commit 95cb9bd2789776cb314161057d128e51e4561eb9 Author: Dmitry Samoylik Date: Sun Nov 10 13:24:11 2024 +0300 Import edk2-20240524-5.el9_5.inferit.1 diff --git a/.edk2.metadata b/.edk2.metadata new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71335e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/.edk2.metadata @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +703fd1d0fad7fc0d2e815a6e293e5d53e4c62bf6 SOURCES/openssl-rhel-8e5beb77088bfec064d60506b1e76ddb0ac417fe.tar.xz +6da44cf37c27ab03f2940769c58515b07271e047 SOURCES/edk2-3e722403cd.tar.xz diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce0dea3 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +SOURCES/openssl-rhel-8e5beb77088bfec064d60506b1e76ddb0ac417fe.tar.xz +SOURCES/edk2-3e722403cd.tar.xz diff --git a/SOURCES/0003-Remove-paths-leading-to-submodules.patch b/SOURCES/0003-Remove-paths-leading-to-submodules.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d22a3b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0003-Remove-paths-leading-to-submodules.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From de9f92d118c1374243d9d3f006088a29ec7dcf8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Miroslav Rezanina +Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2022 03:23:02 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Remove paths leading to submodules + +We removed submodules used upstream. However, edk2 build system requires +such include paths to resolve successfully, regardless of the firmware +platform being built. + +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + BaseTools/Source/C/GNUmakefile | 1 - + MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec | 3 --- + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec | 5 ----- + 3 files changed, 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/BaseTools/Source/C/GNUmakefile b/BaseTools/Source/C/GNUmakefile +index 5275f657ef..39d7199753 100644 +--- a/BaseTools/Source/C/GNUmakefile ++++ b/BaseTools/Source/C/GNUmakefile +@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ all: makerootdir subdirs + LIBRARIES = Common + VFRAUTOGEN = VfrCompile/VfrLexer.h + APPLICATIONS = \ +- BrotliCompress \ + VfrCompile \ + EfiRom \ + GenFfs \ +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec +index f7339f0aec..badb93238f 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec +@@ -26,9 +26,6 @@ + Include + Test/Mock/Include + +-[Includes.Common.Private] +- Library/BrotliCustomDecompressLib/brotli/c/include +- + [LibraryClasses] + ## @libraryclass Defines a set of methods to reset whole system. + ResetSystemLib|Include/Library/ResetSystemLib.h +diff --git a/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec b/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec +index bf94549cbf..605b0f1be8 100644 +--- a/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec ++++ b/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec +@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ + Include + Test/UnitTest/Include + Test/Mock/Include +- Library/MipiSysTLib/mipisyst/library/include + + [Includes.IA32] + Include/Ia32 +@@ -295,10 +294,6 @@ + # + FdtLib|Include/Library/FdtLib.h + +- ## @libraryclass Provides general mipi sys-T services. +- # +- MipiSysTLib|Include/Library/MipiSysTLib.h +- + ## @libraryclass Provides API to output Trace Hub debug message. + # + TraceHubDebugSysTLib|Include/Library/TraceHubDebugSysTLib.h diff --git a/SOURCES/0004-MdeModulePkg-TerminalDxe-set-xterm-resolution-on-mod.patch b/SOURCES/0004-MdeModulePkg-TerminalDxe-set-xterm-resolution-on-mod.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a57269 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0004-MdeModulePkg-TerminalDxe-set-xterm-resolution-on-mod.patch @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +From 5c48211bdce4b30c86e92636e852e9da4ede4c1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 22:40:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] MdeModulePkg: TerminalDxe: set xterm resolution on mode + change (RH only) + +Notes for rebase to edk2-stable202311: + +- Minor context changes due to new PCDs (for USB Networking) being added. + +Notes for rebase to edk2-stable202205: + +- Minor context changes due to fd306d1dbc MdeModulePkg: Add PcdTdxSharedBitMask + +Notes for rebase to edk2-stable202202: + +- Minor context changes due to 1436aea4d MdeModulePkg: Apply uncrustify changes + +Notes about the RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] -> +RHEL-8.5/20210520-e1999b264f1f [edk2-stable202105] rebase: + +- Resolve harmless conflict in "MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec", + originating from new upstream commits + - 45bc28172fbf ("MdeModulePkg.dec: Change PCDs for status code.", + 2020-06-18), + - 0785c619a58a ("MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe: Support PCIe Resizable + BAR Capability", 2021-01-04), + - ef23012e5439 ("MdeModulePkg: Change default value of + PcdPcieResizableBarSupport to FALSE", 2021-01-14). + +Notes about the RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] -> +RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] rebase: + +- Resolve trivial conflict in "MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec", arising + from upstream commit 166830d8f7ca ("MdeModulePkg/dec: add + PcdTcgPfpMeasurementRevision PCD", 2020-01-06). + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- Conflict in "MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec" due to upstream commits + - 1103ba946aee ("MdeModulePkg: Add Capsule On Disk related definition.", + 2019-06-26), + - 1c7b3eb84631 ("MdeModulePkg/DxeIpl: Introduce PCD + PcdUse5LevelPageTable", 2019-08-09), + with easy manual resolution. + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- Refresh downstream-only commit 2909e025db68 against "MdeModulePkg.dec" + context change from upstream commits e043f7895b83 ("MdeModulePkg: Add + PCD PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask", 2017-02-27) and 76081dfcc5b2 + ("MdeModulePkg: Add PROMPT&HELP string of pcd to UNI file", 2017-03-03). + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- refresh commit 519b9751573e against various context changes + +The + + CSI Ps ; Ps ; Ps t + +escape sequence serves for window manipulation. We can use the + + CSI 8 ; ; t + +sequence to adapt eg. the xterm window size to the selected console mode. + +Reference: +Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 2909e025db6878723b49644a8a0cf160d07e6444) +(cherry picked from commit b9c5c901f25e48d68eef6e78a4abca00e153f574) +(cherry picked from commit b7f6115b745de8cbc5214b6ede33c9a8558beb90) +(cherry picked from commit 67415982afdc77922aa37496c981adeb4351acdb) +(cherry picked from commit cfccb98d13e955beb0b93b4a75a973f30c273ffc) +(cherry picked from commit a11602f5e2ef930be5b693ddfd0c789a1bd4c60c) +(cherry picked from commit bc2266f20de5db1636e09a07e4a72c8dbf505f5a) +--- + MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec | 4 +++ + .../Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConOut.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ + .../Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf | 2 ++ + 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec +index badb93238f..3a67acc090 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec +@@ -2222,6 +2222,10 @@ + # @Prompt The value is use for Usb Network rate limiting supported. + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUsbNetworkRateLimitingFactor|100|UINT32|0x10000028 + ++ ## Controls whether TerminalDxe outputs an XTerm resize sequence on terminal ++ # mode change. ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010080 ++ + [PcdsPatchableInModule] + ## Specify memory size with page number for PEI code when + # Loading Module at Fixed Address feature is enabled. +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConOut.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConOut.c +index 7809869e7d..3be801039b 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConOut.c ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConOut.c +@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + + **/ + ++#include ++ + #include "Terminal.h" + + // +@@ -80,6 +82,16 @@ CHAR16 mSetCursorPositionString[] = { ESC, '[', '0', '0', ';', '0', '0', 'H', 0 + CHAR16 mCursorForwardString[] = { ESC, '[', '0', '0', 'C', 0 }; + CHAR16 mCursorBackwardString[] = { ESC, '[', '0', '0', 'D', 0 }; + ++// ++// Note that this is an ASCII format string, taking two INT32 arguments: ++// rows, columns. ++// ++// A %d (INT32) format specification can expand to at most 11 characters. ++// ++CHAR8 mResizeTextAreaFormatString[] = "\x1B[8;%d;%dt"; ++#define RESIZE_SEQ_SIZE (sizeof mResizeTextAreaFormatString + 2 * (11 - 2)) ++ ++ + // + // Body of the ConOut functions + // +@@ -498,6 +510,24 @@ TerminalConOutSetMode ( + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + ++ if (PcdGetBool (PcdResizeXterm)) { ++ CHAR16 ResizeSequence[RESIZE_SEQ_SIZE]; ++ ++ UnicodeSPrintAsciiFormat ( ++ ResizeSequence, ++ sizeof ResizeSequence, ++ mResizeTextAreaFormatString, ++ (INT32) TerminalDevice->TerminalConsoleModeData[ModeNumber].Rows, ++ (INT32) TerminalDevice->TerminalConsoleModeData[ModeNumber].Columns ++ ); ++ TerminalDevice->OutputEscChar = TRUE; ++ Status = This->OutputString (This, ResizeSequence); ++ TerminalDevice->OutputEscChar = FALSE; ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ } ++ + This->Mode->Mode = (INT32)ModeNumber; + + Status = This->ClearScreen (This); +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf +index b2a8aeba85..96810f337c 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf +@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ + DebugLib + PcdLib + BaseLib ++ PrintLib + + [Guids] + ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## Variable:L"ConInDev" +@@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ + [Pcd] + gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDefaultTerminalType ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdErrorCodeSetVariable ## CONSUMES ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm ## CONSUMES + + # [Event] + # # Relative timer event set by UnicodeToEfiKey(), used to be one 2 seconds input timeout. diff --git a/SOURCES/0005-OvmfPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command-li.patch b/SOURCES/0005-OvmfPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command-li.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16da78e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0005-OvmfPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command-li.patch @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +From 0976965c3dd6ac841f59dc09220a6637060ba901 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 15:59:06 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: take PcdResizeXterm from the QEMU command line (RH + only) + +Notes about edk2-stable202205 rebase + +- Necessary minor fixes for upstream changes + +Notes about the RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] -> +RHEL-8.5/20210520-e1999b264f1f [edk2-stable202105] rebase: + +- Extend the DSC change to the new OvmfPkg/AmdSev platform, which has been + introduced upstream in commit 30d277ed7a82 ("OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit + to build encrypted boot specific OVMF", 2020-12-14), for TianoCore#3077. + + We've always patched all those DSC/FDF files in OvmfPkg down-stream that + made sense at least in theory on QEMU. (For example, we've always + patched "OvmfPkgIa32.dsc" and "OvmfPkgIa32.fdf", even though we never + build or ship the pure IA32 firmware platform.) Follow suit with + "AmdSevX64.dsc". + +Notes about the RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] -> +RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] rebase: + +- Resolve contextual conflict in the DSC files, from upstream commit + b0ed7ebdebd1 ("OvmfPkg: set fixed FlashNvStorage base addresses with -D + SMM_REQUIRE", 2020-03-12). + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- refresh downstream-only commit 8abc2a6ddad2 against context differences + in the DSC files from upstream commit 5e167d7e784c + ("OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: don't allocate reserved mem varstore if + SMM_REQUIRE", 2017-03-12). + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- no changes + +Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 6fa0c4d67c0bb8bde2ddd6db41c19eb0c40b2721) +(cherry picked from commit 8abc2a6ddad25af7e88dc0cf57d55dfb75fbf92d) +(cherry picked from commit b311932d3841c017a0f0fec553edcac365cc2038) +(cherry picked from commit 61914fb81cf624c9028d015533b400b2794e52d3) +(cherry picked from commit 2ebf3cc2ae99275d63bb6efd3c22dec76251a853) +(cherry picked from commit f9b73437b9b231773c1a20e0c516168817a930a2) +(cherry picked from commit 2cc462ee963d0be119bc97bfc9c70d292a40516f) +(cherry picked from commit 51e0de961029af84b5bdbfddcc9762b1819d500f) +--- + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 1 + + OvmfPkg/CloudHv/CloudHvX64.dsc | 1 + + OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc | 1 + + OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 1 + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 1 + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 1 + + OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c | 13 +++++++++++++ + OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 1 + + 9 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +index 8eb6f4f24f..627fded641 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ + [PcdsDynamicDefault] + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved|0 + ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase64|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase64|0 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/CloudHv/CloudHvX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/CloudHv/CloudHvX64.dsc +index 4996885301..51a49c09ad 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/CloudHv/CloudHvX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/CloudHv/CloudHvX64.dsc +@@ -581,6 +581,7 @@ + # ($(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE) + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved|0 + ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE + !if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase64|0 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc +index 0931ce061a..9f49b60ff0 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc +@@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ + # ($(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE) + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved|0 + ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase64|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase64|0 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc +index 69de4dd3f1..fb73f2e089 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc +@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ + # only set when + # ($(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE) + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved|0 +- ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase64|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase64|0 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index 2ca005d768..dddef5ed0e 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -599,6 +599,7 @@ + # ($(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE) + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved|0 + ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE + !if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase64|0 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index a39070a626..933abb258f 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -611,6 +611,7 @@ + # ($(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE) + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved|0 + ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE + !if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase64|0 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index 1b90aa8f57..04157ab14b 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -629,6 +629,7 @@ + # ($(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE) + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved|0 + ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE + !if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64|0 + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase64|0 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c +index df35726ff6..6c786bfc1e 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c +@@ -41,6 +41,18 @@ + + #include "Platform.h" + ++#define UPDATE_BOOLEAN_PCD_FROM_FW_CFG(TokenName) \ ++ do { \ ++ BOOLEAN Setting; \ ++ RETURN_STATUS PcdStatus; \ ++ \ ++ if (!RETURN_ERROR (QemuFwCfgParseBool ( \ ++ "opt/ovmf/" #TokenName, &Setting))) { \ ++ PcdStatus = PcdSetBoolS (TokenName, Setting); \ ++ ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus); \ ++ } \ ++ } while (0) ++ + EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR mPpiBootMode[] = { + { + EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_PPI | EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_TERMINATE_LIST, +@@ -355,6 +367,7 @@ InitializePlatform ( + MemTypeInfoInitialization (PlatformInfoHob); + MemMapInitialization (PlatformInfoHob); + NoexecDxeInitialization (PlatformInfoHob); ++ UPDATE_BOOLEAN_PCD_FROM_FW_CFG (PcdResizeXterm); + } + + InstallClearCacheCallback (); +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf +index e036018eab..a2f59e8fc8 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf +@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeIplSwitchToLongMode + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUse1GPageTable + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSetNxForStack diff --git a/SOURCES/0006-ArmVirtPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command.patch b/SOURCES/0006-ArmVirtPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..47be70d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0006-ArmVirtPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command.patch @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +From 4c45a397402f58a67b1d4ea1348bb79f3716c7a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2015 08:02:50 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] ArmVirtPkg: take PcdResizeXterm from the QEMU command line + (RH only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] -> +RHEL-8.5/20210520-e1999b264f1f [edk2-stable202105] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] -> +RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] rebase: + +- Resolve leading context divergence in "ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc", + arising from upstream commits: + + - 82662a3b5f56 ("ArmVirtPkg/PlatformPeiLib: discover the TPM base + address from the DT", 2020-03-04) + + - ddd34a818315 ("ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu: enable TPM2 support in the PEI + phase", 2020-03-04) + + - cdc3fa54184a ("ArmVirtPkg: control PXEv4 / PXEv6 boot support from the + QEMU command line", 2020-04-28) + +- Rework the downstream patch quite a bit, paralleling the upstream work + done for in commit + range 64ab457d1f21..cdc3fa54184a: + + - Refresh copyright year in TerminalPcdProducerLib.{inf,c}. Also replace + open-coded BSDL with "SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent". + + - Simplify LIBRARY_CLASS: this lib instance is meant to be consumed only + via NULL class resolution (basically: as a plugin), so use NULL for + LIBRARY_CLASS, not "TerminalPcdProducerLib|DXE_DRIVER". + + - Sort the [Packages] section alphabetically in the INF file. + + - Replace the open-coded GetNamedFwCfgBoolean() function with a call to + QemuFwCfgParseBool(), from QemuFwCfgSimpleParserLib. + + - Add the SOMETIMES_PRODUCES usage comment in the [Pcd] section of the + INF file. + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase: + +- Refresh downstream-only commit d4564d39dfdb against context changes in + "ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc" from upstream commit 7e5f1b673870 + ("ArmVirtPkg/PlatformHasAcpiDtDxe: allow guest level ACPI disable + override", 2017-03-29). + +Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase: + +- Adapt commit 6b97969096a3 to the fact that upstream has deprecated such + setter functions for dynamic PCDs that don't return a status code (such + as PcdSetBool()). Employ PcdSetBoolS(), and assert that it succeeds -- + there's really no circumstance in this case when it could fail. + +Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit d4564d39dfdbf74e762af43314005a2c026cb262) +(cherry picked from commit c9081ebe3bcd28e5cce4bf58bd8d4fca12f9af7c) +(cherry picked from commit 8e92730c8e1cdb642b3b3e680e643ff774a90c65) +(cherry picked from commit 9448b6b46267d8d807fac0c648e693171bb34806) +(cherry picked from commit 232fcf06f6b3048b7c2ebd6931f23186b3852f04) +(cherry picked from commit 8338545260fbb423f796d5196faaaf8ff6e1ed99) +(cherry picked from commit a5f7a57bf390f1f340ff1d1f1884a73716817ef1) +--- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc | 7 +++- + .../TerminalPcdProducerLib.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++ + .../TerminalPcdProducerLib.inf | 33 ++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.c + create mode 100644 ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.inf + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +index 64aa4e96e5..c37c4ba61e 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +@@ -311,6 +311,8 @@ + gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress|0x0 + !endif + ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm|FALSE ++ + [PcdsDynamicHii] + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdForceNoAcpi|L"ForceNoAcpi"|gOvmfVariableGuid|0x0|FALSE|NV,BS + +@@ -416,7 +418,10 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/ConPlatformDxe/ConPlatformDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/ConSplitterDxe/ConSplitterDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/GraphicsConsoleDxe/GraphicsConsoleDxe.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf { ++ ++ NULL|ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.inf ++ } + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SerialDxe/SerialDxe.inf + + MdeModulePkg/Universal/HiiDatabaseDxe/HiiDatabaseDxe.inf +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.c b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..37f71c5e4c +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.c +@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ ++/** @file ++* Plugin library for setting up dynamic PCDs for TerminalDxe, from fw_cfg ++* ++* Copyright (C) 2015-2020, Red Hat, Inc. ++* Copyright (c) 2014, Linaro Ltd. All rights reserved.
++* ++* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#define UPDATE_BOOLEAN_PCD_FROM_FW_CFG(TokenName) \ ++ do { \ ++ BOOLEAN Setting; \ ++ RETURN_STATUS PcdStatus; \ ++ \ ++ if (!RETURN_ERROR (QemuFwCfgParseBool ( \ ++ "opt/org.tianocore.edk2.aavmf/" #TokenName, &Setting))) { \ ++ PcdStatus = PcdSetBoolS (TokenName, Setting); \ ++ ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus); \ ++ } \ ++ } while (0) ++ ++RETURN_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TerminalPcdProducerLibConstructor ( ++ VOID ++ ) ++{ ++ UPDATE_BOOLEAN_PCD_FROM_FW_CFG (PcdResizeXterm); ++ return RETURN_SUCCESS; ++} +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.inf b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.inf +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..c840f6f97a +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/TerminalPcdProducerLib/TerminalPcdProducerLib.inf +@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ ++## @file ++# Plugin library for setting up dynamic PCDs for TerminalDxe, from fw_cfg ++# ++# Copyright (C) 2015-2020, Red Hat, Inc. ++# Copyright (c) 2014, Linaro Ltd. All rights reserved.
++# ++# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++## ++ ++[Defines] ++ INF_VERSION = 0x00010005 ++ BASE_NAME = TerminalPcdProducerLib ++ FILE_GUID = 4a0c5ed7-8c42-4c01-8f4c-7bf258316a96 ++ MODULE_TYPE = BASE ++ VERSION_STRING = 1.0 ++ LIBRARY_CLASS = NULL ++ CONSTRUCTOR = TerminalPcdProducerLibConstructor ++ ++[Sources] ++ TerminalPcdProducerLib.c ++ ++[Packages] ++ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec ++ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec ++ OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec ++ ++[LibraryClasses] ++ DebugLib ++ PcdLib ++ QemuFwCfgSimpleParserLib ++ ++[Pcd] ++ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdResizeXterm ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES diff --git a/SOURCES/0007-OvmfPkg-enable-DEBUG_VERBOSE-RHEL-only.patch b/SOURCES/0007-OvmfPkg-enable-DEBUG_VERBOSE-RHEL-only.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c8fc3b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0007-OvmfPkg-enable-DEBUG_VERBOSE-RHEL-only.patch @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +From 3dbb4913b3e1c0413dd3016681aca3a3d12edd0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paolo Bonzini +Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 00:57:45 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: enable DEBUG_VERBOSE (RHEL only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] -> +RHEL-8.5/20210520-e1999b264f1f [edk2-stable202105] rebase: + +- Extend the DSC change to the new OvmfPkg/AmdSev platform, which has been + introduced upstream in commit 30d277ed7a82 ("OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit + to build encrypted boot specific OVMF", 2020-12-14), for TianoCore#3077. + +- Remove obsolete commit message tags related to downstream patch + management: Message-id, Patchwork-id, O-Subject, Acked-by, From + (RHBZ#1846481). + +Notes about the RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] -> +RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] rebase: + +- context difference from upstream commit 46bb81200742 ("OvmfPkg: Make + SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE actually need to be set to TRUE", 2019-10-22) + resolved automatically + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no changes + +Bugzilla: 1488247 + +Set the DEBUG_VERBOSE bit (0x00400000) in the log mask. We want detailed +debug messages, and code in OvmfPkg logs many messages on the +DEBUG_VERBOSE level. + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini +(this patch was previously applied as commit 78d3ed73172b5738e32d2b0bc03f7984b9584117) +(cherry picked from commit 7aeeaabc9871f657e65d2b99d81011b4964a1ce9) +(cherry picked from commit a0617a6be1a80966099ddceb010f89202a79ee76) +(cherry picked from commit 759bd3f591e2db699bdef4c7ea4e97c908e7f027) +(cherry picked from commit 7e6d5dc4078c64be6d55d8fc3317c59a91507a50) +(cherry picked from commit 3cb92f9ba18ac79911bd5258ff4f949cc617ae89) +(cherry picked from commit 5ecc18badaabe774d9d0806b027ab63a30c6a2d7) +--- + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 2 +- + 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +index 627fded641..cef43b34b7 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ + # DEBUG_VERBOSE 0x00400000 // Detailed debug messages that may + # // significantly impact boot performance + # DEBUG_ERROR 0x80000000 // Error +- gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8040004F + + !if $(SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE) == TRUE + gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPropertyMask|0x17 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index dddef5ed0e..270bd612e5 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ + # DEBUG_VERBOSE 0x00400000 // Detailed debug messages that may + # // significantly impact boot performance + # DEBUG_ERROR 0x80000000 // Error +- gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8040004F + + !if $(SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE) == TRUE + gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPropertyMask|0x17 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index 933abb258f..269a4b2b21 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ + # DEBUG_VERBOSE 0x00400000 // Detailed debug messages that may + # // significantly impact boot performance + # DEBUG_ERROR 0x80000000 // Error +- gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8040004F + + !if $(SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE) == TRUE + gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPropertyMask|0x17 +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index 04157ab14b..9614cc1c56 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ + # DEBUG_VERBOSE 0x00400000 // Detailed debug messages that may + # // significantly impact boot performance + # DEBUG_ERROR 0x80000000 // Error +- gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8040004F + + !if $(SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE) == TRUE + gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPropertyMask|0x17 diff --git a/SOURCES/0008-OvmfPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuVide.patch b/SOURCES/0008-OvmfPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuVide.