efc3aeea1994ab9c325614ddce57 (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154 +CVE: CVE-2022-36763 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 948f4003ee399241a40dc147a738f05ad2e37375 +Author: Michael D Kinney +Date: Thu Dec 2 18:00:56 2021 -0800 + + SecurityPkg: Change OPTIONAL keyword usage style + + REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3760 + + Update all use of ', OPTIONAL' to ' OPTIONAL,' for function params. + + Cc: Andrew Fish + Cc: Leif Lindholm + Cc: Michael Kubacki + Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney + Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLib.h | 2 +- + SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h | 14 +++++++------- + SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c | 6 +++--- + .../DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib.c | 2 +- + .../DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 2 +- + .../DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c | 2 +- + .../DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c | 4 ++-- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 2 +- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 2 +- + .../PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c | 2 +- + .../Tcg2PpVendorLibNull/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull.c | 2 +- + .../Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c | 2 +- + SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c | 2 +- + SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c | 2 +- + SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c | 2 +- + SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c | 6 +++--- + .../RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/AArch64/RngDxe.c | 2 +- + .../RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c | 2 +- + .../RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxeInternals.h | 2 +- + SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigImpl.c | 2 +- + 20 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLib.h b/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLib.h +index 569eba6874..914517f034 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLib.h ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLib.h +@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + UINT32 + EFIAPI + Tcg2PpVendorLibExecutePendingRequest ( +- IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth OPTIONAL, + IN UINT32 OperationRequest, + IN OUT UINT32 *ManagementFlags, + OUT BOOLEAN *ResetRequired +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h b/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h +index ee8eb62295..ad3b982d48 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h +@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + Tpm2ClearControl ( + IN TPMI_RH_CLEAR AuthHandle, +- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL, + IN TPMI_YES_NO Disable + ); + +@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + Tpm2NvDefineSpace ( + IN TPMI_RH_PROVISION AuthHandle, +- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL, + IN TPM2B_AUTH *Auth, + IN TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC *NvPublic + ); +@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ EFIAPI + Tpm2NvRead ( + IN TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH AuthHandle, + IN TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX NvIndex, +- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL, + IN UINT16 Size, + IN UINT16 Offset, + IN OUT TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *OutData +@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ EFIAPI + Tpm2NvWrite ( + IN TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH AuthHandle, + IN TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX NvIndex, +- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL, + IN TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *InData, + IN UINT16 Offset + ); +@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ Tpm2PcrAllocate ( + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + Tpm2PcrAllocateBanks ( +- IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth OPTIONAL, + IN UINT32 SupportedPCRBanks, + IN UINT32 PCRBanks + ); +@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ EFIAPI + Tpm2PolicySecret ( + IN TPMI_DH_ENTITY AuthHandle, + IN TPMI_SH_POLICY PolicySession, +- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL, + IN TPM2B_NONCE *NonceTPM, + IN TPM2B_DIGEST *CpHashA, + IN TPM2B_NONCE *PolicyRef, +@@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ Tpm2ReadPublic ( + UINT32 + EFIAPI + CopyAuthSessionCommand ( +- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSessionIn, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSessionIn OPTIONAL, + OUT UINT8 *AuthSessionOut + ); + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c +index aa9ebaf3be..3059e5d256 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c +@@ -1183,9 +1183,9 @@ FindCertsFromDb ( + IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid, + IN UINT8 *Data, + IN UINTN DataSize, +- OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL +- OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL +- OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL ++ OUT UINT32 *CertOffset OPTIONAL, ++ OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize OPTIONAL, ++ OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset OPTIONAL, + OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL + ) + { +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib.c +index ec77151c9c..9acff2ae7d 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib/DxeImageAuthenticationStatusLib.c +@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + DxeImageAuthenticationStatusHandler ( + IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus, +- IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File, OPTIONAL ++ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File OPTIONAL, + IN VOID *FileBuffer, + IN UINTN FileSize, + IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +index 1252927664..0a12692454 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c +@@ -1636,7 +1636,7 @@ EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + DxeImageVerificationHandler ( + IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus, +- IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File, OPTIONAL ++ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File OPTIONAL, + IN VOID *FileBuffer, + IN UINTN FileSize, + IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c +index 28807d4d98..5124b884c9 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/DxeRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c +@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ EFIAPI + Rsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionHandler ( + IN CONST VOID *InputSection, + OUT VOID **OutputBuffer, +- IN VOID *ScratchBuffer, OPTIONAL ++ IN VOID *ScratchBuffer OPTIONAL, + OUT UINT32 *AuthenticationStatus + ) + { +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c +index fce5c0af50..d92658f80d 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c +@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ Tpm2CommandChangeEps ( + **/ + UINT32 + Tcg2ExecutePhysicalPresence ( +- IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth OPTIONAL, + IN UINT32 CommandCode, + IN UINT32 CommandParameter, + IN OUT EFI_TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_FLAGS *PpiFlags +@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ Tcg2HaveValidTpmRequest ( + **/ + VOID + Tcg2ExecutePendingTpmRequest ( +- IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth OPTIONAL, + IN OUT EFI_TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE *TcgPpData, + IN OUT EFI_TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_FLAGS *Flags + ) +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +index a531385f81..95682ac567 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler ( + IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus, +- IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File, OPTIONAL ++ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File OPTIONAL, + IN VOID *FileBuffer, + IN UINTN FileSize, + IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +index 4e74cd9db6..27c0ea48ca 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler ( + IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus, +- IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File, OPTIONAL ++ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File OPTIONAL, + IN VOID *FileBuffer, + IN UINTN FileSize, + IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c +index a759183d20..96638e26aa 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib/PeiRsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionExtractLib.c +@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ EFIAPI + Rsa2048Sha256GuidedSectionHandler ( + IN CONST VOID *InputSection, + OUT VOID **OutputBuffer, +- IN VOID *ScratchBuffer, OPTIONAL ++ IN VOID *ScratchBuffer OPTIONAL, + OUT UINT32 *AuthenticationStatus + ) + { +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull.c +index 895d05a28d..aa3dcb6beb 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull/Tcg2PpVendorLibNull.c +@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + UINT32 + EFIAPI + Tcg2PpVendorLibExecutePendingRequest ( +- IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth OPTIONAL, + IN UINT32 OperationRequest, + IN OUT UINT32 *ManagementFlags, + OUT BOOLEAN *ResetRequired +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c +index 0404c0f321..53983d745b 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c +@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ EFIAPI + Tpm2PolicySecret ( + IN TPMI_DH_ENTITY AuthHandle, + IN TPMI_SH_POLICY PolicySession, +- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL, + IN TPM2B_NONCE *NonceTPM, + IN TPM2B_DIGEST *CpHashA, + IN TPM2B_NONCE *PolicyRef, +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c +index 13eeb6ec18..44115cded3 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c +@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ GetHashMaskFromAlgo ( + UINT32 + EFIAPI + CopyAuthSessionCommand ( +- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSessionIn, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSessionIn OPTIONAL, + OUT UINT8 *AuthSessionOut + ) + { +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c +index 043d358a06..957d694431 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c +@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + Tpm2ClearControl ( + IN TPMI_RH_CLEAR AuthHandle, +- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL, + IN TPMI_YES_NO Disable + ) + { +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c +index 8c87de0b0c..d232fe725d 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c +@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ Done: + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + Tpm2PcrAllocateBanks ( +- IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPM2B_AUTH *PlatformAuth OPTIONAL, + IN UINT32 SupportedPCRBanks, + IN UINT32 PCRBanks + ) +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c +index fb46af0fed..d9171fb9a0 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c +@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + Tpm2NvDefineSpace ( + IN TPMI_RH_PROVISION AuthHandle, +- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL, + IN TPM2B_AUTH *Auth, + IN TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC *NvPublic + ) +@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ EFIAPI + Tpm2NvRead ( + IN TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH AuthHandle, + IN TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX NvIndex, +- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL, + IN UINT16 Size, + IN UINT16 Offset, + IN OUT TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *OutData +@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ EFIAPI + Tpm2NvWrite ( + IN TPMI_RH_NV_AUTH AuthHandle, + IN TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX NvIndex, +- IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession, OPTIONAL ++ IN TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *AuthSession OPTIONAL, + IN TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *InData, + IN UINT16 Offset + ) +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/AArch64/RngDxe.c b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/AArch64/RngDxe.c +index 282fdca9d3..1cdc842966 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/AArch64/RngDxe.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/AArch64/RngDxe.c +@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + RngGetRNG ( + IN EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL *This, +- IN EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM *RNGAlgorithm, OPTIONAL ++ IN EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM *RNGAlgorithm OPTIONAL, + IN UINTN RNGValueLength, + OUT UINT8 *RNGValue + ) +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c +index d0e6b7de06..834123b945 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c +@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + RngGetRNG ( + IN EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL *This, +- IN EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM *RNGAlgorithm, OPTIONAL ++ IN EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM *RNGAlgorithm OPTIONAL, + IN UINTN RNGValueLength, + OUT UINT8 *RNGValue + ) +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxeInternals.h b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxeInternals.h +index 2660ed5875..25cccbe92c 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxeInternals.h ++++ b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxeInternals.h +@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + RngGetRNG ( + IN EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL *This, +- IN EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM *RNGAlgorithm, OPTIONAL ++ IN EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM *RNGAlgorithm OPTIONAL, + IN UINTN RNGValueLength, + OUT UINT8 *RNGValue + ); +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigImpl.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigImpl.c +index 68cd62307c..09cb4b0ee9 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigImpl.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigImpl.c +@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ HII_VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH mTcgHiiVendorDevicePath = { + EFI_STATUS + GetTpmState ( + IN EFI_TCG_PROTOCOL *TcgProtocol, +- OUT BOOLEAN *TpmEnable, OPTIONAL ++ OUT BOOLEAN *TpmEnable OPTIONAL, + OUT BOOLEAN *TpmActivate OPTIONAL + ) + { +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-use-of-EFI_D_-to-DEBUG_.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-use-of-EFI_D_-to-DEBUG_.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1d2659d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-use-of-EFI_D_-to-DEBUG_.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2923 @@ +From a026f3bb9ee971b281638b5d4e6daf0bddf32103 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 11:56:37 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 01/17] SecurityPkg: Change use of EFI_D_* to DEBUG_* + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [1/13] 651bdf05edd106945ec4d5e18b4f08dc0e28055c (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154 +CVE: CVE-2022-36763 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 292b44b682d88e6605645ec61ca7081c0a31b059 +Author: Michael D Kinney +Date: Tue Nov 16 19:21:36 2021 -0800 + + SecurityPkg: Change use of EFI_D_* to DEBUG_* + + REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3739 + + Update all use of EFI_D_* defines in DEBUG() macros to DEBUG_* defines. + + Cc: Andrew Fish + Cc: Leif Lindholm + Cc: Michael Kubacki + Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney + Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + SecurityPkg/Hash2DxeCrypto/Driver.c | 2 +- + .../Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c | 2 +- + .../Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c | 16 +- + .../DxeImageVerificationLib/Measurement.c | 8 +- + .../DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c | 36 ++-- + .../DxeTcgPhysicalPresenceLib.c | 13 +- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 14 +- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 4 +- + SecurityPkg/Library/HashLibTpm2/HashLibTpm2.c | 12 +- + .../Library/Tpm12CommandLib/Tpm12Pcr.c | 2 +- + .../Tpm12CommandLib/Tpm12PhysicalPresence.c | 2 +- + .../Library/Tpm12DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm12Tis.c | 24 +-- + .../Tpm12DeviceLibTcg/Tpm12DeviceLibTcg.c | 4 +- + .../Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Context.c | 5 +- + .../Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2DictionaryAttack.c | 8 +- + .../Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c | 16 +- + SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c | 2 +- + .../Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c | 40 ++-- + .../Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c | 42 ++-- + .../Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Miscellaneous.c | 4 +- + .../Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c | 36 ++-- + .../Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Sequences.c | 26 +-- + .../Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Session.c | 6 +- + .../Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Startup.c | 4 +- + .../Library/Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm2Ptp.c | 50 ++--- + .../Library/Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm2Tis.c | 24 +-- + .../Tpm2DeviceLibRouterPei.c | 2 +- + .../Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2/Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2.c | 4 +- + .../Tcg/MemoryOverwriteControl/TcgMor.c | 20 +- + .../TcgMorLockSmm.c | 3 +- + SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigDriver.c | 4 +- + SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigImpl.c | 2 +- + SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPeim.c | 6 +- + SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/TpmDetection.c | 6 +- + SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.c | 188 +++++++++--------- + SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.c | 22 +- + SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Smm/Tcg2Smm.c | 9 +- + .../Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigDriver.c | 4 +- + SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgDxe/TcgDxe.c | 28 +-- + SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.c | 8 +- + SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgSmm/TcgSmm.c | 19 +- + .../SecureBootConfigImpl.c | 16 +- + 42 files changed, 368 insertions(+), 375 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Hash2DxeCrypto/Driver.c b/SecurityPkg/Hash2DxeCrypto/Driver.c +index 4627061a28..0d123b2a2f 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Hash2DxeCrypto/Driver.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Hash2DxeCrypto/Driver.c +@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ Hash2ServiceBindingDestroyChild ( + } + } + if (Instance == NULL) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Hash2ServiceBindingDestroyChild - Invalid handle\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Hash2ServiceBindingDestroyChild - Invalid handle\n")); + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c +index 4fb609504d..aa9ebaf3be 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c +@@ -1752,7 +1752,7 @@ CleanCertsFromDb ( + AuthVariableInfo.Attributes | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE + ); + CertCleaned = TRUE; +- DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Recovery!! Cert for Auth Variable %s Guid %g is removed for consistency\n", VariableName, &AuthVarGuid)); ++ DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "Recovery!! Cert for Auth Variable %s Guid %g is removed for consistency\n", VariableName, &AuthVarGuid)); + FreePool(VariableName); + break; + } +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c +index 122b3b0bf4..7f31458edb 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c +@@ -153,9 +153,9 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize ( + + Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME)); + } else { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME)); + } + + // +@@ -238,9 +238,9 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize ( + return Status; + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable)); + + // + // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state. +@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize ( + return Status; + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode)); + + // + // Check "certdb" variable's existence. +@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize ( + // + Status = CleanCertsFromDb(); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Clean up CertDB fail! Status %x\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Clean up CertDB fail! Status %x\n", Status)); + return Status; + } + } +@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize ( + return Status; + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, mVendorKeyState)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, mVendorKeyState)); + + AuthVarLibContextOut->StructVersion = AUTH_VAR_LIB_CONTEXT_OUT_STRUCT_VERSION; + AuthVarLibContextOut->StructSize = sizeof (AUTH_VAR_LIB_CONTEXT_OUT); +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/Measurement.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/Measurement.c +index 86d8eb4840..351107785d 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/Measurement.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/Measurement.c +@@ -253,8 +253,8 @@ MeasureVariable ( + VarSize + ); + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "DxeImageVerification: MeasureVariable (Pcr - %x, EventType - %x, ", (UINTN)7, (UINTN)EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "VariableName - %s, VendorGuid - %g)\n", VarName, VendorGuid)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerification: MeasureVariable (Pcr - %x, EventType - %x, ", (UINTN)7, (UINTN)EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "VariableName - %s, VendorGuid - %g)\n", VarName, VendorGuid)); + + Status = TpmMeasureAndLogData ( + 7, +@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ SecureBootHook ( + } + + if (IsDataMeasured (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "MeasureSecureAuthorityVariable - IsDataMeasured\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "MeasureSecureAuthorityVariable - IsDataMeasured\n")); + return ; + } + +@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ SecureBootHook ( + Data, + DataSize + ); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "MeasureBootPolicyVariable - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "MeasureBootPolicyVariable - %r\n", Status)); + + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + AddDataMeasured (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize); +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c +index 1e00476509..fce5c0af50 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c +@@ -84,15 +84,15 @@ Tpm2CommandClear ( + CopyMem (LocalAuthSession.hmac.buffer, PlatformAuth->buffer, PlatformAuth->size); + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tpm2ClearControl ... \n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tpm2ClearControl ... \n")); + Status = Tpm2ClearControl (TPM_RH_PLATFORM, AuthSession, NO); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tpm2ClearControl - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tpm2ClearControl - %r\n", Status)); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + goto Done; + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tpm2Clear ... \n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tpm2Clear ... \n")); + Status = Tpm2Clear (TPM_RH_PLATFORM, AuthSession); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tpm2Clear - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tpm2Clear - %r\n", Status)); + + Done: + ZeroMem (&LocalAuthSession.hmac, sizeof(LocalAuthSession.hmac)); +@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ Tpm2CommandChangeEps ( + } + + Status = Tpm2ChangeEPS (TPM_RH_PLATFORM, AuthSession); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tpm2ChangeEPS - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tpm2ChangeEPS - %r\n", Status)); + + ZeroMem(&LocalAuthSession.hmac, sizeof(LocalAuthSession.hmac)); + return Status; +@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest ( + &gEfiTcg2PhysicalPresenceGuid + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM2] Error when lock variable %s, Status = %r\n", TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_FLAGS_VARIABLE, Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM2] Error when lock variable %s, Status = %r\n", TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_FLAGS_VARIABLE, Status)); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + } + } +@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest ( + // Check S4 resume + // + if (GetBootModeHob () == BOOT_ON_S4_RESUME) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "S4 Resume, Skip TPM PP process!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "S4 Resume, Skip TPM PP process!\n")); + return ; + } + +@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest ( + &PpiFlags + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM2] Set physical presence flag failed, Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM2] Set physical presence flag failed, Status = %r\n", Status)); + return ; + } + DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "[TPM2] Initial physical presence flags value is 0x%x\n", PpiFlags.PPFlags)); +@@ -975,18 +975,18 @@ Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest ( + &TcgPpData + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM2] Set physical presence variable failed, Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM2] Set physical presence variable failed, Status = %r\n", Status)); + return ; + } + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "[TPM2] Flags=%x, PPRequest=%x (LastPPRequest=%x)\n", PpiFlags.PPFlags, TcgPpData.PPRequest, TcgPpData.LastPPRequest)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "[TPM2] Flags=%x, PPRequest=%x (LastPPRequest=%x)\n", PpiFlags.PPFlags, TcgPpData.PPRequest, TcgPpData.LastPPRequest)); + + // + // Execute pending TPM request. + // + Tcg2ExecutePendingTpmRequest (PlatformAuth, &TcgPpData, &PpiFlags); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "[TPM2] PPResponse = %x (LastPPRequest=%x, Flags=%x)\n", TcgPpData.PPResponse, TcgPpData.LastPPRequest, PpiFlags.PPFlags)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "[TPM2] PPResponse = %x (LastPPRequest=%x, Flags=%x)\n", TcgPpData.PPResponse, TcgPpData.LastPPRequest, PpiFlags.PPFlags)); + + } + +@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibNeedUserConfirm( + // Check S4 resume + // + if (GetBootModeHob () == BOOT_ON_S4_RESUME) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "S4 Resume, Skip TPM PP process!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "S4 Resume, Skip TPM PP process!\n")); + return FALSE; + } + +@@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibReturnOperationResponseToOsFunction ( + UINTN DataSize; + EFI_TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE PpData; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "[TPM2] ReturnOperationResponseToOsFunction\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "[TPM2] ReturnOperationResponseToOsFunction\n")); + + // + // Get the Physical Presence variable +@@ -1108,7 +1108,7 @@ Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibReturnOperationResponseToOsFunction ( + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + *MostRecentRequest = 0; + *Response = 0; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM2] Get PP variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM2] Get PP variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); + return TCG_PP_RETURN_TPM_OPERATION_RESPONSE_FAILURE; + } + +@@ -1143,7 +1143,7 @@ Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibSubmitRequestToPreOSFunction ( + EFI_TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE PpData; + EFI_TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_FLAGS Flags; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "[TPM2] SubmitRequestToPreOSFunction, Request = %x, %x\n", OperationRequest, RequestParameter)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "[TPM2] SubmitRequestToPreOSFunction, Request = %x, %x\n", OperationRequest, RequestParameter)); + + // + // Get the Physical Presence variable +@@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibSubmitRequestToPreOSFunction ( + &PpData + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM2] Get PP variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM2] Get PP variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); + return TCG_PP_SUBMIT_REQUEST_TO_PREOS_GENERAL_FAILURE; + } + +@@ -1179,7 +1179,7 @@ Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibSubmitRequestToPreOSFunction ( + &PpData + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM2] Set PP variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM2] Set PP variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); + return TCG_PP_SUBMIT_REQUEST_TO_PREOS_GENERAL_FAILURE; + } + } +@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibGetManagementFlags ( + EFI_TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_FLAGS PpiFlags; + UINTN DataSize; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "[TPM2] GetManagementFlags\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "[TPM2] GetManagementFlags\n")); + + DataSize = sizeof (EFI_TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_FLAGS); + Status = gRT->GetVariable ( +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcgPhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcgPhysicalPresenceLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcgPhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcgPhysicalPresenceLib.c +index ba1abe9e08..ab7f664c7a 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcgPhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcgPhysicalPresenceLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcgPhysicalPresenceLib/DxeTcgPhysicalPresenceLib.c +@@ -1203,11 +1203,11 @@ TcgPhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest ( + &PpiFlags + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM] Set physical presence flag failed, Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM] Set physical presence flag failed, Status = %r\n", Status)); + return ; + } + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "[TPM] PpiFlags = %x\n", PpiFlags.PPFlags)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "[TPM] PpiFlags = %x\n", PpiFlags.PPFlags)); + + // + // This flags variable controls whether physical presence is required for TPM command. +@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ TcgPhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest ( + &gEfiPhysicalPresenceGuid + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM] Error when lock variable %s, Status = %r\n", PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_FLAGS_VARIABLE, Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM] Error when lock variable %s, Status = %r\n", PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_FLAGS_VARIABLE, Status)); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + } + } +@@ -1248,12 +1248,12 @@ TcgPhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest ( + &TcgPpData + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM] Set physical presence variable failed, Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM] Set physical presence variable failed, Status = %r\n", Status)); + return; + } + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "[TPM] Flags=%x, PPRequest=%x\n", PpiFlags.PPFlags, TcgPpData.PPRequest)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "[TPM] Flags=%x, PPRequest=%x\n", PpiFlags.PPFlags, TcgPpData.PPRequest)); + + if (TcgPpData.PPRequest == PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_NO_ACTION) { + // +@@ -1292,7 +1292,7 @@ TcgPhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest ( + // Execute pending TPM request. + // + ExecutePendingTpmRequest (TcgProtocol, &TcgPpData, PpiFlags); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "[TPM] PPResponse = %x\n", TcgPpData.PPResponse)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "[TPM] PPResponse = %x\n", TcgPpData.PPResponse)); + + // + // Lock physical presence. +@@ -1397,4 +1397,3 @@ TcgPhysicalPresenceLibNeedUserConfirm( + + return FALSE; + } +- +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +index 92eac71580..a531385f81 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + (UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Failed to Read Partition Table Header!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to Read Partition Table Header!\n")); + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + break; + default: + DEBUG (( +- EFI_D_ERROR, ++ DEBUG_ERROR, + "Tcg2MeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d", + ImageType + )); +@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler ( + // Tcg2 protocol is not installed. So, TPM2 is not present. + // Don't do any measurement, and directly return EFI_SUCCESS. + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2 - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2 - %r\n", Status)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler ( + // + // TPM device doesn't work or activate. + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler (%r) - TPMPresentFlag - %x\n", Status, ProtocolCapability.TPMPresentFlag)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler (%r) - TPMPresentFlag - %x\n", Status, ProtocolCapability.TPMPresentFlag)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler ( + // Measure GPT disk. + // + Status = Tcg2MeasureGptTable (Tcg2Protocol, Handle); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2MeasureGptTable - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2MeasureGptTable - %r\n", Status)); + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // GPT disk check done. +@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler ( + ImageContext.ImageType, + DevicePathNode + ); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2MeasurePeImage - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2MeasurePeImage - %r\n", Status)); + } + + // +@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ Finish: + FreePool (OrigDevicePathNode); + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - %r\n", Status)); + + return Status; + } +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +index d990eb2ad3..4e74cd9db6 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable ( + (UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Failed to Read Partition Table Header!