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d433969 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0008-OvmfPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuVide.patch @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +From ac8f2a85bad100eaf42d3537b6fcb37fa3db5fd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paolo Bonzini +Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 00:57:46 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: silence DEBUG_VERBOSE (0x00400000) in + QemuVideoDxe/QemuRamfbDxe (RH) + +edk2-stable202402 rebase: + +- context changes due to CSM support removal. + +Notes about the RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] -> +RHEL-8.5/20210520-e1999b264f1f [edk2-stable202105] rebase: + +- Extend the DSC change to the new OvmfPkg/AmdSev platform, which has been + introduced upstream in commit 30d277ed7a82 ("OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit + to build encrypted boot specific OVMF", 2020-12-14), for TianoCore#3077. + +- Remove obsolete commit message tags related to downstream patch + management: Message-id, Patchwork-id, O-Subject, Acked-by, From + (RHBZ#1846481). + +Notes about the RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] -> +RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- Due to upstream commit 4b04d9d73604 ("OvmfPkg: Don't build in + QemuVideoDxe when we have CSM", 2019-06-26), the contexts of + "QemuVideoDxe.inf" / "QemuRamfbDxe.inf" have changed in the DSC files. + Resolve the conflict manually. + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- Upstream commit 1d25ff51af5c ("OvmfPkg: add QemuRamfbDxe", 2018-06-14) + introduced another GOP driver that consumes FrameBufferBltLib, and + thereby produces a large number of (mostly useless) debug messages at + the DEBUG_VERBOSE level. Extend the patch to suppress those messages in + both QemuVideoDxe and QemuRamfbDxe; update the subject accordingly. + QemuRamfbDxe itself doesn't log anything at the VERBOSE level (see also + the original commit message at the bottom of this downstream patch). + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no changes + +Bugzilla: 1488247 + +In commit 5b2291f9567a ("OvmfPkg: QemuVideoDxe uses +MdeModulePkg/FrameBufferLib"), QemuVideoDxe was rebased to +FrameBufferBltLib. + +The FrameBufferBltLib instance added in commit b1ca386074bd +("MdeModulePkg: Add FrameBufferBltLib library instance") logs many +messages on the VERBOSE level; for example, a normal boot with OVMF can +produce 500+ "VideoFill" messages, dependent on the progress bar, when the +VERBOSE bit is set in PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel. + +QemuVideoDxe itself doesn't log anything at the VERBOSE level, so we lose +none of its messages this way. + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini +(this patch was previously applied as commit 9b0d031dee7e823f6717bab73e422fbc6f0a6c52) +(cherry picked from commit 9122d5f2e8d8d289064d1e1700cb61964d9931f3) +(cherry picked from commit 7eb3be1d4ccafc26c11fe5afb95cc12b250ce6f0) +(cherry picked from commit bd650684712fb840dbcda5d6eaee065bd9e91fa1) +(cherry picked from commit b06b87f8ffd4fed4ef7eacb13689a9b6d111f850) +(cherry picked from commit c8c3f893e7c3710afe45c46839e97954871536e4) +(cherry picked from commit 1355849ad97c1e4a5c430597a377165a5cc118f7) +--- + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 10 ++++++++-- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 10 ++++++++-- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 10 ++++++++-- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 10 ++++++++-- + 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +index cef43b34b7..f53380aca2 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +@@ -691,8 +691,14 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/DisplayEngineDxe/DisplayEngineDxe.inf + +- OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf +- OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } ++ OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + + # +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index 270bd612e5..d942c7354a 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -828,8 +828,14 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/DisplayEngineDxe/DisplayEngineDxe.inf + +- OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf +- OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } ++ OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtHstiDxe/VirtHstiDxe.inf + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index 269a4b2b21..d915b847cb 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -842,8 +842,14 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/DisplayEngineDxe/DisplayEngineDxe.inf + +- OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf +- OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } ++ OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtHstiDxe/VirtHstiDxe.inf + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index 9614cc1c56..12ee5510bd 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -910,8 +910,14 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/DisplayEngineDxe/DisplayEngineDxe.inf + +- OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf +- OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } ++ OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtHstiDxe/VirtHstiDxe.inf + diff --git a/SOURCES/0009-ArmVirtPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuR.patch b/SOURCES/0009-ArmVirtPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuR.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4de197b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0009-ArmVirtPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuR.patch @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +From 511531fe074c28dd8139f722b25979df1995e492 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 03:05:18 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] ArmVirtPkg: silence DEBUG_VERBOSE (0x00400000) in + QemuRamfbDxe (RH only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] -> +RHEL-8.5/20210520-e1999b264f1f [edk2-stable202105] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] -> +RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- The previous version of this patch (downstream commit 76b4ac28e975) + caused a regression (RHBZ#1714446), which was fixed up in downstream + commit 5a216abaa737 ("ArmVirtPkg: silence DEBUG_VERBOSE masking + ~0x00400000 in QemuRamfbDxe (RH only)", 2019-08-05). + + Squash the fixup into the original patch. Fuse the commit messages. + (Acked-by tags are not preserved, lest we confuse ourselves while + reviewing this rebase.) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- new patch, due to upstream commit c64688f36a8b ("ArmVirtPkg: add + QemuRamfbDxe", 2018-06-14) + +QemuRamfbDxe uses FrameBufferLib. The FrameBufferBltLib instance added in +commit b1ca386074bd ("MdeModulePkg: Add FrameBufferBltLib library +instance") logs many messages on the VERBOSE level; for example, a normal +boot with ArmVirtQemu[Kernel] can produce 500+ "VideoFill" messages, +dependent on the progress bar, when the VERBOSE bit is set in +PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel. + +Clear the VERBOSE bit without touching other bits -- those other bits +differ between the "silent" and "verbose" builds, so we can't set them as +constants. + +QemuRamfbDxe itself doesn't log anything at the VERBOSE level, so we lose +none of its messages, with the VERBOSE bit clear. + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit 76b4ac28e975bd63c25db903a1d42c47b38cc756) +Reported-by: Andrew Jones +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude +(cherry picked from commit 5a216abaa737195327235e37563b18a6bf2a74dc) +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit e5b8152bced2364a1ded0926dbba4d65e23e3f84) +(cherry picked from commit e7f57f154439c1c18ea5030b01f8d7bc492698b2) +--- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc | 5 ++++- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc | 5 ++++- + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +index c37c4ba61e..00e656d0c9 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +@@ -546,7 +546,10 @@ + # + # Video support + # +- OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|($(DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR_LEVEL)) & 0xFFBFFFFF ++ } + OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc +index 2cf96accbd..c7918c8cf3 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc +@@ -450,7 +450,10 @@ + # + # Video support + # +- OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf ++ OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|($(DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR_LEVEL)) & 0xFFBFFFFF ++ } + OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf + diff --git a/SOURCES/0010-OvmfPkg-QemuRamfbDxe-Do-not-report-DXE-failure-on-Aa.patch b/SOURCES/0010-OvmfPkg-QemuRamfbDxe-Do-not-report-DXE-failure-on-Aa.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..08fcb0b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0010-OvmfPkg-QemuRamfbDxe-Do-not-report-DXE-failure-on-Aa.patch @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +From 3bf394bd43a4cf00c2b52b965b47b8194a406166 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Philippe Mathieu-Daude +Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2019 20:43:48 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: QemuRamfbDxe: Do not report DXE failure on Aarch64 + silent builds (RH only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] -> +RHEL-8.5/20210520-e1999b264f1f [edk2-stable202105] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] -> +RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- We have to carry this downstream-only patch -- committed originally as + aaaedc1e2cfd -- indefinitely. + +- To avoid confusion, remove the tags from the commit message that had + been added by the downstream maintainer scripts, such as: Message-id, + Patchwork-id, O-Subject, Acked-by. These remain available on the + original downstream commit. The Bugzilla line is preserved, as it + doesn't relate to a specific posting, but to the problem. + +Bugzilla: 1714446 + +To suppress an error message on the silent build when ramfb is +not configured, change QemuRamfbDxe to return EFI_SUCCESS even +when it fails. +Some memory is wasted (driver stays resident without +any good use), but it is mostly harmless, as the memory +is released by the OS after ExitBootServices(). + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude +(cherry picked from commit aaaedc1e2cfd55ef003fb1b5a37c73a196b26dc7) +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +(cherry picked from commit aa2b66b18a62d652bdbefae7b5732297294306ca) +(cherry picked from commit deb3451034326b75fd760aba47a5171493ff055e) +--- + OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfb.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf | 1 + + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfb.c b/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfb.c +index 5a1044f0dc..83c6d26c74 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfb.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfb.c +@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -259,6 +260,19 @@ InitializeQemuRamfb ( + + Status = QemuFwCfgFindFile ("etc/ramfb", &mRamfbFwCfgItem, &FwCfgSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++#if defined (MDE_CPU_AARCH64) ++ // ++ // RHBZ#1714446 ++ // If no ramfb device was configured, this platform DXE driver should ++ // returns EFI_NOT_FOUND, so the DXE Core can unload it. However, even ++ // using a silent build, an error message is issued to the guest console. ++ // Since this confuse users, return success and stay resident. The wasted ++ // guest RAM still gets freed later after ExitBootServices(). ++ // ++ if (GetDebugPrintErrorLevel () == DEBUG_ERROR) { ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++ } ++#endif + return EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf +index e3890b8c20..f79a4bc987 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ + BaseLib + BaseMemoryLib + DebugLib ++ DebugPrintErrorLevelLib + DevicePathLib + FrameBufferBltLib + MemoryAllocationLib diff --git a/SOURCES/0011-OvmfPkg-silence-EFI_D_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-NvmExpre.patch b/SOURCES/0011-OvmfPkg-silence-EFI_D_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-NvmExpre.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d81f03a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0011-OvmfPkg-silence-EFI_D_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-NvmExpre.patch @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +From b9ac7e96d76caa161d1689c0436551e95728ac0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paolo Bonzini +Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 00:57:47 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: silence EFI_D_VERBOSE (0x00400000) in NvmExpressDxe + (RH only) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] -> +RHEL-8.5/20210520-e1999b264f1f [edk2-stable202105] rebase: + +- Extend the DSC change to the new OvmfPkg/AmdSev platform, which has been + introduced upstream in commit 30d277ed7a82 ("OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit + to build encrypted boot specific OVMF", 2020-12-14), for TianoCore#3077. + +- Remove obsolete commit message tags related to downstream patch + management: Message-id, Patchwork-id, O-Subject, Acked-by, From + (RHBZ#1846481). + +Notes about the RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] -> +RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] -> +RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 -> +RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase: + +- no change + +Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 -> +RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like + a blog: place more recent entries near the top +- no changes to the patch body + +Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase: + +- no changes + +Bugzilla: 1488247 + +NvmExpressDxe logs all BlockIo read & write calls on the EFI_D_VERBOSE +level. + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini +(this patch was previously applied as commit 5f432837b9c60c2929b13dda1a1b488d5c3a6d2f) +(cherry picked from commit 33e00146eb878588ad1395d7b1ae38f401729da4) +(cherry picked from commit bd10cabcfcb1bc9a32b05062f4ee3792e27bc2d8) +(cherry picked from commit 5a27af700f49e00608f232f618dedd7bf5e9b3e6) +(cherry picked from commit 58bba429b9ec7b78109940ef945d0dc93f3cd958) +(cherry picked from commit b8d0ebded8c2cf5b266c807519e2d8ccfd66fee6) +(cherry picked from commit ed89844b47f46cfe911f1bf2bda40e537a908502) +--- + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 5 ++++- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 5 ++++- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 5 ++++- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 5 ++++- + 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +index f53380aca2..32f47704bc 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +@@ -686,7 +686,10 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaAtapiPassThru/AtaAtapiPassThru.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaBusDxe/AtaBusDxe.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + MdeModulePkg/Universal/HiiDatabaseDxe/HiiDatabaseDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/DisplayEngineDxe/DisplayEngineDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index d942c7354a..49540d54d0 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -823,7 +823,10 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaAtapiPassThru/AtaAtapiPassThru.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaBusDxe/AtaBusDxe.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + MdeModulePkg/Universal/HiiDatabaseDxe/HiiDatabaseDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/DisplayEngineDxe/DisplayEngineDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index d915b847cb..1c4e0514ed 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -837,7 +837,10 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaAtapiPassThru/AtaAtapiPassThru.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaBusDxe/AtaBusDxe.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + MdeModulePkg/Universal/HiiDatabaseDxe/HiiDatabaseDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/DisplayEngineDxe/DisplayEngineDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index 12ee5510bd..e50e63b3f6 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -905,7 +905,10 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaAtapiPassThru/AtaAtapiPassThru.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaBusDxe/AtaBusDxe.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf ++ MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf { ++ ++ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F ++ } + MdeModulePkg/Universal/HiiDatabaseDxe/HiiDatabaseDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/DisplayEngineDxe/DisplayEngineDxe.inf diff --git a/SOURCES/0012-OvmfPkg-QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe-suppress-error-on-no-k.patch b/SOURCES/0012-OvmfPkg-QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe-suppress-error-on-no-k.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f928ba --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0012-OvmfPkg-QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe-suppress-error-on-no-k.patch @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +From 8c67b1b96e42c39a3562c8790ae5985a240edfce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2020 11:31:36 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe: suppress error on no "-kernel" + in silent aa64 build (RH) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] -> +RHEL-8.5/20210520-e1999b264f1f [edk2-stable202105] rebase: + +- Remove obsolete commit message tags related to downstream patch + management: Message-id, Patchwork-id, O-Subject, Acked-by, From, + RH-Acked-by, RH-Author (RHBZ#1846481). + +Bugzilla: 1844682 + +If the "-kernel" QEMU option is not used, then QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe +should return EFI_NOT_FOUND, so that the DXE Core can unload it. However, +the associated error message, logged by the DXE Core to the serial +console, is not desired in the silent edk2-aarch64 build, given that the +absence of "-kernel" is nothing out of the ordinary. Therefore, return +success and stay resident. The wasted guest RAM still gets freed after +ExitBootServices(). + +(Inspired by RHEL-8.1.0 commit aaaedc1e2cfd.) + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +(cherry picked from commit 9adcdf493ebbd11efb74e2905ab5f6c8996e096d) +--- + .../QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ + .../QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.inf | 1 + + 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c +index 3c12085f6c..e192809198 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c +@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -1081,6 +1082,22 @@ QemuKernelLoaderFsDxeEntrypoint ( + + if (KernelBlob->Data == NULL) { + Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++#if defined (MDE_CPU_AARCH64) ++ // ++ // RHBZ#1844682 ++ // ++ // If the "-kernel" QEMU option is not being used, this platform DXE driver ++ // should return EFI_NOT_FOUND, so that the DXE Core can unload it. ++ // However, the associated error message, logged by the DXE Core to the ++ // serial console, is not desired in the silent edk2-aarch64 build, given ++ // that the absence of "-kernel" is nothing out of the ordinary. Therefore, ++ // return success and stay resident. The wasted guest RAM still gets freed ++ // after ExitBootServices(). ++ // ++ if (GetDebugPrintErrorLevel () == DEBUG_ERROR) { ++ Status = EFI_SUCCESS; ++ } ++#endif + goto FreeBlobs; + } + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.inf +index 7b35adb8e0..23d9f5fca1 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.inf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.inf +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + BaseLib + BaseMemoryLib + DebugLib ++ DebugPrintErrorLevelLib + DevicePathLib + MemoryAllocationLib + QemuFwCfgLib diff --git a/SOURCES/0013-SecurityPkg-Tcg2Dxe-suppress-error-on-no-swtpm-in-si.patch b/SOURCES/0013-SecurityPkg-Tcg2Dxe-suppress-error-on-no-swtpm-in-si.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02d0290 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0013-SecurityPkg-Tcg2Dxe-suppress-error-on-no-swtpm-in-si.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From de3d6fb999bd464f08c11b879cb4587295f3c0b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Laszlo Ersek +Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2020 11:40:09 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] SecurityPkg/Tcg2Dxe: suppress error on no swtpm in silent + aa64 build (RH) + +Notes about the RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] -> +RHEL-8.5/20210520-e1999b264f1f [edk2-stable202105] rebase: + +- Remove obsolete commit message tags related to downstream patch + management: Message-id, Patchwork-id, O-Subject, Acked-by, From, + RH-Acked-by, RH-Author (RHBZ#1846481). + +Bugzilla: 1844682 + +If swtpm / vTPM2 is not being used, Tcg2Dxe should return EFI_UNSUPPORTED, +so that the DXE Core can unload it. However, the associated error message, +logged by the DXE Core to the serial console, is not desired in the silent +edk2-aarch64 build, given that the absence of swtpm / vTPM2 is nothing out +of the ordinary. Therefore, return success and stay resident. The wasted +guest RAM still gets freed after ExitBootServices(). + +(Inspired by RHEL-8.1.0 commit aaaedc1e2cfd.) + +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +(cherry picked from commit cbce29f7749477e271f9764fed82de94724af5df) +--- + SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ + SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.inf | 1 + + 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.c +index b55b6c12d2..0be885c391 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.c +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + #include + + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -2743,6 +2744,22 @@ DriverEntry ( + CompareGuid (PcdGetPtr (PcdTpmInstanceGuid), &gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid)) + { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "No TPM2 instance required!\n")); ++#if defined (MDE_CPU_AARCH64) ++ // ++ // RHBZ#1844682 ++ // ++ // If swtpm / vTPM2 is not being used, this driver should return ++ // EFI_UNSUPPORTED, so that the DXE Core can unload it. However, the ++ // associated error message, logged by the DXE Core to the serial console, ++ // is not desired in the silent edk2-aarch64 build, given that the absence ++ // of swtpm / vTPM2 is nothing out of the ordinary. Therefore, return ++ // success and stay resident. The wasted guest RAM still gets freed after ++ // ExitBootServices(). ++ // ++ if (GetDebugPrintErrorLevel () == DEBUG_ERROR) { ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++ } ++#endif + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.inf b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.inf +index a645474bf3..dbb7a52f33 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.inf ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.inf +@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ + UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib + BaseMemoryLib + DebugLib ++ DebugPrintErrorLevelLib + Tpm2CommandLib + PrintLib + UefiLib diff --git a/SOURCES/0014-OvmfPkg-Remove-EbcDxe-RHEL-only.patch b/SOURCES/0014-OvmfPkg-Remove-EbcDxe-RHEL-only.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24bdc73 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0014-OvmfPkg-Remove-EbcDxe-RHEL-only.patch @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +From 3208551a4a7934a905ba33dde70bfea37c9a95af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 20:28:49 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: Remove EbcDxe (RHEL only) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-MergeRequest: 3: Disable features for RHEL9 +RH-Commit: [2/19] 6777c3dc453e4aecddc20216f783ba2a5acccaa0 +RH-Bugzilla: 1967747 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek + +Remove EFI Byte Code interpreter. + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 1 - + 8 files changed, 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +index 32f47704bc..6b6e108d11 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +@@ -611,7 +611,6 @@ + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfTpmSecurityStub.dsc.inc + } + +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf + UefiCpuPkg/CpuIo2Dxe/CpuIo2Dxe.inf + UefiCpuPkg/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf + OvmfPkg/LocalApicTimerDxe/LocalApicTimerDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf +index 595945181c..c176043482 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf +@@ -212,7 +212,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/PCD/Dxe/Pcd.inf + + INF MdeModulePkg/Core/RuntimeDxe/RuntimeDxe.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStubDxe.inf +-INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf + INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuIo2Dxe/CpuIo2Dxe.inf + INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/LocalApicTimerDxe/LocalApicTimerDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index 49540d54d0..d368aa11fe 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -746,7 +746,6 @@ + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfTpmSecurityStub.dsc.inc + } + +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf + UefiCpuPkg/CpuIo2Dxe/CpuIo2Dxe.inf + UefiCpuPkg/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf + OvmfPkg/LocalApicTimerDxe/LocalApicTimerDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +index 0d4abb50a8..ef933def99 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +@@ -216,7 +216,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/PCD/Dxe/Pcd.inf + + INF MdeModulePkg/Core/RuntimeDxe/RuntimeDxe.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStubDxe.inf +-INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf + INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuIo2Dxe/CpuIo2Dxe.inf + INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/LocalApicTimerDxe/LocalApicTimerDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index 1c4e0514ed..cf09bdf785 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -760,7 +760,6 @@ + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfTpmSecurityStub.dsc.inc + } + +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf + UefiCpuPkg/CpuIo2Dxe/CpuIo2Dxe.inf + UefiCpuPkg/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf + OvmfPkg/LocalApicTimerDxe/LocalApicTimerDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +index 23a825a012..0cd98ada5a 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +@@ -217,7 +217,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/PCD/Dxe/Pcd.inf + + INF MdeModulePkg/Core/RuntimeDxe/RuntimeDxe.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStubDxe.inf +-INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf + INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuIo2Dxe/CpuIo2Dxe.inf + INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/LocalApicTimerDxe/LocalApicTimerDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index e50e63b3f6..098d569381 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -805,7 +805,6 @@ + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfTpmSecurityStub.dsc.inc + } + +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf + UefiCpuPkg/CpuIo2Dxe/CpuIo2Dxe.inf + + UefiCpuPkg/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf { +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +index 4dcd6a033c..b201505214 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +@@ -245,7 +245,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/PCD/Dxe/Pcd.inf + + INF MdeModulePkg/Core/RuntimeDxe/RuntimeDxe.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStubDxe.inf +-INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf + INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuIo2Dxe/CpuIo2Dxe.inf + + INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf diff --git a/SOURCES/0015-OvmfPkg-Remove-VirtioGpu-device-driver-RHEL-only.patch b/SOURCES/0015-OvmfPkg-Remove-VirtioGpu-device-driver-RHEL-only.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c07086a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0015-OvmfPkg-Remove-VirtioGpu-device-driver-RHEL-only.patch @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +From 42becc4c97abe443d06bb128a4b7d5e279842715 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 20:28:59 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: Remove VirtioGpu device driver (RHEL only) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-MergeRequest: 3: Disable features for RHEL9 +RH-Commit: [4/19] f0a41317291f2e9e3b5bd3125149c3866f23ab08 +RH-Bugzilla: 1967747 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek + +QemuVideoDxe binds virtio-vga, so VirtioGpu is not needed. + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 1 - + 8 files changed, 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +index 6b6e108d11..5461c1290d 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +@@ -701,7 +701,6 @@ + + gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F + } +- OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + + # + # ISA Support +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf +index c176043482..10538a0465 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf +@@ -300,7 +300,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbMassStorageDxe/UsbMassStorageDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf + + INF OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + INF OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf + INF OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index d368aa11fe..40e78014c4 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -838,7 +838,6 @@ + + gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F + } +- OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtHstiDxe/VirtHstiDxe.inf + + # +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +index ef933def99..68d59968ec 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +@@ -317,7 +317,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbMassStorageDxe/UsbMassStorageDxe.inf + + INF OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + INF OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf + INF OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtHstiDxe/VirtHstiDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index cf09bdf785..6ade9aa0ef 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -852,7 +852,6 @@ + + gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F + } +- OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtHstiDxe/VirtHstiDxe.inf + + # +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +index 0cd98ada5a..8891d96422 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +@@ -323,7 +323,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbMassStorageDxe/UsbMassStorageDxe.inf + + INF OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + INF OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf + INF OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index 098d569381..8563835ae5 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -920,7 +920,6 @@ + + gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugPrintErrorLevel|0x8000004F + } +- OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtHstiDxe/VirtHstiDxe.inf + + # +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +index b201505214..06ac4423da 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +@@ -356,7 +356,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbMassStorageDxe/UsbMassStorageDxe.inf + + INF OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + INF OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf + INF OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuDxe.inf diff --git a/SOURCES/0016-OvmfPkg-Remove-VirtioFsDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-on.patch b/SOURCES/0016-OvmfPkg-Remove-VirtioFsDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-on.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9aec177 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0016-OvmfPkg-Remove-VirtioFsDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-on.patch @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +From 67e5739ca9ba906914aade6b5ad84c420ad9af29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 20:29:13 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: Remove VirtioFsDxe filesystem driver (RHEL only) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-MergeRequest: 3: Disable features for RHEL9 +RH-Commit: [9/19] b40d8a6b9c38568a74fb922b12bbae9f0e721f95 +RH-Bugzilla: 1967747 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek + +Remove the virtio-fs driver. + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 1 - + 6 files changed, 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index 40e78014c4..afd2a3c5c0 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -816,7 +816,6 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf + FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf +- OvmfPkg/VirtioFsDxe/VirtioFsDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiBusDxe/ScsiBusDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiDiskDxe/ScsiDiskDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +index 68d59968ec..c392b96470 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +@@ -290,7 +290,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResour + + INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioFsDxe/VirtioFsDxe.inf + + INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index 6ade9aa0ef..f5a4c57c8e 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -830,7 +830,6 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf + FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf +- OvmfPkg/VirtioFsDxe/VirtioFsDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiBusDxe/ScsiBusDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiDiskDxe/ScsiDiskDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +index 8891d96422..6278daeeee 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +@@ -291,7 +291,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResour + + INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioFsDxe/VirtioFsDxe.inf + + INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index 8563835ae5..08b73a64c9 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -898,7 +898,6 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf + FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf +- OvmfPkg/VirtioFsDxe/VirtioFsDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiBusDxe/ScsiBusDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiDiskDxe/ScsiDiskDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +index 06ac4423da..fc4b6dd3a4 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +@@ -322,7 +322,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResour + + INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioFsDxe/VirtioFsDxe.inf + + INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf + diff --git a/SOURCES/0017-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-VirtioFsDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL.patch b/SOURCES/0017-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-VirtioFsDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7936459 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0017-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-VirtioFsDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From 9827ce562f432da36410ef0e9ce6d7971e502b99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 20:29:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] ArmVirtPkg: Remove VirtioFsDxe filesystem driver (RHEL only) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-MergeRequest: 3: Disable features for RHEL9 +RH-Commit: [10/19] 808ad4385c24fbf34fb0ba359808e6d364e1d030 +RH-Bugzilla: 1967747 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek + +Remove the virtio-fs driver. + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc | 1 - + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc | 1 - + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc | 1 - + 3 files changed, 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +index 00e656d0c9..d1deccaadc 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +@@ -464,7 +464,6 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf + FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf +- OvmfPkg/VirtioFsDxe/VirtioFsDxe.inf + + # + # Bds +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +index 38906004d7..7205274bed 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE + INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf +- INF OvmfPkg/VirtioFsDxe/VirtioFsDxe.inf + + # + # Status Code Routing +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc +index c7918c8cf3..9643fd5427 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc +@@ -368,7 +368,6 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf + FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf +- OvmfPkg/VirtioFsDxe/VirtioFsDxe.inf + + # + # Bds diff --git a/SOURCES/0018-OvmfPkg-Remove-UdfDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-only.patch b/SOURCES/0018-OvmfPkg-Remove-UdfDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-only.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..33be900 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0018-OvmfPkg-Remove-UdfDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-only.patch @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +From 98e35df340a8a5cd18cb386361c7da6350c54800 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 20:29:19 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: Remove UdfDxe filesystem driver (RHEL only) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-MergeRequest: 3: Disable features for RHEL9 +RH-Commit: [11/19] 21614de37221fca27d4eec0f03c5c8bce5911af3 +RH-Bugzilla: 1967747 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek + +Remove the UDF driver. + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 1 - + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 1 - + 8 files changed, 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +index 5461c1290d..cf1ad83e09 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +@@ -679,7 +679,6 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/RamDiskDxe/RamDiskDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf + FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiBusDxe/ScsiBusDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiDiskDxe/ScsiDiskDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf +index 10538a0465..c56c98dc85 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf +@@ -280,7 +280,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootScriptExecutorDxe/BootScriptExecutorDxe.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe.inf + + INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf +-INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + + INF OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/AmdSev/Grub/Grub.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index afd2a3c5c0..d8ae542686 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -815,7 +815,6 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/RamDiskDxe/RamDiskDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf + FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiBusDxe/ScsiBusDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiDiskDxe/ScsiDiskDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +index c392b96470..0ffa3be750 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +@@ -289,7 +289,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootScriptExecutorDxe/BootScriptExecutorDxe.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe.inf + + INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf +-INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + + INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index f5a4c57c8e..52ac2c96fc 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -829,7 +829,6 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/RamDiskDxe/RamDiskDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf + FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiBusDxe/ScsiBusDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiDiskDxe/ScsiDiskDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +index 6278daeeee..c4f3ec0735 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +@@ -290,7 +290,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootScriptExecutorDxe/BootScriptExecutorDxe.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe.inf + + INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf +-INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + + INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index 08b73a64c9..f76d0ef7bc 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -897,7 +897,6 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/RamDiskDxe/RamDiskDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf + FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiBusDxe/ScsiBusDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiDiskDxe/ScsiDiskDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +index fc4b6dd3a4..bedd85ef7a 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +@@ -321,7 +321,6 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootScriptExecutorDxe/BootScriptExecutorDxe.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe.inf + + INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf +-INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + + INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf + diff --git a/SOURCES/0019-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-UdfDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-only.patch b/SOURCES/0019-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-UdfDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-only.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a0c6376 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0019-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-UdfDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-only.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From 9b039f2eb195f37b724f86efc31c8a4d6abd217d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 20:29:22 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] ArmVirtPkg: Remove UdfDxe filesystem driver (RHEL only) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-MergeRequest: 3: Disable features for RHEL9 +RH-Commit: [12/19] fcadb6a747b65e4d449d48131c9a2eeed4bd3c9a +RH-Bugzilla: 1967747 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek + +Remove the UDF driver. + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc | 1 - + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc | 1 - + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc | 1 - + 3 files changed, 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +index d1deccaadc..f91bb09fa3 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +@@ -463,7 +463,6 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/PartitionDxe/PartitionDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf + FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + + # + # Bds +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +index 7205274bed..24a9dac2fd 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/PartitionDxe/PartitionDxe.inf + INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf +- INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + + # + # Status Code Routing +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc +index 9643fd5427..c2825aa4c2 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc +@@ -367,7 +367,6 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/PartitionDxe/PartitionDxe.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf + FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf + + # + # Bds diff --git a/SOURCES/0020-OvmfPkg-Remove-TftpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL-on.patch b/SOURCES/0020-OvmfPkg-Remove-TftpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL-on.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c57a7d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0020-OvmfPkg-Remove-TftpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL-on.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From d417cfeb0ed76b3187b44e2491611f55d6de33b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 20:29:25 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: Remove TftpDynamicCommand from shell (RHEL only) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +rebase to edk2-stable202405: + +rewrite due to shell build config being moved to an include file + +RH-Author: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-MergeRequest: 3: Disable features for RHEL9 +RH-Commit: [13/19] cf9ef346386ac89fa05b29d429d8d1b27cf0e3b0 +RH-Bugzilla: 1967747 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek + +Remove the command to download files in the shell via TFTP. + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc | 4 ---- + OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc | 1 - + 2 files changed, 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc +index 4075688e41..3663938054 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc +@@ -6,10 +6,6 @@ + + !if $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) != "XCODE5" + !if $(NETWORK_ENABLE) == TRUE +- ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand.inf { +- +- gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE +- } + ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand.inf { + + gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc +index 38f69747b0..1637083ff1 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc +@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ + + !if $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) != "XCODE5" + !if $(NETWORK_ENABLE) == TRUE +-INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand.inf + INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand.inf + !endif + INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand.inf diff --git a/SOURCES/0021-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-TftpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL.patch b/SOURCES/0021-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-TftpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff09c46 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0021-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-TftpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From b548dd4acf23412e9266be15d65d7f8cfccbf028 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 20:29:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] ArmVirtPkg: Remove TftpDynamicCommand from shell (RHEL only) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +RH-Author: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-MergeRequest: 3: Disable features for RHEL9 +RH-Commit: [14/19] 12436014941bd4a7c99a26d779ebdcd75f169403 +RH-Bugzilla: 1967747 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek + +Remove the command to download files in the shell via TFTP. + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 7 +++---- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc | 1 - + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc +index 7044790a1e..ee98673e98 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc +@@ -391,10 +391,9 @@ + # + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/RamDiskDxe/RamDiskDxe.inf + +- ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand.inf { +- +- gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE +- } ++ # ++ # UEFI application (Shell Embedded Boot Loader) ++ # + ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand.inf { + + gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +index 24a9dac2fd..1341de0a2f 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf + + INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf +- INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand/TftpDynamicCommand.inf + INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand.inf + INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand.inf + INF OvmfPkg/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand.inf diff --git a/SOURCES/0022-OvmfPkg-Remove-HttpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL-on.patch b/SOURCES/0022-OvmfPkg-Remove-HttpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL-on.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e5ba58 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0022-OvmfPkg-Remove-HttpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL-on.patch @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From 8a68c775e8ba00da3d725396fd8c78f67fbc8697 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 20:29:31 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: Remove HttpDynamicCommand from shell (RHEL only) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +rebase to edk2-stable202405: + +rewrite due to shell build config being moved to an include file + +Rebase to edk2-stable202311: + +Minor update, context change due to new variable policy shell command. + +RH-Author: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-MergeRequest: 3: Disable features for RHEL9 +RH-Commit: [15/19] 1911cf04f27467ef1175b1976864c1111d93d19e +RH-Bugzilla: 1967747 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek + +Remove the command to download files in the shell via HTTP(S). + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc | 6 ------ + OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc | 3 --- + 2 files changed, 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc +index 3663938054..a568f1ecc5 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc +@@ -5,12 +5,6 @@ + !if $(BUILD_SHELL) == TRUE + + !if $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) != "XCODE5" +-!if $(NETWORK_ENABLE) == TRUE +- ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand.inf { +- +- gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE +- } +-!endif + ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand.inf { + + gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc +index 1637083ff1..c0118a46e2 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc +@@ -5,9 +5,6 @@ + !if $(BUILD_SHELL) == TRUE && $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == FALSE + + !if $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) != "XCODE5" +-!if $(NETWORK_ENABLE) == TRUE +-INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand.inf +-!endif + INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand.inf + INF OvmfPkg/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand.inf + !endif diff --git a/SOURCES/0023-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-HttpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL.patch b/SOURCES/0023-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-HttpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..331cf73 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0023-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-HttpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From 1f15cf34691e2f9604ee6efe142c2d710aad579c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 20:29:34 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] ArmVirtPkg: Remove HttpDynamicCommand from shell (RHEL only) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Rebase to edk2-stable202311: + +Minor update, context change due to new variable policy shell command. + +RH-Author: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-MergeRequest: 3: Disable features for RHEL9 +RH-Commit: [16/19] 07a74f1fdcdbb9a31d25ce9760edcd852e9574c3 +RH-Bugzilla: 1967747 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek + +Remove the command to download files in the shell via HTTP(S). + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 4 ---- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc | 1 - + 2 files changed, 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc +index ee98673e98..996b4ddfc4 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc +@@ -394,10 +394,6 @@ + # + # UEFI application (Shell Embedded Boot Loader) + # +- ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand.inf { +- +- gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE +- } + ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand.inf { + + gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +index 1341de0a2f..b49bf7ad4e 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf + + INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf +- INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand/HttpDynamicCommand.inf + INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand.inf + INF OvmfPkg/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand.inf + diff --git a/SOURCES/0024-OvmfPkg-Remove-LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand-RHEL-o.patch b/SOURCES/0024-OvmfPkg-Remove-LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand-RHEL-o.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c457ccc --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0024-OvmfPkg-Remove-LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand-RHEL-o.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From cd1746c9920e93bf40994172881bc13cf185991c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 20:29:39 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: Remove LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand (RHEL only) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +rebase to edk2-stable202405: + +rewrite due to shell build config being moved to an include file + +Rebase to edk2-stable202311: + +Minor update, context change due to new variable policy shell command. + +RH-Author: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-MergeRequest: 3: Disable features for RHEL9 +RH-Commit: [17/19] 491fe1301ea29c7cb56c20272e45614d5fcb6f14 +RH-Bugzilla: 1967747 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek + +Remove the command to register a file in the shell as the +initial ramdisk for a UEFI stubbed kernel, to be booted next. + +Note: as further dynamic shell commands might show up upstream, +we intentionally preserve the empty !ifdef'ry context to ease +future downstream rebases. + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc | 4 ---- + OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc | 1 - + 2 files changed, 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc +index a568f1ecc5..f7e0f5e90e 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc +@@ -9,10 +9,6 @@ + + gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE + } +- OvmfPkg/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand.inf { +- +- gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE +- } + !endif + + ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf { +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc +index c0118a46e2..dced75e388 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc +@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ + + !if $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) != "XCODE5" + INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand.inf + !endif + + INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf diff --git a/SOURCES/0025-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand-RHE.patch b/SOURCES/0025-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand-RHE.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2eb4418 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0025-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand-RHE.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From ec9c5e512252964f28c493d10b9f484b88c87c13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 20:29:46 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] ArmVirtPkg: Remove LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand (RHEL only) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Rebase to edk2-stable202311: + +Minor update, context change due to new variable policy shell command. + +RH-Author: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +RH-MergeRequest: 3: Disable features for RHEL9 +RH-Commit: [18/19] 8f4e4007108462533e3d2050b84d8830073a7c0d +RH-Bugzilla: 1967747 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek + +Remove the command to register a file in the shell as the initial +ramdisk for a UEFI stubbed kernel, to be booted next. + +Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé +Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina +--- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 10 +++------- + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc | 1 - + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc +index 996b4ddfc4..2561e10ff5 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc +@@ -391,17 +391,13 @@ + # + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/RamDiskDxe/RamDiskDxe.inf + +- # +- # UEFI application (Shell Embedded Boot Loader) +- # ++ # ++ # UEFI application (Shell Embedded Boot Loader) ++ # + ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand.inf { + + gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE + } +- OvmfPkg/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand.inf { +- +- gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE +- } + ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf { + + ShellCommandLib|ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellCommandLib/UefiShellCommandLib.inf +diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +index b49bf7ad4e..753afd799b 100644 +--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc ++++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc +@@ -101,7 +101,6 @@ READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE + + INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf + INF ShellPkg/DynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand/VariablePolicyDynamicCommand.inf +- INF OvmfPkg/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand.inf + + # + # Bds diff --git a/SOURCES/0026-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-fix-apic-mode-for-cpu-hotplug.patch b/SOURCES/0026-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-fix-apic-mode-for-cpu-hotplug.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..97dd035 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0026-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-fix-apic-mode-for-cpu-hotplug.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 3d02fb6da82331176952e480160223136679ce74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 15:47:00 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: fix apic mode for cpu hotplug + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 42: UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: fix apic mode for cpu hotplug +RH-Bugzilla: 2124143 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [1/1] 5168501c31541a57aaeb3b3bd7c3602205eb7cdf (kraxel/centos-edk2) + +In case the number of CPUs can in increase beyond 255 +due to CPU hotplug choose x2apic mode. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann + +patch_name: edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-fix-apic-mode-for-cpu-hotplug.patch +present_in_specfile: true +location_in_specfile: 38 +--- + UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c | 8 +++++++- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c +index d724456502..c478878bb0 100644 +--- a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c ++++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c +@@ -534,7 +534,9 @@ CollectProcessorCount ( + // + // Enable x2APIC mode if + // 1. Number of CPU is greater than 255; or +- // 2. There are any logical processors reporting an Initial APIC ID of 255 or greater. ++ // 2. The platform exposed the exact *boot* CPU count to us in advance, and ++ // more than 255 logical processors are possible later, with hotplug; or ++ // 3. There are any logical processors reporting an Initial APIC ID of 255 or greater. + // + X2Apic = FALSE; + if (CpuMpData->CpuCount > 255) { +@@ -542,6 +544,10 @@ CollectProcessorCount ( + // If there are more than 255 processor found, force to enable X2APIC + // + X2Apic = TRUE; ++ } else if ((PcdGet32 (PcdCpuBootLogicalProcessorNumber) > 0) && ++ (PcdGet32 (PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber) > 255)) ++ { ++ X2Apic = TRUE; + } else { + CpuInfoInHob = (CPU_INFO_IN_HOB *)(UINTN)CpuMpData->CpuInfoInHob; + for (Index = 0; Index < CpuMpData->CpuCount; Index++) { diff --git a/SOURCES/0027-OvmfPkg-AmdSevDxe-Shim-Reboot-workaround-RHEL-only.patch b/SOURCES/0027-OvmfPkg-AmdSevDxe-Shim-Reboot-workaround-RHEL-only.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8148351 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0027-OvmfPkg-AmdSevDxe-Shim-Reboot-workaround-RHEL-only.patch @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +From c916516d37fb50c187020bd01da21cca85c8e83a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Oliver Steffen +Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2023 12:09:40 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: Shim Reboot workaround (RHEL only) + +RH-Author: Oliver Steffen +RH-MergeRequest: 46: OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: Shim Reboot workaround (RHEL only) +RH-Bugzilla: 2218196 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Commit: [1/1] 9bf3bb989e36253aa34bf82ecfe8faa7312e8d22 (osteffen/edk2) + +Add a callback at the end of the Dxe phase that sets the +"FB_NO_REBOOT" variable under the Shim GUID. +This is a workaround for a boot loop in case a confidential +guest that uses shim is booted with a vtpm device present. + +BZ 2218196 + +Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen + +patch_name: edk2-OvmfPkg-AmdSevDxe-Shim-Reboot-workaround-RHEL-only.patch +present_in_specfile: true +location_in_specfile: 44 +--- + OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c +index d497a343d3..0eb88e50ff 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c +@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -28,6 +29,10 @@ + // Present, initialized, tested bits defined in MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.h + #define EFI_MEMORY_INTERNAL_MASK 0x0700000000000000ULL + ++static EFI_GUID ShimLockGuid = { ++ 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, { 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 } ++}; ++ + STATIC + EFI_STATUS + AllocateConfidentialComputingBlob ( +@@ -191,6 +196,32 @@ STATIC EDKII_MEMORY_ACCEPT_PROTOCOL mMemoryAcceptProtocol = { + AmdSevMemoryAccept + }; + ++VOID ++EFIAPI ++PopulateVarstore ( ++ EFI_EVENT Event, ++ VOID *Context ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable = (EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *)Context; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Populating Varstore\n")); ++ UINT32 data = 1; ++ ++ Status = SystemTable->RuntimeServices->SetVariable ( ++ L"FB_NO_REBOOT", ++ &ShimLockGuid, ++ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS, ++ sizeof (data), ++ &data ++ ); ++ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ Status = SystemTable->BootServices->CloseEvent (Event); ++ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++} ++ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI + AmdSevDxeEntryPoint ( +@@ -203,6 +234,7 @@ AmdSevDxeEntryPoint ( + UINTN NumEntries; + UINTN Index; + CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION *SnpBootDxeTable; ++ EFI_EVENT PopulateVarstoreEvent; + + // + // Do nothing when SEV is not enabled +@@ -361,5 +393,15 @@ AmdSevDxeEntryPoint ( + ); + } + ++ Status = gBS->CreateEventEx ( ++ EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL, ++ TPL_CALLBACK, ++ PopulateVarstore, ++ SystemTable, ++ &gEfiEndOfDxeEventGroupGuid, ++ &PopulateVarstoreEvent ++ ); ++ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf +index e7c7d526c9..09cbd2b0ca 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf +@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ + [Guids] + gConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlobGuid + gEfiEventBeforeExitBootServicesGuid ++ gEfiEndOfDxeEventGroupGuid ## CONSUMES ## Event ++ + + [Pcd] + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfHostBridgePciDevId diff --git a/SOURCES/0028-CryptoPkg-CrtLib-add-stat.h-include-file.patch b/SOURCES/0028-CryptoPkg-CrtLib-add-stat.h-include-file.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b0a962 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0028-CryptoPkg-CrtLib-add-stat.h-include-file.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 7a07b2f16eabf460891a21c05b30cd9c2f875a2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 13:11:02 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] CryptoPkg/CrtLib: add stat.h include file. + +Needed by rhel downstream openssl patches. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +--- + CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/stat.h | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/stat.h + +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/stat.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/stat.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..22247bb2db +--- /dev/null ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/stat.h +@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ ++/** @file ++ Include file to support building the third-party cryptographic library. ++ ++Copyright (c) 2010 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
++SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ ++**/ ++ ++#include diff --git a/SOURCES/0029-CryptoPkg-CrtLib-add-access-open-read-write-close-sy.patch b/SOURCES/0029-CryptoPkg-CrtLib-add-access-open-read-write-close-sy.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b32c5bd --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0029-CryptoPkg-CrtLib-add-access-open-read-write-close-sy.patch @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +From 168cfe83b250d3166817549c1e96e6b1f02bcab4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 13:27:09 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] CryptoPkg/CrtLib: add access/open/read/write/close syscalls + +Needed by rhel downstream openssl patches, they use unix syscalls +for file access (instead of fopen + friends like the rest of the +code base). No actual file access is needed for edk2, so just +add stubs to make linking work. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +--- + .../Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++ + CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h | 41 +++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 87 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c +index 37cdecc9bd..dfdb635536 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c +@@ -550,6 +550,52 @@ fread ( + return 0; + } + ++int ++access( ++ const char*, ++ int ++ ) ++{ ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++int ++open ( ++ const char *, ++ int ++ ) ++{ ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++ssize_t ++read ( ++ int, ++ void*, ++ size_t ++ ) ++{ ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++ssize_t ++write ( ++ int, ++ const void*, ++ size_t ++ ) ++{ ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++int ++close ( ++ int ++ ) ++{ ++ return -1; ++} ++ + uid_t + getuid ( + void +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h +index f36fe08f0c..7d98496af8 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h +@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + // + // Definitions for global constants used by CRT library routines + // ++#define EINTR 4 + #define EINVAL 22 /* Invalid argument */ + #define EAFNOSUPPORT 47 /* Address family not supported by protocol family */ + #define INT_MAX 0x7FFFFFFF /* Maximum (signed) int value */ +@@ -102,6 +103,15 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + #define NS_INADDRSZ 4 /*%< IPv4 T_A */ + #define NS_IN6ADDRSZ 16 /*%< IPv6 T_AAAA */ + ++#define O_RDONLY 00000000 ++#define O_WRONLY 00000001 ++#define O_RDWR 00000002 ++ ++#define R_OK 4 ++#define W_OK 2 ++#define X_OK 1 ++#define F_OK 0 ++ + // + // Basic types mapping + // +@@ -324,6 +334,37 @@ fprintf ( + ... + ); + ++int ++access( ++ const char*, ++ int ++ ); ++ ++int ++open ( ++ const char *, ++ int ++ ); ++ ++ssize_t ++read ( ++ int, ++ void*, ++ size_t ++ ); ++ ++ssize_t ++write ( ++ int, ++ const void*, ++ size_t ++ ); ++ ++int ++close ( ++ int ++ ); ++ + time_t + time ( + time_t * diff --git a/SOURCES/0030-OvmfPkg-Sec-Setup-MTRR-early-in-the-boot-process.patch b/SOURCES/0030-OvmfPkg-Sec-Setup-MTRR-early-in-the-boot-process.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..63facbb --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0030-OvmfPkg-Sec-Setup-MTRR-early-in-the-boot-process.patch @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +From 4c49c1bcb2db128cc4d2ebb29b1ac53fe3ef6b18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:04:38 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process. + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 55: OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process. +RH-Jira: RHEL-21704 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [1/4] c4061788d34f409944898b48642d610c259161f3 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2) + +Specifically before running lzma uncompress of the main firmware volume. +This is needed to make sure caching is enabled, otherwise the uncompress +can be extremely slow. + +Adapt the ASSERTs and MTRR setup in PlatformInitLib to the changes. + +Background: Depending on virtual machine configuration kvm may uses EPT +memory types to apply guest MTRR settings. In case MTRRs are disabled +kvm will use the uncachable memory type for all mappings. The +vmx_get_mt_mask() function in the linux kernel handles this and can be +found here: + +https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c?h=v6.7.1#n7580 + +In most VM configurations kvm uses MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK unconditionally. In +case the VM has a mdev device assigned that is not the case though. + +Before commit e8aa4c6546ad ("UefiCpuPkg/ResetVector: Cache Disable +should not be set by default in CR0") kvm also ended up using +MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK due to KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED. After that commit +kvm evaluates guest mtrr settings, which why setting up MTRRs early is +important now. + +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Message-ID: <20240130130441.772484-2-kraxel@redhat.com> + +[ kraxel: Downstream-only for now. Timely upstream merge is unlikely + due to chinese holidays and rhel-9.4 deadlines are close. + QE regression testing passed. So go with upstream posted + series v3 ] + +patch_name: edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-Setup-MTRR-early-in-the-boot-process.patch +present_in_specfile: true +location_in_specfile: 49 +--- + OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++ + OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c | 10 +++---- + OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c +index 4e750755bf..7094d86159 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c +@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + + #define SEC_IDT_ENTRY_COUNT 34 + +@@ -47,6 +49,31 @@ IA32_IDT_GATE_DESCRIPTOR mIdtEntryTemplate = { + } + }; + ++// ++// Enable MTRR early, set default type to write back. ++// Needed to make sure caching is enabled, ++// without this lzma decompress can be very slow. ++// ++STATIC ++VOID ++SecMtrrSetup ( ++ VOID ++ ) ++{ ++ CPUID_VERSION_INFO_EDX Edx; ++ MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE_REGISTER DefType; ++ ++ AsmCpuid (CPUID_VERSION_INFO, NULL, NULL, NULL, &Edx.Uint32); ++ if (!Edx.Bits.MTRR) { ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ DefType.Uint64 = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE); ++ DefType.Bits.Type = 6; /* write back */ ++ DefType.Bits.E = 1; /* enable */ ++ AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE, DefType.Uint64); ++} ++ + VOID + EFIAPI + SecCoreStartupWithStack ( +@@ -203,6 +230,11 @@ SecCoreStartupWithStack ( + InitializeApicTimer (0, MAX_UINT32, TRUE, 5); + DisableApicTimerInterrupt (); + ++ // ++ // Initialize MTRR ++ // ++ SecMtrrSetup (); ++ + PeilessStartup (&SecCoreData); + + ASSERT (FALSE); +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c +index e64c0ee324..b6ba63ef95 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c +@@ -1164,18 +1164,18 @@ PlatformQemuInitializeRam ( + MtrrGetAllMtrrs (&MtrrSettings); + + // +- // MTRRs disabled, fixed MTRRs disabled, default type is uncached ++ // See SecMtrrSetup(), default type should be write back + // +- ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & BIT11) == 0); ++ ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & BIT11) != 0); + ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & BIT10) == 0); +- ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & 0xFF) == 0); ++ ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & 0xFF) == MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK); + + // + // flip default type to writeback + // +- SetMem (&MtrrSettings.Fixed, sizeof MtrrSettings.Fixed, 0x06); ++ SetMem (&MtrrSettings.Fixed, sizeof MtrrSettings.Fixed, MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK); + ZeroMem (&MtrrSettings.Variables, sizeof MtrrSettings.Variables); +- MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType |= BIT11 | BIT10 | 6; ++ MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType |= BIT10; + MtrrSetAllMtrrs (&MtrrSettings); + + // +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c +index 60dfa61842..725b57e2fa 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c +@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + #include "AmdSev.h" + + #define SEC_IDT_ENTRY_COUNT 34 +@@ -743,6 +745,31 @@ FindAndReportEntryPoints ( + return; + } + ++// ++// Enable MTRR early, set default type to write back. ++// Needed to make sure caching is enabled, ++// without this lzma decompress can be very slow. ++// ++STATIC ++VOID ++SecMtrrSetup ( ++ VOID ++ ) ++{ ++ CPUID_VERSION_INFO_EDX Edx; ++ MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE_REGISTER DefType; ++ ++ AsmCpuid (CPUID_VERSION_INFO, NULL, NULL, NULL, &Edx.Uint32); ++ if (!Edx.Bits.MTRR) { ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ DefType.Uint64 = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE); ++ DefType.Bits.Type = 6; /* write back */ ++ DefType.Bits.E = 1; /* enable */ ++ AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE, DefType.Uint64); ++} ++ + VOID + EFIAPI + SecCoreStartupWithStack ( +@@ -942,6 +969,11 @@ SecCoreStartupWithStack ( + InitializeApicTimer (0, MAX_UINT32, TRUE, 5); + DisableApicTimerInterrupt (); + ++ // ++ // Initialize MTRR ++ // ++ SecMtrrSetup (); ++ + // + // Initialize Debug Agent to support source level debug in SEC/PEI phases before memory ready. + // diff --git a/SOURCES/0031-MdePkg-ArchitecturalMsr.h-add-defines-for-MTRR-cache.patch b/SOURCES/0031-MdePkg-ArchitecturalMsr.h-add-defines-for-MTRR-cache.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b439a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0031-MdePkg-ArchitecturalMsr.h-add-defines-for-MTRR-cache.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 3124da27dc460926f40477d247e021ceeabe0be3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:04:39 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] MdePkg/ArchitecturalMsr.h: add #defines for MTRR cache types + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 55: OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process. +RH-Jira: RHEL-21704 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [2/4] a568bc2793d677462a2971aae9566a9bbc64b063 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2) + +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Message-ID: <20240130130441.772484-3-kraxel@redhat.com> + +patch_name: edk2-MdePkg-ArchitecturalMsr.h-add-defines-for-MTRR-cache.patch +present_in_specfile: true +location_in_specfile: 50 +--- + MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h b/MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h +index 756e7c86ec..08ba949cf7 100644 +--- a/MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h ++++ b/MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h +@@ -2103,6 +2103,13 @@ typedef union { + #define MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE9 0x00000212 + /// @} + ++#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_UNCACHEABLE 0 ++#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_COMBINING 1 ++#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_THROUGH 4 ++#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_PROTECTED 5 ++#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK 6 ++#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_INVALID_TYPE 7 ++ + /** + MSR information returned for MSR indexes #MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE0 to + #MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE9 diff --git a/SOURCES/0032-UefiCpuPkg-MtrrLib.h-use-cache-type-defines-from-Arc.patch b/SOURCES/0032-UefiCpuPkg-MtrrLib.h-use-cache-type-defines-from-Arc.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..89772d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0032-UefiCpuPkg-MtrrLib.h-use-cache-type-defines-from-Arc.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +From f015a541308b2d752c399b9ef9597c4585218032 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:04:40 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] UefiCpuPkg/MtrrLib.h: use cache type #defines from + ArchitecturalMsr.h + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 55: OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process. +RH-Jira: RHEL-21704 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [3/4] 8b766c97b247a8665662697534455c19423ff23c (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2) + +Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Message-ID: <20240130130441.772484-4-kraxel@redhat.com> + +patch_name: edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MtrrLib.h-use-cache-type-defines-from-Arc.patch +present_in_specfile: true +location_in_specfile: 51 +--- + UefiCpuPkg/Include/Library/MtrrLib.h | 26 ++++++++++++++------------ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Include/Library/MtrrLib.h b/UefiCpuPkg/Include/Library/MtrrLib.h +index 86cc1aab3b..287d249a99 100644 +--- a/UefiCpuPkg/Include/Library/MtrrLib.h ++++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Include/Library/MtrrLib.h +@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ + #ifndef _MTRR_LIB_H_ + #define _MTRR_LIB_H_ + ++#include ++ + // + // According to IA32 SDM, MTRRs number and MSR offset are always consistent + // for IA32 processor family +@@ -82,20 +84,20 @@ typedef struct _MTRR_SETTINGS_ { + // Memory cache types + // + typedef enum { +- CacheUncacheable = 0, +- CacheWriteCombining = 1, +- CacheWriteThrough = 4, +- CacheWriteProtected = 5, +- CacheWriteBack = 6, +- CacheInvalid = 7 ++ CacheUncacheable = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_UNCACHEABLE, ++ CacheWriteCombining = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_COMBINING, ++ CacheWriteThrough = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_THROUGH, ++ CacheWriteProtected = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_PROTECTED, ++ CacheWriteBack = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK, ++ CacheInvalid = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_INVALID_TYPE, + } MTRR_MEMORY_CACHE_TYPE; + +-#define MTRR_CACHE_UNCACHEABLE 0 +-#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_COMBINING 1 +-#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_THROUGH 4 +-#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_PROTECTED 5 +-#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK 6 +-#define MTRR_CACHE_INVALID_TYPE 7 ++#define MTRR_CACHE_UNCACHEABLE MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_UNCACHEABLE ++#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_COMBINING MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_COMBINING ++#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_THROUGH MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_THROUGH ++#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_PROTECTED MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_PROTECTED ++#define MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK ++#define MTRR_CACHE_INVALID_TYPE MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_INVALID_TYPE + + typedef struct { + UINT64 BaseAddress; diff --git a/SOURCES/0033-OvmfPkg-Sec-use-cache-type-defines-from-Architectura.patch b/SOURCES/0033-OvmfPkg-Sec-use-cache-type-defines-from-Architectura.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b65bd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0033-OvmfPkg-Sec-use-cache-type-defines-from-Architectura.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From dd543686c34fc3c6ddfafc0104066889ad9d1813 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:04:41 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg/Sec: use cache type #defines from ArchitecturalMsr.h + +RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-MergeRequest: 55: OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process. +RH-Jira: RHEL-21704 +RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek +RH-Commit: [4/4] 55f00e3e153ca945ca458e7abc26780a8d83ac85 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2) + +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +Message-ID: <20240130130441.772484-5-kraxel@redhat.com> + +patch_name: edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-use-cache-type-defines-from-Architectura.patch +present_in_specfile: true +location_in_specfile: 52 +--- + OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c +index 7094d86159..1a19f26178 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c +@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ SecMtrrSetup ( + } + + DefType.Uint64 = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE); +- DefType.Bits.Type = 6; /* write back */ ++ DefType.Bits.Type = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK; + DefType.Bits.E = 1; /* enable */ + AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE, DefType.Uint64); + } +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c +index 725b57e2fa..26963b924d 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c +@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ SecMtrrSetup ( + } + + DefType.Uint64 = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE); +- DefType.Bits.Type = 6; /* write back */ ++ DefType.Bits.Type = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK; + DefType.Bits.E = 1; /* enable */ + AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE, DefType.Uint64); + } diff --git a/SOURCES/0034-NetworkPkg-TcpDxe-Fixed-system-stuck-on-PXE-boot-flo.patch b/SOURCES/0034-NetworkPkg-TcpDxe-Fixed-system-stuck-on-PXE-boot-flo.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..557b11d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0034-NetworkPkg-TcpDxe-Fixed-system-stuck-on-PXE-boot-flo.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From bbd537bc6560494b0b08886364c38406b1e8107a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sam +Date: Wed, 29 May 2024 07:46:03 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] NetworkPkg TcpDxe: Fixed system stuck on PXE boot flow in + iPXE environment +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +This bug fix is based on the following commit "NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH" +REF: 1904a64 + +Issue Description: +An "Invalid handle" error was detected during runtime when attempting to destroy a child instance of the hashing protocol. The problematic code segment was: + +NetworkPkg\TcpDxe\TcpDriver.c +Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild(Hash2ServiceBinding, ​&mHash2ServiceHandle); + +Root Cause Analysis: +The root cause of the error was the passing of an incorrect parameter type, a pointer to an EFI_HANDLE instead of an EFI_HANDLE itself, to the DestroyChild function. This mismatch resulted in the function receiving an invalid handle. + +Implemented Solution: +To resolve this issue, the function call was corrected to pass mHash2ServiceHandle directly: + +NetworkPkg\TcpDxe\TcpDriver.c +Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild(Hash2ServiceBinding, mHash2ServiceHandle); + +This modification ensures the correct handle type is used, effectively rectifying the "Invalid handle" error. + +Verification: +Testing has been conducted, confirming the efficacy of the fix. Additionally, the BIOS can boot into the OS in an iPXE environment. + +Cc: Doug Flick [MSFT] + +Signed-off-by: Sam Tsai [Wiwynn] +Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar +(cherry picked from commit ced13b93afea87a8a1fe6ddbb67240a84cb2e3d3) +--- + NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c +index 40bba4080c..c6e7c0df54 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c +@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ TcpDestroyService ( + // + // Destroy the instance of the hashing protocol for this controller. + // +- Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild (Hash2ServiceBinding, &mHash2ServiceHandle); ++ Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild (Hash2ServiceBinding, mHash2ServiceHandle); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } diff --git a/SOURCES/0035-OvmfPkg-add-morlock-support.patch b/SOURCES/0035-OvmfPkg-add-morlock-support.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ad1a30 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0035-OvmfPkg-add-morlock-support.patch @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +From 3f8eab199430de18c1c6a98d1d0772499b17cc86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Wed, 8 May 2024 13:14:26 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: add morlock support + +Add dsc + fdf include files to add the MorLock drivers to the build. +Add the include files to OVMF build configurations. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +(cherry picked from commit b45aff0dc9cb87f316eb17a11e5d4438175d9cca) +--- + OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/MorLock.dsc.inc | 10 ++++++++++ + OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/MorLock.fdf.inc | 10 ++++++++++ + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 1 + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf | 1 + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 1 + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf | 1 + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 1 + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 1 + + 8 files changed, 26 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/MorLock.dsc.inc + create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/MorLock.fdf.inc + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/MorLock.dsc.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/MorLock.dsc.inc +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..a8c5fb24b8 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/MorLock.dsc.inc +@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ ++## ++# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++# ++# MorLock support ++## ++ ++ SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteControl/TcgMor.inf ++!if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE ++ SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteRequestControlLock/TcgMorLockSmm.inf ++!endif +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/MorLock.fdf.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/MorLock.fdf.inc +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..20b7d6619a +--- /dev/null ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/MorLock.fdf.inc +@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ ++## ++# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++# ++# MorLock support ++## ++ ++INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteControl/TcgMor.inf ++!if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE ++INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteRequestControlLock/TcgMorLockSmm.inf ++!endif +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index d8ae542686..65a866ae0c 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -887,6 +887,7 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbMassStorageDxe/UsbMassStorageDxe.inf + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/MorLock.dsc.inc + + !if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE + SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +index 0ffa3be750..10eb6fe72b 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +@@ -355,6 +355,7 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmDxe.fdf.inc + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/MorLock.fdf.inc + + !if $(LOAD_X64_ON_IA32_ENABLE) == TRUE + INF OvmfPkg/CompatImageLoaderDxe/CompatImageLoaderDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index 52ac2c96fc..679e25501b 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -901,6 +901,7 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbMassStorageDxe/UsbMassStorageDxe.inf + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/MorLock.dsc.inc + + !if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE + SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +index c4f3ec0735..ff06bbfc6f 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmDxe.fdf.inc + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/MorLock.fdf.inc + + ################################################################################ + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index f76d0ef7bc..d294fd4625 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -969,6 +969,7 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbMassStorageDxe/UsbMassStorageDxe.inf + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/MorLock.dsc.inc + + !if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE + SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +index bedd85ef7a..f3b787201f 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +@@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/TdTcg2Dxe/TdTcg2Dxe.inf + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmDxe.fdf.inc + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/MorLock.fdf.inc + + ################################################################################ + diff --git a/SOURCES/0036-MdePkg-BaseRngLib-Add-a-smoketest-for-RDRAND-and-che.patch b/SOURCES/0036-MdePkg-BaseRngLib-Add-a-smoketest-for-RDRAND-and-che.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..653b277 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0036-MdePkg-BaseRngLib-Add-a-smoketest-for-RDRAND-and-che.patch @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +From 3899f089b8197f52ca63fe1561f8e5e1341f8198 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Pedro Falcato +Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 22:31:03 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] MdePkg/BaseRngLib: Add a smoketest for RDRAND and check CPUID + +RDRAND has notoriously been broken many times over its lifespan. +Add a smoketest to RDRAND, in order to better sniff out potential +security concerns. + +Also add a proper CPUID test in order to support older CPUs which may +not have it; it was previously being tested but then promptly ignored. + +Testing algorithm inspired by linux's arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c +:x86_init_rdrand() per commit 049f9ae9.. + +Many thanks to Jason Donenfeld for relicensing his linux RDRAND detection +code to MIT and the public domain. + +>On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 2:21 PM Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: + <..> +> I (re)wrote that function in Linux. I hereby relicense it as MIT, and +> also place it into public domain. Do with it what you will now. +> +> Jason + +BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4163 + +Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato +Cc: Michael D Kinney +Cc: Liming Gao +Cc: Zhiguang Liu +Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld +(cherry picked from commit c3a8ca7b54a9fd17acdf16c6282a92cc989fa92a) +--- + MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 91 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c b/MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c +index 9bd68352f9..06d2a6f12d 100644 +--- a/MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c ++++ b/MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c +@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ + to provide high-quality random numbers. + + Copyright (c) 2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