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to Read Partition Table Header!\n")); + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage ( + break; + default: + DEBUG (( +- EFI_D_ERROR, ++ DEBUG_ERROR, + "TcgMeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d", + ImageType + )); +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/HashLibTpm2/HashLibTpm2.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/HashLibTpm2/HashLibTpm2.c +index bd24958505..876b15fad4 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/HashLibTpm2/HashLibTpm2.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/HashLibTpm2/HashLibTpm2.c +@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ HashAndExtend ( + TPM2B_EVENT EventData; + TPM2B_DIGEST Result; + +- DEBUG((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n HashAndExtend Entry \n")); ++ DEBUG((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n HashAndExtend Entry \n")); + + SequenceHandle = 0xFFFFFFFF; // Know bad value + +@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ HashAndExtend ( + if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +- DEBUG((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n Tpm2HashSequenceStart Success \n")); ++ DEBUG((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n Tpm2HashSequenceStart Success \n")); + + Buffer = (UINT8 *)(UINTN)DataToHash; + for (HashLen = DataToHashLen; HashLen > sizeof(HashBuffer.buffer); HashLen -= sizeof(HashBuffer.buffer)) { +@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ HashAndExtend ( + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + } +- DEBUG((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n Tpm2SequenceUpdate Success \n")); ++ DEBUG((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n Tpm2SequenceUpdate Success \n")); + + HashBuffer.size = (UINT16)HashLen; + CopyMem(HashBuffer.buffer, Buffer, (UINTN)HashLen); +@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ HashAndExtend ( + if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +- DEBUG((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n Tpm2EventSequenceComplete Success \n")); ++ DEBUG((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n Tpm2EventSequenceComplete Success \n")); + } else { + Status = Tpm2SequenceComplete ( + SequenceHandle, +@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ HashAndExtend ( + if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +- DEBUG((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n Tpm2SequenceComplete Success \n")); ++ DEBUG((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n Tpm2SequenceComplete Success \n")); + + DigestList->count = 1; + DigestList->digests[0].hashAlg = AlgoId; +@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ HashAndExtend ( + if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +- DEBUG((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n Tpm2PcrExtend Success \n")); ++ DEBUG((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n Tpm2PcrExtend Success \n")); + } + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12CommandLib/Tpm12Pcr.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12CommandLib/Tpm12Pcr.c +index 562cf582de..4fbcb3617c 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12CommandLib/Tpm12Pcr.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12CommandLib/Tpm12Pcr.c +@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Tpm12Extend ( + } + + if (SwapBytes32(Response.Hdr.returnCode) != TPM_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm12Extend: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Response.Hdr.returnCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm12Extend: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Response.Hdr.returnCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12CommandLib/Tpm12PhysicalPresence.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12CommandLib/Tpm12PhysicalPresence.c +index 208bff594d..6714d17d8e 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12CommandLib/Tpm12PhysicalPresence.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12CommandLib/Tpm12PhysicalPresence.c +@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Tpm12PhysicalPresence ( + } + + if (SwapBytes32(Response.returnCode) != TPM_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm12PhysicalPresence: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Response.returnCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm12PhysicalPresence: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Response.returnCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm12Tis.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm12Tis.c +index f858090479..b8218f122d 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm12Tis.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm12Tis.c +@@ -266,22 +266,22 @@ Tpm12TisTpmCommand ( + DEBUG_CODE ( + UINTN DebugSize; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "Tpm12TisTpmCommand Send - ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Tpm12TisTpmCommand Send - ")); + if (SizeIn > 0x100) { + DebugSize = 0x40; + } else { + DebugSize = SizeIn; + } + for (Index = 0; Index < DebugSize; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferIn[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferIn[Index])); + } + if (DebugSize != SizeIn) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "...... ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "...... ")); + for (Index = SizeIn - 0x20; Index < SizeIn; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferIn[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferIn[Index])); + } + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n")); + ); + TpmOutSize = 0; + +@@ -352,11 +352,11 @@ Tpm12TisTpmCommand ( + } + } + DEBUG_CODE ( +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "Tpm12TisTpmCommand ReceiveHeader - ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Tpm12TisTpmCommand ReceiveHeader - ")); + for (Index = 0; Index < sizeof (TPM_RSP_COMMAND_HDR); Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferOut[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferOut[Index])); + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n")); + ); + // + // Check the response data header (tag, parasize and returncode) +@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ Tpm12TisTpmCommand ( + CopyMem (&Data16, BufferOut, sizeof (UINT16)); + RspTag = SwapBytes16 (Data16); + if (RspTag != TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND && RspTag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND && RspTag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TPM12: Response tag error - current tag value is %x\n", RspTag)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPM12: Response tag error - current tag value is %x\n", RspTag)); + Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + goto Exit; + } +@@ -396,11 +396,11 @@ Tpm12TisTpmCommand ( + } + Exit: + DEBUG_CODE ( +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "Tpm12TisTpmCommand Receive - ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Tpm12TisTpmCommand Receive - ")); + for (Index = 0; Index < TpmOutSize; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferOut[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferOut[Index])); + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n")); + ); + MmioWrite8((UINTN)&TisReg->Status, TIS_PC_STS_READY); + return Status; +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12DeviceLibTcg/Tpm12DeviceLibTcg.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12DeviceLibTcg/Tpm12DeviceLibTcg.c +index f975b1bc8a..2869f9ec83 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12DeviceLibTcg/Tpm12DeviceLibTcg.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm12DeviceLibTcg/Tpm12DeviceLibTcg.c +@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Tpm12SubmitCommand ( + // + // TCG protocol is not installed. So, TPM12 is not present. + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm12SubmitCommand - TCG - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm12SubmitCommand - TCG - %r\n", Status)); + return EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } + } +@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ Tpm12RequestUseTpm ( + // + // TCG protocol is not installed. So, TPM12 is not present. + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm12RequestUseTpm - TCG - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm12RequestUseTpm - TCG - %r\n", Status)); + return EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } + } +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Context.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Context.c +index 80b15a51f0..f284f8d21a 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Context.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Context.c +@@ -67,14 +67,13 @@ Tpm2FlushContext ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2FlushContext - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2FlushContext - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + if (SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2FlushContext - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2FlushContext - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } +- +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2DictionaryAttack.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2DictionaryAttack.c +index f502113873..2f830e0aea 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2DictionaryAttack.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2DictionaryAttack.c +@@ -102,12 +102,12 @@ Tpm2DictionaryAttackLockReset ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2DictionaryAttackLockReset - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2DictionaryAttackLockReset - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } + if (SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2DictionaryAttackLockReset - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2DictionaryAttackLockReset - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } +@@ -193,12 +193,12 @@ Tpm2DictionaryAttackParameters ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2DictionaryAttackParameters - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2DictionaryAttackParameters - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } + if (SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2DictionaryAttackParameters - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2DictionaryAttackParameters - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c +index 61c6367262..0404c0f321 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2EnhancedAuthorization.c +@@ -159,12 +159,12 @@ Tpm2PolicySecret ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicySecret - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicySecret - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } + if (SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicySecret - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicySecret - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } +@@ -263,11 +263,11 @@ Tpm2PolicyOR ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicyOR - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicyOR - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + if (SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicyOR - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicyOR - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +@@ -318,11 +318,11 @@ Tpm2PolicyCommandCode ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicyCommandCode - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicyCommandCode - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + if (SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicyCommandCode - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicyCommandCode - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +@@ -373,11 +373,11 @@ Tpm2PolicyGetDigest ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicyGetDigest - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicyGetDigest - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + if (SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicyGetDigest - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PolicyGetDigest - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c +index 36c240d122..13eeb6ec18 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Help.c +@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ CopyDigestListToBuffer ( + Buffer = (UINT8 *)Buffer + sizeof(DigestList->count); + for (Index = 0; Index < DigestList->count; Index++) { + if (!IsHashAlgSupportedInHashAlgorithmMask(DigestList->digests[Index].hashAlg, HashAlgorithmMask)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "WARNING: TPM2 Event log has HashAlg unsupported by PCR bank (0x%x)\n", DigestList->digests[Index].hashAlg)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "WARNING: TPM2 Event log has HashAlg unsupported by PCR bank (0x%x)\n", DigestList->digests[Index].hashAlg)); + continue; + } + CopyMem (Buffer, &DigestList->digests[Index].hashAlg, sizeof(DigestList->digests[Index].hashAlg)); +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c +index dc36963c0e..043d358a06 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Hierarchy.c +@@ -184,12 +184,12 @@ Tpm2SetPrimaryPolicy ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2SetPrimaryPolicy - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2SetPrimaryPolicy - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } + if (SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2SetPrimaryPolicy - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2SetPrimaryPolicy - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } +@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ Tpm2Clear ( + } + + if (ResultBufSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Clear: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Clear: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ Tpm2Clear ( + // + RespSize = SwapBytes32(Res.Header.paramSize); + if (RespSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Clear: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Clear: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ Tpm2Clear ( + // Fail if command failed + // + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Clear: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Clear: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } +@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ Tpm2ClearControl ( + } + + if (ResultBufSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "ClearControl: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "ClearControl: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ Tpm2ClearControl ( + // + RespSize = SwapBytes32(Res.Header.paramSize); + if (RespSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "ClearControl: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "ClearControl: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ Tpm2ClearControl ( + // Fail if command failed + // + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "ClearControl: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "ClearControl: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } +@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ Tpm2HierarchyChangeAuth ( + } + + if (ResultBufSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "HierarchyChangeAuth: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "HierarchyChangeAuth: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ Tpm2HierarchyChangeAuth ( + // + RespSize = SwapBytes32(Res.Header.paramSize); + if (RespSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "HierarchyChangeAuth: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "HierarchyChangeAuth: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ Tpm2HierarchyChangeAuth ( + // Fail if command failed + // + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR,"HierarchyChangeAuth: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG((DEBUG_ERROR,"HierarchyChangeAuth: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } +@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ Tpm2ChangeEPS ( + } + + if (ResultBufSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "ChangeEPS: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "ChangeEPS: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ Tpm2ChangeEPS ( + // + RespSize = SwapBytes32(Res.Header.paramSize); + if (RespSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "ChangeEPS: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "ChangeEPS: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ Tpm2ChangeEPS ( + // Fail if command failed + // + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR,"ChangeEPS: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG((DEBUG_ERROR,"ChangeEPS: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } +@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ Tpm2ChangePPS ( + } + + if (ResultBufSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "ChangePPS: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "ChangePPS: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ Tpm2ChangePPS ( + // + RespSize = SwapBytes32(Res.Header.paramSize); + if (RespSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "ChangePPS: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "ChangePPS: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ Tpm2ChangePPS ( + // Fail if command failed + // + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR,"ChangePPS: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG((DEBUG_ERROR,"ChangePPS: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } +@@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ Tpm2HierarchyControl ( + } + + if (ResultBufSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "HierarchyControl: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "HierarchyControl: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -773,7 +773,7 @@ Tpm2HierarchyControl ( + // + RespSize = SwapBytes32(Res.Header.paramSize); + if (RespSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "HierarchyControl: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "HierarchyControl: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ Tpm2HierarchyControl ( + // Fail if command failed + // + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR,"HierarchyControl: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG((DEBUG_ERROR,"HierarchyControl: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c +index ddb15178fb..8c87de0b0c 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Integrity.c +@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ Tpm2PcrExtend ( + Buffer += sizeof(UINT16); + DigestSize = GetHashSizeFromAlgo (Digests->digests[Index].hashAlg); + if (DigestSize == 0) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Unknown hash algorithm %d\r\n", Digests->digests[Index].hashAlg)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Unknown hash algorithm %d\r\n", Digests->digests[Index].hashAlg)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + CopyMem( +@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ Tpm2PcrExtend ( + } + + if (ResultBufSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrExtend: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrExtend: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ Tpm2PcrExtend ( + // + RespSize = SwapBytes32(Res.Header.paramSize); + if (RespSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrExtend: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrExtend: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ Tpm2PcrExtend ( + // Fail if command failed + // + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrExtend: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrExtend: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ Tpm2PcrEvent ( + } + + if (ResultBufSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrEvent: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrEvent: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ Tpm2PcrEvent ( + // + RespSize = SwapBytes32(Res.Header.paramSize); + if (RespSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrEvent: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrEvent: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ Tpm2PcrEvent ( + // Fail if command failed + // + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrEvent: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrEvent: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ Tpm2PcrEvent ( + Buffer += sizeof(UINT16); + DigestSize = GetHashSizeFromAlgo (Digests->digests[Index].hashAlg); + if (DigestSize == 0) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Unknown hash algorithm %d\r\n", Digests->digests[Index].hashAlg)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Unknown hash algorithm %d\r\n", Digests->digests[Index].hashAlg)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + CopyMem( +@@ -353,11 +353,11 @@ Tpm2PcrRead ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrRead - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrRead - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + if (SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrRead - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrRead - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + return EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } + +@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ Tpm2PcrRead ( + // PcrUpdateCounter + // + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER) + sizeof(RecvBuffer.PcrUpdateCounter)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrRead - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrRead - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + *PcrUpdateCounter = SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.PcrUpdateCounter); +@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ Tpm2PcrRead ( + // PcrSelectionOut + // + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER) + sizeof(RecvBuffer.PcrUpdateCounter) + sizeof(RecvBuffer.PcrSelectionOut.count)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrRead - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrRead - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + PcrSelectionOut->count = SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.PcrSelectionOut.count); +@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ Tpm2PcrRead ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER) + sizeof(RecvBuffer.PcrUpdateCounter) + sizeof(RecvBuffer.PcrSelectionOut.count) + sizeof(RecvBuffer.PcrSelectionOut.pcrSelections[0]) * PcrSelectionOut->count) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrRead - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrRead - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + for (Index = 0; Index < PcrSelectionOut->count; Index++) { +@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ Tpm2PcrAllocate ( + } + + if (ResultBufSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrAllocate: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrAllocate: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ Tpm2PcrAllocate ( + // + RespSize = SwapBytes32(Res.Header.paramSize); + if (RespSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrAllocate: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2PcrAllocate: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); + Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto Done; + } +@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ Tpm2PcrAllocate ( + // Fail if command failed + // + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR,"Tpm2PcrAllocate: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG((DEBUG_ERROR,"Tpm2PcrAllocate: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } +@@ -673,15 +673,15 @@ Tpm2PcrAllocateBanks ( + &SizeNeeded, + &SizeAvailable + ); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tpm2PcrAllocateBanks call Tpm2PcrAllocate - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tpm2PcrAllocateBanks call Tpm2PcrAllocate - %r\n", Status)); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + goto Done; + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "AllocationSuccess - %02x\n", AllocationSuccess)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "MaxPCR - %08x\n", MaxPCR)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SizeNeeded - %08x\n", SizeNeeded)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SizeAvailable - %08x\n", SizeAvailable)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "AllocationSuccess - %02x\n", AllocationSuccess)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "MaxPCR - %08x\n", MaxPCR)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SizeNeeded - %08x\n", SizeNeeded)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SizeAvailable - %08x\n", SizeAvailable)); + + Done: + ZeroMem(&LocalAuthSession.hmac, sizeof(LocalAuthSession.hmac)); +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Miscellaneous.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Miscellaneous.c +index 32bff45844..1afc562998 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Miscellaneous.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Miscellaneous.c +@@ -96,12 +96,12 @@ Tpm2SetAlgorithmSet ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2SetAlgorithmSet - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2SetAlgorithmSet - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } + if (SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2SetAlgorithmSet - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2SetAlgorithmSet - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c +index 87572de201..fb46af0fed 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2NVStorage.c +@@ -200,12 +200,12 @@ Tpm2NvReadPublic ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvReadPublic - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvReadPublic - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + ResponseCode = SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode); + if (ResponseCode != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvReadPublic - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvReadPublic - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + } + switch (ResponseCode) { + case TPM_RC_SUCCESS: +@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ Tpm2NvReadPublic ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize <= sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER) + sizeof (UINT16) + sizeof(UINT16)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvReadPublic - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvReadPublic - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + return EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } + +@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ Tpm2NvReadPublic ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize != sizeof(TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER) + sizeof(UINT16) + NvPublicSize + sizeof(UINT16) + NvNameSize) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvReadPublic - RecvBufferSize Error - NvPublicSize %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvReadPublic - RecvBufferSize Error - NvPublicSize %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + return EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } + +@@ -354,14 +354,14 @@ Tpm2NvDefineSpace ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvDefineSpace - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvDefineSpace - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } + + ResponseCode = SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode); + if (ResponseCode != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvDefineSpace - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvDefineSpace - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + } + switch (ResponseCode) { + case TPM_RC_SUCCESS: +@@ -462,14 +462,14 @@ Tpm2NvUndefineSpace ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvUndefineSpace - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvUndefineSpace - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } + + ResponseCode = SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode); + if (ResponseCode != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvUndefineSpace - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvUndefineSpace - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + } + switch (ResponseCode) { + case TPM_RC_SUCCESS: +@@ -577,13 +577,13 @@ Tpm2NvRead ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvRead - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvRead - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } + ResponseCode = SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode); + if (ResponseCode != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvRead - responseCode - %x\n", ResponseCode)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvRead - responseCode - %x\n", ResponseCode)); + } + switch (ResponseCode) { + case TPM_RC_SUCCESS: +@@ -723,13 +723,13 @@ Tpm2NvWrite ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvWrite - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvWrite - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } + ResponseCode = SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode); + if (ResponseCode != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvWrite - responseCode - %x\n", ResponseCode)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvWrite - responseCode - %x\n", ResponseCode)); + } + switch (ResponseCode) { + case TPM_RC_SUCCESS: +@@ -843,14 +843,14 @@ Tpm2NvReadLock ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvReadLock - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvReadLock - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } + + ResponseCode = SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode); + if (ResponseCode != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvReadLock - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvReadLock - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + } + switch (ResponseCode) { + case TPM_RC_SUCCESS: +@@ -930,14 +930,14 @@ Tpm2NvWriteLock ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvWriteLock - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvWriteLock - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } + + ResponseCode = SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode); + if (ResponseCode != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvWriteLock - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvWriteLock - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + } + switch (ResponseCode) { + case TPM_RC_SUCCESS: +@@ -1014,14 +1014,14 @@ Tpm2NvGlobalWriteLock ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvGlobalWriteLock - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvGlobalWriteLock - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto Done; + } + + ResponseCode = SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode); + if (ResponseCode != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2NvGlobalWriteLock - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2NvGlobalWriteLock - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + } + switch (ResponseCode) { + case TPM_RC_SUCCESS: +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Sequences.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Sequences.c +index 201c2170fc..3d99f0615c 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Sequences.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Sequences.c +@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ Tpm2HashSequenceStart ( + } + + if (ResultBufSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "HashSequenceStart: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "HashSequenceStart: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ Tpm2HashSequenceStart ( + // + RespSize = SwapBytes32(Res.Header.paramSize); + if (RespSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "HashSequenceStart: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "HashSequenceStart: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ Tpm2HashSequenceStart ( + // Fail if command failed + // + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "HashSequenceStart: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "HashSequenceStart: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ Tpm2SequenceUpdate ( + } + + if (ResultBufSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SequenceUpdate: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SequenceUpdate: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ Tpm2SequenceUpdate ( + // + RespSize = SwapBytes32(Res.Header.paramSize); + if (RespSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SequenceUpdate: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SequenceUpdate: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ Tpm2SequenceUpdate ( + // Fail if command failed + // + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SequenceUpdate: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SequenceUpdate: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ Tpm2EventSequenceComplete ( + } + + if (ResultBufSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "EventSequenceComplete: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSequenceComplete: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ Tpm2EventSequenceComplete ( + // + RespSize = SwapBytes32(Res.Header.paramSize); + if (RespSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "EventSequenceComplete: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSequenceComplete: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ Tpm2EventSequenceComplete ( + // Fail if command failed + // + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "EventSequenceComplete: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSequenceComplete: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ Tpm2EventSequenceComplete ( + + DigestSize = GetHashSizeFromAlgo (Results->digests[Index].hashAlg); + if (DigestSize == 0) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "EventSequenceComplete: Unknown hash algorithm %d\r\n", Results->digests[Index].hashAlg)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSequenceComplete: Unknown hash algorithm %d\r\n", Results->digests[Index].hashAlg)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + CopyMem( +@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ Tpm2SequenceComplete ( + } + + if (ResultBufSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SequenceComplete: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SequenceComplete: Failed ExecuteCommand: Buffer Too Small\r\n")); + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ Tpm2SequenceComplete ( + // + RespSize = SwapBytes32(Res.Header.paramSize); + if (RespSize > sizeof(Res)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SequenceComplete: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SequenceComplete: Response size too large! %d\r\n", RespSize)); + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ Tpm2SequenceComplete ( + // Fail if command failed + // + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SequenceComplete: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SequenceComplete: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Session.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Session.c +index 57367432df..4ca616188c 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Session.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Session.c +@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ Tpm2StartAuthSession ( + break; + default: + ASSERT (FALSE); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2StartAuthSession - Symmetric->algorithm - %x\n", Symmetric->algorithm)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2StartAuthSession - Symmetric->algorithm - %x\n", Symmetric->algorithm)); + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + +@@ -144,11 +144,11 @@ Tpm2StartAuthSession ( + } + + if (RecvBufferSize < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2StartAuthSession - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2StartAuthSession - RecvBufferSize Error - %x\n", RecvBufferSize)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + if (SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2StartAuthSession - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2StartAuthSession - responseCode - %x\n", SwapBytes32(RecvBuffer.Header.responseCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Startup.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Startup.c +index 41f2367ba2..645ac49b87 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Startup.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2CommandLib/Tpm2Startup.c +@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ Tpm2Startup ( + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "TPM2Startup: TPM_RC_INITIALIZE\n")); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + default: +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2Startup: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", ResponseCode)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2Startup: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", ResponseCode)); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + } +@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ Tpm2Shutdown ( + } + + if (SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2Shutdown: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2Shutdown: Response Code error! 0x%08x\r\n", SwapBytes32(Res.Header.responseCode))); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm2Ptp.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm2Ptp.c +index f1f8091683..edde7f8e15 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm2Ptp.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm2Ptp.c +@@ -154,22 +154,22 @@ PtpCrbTpmCommand ( + DEBUG_CODE ( + UINTN DebugSize; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "PtpCrbTpmCommand Send - ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "PtpCrbTpmCommand Send - ")); + if (SizeIn > 0x100) { + DebugSize = 0x40; + } else { + DebugSize = SizeIn; + } + for (Index = 0; Index < DebugSize; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferIn[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferIn[Index])); + } + if (DebugSize != SizeIn) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "...... ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "...... ")); + for (Index = SizeIn - 0x20; Index < SizeIn; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferIn[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferIn[Index])); + } + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n")); + ); + TpmOutSize = 0; + +@@ -286,11 +286,11 @@ PtpCrbTpmCommand ( + BufferOut[Index] = MmioRead8 ((UINTN)&CrbReg->CrbDataBuffer[Index]); + } + DEBUG_CODE ( +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "PtpCrbTpmCommand ReceiveHeader - ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "PtpCrbTpmCommand ReceiveHeader - ")); + for (Index = 0; Index < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER); Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferOut[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferOut[Index])); + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n")); + ); + // + // Check the response data header (tag, parasize and returncode) +@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ PtpCrbTpmCommand ( + CopyMem (&Data16, BufferOut, sizeof (UINT16)); + // TPM2 should not use this RSP_COMMAND + if (SwapBytes16 (Data16) == TPM_ST_RSP_COMMAND) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TPM2: TPM_ST_RSP error - %x\n", TPM_ST_RSP_COMMAND)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPM2: TPM_ST_RSP error - %x\n", TPM_ST_RSP_COMMAND)); + Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + goto GoIdle_Exit; + } +@@ -321,11 +321,11 @@ PtpCrbTpmCommand ( + } + + DEBUG_CODE ( +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "PtpCrbTpmCommand Receive - ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "PtpCrbTpmCommand Receive - ")); + for (Index = 0; Index < TpmOutSize; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferOut[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferOut[Index])); + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n")); + ); + + GoReady_Exit: +@@ -494,36 +494,36 @@ DumpPtpInfo ( + // + // Dump InterfaceId Register for PTP + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "InterfaceId - 0x%08x\n", InterfaceId.Uint32)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " InterfaceType - 0x%02x\n", InterfaceId.Bits.InterfaceType)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "InterfaceId - 0x%08x\n", InterfaceId.Uint32)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " InterfaceType - 0x%02x\n", InterfaceId.Bits.InterfaceType)); + if (InterfaceId.Bits.InterfaceType != PTP_INTERFACE_IDENTIFIER_INTERFACE_TYPE_TIS) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " InterfaceVersion - 0x%02x\n", InterfaceId.Bits.InterfaceVersion)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " CapFIFO - 0x%x\n", InterfaceId.Bits.CapFIFO)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " CapCRB - 0x%x\n", InterfaceId.Bits.CapCRB)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " InterfaceVersion - 0x%02x\n", InterfaceId.Bits.InterfaceVersion)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " CapFIFO - 0x%x\n", InterfaceId.Bits.CapFIFO)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " CapCRB - 0x%x\n", InterfaceId.Bits.CapCRB)); + } + + // + // Dump Capability Register for TIS and FIFO + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "InterfaceCapability - 0x%08x\n", InterfaceCapability.Uint32)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "InterfaceCapability - 0x%08x\n", InterfaceCapability.Uint32)); + if ((InterfaceId.Bits.InterfaceType == PTP_INTERFACE_IDENTIFIER_INTERFACE_TYPE_TIS) || + (InterfaceId.Bits.InterfaceType == PTP_INTERFACE_IDENTIFIER_INTERFACE_TYPE_FIFO)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " InterfaceVersion - 0x%x\n", InterfaceCapability.Bits.InterfaceVersion)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " InterfaceVersion - 0x%x\n", InterfaceCapability.Bits.InterfaceVersion)); + } + + // + // Dump StatusEx Register for PTP FIFO + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "StatusEx - 0x%02x\n", StatusEx)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "StatusEx - 0x%02x\n", StatusEx)); + if (InterfaceCapability.Bits.InterfaceVersion == INTERFACE_CAPABILITY_INTERFACE_VERSION_PTP) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " TpmFamily - 0x%x\n", (StatusEx & PTP_FIFO_STS_EX_TPM_FAMILY) >> PTP_FIFO_STS_EX_TPM_FAMILY_OFFSET)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " TpmFamily - 0x%x\n", (StatusEx & PTP_FIFO_STS_EX_TPM_FAMILY) >> PTP_FIFO_STS_EX_TPM_FAMILY_OFFSET)); + } + + Vid = 0xFFFF; + Did = 0xFFFF; + Rid = 0xFF; + PtpInterface = GetCachedPtpInterface (); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "PtpInterface - %x\n", PtpInterface)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "PtpInterface - %x\n", PtpInterface)); + switch (PtpInterface) { + case Tpm2PtpInterfaceCrb: + Vid = MmioRead16 ((UINTN)&((PTP_CRB_REGISTERS *)Register)->Vid); +@@ -539,9 +539,9 @@ DumpPtpInfo ( + default: + break; + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "VID - 0x%04x\n", Vid)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "DID - 0x%04x\n", Did)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "RID - 0x%02x\n", Rid)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "VID - 0x%04x\n", Vid)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DID - 0x%04x\n", Did)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "RID - 0x%02x\n", Rid)); + } + + /** +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm2Tis.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm2Tis.c +index 9a809612b3..e3bef8dfe4 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm2Tis.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm2Tis.c +@@ -221,22 +221,22 @@ Tpm2TisTpmCommand ( + DEBUG_CODE ( + UINTN DebugSize; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "Tpm2TisTpmCommand Send - ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Tpm2TisTpmCommand Send - ")); + if (SizeIn > 0x100) { + DebugSize = 0x40; + } else { + DebugSize = SizeIn; + } + for (Index = 0; Index < DebugSize; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferIn[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferIn[Index])); + } + if (DebugSize != SizeIn) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "...... ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "...... ")); + for (Index = SizeIn - 0x20; Index < SizeIn; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferIn[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferIn[Index])); + } + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n")); + ); + TpmOutSize = 0; + +@@ -333,11 +333,11 @@ Tpm2TisTpmCommand ( + } + } + DEBUG_CODE ( +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "Tpm2TisTpmCommand ReceiveHeader - ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Tpm2TisTpmCommand ReceiveHeader - ")); + for (Index = 0; Index < sizeof (TPM2_RESPONSE_HEADER); Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferOut[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferOut[Index])); + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n")); + ); + // + // Check the response data header (tag,parasize and returncode ) +@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ Tpm2TisTpmCommand ( + CopyMem (&Data16, BufferOut, sizeof (UINT16)); + // TPM2 should not use this RSP_COMMAND + if (SwapBytes16 (Data16) == TPM_ST_RSP_COMMAND) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TPM2: TPM_ST_RSP error - %x\n", TPM_ST_RSP_COMMAND)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPM2: TPM_ST_RSP error - %x\n", TPM_ST_RSP_COMMAND)); + Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + goto Exit; + } +@@ -377,11 +377,11 @@ Tpm2TisTpmCommand ( + } + Exit: + DEBUG_CODE ( +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "Tpm2TisTpmCommand Receive - ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Tpm2TisTpmCommand Receive - ")); + for (Index = 0; Index < TpmOutSize; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferOut[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%02x ", BufferOut[Index])); + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_VERBOSE, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "\n")); + ); + MmioWrite8((UINTN)&TisReg->Status, TIS_PC_STS_READY); + return Status; +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibRouter/Tpm2DeviceLibRouterPei.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibRouter/Tpm2DeviceLibRouterPei.c +index 2e77d35433..e24ef08515 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibRouter/Tpm2DeviceLibRouterPei.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibRouter/Tpm2DeviceLibRouterPei.c +@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ Tpm2RegisterTpm2DeviceLib ( + // + // In PEI phase, there will be shadow driver dispatched again. + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tpm2RegisterTpm2DeviceLib - Override\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tpm2RegisterTpm2DeviceLib - Override\n")); + CopyMem (Tpm2DeviceInterface, Tpm2Device, sizeof(*Tpm2Device)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } else { +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2/Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2/Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2.c +index c34c417093..9d12695a62 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2/Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2/Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2.c +@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Tpm2SubmitCommand ( + // + // Tcg2 protocol is not installed. So, TPM2 is not present. + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2SubmitCommand - Tcg2 - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2SubmitCommand - Tcg2 - %r\n", Status)); + return EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } + } +@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ Tpm2RequestUseTpm ( + // + // Tcg2 protocol is not installed. So, TPM2 is not present. + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2RequestUseTpm - Tcg2 - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2RequestUseTpm - Tcg2 - %r\n", Status)); + return EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } + } +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteControl/TcgMor.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteControl/TcgMor.c +index 32b64a31d1..e5dd06ebcf 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteControl/TcgMor.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteControl/TcgMor.c +@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ OnReadyToBoot ( + // + // Clear MOR_CLEAR_MEMORY_BIT + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "TcgMor: Clear MorClearMemory bit\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "TcgMor: Clear MorClearMemory bit\n")); + mMorControl &= 0xFE; + + DataSize = sizeof (mMorControl); +@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ InitiateTPerReset ( + // Found a TCG device. + // + TcgFlag = TRUE; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "This device is a TCG protocol device\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "This device is a TCG protocol device\n")); + break; + } + +@@ -177,13 +177,13 @@ InitiateTPerReset ( + // Found a IEEE 1667 device. + // + IeeeFlag = TRUE; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "This device is a IEEE 1667 protocol device\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "This device is a IEEE 1667 protocol device\n")); + break; + } + } + + if (!TcgFlag && !IeeeFlag) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Neither a TCG nor IEEE 1667 protocol device is found\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Neither a TCG nor IEEE 1667 protocol device is found\n")); + goto Exit; + } + +@@ -203,9 +203,9 @@ InitiateTPerReset ( + ); + + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Send TPer Reset Command Successfully !\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Send TPer Reset Command Successfully !\n")); + } else { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Send TPer Reset Command Fail !\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Send TPer Reset Command Fail !\n")); + } + } + +@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ InitiateTPerReset ( + // + // TBD : Perform a TPer Reset via IEEE 1667 Protocol + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "IEEE 1667 Protocol didn't support yet!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "IEEE 1667 Protocol didn't support yet!\n")); + } + + Exit: +@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ MorDriverEntryPoint ( + DataSize, + &mMorControl + ); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "TcgMor: Create MOR variable! Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "TcgMor: Create MOR variable! Status = %r\n", Status)); + } else { + // + // Create a Ready To Boot Event and Clear the MorControl bit in the call back function. +@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ MorDriverEntryPoint ( + // + // Register EFI_END_OF_DXE_EVENT_GROUP_GUID event. + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "TcgMor: Create EndofDxe Event for Mor TPer Reset!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "TcgMor: Create EndofDxe Event for Mor TPer Reset!\n")); + Status = gBS->CreateEventEx ( + EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL, + TPL_CALLBACK, +@@ -371,5 +371,3 @@ MorDriverEntryPoint ( + + return Status; + } +- +- +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteRequestControlLock/TcgMorLockSmm.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteRequestControlLock/TcgMorLockSmm.c +index 8c92317313..8e775cb96c 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteRequestControlLock/TcgMorLockSmm.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteRequestControlLock/TcgMorLockSmm.c +@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ MorLockDriverEntryPointSmm ( + // + // This driver link to Smm Variable driver + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "MorLockDriverEntryPointSmm\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "MorLockDriverEntryPointSmm\n")); + + Status = gSmst->SmmLocateProtocol ( + &gEfiSmmVariableProtocolGuid, +@@ -149,4 +149,3 @@ MorLockDriverEntryPointSmm ( + + return Status; + } +- +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigDriver.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigDriver.c +index 10d1c5cc78..fca5ae2645 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigDriver.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigDriver.c +@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ Tcg2ConfigDriverEntryPoint ( + &Tcg2DeviceDetection + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tcg2ConfigDriver: Fail to set TCG2_DEVICE_DETECTION_NAME\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tcg2ConfigDriver: Fail to set TCG2_DEVICE_DETECTION_NAME\n")); + Status = gRT->SetVariable ( + TCG2_DEVICE_DETECTION_NAME, + &gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid, +@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ Tcg2ConfigDriverEntryPoint ( + &Tcg2Configuration + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tcg2ConfigDriver: Fail to set TCG2_STORAGE_NAME\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tcg2ConfigDriver: Fail to set TCG2_STORAGE_NAME\n")); + } + + // +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigImpl.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigImpl.c +index 2946f95db0..a7446ef2f6 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigImpl.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigImpl.c +@@ -960,7 +960,7 @@ InstallTcg2ConfigForm ( + &Tcg2ConfigInfo + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tcg2ConfigDriver: Fail to set TCG2_STORAGE_INFO_NAME\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tcg2ConfigDriver: Fail to set TCG2_STORAGE_INFO_NAME\n")); + } + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPeim.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPeim.c +index 0f9bad724e..8abc33efd4 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPeim.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPeim.c +@@ -104,11 +104,11 @@ Tcg2ConfigPeimEntryPoint ( + // + // Although we have SetupVariable info, we still need detect TPM device manually. + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2Configuration.TpmDevice from Setup: %x\n", Tcg2Configuration.TpmDevice)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2Configuration.TpmDevice from Setup: %x\n", Tcg2Configuration.TpmDevice)); + + if (PcdGetBool (PcdTpmAutoDetection)) { + TpmDevice = DetectTpmDevice (Tcg2Configuration.TpmDevice); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "TpmDevice final: %x\n", TpmDevice)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "TpmDevice final: %x\n", TpmDevice)); + if (TpmDevice != TPM_DEVICE_NULL) { + Tcg2Configuration.TpmDevice = TpmDevice; + } +@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ Tcg2ConfigPeimEntryPoint ( + Size = sizeof(mTpmInstanceId[Index].TpmInstanceGuid); + Status = PcdSetPtrS (PcdTpmInstanceGuid, &Size, &mTpmInstanceId[Index].TpmInstanceGuid); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "TpmDevice PCD: %g\n", &mTpmInstanceId[Index].TpmInstanceGuid)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "TpmDevice PCD: %g\n", &mTpmInstanceId[Index].TpmInstanceGuid)); + break; + } + } +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/TpmDetection.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/TpmDetection.c +index eeaadc5e2f..57d3638f0c 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/TpmDetection.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/TpmDetection.c +@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ DetectTpmDevice ( + // In S3, we rely on normal boot Detection, because we save to ReadOnly Variable in normal boot. + // + if (BootMode == BOOT_ON_S3_RESUME) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "DetectTpmDevice: S3 mode\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DetectTpmDevice: S3 mode\n")); + + Status = PeiServicesLocatePpi (&gEfiPeiReadOnlyVariable2PpiGuid, 0, NULL, (VOID **) &VariablePpi); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); +@@ -65,12 +65,12 @@ DetectTpmDevice ( + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && + (Tcg2DeviceDetection.TpmDeviceDetected >= TPM_DEVICE_MIN) && + (Tcg2DeviceDetection.TpmDeviceDetected <= TPM_DEVICE_MAX)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TpmDevice from DeviceDetection: %x\n", Tcg2DeviceDetection.TpmDeviceDetected)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TpmDevice from DeviceDetection: %x\n", Tcg2DeviceDetection.TpmDeviceDetected)); + return Tcg2DeviceDetection.TpmDeviceDetected; + } + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "DetectTpmDevice:\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DetectTpmDevice:\n")); + + // dTPM available and not disabled by setup + // We need check if it is TPM1.2 or TPM2.0 +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.c +index f1a97d4b2d..c26be18338 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.c +@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ InternalDumpData ( + { + UINTN Index; + for (Index = 0; Index < Size; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "%02x", (UINTN)Data[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%02x", (UINTN)Data[Index])); + } + } + +@@ -262,15 +262,15 @@ InternalDumpHex ( + Count = Size / COLUME_SIZE; + Left = Size % COLUME_SIZE; + for (Index = 0; Index < Count; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "%04x: ", Index * COLUME_SIZE)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%04x: ", Index * COLUME_SIZE)); + InternalDumpData (Data + Index * COLUME_SIZE, COLUME_SIZE); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "\n")); + } + + if (Left != 0) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "%04x: ", Index * COLUME_SIZE)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%04x: ", Index * COLUME_SIZE)); + InternalDumpData (Data + Index * COLUME_SIZE, Left); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "\n")); + } + } + +@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ Tcg2GetCapability ( + ProtocolCapability->StructureVersion.Minor = 0; + ProtocolCapability->ProtocolVersion.Major = 1; + ProtocolCapability->ProtocolVersion.Minor = 0; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TreeGetCapability (Compatible) - %r\n", EFI_SUCCESS)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TreeGetCapability (Compatible) - %r\n", EFI_SUCCESS)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + } +@@ -428,15 +428,15 @@ DumpEvent ( + { + UINTN Index; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " Event:\n")); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " PCRIndex - %d\n", EventHdr->PCRIndex)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " EventType - 0x%08x\n", EventHdr->EventType)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " Digest - ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " Event:\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " PCRIndex - %d\n", EventHdr->PCRIndex)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " EventType - 0x%08x\n", EventHdr->EventType)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " Digest - ")); + for (Index = 0; Index < sizeof(TCG_DIGEST); Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "%02x ", EventHdr->Digest.digest[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%02x ", EventHdr->Digest.digest[Index])); + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "\n")); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " EventSize - 0x%08x\n", EventHdr->EventSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " EventSize - 0x%08x\n", EventHdr->EventSize)); + InternalDumpHex ((UINT8 *)(EventHdr + 1), EventHdr->EventSize); + } + +@@ -456,33 +456,33 @@ DumpTcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct ( + UINT8 *VendorInfo; + UINT32 NumberOfAlgorithms; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " TCG_EfiSpecIDEventStruct:\n")); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " signature - '")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " TCG_EfiSpecIDEventStruct:\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " signature - '")); + for (Index = 0; Index < sizeof(TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct->signature); Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "%c", TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct->signature[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%c", TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct->signature[Index])); + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "'\n")); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " platformClass - 0x%08x\n", TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct->platformClass)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " specVersion - %d.%d%d\n", TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct->specVersionMajor, TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct->specVersionMinor, TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct->specErrata)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " uintnSize - 0x%02x\n", TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct->uintnSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "'\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " platformClass - 0x%08x\n", TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct->platformClass)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " specVersion - %d.%d%d\n", TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct->specVersionMajor, TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct->specVersionMinor, TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct->specErrata)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " uintnSize - 0x%02x\n", TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct->uintnSize)); + + CopyMem (&NumberOfAlgorithms, TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct + 1, sizeof(NumberOfAlgorithms)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " NumberOfAlgorithms - 0x%08x\n", NumberOfAlgorithms)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " NumberOfAlgorithms - 0x%08x\n", NumberOfAlgorithms)); + + DigestSize = (TCG_EfiSpecIdEventAlgorithmSize *)((UINT8 *)TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct + sizeof(*TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct) + sizeof(NumberOfAlgorithms)); + for (Index = 0; Index < NumberOfAlgorithms; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " digest(%d)\n", Index)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " algorithmId - 0x%04x\n", DigestSize[Index].algorithmId)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " digestSize - 0x%04x\n", DigestSize[Index].digestSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " digest(%d)\n", Index)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " algorithmId - 0x%04x\n", DigestSize[Index].algorithmId)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " digestSize - 0x%04x\n", DigestSize[Index].digestSize)); + } + VendorInfoSize = (UINT8 *)&DigestSize[NumberOfAlgorithms]; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " VendorInfoSize - 0x%02x\n", *VendorInfoSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " VendorInfoSize - 0x%02x\n", *VendorInfoSize)); + VendorInfo = VendorInfoSize + 1; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " VendorInfo - ")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " VendorInfo - ")); + for (Index = 0; Index < *VendorInfoSize; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "%02x ", VendorInfo[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%02x ", VendorInfo[Index])); + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "\n")); + } + + /** +@@ -525,34 +525,34 @@ DumpEvent2 ( + UINT32 EventSize; + UINT8 *EventBuffer; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " Event:\n")); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " PCRIndex - %d\n", TcgPcrEvent2->PCRIndex)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " EventType - 0x%08x\n", TcgPcrEvent2->EventType)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " Event:\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " PCRIndex - %d\n", TcgPcrEvent2->PCRIndex)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " EventType - 0x%08x\n", TcgPcrEvent2->EventType)); + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " DigestCount: 0x%08x\n", TcgPcrEvent2->Digest.count)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " DigestCount: 0x%08x\n", TcgPcrEvent2->Digest.count)); + + DigestCount = TcgPcrEvent2->Digest.count; + HashAlgo = TcgPcrEvent2->Digest.digests[0].hashAlg; + DigestBuffer = (UINT8 *)&TcgPcrEvent2->Digest.digests[0].digest; + for (DigestIndex = 0; DigestIndex < DigestCount; DigestIndex++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " HashAlgo : 0x%04x\n", HashAlgo)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " Digest(%d): ", DigestIndex)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " HashAlgo : 0x%04x\n", HashAlgo)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " Digest(%d): ", DigestIndex)); + DigestSize = GetHashSizeFromAlgo (HashAlgo); + for (Index = 0; Index < DigestSize; Index++) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "%02x ", DigestBuffer[Index])); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%02x ", DigestBuffer[Index])); + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "\n")); + // + // Prepare next + // + CopyMem (&HashAlgo, DigestBuffer + DigestSize, sizeof(TPMI_ALG_HASH)); + DigestBuffer = DigestBuffer + DigestSize + sizeof(TPMI_ALG_HASH); + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "\n")); + DigestBuffer = DigestBuffer - sizeof(TPMI_ALG_HASH); + + CopyMem (&EventSize, DigestBuffer, sizeof(TcgPcrEvent2->EventSize)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " EventSize - 0x%08x\n", EventSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " EventSize - 0x%08x\n", EventSize)); + EventBuffer = DigestBuffer + sizeof(TcgPcrEvent2->EventSize); + InternalDumpHex (EventBuffer, EventSize); + } +@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ DumpEventLog ( + TCG_EfiSpecIDEventStruct *TcgEfiSpecIdEventStruct; + UINTN NumberOfEvents; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "EventLogFormat: (0x%x)\n", EventLogFormat)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "EventLogFormat: (0x%x)\n", EventLogFormat)); + + switch (EventLogFormat) { + case EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2: +@@ -628,11 +628,11 @@ DumpEventLog ( + EventHdr = (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR *)((UINTN)EventHdr + sizeof(TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR) + EventHdr->EventSize); + } + if (FinalEventsTable == NULL) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FinalEventsTable: NOT FOUND\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FinalEventsTable: NOT FOUND\n")); + } else { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FinalEventsTable: (0x%x)\n", FinalEventsTable)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " Version: (0x%x)\n", FinalEventsTable->Version)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " NumberOfEvents: (0x%x)\n", FinalEventsTable->NumberOfEvents)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FinalEventsTable: (0x%x)\n", FinalEventsTable)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " Version: (0x%x)\n", FinalEventsTable->Version)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " NumberOfEvents: (0x%x)\n", FinalEventsTable->NumberOfEvents)); + + EventHdr = (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR *)(UINTN)(FinalEventsTable + 1); + for (NumberOfEvents = 0; NumberOfEvents < FinalEventsTable->NumberOfEvents; NumberOfEvents++) { +@@ -658,11 +658,11 @@ DumpEventLog ( + } + + if (FinalEventsTable == NULL) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FinalEventsTable: NOT FOUND\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FinalEventsTable: NOT FOUND\n")); + } else { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FinalEventsTable: (0x%x)\n", FinalEventsTable)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " Version: (0x%x)\n", FinalEventsTable->Version)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " NumberOfEvents: (0x%x)\n", FinalEventsTable->NumberOfEvents)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FinalEventsTable: (0x%x)\n", FinalEventsTable)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " Version: (0x%x)\n", FinalEventsTable->Version)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " NumberOfEvents: (0x%x)\n", FinalEventsTable->NumberOfEvents)); + + TcgPcrEvent2 = (TCG_PCR_EVENT2 *)(UINTN)(FinalEventsTable + 1); + for (NumberOfEvents = 0; NumberOfEvents < FinalEventsTable->NumberOfEvents; NumberOfEvents++) { +@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ Tcg2GetEventLog ( + { + UINTN Index; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2GetEventLog ... (0x%x)\n", EventLogFormat)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2GetEventLog ... (0x%x)\n", EventLogFormat)); + + if (This == NULL) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; +@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ Tcg2GetEventLog ( + + if (EventLogLocation != NULL) { + *EventLogLocation = mTcgDxeData.EventLogAreaStruct[Index].Lasa; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2GetEventLog (EventLogLocation - %x)\n", *EventLogLocation)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2GetEventLog (EventLogLocation - %x)\n", *EventLogLocation)); + } + + if (EventLogLastEntry != NULL) { +@@ -749,15 +749,15 @@ Tcg2GetEventLog ( + } else { + *EventLogLastEntry = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)mTcgDxeData.EventLogAreaStruct[Index].LastEvent; + } +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2GetEventLog (EventLogLastEntry - %x)\n", *EventLogLastEntry)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2GetEventLog (EventLogLastEntry - %x)\n", *EventLogLastEntry)); + } + + if (EventLogTruncated != NULL) { + *EventLogTruncated = mTcgDxeData.EventLogAreaStruct[Index].EventLogTruncated; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2GetEventLog (EventLogTruncated - %x)\n", *EventLogTruncated)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2GetEventLog (EventLogTruncated - %x)\n", *EventLogTruncated)); + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2GetEventLog - %r\n", EFI_SUCCESS)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2GetEventLog - %r\n", EFI_SUCCESS)); + + // Dump Event Log for debug purpose + if ((EventLogLocation != NULL) && (EventLogLastEntry != NULL)) { +@@ -980,8 +980,8 @@ TcgDxeLogEvent ( + // Increase the NumberOfEvents in FinalEventsTable + // + (mTcgDxeData.FinalEventsTable[Index])->NumberOfEvents ++; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FinalEventsTable->NumberOfEvents - 0x%x\n", (mTcgDxeData.FinalEventsTable[Index])->NumberOfEvents)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " Size - 0x%x\n", (UINTN)EventLogAreaStruct->EventLogSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FinalEventsTable->NumberOfEvents - 0x%x\n", (mTcgDxeData.FinalEventsTable[Index])->NumberOfEvents)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " Size - 0x%x\n", (UINTN)EventLogAreaStruct->EventLogSize)); + } + } + +@@ -1101,12 +1101,12 @@ TcgDxeLogHashEvent ( + UINT8 *DigestBuffer; + UINT32 *EventSizePtr; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SupportedEventLogs - 0x%08x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.SupportedEventLogs)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SupportedEventLogs - 0x%08x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.SupportedEventLogs)); + + RetStatus = EFI_SUCCESS; + for (Index = 0; Index < sizeof(mTcg2EventInfo)/sizeof(mTcg2EventInfo[0]); Index++) { + if ((mTcgDxeData.BsCap.SupportedEventLogs & mTcg2EventInfo[Index].LogFormat) != 0) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " LogFormat - 0x%08x\n", mTcg2EventInfo[Index].LogFormat)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " LogFormat - 0x%08x\n", mTcg2EventInfo[Index].LogFormat)); + switch (mTcg2EventInfo[Index].LogFormat) { + case EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2: + Status = GetDigestFromDigestList (TPM_ALG_SHA1, DigestList, &NewEventHdr->Digest); +@@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ TcgDxeHashLogExtendEvent ( + } + + if (Status == EFI_DEVICE_ERROR) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TcgDxeHashLogExtendEvent - %r. Disable TPM.