++Copyright (c) 2022, Pedro Falcato. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 2021, NUVIA Inc. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ +@@ -24,6 +25,88 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + + STATIC BOOLEAN mRdRandSupported; + ++// ++// Intel SDM says 10 tries is good enough for reliable RDRAND usage. ++// ++#define RDRAND_RETRIES 10 ++ ++#define RDRAND_TEST_SAMPLES 8 ++ ++#define RDRAND_MIN_CHANGE 5 ++ ++// ++// Add a define for native-word RDRAND, just for the test. ++// ++#ifdef MDE_CPU_X64 ++#define ASM_RDRAND AsmRdRand64 ++#else ++#define ASM_RDRAND AsmRdRand32 ++#endif ++ ++/** ++ Tests RDRAND for broken implementations. ++ ++ @retval TRUE RDRAND is reliable (and hopefully safe). ++ @retval FALSE RDRAND is unreliable and should be disabled, despite CPUID. ++ ++**/ ++STATIC ++BOOLEAN ++TestRdRand ( ++ VOID ++ ) ++{ ++ // ++ // Test for notoriously broken rdrand implementations that always return the same ++ // value, like the Zen 3 uarch (all-1s) or other several AMD families on suspend/resume (also all-1s). ++ // Note that this should be expanded to extensively test for other sorts of possible errata. ++ // ++ ++ // ++ // Our algorithm samples rdrand $RDRAND_TEST_SAMPLES times and expects ++ // a different result $RDRAND_MIN_CHANGE times for reliable RDRAND usage. ++ // ++ UINTN Prev; ++ UINT8 Idx; ++ UINT8 TestIteration; ++ UINT32 Changed; ++ ++ Changed = 0; ++ ++ for (TestIteration = 0; TestIteration < RDRAND_TEST_SAMPLES; TestIteration++) { ++ UINTN Sample; ++ // ++ // Note: We use a retry loop for rdrand. Normal users get this in BaseRng.c ++ // Any failure to get a random number will assume RDRAND does not work. ++ // ++ for (Idx = 0; Idx < RDRAND_RETRIES; Idx++) { ++ if (ASM_RDRAND (&Sample)) { ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (Idx == RDRAND_RETRIES) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "BaseRngLib/x86: CPU BUG: Failed to get an RDRAND random number - disabling\n")); ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ if (TestIteration != 0) { ++ Changed += Sample != Prev; ++ } ++ ++ Prev = Sample; ++ } ++ ++ if (Changed < RDRAND_MIN_CHANGE) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "BaseRngLib/x86: CPU BUG: RDRAND not reliable - disabling\n")); ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ return TRUE; ++} ++ ++#undef ASM_RDRAND ++ + /** + The constructor function checks whether or not RDRAND instruction is supported + by the host hardware. +@@ -48,10 +131,13 @@ BaseRngLibConstructor ( + // CPUID. A value of 1 indicates that processor support RDRAND instruction. + // + AsmCpuid (1, 0, 0, &RegEcx, 0); +- ASSERT ((RegEcx & RDRAND_MASK) == RDRAND_MASK); + + mRdRandSupported = ((RegEcx & RDRAND_MASK) == RDRAND_MASK); + ++ if (mRdRandSupported) { ++ mRdRandSupported = TestRdRand (); ++ } ++ + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +@@ -70,6 +156,7 @@ ArchGetRandomNumber16 ( + OUT UINT16 *Rand + ) + { ++ ASSERT (mRdRandSupported); + return AsmRdRand16 (Rand); + } + +@@ -88,6 +175,7 @@ ArchGetRandomNumber32 ( + OUT UINT32 *Rand + ) + { ++ ASSERT (mRdRandSupported); + return AsmRdRand32 (Rand); + } + +@@ -106,6 +194,7 @@ ArchGetRandomNumber64 ( + OUT UINT64 *Rand + ) + { ++ ASSERT (mRdRandSupported); + return AsmRdRand64 (Rand); + } + +@@ -122,13 +211,7 @@ ArchIsRngSupported ( + VOID + ) + { +- /* +- Existing software depends on this always returning TRUE, so for +- now hard-code it. +- +- return mRdRandSupported; +- */ +- return TRUE; ++ return mRdRandSupported; + } + + /** diff --git a/SOURCES/0037-SecurityPkg-RngDxe-add-rng-test.patch b/SOURCES/0037-SecurityPkg-RngDxe-add-rng-test.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b894821 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0037-SecurityPkg-RngDxe-add-rng-test.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 4947d363211159647e9266fa20ad9d4c8bc52f71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 09:49:13 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] SecurityPkg/RngDxe: add rng test + +Check whenever RngLib actually returns random numbers, only return +a non-zero number of Algorithms if that is the case. + +This has the effect that RndDxe loads and installs EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL +only in case it can actually deliver random numbers. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +(cherry picked from commit a61bc0accb8a76edba4f073fdc7bafc908df045d) +--- + SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c | 8 +++++++- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c +index 5723ed6957..8b0742bab6 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include + + #include "RngDxeInternals.h" + +@@ -43,7 +44,12 @@ GetAvailableAlgorithms ( + VOID + ) + { +- mAvailableAlgoArrayCount = RNG_ALGORITHM_COUNT; ++ UINT64 RngTest; ++ ++ if (GetRandomNumber64 (&RngTest)) { ++ mAvailableAlgoArrayCount = RNG_ALGORITHM_COUNT; ++ } ++ + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + diff --git a/SOURCES/0038-OvmfPkg-wire-up-RngDxe.patch b/SOURCES/0038-OvmfPkg-wire-up-RngDxe.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71d66be --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0038-OvmfPkg-wire-up-RngDxe.patch @@ -0,0 +1,301 @@ +From 0aa96c512c689426838ec1cf4aa78ff088c03a1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Fri, 24 May 2024 12:51:17 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg: wire up RngDxe + +Add OvmfRng include snippets with the random number generator +configuration for OVMF. Include RngDxe, build with BaseRngLib, +so the rdrand instruction is used (if available). + +Also move VirtioRng to the include snippets. + +Use the new include snippets for OVMF builds. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +(cherry picked from commit 712797cf19acd292bf203522a79e40e7e13d268b) +--- + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc | 9 +++++++++ + OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc | 6 ++++++ + OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 2 +- + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 2 +- + 14 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc + create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +index cf1ad83e09..4edc2a9069 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +@@ -649,7 +649,6 @@ + OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf +- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf + !if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE + OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf + !endif +@@ -740,6 +739,7 @@ + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/Grub/Grub.inf + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc + + OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf + OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf { +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf +index c56c98dc85..480837b0fa 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf +@@ -227,7 +227,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf + !if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE + INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf + !endif +@@ -318,6 +317,7 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmDxe.fdf.inc + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc + + ################################################################################ + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..68839a0caa +--- /dev/null ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc +@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ ++## ++# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++## ++ ++ SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxe.inf { ++ ++ RngLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/BaseRngLib.inf ++ } ++ OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..99cb4a32b1 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc +@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ ++## ++# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++## ++ ++INF SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxe.inf ++INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc +index 9f49b60ff0..4b7e1596fc 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc +@@ -636,7 +636,6 @@ + OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf +- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf + !if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE + OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf + !endif +@@ -719,6 +718,7 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbMassStorageDxe/UsbMassStorageDxe.inf + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc + + !if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE + SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf +index ce5d542048..88d0f75ae2 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf +@@ -285,7 +285,6 @@ READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE + # + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf + !if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE + INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf + !endif +@@ -326,6 +325,7 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf + INF OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc + + ################################################################################ + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc +index fb73f2e089..9206f01816 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc +@@ -760,7 +760,6 @@ + OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf +- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/WatchdogTimerDxe/WatchdogTimer.inf + MdeModulePkg/Universal/MonotonicCounterRuntimeDxe/MonotonicCounterRuntimeDxe.inf +@@ -846,6 +845,7 @@ + MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbMassStorageDxe/UsbMassStorageDxe.inf + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc + + !if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE + SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf +index 055e659a35..c8268d7e8c 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf +@@ -207,7 +207,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf + + !if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE +@@ -299,6 +298,7 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteDxe.inf + INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc + + ################################################################################ + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +index 65a866ae0c..b64c215585 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc +@@ -784,7 +784,6 @@ + OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf +- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf + !if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE + OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf +@@ -888,6 +887,7 @@ + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/MorLock.dsc.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc + + !if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE + SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +index 10eb6fe72b..c31276e4a3 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf +@@ -231,7 +231,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf + !if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE + INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf +@@ -356,6 +355,7 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/MorLock.fdf.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc + + !if $(LOAD_X64_ON_IA32_ENABLE) == TRUE + INF OvmfPkg/CompatImageLoaderDxe/CompatImageLoaderDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +index 679e25501b..ececac3757 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc +@@ -798,7 +798,6 @@ + OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf +- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf + !if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE + OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf +@@ -902,6 +901,7 @@ + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/MorLock.dsc.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc + + !if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE + SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +index ff06bbfc6f..a7b4aeac08 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf +@@ -232,7 +232,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf + !if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE + INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf +@@ -363,6 +362,7 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/MorLock.fdf.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc + + ################################################################################ + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +index d294fd4625..0ab4d3df06 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +@@ -866,7 +866,6 @@ + OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf +- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf + OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf + !if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE + OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf +@@ -970,6 +969,7 @@ + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/ShellComponents.dsc.inc + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/MorLock.dsc.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc + + !if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE + SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +index f3b787201f..ae08ac4fe9 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf ++++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf +@@ -263,7 +263,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf + INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf +-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf + INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf + !if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE + INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf +@@ -403,6 +402,7 @@ INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/TdTcg2Dxe/TdTcg2Dxe.inf + + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc + !include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/MorLock.fdf.inc ++!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc + + ################################################################################ + diff --git a/SOURCES/0039-CryptoPkg-Test-call-ProcessLibraryConstructorList.patch b/SOURCES/0039-CryptoPkg-Test-call-ProcessLibraryConstructorList.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0194b84 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0039-CryptoPkg-Test-call-ProcessLibraryConstructorList.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From d5d19043e62a268a492f9a1ef6a11380d8f7e784 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2024 11:45:49 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] CryptoPkg/Test: call ProcessLibraryConstructorList + +Needed to properly initialize BaseRngLib. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +(cherry picked from commit 94961b8817eec6f8d0434555ac50a7aa51c22201) +--- + .../Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c b/CryptoPkg/Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c +index d0c1c7a4f7..48d463b8ad 100644 +--- a/CryptoPkg/Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c ++++ b/CryptoPkg/Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c +@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@ + **/ + #include "TestBaseCryptLib.h" + ++VOID ++EFIAPI ++ProcessLibraryConstructorList ( ++ VOID ++ ); ++ + /** + Initialize the unit test framework, suite, and unit tests for the + sample unit tests and run the unit tests. +@@ -76,5 +82,6 @@ main ( + char *argv[] + ) + { ++ ProcessLibraryConstructorList (); + return UefiTestMain (); + } diff --git a/SOURCES/0040-MdePkg-X86UnitTestHost-set-rdrand-cpuid-bit.patch b/SOURCES/0040-MdePkg-X86UnitTestHost-set-rdrand-cpuid-bit.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d32e748 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0040-MdePkg-X86UnitTestHost-set-rdrand-cpuid-bit.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 320207a3df995771af36639c7bdf89c4203cf1c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2024 11:45:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] MdePkg/X86UnitTestHost: set rdrand cpuid bit + +Set the rdrand feature bit when faking cpuid for host test cases. +Needed to make the CryptoPkg test cases work. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +(cherry picked from commit 5e776299a2604b336a947e68593012ab2cc16eb4) +--- + MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c | 11 ++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c b/MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c +index 8ba4f54a38..7f7276f7f4 100644 +--- a/MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c ++++ b/MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c +@@ -66,6 +66,15 @@ UnitTestHostBaseLibAsmCpuid ( + OUT UINT32 *Edx OPTIONAL + ) + { ++ UINT32 RetEcx; ++ ++ RetEcx = 0; ++ switch (Index) { ++ case 1: ++ RetEcx |= BIT30; /* RdRand */ ++ break; ++ } ++ + if (Eax != NULL) { + *Eax = 0; + } +@@ -75,7 +84,7 @@ UnitTestHostBaseLibAsmCpuid ( + } + + if (Ecx != NULL) { +- *Ecx = 0; ++ *Ecx = RetEcx; + } + + if (Edx != NULL) { diff --git a/SOURCES/30-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb-enrolled.json b/SOURCES/30-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb-enrolled.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d77ed08 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/30-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb-enrolled.json @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +{ + "description": "OVMF with SB+SMM, SB enabled, MS certs enrolled", + "interface-types": [ + "uefi" + ], + "mapping": { + "device": "flash", + "mode": "split", + "executable": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd", + "format": "raw" + }, + "nvram-template": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd", + "format": "raw" + } + }, + "targets": [ + { + "architecture": "x86_64", + "machines": [ + "pc-q35-*" + ] + } + ], + "features": [ + "acpi-s3", + "enrolled-keys", + "requires-smm", + "secure-boot", + "verbose-dynamic" + ], + "tags": [ + + ] +} diff --git a/SOURCES/40-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb.json b/SOURCES/40-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02a7622 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/40-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb.json @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +{ + "description": "OVMF with SB+SMM, empty varstore", + "interface-types": [ + "uefi" + ], + "mapping": { + "device": "flash", + "mode": "split", + "executable": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd", + "format": "raw" + }, + "nvram-template": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd", + "format": "raw" + } + }, + "targets": [ + { + "architecture": "x86_64", + "machines": [ + "pc-q35-*" + ] + } + ], + "features": [ + "acpi-s3", + "requires-smm", + "secure-boot", + "verbose-dynamic" + ], + "tags": [ + + ] +} diff --git a/SOURCES/50-edk2-aarch64-qcow2.json b/SOURCES/50-edk2-aarch64-qcow2.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..937d295 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/50-edk2-aarch64-qcow2.json @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +{ + "description": "UEFI firmware for ARM64 virtual machines", + "interface-types": [ + "uefi" + ], + "mapping": { + "device": "flash", + "mode": "split", + "executable": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-silent-pflash.qcow2", + "format": "qcow2" + }, + "nvram-template": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/aarch64/vars-template-pflash.qcow2", + "format": "qcow2" + } + }, + "targets": [ + { + "architecture": "aarch64", + "machines": [ + "virt-*" + ] + } + ], + "features": [ + + ], + "tags": [ + + ] +} diff --git a/SOURCES/50-edk2-ovmf-x64-nosb.json b/SOURCES/50-edk2-ovmf-x64-nosb.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c660e0c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/50-edk2-ovmf-x64-nosb.json @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +{ + "description": "OVMF without SB+SMM, empty varstore", + "interface-types": [ + "uefi" + ], + "mapping": { + "device": "flash", + "mode": "split", + "executable": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.fd", + "format": "raw" + }, + "nvram-template": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd", + "format": "raw" + } + }, + "targets": [ + { + "architecture": "x86_64", + "machines": [ + "pc-q35-*" + ] + } + ], + "features": [ + "acpi-s3", + "amd-sev", + "amd-sev-es", + "verbose-dynamic" + ], + "tags": [ + + ] +} diff --git a/SOURCES/51-edk2-aarch64-raw.json b/SOURCES/51-edk2-aarch64-raw.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..506bbe6 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/51-edk2-aarch64-raw.json @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +{ + "description": "UEFI firmware for ARM64 virtual machines", + "interface-types": [ + "uefi" + ], + "mapping": { + "device": "flash", + "mode": "split", + "executable": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-silent-pflash.raw", + "format": "raw" + }, + "nvram-template": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/aarch64/vars-template-pflash.raw", + "format": "raw" + } + }, + "targets": [ + { + "architecture": "aarch64", + "machines": [ + "virt-*" + ] + } + ], + "features": [ + + ], + "tags": [ + + ] +} diff --git a/SOURCES/52-edk2-aarch64-verbose-qcow2.json b/SOURCES/52-edk2-aarch64-verbose-qcow2.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..976f2a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/52-edk2-aarch64-verbose-qcow2.json @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +{ + "description": "UEFI firmware for ARM64 virtual machines, verbose logs", + "interface-types": [ + "uefi" + ], + "mapping": { + "device": "flash", + "mode": "split", + "executable": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-pflash.qcow2", + "format": "qcow2" + }, + "nvram-template": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/aarch64/vars-template-pflash.qcow2", + "format": "qcow2" + } + }, + "targets": [ + { + "architecture": "aarch64", + "machines": [ + "virt-*" + ] + } + ], + "features": [ + "verbose-static" + ], + "tags": [ + + ] +} diff --git a/SOURCES/53-edk2-aarch64-verbose-raw.json b/SOURCES/53-edk2-aarch64-verbose-raw.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa0ed91 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/53-edk2-aarch64-verbose-raw.json @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +{ + "description": "UEFI firmware for ARM64 virtual machines, verbose logs", + "interface-types": [ + "uefi" + ], + "mapping": { + "device": "flash", + "mode": "split", + "executable": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-pflash.raw", + "format": "raw" + }, + "nvram-template": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/aarch64/vars-template-pflash.raw", + "format": "raw" + } + }, + "targets": [ + { + "architecture": "aarch64", + "machines": [ + "virt-*" + ] + } + ], + "features": [ + "verbose-static" + ], + "tags": [ + + ] +} diff --git a/SOURCES/60-edk2-ovmf-x64-amdsev.json b/SOURCES/60-edk2-ovmf-x64-amdsev.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a561bc --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/60-edk2-ovmf-x64-amdsev.json @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +{ + "description": "OVMF with SEV-ES support", + "interface-types": [ + "uefi" + ], + "mapping": { + "device": "flash", + "mode": "stateless", + "executable": { + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF.amdsev.fd", + "format": "raw" + } + }, + "targets": [ + { + "architecture": "x86_64", + "machines": [ + "pc-q35-*" + ] + } + ], + "features": [ + "amd-sev", + "amd-sev-es", + "amd-sev-snp", + "verbose-dynamic" + ], + "tags": [ + + ] +} diff --git a/SOURCES/60-edk2-ovmf-x64-inteltdx.json b/SOURCES/60-edk2-ovmf-x64-inteltdx.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..445eb70 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/60-edk2-ovmf-x64-inteltdx.json @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +{ + "description": "OVMF with TDX support", + "interface-types": [ + "uefi" + ], + "mapping": { + "device": "memory", + "filename": "/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF.inteltdx.secboot.fd" + }, + "targets": [ + { + "architecture": "x86_64", + "machines": [ + "pc-q35-*" + ] + } + ], + "features": [ + "enrolled-keys", + "intel-tdx", + "secure-boot", + "verbose-dynamic" + ], + "tags": [ + + ] +} diff --git a/SOURCES/DBXUpdate-20230509.x64.bin b/SOURCES/DBXUpdate-20230509.x64.bin new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e2f6b02 Binary files /dev/null and b/SOURCES/DBXUpdate-20230509.x64.bin differ diff --git a/SOURCES/certs_add.sh b/SOURCES/certs_add.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..4284e6b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/certs_add.sh @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +#!/bin/bash + +IMAGE="$1" + +[ -f "$IMAGE" ] || { echo "File $IMAGE is not found!"; exit 1; } + +GUID=$(virt-fw-vars -i $IMAGE -p -v 2>/dev/null | awk '{if($1 ~ /name=db$/){sub(/guid=guid:/,"",$2);print $2}}') + +[ -n "$GUID" ] || { echo "GUID is not set!"; exit 1; } + +for F in `ls ./*.pem`; do + echo "virt-fw-vars --add-db $GUID $F -i $IMAGE -o $IMAGE"; + virt-fw-vars --add-db $GUID $F -i $IMAGE -o $IMAGE; +done diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-AmdSevDxe-Fix-the-shim-fallback-reboot-workaround-fo.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-AmdSevDxe-Fix-the-shim-fallback-reboot-workaround-fo.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8656838 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-AmdSevDxe-Fix-the-shim-fallback-reboot-workaround-fo.patch @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From 481310a21104aba17bc0cddd236ecdf69d4ba662 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Oliver Steffen +Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2024 19:25:52 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] AmdSevDxe: Fix the shim fallback reboot workaround for SNP + +RH-Author: Oliver Steffen +RH-MergeRequest: 68: AmdSevDxe: Fix the shim fallback reboot workaround for SNP +RH-Jira: RHEL-56081 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Commit: [1/1] ab8678b61d171f9c19459e034483437b29037b4b (osteffen/edk2) + +The shim fallback reboot workaround (introduced for SEV-ES) does +not always work for SEV-SNP, due to a conditional early return. + +Let's just register the workaround earlier in this function to +fix that. + +Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen +--- + OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c +index 0eb88e50ff..ca345e95da 100644 +--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c ++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c +@@ -243,6 +243,17 @@ AmdSevDxeEntryPoint ( + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + ++ // Shim fallback reboot workaround ++ Status = gBS->CreateEventEx ( ++ EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL, ++ TPL_CALLBACK, ++ PopulateVarstore, ++ SystemTable, ++ &gEfiEndOfDxeEventGroupGuid, ++ &PopulateVarstoreEvent ++ ); ++ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ + // + // Iterate through the GCD map and clear the C-bit from MMIO and NonExistent + // memory space. The NonExistent memory space will be used for mapping the +@@ -393,15 +404,5 @@ AmdSevDxeEntryPoint ( + ); + } + +- Status = gBS->CreateEventEx ( +- EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL, +- TPL_CALLBACK, +- PopulateVarstore, +- SystemTable, +- &gEfiEndOfDxeEventGroupGuid, +- &PopulateVarstoreEvent +- ); +- ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); +- + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-MdeModulePkg-Warn-if-out-of-flash-space-when-writing.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-MdeModulePkg-Warn-if-out-of-flash-space-when-writing.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2198b6f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-MdeModulePkg-Warn-if-out-of-flash-space-when-writing.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 880c1ca7420b873c5f81563b122d7bd1ebad72cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Oliver Steffen +Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 15:32:58 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] MdeModulePkg: Warn if out of flash space when writing + variables + +RH-Author: Oliver Steffen +RH-MergeRequest: 64: MdeModulePkg: Warn if out of flash space when writing variables +RH-Jira: RHEL-43442 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Commit: [1/1] b65130800090192f47f13d67ff14f902a4f5bfb5 (osteffen/edk2) + +Emit a DEBUG_WARN message if there is not enough flash space left to +write/update a variable. This condition is currently not logged +appropriately in all cases, given that full variable store can easily +render the system unbootable. +This new message helps identifying this condition. + +Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen +Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek +Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann +(cherry picked from commit 80b59ff8320d1bd134bf689fe9c0ddf4e0473b88) +Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen +--- + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c +index d394d237a5..1c7659031d 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c +@@ -2364,6 +2364,8 @@ Done: + ); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + } ++ } else if (Status == EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_WARN, "UpdateVariable failed: Out of flash space\n")); + } + + return Status; +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-DxeNetLib-Reword-PseudoRandom-error-loggi.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-DxeNetLib-Reword-PseudoRandom-error-loggi.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..415a914 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-DxeNetLib-Reword-PseudoRandom-error-loggi.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From c5f142e26ea5e892a63ed35ca952c8b583a9f8c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Oliver Steffen +Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2024 09:53:49 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] NetworkPkg/DxeNetLib: Reword PseudoRandom error logging + +RH-Author: Oliver Steffen +RH-MergeRequest: 67: NetworkPkg/DxeNetLib: adjust PseudoRandom error logging +RH-Jira: RHEL-45899 +RH-Commit: [2/2] 0d465ca0ea00598e6826446cd08e890c2ae4bea7 (osteffen/edk2) + +The word "Failed" is used when logging tired Rng algorithms. +These mostly non-critical messages confused some users. + +Reword it and also add a message confirming eventual success to +deescalate the importance somewhat. + +Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen +--- + NetworkPkg/Library/DxeNetLib/DxeNetLib.