\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TcgDxeHashLogExtendEvent - %r. Disable TPM.\n", Status)); + mTcgDxeData.BsCap.TPMPresentFlag = FALSE; + REPORT_STATUS_CODE ( + EFI_ERROR_CODE | EFI_ERROR_MINOR, +@@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ Tcg2HashLogExtendEvent ( + } + } + if (Status == EFI_DEVICE_ERROR) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "MeasurePeImageAndExtend - %r. Disable TPM.\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "MeasurePeImageAndExtend - %r. Disable TPM.\n", Status)); + mTcgDxeData.BsCap.TPMPresentFlag = FALSE; + REPORT_STATUS_CODE ( + EFI_ERROR_CODE | EFI_ERROR_MINOR, +@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ Tcg2SubmitCommand ( + { + EFI_STATUS Status; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2SubmitCommand ...\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2SubmitCommand ...\n")); + + if ((This == NULL) || + (InputParameterBlockSize == 0) || (InputParameterBlock == NULL) || +@@ -1379,7 +1379,7 @@ Tcg2SubmitCommand ( + &OutputParameterBlockSize, + OutputParameterBlock + ); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2SubmitCommand - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2SubmitCommand - %r\n", Status)); + return Status; + } + +@@ -1425,7 +1425,7 @@ Tcg2SetActivePCRBanks ( + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINT32 ReturnCode; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2SetActivePCRBanks ... (0x%x)\n", ActivePcrBanks)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2SetActivePCRBanks ... (0x%x)\n", ActivePcrBanks)); + + if (ActivePcrBanks == 0) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; +@@ -1452,7 +1452,7 @@ Tcg2SetActivePCRBanks ( + Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2SetActivePCRBanks - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2SetActivePCRBanks - %r\n", Status)); + + return Status; + } +@@ -1533,7 +1533,7 @@ SetupEventLog ( + UINT32 NumberOfAlgorithms; + TCG_EfiStartupLocalityEvent StartupLocalityEvent; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SetupEventLog\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SetupEventLog\n")); + + // + // 1. Create Log Area +@@ -1940,7 +1940,7 @@ MeasureSeparatorEvent ( + TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR TcgEvent; + UINT32 EventData; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "MeasureSeparatorEvent Pcr - %x\n", PCRIndex)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "MeasureSeparatorEvent Pcr - %x\n", PCRIndex)); + + EventData = 0; + TcgEvent.PCRIndex = PCRIndex; +@@ -1985,8 +1985,8 @@ MeasureVariable ( + UINTN VarNameLength; + UEFI_VARIABLE_DATA *VarLog; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2Dxe: MeasureVariable (Pcr - %x, EventType - %x, ", (UINTN)PCRIndex, (UINTN)EventType)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "VariableName - %s, VendorGuid - %g)\n", VarName, VendorGuid)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2Dxe: MeasureVariable (Pcr - %x, EventType - %x, ", (UINTN)PCRIndex, (UINTN)EventType)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "VariableName - %s, VendorGuid - %g)\n", VarName, VendorGuid)); + + VarNameLength = StrLen (VarName); + TcgEvent.PCRIndex = PCRIndex; +@@ -2336,11 +2336,11 @@ MeasureSecureBootPolicy ( + + if (PcdGetBool (PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized)) { + Status = MeasureLaunchOfFirmwareDebugger (); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "MeasureLaunchOfFirmwareDebugger - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "MeasureLaunchOfFirmwareDebugger - %r\n", Status)); + } + + Status = MeasureAllSecureVariables (); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "MeasureAllSecureVariables - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "MeasureAllSecureVariables - %r\n", Status)); + + // + // We need measure Separator(7) here, because this event must be between SecureBootPolicy (Configure) +@@ -2349,7 +2349,7 @@ MeasureSecureBootPolicy ( + // the Authority measurement happen before ReadToBoot event. + // + Status = MeasureSeparatorEvent (7); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "MeasureSeparatorEvent - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "MeasureSeparatorEvent - %r\n", Status)); + return ; + } + +@@ -2380,7 +2380,7 @@ OnReadyToBoot ( + // + Status = MeasureHandoffTables (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "HOBs not Measured. Error!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "HOBs not Measured. Error!\n")); + } + + // +@@ -2388,7 +2388,7 @@ OnReadyToBoot ( + // + Status = MeasureAllBootVariables (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Boot Variables not Measured. Error!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Boot Variables not Measured. Error!\n")); + } + + // +@@ -2399,7 +2399,7 @@ OnReadyToBoot ( + EFI_CALLING_EFI_APPLICATION + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_CALLING_EFI_APPLICATION)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_CALLING_EFI_APPLICATION)); + } + + // +@@ -2433,7 +2433,7 @@ OnReadyToBoot ( + EFI_RETURNING_FROM_EFI_APPLICATION + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_RETURNING_FROM_EFI_APPLICATION)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_RETURNING_FROM_EFI_APPLICATION)); + } + + // +@@ -2445,11 +2445,11 @@ OnReadyToBoot ( + EFI_CALLING_EFI_APPLICATION + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_CALLING_EFI_APPLICATION)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_CALLING_EFI_APPLICATION)); + } + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "TPM2 Tcg2Dxe Measure Data when ReadyToBoot\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "TPM2 Tcg2Dxe Measure Data when ReadyToBoot\n")); + // + // Increase boot attempt counter. + // +@@ -2483,7 +2483,7 @@ OnExitBootServices ( + EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_INVOCATION + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_INVOCATION)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_INVOCATION)); + } + + // +@@ -2494,7 +2494,7 @@ OnExitBootServices ( + EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_SUCCEEDED + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_SUCCEEDED)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_SUCCEEDED)); + } + } + +@@ -2524,7 +2524,7 @@ OnExitBootServicesFailed ( + EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_FAILED + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_FAILED)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_FAILED)); + } + + } +@@ -2663,13 +2663,13 @@ DriverEntry ( + } + + if (GetFirstGuidHob (&gTpmErrorHobGuid) != NULL) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TPM2 error!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPM2 error!\n")); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + + Status = Tpm2RequestUseTpm (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TPM2 not detected!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPM2 not detected!\n")); + return Status; + } + +@@ -2684,14 +2684,14 @@ DriverEntry ( + mTcgDxeData.BsCap.StructureVersion.Major = 1; + mTcgDxeData.BsCap.StructureVersion.Minor = 1; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2.ProtocolVersion - %02x.%02x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.ProtocolVersion.Major, mTcgDxeData.BsCap.ProtocolVersion.Minor)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2.StructureVersion - %02x.%02x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.StructureVersion.Major, mTcgDxeData.BsCap.StructureVersion.Minor)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2.ProtocolVersion - %02x.%02x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.ProtocolVersion.Major, mTcgDxeData.BsCap.ProtocolVersion.Minor)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2.StructureVersion - %02x.%02x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.StructureVersion.Major, mTcgDxeData.BsCap.StructureVersion.Minor)); + + Status = Tpm2GetCapabilityManufactureID (&mTcgDxeData.BsCap.ManufacturerID); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2GetCapabilityManufactureID fail!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2GetCapabilityManufactureID fail!\n")); + } else { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tpm2GetCapabilityManufactureID - %08x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.ManufacturerID)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tpm2GetCapabilityManufactureID - %08x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.ManufacturerID)); + } + + DEBUG_CODE ( +@@ -2700,19 +2700,19 @@ DriverEntry ( + + Status = Tpm2GetCapabilityFirmwareVersion (&FirmwareVersion1, &FirmwareVersion2); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2GetCapabilityFirmwareVersion fail!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2GetCapabilityFirmwareVersion fail!\n")); + } else { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tpm2GetCapabilityFirmwareVersion - %08x %08x\n", FirmwareVersion1, FirmwareVersion2)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tpm2GetCapabilityFirmwareVersion - %08x %08x\n", FirmwareVersion1, FirmwareVersion2)); + } + ); + + Status = Tpm2GetCapabilityMaxCommandResponseSize (&MaxCommandSize, &MaxResponseSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tpm2GetCapabilityMaxCommandResponseSize fail!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tpm2GetCapabilityMaxCommandResponseSize fail!\n")); + } else { + mTcgDxeData.BsCap.MaxCommandSize = (UINT16)MaxCommandSize; + mTcgDxeData.BsCap.MaxResponseSize = (UINT16)MaxResponseSize; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tpm2GetCapabilityMaxCommandResponseSize - %08x, %08x\n", MaxCommandSize, MaxResponseSize)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tpm2GetCapabilityMaxCommandResponseSize - %08x, %08x\n", MaxCommandSize, MaxResponseSize)); + } + + // +@@ -2739,7 +2739,7 @@ DriverEntry ( + } else { + mTcgDxeData.BsCap.NumberOfPCRBanks = PcdGet32 (PcdTcg2NumberOfPCRBanks); + if (PcdGet32 (PcdTcg2NumberOfPCRBanks) > NumberOfPCRBanks) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "ERROR: PcdTcg2NumberOfPCRBanks(0x%x) > NumberOfPCRBanks(0x%x)\n", PcdGet32 (PcdTcg2NumberOfPCRBanks), NumberOfPCRBanks)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "ERROR: PcdTcg2NumberOfPCRBanks(0x%x) > NumberOfPCRBanks(0x%x)\n", PcdGet32 (PcdTcg2NumberOfPCRBanks), NumberOfPCRBanks)); + mTcgDxeData.BsCap.NumberOfPCRBanks = NumberOfPCRBanks; + } + } +@@ -2752,10 +2752,10 @@ DriverEntry ( + mTcgDxeData.BsCap.SupportedEventLogs &= ~EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2; + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2.SupportedEventLogs - 0x%08x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.SupportedEventLogs)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2.HashAlgorithmBitmap - 0x%08x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.HashAlgorithmBitmap)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2.NumberOfPCRBanks - 0x%08x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.NumberOfPCRBanks)); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Tcg2.ActivePcrBanks - 0x%08x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.ActivePcrBanks)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2.SupportedEventLogs - 0x%08x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.SupportedEventLogs)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2.HashAlgorithmBitmap - 0x%08x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.HashAlgorithmBitmap)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2.NumberOfPCRBanks - 0x%08x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.NumberOfPCRBanks)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Tcg2.ActivePcrBanks - 0x%08x\n", mTcgDxeData.BsCap.ActivePcrBanks)); + + if (mTcgDxeData.BsCap.TPMPresentFlag) { + // +@@ -2812,7 +2812,7 @@ DriverEntry ( + // Install Tcg2Protocol + // + Status = InstallTcg2 (); +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "InstallTcg2 - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "InstallTcg2 - %r\n", Status)); + + return Status; + } +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.c +index 93a8803ff6..7eb02f08f9 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.c +@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ SyncPcrAllocationsAndPcrMask ( + UINT32 Tpm2PcrMask; + UINT32 NewTpm2PcrMask; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SyncPcrAllocationsAndPcrMask!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SyncPcrAllocationsAndPcrMask!\n")); + + // + // Determine the current TPM support and the Platform PCR mask. +@@ -297,9 +297,9 @@ SyncPcrAllocationsAndPcrMask ( + if ((TpmActivePcrBanks & Tpm2PcrMask) != TpmActivePcrBanks) { + NewTpmActivePcrBanks = TpmActivePcrBanks & Tpm2PcrMask; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "%a - Reallocating PCR banks from 0x%X to 0x%X.\n", __FUNCTION__, TpmActivePcrBanks, NewTpmActivePcrBanks)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a - Reallocating PCR banks from 0x%X to 0x%X.\n", __FUNCTION__, TpmActivePcrBanks, NewTpmActivePcrBanks)); + if (NewTpmActivePcrBanks == 0) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a - No viable PCRs active! Please set a less restrictive value for PcdTpm2HashMask!\n", __FUNCTION__)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a - No viable PCRs active! Please set a less restrictive value for PcdTpm2HashMask!\n", __FUNCTION__)); + ASSERT (FALSE); + } else { + Status = Tpm2PcrAllocateBanks (NULL, (UINT32)TpmHashAlgorithmBitmap, NewTpmActivePcrBanks); +@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ SyncPcrAllocationsAndPcrMask ( + // + // We can't do much here, but we hope that this doesn't happen. + // +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a - Failed to reallocate PCRs!\n", __FUNCTION__)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a - Failed to reallocate PCRs!\n", __FUNCTION__)); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + } + // +@@ -324,9 +324,9 @@ SyncPcrAllocationsAndPcrMask ( + if ((Tpm2PcrMask & TpmHashAlgorithmBitmap) != Tpm2PcrMask) { + NewTpm2PcrMask = Tpm2PcrMask & TpmHashAlgorithmBitmap; + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "%a - Updating PcdTpm2HashMask from 0x%X to 0x%X.\n", __FUNCTION__, Tpm2PcrMask, NewTpm2PcrMask)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a - Updating PcdTpm2HashMask from 0x%X to 0x%X.\n", __FUNCTION__, Tpm2PcrMask, NewTpm2PcrMask)); + if (NewTpm2PcrMask == 0) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a - No viable PCRs supported! Please set a less restrictive value for PcdTpm2HashMask!\n", __FUNCTION__)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a - No viable PCRs supported! Please set a less restrictive value for PcdTpm2HashMask!\n", __FUNCTION__)); + ASSERT (FALSE); + } + +@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ LogHashEvent ( + RetStatus = EFI_SUCCESS; + for (Index = 0; Index < sizeof(mTcg2EventInfo)/sizeof(mTcg2EventInfo[0]); Index++) { + if ((SupportedEventLogs & mTcg2EventInfo[Index].LogFormat) != 0) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, " LogFormat - 0x%08x\n", mTcg2EventInfo[Index].LogFormat)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " LogFormat - 0x%08x\n", mTcg2EventInfo[Index].LogFormat)); + switch (mTcg2EventInfo[Index].LogFormat) { + case EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2: + Status = GetDigestFromDigestList (TPM_ALG_SHA1, DigestList, &NewEventHdr->Digest); +@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ HashLogExtendEvent ( + } + + if (Status == EFI_DEVICE_ERROR) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "HashLogExtendEvent - %r. Disable TPM.\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "HashLogExtendEvent - %r. Disable TPM.\n", Status)); + BuildGuidHob (&gTpmErrorHobGuid,0); + REPORT_STATUS_CODE ( + EFI_ERROR_CODE | EFI_ERROR_MINOR, +@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ PeimEntryMA ( + } + + if (GetFirstGuidHob (&gTpmErrorHobGuid) != NULL) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TPM2 error!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPM2 error!\n")); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +@@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ PeimEntryMA ( + for (PcrIndex = 0; PcrIndex < 8; PcrIndex++) { + Status = MeasureSeparatorEventWithError (PcrIndex); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Separator Event with Error not Measured. Error!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Separator Event with Error not Measured. Error!\n")); + } + } + } +@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ PeimEntryMA ( + + Done: + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TPM2 error! Build Hob\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPM2 error! Build Hob\n")); + BuildGuidHob (&gTpmErrorHobGuid,0); + REPORT_STATUS_CODE ( + EFI_ERROR_CODE | EFI_ERROR_MINOR, +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Smm/Tcg2Smm.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Smm/Tcg2Smm.c +index f49eccb0bd..9f5111552b 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Smm/Tcg2Smm.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Smm/Tcg2Smm.c +@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ MemoryClearCallback ( + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + mTcgNvs->MemoryClear.ReturnCode = MOR_REQUEST_GENERAL_FAILURE; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM] Get MOR variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM] Get MOR variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ MemoryClearCallback ( + MorControl &= ~MOR_CLEAR_MEMORY_BIT_MASK; + } else { + mTcgNvs->MemoryClear.ReturnCode = MOR_REQUEST_GENERAL_FAILURE; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM] MOR Parameter error! Parameter = %x\n", mTcgNvs->MemoryClear.Parameter)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM] MOR Parameter error! Parameter = %x\n", mTcgNvs->MemoryClear.Parameter)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ MemoryClearCallback ( + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + mTcgNvs->MemoryClear.ReturnCode = MOR_REQUEST_GENERAL_FAILURE; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM] Set MOR variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM] Set MOR variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); + } + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ InitializeTcgCommon ( + EFI_HANDLE NotifyHandle; + + if (!CompareGuid (PcdGetPtr(PcdTpmInstanceGuid), &gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm20DtpmGuid)){ +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "No TPM2 DTPM instance required!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "No TPM2 DTPM instance required!\n")); + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + +@@ -372,4 +372,3 @@ Cleanup: + + return Status; + } +- +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigDriver.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigDriver.c +index 8210548077..4bc6086454 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigDriver.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgConfigDxe/TcgConfigDriver.c +@@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ TcgConfigDriverEntryPoint ( + EFI_TCG_PROTOCOL *TcgProtocol; + + if (!CompareGuid (PcdGetPtr(PcdTpmInstanceGuid), &gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid)){ +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "No TPM12 instance required!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "No TPM12 instance required!\n")); + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + Status = Tpm12RequestUseTpm (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TPM not detected!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPM not detected!\n")); + return Status; + } + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgDxe/TcgDxe.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgDxe/TcgDxe.c +index 3990d1e937..7019c666b1 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgDxe/TcgDxe.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgDxe/TcgDxe.c +@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ TcgDxeHashLogExtendEventI ( + + Done: + if ((Status == EFI_DEVICE_ERROR) || (Status == EFI_TIMEOUT)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TcgDxeHashLogExtendEventI - %r. Disable TPM.\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TcgDxeHashLogExtendEventI - %r. Disable TPM.\n", Status)); + TcgData->BsCap.TPMPresentFlag = FALSE; + REPORT_STATUS_CODE ( + EFI_ERROR_CODE | EFI_ERROR_MINOR, +@@ -1127,7 +1127,7 @@ OnReadyToBoot ( + // + Status = MeasureHandoffTables (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "HOBs not Measured. Error!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "HOBs not Measured. Error!\n")); + } + + // +@@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ OnReadyToBoot ( + // + Status = MeasureAllBootVariables (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Boot Variables not Measured. Error!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Boot Variables not Measured. Error!\n")); + } + + // +@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ OnReadyToBoot ( + EFI_CALLING_EFI_APPLICATION + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_CALLING_EFI_APPLICATION)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_CALLING_EFI_APPLICATION)); + } + + // +@@ -1177,11 +1177,11 @@ OnReadyToBoot ( + EFI_RETURNING_FROM_EFI_APPLICATION + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_RETURNING_FROM_EFI_APPLICATION)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_RETURNING_FROM_EFI_APPLICATION)); + } + } + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "TPM TcgDxe Measure Data when ReadyToBoot\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "TPM TcgDxe Measure Data when ReadyToBoot\n")); + // + // Increase boot attempt counter. + // +@@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ InstallAcpiTable ( + } + + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Tcg Acpi Table installation failure")); ++ DEBUG((DEBUG_ERROR, "Tcg Acpi Table installation failure")); + } + } + +@@ -1289,7 +1289,7 @@ OnExitBootServices ( + EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_INVOCATION + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_INVOCATION)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_INVOCATION)); + } + + // +@@ -1299,7 +1299,7 @@ OnExitBootServices ( + EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_SUCCEEDED + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)){ +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_SUCCEEDED)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_SUCCEEDED)); + } + } + +@@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@ OnExitBootServicesFailed ( + EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_FAILED + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)){ +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_FAILED)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a not Measured. Error!\n", EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES_FAILED)); + } + } + +@@ -1381,25 +1381,25 @@ DriverEntry ( + VOID *Registration; + + if (!CompareGuid (PcdGetPtr(PcdTpmInstanceGuid), &gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid)){ +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "No TPM12 instance required!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "No TPM12 instance required!\n")); + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + if (GetFirstGuidHob (&gTpmErrorHobGuid) != NULL) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TPM error!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPM error!\n")); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + + Status = Tpm12RequestUseTpm (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TPM not detected!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPM not detected!\n")); + return Status; + } + + Status = GetTpmStatus (&mTcgDxeData.BsCap.TPMDeactivatedFlag); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG (( +- EFI_D_ERROR, ++ DEBUG_ERROR, + "DriverEntry: TPM not working properly\n" + )); + return Status; +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.c +index db33daed37..536bd5a408 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.c +@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ HashLogExtendEvent ( + + Done: + if ((Status == EFI_DEVICE_ERROR) || (Status == EFI_TIMEOUT)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "HashLogExtendEvent - %r. Disable TPM.\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "HashLogExtendEvent - %r. Disable TPM.\n", Status)); + BuildGuidHob (&gTpmErrorHobGuid,0); + REPORT_STATUS_CODE ( + EFI_ERROR_CODE | EFI_ERROR_MINOR, +@@ -844,12 +844,12 @@ PeimEntryMA ( + EFI_BOOT_MODE BootMode; + + if (!CompareGuid (PcdGetPtr(PcdTpmInstanceGuid), &gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid)){ +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "No TPM12 instance required!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "No TPM12 instance required!\n")); + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + if (GetFirstGuidHob (&gTpmErrorHobGuid) != NULL) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TPM error!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPM error!\n")); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ PeimEntryMA ( + + Done: + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "TPM error! Build Hob\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPM error! Build Hob\n")); + BuildGuidHob (&gTpmErrorHobGuid,0); + REPORT_STATUS_CODE ( + EFI_ERROR_CODE | EFI_ERROR_MINOR, +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgSmm/TcgSmm.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgSmm/TcgSmm.c +index a60efc7d69..25f443c04f 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgSmm/TcgSmm.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgSmm/TcgSmm.c +@@ -62,13 +62,13 @@ PhysicalPresenceCallback ( + &PpData + ); + +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "[TPM] PP callback, Parameter = %x\n", mTcgNvs->PhysicalPresence.Parameter)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "[TPM] PP callback, Parameter = %x\n", mTcgNvs->PhysicalPresence.Parameter)); + if (mTcgNvs->PhysicalPresence.Parameter == ACPI_FUNCTION_RETURN_REQUEST_RESPONSE_TO_OS) { + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + mTcgNvs->PhysicalPresence.ReturnCode = PP_RETURN_TPM_OPERATION_RESPONSE_FAILURE; + mTcgNvs->PhysicalPresence.LastRequest = 0; + mTcgNvs->PhysicalPresence.Response = 0; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM] Get PP variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM] Get PP variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + mTcgNvs->PhysicalPresence.ReturnCode = PP_RETURN_TPM_OPERATION_RESPONSE_SUCCESS; +@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ PhysicalPresenceCallback ( + || (mTcgNvs->PhysicalPresence.Parameter == ACPI_FUNCTION_SUBMIT_REQUEST_TO_BIOS_2)) { + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + mTcgNvs->PhysicalPresence.ReturnCode = TCG_PP_SUBMIT_REQUEST_TO_PREOS_GENERAL_FAILURE; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM] Get PP variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM] Get PP variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + if (mTcgNvs->PhysicalPresence.Request == PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_SET_OPERATOR_AUTH) { +@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ PhysicalPresenceCallback ( + } else if (mTcgNvs->PhysicalPresence.Parameter == ACPI_FUNCTION_GET_USER_CONFIRMATION_STATUS_FOR_REQUEST) { + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + mTcgNvs->PhysicalPresence.ReturnCode = TCG_PP_GET_USER_CONFIRMATION_BLOCKED_BY_BIOS_CONFIGURATION; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM] Get PP variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM] Get PP variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + // +@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ PhysicalPresenceCallback ( + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + mTcgNvs->PhysicalPresence.ReturnCode = TCG_PP_GET_USER_CONFIRMATION_BLOCKED_BY_BIOS_CONFIGURATION; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM] Get PP flags failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM] Get PP flags failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ MemoryClearCallback ( + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + mTcgNvs->MemoryClear.ReturnCode = MOR_REQUEST_GENERAL_FAILURE; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM] Get MOR variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM] Get MOR variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ MemoryClearCallback ( + MorControl &= ~MOR_CLEAR_MEMORY_BIT_MASK; + } else { + mTcgNvs->MemoryClear.ReturnCode = MOR_REQUEST_GENERAL_FAILURE; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM] MOR Parameter error! Parameter = %x\n", mTcgNvs->MemoryClear.Parameter)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM] MOR Parameter error! Parameter = %x\n", mTcgNvs->MemoryClear.Parameter)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ MemoryClearCallback ( + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + mTcgNvs->MemoryClear.ReturnCode = MOR_REQUEST_GENERAL_FAILURE; +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[TPM] Set MOR variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "[TPM] Set MOR variable failure! Status = %r\n", Status)); + } + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ InitializeTcgSmm ( + EFI_HANDLE SwHandle; + + if (!CompareGuid (PcdGetPtr(PcdTpmInstanceGuid), &gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid)){ +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "No TPM12 instance required!\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "No TPM12 instance required!