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Library/DxeNetLib/DxeNetLib.c b/NetworkPkg/Library/DxeNetLib/DxeNetLib.c +index 4dfbe91a55..905a944975 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Library/DxeNetLib/DxeNetLib.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Library/DxeNetLib/DxeNetLib.c +@@ -946,12 +946,13 @@ PseudoRandom ( + // + // Secure Algorithm was supported on this platform + // ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Generated random data using secure algorithm %d: %r\n", AlgorithmIndex, Status)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } else if (Status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED) { + // + // Secure Algorithm was not supported on this platform + // +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Failed to generate random data using secure algorithm %d: %r\n", AlgorithmIndex, Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Unable to generate random data using secure algorithm %d not available: %r\n", AlgorithmIndex, Status)); + + // + // Try the next secure algorithm +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-DxeNetLib-adjust-PseudoRandom-error-loggi.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-DxeNetLib-adjust-PseudoRandom-error-loggi.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..18fb2ab --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-NetworkPkg-DxeNetLib-adjust-PseudoRandom-error-loggi.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 7cbd00792445ad50e861e4835cdb5ba60466aae3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2024 09:07:56 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] NetworkPkg/DxeNetLib: adjust PseudoRandom error logging + +RH-Author: Oliver Steffen +RH-MergeRequest: 67: NetworkPkg/DxeNetLib: adjust PseudoRandom error logging +RH-Jira: RHEL-45899 +RH-Commit: [1/2] 15135d672cef4310cb29f8a55146f36b2ee1f15d (osteffen/edk2) + +There is a list of allowed rng algorithms, if /one/ of them is not +supported this is not a problem, only /all/ of them failing is an +error condition. + +Downgrade the message for a single unsupported algorithm from ERROR to +VERBOSE. Add an error message in case we finish the loop without +finding a supported algorithm. + +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +(cherry picked from commit 6862b9d538d96363635677198899e1669e591259) +--- + NetworkPkg/Library/DxeNetLib/DxeNetLib.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Library/DxeNetLib/DxeNetLib.c b/NetworkPkg/Library/DxeNetLib/DxeNetLib.c +index 01c13c08d2..4dfbe91a55 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Library/DxeNetLib/DxeNetLib.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Library/DxeNetLib/DxeNetLib.c +@@ -951,7 +951,7 @@ PseudoRandom ( + // + // Secure Algorithm was not supported on this platform + // +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to generate random data using secure algorithm %d: %r\n", AlgorithmIndex, Status)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Failed to generate random data using secure algorithm %d: %r\n", AlgorithmIndex, Status)); + + // + // Try the next secure algorithm +@@ -971,6 +971,7 @@ PseudoRandom ( + // If we get here, we failed to generate random data using any secure algorithm + // Platform owner should ensure that at least one secure algorithm is supported + // ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to generate random data, no supported secure algorithm found\n")); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + return Status; + } +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-UefiCpuPkg-PiSmmCpuDxeSmm-skip-PatchInstructionX86-c.patch b/SOURCES/edk2-UefiCpuPkg-PiSmmCpuDxeSmm-skip-PatchInstructionX86-c.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e09d72 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-UefiCpuPkg-PiSmmCpuDxeSmm-skip-PatchInstructionX86-c.patch @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +From c4aa4797fafa3a627205eaa346401e399d4a7146 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann +Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 12:06:15 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: skip PatchInstructionX86 calls if + not needed. + +RH-Author: Oliver Steffen +RH-MergeRequest: 71: UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: skip PatchInstructionX86 calls if not needed. +RH-Jira: RHEL-45847 +RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann +RH-Commit: [1/1] 70ceffb2c1e695276af87d3aa334fe9be8e2e90e (osteffen/edk2) + +Add the new global mMsrIa32MiscEnableSupported variable to track +whenever support for the IA32_MISC_ENABLE MSR is present or not. + +Add new local PatchingNeeded variable to CheckFeatureSupported() +to track if patching the SMM setup code is needed or not. + +Issue PatchInstructionX86() calls only if needed, i.e. if one of +the *Supported variables has been updated. + +Result is that on a typical SMP machine where all processors are +identical the PatchInstructionX86() calls are issued only once, +when checking the first processor. Specifically this avoids +PatchInstructionX86() being called in OVMF on CPU hotplug. That +is important because instruction patching at runtime does not not +work and leads to page faults. + +This fixes CPU hotplug on OVMF not working with AMD cpus. + +Fixes: 6b3a89a9fdb5 ("OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Relocate SmBases in PEI phase") +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann +(cherry picked from commit 17ff8960848b2cb2e49fffb3dfbacd08865786a4) +--- + UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c b/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c +index 8142d3ceac..8e299fd29a 100644 +--- a/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c ++++ b/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c +@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ BOOLEAN mXdEnabled = FALSE; + // + BOOLEAN mBtsSupported = TRUE; + ++// ++// The flag indicates if MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE is supported by processor ++// ++BOOLEAN mMsrIa32MiscEnableSupported = TRUE; ++ + // + // The flag indicates if SMM profile starts to record data. + // +@@ -904,18 +909,23 @@ CheckFeatureSupported ( + UINT32 RegEcx; + UINT32 RegEdx; + MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_REGISTER MiscEnableMsr; ++ BOOLEAN PatchingNeeded = FALSE; + + if ((PcdGet32 (PcdControlFlowEnforcementPropertyMask) != 0) && mCetSupported) { + AsmCpuid (CPUID_SIGNATURE, &RegEax, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (RegEax >= CPUID_STRUCTURED_EXTENDED_FEATURE_FLAGS) { + AsmCpuidEx (CPUID_STRUCTURED_EXTENDED_FEATURE_FLAGS, CPUID_STRUCTURED_EXTENDED_FEATURE_FLAGS_SUB_LEAF_INFO, NULL, NULL, &RegEcx, NULL); + if ((RegEcx & CPUID_CET_SS) == 0) { +- mCetSupported = FALSE; +- PatchInstructionX86 (mPatchCetSupported, mCetSupported, 1); ++ if (mCetSupported) { ++ mCetSupported = FALSE; ++ PatchingNeeded = TRUE; ++ } + } + } else { +- mCetSupported = FALSE; +- PatchInstructionX86 (mPatchCetSupported, mCetSupported, 1); ++ if (mCetSupported) { ++ mCetSupported = FALSE; ++ PatchingNeeded = TRUE; ++ } + } + } + +@@ -925,8 +935,10 @@ CheckFeatureSupported ( + // + // Extended CPUID functions are not supported on this processor. + // +- mXdSupported = FALSE; +- PatchInstructionX86 (gPatchXdSupported, mXdSupported, 1); ++ if (mXdSupported) { ++ mXdSupported = FALSE; ++ PatchingNeeded = TRUE; ++ } + } + + AsmCpuid (CPUID_EXTENDED_CPU_SIG, NULL, NULL, NULL, &RegEdx); +@@ -934,15 +946,20 @@ CheckFeatureSupported ( + // + // Execute Disable Bit feature is not supported on this processor. + // +- mXdSupported = FALSE; +- PatchInstructionX86 (gPatchXdSupported, mXdSupported, 1); ++ if (mXdSupported) { ++ mXdSupported = FALSE; ++ PatchingNeeded = TRUE; ++ } + } + + if (StandardSignatureIsAuthenticAMD ()) { + // + // AMD processors do not support MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE + // +- PatchInstructionX86 (gPatchMsrIa32MiscEnableSupported, FALSE, 1); ++ if (mMsrIa32MiscEnableSupported) { ++ mMsrIa32MiscEnableSupported = FALSE; ++ PatchingNeeded = TRUE; ++ } + } + } + +@@ -966,6 +983,20 @@ CheckFeatureSupported ( + } + } + } ++ ++ if (PatchingNeeded) { ++ if (!mCetSupported) { ++ PatchInstructionX86 (mPatchCetSupported, mCetSupported, 1); ++ } ++ ++ if (!mXdSupported) { ++ PatchInstructionX86 (gPatchXdSupported, mXdSupported, 1); ++ } ++ ++ if (!mMsrIa32MiscEnableSupported) { ++ PatchInstructionX86 (gPatchMsrIa32MiscEnableSupported, FALSE, 1); ++ } ++ } + } + + /** +-- +2.39.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-build.py b/SOURCES/edk2-build.py new file mode 100755 index 0000000..cee7541 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-build.py @@ -0,0 +1,447 @@ +#!/usr/bin/python3 +""" +build helper script for edk2, see +https://gitlab.com/kraxel/edk2-build-config + +""" +import os +import sys +import time +import shutil +import argparse +import subprocess +import configparser + +rebase_prefix = "" +version_override = None +release_date = None + +# pylint: disable=unused-variable +def check_rebase(): + """ detect 'git rebase -x edk2-build.py master' testbuilds """ + global rebase_prefix + global version_override + gitdir = '.git' + + if os.path.isfile(gitdir): + with open(gitdir, 'r', encoding = 'utf-8') as f: + (unused, gitdir) = f.read().split() + + if not os.path.exists(f'{gitdir}/rebase-merge/msgnum'): + return + with open(f'{gitdir}/rebase-merge/msgnum', 'r', encoding = 'utf-8') as f: + msgnum = int(f.read()) + with open(f'{gitdir}/rebase-merge/end', 'r', encoding = 'utf-8') as f: + end = int(f.read()) + with open(f'{gitdir}/rebase-merge/head-name', 'r', encoding = 'utf-8') as f: + head = f.read().strip().split('/') + + rebase_prefix = f'[ {int(msgnum/2)} / {int(end/2)} - {head[-1]} ] ' + if msgnum != end and not version_override: + # fixed version speeds up builds + version_override = "test-build-patch-series" + +def get_coredir(cfg): + if cfg.has_option('global', 'core'): + return os.path.abspath(cfg['global']['core']) + return os.getcwd() + +def get_toolchain(cfg, build): + if cfg.has_option(build, 'tool'): + return cfg[build]['tool'] + if cfg.has_option('global', 'tool'): + return cfg['global']['tool'] + return 'GCC5' + +def get_hostarch(): + mach = os.uname().machine + if mach == 'x86_64': + return 'X64' + if mach == 'aarch64': + return 'AARCH64' + if mach == 'riscv64': + return 'RISCV64' + return 'UNKNOWN' + +def get_version(cfg, silent = False): + coredir = get_coredir(cfg) + if version_override: + version = version_override + if not silent: + print('') + print(f'### version [override]: {version}') + return version + if os.environ.get('RPM_PACKAGE_NAME'): + version = os.environ.get('RPM_PACKAGE_NAME') + version += '-' + os.environ.get('RPM_PACKAGE_VERSION') + version += '-' + os.environ.get('RPM_PACKAGE_RELEASE') + if not silent: + print('') + print(f'### version [rpmbuild]: {version}') + return version + if os.path.exists(coredir + '/.git'): + cmdline = [ 'git', 'describe', '--tags', '--abbrev=8', + '--match=edk2-stable*' ] + result = subprocess.run(cmdline, cwd = coredir, + stdout = subprocess.PIPE, + check = True) + version = result.stdout.decode().strip() + if not silent: + print('') + print(f'### version [git]: {version}') + return version + return None + +def pcd_string(name, value): + return f'{name}=L{value}\\0' + +def pcd_version(cfg, silent = False): + version = get_version(cfg, silent) + if version is None: + return [] + return [ '--pcd', pcd_string('PcdFirmwareVersionString', version) ] + +def pcd_release_date(): + if release_date is None: + return [] + return [ '--pcd', pcd_string('PcdFirmwareReleaseDateString', release_date) ] + +def build_message(line, line2 = None, silent = False): + if os.environ.get('TERM') in [ 'xterm', 'xterm-256color' ]: + # setxterm title + start = '\x1b]2;' + end = '\x07' + print(f'{start}{rebase_prefix}{line}{end}', end = '') + + if silent: + print(f'### {rebase_prefix}{line}', flush = True) + else: + print('') + print('###') + print(f'### {rebase_prefix}{line}') + if line2: + print(f'### {line2}') + print('###', flush = True) + +def build_run(cmdline, name, section, silent = False, nologs = False): + if silent: + logfile = f'{section}.log' + if nologs: + print(f'### building in silent mode [no log] ...', flush = True) + else: + print(f'### building in silent mode [{logfile}] ...', flush = True) + start = time.time() + result = subprocess.run(cmdline, check = False, + stdout = subprocess.PIPE, + stderr = subprocess.STDOUT) + if not nologs: + with open(logfile, 'wb') as f: + f.write(result.stdout) + + if result.returncode: + print('### BUILD FAILURE') + print('### cmdline') + print(cmdline) + print('### output') + print(result.stdout.decode()) + print(f'### exit code: {result.returncode}') + else: + secs = int(time.time() - start) + print(f'### OK ({int(secs/60)}:{secs%60:02d})') + else: + print(cmdline, flush = True) + result = subprocess.run(cmdline, check = False) + if result.returncode: + print(f'ERROR: {cmdline[0]} exited with {result.returncode}' + f' while building {name}') + sys.exit(result.returncode) + +def build_copy(plat, tgt, toolchain, dstdir, copy): + srcdir = f'Build/{plat}/{tgt}_{toolchain}' + names = copy.split() + srcfile = names[0] + if len(names) > 1: + dstfile = names[1] + else: + dstfile = os.path.basename(srcfile) + print(f'# copy: {srcdir} / {srcfile} => {dstdir} / {dstfile}') + + src = srcdir + '/' + srcfile + dst = dstdir + '/' + dstfile + os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(dst), exist_ok = True) + shutil.copy(src, dst) + +def pad_file(dstdir, pad): + args = pad.split() + if len(args) < 2: + raise RuntimeError(f'missing arg for pad ({args})') + name = args[0] + size = args[1] + cmdline = [ + 'truncate', + '--size', size, + dstdir + '/' + name, + ] + print(f'# padding: {dstdir} / {name} => {size}') + subprocess.run(cmdline, check = True) + +# pylint: disable=too-many-branches +def build_one(cfg, build, jobs = None, silent = False, nologs = False): + b = cfg[build] + + cmdline = [ 'build' ] + cmdline += [ '-t', get_toolchain(cfg, build) ] + cmdline += [ '-p', b['conf'] ] + + if (b['conf'].startswith('OvmfPkg/') or + b['conf'].startswith('ArmVirtPkg/')): + cmdline += pcd_version(cfg, silent) + cmdline += pcd_release_date() + + if jobs: + cmdline += [ '-n', jobs ] + for arch in b['arch'].split(): + if arch == 'HOST': + cmdline += [ '-a', get_hostarch() ] + else: + cmdline += [ '-a', arch ] + if 'opts' in b: + for name in b['opts'].split(): + section = 'opts.' + name + for opt in cfg[section]: + cmdline += [ '-D', opt + '=' + cfg[section][opt] ] + if 'pcds' in b: + for name in b['pcds'].split(): + section = 'pcds.' + name + for pcd in cfg[section]: + cmdline += [ '--pcd', pcd + '=' + cfg[section][pcd] ] + if 'tgts' in b: + tgts = b['tgts'].split() + else: + tgts = [ 'DEBUG' ] + for tgt in tgts: + desc = None + if 'desc' in b: + desc = b['desc'] + build_message(f'building: {b["conf"]} ({b["arch"]}, {tgt})', + f'description: {desc}', + silent = silent) + build_run(cmdline + [ '-b', tgt ], + b['conf'], + build + '.' + tgt, + silent, + nologs) + + if 'plat' in b: + # copy files + for cpy in b: + if not cpy.startswith('cpy'): + continue + build_copy(b['plat'], tgt, + get_toolchain(cfg, build), + b['dest'], b[cpy]) + # pad builds + for pad in b: + if not pad.startswith('pad'): + continue + pad_file(b['dest'], b[pad]) + +def build_basetools(silent = False, nologs = False): + build_message('building: BaseTools', silent = silent) + basedir = os.environ['EDK_TOOLS_PATH'] + cmdline = [ 'make', '-C', basedir ] + build_run(cmdline, 'BaseTools', 'build.basetools', silent, nologs) + +def binary_exists(name): + for pdir in os.environ['PATH'].split(':'): + if os.path.exists(pdir + '/' + name): + return True + return False + +def prepare_env(cfg, silent = False): + """ mimic Conf/BuildEnv.sh """ + workspace = os.getcwd() + packages = [ workspace, ] + path = os.environ['PATH'].split(':') + dirs = [ + 'BaseTools/Bin/Linux-x86_64', + 'BaseTools/BinWrappers/PosixLike' + ] + + if cfg.has_option('global', 'pkgs'): + for pkgdir in cfg['global']['pkgs'].split(): + packages.append(os.path.abspath(pkgdir)) + coredir = get_coredir(cfg) + if coredir != workspace: + packages.append(coredir) + + # add basetools to path + for pdir in dirs: + p = coredir + '/' + pdir + if not os.path.exists(p): + continue + if p in path: + continue + path.insert(0, p) + + # run edksetup if needed + toolsdef = coredir + '/Conf/tools_def.txt' + if not os.path.exists(toolsdef): + os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(toolsdef), exist_ok = True) + build_message('running BaseTools/BuildEnv', silent = silent) + cmdline = [ 'bash', 'BaseTools/BuildEnv' ] + subprocess.run(cmdline, cwd = coredir, check = True) + + # set variables + os.environ['PATH'] = ':'.join(path) + os.environ['PACKAGES_PATH'] = ':'.join(packages) + os.environ['WORKSPACE'] = workspace + os.environ['EDK_TOOLS_PATH'] = coredir + '/BaseTools' + os.environ['CONF_PATH'] = coredir + '/Conf' + os.environ['PYTHON_COMMAND'] = '/usr/bin/python3' + os.environ['PYTHONHASHSEED'] = '1' + + # for cross builds + if binary_exists('arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc'): + # ubuntu + os.environ['GCC5_ARM_PREFIX'] = 'arm-linux-gnueabi-' + os.environ['GCC_ARM_PREFIX'] = 'arm-linux-gnueabi-' + elif binary_exists('arm-linux-gnu-gcc'): + # fedora + os.environ['GCC5_ARM_PREFIX'] = 'arm-linux-gnu-' + os.environ['GCC_ARM_PREFIX'] = 'arm-linux-gnu-' + if binary_exists('loongarch64-linux-gnu-gcc'): + os.environ['GCC5_LOONGARCH64_PREFIX'] = 'loongarch64-linux-gnu-' + os.environ['GCC_LOONGARCH64_PREFIX'] = 'loongarch64-linux-gnu-' + + hostarch = os.uname().machine + if binary_exists('aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc') and hostarch != 'aarch64': + os.environ['GCC5_AARCH64_PREFIX'] = 'aarch64-linux-gnu-' + os.environ['GCC_AARCH64_PREFIX'] = 'aarch64-linux-gnu-' + if binary_exists('riscv64-linux-gnu-gcc') and hostarch != 'riscv64': + os.environ['GCC5_RISCV64_PREFIX'] = 'riscv64-linux-gnu-' + os.environ['GCC_RISCV64_PREFIX'] = 'riscv64-linux-gnu-' + if binary_exists('x86_64-linux-gnu-gcc') and hostarch != 'x86_64': + os.environ['GCC5_IA32_PREFIX'] = 'x86_64-linux-gnu-' + os.environ['GCC5_X64_PREFIX'] = 'x86_64-linux-gnu-' + os.environ['GCC5_BIN'] = 'x86_64-linux-gnu-' + os.environ['GCC_IA32_PREFIX'] = 'x86_64-linux-gnu-' + os.environ['GCC_X64_PREFIX'] = 'x86_64-linux-gnu-' + os.environ['GCC_BIN'] = 'x86_64-linux-gnu-' + +def build_list(cfg): + for build in cfg.sections(): + if not build.startswith('build.'): + continue + name = build.lstrip('build.') + desc = 'no description' + if 'desc' in cfg[build]: + desc = cfg[build]['desc'] + print(f'# {name:20s} - {desc}') + +def main(): + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog = 'edk2-build', + description = 'edk2 build helper script') + parser.add_argument('-c', '--config', dest = 'configfile', + type = str, default = '.edk2.builds', metavar = 'FILE', + help = 'read configuration from FILE (default: .edk2.builds)') + parser.add_argument('-C', '--directory', dest = 'directory', type = str, + help = 'change to DIR before building', metavar = 'DIR') + parser.add_argument('-j', '--jobs', dest = 'jobs', type = str, + help = 'allow up to JOBS parallel build jobs', + metavar = 'JOBS') + parser.add_argument('-m', '--match', dest = 'match', + type = str, action = 'append', + help = 'only run builds matching INCLUDE (substring)', + metavar = 'INCLUDE') + parser.add_argument('-x', '--exclude', dest = 'exclude', + type = str, action = 'append', + help = 'skip builds matching EXCLUDE (substring)', + metavar = 'EXCLUDE') + parser.add_argument('-l', '--list', dest = 'list', + action = 'store_true', default = False, + help = 'list build configs available') + parser.add_argument('--silent', dest = 'silent', + action = 'store_true', default = False, + help = 'write build output to logfiles, ' + 'write to console only on errors') + parser.add_argument('--no-logs', dest = 'nologs', + action = 'store_true', default = False, + help = 'do not write build log files (with --silent)') + parser.add_argument('--core', dest = 'core', type = str, metavar = 'DIR', + help = 'location of the core edk2 repository ' + '(i.e. where BuildTools are located)') + parser.add_argument('--pkg', '--package', dest = 'pkgs', + type = str, action = 'append', metavar = 'DIR', + help = 'location(s) of additional packages ' + '(can be specified multiple times)') + parser.add_argument('-t', '--toolchain', dest = 'toolchain', + type = str, metavar = 'NAME', + help = 'tool chain to be used to build edk2') + parser.add_argument('--version-override', dest = 'version_override', + type = str, metavar = 'VERSION', + help = 'set firmware build version') + parser.add_argument('--release-date', dest = 'release_date', + type = str, metavar = 'DATE', + help = 'set firmware build release date (in MM/DD/YYYY format)') + options = parser.parse_args() + + if options.directory: + os.chdir(options.directory) + + if not os.path.exists(options.configfile): + print(f'config file "{options.configfile}" not found') + return 1 + + cfg = configparser.ConfigParser() + cfg.optionxform = str + cfg.read(options.configfile) + + if options.list: + build_list(cfg) + return 0 + + if not cfg.has_section('global'): + cfg.add_section('global') + if options.core: + cfg.set('global', 'core', options.core) + if options.pkgs: + cfg.set('global', 'pkgs', ' '.join(options.pkgs)) + if options.toolchain: + cfg.set('global', 'tool', options.toolchain) + + global version_override + global release_date + check_rebase() + if options.version_override: + version_override = options.version_override + if options.release_date: + release_date = options.release_date + + prepare_env(cfg, options.silent) + build_basetools(options.silent, options.nologs) + for build in cfg.sections(): + if not build.startswith('build.'): + continue + if options.match: + matching = False + for item in options.match: + if item in build: + matching = True + if not matching: + print(f'# skipping "{build}" (not matching "{"|".join(options.match)}")') + continue + if options.exclude: + exclude = False + for item in options.exclude: + if item in build: + print(f'# skipping "{build}" (matching "{item}")') + exclude = True + if exclude: + continue + build_one(cfg, build, options.jobs, options.silent, options.nologs) + + return 0 + +if __name__ == '__main__': + sys.exit(main()) diff --git a/SOURCES/edk2-build.rhel-9 b/SOURCES/edk2-build.rhel-9 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9088bf8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/edk2-build.rhel-9 @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ + +[opts.ovmf.common] +NETWORK_HTTP_BOOT_ENABLE = TRUE +NETWORK_IP6_ENABLE = TRUE +NETWORK_TLS_ENABLE = TRUE +NETWORK_ISCSI_ENABLE = TRUE +NETWORK_ALLOW_HTTP_CONNECTIONS = TRUE +TPM2_ENABLE = TRUE +TPM2_CONFIG_ENABLE = TRUE +TPM1_ENABLE = FALSE +CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456 = TRUE + +[opts.ovmf.4m] +FD_SIZE_4MB = TRUE + +[opts.ovmf.sb.smm] +SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE = TRUE +SMM_REQUIRE = TRUE +# old downstream +EXCLUDE_SHELL_FROM_FD = TRUE +# new upstream +BUILD_SHELL = FALSE + +[opts.ovmf.sb.stateless] +SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE = TRUE +SMM_REQUIRE = FALSE + +[opts.armvirt.verbose] +DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR_LEVEL = 0x8040004F + +[opts.armvirt.silent] +DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR_LEVEL = 0x80000000 + + +[pcds.nx.strict] +PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy = 0xC000000000007FD5 +PcdUninstallMemAttrProtocol = FALSE + +[pcds.nx.broken.shim.grub] +# grub.efi uses EfiLoaderData for code +PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy = 0xC000000000007FD1 +# shim.efi has broken MemAttr code +PcdUninstallMemAttrProtocol = TRUE + + +##################################################################### +# stateful ovmf builds (with vars in flash) + +[build.ovmf.4m.default] +desc = ovmf build (64-bit, 4MB) +conf = OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +arch = X64 +opts = ovmf.common + ovmf.4m +plat = OvmfX64 +dest = RHEL-9/ovmf +cpy1 = FV/OVMF_CODE.fd OVMF_CODE.fd +cpy2 = FV/OVMF_VARS.fd +cpy3 = X64/Shell.efi + +[build.ovmf.4m.sb.smm] +desc = ovmf build (64-bit, 4MB, q35 only, needs smm, secure boot) +conf = OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc +arch = X64 +opts = ovmf.common + ovmf.4m + ovmf.sb.smm +plat = OvmfX64 +dest = RHEL-9/ovmf +cpy1 = FV/OVMF_CODE.fd OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd +cpy2 = X64/EnrollDefaultKeys.efi + + +##################################################################### +# stateless ovmf builds (firmware in rom or r/o flash) + +[build.ovmf.amdsev] +desc = ovmf build for AmdSev (4MB) +conf = OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc +arch = X64 +opts = ovmf.common + ovmf.4m +plat = AmdSev +dest = RHEL-9/ovmf +cpy1 = FV/OVMF.fd OVMF.amdsev.fd + +[build.ovmf.inteltdx] +desc = ovmf build for IntelTdx (4MB) +conf = OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc +arch = X64 +opts = ovmf.common + ovmf.4m + ovmf.sb.stateless +plat = IntelTdx +dest = RHEL-9/ovmf +cpy1 = FV/OVMF.fd OVMF.inteltdx.fd + + +##################################################################### +# armvirt builds + +[build.armvirt.aa64.verbose] +desc = ArmVirt build for qemu, 64-bit (arm v8), verbose +conf = ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +arch = AARCH64 +opts = ovmf.common + armvirt.verbose +pcds = nx.broken.shim.grub +plat = ArmVirtQemu-AARCH64 +dest = RHEL-9/aarch64 +cpy1 = FV/QEMU_EFI.fd +cpy2 = FV/QEMU_VARS.fd +cpy3 = FV/QEMU_EFI.fd QEMU_EFI-pflash.raw +cpy4 = FV/QEMU_VARS.fd vars-template-pflash.raw +pad3 = QEMU_EFI-pflash.raw 64m +pad4 = vars-template-pflash.raw 64m + +[build.armvirt.aa64.silent] +desc = ArmVirt build for qemu, 64-bit (arm v8), silent +conf = ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc +arch = AARCH64 +opts = ovmf.common + armvirt.silent +pcds = nx.broken.shim.grub +plat = ArmVirtQemu-AARCH64 +dest = RHEL-9/aarch64 +cpy1 = FV/QEMU_EFI.fd QEMU_EFI.silent.fd +cpy2 = FV/QEMU_EFI.fd QEMU_EFI-silent-pflash.raw +pad2 = QEMU_EFI-silent-pflash.raw 64m diff --git a/SOURCES/msvsphereca1.pem b/SOURCES/msvsphereca1.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d83801 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/msvsphereca1.pem @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: + 52:17:7c:cc:f0:fd:5d:71:2f:84:89:87:48:d3:d9:07:71:f5:c3:c1 + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: CN = MSVSphere IMA CA, O = NCSD LLC, C = RU, ST = Moscow, L = Moscow, emailAddress = security@msvsphere-os.ru, OU = MSVSphere Certification Authority + Validity + Not Before: Oct 17 14:50:46 2023 GMT + Not After : May 31 14:50:46 2040 GMT + Subject: CN = MSVSphere IMA CA, O = NCSD LLC, C = RU, ST = Moscow, L = Moscow, emailAddress = security@msvsphere-os.ru, OU = MSVSphere Certification Authority + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + Public-Key: (2048 bit) + Modulus: + 00:a7:93:2f:b8:68:02:6e:4c:a8:ec:d4:b5:5c:24: + f9:30:e9:ef:4a:16:2e:d6:19:f8:44:0f:b8:f1:7d: + 32:74:2a:05:d4:2d:3b:36:89:70:d7:59:f9:c8:b1: + 9c:7e:71:c5:61:72:59:b6:c5:c8:d1:a2:d6:57:f4: + 14:f2:c1:67:bd:a3:aa:75:df:f2:f9:48:cb:13:f2: + b9:f0:94:02:a5:3c:cf:9b:43:f1:a1:b2:8c:ff:c7: + 20:3b:1e:75:14:d6:e6:0c:01:04:6d:82:f7:56:25: + 9a:d8:e3:72:b2:1b:17:87:3a:3c:da:6f:5d:06:c2: + 8c:b9:de:ef:e1:f5:38:ae:d4:c9:26:3c:57:be:af: + b2:57:5d:ec:ce:cd:14:98:39:77:cd:b8:f5:ad:a4: + 3c:a7:1c:c3:2b:80:d2:89:b8:7e:22:9a:67:00:91: + d8:c1:52:e7:b3:61:21:3c:8c:80:39:68:8c:1e:ee: + 23:a5:86:6a:80:16:e1:4a:27:fa:37:fd:69:62:89: + 28:d6:5c:cd:cb:3e:d4:d7:f4:23:57:ce:cb:c2:ec: + ca:ff:4a:04:ec:98:b4:cd:b9:f6:81:3c:fd:ab:bc: + 83:b1:ed:47:be:65:8e:93:14:13:d3:bd:df:99:8b: + fa:93:ca:55:9c:c1:2e:74:54:f5:ae:86:a1:20:29: + b2:d9 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 77:00:6F:8D:E0:2B:DC:27:EA:D8:DB:F4:C1:DA:12:AD:BF:6E:05:EC + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:TRUE + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + 77:00:6F:8D:E0:2B:DC:27:EA:D8:DB:F4:C1:DA:12:AD:BF:6E:05:EC + X509v3 Key Usage: critical + Certificate Sign, CRL Sign + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Signature Value: + a3:d4:fc:8d:25:5c:d9:3a:60:c3:6d:41:e1:c1:d9:7b:aa:bf: + 13:97:71:9f:8f:c1:a6:c9:fe:8d:50:49:cb:14:cc:03:76:80: + 69:8a:9a:af:84:e0:b8:9b:ef:8e:03:04:ea:38:01:5c:c0:cd: + f0:af:85:e0:de:9f:f8:05:1e:6c:36:13:c5:24:f3:57:4d:0d: + 97:ef:f2:ef:18:e9:82:c0:ce:1f:4a:b5:55:94:1b:c5:06:33: + 29:de:c8:45:1a:c3:10:2b:c9:ba:9f:8e:66:50:24:b8:78:a8: + 42:72:28:54:2e:67:1c:4f:74:d2:bf:45:cc:cb:f2:b9:44:86: + 01:1a:54:e0:58:19:e7:dc:00:15:80:0a:47:6e:5a:25:9a:21: + 7c:47:c6:de:c4:73:82:7a:0e:2c:3b:4a:e8:1a:4d:32:33:b1: + f2:02:1f:dc:f3:b2:45:79:db:5f:3d:67:a7:b5:b3:90:41:e4: + 49:e6:40:29:39:d3:b6:72:06:17:d5:96:80:c1:20:29:4b:f1: + 51:03:18:60:66:e3:b3:14:50:b3:0e:72:ad:d7:d6:a2:eb:94: + 8f:2f:7f:db:02:1f:a6:a9:f5:a4:2e:fc:73:43:8f:0e:84:96: + 8b:d5:c5:60:f1:2d:9f:e4:ca:07:ea:af:5f:68:93:9f:41:73: + 31:8b:b6:a7 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIEVzCCAz+gAwIBAgIUUhd8zPD9XXEvhImHSNPZB3H1w8EwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL +BQAwgbIxGTAXBgNVBAMMEE1TVlNwaGVyZSBJTUEgQ0ExETAPBgNVBAoMCE5DU0Qg +TExDMQswCQYDVQQGEwJSVTEPMA0GA1UECAwGTW9zY293MQ8wDQYDVQQHDAZNb3Nj +b3cxJzAlBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWGHNlY3VyaXR5QG1zdnNwaGVyZS1vcy5ydTEqMCgG +A1UECwwhTVNWU3BoZXJlIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MB4XDTIzMTAx +NzE0NTA0NloXDTQwMDUzMTE0NTA0NlowgbIxGTAXBgNVBAMMEE1TVlNwaGVyZSBJ +TUEgQ0ExETAPBgNVBAoMCE5DU0QgTExDMQswCQYDVQQGEwJSVTEPMA0GA1UECAwG +TW9zY293MQ8wDQYDVQQHDAZNb3Njb3cxJzAlBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWGHNlY3VyaXR5 +QG1zdnNwaGVyZS1vcy5ydTEqMCgGA1UECwwhTVNWU3BoZXJlIENlcnRpZmljYXRp +b24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAp5Mv +uGgCbkyo7NS1XCT5MOnvShYu1hn4RA+48X0ydCoF1C07Nolw11n5yLGcfnHFYXJZ +tsXI0aLWV/QU8sFnvaOqdd/y+UjLE/K58JQCpTzPm0PxobKM/8cgOx51FNbmDAEE +bYL3ViWa2ONyshsXhzo82m9dBsKMud7v4fU4rtTJJjxXvq+yV13szs0UmDl3zbj1 +raQ8pxzDK4DSibh+IppnAJHYwVLns2EhPIyAOWiMHu4jpYZqgBbhSif6N/1pYoko +1lzNyz7U1/QjV87LwuzK/0oE7Ji0zbn2gTz9q7yDse1HvmWOkxQT073fmYv6k8pV +nMEudFT1roahICmy2QIDAQABo2MwYTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUdwBvjeAr3Cfq2Nv0wdoS +rb9uBewwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBR3AG+N4CvcJ+rY2/TB +2hKtv24F7DAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAKPU/I0l +XNk6YMNtQeHB2XuqvxOXcZ+PwabJ/o1QScsUzAN2gGmKmq+E4Lib744DBOo4AVzA +zfCvheDen/gFHmw2E8Uk81dNDZfv8u8Y6YLAzh9KtVWUG8UGMyneyEUawxArybqf +jmZQJLh4qEJyKFQuZxxPdNK/RczL8rlEhgEaVOBYGefcABWACkduWiWaIXxHxt7E +c4J6Diw7SugaTTIzsfICH9zzskV52189Z6e1s5BB5EnmQCk507ZyBhfVloDBIClL +8VEDGGBm47MUULMOcq3X1qLrlI8vf9sCH6ap9aQu/HNDjw6ElovVxWDxLZ/kygfq +r19ok59BczGLtqc= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/SOURCES/msvspheredup1.pem b/SOURCES/msvspheredup1.