\n")); + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + +@@ -460,4 +460,3 @@ InitializeTcgSmm ( + + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } +- +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c +index 65a8188d6d..c19f9e7b90 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c +@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ EnrollPlatformKey ( + DataSize = PkCert->SignatureListSize; + Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8**) &PkCert); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); + goto ON_EXIT; + } + +@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ EnrollPlatformKey ( + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + if (Status == EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Enroll PK failed with out of resource.\n")); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Enroll PK failed with out of resource.\n")); + } + goto ON_EXIT; + } +@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ EnrollRsa2048ToKek ( + | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; + Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); + goto ON_EXIT; + } + +@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ EnrollX509ToKek ( + | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; + Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); + goto ON_EXIT; + } + +@@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ EnrollX509toSigDB ( + | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; + Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); + goto ON_EXIT; + } + +@@ -2243,7 +2243,7 @@ EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB ( + | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; + Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); + goto ON_EXIT; + } + +@@ -2700,7 +2700,7 @@ DeleteKeyExchangeKey ( + if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) { + Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); + goto ON_EXIT; + } + } +@@ -2901,7 +2901,7 @@ DeleteSignature ( + if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) { + Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); + goto ON_EXIT; + } + } +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4118-2.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4118-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..464b257 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4118-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ +From 7b5040e857f1a16bed935f7944bda8bc6f6999ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 11/17] SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH + 4117/4118 symbol rename + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [11/13] 45fc2658aaa726b57219789bb1af64f5c4e2cfdc (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21156 +CVE: CVE-2022-36764 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 40adbb7f628dee79156c679fb0857968b61b7620 +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Wed Jan 17 14:47:20 2024 -0800 + + SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename + + Updates the sanitation function names to be lib unique names + + Cc: Jiewen Yao + Cc: Rahul Kumar + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Message-Id: <7b18434c8a8b561654efd40ced3becb8b378c8f1.1705529990.git.doug.edk2@gmail.com> + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 8 +++--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 8 +++--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 8 +++--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 26 +++++++++---------- + 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +index f06926e631..8f8bef1d0b 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + BlockIo->Media->BlockSize, + (UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader + ); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) { ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to read Partition Table Header or invalid Partition Table Header!\n")); + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + // + // Read the partition entry. + // +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; +@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + // + // Prepare Data for Measurement (CcProtocol and Tcg2Protocol) + // +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &TcgEventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &TcgEventSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + FreePool (EntryPtr); +@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + } + + FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath); +- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +index 2a4d52c6d5..809a3bfd89 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo + ) +@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize + ) +@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize +@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize ( + IN UINT32 FilePathSize, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize + ) +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +index 8f72ba4240..8526bc7537 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo + ); +@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize + ); +@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize +@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize ( + IN UINT32 FilePathSize, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize + ); +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +index 820e99aeb9..50a68e1076 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +@@ -84,27 +84,27 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + PrimaryHeader.Header.CRC32 = CalculateCrc32 ((UINT8 *)&PrimaryHeader, PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize); + + // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + // Test that when number of partition entries is 0, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR + // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!"" + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 0; +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; + + // Test that when the header size is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR + // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header Size!" + PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = 0; +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); + PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER); + + // Test that when the SizeOfPartitionEntry is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR + // should print: "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!" + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 1; +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; + +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + // Test that the allocation size is correct compared to the existing logic +@@ -146,19 +146,19 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + // Test that an overflow is detected + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 5; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + // Test the inverse + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + // Test the worst case scenario + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + NumberOfPartition = 13; + + // that the primary event size is correct +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + // Calculate the existing logic event size +@@ -207,12 +207,12 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (EventSize, ExistingLogicEventSize); + + // Tests that the primary event size may not overflow +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + // Test that the size of partition entries may not overflow + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize ( + FilePathSize = 255; + + // Test that a normal PE image passes validation +- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_SUCCESS); + + // Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic +@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize ( + } + + // Test that the event size may not overflow +- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ Status = Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..372ad1f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411.patch @@ -0,0 +1,1066 @@ +From dd30c6c8f2a47b46d514eb413c8c96aedc951297 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:20:52 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 06/17] SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117 + - CVE 2022-36763 + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [6/13] d8e42e23d4215506de05ed540644545a4dd65f44 (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154 +CVE: CVE-2022-36763 +Upstream: Merged +Conflicts: Only cosmetic conflicts. + +commit 224446543206450ddb5830e6abd026d61d3c7f4b +Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] +Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:01 2024 +0800 + + SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763 + + This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib + CVE 2022-36763. + + Cc: Jiewen Yao + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 81 ++--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf | 4 +- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 275 ++++++++++++++++ + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 113 +++++++ + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 303 ++++++++++++++++++ + ...Tpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf | 28 ++ + SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml | 2 + + SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc | 47 +++ + 8 files changed, 815 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +index 7abacdbc0a..476c8d543f 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ Copyright (c) 2013 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + ++Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
++SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + **/ + + #include +@@ -44,6 +46,8 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + #include + #include + ++#include "DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h" ++ + typedef struct { + EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol; + EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol; +@@ -144,10 +148,11 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event; + EFI_CC_EVENT *CcEvent; + EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; +- UINT32 EventSize; ++ UINT32 TcgEventSize; + EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol; + EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol; + EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex; ++ UINT32 AllocSize; + + if (mTcg2MeasureGptCount > 0) { + return EFI_SUCCESS; +@@ -192,25 +197,22 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + BlockIo->Media->BlockSize, + (UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader + ); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to Read Partition Table Header!\n")); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to read Partition Table Header or invalid Partition Table Header!\n")); + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + + // +- // PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry should not be zero ++ // Read the partition entry. + // +- if (PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry == 0) { +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SizeOfPartitionEntry should not be zero!\n")); ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; + } + +- // +- // Read the partition entry. +- // +- EntryPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocatePool (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry); ++ EntryPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocatePool (AllocSize); + if (EntryPtr == NULL) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; +@@ -218,8 +220,8 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + Status = DiskIo->ReadDisk ( + DiskIo, + BlockIo->Media->MediaId, +- MultU64x32(PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize), +- PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry, ++ MultU64x32 (PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize), ++ AllocSize, + EntryPtr + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +@@ -243,23 +245,22 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + // + // Prepare Data for Measurement (CcProtocol and Tcg2Protocol) + // +- EventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions) +- + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry); +- EventPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)); ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &TcgEventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ FreePool (PrimaryHeader); ++ FreePool (EntryPtr); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ EventPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (TcgEventSize); + if (EventPtr == NULL) { + Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + goto Exit; + } + + Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *)EventPtr; +- if (Tcg2Event == NULL) { +- FreePool (PrimaryHeader); +- FreePool (EntryPtr); +- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; +- } +- +- Tcg2Event->Size = EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof(Tcg2Event->Event); +- Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof(EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER); ++ Tcg2Event->Size = TcgEventSize; ++ Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER); + Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderVersion = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION; + Tcg2Event->Header.PCRIndex = 5; + Tcg2Event->Header.EventType = EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT; +@@ -310,7 +311,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + CcProtocol, + 0, + (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)(VOID *)GptData, +- (UINT64)EventSize, ++ (UINT64)TcgEventSize - OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event), + CcEvent + ); + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +@@ -326,7 +327,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + Tcg2Protocol, + 0, + (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)(VOID *)GptData, +- (UINT64)EventSize, ++ (UINT64)TcgEventSize - OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event), + Tcg2Event + ); + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +@@ -442,11 +443,13 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + Tcg2Event->Header.PCRIndex = 2; + break; + default: +- DEBUG (( +- DEBUG_ERROR, +- "Tcg2MeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d", +- ImageType +- )); ++ DEBUG ( ++ ( ++ DEBUG_ERROR, ++ "Tcg2MeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d", ++ ImageType ++ ) ++ ); + goto Finish; + } + +@@ -514,7 +517,7 @@ Finish: + + @param MeasureBootProtocols Pointer to the located measure boot protocol instances. + +- @retval EFI_SUCCESS Sucessfully locate the measure boot protocol instances (at least one instance). ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully locate the measure boot protocol instances (at least one instance). + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Measure boot is not supported. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +@@ -644,12 +647,16 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler ( + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "None of Tcg2Protocol/CcMeasurementProtocol is installed.\n")); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } +- DEBUG (( +- DEBUG_INFO, +- "Tcg2Protocol = %p, CcMeasurementProtocol = %p\n", +- MeasureBootProtocols.Tcg2Protocol, +- MeasureBootProtocols.CcProtocol +- )); ++ ++ DEBUG ( ++ ( ++ DEBUG_INFO, ++ "Tcg2Protocol = %p, CcMeasurementProtocol = %p\n", ++ MeasureBootProtocols.Tcg2Protocol, ++ MeasureBootProtocols.CcProtocol ++ ) ++ ); ++ + // + // Copy File Device Path + // +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf +index 6dca79a20c..28995f438d 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf +@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ + + [Sources] + DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h + + [Packages] + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec +@@ -46,6 +48,7 @@ + + [LibraryClasses] + BaseMemoryLib ++ SafeIntLib + DebugLib + MemoryAllocationLib + DevicePathLib +@@ -65,4 +68,3 @@ + gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES +- +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..e2309655d3 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@ ++/** @file ++ The library instance provides security service of TPM2 measure boot and ++ Confidential Computing (CC) measure boot. ++ ++ Caution: This file requires additional review when modified. ++ This library will have external input - PE/COFF image and GPT partition. ++ This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like ++ buffer overflow, integer overflow. ++ ++ This file will pull out the validation logic from the following functions, in an ++ attempt to validate the untrusted input in the form of unit tests ++ ++ These are those functions: ++ ++ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content ++ read is within the image buffer. ++ ++ Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse ++ partition data carefully. ++ ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h" ++ ++#define GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1 0x00010000 ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is safe to parse ++ However this function will not attempt to verify the validity of the GPT partition ++ It will check the following: ++ - Signature ++ - Revision ++ - AlternateLBA ++ - FirstUsableLBA ++ - LastUsableLBA ++ - PartitionEntryLBA ++ - NumberOfPartitionEntries ++ - SizeOfPartitionEntry ++ - BlockIo ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader ++ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ ++ @param[in] BlockIo ++ Pointer to the EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL structure. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo ++ ) ++{ ++ // ++ // Verify that the input parameters are safe to use ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header!\n")); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if ((BlockIo == NULL) || (BlockIo->Media == NULL)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid BlockIo!\n")); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // The signature must be EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID ("EFI PART" in ASCII) ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader->Header.Signature != EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // The version must be GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1 (0x00010000) ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader->Header.Revision != GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header Revision!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // The HeaderSize must be greater than or equal to 92 and must be less than or equal to the logical block size ++ // ++ if ((PrimaryHeader->Header.HeaderSize < sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER)) || (PrimaryHeader->Header.HeaderSize > BlockIo->Media->BlockSize)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header HeaderSize!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // The partition entries should all be before the first usable block ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader->FirstUsableLBA <= PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "GPT PartitionEntryLBA is not less than FirstUsableLBA!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Check that the PartitionEntryLBA greater than the Max LBA ++ // This will be used later for multiplication ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA > DivU64x32 (MAX_UINT64, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header PartitionEntryLBA!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Check that the number of partition entries is greater than zero ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries == 0) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // SizeOfPartitionEntry must be 128, 256, 512... improper size may lead to accessing uninitialized memory ++ // ++ if ((PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry < 128) || ((PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry & (PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry - 1)) != 0)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // This check is to prevent overflow when calculating the allocation size for the partition entries ++ // This check will be used later for multiplication ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries > DivU64x32 (MAX_UINT64, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - AllocationSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader ++ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ ++ @param[out] AllocationSize ++ Pointer to the allocation size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The allocation size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ The allocation size is invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if (AllocationSize == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry; ++ // ++ Status = SafeUint32Mult (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry, AllocationSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Allocation Size would have overflowed!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the Gpt Event Size calculated from the primary header is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ Important: This function includes the entire length of the allocated space, including ++ (sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)) . When hashing the buffer allocated with this ++ size, the caller must subtract the size of the (sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)) ++ from the size of the buffer before hashing. ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader - Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ @param[in] NumberOfPartition - Number of partitions. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINT32 SafeNumberOfPartitions; ++ ++ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if (EventSize == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // We shouldn't even attempt to perform the multiplication if the number of partitions is greater than the maximum value of UINT32 ++ // ++ Status = SafeUintnToUint32 (NumberOfPartition, &SafeNumberOfPartitions); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NumberOfPartition would have overflowed!\n")); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions) + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry); ++ // ++ Status = SafeUint32Mult (SafeNumberOfPartitions, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry, EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Event Size would have overflowed!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // *EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event); ++ // ++ Status = SafeUint32Add ( ++ OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event) + OFFSET_OF (EFI_GPT_DATA, Partitions), ++ *EventSize, ++ EventSize ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Event Size would have overflowed because of GPTData!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..048b738987 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ ++/** @file ++ This file includes the function prototypes for the sanitization functions. ++ ++ These are those functions: ++ ++ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content ++ read is within the image buffer. ++ ++ Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse ++ partition data carefully. ++ ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ ++**/ ++ ++#ifndef DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_SANITATION_ ++#define DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_SANITATION_ ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is safe to parse ++ However this function will not attempt to verify the validity of the GPT partition ++ It will check the following: ++ - Signature ++ - Revision ++ - AlternateLBA ++ - FirstUsableLBA ++ - LastUsableLBA ++ - PartitionEntryLBA ++ - NumberOfPartitionEntries ++ - SizeOfPartitionEntry ++ - BlockIo ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader ++ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ ++ @param[in] BlockIo ++ Pointer to the EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL structure. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo ++ ); ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - AllocationSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader ++ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ ++ @param[out] AllocationSize ++ Pointer to the allocation size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The allocation size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ The allocation size is invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize ++ ); ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the Gpt Event Size calculated from the primary header is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ Important: This function includes the entire length of the allocated space, including ++ (sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)) . When hashing the buffer allocated with this ++ size, the caller must subtract the size of the (sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)) ++ from the size of the buffer before hashing. ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader - Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ @param[in] NumberOfPartition - Number of partitions. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ); ++ ++#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_SANITATION_ +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..3eb9763e3c +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@ ++/** @file ++ This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c. ++ ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h" ++ ++#define UNIT_TEST_NAME "DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest" ++#define UNIT_TEST_VERSION "1.0" ++ ++#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION 0x00010000 ++#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES 1 ++#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY 128 ++ ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader function. ++ It's intent is to test that a malicious EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER ++ structure will not cause undefined or unexpected behavior. ++ ++ In general the TPM should still be able to measure the data, but ++ be the header should be sanitized to prevent any unexpected behavior. ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; ++ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL BlockIo; ++ EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA BlockMedia; ++ ++ // Generate EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA test data ++ BlockMedia.MediaId = 1; ++ BlockMedia.RemovableMedia = FALSE; ++ BlockMedia.MediaPresent = TRUE; ++ BlockMedia.LogicalPartition = FALSE; ++ BlockMedia.ReadOnly = FALSE; ++ BlockMedia.WriteCaching = FALSE; ++ BlockMedia.BlockSize = 512; ++ BlockMedia.IoAlign = 1; ++ BlockMedia.LastBlock = 0; ++ ++ // Generate EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL test data ++ BlockIo.Revision = 1; ++ BlockIo.Media = &BlockMedia; ++ BlockIo.Reset = NULL; ++ BlockIo.ReadBlocks = NULL; ++ BlockIo.WriteBlocks = NULL; ++ BlockIo.FlushBlocks = NULL; ++ ++ // Geneate EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER test data ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.Signature = EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID; ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.Revision = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION; ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER); ++ PrimaryHeader.MyLBA = 1; ++ PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 2; ++ PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 3; ++ PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 4; ++ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; ++ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryArrayCRC32 = 0; // Purposely invalid ++ ++ // Calculate the CRC32 of the PrimaryHeader ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.CRC32 = CalculateCrc32 ((UINT8 *)&PrimaryHeader, PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize); ++ ++ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation ++ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ // Test that when number of partition entries is 0, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ++ // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!"" ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 0; ++ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; ++ ++ // Test that when the header size is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ++ // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header Size!" ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = 0; ++ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER); ++ ++ // Test that when the SizeOfPartitionEntry is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ++ // should print: "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!" ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 1; ++ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ ++ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++} ++ ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize function. ++ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER ++ structure will not cause an overflow when calculating the allocation size. ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 AllocationSize; ++ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; ++ ++ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; ++ ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ // Test that the allocation size is correct compared to the existing logic ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (AllocationSize, PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry); ++ ++ // Test that an overflow is detected ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 5; ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ // Test the inverse ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ // Test the worst case scenario ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ ++ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++} ++ ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize function. ++ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a EFI_GPT_DATA structure ++ will not cause an overflow when calculating the event size. ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 EventSize; ++ UINT32 ExistingLogicEventSize; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; ++ UINTN NumberOfPartition; ++ EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; ++ EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event; ++ ++ Tcg2Event = NULL; ++ GptData = NULL; ++ ++ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; ++ ++ // set the number of partitions ++ NumberOfPartition = 13; ++ ++ // that the primary event size is correct ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ // Calculate the existing logic event size ++ ExistingLogicEventSize = (UINT32)(OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event) + OFFSET_OF (EFI_GPT_DATA, Partitions) ++ + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry); ++ ++ // Check that the event size is correct ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (EventSize, ExistingLogicEventSize); ++ ++ // Tests that the primary event size may not overflow ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ // Test that the size of partition entries may not overflow ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ ++ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++} ++ ++// *--------------------------------------------------------------------* ++// * Unit Test Code Main Function ++// *--------------------------------------------------------------------* ++ ++/** ++ This function acts as the entry point for the unit tests. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++ @retval others The test failed. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++UefiTestMain ( ++ VOID ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UNIT_TEST_FRAMEWORK_HANDLE Framework; ++ UNIT_TEST_SUITE_HANDLE Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite; ++ ++ Framework = NULL; ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: TestMain() - Start\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME)); ++ ++ Status = InitUnitTestFramework (&Framework, UNIT_TEST_NAME, gEfiCallerBaseName, UNIT_TEST_VERSION); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Failed in InitUnitTestFramework. Status = %r\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME, Status)); ++ goto EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ Status = CreateUnitTestSuite (&Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, Framework, "Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", NULL, NULL); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%s: Failed in CreateUnitTestSuite for Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME)); ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ // -----------Suite---------------------------------Description----------------------------Class----------------------------------Test Function------------------------Pre---Clean-Context ++ AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework); ++ ++EXIT: ++ if (Framework != NULL) { ++ FreeUnitTestFramework (Framework); ++ } ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: TestMain() - End\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME)); ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++/// ++/// Avoid ECC error for function name that starts with lower case letter ++/// ++#define DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibUnitTestMain main ++ ++/** ++ Standard POSIX C entry point for host based unit test execution. ++ ++ @param[in] Argc Number of arguments ++ @param[in] Argv Array of pointers to arguments ++ ++ @retval 0 Success ++ @retval other Error ++**/ ++INT32 ++DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibUnitTestMain ( ++ IN INT32 Argc, ++ IN CHAR8 *Argv[] ++ ) ++{ ++ return (INT32)UefiTestMain (); ++} +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..2999aa2a44 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ ++## @file ++# This file builds the unit tests for DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib ++# ++# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation.
++# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++## ++ ++[Defines] ++ INF_VERSION = 0x00010006 ++ BASE_NAME = DxeTpm2MeasuredBootLibTest ++ FILE_GUID = 144d757f-d423-484e-9309-a23695fad5bd ++ MODULE_TYPE = HOST_APPLICATION ++ VERSION_STRING = 1.0 ++ ENTRY_POINT = main ++ ++[Sources] ++ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c ++ ../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++ ++[Packages] ++ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec ++ ++[LibraryClasses] ++ BaseLib ++ DebugLib ++ UnitTestLib ++ PrintLib ++ SafeIntLib +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml +index d7b9e1f4e2..aa8496d6d9 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml ++++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml +@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ + ## "", "" + ## ] + "ExceptionList": [ ++ "8005", "gRT", ++ "8001", "DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibUnitTestMain", + ], + ## Both file path and directory path are accepted. + "IgnoreFiles": [ +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc b/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..788c1ab6fe +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc +@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ ++## @file ++# SecurityPkg DSC file used to build host-based unit tests. ++# ++# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. ++# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++# ++## ++ ++[Defines] ++ PLATFORM_NAME = SecurityPkgHostTest ++ PLATFORM_GUID = 9D78A9B4-00CD-477E-A5BF-90CC793EEFB0 ++ PLATFORM_VERSION = 0.1 ++ DSC_SPECIFICATION = 0x00010005 ++ OUTPUT_DIRECTORY = Build/SecurityPkg/HostTest ++ SUPPORTED_ARCHITECTURES = IA32|X64 ++ BUILD_TARGETS = NOOPT ++ SKUID_IDENTIFIER = DEFAULT ++ ++!include UnitTestFrameworkPkg/UnitTestFrameworkPkgHost.dsc.inc ++ ++[LibraryClasses] ++ SafeIntLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseSafeIntLib/BaseSafeIntLib.inf ++ ++[Components] ++ SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/UnitTest/MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.inf ++ SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/UnitTest/MockPlatformPKProtectionLib.inf ++ SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/UnitTest/MockUefiLib.inf ++ SecurityPkg/Test/Mock/Library/GoogleTest/MockPlatformPKProtectionLib/MockPlatformPKProtectionLib.inf ++ SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf ++ ++ # ++ # Build SecurityPkg HOST_APPLICATION Tests ++ # ++ SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/UnitTest/SecureBootVariableLibUnitTest.inf { ++ ++ SecureBootVariableLib|SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLib.inf ++ UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib|SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/UnitTest/MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.inf ++ PlatformPKProtectionLib|SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/UnitTest/MockPlatformPKProtectionLib.inf ++ UefiLib|SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/UnitTest/MockUefiLib.inf ++ } ++ SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/GoogleTest/SecureBootVariableLibGoogleTest.inf { ++ ++ SecureBootVariableLib|SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLib.inf ++ UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib|MdePkg/Test/Mock/Library/GoogleTest/MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib/MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.inf ++ PlatformPKProtectionLib|SecurityPkg/Test/Mock/Library/GoogleTest/MockPlatformPKProtectionLib/MockPlatformPKProtectionLib.inf ++ UefiLib|MdePkg/Test/Mock/Library/GoogleTest/MockUefiLib/MockUefiLib.inf ++ } +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-418.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-418.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f01c9a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-418.patch @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ +From 7c3fefb0c857acb9e7e14b150c4c3131e78fbb63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 15:43:10 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 09/17] SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 + - CVE 2022-36764 + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [9/13] c7890fc5c5d7fef2fc1daa931ea2d48f3a76b9e3 (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21156 +CVE: CVE-2022-36764 +Upstream: Merged + +commit c7b27944218130cca3bbb20314ba5b88b5de4aa4 +Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] +Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:04 2024 +0800 + + SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764 + + This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib + CVE 2022-36764. + + Cc: Jiewen Yao + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 15 +++-- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 46 +++++++++++++- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 28 ++++++++- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++--- + 4 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +index 476c8d543f..f06926e631 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +@@ -372,7 +372,6 @@ Exit: + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure image. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED ImageType is unsupported or PE image is mal-format. + @retval other error value +- + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +@@ -399,6 +398,7 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + ImageLoad = NULL; + EventPtr = NULL; ++ Tcg2Event = NULL; + + Tcg2Protocol = MeasureBootProtocols->Tcg2Protocol; + CcProtocol = MeasureBootProtocols->CcProtocol; +@@ -413,19 +413,24 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + +- FilePathSize = (UINT32) GetDevicePathSize (FilePath); ++ FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath); ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ } + + // + // Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy + // +- EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize; +- EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)); ++ // from a malicious GPT disk partition ++ EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize); + if (EventPtr == NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + + Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *)EventPtr; +- Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof(EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER); ++ Tcg2Event->Size = EventSize; ++ Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER); + Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderVersion = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION; + ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *) Tcg2Event->Event; + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +index e2309655d3..2a4d52c6d5 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + } + + /** +- This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane ++ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane + It will check the following: + - AllocationSize does not overflow + +@@ -273,3 +273,47 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UINT32 FilePathSize, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize; ++ Status = SafeUint32Add (OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath), FilePathSize, EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event) ++ Status = SafeUint32Add (*EventSize, OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event), EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +index 048b738987..8f72ba4240 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ + Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse + partition data carefully. + ++ Tcg2MeasurePeImage() function will accept untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its ++ data structure within this image buffer before use. ++ + Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +@@ -110,4 +113,27 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + OUT UINT32 *EventSize + ); + +-#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_SANITATION_ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UINT32 FilePathSize, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ); ++ ++#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_ +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +index 3eb9763e3c..820e99aeb9 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +@@ -72,10 +72,10 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + PrimaryHeader.Header.Revision = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION; + PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER); + PrimaryHeader.MyLBA = 1; +- PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 2; +- PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 3; +- PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 4; +- PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 2; ++ PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 3; ++ PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 4; ++ PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 5; + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; + PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryArrayCRC32 = 0; // Purposely invalid +@@ -187,11 +187,6 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; + UINTN NumberOfPartition; +- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; +- EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event; +- +- Tcg2Event = NULL; +- GptData = NULL; + + // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; +@@ -225,6 +220,52 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; + } + ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizePeImageEventSize function. ++ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a file path when generating a ++ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT structure will not cause an overflow when calculating ++ the event size when allocating space ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 EventSize; ++ UINTN ExistingLogicEventSize; ++ UINT32 FilePathSize; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ FilePathSize = 255; ++ ++ // Test that a normal PE image passes validation ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_SUCCESS); ++ ++ // Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic ++ ExistingLogicEventSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath) + FilePathSize; ++ ExistingLogicEventSize += OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event); ++ ++ if (EventSize != ExistingLogicEventSize) { ++ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize returned an incorrect event size. Expected %u, got %u\n", ExistingLogicEventSize, EventSize); ++ return UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED; ++ } ++ ++ // Test that the event size may not overflow ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ ++ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++} ++ + // *--------------------------------------------------------------------* + // * Unit Test Code Main Function + // *--------------------------------------------------------------------* +@@ -267,6 +308,7 @@ UefiTestMain ( + AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL); + AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); + AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests PE Image and FileSize checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePeImageEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); + + Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework); + +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4117-2.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4117-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9629c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4117-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,279 @@ +From ac25c501c8d97c7520a7c75ae708fb4c43bae035 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 12/17] SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH + 4117/4118 symbol rename + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [12/13] 6ef41050fb68f984a5ae6104ccc102afb5290f9f (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21156 +CVE: CVE-2022-36764 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 326db0c9072004dea89427ea3a44393a84966f2b +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Wed Jan 17 14:47:21 2024 -0800 + + SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename + + Updates the sanitation function names to be lib unique names + + Cc: Jiewen Yao + Cc: Rahul Kumar + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Message-Id: <355aa846a99ca6ac0f7574cf5982661da0d9fea6.1705529990.git.doug.edk2@gmail.com> + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 8 +++--- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 10 +++---- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 8 +++--- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 26 +++++++++---------- + 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +index 1598015176..c39018d7e4 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable ( + BlockIo->Media->BlockSize, + (UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader + ); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) { ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to read Partition Table Header or invalid Partition Table Header!\n")); + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable ( + // + // Read the partition entry. + // +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; +@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable ( + // + // Prepare Data for Measurement + // +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); + TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *)AllocateZeroPool (EventSize); + if (TcgEvent == NULL) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); +@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage ( + + // Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy + // +- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c +index bcf8c6de6f..7f17af56cd 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /** @file +- The library instance provides security service of TPM2 measure boot and ++ The library instance provides security service of TPM measure boot and + Confidential Computing (CC) measure boot. + + Caution: This file requires additional review when modified. +@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo + ) +@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize + ) +@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize +@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize ( + IN UINT32 FilePathSize, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize + ) +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h +index 2248495813..db6e9c3752 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h +@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo + ); +@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize + ); +@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, + IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize +@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + One of the passed parameters was invalid. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +-SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize ( + IN UINT32 FilePathSize, + OUT UINT32 *EventSize + ); +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +index c41498be45..de1740af41 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +@@ -83,27 +83,27 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + PrimaryHeader.Header.CRC32 = CalculateCrc32 ((UINT8 *)&PrimaryHeader, PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize); + + // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + // Test that when number of partition entries is 0, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR + // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!"" + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 0; +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; + + // Test that when the header size is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR + // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header Size!" + PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = 0; +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); + PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER); + + // Test that when the SizeOfPartitionEntry is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR + // should print: "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!" + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 1; +- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; + +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + // Test that the allocation size is correct compared to the existing logic +@@ -145,19 +145,19 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( + // Test that an overflow is detected + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 5; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + // Test the inverse + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + // Test the worst case scenario + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + NumberOfPartition = 13; + + // that the primary event size is correct +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + // Calculate the existing logic event size +@@ -206,12 +206,12 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (EventSize, ExistingLogicEventSize); + + // Tests that the primary event size may not overflow +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + // Test that the size of partition entries may not overflow + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; +- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); + UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); +@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize ( + FilePathSize = 255; + + // Test that a normal PE image passes validation +- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize failed with %r\n", Status); + goto Exit; +@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize ( + } + + // Test that the event size may not overflow +- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ Status = TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); + if (Status != EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE) { + UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize succeded when it was supposed to fail with %r\n", Status); + goto Exit; +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4117.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4117.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..499abda --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4117.patch @@ -0,0 +1,960 @@ +From cb36d95002013ae8d4e5120383cd756a2a6c4124 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:20:52 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 07/17] SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117 + - CVE 2022-36763 + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [7/13] f5a5d2b0a33dc1efdb83e501eda2716df0e904a0 (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154 +CVE: CVE-2022-36763 +Upstream: Merged +Conflicts: We get function definiton clash for the following three functions: + - SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader() + - SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize() + - SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize() + Those are are defined both in + - SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitazion.c + and + - SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitazion.c + Closer investigation reveals that they are identical in functionality (although + not in comment style). + I chose to leave them as is now, meaning that this package will be + unbuildable until I add a commit renaming these symbols later in + this series. + +commit 4776a1b39ee08fc45c70c1eab5a0195f325000d3 +Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] +Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:02 2024 +0800 + + SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763 + + This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpmMeasureBootLib + CVE 2022-36763. + + Cc: Jiewen Yao + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 74 +++-- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf | 4 +- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 242 ++++++++++++++ + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 114 +++++++ + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 301 ++++++++++++++++++ + ...eTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf | 28 ++ + SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml | 1 + + SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc | 1 + + 8 files changed, 734 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +index 27c0ea48ca..d44422dee8 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ + Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + ++Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
++SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + **/ + + #include +@@ -40,6 +42,8 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + #include + #include + ++#include "DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h" ++ + // + // Flag to check GPT partition. It only need be measured once. + // +@@ -123,19 +127,22 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable ( + IN EFI_HANDLE GptHandle + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo; +- EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *DiskIo; +- EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader; +- EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *PartitionEntry; +- UINT8 *EntryPtr; +- UINTN NumberOfPartition; +- UINT32 Index; +- TCG_PCR_EVENT *TcgEvent; +- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; +- UINT32 EventSize; +- UINT32 EventNumber; +- EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo; ++ EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *DiskIo; ++ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader; ++ EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *PartitionEntry; ++ UINT8 *EntryPtr; ++ UINTN NumberOfPartition; ++ UINT32 Index; ++ TCG_PCR_EVENT *TcgEvent; ++ EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; ++ UINT32 EventSize; ++ UINT32 EventNumber; ++ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry; ++ UINT32 AllocSize; ++ ++ GptData = NULL; + + if (mMeasureGptCount > 0) { + return EFI_SUCCESS; +@@ -163,15 +170,21 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable ( + BlockIo->Media->BlockSize, + (UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader + ); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to Read Partition Table Header!\n")); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to read Partition Table Header or invalid Partition Table Header!\n")); + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + // + // Read the partition entry. + // +- EntryPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocatePool (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry); ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ FreePool (PrimaryHeader); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ EntryPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocatePool (AllocSize); + if (EntryPtr == NULL) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; +@@ -179,8 +192,8 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable ( + Status = DiskIo->ReadDisk ( + DiskIo, + BlockIo->Media->MediaId, +- MultU64x32(PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize), +- PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry, ++ MultU64x32 (PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize), ++ AllocSize, + EntryPtr + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +@@ -204,19 +217,18 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable ( + // + // Prepare Data for Measurement + // +- EventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions) +- + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry); +- TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *) AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR)); ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *)AllocateZeroPool (EventSize); + if (TcgEvent == NULL) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + FreePool (EntryPtr); + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + +- TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 5; +- TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT; +- TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize; +- GptData = (EFI_GPT_DATA *) TcgEvent->Event; ++ TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 5; ++ TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT; ++ TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize - sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR); ++ GptData = (EFI_GPT_DATA *)TcgEvent->Event; + + // + // Copy the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER and NumberOfPartition +@@ -354,11 +366,13 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage ( + TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 2; + break; + default: +- DEBUG (( +- DEBUG_ERROR, +- "TcgMeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d", +- ImageType +- )); ++ DEBUG ( ++ ( ++ DEBUG_ERROR, ++ "TcgMeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d", ++ ImageType ++ ) ++ ); + goto Finish; + } + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf +index ebab6f7c1e..414c654d15 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf +@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ + + [Sources] + DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c ++ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h + + [Packages] + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec +@@ -41,6 +43,7 @@ + + [LibraryClasses] + BaseMemoryLib ++ SafeIntLib + DebugLib + MemoryAllocationLib + DevicePathLib +@@ -59,4 +62,3 @@ + gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES +- +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..37cd3ed0ea +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c +@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ ++/** @file ++ The library instance provides security service of TPM2 measure boot and ++ Confidential Computing (CC) measure boot. ++ ++ Caution: This file requires additional review when modified. ++ This library will have external input - PE/COFF image and GPT partition. ++ This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like ++ buffer overflow, integer overflow. ++ ++ This file will pull out the validation logic from the following functions, in an ++ attempt to validate the untrusted input in the form of unit tests ++ ++ These are those functions: ++ ++ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content ++ read is within the image buffer. ++ ++ Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse ++ partition data carefully. ++ ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h" ++ ++#define GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1 0x00010000 ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is safe to parse ++ However this function will not attempt to verify the validity of the GPT partition ++ It will check the following: ++ - Signature ++ - Revision ++ - AlternateLBA ++ - FirstUsableLBA ++ - LastUsableLBA ++ - PartitionEntryLBA ++ - NumberOfPartitionEntries ++ - SizeOfPartitionEntry ++ - BlockIo ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader ++ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ ++ @param[in] BlockIo ++ Pointer to the EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL structure. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo ++ ) ++{ ++ // Verify that the input parameters are safe to use ++ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header!\n")); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if ((BlockIo == NULL) || (BlockIo->Media == NULL)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid BlockIo!\n")); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // The signature must be EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID ("EFI PART" in ASCII) ++ if (PrimaryHeader->Header.Signature != EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // The version must be GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1 (0x00010000) ++ if (PrimaryHeader->Header.Revision != GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header Revision!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // The HeaderSize must be greater than or equal to 92 and must be less than or equal to the logical block size ++ if ((PrimaryHeader->Header.HeaderSize < sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER)) || (PrimaryHeader->Header.HeaderSize > BlockIo->Media->BlockSize)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header HeaderSize!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // check that the PartitionEntryLBA greater than the Max LBA ++ // This will be used later for multiplication ++ if (PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA > DivU64x32 (MAX_UINT64, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header PartitionEntryLBA!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // Check that the number of partition entries is greater than zero ++ if (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries == 0) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // SizeOfPartitionEntry must be 128, 256, 512... improper size may lead to accessing uninitialized memory ++ if ((PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry < 128) || ((PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry & (PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry - 1)) != 0)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // This check is to prevent overflow when calculating the allocation size for the partition entries ++ // This check will be used later for multiplication ++ if (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries > DivU64x32 (MAX_UINT64, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - AllocationSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader ++ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ ++ @param[out] AllocationSize ++ Pointer to the allocation size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The allocation size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ The allocation size is invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if (AllocationSize == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry; ++ Status = SafeUint32Mult (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry, AllocationSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Allocation Size would have overflowed!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the Gpt Event Size calculated from the primary header is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ Important: This function includes the entire length of the allocated space, including the ++ TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR. When hashing the buffer allocated with this size, the caller must subtract ++ the size of the TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR from the size of the buffer before hashing. ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader - Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ @param[in] NumberOfPartition - Number of partitions. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINT32 SafeNumberOfPartitions; ++ ++ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if (EventSize == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // We shouldn't even attempt to perform the multiplication if the number of partitions is greater than the maximum value of UINT32 ++ Status = SafeUintnToUint32 (NumberOfPartition, &SafeNumberOfPartitions); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NumberOfPartition would have overflowed!\n")); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions) + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR)); ++ Status = SafeUint32Mult (SafeNumberOfPartitions, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry, EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Event Size would have overflowed!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ Status = SafeUint32Add ( ++ sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR) + ++ OFFSET_OF (EFI_GPT_DATA, Partitions), ++ *EventSize, ++ EventSize ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Event Size would have overflowed because of GPTData!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..0d9d00c281 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h +@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ ++/** @file ++ This file includes the function prototypes for the sanitization functions. ++ ++ These are those functions: ++ ++ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content ++ read is within the image buffer. ++ ++ TcgMeasurePeImage() function will accept untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its ++ data structure within this image buffer before use. ++ ++ TcgMeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse ++ partition data carefully. ++ ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ ++**/ ++ ++#ifndef DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_ ++#define DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_ ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is safe to parse ++ However this function will not attempt to verify the validity of the GPT partition ++ It will check the following: ++ - Signature ++ - Revision ++ - AlternateLBA ++ - FirstUsableLBA ++ - LastUsableLBA ++ - PartitionEntryLBA ++ - NumberOfPartitionEntries ++ - SizeOfPartitionEntry ++ - BlockIo ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader ++ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ ++ @param[in] BlockIo ++ Pointer to the EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL structure. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo ++ ); ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - AllocationSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader ++ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ ++ @param[out] AllocationSize ++ Pointer to the allocation size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The allocation size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ The allocation size is invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize ++ ); ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the Gpt Event Size calculated from the primary header is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ Important: This function includes the entire length of the allocated space, including the ++ TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR. When hashing the buffer allocated with this size, the caller must subtract ++ the size of the TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR from the size of the buffer before hashing. ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader - Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ @param[in] NumberOfPartition - Number of partitions. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ); ++ ++#endif // DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_ +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..eeb928cdb0 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@ ++/** @file ++This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c. ++ ++Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
++SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h" ++ ++#define UNIT_TEST_NAME "DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest" ++#define UNIT_TEST_VERSION "1.0" ++ ++#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION 0x00010000 ++#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES 1 ++#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY 128 ++ ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader function. ++ It's intent is to test that a malicious EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER ++ structure will not cause undefined or unexpected behavior. ++ ++ In general the TPM should still be able to measure the data, but ++ be the header should be sanitized to prevent any unexpected behavior. ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; ++ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL BlockIo; ++ EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA BlockMedia; ++ ++ // Generate EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA test data ++ BlockMedia.MediaId = 1; ++ BlockMedia.RemovableMedia = FALSE; ++ BlockMedia.MediaPresent = TRUE; ++ BlockMedia.LogicalPartition = FALSE; ++ BlockMedia.ReadOnly = FALSE; ++ BlockMedia.WriteCaching = FALSE; ++ BlockMedia.BlockSize = 512; ++ BlockMedia.IoAlign = 1; ++ BlockMedia.LastBlock = 0; ++ ++ // Generate EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL test data ++ BlockIo.Revision = 1; ++ BlockIo.Media = &BlockMedia; ++ BlockIo.Reset = NULL; ++ BlockIo.ReadBlocks = NULL; ++ BlockIo.WriteBlocks = NULL; ++ BlockIo.FlushBlocks = NULL; ++ ++ // Geneate EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER test data ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.Signature = EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID; ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.Revision = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION; ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER); ++ PrimaryHeader.MyLBA = 1; ++ PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 2; ++ PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 3; ++ PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 4; ++ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; ++ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryArrayCRC32 = 0; // Purposely invalid ++ ++ // Calculate the CRC32 of the PrimaryHeader ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.CRC32 = CalculateCrc32 ((UINT8 *)&PrimaryHeader, PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize); ++ ++ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation ++ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ // Test that when number of partition entries is 0, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ++ // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!"" ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 0; ++ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; ++ ++ // Test that when the header size is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ++ // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header Size!" ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = 0; ++ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER); ++ ++ // Test that when the SizeOfPartitionEntry is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ++ // should print: "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!" ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 1; ++ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ ++ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++} ++ ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize function. ++ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER ++ structure will not cause an overflow when calculating the allocation size. ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 AllocationSize; ++ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; ++ ++ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; ++ ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ // Test that the allocation size is correct compared to the existing logic ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (AllocationSize, PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry); ++ ++ // Test that an overflow is detected ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 5; ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ // Test the inverse ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ // Test the worst case scenario ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ ++ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++} ++ ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize function. ++ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a EFI_GPT_DATA structure ++ will not cause an overflow when calculating the event size. ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 EventSize; ++ UINT32 ExistingLogicEventSize; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; ++ UINTN NumberOfPartition; ++ EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; ++ ++ GptData = NULL; ++ ++ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; ++ ++ // set the number of partitions ++ NumberOfPartition = 13; ++ ++ // that the primary event size is correct ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ // Calculate the existing logic event size ++ ExistingLogicEventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR) + OFFSET_OF (EFI_GPT_DATA, Partitions) ++ + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry); ++ ++ // Check that the event size is correct ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (EventSize, ExistingLogicEventSize); ++ ++ // Tests that the primary event size may not overflow ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ // Test that the size of partition entries may not overflow ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ ++ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++} ++ ++// *--------------------------------------------------------------------* ++// * Unit Test Code Main Function ++// *--------------------------------------------------------------------* ++ ++/** ++ This function acts as the entry point for the unit tests. ++ ++ @param argc - The number of command line arguments ++ @param argv - The command line arguments ++ ++ @return int - The status of the test ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++UefiTestMain ( ++ VOID ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UNIT_TEST_FRAMEWORK_HANDLE Framework; ++ UNIT_TEST_SUITE_HANDLE TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite; ++ ++ Framework = NULL; ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: TestMain() - Start\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME)); ++ ++ Status = InitUnitTestFramework (&Framework, UNIT_TEST_NAME, gEfiCallerBaseName, UNIT_TEST_VERSION); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Failed in InitUnitTestFramework. Status = %r\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME, Status)); ++ goto EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ Status = CreateUnitTestSuite (&TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, Framework, "TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", NULL, NULL); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%s: Failed in CreateUnitTestSuite for TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME)); ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ // -----------Suite---------------------------------Description----------------------------Class----------------------------------Test Function------------------------Pre---Clean-Context ++ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework); ++ ++EXIT: ++ if (Framework != NULL) { ++ FreeUnitTestFramework (Framework); ++ } ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: TestMain() - End\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME)); ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++/// ++/// Avoid ECC error for function name that starts with lower case letter ++/// ++#define DxeTpmMeasureBootLibUnitTestMain main ++ ++/** ++ Standard POSIX C entry point for host based unit test execution. ++ ++ @param[in] Argc Number of arguments ++ @param[in] Argv Array of pointers to arguments ++ ++ @retval 0 Success ++ @retval other Error ++**/ ++INT32 ++DxeTpmMeasureBootLibUnitTestMain ( ++ IN INT32 Argc, ++ IN CHAR8 *Argv[] ++ ) ++{ ++ return (INT32)UefiTestMain (); ++} +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..47b0811b00 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ ++## @file ++# This file builds the unit tests for DxeTpmMeasureBootLib ++# ++# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation.
++# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++## ++ ++[Defines] ++ INF_VERSION = 0x00010006 ++ BASE_NAME = DxeTpmMeasuredBootLibTest ++ FILE_GUID = eb01bc38-309c-4d3e-967e-9f078c90772f ++ MODULE_TYPE = HOST_APPLICATION ++ VERSION_STRING = 1.0 ++ ENTRY_POINT = main ++ ++[Sources] ++ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c ++ ../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++ ++[Packages] ++ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec ++ ++[LibraryClasses] ++ BaseLib ++ DebugLib ++ UnitTestLib ++ PrintLib ++ SafeIntLib +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml +index aa8496d6d9..26865cb15a 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml ++++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml +@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ + "ExceptionList": [ + "8005", "gRT", + "8001", "DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibUnitTestMain", ++ "8001", "DxeTpmMeasureBootLibUnitTestMain" + ], + ## Both file path and directory path are accepted. + "IgnoreFiles": [ +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc b/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc +index 788c1ab6fe..1655e573ea 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc +@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ + SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/UnitTest/MockUefiLib.inf + SecurityPkg/Test/Mock/Library/GoogleTest/MockPlatformPKProtectionLib/MockPlatformPKProtectionLib.inf + SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf ++ SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf + + # + # Build SecurityPkg HOST_APPLICATION Tests +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8586c39 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch @@ -0,0 +1,307 @@ +From f6f72373630d901f331df719a0fb55e8f1143c4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 15:43:10 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 10/17] SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 + - CVE 2022-36764 + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [10/13] 5ed702e16f390c79d1abb0ec0b04d886e0094c0b (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21156 +CVE: CVE-2022-36764 +Upstream: Merged +Conflicts: We get function definiton clash for the following three functions: + - SanitizePeImageEventSize() + This is defined both in + - SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitazion.c + and + - SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitazion.c + Closer investigation reveals that they are identical in functionality (although + not in comment style). + I chose to leave them as is now, meaning that this package will be + unbuildable until I add a commit renaming these symbols later in + this series. + +commit 0d341c01eeabe0ab5e76693b36e728b8f538a40e +Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] +Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:05 2024 +0800 + + SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764 + + This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpmMeasureBootLib + CVE 2022-36764. + + Cc: Jiewen Yao + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 17 ++-- + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 44 +++++++++ + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 23 +++++ + .../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++-- + 4 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +index d44422dee8..1598015176 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c +@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ + + Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
+ + Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +@@ -338,19 +339,23 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage ( + ImageLoad = NULL; + SectionHeader = NULL; + Sha1Ctx = NULL; +- FilePathSize = (UINT32) GetDevicePathSize (FilePath); ++ TcgEvent = NULL; ++ FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath); + +- // + // Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy + // +- EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize; +- TcgEvent = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT)); ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ } ++ ++ TcgEvent = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize); + if (TcgEvent == NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + +- TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize; +- ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *) TcgEvent->Event; ++ TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize - sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR); ++ ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *)TcgEvent->Event; + + switch (ImageType) { + case EFI_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION: +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c +index 37cd3ed0ea..bcf8c6de6f 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c +@@ -240,3 +240,47 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + ++/** ++ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UINT32 FilePathSize, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize; ++ Status = SafeUint32Add (OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath), FilePathSize, EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR) ++ Status = SafeUint32Add (*EventSize, sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR), EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h +index 0d9d00c281..2248495813 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h +@@ -111,4 +111,27 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + OUT UINT32 *EventSize + ); + ++/** ++ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UINT32 FilePathSize, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ); ++ + #endif // DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_ +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +index eeb928cdb0..c41498be45 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ + /** @file +-This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c. ++ This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c. + +-Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
+-SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + **/ + + #include +@@ -186,9 +186,6 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; + UINTN NumberOfPartition; +- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; +- +- GptData = NULL; + + // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; +@@ -222,6 +219,94 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; + } + ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizePeImageEventSize function. ++ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a file path for an ++ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT structure will not cause an overflow when calculating ++ the event size when allocating space. ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 EventSize; ++ UINTN ExistingLogicEventSize; ++ UINT32 FilePathSize; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL DevicePath; ++ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoadEvent; ++ UNIT_TEST_STATUS TestStatus; ++ ++ TestStatus = UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED; ++ ++ // Generate EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL test data ++ DevicePath.Type = 0; ++ DevicePath.SubType = 0; ++ DevicePath.Length[0] = 0; ++ DevicePath.Length[1] = 0; ++ ++ // Generate EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT test data ++ ImageLoadEvent = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT) + sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL)); ++ if (ImageLoadEvent == NULL) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: AllocateZeroPool failed\n", __func__)); ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ ++ // Populate EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT54 test data ++ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLocationInMemory = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)0x12345678; ++ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLengthInMemory = 0x1000; ++ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLinkTimeAddress = (UINTN)ImageLoadEvent; ++ ImageLoadEvent->LengthOfDevicePath = sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL); ++ CopyMem (ImageLoadEvent->DevicePath, &DevicePath, sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL)); ++ ++ FilePathSize = 255; ++ ++ // Test that a normal PE image passes validation ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize failed with %r\n", Status); ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ ++ // Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic ++ ExistingLogicEventSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath) + FilePathSize; ++ ExistingLogicEventSize += sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR); ++ ++ if (EventSize != ExistingLogicEventSize) { ++ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize returned an incorrect event size. Expected %u, got %u\n", ExistingLogicEventSize, EventSize); ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ ++ // Test that the event size may not overflow ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ if (Status != EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE) { ++ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize succeded when it was supposed to fail with %r\n", Status); ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ ++ TestStatus = UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++Exit: ++ ++ if (ImageLoadEvent != NULL) { ++ FreePool (ImageLoadEvent); ++ } ++ ++ if (TestStatus == UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Test failed\n", __func__)); ++ } else { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ } ++ ++ return TestStatus; ++} ++ + // *--------------------------------------------------------------------* + // * Unit Test Code Main Function + // *--------------------------------------------------------------------* +@@ -265,6 +350,7 @@ UefiTestMain ( + AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL); + AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); + AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests PE Image and FileSize checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePeImageEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); + + Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework); + +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpm2.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpm2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2ee9f81 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpm2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,584 @@ +From e138f66708415704ad1133938c0dce5243795656 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 04/17] SecurityPkg: Support CcMeasurementProtocol in + DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [4/13] 8038fb605dbdaccfd40cb9d9d56db559ee9df639 (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154 +CVE: CVE-2022-36763 +Upstream: Merged +Conflicts: Only cosmetic, due to the uncrustify changes made + in the newer version. + +commit a124cd4ef92a349a6c823ea6701fcfd3a17db255 +Author: Min Xu +Date: Sat Dec 11 21:08:41 2021 +0800 + + SecurityPkg: Support CcMeasurementProtocol in DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib + + BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3625 + + DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib supports TPM2 based measure boot. After + CcMeasurementProtocol is introduced, CC based measure boot needs to + be supported in DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib as well. + + There are 2 major changes in this commit. + + 1. A platform should have only one RTS/RTR. Only one of (virtual)TPM1.2, + (virtual)TPM2.0 and CC MR exists. Then only one TCG_SERVICE_PROTOCOL, + TCG2_PROTOCOL, CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL is exposed. In this library when + do measure boot only one of TCG2_PROTOCOL / CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL + will be called. MEASURE_BOOT_PROTOCOLS is defined to store the instances + of TCG2 protocol and CC Measurement protocol. + + 2. CcEvent is similar to Tcg2Event except the MrIndex and PcrIndex. + So in the code Tcg2Event will be first created and intialized. If + CcMeasurementProtocol is called to do the measure boot, then CcEvent + points to Tcg2Event and the MrIndex is adjusted. + + Cc: Michael D Kinney + Cc: Liming Gao + Cc: Zhiguang Liu + Cc: Jiewen Yao + Cc: Jian J Wang + Cc: Sami Mujawar + Cc: Gerd Hoffmann + Reviewed-by: Sami Mujawar + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + Signed-off-by: Min Xu + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 347 ++++++++++++++---- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf | 3 +- + 2 files changed, 271 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +index 95682ac567..7abacdbc0a 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ + /** @file +- The library instance provides security service of TPM2 measure boot. ++ The library instance provides security service of TPM2 measure boot and ++ Confidential Computing (CC) measure boot. + + Caution: This file requires additional review when modified. + This library will have external input - PE/COFF image and GPT partition. +@@ -41,6 +42,12 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + #include + #include + #include ++#include ++ ++typedef struct { ++ EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol; ++ EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol; ++} MEASURE_BOOT_PROTOCOLS; + + // + // Flag to check GPT partition. It only need be measured once. +@@ -109,7 +116,7 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibImageRead ( + Caution: This function may receive untrusted input. + The GPT partition table is external input, so this function should parse partition data carefully. + +- @param Tcg2Protocol Pointer to the located TCG2 protocol instance. ++ @param MeasureBootProtocols Pointer to the located MeasureBoot protocol instances (i.e. TCG2/CC protocol). + @param GptHandle Handle that GPT partition was installed. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully measure GPT table. +@@ -121,26 +128,48 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibImageRead ( + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( +- IN EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol, +- IN EFI_HANDLE GptHandle ++ IN MEASURE_BOOT_PROTOCOLS *MeasureBootProtocols, ++ IN EFI_HANDLE GptHandle + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo; +- EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *DiskIo; +- EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader; +- EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *PartitionEntry; +- UINT8 *EntryPtr; +- UINTN NumberOfPartition; +- UINT32 Index; +- EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event; +- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; +- UINT32 EventSize; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo; ++ EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *DiskIo; ++ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader; ++ EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *PartitionEntry; ++ UINT8 *EntryPtr; ++ UINTN NumberOfPartition; ++ UINT32 Index; ++ UINT8 *EventPtr; ++ EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event; ++ EFI_CC_EVENT *CcEvent; ++ EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; ++ UINT32 EventSize; ++ EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol; ++ EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol; ++ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex; + + if (mTcg2MeasureGptCount > 0) { + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + ++ PrimaryHeader = NULL; ++ EntryPtr = NULL; ++ EventPtr = NULL; ++ ++ Tcg2Protocol = MeasureBootProtocols->Tcg2Protocol; ++ CcProtocol = MeasureBootProtocols->CcProtocol; ++ ++ if ((Tcg2Protocol == NULL) && (CcProtocol == NULL)) { ++ ASSERT (FALSE); ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ } ++ ++ if (sizeof (EFI_CC_EVENT) != sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT)) { ++ ASSERT (FALSE); ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ } ++ + Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (GptHandle, &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid, (VOID**)&BlockIo); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; +@@ -168,6 +197,16 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } ++ ++ // ++ // PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry should not be zero ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry == 0) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SizeOfPartitionEntry should not be zero!\n")); ++ FreePool (PrimaryHeader); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ + // + // Read the partition entry. + // +@@ -202,11 +241,17 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + } + + // +- // Prepare Data for Measurement ++ // Prepare Data for Measurement (CcProtocol and Tcg2Protocol) + // + EventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions) + + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry); +- Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *) AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof(Tcg2Event->Event)); ++ EventPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)); ++ if (EventPtr == NULL) { ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ ++ Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *)EventPtr; + if (Tcg2Event == NULL) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + FreePool (EntryPtr); +@@ -243,22 +288,66 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + } + + // +- // Measure the GPT data ++ // Only one of TCG2_PROTOCOL or CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL is exposed. ++ // So Measure the GPT data with one of the protocol. + // +- Status = Tcg2Protocol->HashLogExtendEvent ( +- Tcg2Protocol, +- 0, +- (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) (VOID *) GptData, +- (UINT64) EventSize, +- Tcg2Event +- ); +- if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- mTcg2MeasureGptCount++; ++ if (CcProtocol != NULL) { ++ // ++ // EFI_CC_EVENT share the same data structure with EFI_TCG2_EVENT ++ // except the MrIndex and PCRIndex in Header. ++ // Tcg2Event has been created and initialized before. So only the MrIndex need ++ // be adjusted. ++ // ++ Status = CcProtocol->MapPcrToMrIndex (CcProtocol, Tcg2Event->Header.PCRIndex, &MrIndex); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot map PcrIndex(%d) to MrIndex\n", Tcg2Event->Header.PCRIndex)); ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ ++ CcEvent = (EFI_CC_EVENT *)EventPtr; ++ CcEvent->Header.MrIndex = MrIndex; ++ Status = CcProtocol->HashLogExtendEvent ( ++ CcProtocol, ++ 0, ++ (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)(VOID *)GptData, ++ (UINT64)EventSize, ++ CcEvent ++ ); ++ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ mTcg2MeasureGptCount++; ++ } ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Cc MeasureGptTable - %r\n", Status)); ++ } else if (Tcg2Protocol != NULL) { ++ // ++ // If Tcg2Protocol is installed, then Measure GPT data with this protocol. ++ // ++ Status = Tcg2Protocol->HashLogExtendEvent ( ++ Tcg2Protocol, ++ 0, ++ (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)(VOID *)GptData, ++ (UINT64)EventSize, ++ Tcg2Event ++ ); ++ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ mTcg2MeasureGptCount++; ++ } ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2 MeasureGptTable - %r\n", Status)); + } + +- FreePool (PrimaryHeader); +- FreePool (EntryPtr); +- FreePool (Tcg2Event); ++Exit: ++ if (PrimaryHeader != NULL) { ++ FreePool (PrimaryHeader); ++ } ++ ++ if (EntryPtr != NULL) { ++ FreePool (EntryPtr); ++ } ++ ++ if (EventPtr != NULL) { ++ FreePool (EventPtr); ++ } + + return Status; + } +@@ -271,12 +360,12 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure + within this image buffer before use. + +- @param[in] Tcg2Protocol Pointer to the located TCG2 protocol instance. +- @param[in] ImageAddress Start address of image buffer. +- @param[in] ImageSize Image size +- @param[in] LinkTimeBase Address that the image is loaded into memory. +- @param[in] ImageType Image subsystem type. +- @param[in] FilePath File path is corresponding to the input image. ++ @param[in] MeasureBootProtocols Pointer to the located MeasureBoot protocol instances. ++ @param[in] ImageAddress Start address of image buffer. ++ @param[in] ImageSize Image size ++ @param[in] LinkTimeBase Address that the image is loaded into memory. ++ @param[in] ImageType Image subsystem type. ++ @param[in] FilePath File path is corresponding to the input image. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully measure image. + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure image. +@@ -287,7 +376,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( +- IN EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol, ++ IN MEASURE_BOOT_PROTOCOLS *MeasureBootProtocols, + IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS ImageAddress, + IN UINTN ImageSize, + IN UINTN LinkTimeBase, +@@ -295,26 +384,46 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + IN EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *FilePath + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event; +- EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoad; +- UINT32 FilePathSize; +- UINT32 EventSize; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event; ++ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoad; ++ UINT32 FilePathSize; ++ UINT32 EventSize; ++ EFI_CC_EVENT *CcEvent; ++ EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol; ++ EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol; ++ UINT8 *EventPtr; ++ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex; ++ ++ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ ImageLoad = NULL; ++ EventPtr = NULL; ++ ++ Tcg2Protocol = MeasureBootProtocols->Tcg2Protocol; ++ CcProtocol = MeasureBootProtocols->CcProtocol; ++ ++ if ((Tcg2Protocol == NULL) && (CcProtocol == NULL)) { ++ ASSERT (FALSE); ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ } ++ ++ if (sizeof (EFI_CC_EVENT) != sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT)) { ++ ASSERT (FALSE); ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ } + +- Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; +- ImageLoad = NULL; + FilePathSize = (UINT32) GetDevicePathSize (FilePath); + + // + // Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy + // + EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize; +- Tcg2Event = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof(Tcg2Event->Event)); +- if (Tcg2Event == NULL) { ++ EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)); ++ if (EventPtr == NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + +- Tcg2Event->Size = EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof(Tcg2Event->Event); ++ Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *)EventPtr; + Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof(EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER); + Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderVersion = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION; + ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *) Tcg2Event->Event; +@@ -352,13 +461,35 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + // + // Log the PE data + // +- Status = Tcg2Protocol->HashLogExtendEvent ( +- Tcg2Protocol, +- PE_COFF_IMAGE, +- ImageAddress, +- ImageSize, +- Tcg2Event +- ); ++ if (CcProtocol != NULL) { ++ Status = CcProtocol->MapPcrToMrIndex (CcProtocol, Tcg2Event->Header.PCRIndex, &MrIndex); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot map PcrIndex(%d) to MrIndex\n", Tcg2Event->Header.PCRIndex)); ++ goto Finish; ++ } ++ ++ CcEvent = (EFI_CC_EVENT *)EventPtr; ++ CcEvent->Header.MrIndex = MrIndex; ++ ++ Status = CcProtocol->HashLogExtendEvent ( ++ CcProtocol, ++ PE_COFF_IMAGE, ++ ImageAddress, ++ ImageSize, ++ CcEvent ++ ); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Cc MeasurePeImage - %r\n", Status)); ++ } else if (Tcg2Protocol != NULL) { ++ Status = Tcg2Protocol->HashLogExtendEvent ( ++ Tcg2Protocol, ++ PE_COFF_IMAGE, ++ ImageAddress, ++ ImageSize, ++ Tcg2Event ++ ); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2 MeasurePeImage - %r\n", Status)); ++ } ++ + if (Status == EFI_VOLUME_FULL) { + // + // Volume full here means the image is hashed and its result is extended to PCR. +@@ -369,11 +500,77 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + } + + Finish: +- FreePool (Tcg2Event); ++ if (EventPtr != NULL) { ++ FreePool (EventPtr); ++ } + + return Status; + } + ++/** ++ Get the measure boot protocols. ++ ++ There are 2 measure boot, TCG2 protocol based and Cc measurement protocol based. ++ ++ @param MeasureBootProtocols Pointer to the located measure boot protocol instances. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Sucessfully locate the measure boot protocol instances (at least one instance). ++ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Measure boot is not supported. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++GetMeasureBootProtocols ( ++ MEASURE_BOOT_PROTOCOLS *MeasureBootProtocols ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol; ++ EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol; ++ EFI_TCG2_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY Tcg2ProtocolCapability; ++ EFI_CC_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY CcProtocolCapability; ++ ++ CcProtocol = NULL; ++ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiCcMeasurementProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&CcProtocol); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ // ++ // Cc Measurement protocol is not installed. ++ // ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "CcMeasurementProtocol is not installed. - %r\n", Status)); ++ } else { ++ ZeroMem (&CcProtocolCapability, sizeof (CcProtocolCapability)); ++ CcProtocolCapability.Size = sizeof (CcProtocolCapability); ++ Status = CcProtocol->GetCapability (CcProtocol, &CcProtocolCapability); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (CcProtocolCapability.CcType.Type == EFI_CC_TYPE_NONE)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CcProtocol->GetCapability returns : %x, %r\n", CcProtocolCapability.CcType.Type, Status)); ++ CcProtocol = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ Tcg2Protocol = NULL; ++ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiTcg2ProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&Tcg2Protocol); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ // ++ // Tcg2 protocol is not installed. So, TPM2 is not present. ++ // ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Tcg2Protocol is not installed. - %r\n", Status)); ++ } else { ++ Tcg2ProtocolCapability.Size = (UINT8)sizeof (Tcg2ProtocolCapability); ++ Status = Tcg2Protocol->GetCapability (Tcg2Protocol, &Tcg2ProtocolCapability); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (!Tcg2ProtocolCapability.TPMPresentFlag)) { ++ // ++ // TPM device doesn't work or activate. ++ // ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TPMPresentFlag=FALSE %r\n", Status)); ++ Tcg2Protocol = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ MeasureBootProtocols->Tcg2Protocol = Tcg2Protocol; ++ MeasureBootProtocols->CcProtocol = CcProtocol; ++ ++ return (Tcg2Protocol == NULL && CcProtocol == NULL) ? EFI_UNSUPPORTED : EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ + /** + The security handler is used to abstract platform-specific policy + from the DXE core response to an attempt to use a file that returns a +@@ -422,9 +619,8 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler ( + IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy + ) + { +- EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol; ++ MEASURE_BOOT_PROTOCOLS MeasureBootProtocols; + EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_TCG2_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY ProtocolCapability; + EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePathNode; + EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *OrigDevicePathNode; + EFI_HANDLE Handle; +@@ -435,29 +631,25 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler ( + EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS FvAddress; + UINT32 Index; + +- Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiTcg2ProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **) &Tcg2Protocol); ++ MeasureBootProtocols.Tcg2Protocol = NULL; ++ MeasureBootProtocols.CcProtocol = NULL; ++ ++ Status = GetMeasureBootProtocols (&MeasureBootProtocols); ++ + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // +- // Tcg2 protocol is not installed. So, TPM2 is not present. ++ // None of Measured boot protocols (Tcg2, Cc) is installed. + // Don't do any measurement, and directly return EFI_SUCCESS. + // +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2 - %r\n", Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "None of Tcg2Protocol/CcMeasurementProtocol is installed.\n")); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } +- +- ProtocolCapability.Size = (UINT8) sizeof (ProtocolCapability); +- Status = Tcg2Protocol->GetCapability ( +- Tcg2Protocol, +- &ProtocolCapability +- ); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (!ProtocolCapability.TPMPresentFlag)) { +- // +- // TPM device doesn't work or activate. +- // +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler (%r) - TPMPresentFlag - %x\n", Status, ProtocolCapability.TPMPresentFlag)); +- return EFI_SUCCESS; +- } +- ++ DEBUG (( ++ DEBUG_INFO, ++ "Tcg2Protocol = %p, CcMeasurementProtocol = %p\n", ++ MeasureBootProtocols.Tcg2Protocol, ++ MeasureBootProtocols.CcProtocol ++ )); + // + // Copy File Device Path + // +@@ -502,8 +694,8 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler ( + // + // Measure GPT disk. + // +- Status = Tcg2MeasureGptTable (Tcg2Protocol, Handle); +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2MeasureGptTable - %r\n", Status)); ++ Status = Tcg2MeasureGptTable (&MeasureBootProtocols, Handle); ++ + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // GPT disk check done. +@@ -647,14 +839,13 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler ( + // Measure PE image into TPM log. + // + Status = Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( +- Tcg2Protocol, ++ &MeasureBootProtocols, + (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) FileBuffer, + FileSize, + (UINTN) ImageContext.ImageAddress, + ImageContext.ImageType, + DevicePathNode + ); +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler - Tcg2MeasurePeImage - %r\n", Status)); + } + + // +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf +index 2506abbe7c..6dca79a20c 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + ## @file +-# Provides security service for TPM 2.0 measured boot ++# Provides security service for TPM 2.0 measured boot and Confidential Computing measure boot. + # + # Spec Compliance Info: + # "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification for TPM Family 2.0 Level 00 Revision 1.03 v51" +@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ + + [Protocols] + gEfiTcg2ProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ++ gEfiCcMeasurementProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpmM.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpmM.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9764d7f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpmM.patch @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +From a35a08c5c8d9308ba2b63a15a40e4ddc3e265dbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 05/17] SecurityPkg: Support CcMeasurementProtocol in + DxeTpmMeasurementLib + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [5/13] fa844740ca589cabb52ae7dfa0dd329315dc168f (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21154 +CVE: CVE-2022-36763 +Upstream: Merged +Conflicts: Only cosmetic, due to the uncrustify changes made + in the newer version. + +commit 314ff1dc8c9a9597280b50e44a5c861cb6a58517 (HEAD -> CVE-2022-36763_RHEL-21154_rhel-8.10.0) +Author: Min Xu +Date: Sat Dec 11 21:08:42 2021 +0800 + + SecurityPkg: Support CcMeasurementProtocol in DxeTpmMeasurementLib + + BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3625 + + DxeTpmMeasurementLib supports TPM based measurement in DXE phase. + After CcMeasurementProtocol is introduced, CC based measurement needs + to be supported in DxeTpmMeasurementLib as well. + + A platform should have only one RTS/RTR. Only one of (virtual)TPM1.2, + (virtual)TPM2.0 and CC MR exists. Then only one TCG_SERVICE_PROTOCOL, + TCG2_PROTOCOL, CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL is exposed. + + In this library when do measurement only one of above 3 protocols will + be called. + + Cc: Michael D Kinney + Cc: Liming Gao + Cc: Zhiguang Liu + Cc: Jiewen Yao + Cc: Jian J Wang + Cc: Sami Mujawar + Cc: Gerd Hoffmann + Reviewed-by: Sami Mujawar + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + Signed-off-by: Min Xu + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../DxeTpmMeasurementLib.c | 122 +++++++++++++++--- + .../DxeTpmMeasurementLib.inf | 9 +- + 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.c +index 061136ee78..802bc3c3cd 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.c +@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ + /** @file +- This library is used by other modules to measure data to TPM. ++ This library is used by other modules to measure data to TPM and Confidential ++ Computing (CC) measure registers. + + Copyright (c) 2012 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + + #include + #include ++#include + + + +@@ -37,6 +39,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Out of memory. + @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The operation was unsuccessful. + **/ ++STATIC + EFI_STATUS + Tpm12MeasureAndLogData ( + IN UINT32 PcrIndex, +@@ -103,6 +106,7 @@ Tpm12MeasureAndLogData ( + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Out of memory. + @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The operation was unsuccessful. + **/ ++STATIC + EFI_STATUS + Tpm20MeasureAndLogData ( + IN UINT32 PcrIndex, +@@ -149,6 +153,73 @@ Tpm20MeasureAndLogData ( + return Status; + } + ++/** ++ Cc measure and log data, and extend the measurement result into a ++ specific CC MR. ++ ++ @param[in] CcProtocol Instance of CC measurement protocol ++ @param[in] PcrIndex PCR Index. ++ @param[in] EventType Event type. ++ @param[in] EventLog Measurement event log. ++ @param[in] LogLen Event log length in bytes. ++ @param[in] HashData The start of the data buffer to be hashed, extended. ++ @param[in] HashDataLen The length, in bytes, of the buffer referenced by HashData ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Operation completed successfully. ++ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED CC guest not available. ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Out of memory. ++ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The operation was unsuccessful. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The input parameter is invalid. ++**/ ++STATIC ++EFI_STATUS ++CcMeasureAndLogData ( ++ IN EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol, ++ IN UINT32 PcrIndex, ++ IN UINT32 EventType, ++ IN VOID *EventLog, ++ IN UINT32 LogLen, ++ IN VOID *HashData, ++ IN UINT64 HashDataLen ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_CC_EVENT *EfiCcEvent; ++ EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex; ++ ++ if (CcProtocol == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ Status = CcProtocol->MapPcrToMrIndex (CcProtocol, PcrIndex, &MrIndex); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return Status; ++ } ++ ++ EfiCcEvent = (EFI_CC_EVENT *)AllocateZeroPool (LogLen + sizeof (EFI_CC_EVENT)); ++ if (EfiCcEvent == NULL) { ++ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ } ++ ++ EfiCcEvent->Size = (UINT32)LogLen + sizeof (EFI_CC_EVENT) - sizeof (EfiCcEvent->Event); ++ EfiCcEvent->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER); ++ EfiCcEvent->Header.HeaderVersion = EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION; ++ EfiCcEvent->Header.MrIndex = MrIndex; ++ EfiCcEvent->Header.EventType = EventType; ++ CopyMem (&EfiCcEvent->Event[0], EventLog, LogLen); ++ ++ Status = CcProtocol->HashLogExtendEvent ( ++ CcProtocol, ++ 0, ++ (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)HashData, ++ HashDataLen, ++ EfiCcEvent ++ ); ++ FreePool (EfiCcEvent); ++ ++ return Status; ++} ++ + /** + Tpm measure and log data, and extend the measurement result into a specific PCR. + +@@ -175,25 +246,16 @@ TpmMeasureAndLogData ( + IN UINT64 HashDataLen + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- +- // +- // Try to measure using Tpm20 protocol +- // +- Status = Tpm20MeasureAndLogData( +- PcrIndex, +- EventType, +- EventLog, +- LogLen, +- HashData, +- HashDataLen +- ); ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol; + +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiCcMeasurementProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&CcProtocol); ++ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // +- // Try to measure using Tpm1.2 protocol ++ // Try to measure using Cc measurement protocol + // +- Status = Tpm12MeasureAndLogData( ++ Status = CcMeasureAndLogData ( ++ CcProtocol, + PcrIndex, + EventType, + EventLog, +@@ -201,6 +263,32 @@ TpmMeasureAndLogData ( + HashData, + HashDataLen + ); ++ } else { ++ // ++ // Try to measure using Tpm20 protocol ++ // ++ Status = Tpm20MeasureAndLogData ( ++ PcrIndex, ++ EventType, ++ EventLog, ++ LogLen, ++ HashData, ++ HashDataLen ++ ); ++ ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ // ++ // Try to measure using Tpm1.2 protocol ++ // ++ Status = Tpm12MeasureAndLogData ( ++ PcrIndex, ++ EventType, ++ EventLog, ++ LogLen, ++ HashData, ++ HashDataLen ++ ); ++ } + } + + return Status; +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.inf +index 7d41bc41f9..3af3d4e33b 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.inf ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasurementLib.inf +@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ + ## @file +-# Provides TPM measurement functions for TPM1.2 and TPM 2.0 ++# Provides below measurement functions: ++# 1. TPM measurement functions for TPM1.2 and TPM 2.0 ++# 2. Confidential Computing (CC) measurement functions + # + # This library provides TpmMeasureAndLogData() to measure and log data, and + # extend the measurement result into a specific PCR. +@@ -40,5 +42,6 @@ + UefiBootServicesTableLib + + [Protocols] +- gEfiTcgProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES +- gEfiTcg2ProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ++ gEfiTcgProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ++ gEfiTcg2ProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ++ gEfiCcMeasurementProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce0441b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +From fa892c7112cfb5aa742f358544da3788a831e431 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 13/17] SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol + rename + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 44: edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [13/13] 3bf59dbb583b67eddb54361781054cc650398309 (jmaloy/jons_fork) + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21156 +CVE: CVE-2022-36764 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 264636d8e6983e0f6dc6be2fca9d84ec81315954 +Author: Doug Flick +Date: Wed Jan 17 14:47:22 2024 -0800 + + SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol rename + + Adding the new commit titles for the symbol renames + + Cc: Jiewen Yao + Cc: Rahul Kumar + + Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] + Message-Id: <5e0e851e97459e183420178888d4fcdadc2f1ae1.1705529990.git.doug.edk2@gmail.com> + Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao + +Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml +index f9e3e7be74..dc1bb83489 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml ++++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml +@@ -9,14 +9,35 @@ CVE_2022_36763: + - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2Measurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763" + - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763" + - "SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36763 to SecurityFixes.yaml" ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename" ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename" ++ - "SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol rename" + cve: CVE-2022-36763 + date_reported: 2022-10-25 11:31 UTC + description: (CVE-2022-36763) - Heap Buffer Overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() + note: This patch is related to and supersedes TCBZ2168 + files_impacted: +- - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +- - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c ++ - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++ - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c + links: +- - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4117 +- - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2168 +- - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1990 ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4117 ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2168 ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1990 ++CVE_2022_36764: ++ commit_titles: ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764" ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764" ++ - "SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36764 to SecurityFixes.yaml" ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename" ++ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename" ++ - "SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol rename" ++ cve: CVE-2022-36764 ++ date_reported: 2022-10-25 12:23 UTC ++ description: Heap Buffer Overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() ++ note: ++ files_impacted: ++ - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++ - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c ++ links: ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4118 ++ +-- +2.41.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-StandaloneMmPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-StandaloneMmPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f5fdb5d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-StandaloneMmPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +From 155eceaf831492dcd77172833350072e4156e1c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jon Maloy +Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 16:38:49 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] StandaloneMmPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob() + +RH-Author: Jon Maloy +RH-MergeRequest: 66: EmbeddedPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob() +RH-Jira: RHEL-21158 +RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Commit: [2/2] be7ee11a65a56faec07c249a35940cf9b95b9ec1 + +JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21158 +CVE: CVE-2022-36765 +Upstream: Merged + +commit 9a75b030cf27d2530444e9a2f9f11867f79bf679 +Author: Gua Guo +Date: Thu Jan 11 13:03:26 2024 +0800 + + StandaloneMmPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob() + + REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4166 + + Fix integer overflow in various CreateHob instances. + Fixes: CVE-2022-36765 + + The CreateHob() function aligns the requested size to 8 + performing the following operation: + ``` + HobLength = (UINT16)((HobLength + 0x7) & (~0x7)); + ``` + + No checks are performed to ensure this value doesn't + overflow, and could lead to CreateHob() returning a smaller + HOB than requested, which could lead to OOB HOB accesses. + + Reported-by: Marc Beatove + Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel + Cc: Sami Mujawar + Reviewed-by: Ray Ni + Cc: John Mathew + Authored-by: Gerd Hoffmann + Signed-off-by: Gua Guo + + Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy +--- + .../Arm/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/StandaloneMmPkg/Library/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib/Arm/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib.c b/StandaloneMmPkg/Library/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib/Arm/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib.c +index 0ec2d4ad6f..3b13249e33 100644 +--- a/StandaloneMmPkg/Library/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib/Arm/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib.c ++++ b/StandaloneMmPkg/Library/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib/Arm/StandaloneMmCoreHobLib.c +@@ -34,6 +34,13 @@ CreateHob ( + + HandOffHob = GetHobList (); + ++ // ++ // Check Length to avoid data overflow. ++ // ++ if (HobLength > MAX_UINT16 - 0x7) { ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + HobLength = (UINT16)((HobLength + 0x7) & (~0x7)); + + FreeMemory = HandOffHob->EfiFreeMemoryTop - HandOffHob->EfiFreeMemoryBottom; +@@ -87,6 +94,10 @@ BuildModuleHob ( + ((ModuleLength & (EFI_PAGE_SIZE - 1)) == 0)); + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_MODULE)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + CopyGuid (&(Hob->MemoryAllocationHeader.Name), &gEfiHobMemoryAllocModuleGuid); + Hob->MemoryAllocationHeader.MemoryBaseAddress = MemoryAllocationModule; +@@ -127,6 +138,9 @@ BuildResourceDescriptorHob ( + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR, sizeof (EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR)); + ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->ResourceType = ResourceType; + Hob->ResourceAttribute = ResourceAttribute; +@@ -164,7 +178,12 @@ BuildGuidHob ( + // + ASSERT (DataLength <= (0xffff - sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE))); + +- Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_GUID_EXTENSION, (UINT16) (sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE) + DataLength)); ++ Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_GUID_EXTENSION, (UINT16)(sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE) + DataLength)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + CopyGuid (&Hob->Name, Guid); + return Hob + 1; + } +@@ -225,6 +244,10 @@ BuildFvHob ( + EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME *Hob; + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress; + Hob->Length = Length; +@@ -255,6 +278,10 @@ BuildFv2Hob ( + EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME2 *Hob; + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV2, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME2)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress; + Hob->Length = Length; +@@ -283,6 +310,10 @@ BuildCpuHob ( + EFI_HOB_CPU *Hob; + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_CPU, sizeof (EFI_HOB_CPU)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->SizeOfMemorySpace = SizeOfMemorySpace; + Hob->SizeOfIoSpace = SizeOfIoSpace; +@@ -318,6 +349,10 @@ BuildMemoryAllocationHob ( + ((Length & (EFI_PAGE_SIZE - 1)) == 0)); + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + ZeroMem (&(Hob->AllocDescriptor.Name), sizeof (EFI_GUID)); + Hob->AllocDescriptor.MemoryBaseAddress = BaseAddress; +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SPECS/edk2.spec b/SPECS/edk2.spec index c6515a5..3732d25 100644 --- a/SPECS/edk2.spec +++ b/SPECS/edk2.spec @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64 Name: edk2 Version: %{GITDATE}git%{GITCOMMIT} -Release: 6%{?dist}.6 +Release: 13%{?dist} Summary: UEFI firmware for 64-bit virtual machines Group: Applications/Emulators License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent and OpenSSL and MIT @@ -60,22 +60,206 @@ Patch28: edk2-rh-openssl-add-crypto-bn-rsa_sup_mul.c-to-file-list.patch Patch29: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationLib-Check-result-of-.patch # For bz#2150267 - ovmf must consider max cpu count not boot cpu count for apic mode [rhel-8] Patch30: edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-fix-apic-mode-for-cpu-hotplug.patch -# For RHEL-20351 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error [rhel-8.9.0.z] -Patch31: old.patch -# For RHEL-20351 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error [rhel-8.9.0.z] -Patch32: old2.patch -# For RHEL-21993 - CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8.9.0.z] -Patch33: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch -# For RHEL-21993 - CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8.9.0.z] -Patch34: edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch -# For RHEL-21993 - CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8.9.0.z] -Patch35: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch -# For RHEL-22002 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8.9.0.z] -Patch36: edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-chang1.patch -# For RHEL-22002 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8.9.0.z] -Patch37: edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECUR-PATCH-CVE-2023-45234.patch -# For RHEL-22002 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8.9.0.z] -Patch38: edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECUR-PATCH-CVE-2023-45234_U.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch31: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariableG.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch32: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variables.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch33: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clone-ArmPlatformPkg-s-NOR-f.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch34: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-CheckBlockLocked-feat.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch35: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-disk-I-O-protocol-imp.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch36: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-drop-block-I-O-protocol-impl.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch37: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-array-mode-switch-afte.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch38: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-switching-between-mode.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch39: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-use-EFI_MEMORY_WC-and-drop-A.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch40: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-map-flash-memory-as-uncachea.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch41: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariable2.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch42: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variable2.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch43: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-casts-to-UINTN-and-UINT3.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch44: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clarify-block-write-logic-fi.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch45: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-a-loop-for-NorFlashWrite.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch46: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-allow-larger-writes-without-.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch47: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-ValidateFvHeader-unwritten-s.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch48: edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-move-DoErase-code-block-into.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch49: edk2-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-migrate-to-OVMF-s-VirtNorFlas.patch +# For RHEL-17587 - [rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error +Patch50: edk2-OvmfPkg-clone-NorFlashPlatformLib-into-VirtNorFlashP.patch +# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8] +Patch51: edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-use-of-EFI_D_-to-DEBUG_.patch +# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8] +Patch52: edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-OPTIONAL-keyword-usage-style.patch +# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8] +Patch53: edk2-MdePkg-Introduce-CcMeasurementProtocol-for-CC-Guest-.patch +# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8] +Patch54: edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpm2.patch +# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8] +Patch55: edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpmM.patch +# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8] +Patch56: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411.patch +# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8] +Patch57: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4117.patch +# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8] +Patch58: edk2-SecurityPkg-Adding-CVE-2022-36763-to-SecurityFixes.y.patch +# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8] +Patch59: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-418.patch +# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8] +Patch60: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch +# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8] +Patch61: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4118-2.patch +# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8] +Patch62: edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4117-2.patch +# For RHEL-21154 - CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21156 - CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8] +Patch63: edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21842 - CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8] +Patch64: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21842 - CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8] +Patch65: edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21842 - CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8] +Patch66: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21842 - CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8] +Patch67: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Pa.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch68: edk2-Apply-uncrustify-changes-to-.c-.h-files-in-the-Netwo.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch69: edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Patc.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch70: edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Unit.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch71: edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Patc.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch72: edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Unit.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch73: edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch74: edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch75: edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p2.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch76: edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p3.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch77: edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p4.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch78: edk2-NetworkPkg-Adds-a-SecurityFix.yaml-file.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch79: edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes-p2.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch80: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Re.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch81: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Removes-duplicate-check-and-repl.patch +# For RHEL-21840 - CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21844 - CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21846 - CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21848 - CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21850 - CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8] +# For RHEL-21852 - CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8] +Patch82: edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Packet-Length-is-not-updated-bef.patch +# For RHEL-21158 - CVE-2022-36765 edk2: integer overflow in CreateHob() could lead to HOB OOB R/W [rhel-8] +Patch83: edk2-EmbeddedPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch +# For RHEL-21158 - CVE-2022-36765 edk2: integer overflow in CreateHob() could lead to HOB OOB R/W [rhel-8] +Patch84: edk2-StandaloneMmPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch # python3-devel and libuuid-devel are required for building tools. @@ -222,6 +406,8 @@ sed \ %{SOURCE5} \ > PkKek1.oemstr +# Hack to ensure git lock is removed before chmod starts to not fail +sleep 5 # Done by %setup, but we do not use it for the auxiliary tarballs chmod -Rf a+rX,u+w,g-w,o-w . @@ -520,34 +706,104 @@ true %endif %changelog -* Tue Feb 27 2024 Jon Maloy - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-6.el8_9.6 -- edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-chang1.patch [RHEL-22002] -- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECUR-PATCH-CVE-2023-45234.patch [RHEL-22002] -- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECUR-PATCH-CVE-2023-45234_U.patch [RHEL-22002] -- Resolves: RHEL-22002 - (CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8.9.0.z]) - -* Wed Feb 14 2024 Jon Maloy - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-6.el8_9.4 -- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch [RHEL-21993] -- edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch [RHEL-21993] -- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch [RHEL-21993] -- Resolves: RHEL-21993 - (CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8.9.0.z]) - -* Mon Jan 15 2024 Jon Maloy - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-6.el8_9.3 -- old.patch [RHEL-20351] -- old2.patch [RHEL-20351] -- Resolves: RHEL-20351 - ([rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error [rhel-8.9.0.z]) - -* Fri Jan 05 2024 Jon Maloy - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-6.el8_9.2 -- edk2-Bumped-openssl-submodule-version-to-cf317b2bb227.patch [RHEL-18048] -- Resolves: RHEL-18048 - (CVE-2023-3446 edk2: openssl: Excessive time spent checking DH keys and parameters [rhel-8.9.0.z]) - -* Wed Nov 22 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-6.el8_9.1 -- edk2-add-8.6-machine-type-to-edk2-ovmf-cc.json.patch [RHEL-15931] -- Resolves: RHEL-15931 +* Thu Mar 14 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-13 +- edk2-EmbeddedPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch [RHEL-21158] +- edk2-StandaloneMmPkg-Hob-Integer-Overflow-in-CreateHob.patch [RHEL-21158] +- Resolves: RHEL-21158 + (CVE-2022-36765 edk2: integer overflow in CreateHob() could lead to HOB OOB R/W [rhel-8]) + +* Tue Feb 27 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-12 +- edk2-Apply-uncrustify-changes-to-.c-.h-files-in-the-Netwo.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Patc.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Unit.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Patc.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Unit.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p2.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p3.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p4.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Adds-a-SecurityFix.yaml-file.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Apply-uncrustify-changes-p2.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Re.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Removes-duplicate-check-and-repl.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Packet-Length-is-not-updated-bef.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21844 RHEL-21846 RHEL-21848 RHEL-21850 RHEL-21852] +- Resolves: RHEL-21840 + (CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21844 + (CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21846 + (CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21848 + (CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21850 + (CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21852 + (CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-8]) + +* Wed Feb 14 2024 Jon Maloy - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-11 +- edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-use-of-EFI_D_-to-DEBUG_.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-Change-OPTIONAL-keyword-usage-style.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] +- edk2-MdePkg-Introduce-CcMeasurementProtocol-for-CC-Guest-.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpm2.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-Support-CcMeasurementProtocol-in-DxeTpmM.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4117.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-Adding-CVE-2022-36763-to-SecurityFixes.y.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-418.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4118-2.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SEC-PATCH-4117-2.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch [RHEL-21154 RHEL-21156] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Pa.patch [RHEL-21840 RHEL-21842] +- Resolves: RHEL-21154 + (CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21156 + (CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21840 + (CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21842 + (CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-8]) + +* Sat Feb 03 2024 Jon Maloy - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-10 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clone-ArmPlatformPkg-s-NOR-f.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-CheckBlockLocked-feat.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-remove-disk-I-O-protocol-imp.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-drop-block-I-O-protocol-impl.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-array-mode-switch-afte.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-avoid-switching-between-mode.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-use-EFI_MEMORY_WC-and-drop-A.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-map-flash-memory-as-uncachea.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariable2.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variable2.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-casts-to-UINTN-and-UINT3.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clarify-block-write-logic-fi.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-a-loop-for-NorFlashWrite.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-allow-larger-writes-without-.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-ValidateFvHeader-unwritten-s.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-move-DoErase-code-block-into.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-migrate-to-OVMF-s-VirtNorFlas.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-clone-NorFlashPlatformLib-into-VirtNorFlashP.patch [RHEL-17587] +- Resolves: RHEL-17587 + ([rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error) + +* Wed Jan 24 2024 Jon Maloy - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-9 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariableG.patch [RHEL-17587] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variables.patch [RHEL-17587] +- Resolves: RHEL-17587 + ([rhel8] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error) + +* Fri Jan 05 2024 Jon Maloy - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-8 +- edk2-Bumped-openssl-submodule-version-to-cf317b2bb227.patch [RHEL-7560] +- Resolves: RHEL-7560 + (CVE-2023-3446 edk2: openssl: Excessive time spent checking DH keys and parameters [rhel-8]) + +* Wed Nov 22 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-7 +- edk2-add-8.6-machine-type-to-edk2-ovmf-cc.json.patch [RHEL-12626] +- Resolves: RHEL-12626 (Missing firmware descriptor with secureboot disabled in RHEL 8) * Fri Aug 04 2023 Jon Maloy - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-6