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d2533d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/msvspheredup1.pem @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: + d6:39:17:e7:e5:6a:47:54:b8:56:f2:eb:47:6b:f8:c3 + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: OU = MSVSphere Certification Authority, emailAddress = security@msvsphere.ru, L = Moscow, ST = Moscow, C = RU, O = NCSD LLC, CN = MSVSphere Secure Boot CA + Validity + Not Before: Mar 22 16:42:54 2023 GMT + Not After : Mar 22 16:42:54 2053 GMT + Subject: OU = MSVSphere Certification Authority, emailAddress = security@msvsphere.ru, L = Moscow, ST = Moscow, C = RU, O = NCSD LLC, CN = MSVSphere Driver update signing key + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + Public-Key: (2048 bit) + Modulus: + 00:ba:09:cd:1d:80:9c:00:59:96:07:ce:1f:69:a2: + d7:8b:29:2e:68:13:6f:87:42:5e:ff:42:58:19:b1: + 75:b2:ba:af:5d:84:37:74:50:0e:dd:5a:1d:45:f2: + f1:e0:9b:b5:f3:9c:d5:a8:29:5a:cd:8c:85:8a:13: + d4:60:b9:52:ad:c9:fe:0c:4f:fe:af:08:25:ec:a7: + c6:2a:e3:ff:66:b8:b0:89:69:5a:fe:b1:a8:68:8a: + de:79:1e:68:e7:a8:14:01:c8:45:5b:0e:00:54:98: + 32:40:4a:5d:e7:18:55:ce:bd:bc:77:3d:94:38:ac: + db:e8:5e:71:d2:be:e4:38:60:39:f8:e1:9a:ee:1a: + 84:df:14:33:ce:ce:db:c4:57:c8:cf:d1:3e:72:a9: + eb:b5:7e:50:57:a1:51:06:d5:07:9c:e2:57:1a:1c: + 66:8c:ba:05:aa:50:dc:e2:19:d5:04:fd:a8:bd:83: + eb:70:06:19:81:f0:ab:2a:3f:ec:cd:f3:0f:ce:ee: + 75:87:87:93:1b:0e:44:e1:f9:ba:e5:53:91:ef:09: + 6e:d8:63:8e:69:00:6e:37:1d:90:83:99:3f:23:c7: + 33:d7:ae:13:cb:c8:fa:76:d8:5d:26:b5:9f:5a:5e: + 18:22:b1:3a:c5:84:6c:67:20:e3:72:98:07:02:43: + 83:55 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + 49:59:67:B5:13:6C:C8:DF:7E:64:B9:22:E3:A9:35:50:6B:95:84:D5 + X509v3 Extended Key Usage: + Code Signing, 1.3.6.1.4.1.2312.16.1.2 + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:FALSE + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 20:11:38:3B:AE:1E:E8:65:DE:29:6E:C4:7B:90:7F:4D:38:27:EB:DE + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Signature Value: + 82:29:45:3f:f4:79:e2:b5:d4:4a:a3:22:1e:16:75:68:38:44: + 46:61:0d:4c:74:cc:7d:11:f5:e2:db:c3:a3:ba:5f:03:77:95: + 9e:37:b8:72:68:ea:ee:a9:f2:09:a9:d6:07:d7:45:27:6c:fa: + a1:b8:20:77:fb:22:f1:59:26:70:fa:4c:2f:1c:6e:fc:ec:4a: + 15:91:c2:90:d6:89:b8:50:9e:c6:56:e3:1f:4a:e2:20:e5:90: + 09:16:80:a2:89:a9:90:a8:f2:37:e8:6e:29:d8:9a:61:31:d2: + 2b:2a:23:2f:69:1a:7c:9f:7f:66:e0:93:29:1f:5f:9b:78:0b: + ec:74:5b:58:33:6f:bc:62:9e:98:87:9b:ae:38:b5:ed:4f:f3: + b6:48:24:16:da:18:72:09:a0:b1:01:ee:d7:6e:e4:b4:c3:eb: + b8:06:5f:38:69:78:c8:bb:40:6d:c7:8a:e9:82:69:fa:db:28: + 54:2d:8c:c0:83:4c:4f:d7:8f:a5:fd:a0:96:b7:e9:c7:b1:78: + e7:09:72:e7:62:37:44:67:3f:53:b8:4c:17:17:c8:a8:1f:ec: + a5:5f:2a:18:4d:3d:aa:1a:f5:7d:c3:17:5b:42:ba:28:68:f8: + 36:ad:6a:28:6b:a8:a9:aa:be:82:96:11:a8:0e:88:b5:20:52: + c1:23:aa:15 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIEeTCCA2GgAwIBAgIRANY5F+flakdUuFby60dr+MMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw +gbcxKjAoBgNVBAsTIU1TVlNwaGVyZSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTEk +MCIGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYVc2VjdXJpdHlAbXN2c3BoZXJlLnJ1MQ8wDQYDVQQHEwZN +b3Njb3cxDzANBgNVBAgTBk1vc2NvdzELMAkGA1UEBhMCUlUxETAPBgNVBAoTCE5D +U0QgTExDMSEwHwYDVQQDExhNU1ZTcGhlcmUgU2VjdXJlIEJvb3QgQ0EwIBcNMjMw +MzIyMTY0MjU0WhgPMjA1MzAzMjIxNjQyNTRaMIHCMSowKAYDVQQLEyFNU1ZTcGhl +cmUgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkxJDAiBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWFXNlY3Vy +aXR5QG1zdnNwaGVyZS5ydTEPMA0GA1UEBxMGTW9zY293MQ8wDQYDVQQIEwZNb3Nj +b3cxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlJVMREwDwYDVQQKEwhOQ1NEIExMQzEsMCoGA1UEAxMjTVNW +U3BoZXJlIERyaXZlciB1cGRhdGUgc2lnbmluZyBrZXkwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB +AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQC6Cc0dgJwAWZYHzh9poteLKS5oE2+HQl7/QlgZsXWy +uq9dhDd0UA7dWh1F8vHgm7XznNWoKVrNjIWKE9RguVKtyf4MT/6vCCXsp8Yq4/9m +uLCJaVr+sahoit55HmjnqBQByEVbDgBUmDJASl3nGFXOvbx3PZQ4rNvoXnHSvuQ4 +YDn44ZruGoTfFDPOztvEV8jP0T5yqeu1flBXoVEG1Qec4lcaHGaMugWqUNziGdUE +/ai9g+twBhmB8KsqP+zN8w/O7nWHh5MbDkTh+brlU5HvCW7YY45pAG43HZCDmT8j +xzPXrhPLyPp22F0mtZ9aXhgisTrFhGxnIONymAcCQ4NVAgMBAAGjcTBvMB8GA1Ud +IwQYMBaAFElZZ7UTbMjffmS5IuOpNVBrlYTVMB8GA1UdJQQYMBYGCCsGAQUFBwMD +BgorBgEEAZIIEAECMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFCARODuuHuhl3ilu +xHuQf004J+veMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCCKUU/9HnitdRKoyIeFnVoOERG +YQ1MdMx9EfXi28Ojul8Dd5WeN7hyaOruqfIJqdYH10UnbPqhuCB3+yLxWSZw+kwv +HG787EoVkcKQ1om4UJ7GVuMfSuIg5ZAJFoCiiamQqPI36G4p2JphMdIrKiMvaRp8 +n39m4JMpH1+beAvsdFtYM2+8Yp6Yh5uuOLXtT/O2SCQW2hhyCaCxAe7XbuS0w+u4 +Bl84aXjIu0Btx4rpgmn62yhULYzAg0xP14+l/aCWt+nHsXjnCXLnYjdEZz9TuEwX +F8ioH+ylXyoYTT2qGvV9wxdbQrooaPg2rWooa6ipqr6ClhGoDoi1IFLBI6oV +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/SOURCES/msvsphereima.pem b/SOURCES/msvsphereima.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9dbaa7d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/msvsphereima.pem @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: + 71:a3:0f:db:5d:68:ba:11:ad:0d:d7:a2:bb:f2:9b:33:69:22:69:1b + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: CN = MSVSphere IMA CA, O = NCSD LLC, C = RU, ST = Moscow, L = Moscow, emailAddress = security@msvsphere-os.ru, OU = MSVSphere Certification Authority + Validity + Not Before: Oct 17 14:52:34 2023 GMT + Not After : May 31 14:52:34 2040 GMT + Subject: CN = MSVSphere 9 IMA release key, O = NCSD LLC, C = RU, ST = Moscow, L = Moscow, emailAddress = security@msvsphere-os.ru, OU = MSVSphere Certification Authority + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey + Public-Key: (384 bit) + pub: + 04:8f:3a:c4:74:50:a0:dd:2b:7c:eb:48:63:06:f9: + ec:a5:f9:c2:ef:1a:5a:64:79:95:14:9c:2a:da:3a: + f7:bb:50:36:16:51:ca:2d:e4:0f:2e:a1:a5:16:9a: + 63:a6:f0:ce:c2:69:2a:aa:08:ce:40:17:8f:db:de: + 16:08:47:02:6d:0b:39:36:80:bd:0d:12:f5:aa:9e: + 80:8d:ae:c9:90:d6:d3:5e:a4:c0:26:a6:78:83:04: + ce:9e:09:17:b7:3e:52 + ASN1 OID: secp384r1 + NIST CURVE: P-384 + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:FALSE + X509v3 Key Usage: critical + Digital Signature + X509v3 Extended Key Usage: critical + Code Signing + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 90:88:18:27:43:0F:80:32:F8:AB:35:AC:DE:28:6D:3B:B9:F5:55:E0 + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + 77:00:6F:8D:E0:2B:DC:27:EA:D8:DB:F4:C1:DA:12:AD:BF:6E:05:EC + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Signature Value: + 18:6a:36:58:96:ad:13:f2:48:97:e6:87:14:ec:00:43:2d:a4: + 9a:43:80:5a:92:06:fb:cb:26:62:fe:04:23:b2:11:e8:d4:7a: + 25:6e:14:e4:2b:c0:8d:27:2e:92:b1:19:41:2d:ce:e4:e5:30: + 99:72:d5:fd:86:b2:d6:15:32:86:91:20:5f:02:da:be:fe:2d: + b0:24:60:48:7b:df:41:11:36:0e:df:97:d0:a3:36:4a:0b:88: + ec:7c:32:b7:9e:a0:72:6f:f5:4f:b4:bb:c0:71:1d:6c:38:22: + 3c:e8:e8:9d:58:40:54:7d:86:1d:43:f3:02:df:16:07:89:1b: + 5b:d0:d5:ea:9c:4d:b5:04:5d:99:f1:64:42:67:ab:d7:15:e6: + 44:3f:2e:a8:03:51:ae:3a:df:7e:9c:8b:3d:91:5c:ce:a1:b2: + b7:69:81:43:ed:a1:f7:63:93:e8:f7:b7:0f:7d:5d:94:55:18: + f4:0a:35:13:01:d6:4b:06:57:50:ca:7c:ea:23:b3:e5:9c:ed: + 87:80:23:7e:0b:64:09:49:98:a2:22:51:83:3c:b8:e4:0b:8b: + 16:c2:3a:11:ee:78:6a:f2:a4:c7:13:de:b0:3d:97:c6:d5:84: + f5:6a:8e:4a:5e:1d:c1:f3:d8:80:b6:71:f5:8f:3b:fd:ad:15: + d6:c9:78:d6 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDyTCCArGgAwIBAgIUcaMP211ouhGtDdeiu/KbM2kiaRswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL +BQAwgbIxGTAXBgNVBAMMEE1TVlNwaGVyZSBJTUEgQ0ExETAPBgNVBAoMCE5DU0Qg +TExDMQswCQYDVQQGEwJSVTEPMA0GA1UECAwGTW9zY293MQ8wDQYDVQQHDAZNb3Nj +b3cxJzAlBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWGHNlY3VyaXR5QG1zdnNwaGVyZS1vcy5ydTEqMCgG +A1UECwwhTVNWU3BoZXJlIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MB4XDTIzMTAx +NzE0NTIzNFoXDTQwMDUzMTE0NTIzNFowgb0xJDAiBgNVBAMMG01TVlNwaGVyZSA5 +IElNQSByZWxlYXNlIGtleTERMA8GA1UECgwITkNTRCBMTEMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlJV +MQ8wDQYDVQQIDAZNb3Njb3cxDzANBgNVBAcMBk1vc2NvdzEnMCUGCSqGSIb3DQEJ +ARYYc2VjdXJpdHlAbXN2c3BoZXJlLW9zLnJ1MSowKAYDVQQLDCFNU1ZTcGhlcmUg +Q2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkwdjAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAIgNiAASP +OsR0UKDdK3zrSGMG+eyl+cLvGlpkeZUUnCraOve7UDYWUcot5A8uoaUWmmOm8M7C +aSqqCM5AF4/b3hYIRwJtCzk2gL0NEvWqnoCNrsmQ1tNepMAmpniDBM6eCRe3PlKj +eDB2MAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBYGA1UdJQEB/wQMMAoG +CCsGAQUFBwMDMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSQiBgnQw+AMvirNazeKG07ufVV4DAfBgNVHSME +GDAWgBR3AG+N4CvcJ+rY2/TB2hKtv24F7DANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAGGo2 +WJatE/JIl+aHFOwAQy2kmkOAWpIG+8smYv4EI7IR6NR6JW4U5CvAjScukrEZQS3O +5OUwmXLV/Yay1hUyhpEgXwLavv4tsCRgSHvfQRE2Dt+X0KM2SguI7Hwyt56gcm/1 +T7S7wHEdbDgiPOjonVhAVH2GHUPzAt8WB4kbW9DV6pxNtQRdmfFkQmer1xXmRD8u +qANRrjrffpyLPZFczqGyt2mBQ+2h92OT6Pe3D31dlFUY9Ao1EwHWSwZXUMp86iOz +5Zzth4AjfgtkCUmYoiJRgzy45AuLFsI6Ee54avKkxxPesD2XxtWE9WqOSl4dwfPY +gLZx9Y87/a0V1sl41g== +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/SOURCES/msvspherepatch1.pem b/SOURCES/msvspherepatch1.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000..407ec63 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/msvspherepatch1.pem @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: + f3:41:d2:7d:2e:b9:42:05:b5:8d:9a:39:b4:a8:dd:cf + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: OU = MSVSphere Certification Authority, emailAddress = security@msvsphere.ru, L = Moscow, ST = Moscow, C = RU, O = NCSD LLC, CN = MSVSphere Secure Boot CA + Validity + Not Before: Mar 22 16:42:54 2023 GMT + Not After : Mar 22 16:42:54 2053 GMT + Subject: OU = MSVSphere Certification Authority, emailAddress = security@msvsphere.ru, L = Moscow, ST = Moscow, C = RU, O = NCSD LLC, CN = MSVSphere kpatch signing key + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + Public-Key: (2048 bit) + Modulus: + 00:e1:8d:77:fe:7c:63:d5:a8:03:20:d3:ce:f0:96: + 2a:84:1b:9c:e3:8f:01:f7:a0:76:c3:f8:ee:17:44: + 10:cc:0d:58:df:65:73:2c:30:78:55:13:80:f9:9f: + af:88:87:4b:ef:98:cd:06:ff:62:37:f9:2d:ce:1c: + 5e:7d:e9:b0:ac:4e:0f:08:70:45:ff:a3:a4:d8:f8: + d4:65:ed:1a:93:ab:bc:31:a6:de:ea:9c:81:f6:e6: + 5b:c7:5c:d1:47:8d:e2:4f:3d:e9:17:c8:3e:c8:66: + 51:4d:a8:df:14:f8:1f:55:df:31:2c:f4:a0:fb:8d: + 39:3b:79:f7:3d:4e:cc:5f:e5:56:59:6a:77:0c:bf: + eb:fc:84:7d:ea:5b:51:34:fc:bc:4e:7a:be:7d:a3: + af:79:e0:9f:29:49:dc:f5:11:c8:3d:9e:39:89:25: + bb:63:57:7c:23:b0:e0:f8:ec:7b:4c:cb:bc:c9:92: + fb:f0:8f:8f:13:b0:ba:5f:65:68:78:f5:6e:dc:e1: + 57:3d:50:c0:94:b1:41:63:23:ff:07:c9:c1:2a:e3: + 68:94:c9:42:a4:52:4f:1f:dd:e0:9a:d9:c4:91:73: + ba:2e:29:24:67:e8:9c:92:3e:82:46:d8:f3:15:08: + f1:85:07:17:c8:f9:9b:ba:9c:87:ed:0f:d1:88:dc: + 71:05 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + 49:59:67:B5:13:6C:C8:DF:7E:64:B9:22:E3:A9:35:50:6B:95:84:D5 + X509v3 Extended Key Usage: + Code Signing, 1.3.6.1.4.1.2312.16.1.2 + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:FALSE + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + E0:DA:A8:81:5B:FF:F2:CC:A3:53:F9:46:E2:33:E2:E7:AC:2A:E0:FA + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Signature Value: + 7e:95:d0:2f:4f:e6:6b:e6:9b:ad:b2:a4:72:4e:bd:f1:c9:68: + 23:cd:c6:31:35:ab:34:15:c2:ed:8d:ef:0f:82:f3:8a:12:16: + 16:82:a9:d9:5a:b5:98:20:b6:f5:d2:24:53:58:c3:b9:ec:79: + 40:ca:b4:4a:7b:9c:74:b9:1e:2b:a9:66:5c:b3:57:46:f2:98: + 9b:96:23:48:a2:4f:0b:86:96:a2:30:0d:b7:8f:fb:83:95:3a: + 29:96:24:80:d3:23:78:05:a9:ee:6f:af:e6:5c:70:61:4f:15: + 5d:2c:75:22:a8:22:9a:6f:cf:86:52:01:03:73:ce:8c:86:67: + 90:3c:f5:38:50:04:59:70:f0:25:35:da:34:cc:3e:84:e7:4f: + 93:4c:01:33:34:3d:6c:e7:ea:d8:1e:63:43:1d:6a:b1:bf:01: + 1b:20:a8:27:df:62:9e:af:7c:bd:52:95:fe:ad:0c:68:a5:1a: + b0:fc:59:b0:f9:c0:38:b0:5f:b2:3c:7d:ec:32:3a:a2:73:53: + c8:91:7e:cb:3b:cb:7f:85:de:d8:5d:f1:92:80:e6:61:7d:6d: + c3:8f:e8:a7:ce:14:33:d2:22:c1:7e:f6:ab:c1:75:8c:c3:70: + dd:ab:fd:c4:e9:db:9e:1a:bb:98:32:94:2b:56:d7:e1:31:99: + 84:5e:c6:4d +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIEcjCCA1qgAwIBAgIRAPNB0n0uuUIFtY2aObSo3c8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw +gbcxKjAoBgNVBAsTIU1TVlNwaGVyZSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTEk +MCIGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYVc2VjdXJpdHlAbXN2c3BoZXJlLnJ1MQ8wDQYDVQQHEwZN +b3Njb3cxDzANBgNVBAgTBk1vc2NvdzELMAkGA1UEBhMCUlUxETAPBgNVBAoTCE5D +U0QgTExDMSEwHwYDVQQDExhNU1ZTcGhlcmUgU2VjdXJlIEJvb3QgQ0EwIBcNMjMw +MzIyMTY0MjU0WhgPMjA1MzAzMjIxNjQyNTRaMIG7MSowKAYDVQQLEyFNU1ZTcGhl +cmUgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkxJDAiBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWFXNlY3Vy +aXR5QG1zdnNwaGVyZS5ydTEPMA0GA1UEBxMGTW9zY293MQ8wDQYDVQQIEwZNb3Nj +b3cxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlJVMREwDwYDVQQKEwhOQ1NEIExMQzElMCMGA1UEAxMcTVNW +U3BoZXJlIGtwYXRjaCBzaWduaW5nIGtleTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP +ADCCAQoCggEBAOGNd/58Y9WoAyDTzvCWKoQbnOOPAfegdsP47hdEEMwNWN9lcyww +eFUTgPmfr4iHS++YzQb/Yjf5Lc4cXn3psKxODwhwRf+jpNj41GXtGpOrvDGm3uqc +gfbmW8dc0UeN4k896RfIPshmUU2o3xT4H1XfMSz0oPuNOTt59z1OzF/lVllqdwy/ +6/yEfepbUTT8vE56vn2jr3ngnylJ3PURyD2eOYklu2NXfCOw4Pjse0zLvMmS+/CP +jxOwul9laHj1btzhVz1QwJSxQWMj/wfJwSrjaJTJQqRSTx/d4JrZxJFzui4pJGfo +nJI+gkbY8xUI8YUHF8j5m7qch+0P0YjccQUCAwEAAaNxMG8wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU +SVlntRNsyN9+ZLki46k1UGuVhNUwHwYDVR0lBBgwFgYIKwYBBQUHAwMGCisGAQQB +kggQAQIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU4NqogVv/8syjU/lG4jPi56wq +4PowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAH6V0C9P5mvmm62ypHJOvfHJaCPNxjE1qzQV +wu2N7w+C84oSFhaCqdlatZggtvXSJFNYw7nseUDKtEp7nHS5HiupZlyzV0bymJuW +I0iiTwuGlqIwDbeP+4OVOimWJIDTI3gFqe5vr+ZccGFPFV0sdSKoIppvz4ZSAQNz +zoyGZ5A89ThQBFlw8CU12jTMPoTnT5NMATM0PWzn6tgeY0MdarG/ARsgqCffYp6v +fL1Slf6tDGilGrD8WbD5wDiwX7I8fewyOqJzU8iRfss7y3+F3thd8ZKA5mF9bcOP +6KfOFDPSIsF+9qvBdYzDcN2r/cTp254au5gylCtW1+ExmYRexk0= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/SOURCES/nvidiagpuoot001.pem b/SOURCES/nvidiagpuoot001.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7de48cd --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/nvidiagpuoot001.pem @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: + c5:2a:b8:18:9b:cc:bb:16 + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: CN = Nvidia GPU OOT CA, emailAddress = secalert@redhat.com + Validity + Not Before: Nov 28 17:57:33 2023 GMT + Not After : Jan 18 17:57:33 2038 GMT + Subject: CN = Nvidia GPU OOT signing 001, emailAddress = secalert@redhat.com + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + Public-Key: (4096 bit) + Modulus: + 00:aa:e7:0f:55:10:c8:19:46:a2:de:ec:0a:54:88: + f3:72:72:47:2b:0d:f9:13:28:e8:db:c8:76:17:51: + 26:ab:da:31:e9:2f:f4:ec:a1:08:df:72:6a:e0:86: + 1e:27:00:4f:a2:00:e7:14:c1:92:2a:0b:b5:6f:38: + f1:79:8b:0b:f3:7d:bb:e4:31:2f:34:12:9e:f5:8f: + fb:e4:f6:06:b4:92:1f:b4:11:21:bf:e4:bc:1f:93: + d6:88:d4:b5:f5:a1:a4:1c:a1:1f:15:40:ef:ff:b6: + 2e:bf:b9:a9:10:a5:fe:0c:4b:a0:1d:7c:98:ea:2c: + 12:8b:3c:f2:b0:5f:f6:22:89:c8:ca:d1:ec:3d:cb: + 9c:e7:7c:d9:af:02:d5:69:77:6e:e4:98:a9:dd:92: + bd:62:1e:a6:2f:03:69:e5:3b:53:93:8d:88:54:c0: + db:d7:63:ad:82:3b:5b:74:90:6b:4e:91:2b:e4:9f: + 5b:23:fc:8b:28:a5:68:01:88:b1:e1:90:a2:4b:e6: + ff:e0:e4:16:ae:a2:f6:64:57:4b:c7:a9:68:a8:c4: + 45:fb:54:3c:cf:ef:fd:4e:b1:c6:08:4e:da:ae:51: + f8:5f:2a:b4:12:06:b1:03:60:1a:e7:45:22:f9:cd: + 59:a1:91:36:2d:dd:6f:ec:42:35:98:2e:92:d9:31: + 9b:4d:c3:00:4b:ea:8b:70:d6:dc:34:da:b3:66:2a: + f3:5e:00:4e:83:14:21:24:71:7a:ed:ea:09:c7:57: + 2c:58:39:32:1e:24:1f:ef:52:7b:bc:8d:18:47:ba: + b3:16:a4:56:65:e3:9d:fe:ae:44:59:93:a1:c4:c6: + ec:64:03:71:ed:35:54:9e:2d:dc:b3:ad:2b:cc:74: + 1f:db:66:8f:73:19:47:5d:19:bf:e3:5c:48:bd:5d: + 3b:10:b3:9c:a2:ed:30:af:a0:2e:ac:cc:6a:bf:d6: + 1b:83:c2:98:86:bb:92:26:f3:ce:57:41:d2:68:74: + 57:f3:3a:f4:71:e4:52:8f:26:9b:60:65:cd:c3:87: + 3d:af:dd:06:99:30:70:08:ba:39:91:47:18:ea:c6: + 68:aa:ad:f4:e7:6f:26:bf:51:ff:be:1a:3c:52:45: + 9c:a0:03:7a:f5:e8:cc:55:89:ac:16:1a:6c:c2:18: + 75:3a:51:68:3d:8a:9c:b3:8e:ce:ed:00:a9:ac:47: + a1:1e:04:14:b7:fd:d3:75:ca:97:52:90:6e:d0:96: + 94:bf:44:2c:75:63:7b:78:3c:40:cc:13:bc:52:dd: + 71:14:ef:ee:d8:45:6c:37:85:bd:a8:01:df:ce:e6: + b1:fb:9c:4d:72:e7:47:fd:cb:a4:6e:cd:a7:4e:cb: + 01:b9:11 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:FALSE + X509v3 Key Usage: critical + Digital Signature + X509v3 Extended Key Usage: critical + Code Signing + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 55:E1:CE:F8:81:93:E6:04:19:F0:B0:EC:37:9C:49:F7:75:45:AC:F0 + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + 5E:D6:FB:11:3F:AB:FD:E7:63:F0:13:73:E9:E2:D1:51:FB:B3:85:12 + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Signature Value: + 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updates in August 2014 - January 2015) + +Author: Laszlo Ersek +Copyright (C) 2014-2015, Red Hat, Inc. +CC BY-SA 4.0 + +Abstract +-------- + +The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) is a specification that +defines a software interface between an operating system and platform firmware. +UEFI is designed to replace the Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) firmware +interface. + +Hardware platform vendors have been increasingly adopting the UEFI +Specification to govern their boot firmware developments. OVMF (Open Virtual +Machine Firmware), a sub-project of Intel's EFI Development Kit II (edk2), +enables UEFI support for Ia32 and X64 Virtual Machines. + +This paper reports on the status of the OVMF project, treats features and +limitations, gives end-user hints, and examines some areas in-depth. + +Keywords: ACPI, boot options, CSM, edk2, firmware, flash, fw_cfg, KVM, memory +map, non-volatile variables, OVMF, PCD, QEMU, reset vector, S3, Secure Boot, +Smbios, SMM, TianoCore, UEFI, VBE shim, Virtio + +Table of Contents +----------------- + +- Motivation +- Scope +- Example qemu invocation +- Installation of OVMF guests with virt-manager and virt-install +- Supported guest operating systems +- Compatibility Support Module (CSM) +- Phases of the boot process +- Project structure +- Platform Configuration Database (PCD) +- Firmware image structure +- S3 (suspend to RAM and resume) +- A comprehensive memory map of OVMF +- Known Secure Boot limitations +- Variable store and LockBox in SMRAM +- Select features + - X64-specific reset vector for OVMF + - Client library for QEMU's firmware configuration interface + - Guest ACPI tables + - Guest SMBIOS tables + - Platform-specific boot policy + - Virtio drivers + - Platform Driver + - Video driver +- Afterword + +Motivation +---------- + +OVMF extends the usual benefits of virtualization to UEFI. Reasons to use OVMF +include: + +- Legacy-free guests. A UEFI-based environment eliminates dependencies on + legacy address spaces and devices. This is especially beneficial when used + with physically assigned devices where the legacy operating mode is + troublesome to support, ex. assigned graphics cards operating in legacy-free, + non-VGA mode in the guest. + +- Future proof guests. The x86 market is steadily moving towards a legacy-free + platform and guest operating systems may eventually require a UEFI + environment. OVMF provides that next generation firmware support for such + applications. + +- GUID partition tables (GPTs). MBR partition tables represent partition + offsets and sizes with 32-bit integers, in units of 512 byte sectors. This + limits the addressable portion of the disk to 2 TB. GPT represents logical + block addresses with 64 bits. + +- Liberating boot loader binaries from residing in contested and poorly defined + space between the partition table and the partitions. + +- Support for booting off disks (eg. pass-through physical SCSI devices) with a + 4kB physical and logical sector size, i.e. which don't have 512-byte block + emulation. + +- Development and testing of Secure Boot-related features in guest operating + systems. Although OVMF's Secure Boot implementation is currently not secure + against malicious UEFI drivers, UEFI applications, and guest kernels, + trusted guest code that only uses standard UEFI interfaces will find a valid + Secure Boot environment under OVMF, with working key enrollment and signature + validation. This enables development and testing of portable, Secure + Boot-related guest code. + +- Presence of non-volatile UEFI variables. This furthers development and + testing of OS installers, UEFI boot loaders, and unique, dependent guest OS + features. For example, an efivars-backed pstore (persistent storage) + file system works under Linux. + +- Altogether, a near production-level UEFI environment for virtual machines + when Secure Boot is not required. + +Scope +----- + +UEFI and especially Secure Boot have been topics fraught with controversy and +political activism. This paper sidesteps these aspects and strives to focus on +use cases, hands-on information for end users, and technical details. + +Unless stated otherwise, the expression "X supports Y" means "X is technically +compatible with interfaces provided or required by Y". It does not imply +support as an activity performed by natural persons or companies. + +We discuss the status of OVMF at a state no earlier than edk2 SVN revision +16158. The paper concentrates on upstream projects and communities, but +occasionally it pans out about OVMF as it is planned to be shipped (as +Technical Preview) in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1. Such digressions are marked +with the [RHEL] margin notation. + +Although other VMMs and accelerators are known to support (or plan to support) +OVMF to various degrees -- for example, VirtualBox, Xen, BHyVe --, we'll +emphasize OVMF on qemu/KVM, because QEMU and KVM have always been Red Hat's +focus wrt. OVMF. + +The recommended upstream QEMU version is 2.1+. The recommended host Linux +kernel (KVM) version is 3.10+. The recommended QEMU machine type is +"qemu-system-x86_64 -M pc-i440fx-2.1" or later. + +The term "TianoCore" is used interchangeably with "edk2" in this paper. + +Example qemu invocation +----------------------- + +The following commands give a quick foretaste of installing a UEFI operating +system on OVMF, relying only on upstream edk2 and qemu. + +- Clone and build OVMF: + + git clone https://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git + cd edk2 + nice OvmfPkg/build.sh -a X64 -n $(getconf _NPROCESSORS_ONLN) + + (Note that this ad-hoc build will not include the Secure Boot feature.) + +- The build output file, "OVMF.fd", includes not only the executable firmware + code, but the non-volatile variable store as well. For this reason, make a + VM-specific copy of the build output (the variable store should be private to + the virtual machine): + + cp Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_GCC4?/FV/OVMF.fd fedora.flash + + (The variable store and the firmware executable are also available in the + build output as separate files: "OVMF_VARS.fd" and "OVMF_CODE.fd". This + enables central management and updates of the firmware executable, while each + virtual machine can retain its own variable store.) + +- Download a Fedora LiveCD: + + wget https://dl.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/releases/20/Live/x86_64/Fedora-Live-Xfce-x86_64-20-1.iso + +- Create a virtual disk (qcow2 format, 20 GB in size): + + qemu-img create -f qcow2 fedora.img 20G + +- Create the following qemu wrapper script under the name "fedora.sh": + + # Basic virtual machine properties: a recent i440fx machine type, KVM + # acceleration, 2048 MB RAM, two VCPUs. + OPTS="-M pc-i440fx-2.1 -enable-kvm -m 2048 -smp 2" + + # The OVMF binary, including the non-volatile variable store, appears as a + # "normal" qemu drive on the host side, and it is exposed to the guest as a + # persistent flash device. + OPTS="$OPTS -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file=fedora.flash" + + # The hard disk is exposed to the guest as a virtio-block device. OVMF has a + # driver stack that supports such a disk. We specify this disk as first boot + # option. OVMF recognizes the boot order specification. + OPTS="$OPTS -drive id=disk0,if=none,format=qcow2,file=fedora.img" + OPTS="$OPTS -device virtio-blk-pci,drive=disk0,bootindex=0" + + # The Fedora installer disk appears as an IDE CD-ROM in the guest. This is + # the 2nd boot option. + OPTS="$OPTS -drive id=cd0,if=none,format=raw,readonly" + OPTS="$OPTS,file=Fedora-Live-Xfce-x86_64-20-1.iso" + OPTS="$OPTS -device ide-cd,bus=ide.1,drive=cd0,bootindex=1" + + # The following setting enables S3 (suspend to RAM). OVMF supports S3 + # suspend/resume. + OPTS="$OPTS -global PIIX4_PM.disable_s3=0" + + # OVMF emits a number of info / debug messages to the QEMU debug console, at + # ioport 0x402. We configure qemu so that the debug console is indeed + # available at that ioport. We redirect the host side of the debug console to + # a file. + OPTS="$OPTS -global isa-debugcon.iobase=0x402 -debugcon file:fedora.ovmf.log" + + # QEMU accepts various commands and queries from the user on the monitor + # interface. Connect the monitor with the qemu process's standard input and + # output. + OPTS="$OPTS -monitor stdio" + + # A USB tablet device in the guest allows for accurate pointer tracking + # between the host and the guest. + OPTS="$OPTS -device piix3-usb-uhci -device usb-tablet" + + # Provide the guest with a virtual network card (virtio-net). + # + # Normally, qemu provides the guest with a UEFI-conformant network driver + # from the iPXE project, in the form of a PCI expansion ROM. For this test, + # we disable the expansion ROM and allow OVMF's built-in virtio-net driver to + # take effect. + # + # On the host side, we use the SLIRP ("user") network backend, which has + # relatively low performance, but it doesn't require extra privileges from + # the user executing qemu. + OPTS="$OPTS -netdev id=net0,type=user" + OPTS="$OPTS -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0,romfile=" + + # A Spice QXL GPU is recommended as the primary VGA-compatible display + # device. It is a full-featured virtual video card, with great operating + # system driver support. OVMF supports it too. + OPTS="$OPTS -device qxl-vga" + + qemu-system-x86_64 $OPTS + +- Start the Fedora guest: + + sh fedora.sh + +- The above command can be used for both installation and later boots of the + Fedora guest. + +- In order to verify basic OVMF network connectivity: + + - Assuming that the non-privileged user running qemu belongs to group G + (where G is a numeric identifier), ensure as root on the host that the + group range in file "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range" includes G. + + - As the non-privileged user, boot the guest as usual. + + - On the TianoCore splash screen, press ESC. + + - Navigate to Boot Manager | EFI Internal Shell + + - In the UEFI Shell, issue the following commands: + + ifconfig -s eth0 dhcp + ping A.B.C.D + + where A.B.C.D is a public IPv4 address in dotted decimal notation that your + host can reach. + + - Type "quit" at the (qemu) monitor prompt. + +Installation of OVMF guests with virt-manager and virt-install +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +(1) Assuming OVMF has been installed on the host with the following files: + - /usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE.fd + - /usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_VARS.fd + + locate the "nvram" stanza in "/etc/libvirt/qemu.conf", and edit it as + follows: + + nvram = [ "/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE.fd:/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_VARS.fd" ] + +(2) Restart libvirtd with your Linux distribution's service management tool; + for example, + + systemctl restart libvirtd + +(3) In virt-manager, proceed with the guest installation as usual: + - select File | New Virtual Machine, + - advance to Step 5 of 5, + - in Step 5, check "Customize configuration before install", + - click Finish; + - in the customization dialog, select Overview | Firmware, and choose UEFI, + - click Apply and Begin Installation. + +(4) With virt-install: + + LDR="loader=/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE.fd,loader_ro=yes,loader_type=pflash" + virt-install \ + --name fedora20 \ + --memory 2048 \ + --vcpus 2 \ + --os-variant fedora20 \ + --boot hd,cdrom,$LDR \ + --disk size=20 \ + --disk path=Fedora-Live-Xfce-x86_64-20-1.iso,device=cdrom,bus=scsi + +(5) A popular, distribution-independent, bleeding-edge OVMF package is + available under , courtesy of Gerd Hoffmann. + + The "edk2.git-ovmf-x64" package provides the following files, among others: + - /usr/share/edk2.git/ovmf-x64/OVMF_CODE-pure-efi.fd + - /usr/share/edk2.git/ovmf-x64/OVMF_VARS-pure-efi.fd + + When using this package, adapt steps (1) and (4) accordingly. + +(6) Additionally, the "edk2.git-ovmf-x64" package seeks to simplify the + enablement of Secure Boot in a virtual machine (strictly for development + and testing purposes). + + - Boot the virtual machine off the CD-ROM image called + "/usr/share/edk2.git/ovmf-x64/UefiShell.iso"; before or after installing + the main guest operating system. + + - When the UEFI shell appears, issue the following commands: + + EnrollDefaultKeys.efi + reset -s + + - The EnrollDefaultKeys.efi utility enrolls the following keys: + + - A static example X.509 certificate (CN=TestCommonName) as Platform Key + and first Key Exchange Key. + + The private key matching this certificate has been destroyed (but you + shouldn't trust this statement). + + - "Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011" as second Key Exchange Key + (SHA1: 31:59:0b:fd:89:c9:d7:4e:d0:87:df:ac:66:33:4b:39:31:25:4b:30). + + - "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011" as first DB entry + (SHA1: 58:0a:6f:4c:c4:e4:b6:69:b9:eb:dc:1b:2b:3e:08:7b:80:d0:67:8d). + + - "Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011" as second DB entry + (SHA1: 46:de:f6:3b:5c:e6:1c:f8:ba:0d:e2:e6:63:9c:10:19:d0:ed:14:f3). + + These keys suffice to boot released versions of popular Linux + distributions (through the shim.efi utility), and Windows 8 and Windows + Server 2012 R2, in Secure Boot mode. + +Supported guest operating systems +--------------------------------- + +Upstream OVMF does not favor some guest operating systems over others for +political or ideological reasons. However, some operating systems are harder to +obtain and/or technically more difficult to support. The general expectation is +that recent UEFI OSes should just work. Please consult the "OvmfPkg/README" +file. + +The following guest OSes were tested with OVMF: +- Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 +- Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 +- Fedora 18 +- Fedora 19 +- Fedora 20 +- Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 +- Windows Server 2012 +- Windows 8 + +Notes about Windows Server 2008 R2 (paraphrasing the "OvmfPkg/README" file): + +- QEMU should be started with one of the "-device qxl-vga" and "-device VGA" + options. + +- Only one video mode, 1024x768x32, is supported at OS runtime. + + Please refer to the section about QemuVideoDxe (OVMF's built-in video driver) + for more details on this limitation. + +- The qxl-vga video card is recommended ("-device qxl-vga"). After booting the + installed guest OS, select the video card in Device Manager, and upgrade the + video driver to the QXL XDDM one. + + The QXL XDDM driver can be downloaded from + , under Guest | Windows binaries. + + This driver enables additional graphics resolutions at OS runtime, and + provides S3 (suspend/resume) capability. + +Notes about Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8: + +- QEMU should be started with the "-device qxl-vga,revision=4" option (or a + later revision, if available). + +- The guest OS's builtin video driver inherits the video mode / frame buffer + from OVMF. There's no way to change the resolution at OS runtime. + + For this reason, a platform driver has been developed for OVMF, which allows + users to change the preferred video mode in the firmware. Please refer to the + section about PlatformDxe for details. + +- It is recommended to upgrade the guest OS's video driver to the QXL WDDM one, + via Device Manager. + + Binaries for the QXL WDDM driver can be found at + (pick a version greater than or + equal to 0.6), while the source code resides at + . + + This driver enables additional graphics resolutions at OS runtime, and + provides S3 (suspend/resume) capability. + +Compatibility Support Module (CSM) +---------------------------------- + +Collaboration between SeaBIOS and OVMF developers has enabled SeaBIOS to be +built as a Compatibility Support Module, and OVMF to embed and use it. + +Benefits of a SeaBIOS CSM include: + +- The ability to boot legacy (non-UEFI) operating systems, such as legacy Linux + systems, Windows 7, OpenBSD 5.2, FreeBSD 8/9, NetBSD, DragonflyBSD, Solaris + 10/11. + +- Legacy (non-UEFI-compliant) PCI expansion ROMs, such as a VGA BIOS, mapped by + QEMU in emulated devices' ROM BARs, are loaded and executed by OVMF. + + For example, this grants the Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 guest's native, + legacy video driver access to all modes of all QEMU video cards. + +Building the CSM target of the SeaBIOS source tree is out of scope for this +report. Additionally, upstream OVMF does not enable the CSM by default. + +Interested users and developers should look for OVMF's "-D CSM_ENABLE" +build-time option, and check out the continuous +integration repository, which provides CSM-enabled OVMF builds. + +[RHEL] The "OVMF_CODE.fd" firmware image made available on the Red Hat + Enterprise Linux 7.1 host does not include a Compatibility Support + Module, for the following reasons: + + - Virtual machines running officially supported, legacy guest operating + systems should just use the standalone SeaBIOS firmware. Firmware + selection is flexible in virtualization, see eg. "Installation of OVMF + guests with virt-manager and virt-install" above. + + - The 16-bit thunking interface between OVMF and SeaBIOS is very complex + and presents a large debugging and support burden, based on past + experience. + + - Secure Boot is incompatible with CSM. + + - Inter-project dependencies should be minimized whenever possible. + + - Using the default QXL video card, the Windows 2008 R2 SP1 guest can be + installed with its built-in, legacy video driver. Said driver will + select the only available video mode, 1024x768x32. After installation, + the video driver can be upgraded to the full-featured QXL XDDM driver. + +Phases of the boot process +-------------------------- + +The PI and UEFI specifications, and Intel's UEFI and EDK II Learning and +Development materials provide ample information on PI and UEFI concepts. The +following is an absolutely minimal, rough glossary that is included only to +help readers new to PI and UEFI understand references in later, OVMF-specific +sections. We defer heavily to the official specifications and the training +materials, and frequently quote them below. + +A central concept to mention early is the GUID -- globally unique identifier. A +GUID is a 128-bit number, written as XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXXXXXXXXXX, +where each X stands for a hexadecimal nibble. GUIDs are used to name everything +in PI and in UEFI. Programmers introduce new GUIDs with the "uuidgen" utility, +and standards bodies standardize well-known services by positing their GUIDs. + +The boot process is roughly divided in the following phases: + +- Reset vector code. + +- SEC: Security phase. This phase is the root of firmware integrity. + +- PEI: Pre-EFI Initialization. This phase performs "minimal processor, chipset + and platform configuration for the purpose of discovering memory". Modules in + PEI collectively save their findings about the platform in a list of HOBs + (hand-off blocks). + + When developing PEI code, the Platform Initialization (PI) specification + should be consulted. + +- DXE: Driver eXecution Environment, pronounced as "Dixie". This "is the phase + where the bulk of the booting occurs: devices are enumerated and initialized, + UEFI services are supported, and protocols and drivers are implemented. Also, + the tables that create the UEFI interface are produced". + + On the PEI/DXE boundary, the HOBs produced by PEI are consumed. For example, + this is how the memory space map is configured initially. + +- BDS: Boot Device Selection. It is "responsible for determining how and where + you want to boot the operating system". + + When developing DXE and BDS code, it is mainly the UEFI specification that + should be consulted. When speaking about DXE, BDS is frequently considered to + be a part of it. + +The following concepts are tied to specific boot process phases: + +- PEIM: a PEI Module (pronounced "PIM"). A binary module running in the PEI + phase, consuming some PPIs and producing other PPIs, and producing HOBs. + +- PPI: PEIM-to-PEIM interface. A structure of function pointers and related + data members that establishes a PEI service, or an instance of a PEI service. + PPIs are identified by GUID. + + An example is EFI_PEI_S3_RESUME2_PPI (6D582DBC-DB85-4514-8FCC-5ADF6227B147). + +- DXE driver: a binary module running in the DXE and BDS phases, consuming some + protocols and producing other protocols. + +- Protocol: A structure of function pointers and related data members that + establishes a DXE service, or an instance of a DXE service. Protocols are + identified by GUID. + + An example is EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL (964E5B21-6459-11D2-8E39-00A0C969723B). + +- Architectural protocols: a set of standard protocols that are foundational to + the working of a UEFI system. Each architectural protocol has at most one + instance. Architectural protocols are implemented by a subset of DXE drivers. + DXE drivers explicitly list the set of protocols (including architectural + protocols) that they need to work. UEFI drivers can only be loaded once all + architectural protocols have become available during the DXE phase. + + An example is EFI_VARIABLE_WRITE_ARCH_PROTOCOL + (6441F818-6362-4E44-B570-7DBA31DD2453). + +Project structure +----------------- + +The term "OVMF" usually denotes the project (community and development effort) +that provide and maintain the subject matter UEFI firmware for virtual +machines. However the term is also frequently applied to the firmware binary +proper that a virtual machine executes. + +OVMF emerges as a compilation of several modules from the edk2 source +repository. "edk2" stands for EFI Development Kit II; it is a "modern, +feature-rich, cross-platform firmware development environment for the UEFI and +PI specifications". + +The composition of OVMF is dictated by the following build control files: + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf + + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc + OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf + +The format of these files is described in the edk2 DSC and FDF specifications. +Roughly, the DSC file determines: +- library instance resolutions for library class requirements presented by the + modules to be compiled, +- the set of modules to compile. + +The FDF file roughly determines: +- what binary modules (compilation output files, precompiled binaries, graphics + image files, verbatim binary sections) to include in the firmware image, +- how to lay out the firmware image. + +The Ia32 flavor of these files builds a firmware where both PEI and DXE phases +are 32-bit. The Ia32X64 flavor builds a firmware where the PEI phase consists +of 32-bit modules, and the DXE phase is 64-bit. The X64 flavor builds a purely +64-bit firmware. + +The word size of the DXE phase must match the word size of the runtime OS -- a +32-bit DXE can't cooperate with a 64-bit OS, and a 64-bit DXE can't work a +32-bit OS. + +OVMF pulls together modules from across the edk2 tree. For example: + +- common drivers and libraries that are platform independent are usually + located under MdeModulePkg and MdePkg, + +- common but hardware-specific drivers and libraries that match QEMU's + pc-i440fx-* machine type are pulled in from IntelFrameworkModulePkg, + PcAtChipsetPkg and UefiCpuPkg, + +- the platform independent UEFI Shell is built from ShellPkg, + +- OvmfPkg includes drivers and libraries that are useful for virtual machines + and may or may not be specific to QEMU's pc-i440fx-* machine type. + +Platform Configuration Database (PCD) +------------------------------------- + +Like the "Phases of the boot process" section, this one introduces a concept in +very raw form. We defer to the PCD related edk2 specifications, and we won't +discuss implementation details here. Our purpose is only to offer the reader a +usable (albeit possibly inaccurate) definition, so that we can refer to PCDs +later on. + +Colloquially, when we say "PCD", we actually mean "PCD entry"; that is, an +entry stored in the Platform Configuration Database. + +The Platform Configuration Database is +- a firmware-wide +- name-value store +- of scalars and buffers +- where each entry may be + - build-time constant, or + - run-time dynamic, or + - theoretically, a middle option: patchable in the firmware file itself, + using a dedicated tool. (OVMF does not utilize externally patchable + entries.) + +A PCD entry is declared in the DEC file of the edk2 top-level Package directory +whose modules (drivers and libraries) are the primary consumers of the PCD +entry. (See for example OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec). Basically, a PCD in a DEC file +exposes a simple customization point. + +Interest in a PCD entry is communicated to the build system by naming the PCD +entry in the INF file of the interested module (application, driver or +library). The module may read and -- dependent on the PCD entry's category -- +write the PCD entry. + +Let's investigate the characteristics of the Database and the PCD entries. + +- Firmware-wide: technically, all modules may access all entries they are + interested in, assuming they advertise their interest in their INF files. + With careful design, PCDs enable inter-driver propagation of (simple) system + configuration. PCDs are available in both PEI and DXE. + + (UEFI drivers meant to be portable (ie. from third party vendors) are not + supposed to use PCDs, since PCDs qualify internal to the specific edk2 + firmware in question.) + +- Name-value store of scalars and buffers: each PCD has a symbolic name, and a + fixed scalar type (UINT16, UINT32 etc), or VOID* for buffers. Each PCD entry + belongs to a namespace, where a namespace is (obviously) a GUID, defined in + the DEC file. + +- A DEC file can permit several categories for a PCD: + - build-time constant ("FixedAtBuild"), + - patchable in the firmware image ("PatchableInModule", unused in OVMF), + - runtime modifiable ("Dynamic"). + +The platform description file (DSC) of a top-level Package directory may choose +the exact category for a given PCD entry that its modules wish to use, and +assign a default (or constant) initial value to it. + +In addition, the edk2 build system too can initialize PCD entries to values +that it calculates while laying out the flash device image. Such PCD +assignments are described in the FDF control file. + +Firmware image structure +------------------------ + +(We assume the common X64 choice for both PEI and DXE, and the default DEBUG +build target.) + +The OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf file defines the following layout for the flash +device image "OVMF.fd": + + Description Compression type Size + ------------------------------ ---------------------- ------- + Non-volatile data storage open-coded binary data 128 KB + Variable store 56 KB + Event log 4 KB + Working block 4 KB + Spare area 64 KB + + FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed 1712 KB + FV Firmware File System file LZMA compressed + PEIFV uncompressed 896 KB + individual PEI modules uncompressed + DXEFV uncompressed 8192 KB + individual DXE modules uncompressed + + SECFV uncompressed 208 KB + SEC driver + reset vector code + +The top-level image consists of three regions (three firmware volumes): +- non-volatile data store (128 KB), +- main firmware volume (FVMAIN_COMPACT, 1712 KB), +- firmware volume containing the reset vector code and the SEC phase code (208 + KB). + +In total, the OVMF.fd file has size 128 KB + 1712 KB + 208 KB == 2 MB. + +(1) The firmware volume with non-volatile data store (128 KB) has the following + internal structure, in blocks of 4 KB: + + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ L: event log + LIVE | varstore |L|W| W: working block + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + SPARE | | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + The first half of this firmware volume is "live", while the second half is + "spare". The spare half is important when the variable driver reclaims + unused storage and reorganizes the variable store. + + The live half dedicates 14 blocks (56 KB) to the variable store itself. On + top of those, one block is set aside for an event log, and one block is + used as the working block of the fault tolerant write protocol. Fault + tolerant writes are used to recover from an occasional (virtual) power loss + during variable updates. + + The blocks in this firmware volume are accessed, in stacking order from + least abstract to most abstract, by: + + - EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK_PROTOCOL (provided by + OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe), + + - EFI_FAULT_TOLERANT_WRITE_PROTOCOL (provided by + MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe), + + - architectural protocols instrumental to the runtime UEFI variable + services: + - EFI_VARIABLE_ARCH_PROTOCOL, + - EFI_VARIABLE_WRITE_ARCH_PROTOCOL. + + In a non-secure boot build, the DXE driver providing these architectural + protocols is MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe. In a secure boot + build, where authenticated variables are available, the DXE driver + offering these protocols is SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe. + +(2) The main firmware volume (FVMAIN_COMPACT, 1712 KB) embeds further firmware + volumes. The outermost layer is a Firmware File System (FFS), carrying a + single file. This file holds an LZMA-compressed section, which embeds two + firmware volumes: PEIFV (896 KB) with PEIMs, and DXEFV (8192 KB) with DXE + and UEFI drivers. + + This scheme enables us to build 896 KB worth of PEI drivers and 8192 KB + worth of DXE and UEFI drivers, compress them all with LZMA in one go, and + store the compressed result in 1712 KB, saving room in the flash device. + +(3) The SECFV firmware volume (208 KB) is not compressed. It carries the + "volume top file" with the reset vector code, to end at 4 GB in + guest-physical address space, and the SEC phase driver (OvmfPkg/Sec). + + The last 16 bytes of the volume top file (mapped directly under 4 GB) + contain a NOP slide and a jump instruction. This is where QEMU starts + executing the firmware, at address 0xFFFF_FFF0. The reset vector and the + SEC driver run from flash directly. + + The SEC driver locates FVMAIN_COMPACT in the flash, and decompresses the + main firmware image to RAM. The rest of OVMF (PEI, DXE, BDS phases) run + from RAM. + +As already mentioned, the OVMF.fd file is mapped by qemu's +"hw/block/pflash_cfi01.c" device just under 4 GB in guest-physical address +space, according to the command line option + + -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file=fedora.flash + +(refer to the Example qemu invocation). This is a "ROMD device", which can +switch out of "ROMD mode" and back into it. + +Namely, in the default ROMD mode, the guest-physical address range backed by +the flash device reads and executes as ROM (it does not trap from KVM to QEMU). +The first write access in this mode traps to QEMU, and flips the device out of +ROMD mode. + +In non-ROMD mode, the flash chip is programmed by storing CFI (Common Flash +Interface) command values at the flash-covered addresses; both reads and writes +trap to QEMU, and the flash contents are modified and synchronized to the +host-side file. A special CFI command flips the flash device back to ROMD mode. + +Qemu implements the above based on the KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM / KVM_MEM_READONLY +KVM features, and OVMF puts it to use in its EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK_PROTOCOL +implementation, under "OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe". + +IMPORTANT: Never pass OVMF.fd to qemu with the -bios option. That option maps +the firmware image as ROM into the guest's address space, and forces OVMF to +emulate non-volatile variables with a fallback driver that is bound to have +insufficient and confusing semantics. + +The 128 KB firmware volume with the variable store, discussed under (1), is +also built as a separate host-side file, named "OVMF_VARS.fd". The "rest" is +built into a third file, "OVMF_CODE.fd", which is only 1920 KB in size. The +variable store is mapped into its usual location, at 4 GB - 2 MB = 0xFFE0_0000, +through the following qemu options: + + -drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly,file=OVMF_CODE.fd \ + -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file=fedora.varstore.fd + +This way qemu configures two flash chips consecutively, with start addresses +growing downwards, which is transparent to OVMF. + +[RHEL] Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 ships a Secure Boot-enabled, X64, DEBUG + firmware only. Furthermore, only the split files ("OVMF_VARS.fd" and + "OVMF_CODE.fd") are available. + +S3 (suspend to RAM and resume) +------------------------------ + +As noted in Example qemu invocation, the + + -global PIIX4_PM.disable_s3=0 + +command line option tells qemu and OVMF if the user would like to enable S3 +support. (This is corresponds to the /domain/pm/suspend-to-mem/@enabled libvirt +domain XML attribute.) + +Implementing / orchestrating S3 was a considerable community effort in OVMF. A +detailed description exceeds the scope of this report; we only make a few +statements. + +(1) S3-related PPIs and protocols are well documented in the PI specification. + +(2) Edk2 contains most modules that are needed to implement S3 on a given + platform. One abstraction that is central to the porting / extending of the + S3-related modules to a new platform is the LockBox library interface, + which a specific platform can fill in by implementing its own LockBox + library instance. + + The LockBox library provides a privileged name-value store (to be addressed + by GUIDs). The privilege separation stretches between the firmware and the + operating system. That is, the S3-related machinery of the firmware saves + some items in the LockBox securely, under well-known GUIDs, before booting + the operating system. During resume (which is a form of warm reset), the + firmware is activated again, and retrieves items from the LockBox. Before + jumping to the OS's resume vector, the LockBox is secured again. + + We'll return to this later when we separately discuss SMRAM and SMM. + +(3) During resume, the DXE and later phases are never reached; only the reset + vector, and the SEC and PEI phases of the firmware run. The platform is + supposed to detect a resume in progress during PEI, and to store that fact + in the BootMode field of the Phase Handoff Information Table (PHIT) HOB. + OVMF keys this off the CMOS, see OvmfPkg/PlatformPei. + + At the end of PEI, the DXE IPL PEIM (Initial Program Load PEI Module, see + MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim) examines the Boot Mode, and if it says "S3 + resume in progress", then the IPL branches to the PEIM that exports + EFI_PEI_S3_RESUME2_PPI (provided by UefiCpuPkg/Universal/Acpi/S3Resume2Pei) + rather than loading the DXE core. + + S3Resume2Pei executes the technical steps of the resumption, relying on the + contents of the LockBox. + +(4) During first boot (or after a normal platform reset), when DXE does run, + hardware drivers in the DXE phase are encouraged to "stash" their hardware + configuration steps (eg. accesses to PCI config space, I/O ports, memory + mapped addresses, and so on) in a centrally maintained, so called "S3 boot + script". Hardware accesses are represented with opcodes of a special binary + script language. + + This boot script is to be replayed during resume, by S3Resume2Pei. The + general goal is to bring back hardware devices -- which have been powered + off during suspend -- to their original after-first-boot state, and in + particular, to do so quickly. + + At the moment, OVMF saves only one opcode in the S3 resume boot script: an + INFORMATION opcode, with contents 0xDEADBEEF (in network byte order). The + consensus between Linux developers seems to be that boot firmware is only + responsible for restoring basic chipset state, which OVMF does during PEI + anyway, independently of S3 vs. normal reset. (One example is the power + management registers of the i440fx chipset.) Device and peripheral state is + the responsibility of the runtime operating system. + + Although an experimental OVMF S3 boot script was at one point captured for + the virtual Cirrus VGA card, such a boot script cannot follow eg. video + mode changes effected by the OS. Hence the operating system can never avoid + restoring device state, and most Linux display drivers (eg. stdvga, QXL) + already cover S3 resume fully. + + The XDDM and WDDM driver models used under Windows OSes seem to recognize + this notion of runtime OS responsibility as well. (See the list of OSes + supported by OVMF in a separate section.) + +(5) The S3 suspend/resume data flow in OVMF is included here tersely, for + interested developers. + + (a) BdsLibBootViaBootOption() + EFI_ACPI_S3_SAVE_PROTOCOL [AcpiS3SaveDxe] + - saves ACPI S3 Context to LockBox ---------------------+ + (including FACS address -- FACS ACPI table | + contains OS waking vector) | + | + - prepares boot script: | + EFI_S3_SAVE_STATE_PROTOCOL.Write() [S3SaveStateDxe] | + S3BootScriptLib [PiDxeS3BootScriptLib] | + - opcodes & arguments are saved in NVS. --+ | + | | + - issues a notification by installing | | + EFI_DXE_SMM_READY_TO_LOCK_PROTOCOL | | + | | + (b) EFI_S3_SAVE_STATE_PROTOCOL [S3SaveStateDxe] | | + S3BootScriptLib [PiDxeS3BootScriptLib] | | + - closes script with special opcode <---------+ | + - script is available in non-volatile memory | + via PcdS3BootScriptTablePrivateDataPtr --+ | + | | + BootScriptExecutorDxe | | + S3BootScriptLib [PiDxeS3BootScriptLib] | | + - Knows about boot script location by <----+ | + synchronizing with the other library | + instance via | + PcdS3BootScriptTablePrivateDataPtr. | + - Copies relocated image of itself to | + reserved memory. --------------------------------+ | + - Saved image contains pointer to boot script. ---|--+ | + | | | + Runtime: | | | + | | | + (c) OS is booted, writes OS waking vector to FACS, | | | + suspends machine | | | + | | | + S3 Resume (PEI): | | | + | | | + (d) PlatformPei sets S3 Boot Mode based on CMOS | | | + | | | + (e) DXE core is skipped and EFI_PEI_S3_RESUME2 is | | | + called as last step of PEI | | | + | | | + (f) S3Resume2Pei retrieves from LockBox: | | | + - ACPI S3 Context (path to FACS) <------------------|--|--+ + | | | + +------------------|--|--+ + - Boot Script Executor Image <----------------------+ | | + | | + (g) BootScriptExecutorDxe | | + S3BootScriptLib [PiDxeS3BootScriptLib] | | + - executes boot script <-----------------------------+ | + | + (h) OS waking vector available from ACPI S3 Context / FACS <--+ + is called + +A comprehensive memory map of OVMF +---------------------------------- + +The following section gives a detailed analysis of memory ranges below 4 GB +that OVMF statically uses. + +In the rightmost column, the PCD entry is identified by which the source refers +to the address or size in question. + +The flash-covered range has been discussed previously in "Firmware image +structure", therefore we include it only for completeness. Due to the fact that +this range is always backed by a memory mapped device (and never RAM), it is +unaffected by S3 (suspend to RAM and resume). + ++--------------------------+ 4194304 KB +| | +| SECFV | size: 208 KB +| | ++--------------------------+ 4194096 KB +| | +| FVMAIN_COMPACT | size: 1712 KB +| | ++--------------------------+ 4192384 KB +| | +| variable store | size: 64 KB PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize +| spare area | +| | ++--------------------------+ 4192320 KB PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase +| | +| FTW working block | size: 4 KB PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingSize +| | ++--------------------------+ 4192316 KB PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase +| | +| Event log of | size: 4 KB PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageEventLogSize +| non-volatile storage | +| | ++--------------------------+ 4192312 KB PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageEventLogBase +| | +| variable store | size: 56 KB PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize +| | ++--------------------------+ 4192256 KB PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageVariableBase + +The flash-mapped image of OVMF.fd covers the entire structure above (2048 KB). + +When using the split files, the address 4192384 KB +(PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase + PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareSize) is the +boundary between the mapped images of OVMF_VARS.fd (56 KB + 4 KB + 4 KB + 64 KB += 128 KB) and OVMF_CODE.fd (1712 KB + 208 KB = 1920 KB). + +With regard to RAM that is statically used by OVMF, S3 (suspend to RAM and +resume) complicates matters. Many ranges have been introduced only to support +S3, hence for all ranges below, the following questions will be audited: + +(a) when and how a given range is initialized after first boot of the VM, +(b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE, +(c) how it is protected from the OS, +(d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path, +(e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path. + +Importantly, the term "protected" is meant as protection against inadvertent +reallocations and overwrites by co-operating DXE and OS modules. It does not +imply security against malicious code. + ++--------------------------+ 17408 KB +| | +|DXEFV from FVMAIN_COMPACT | size: 8192 KB PcdOvmfDxeMemFvSize +| decompressed firmware | +| volume with DXE modules | +| | ++--------------------------+ 9216 KB PcdOvmfDxeMemFvBase +| | +|PEIFV from FVMAIN_COMPACT | size: 896 KB PcdOvmfPeiMemFvSize +| decompressed firmware | +| volume with PEI modules | +| | ++--------------------------+ 8320 KB PcdOvmfPeiMemFvBase +| | +| permanent PEI memory for | size: 32 KB PcdS3AcpiReservedMemorySize +| the S3 resume path | +| | ++--------------------------+ 8288 KB PcdS3AcpiReservedMemoryBase +| | +| temporary SEC/PEI heap | size: 32 KB PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize +| and stack | +| | ++--------------------------+ 8256 KB PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase +| | +| unused | size: 32 KB +| | ++--------------------------+ 8224 KB +| | +| SEC's table of | size: 4 KB PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableSize +| GUIDed section handlers | +| | ++--------------------------+ 8220 KB PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableAddress +| | +| LockBox storage | size: 4 KB PcdOvmfLockBoxStorageSize +| | ++--------------------------+ 8216 KB PcdOvmfLockBoxStorageBase +| | +| early page tables on X64 | size: 24 KB PcdOvmfSecPageTablesSize +| | ++--------------------------+ 8192 KB PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase + +(1) Early page tables on X64: + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + The range is filled in during the SEC phase + [OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm]. The CR3 register is verified + against the base address in SecCoreStartupWithStack() + [OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c]. + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + If S3 was enabled on the QEMU command line (see "-global + PIIX4_PM.disable_s3=0" earlier), then InitializeRamRegions() + [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] protects the range with an AcpiNVS memory + allocation HOB, in PEI. + + If S3 was disabled, then this range is not protected. DXE's own page tables + are first built while still in PEI (see HandOffToDxeCore() + [MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/X64/DxeLoadFunc.c]). Those tables are located + in permanent PEI memory. After CR3 is switched over to them (which occurs + before jumping to the DXE core entry point), we don't have to preserve the + initial tables. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + If S3 is enabled, then (1b) reserves it from the OS too. + + If S3 is disabled, then the range needs no protection. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + It is rewritten same as in (1a), which is fine because (1c) reserved it. + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + It is rewritten same as in (1a). + +(2) LockBox storage: + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + InitializeRamRegions() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] zeroes out the + area during PEI. This is correct but not strictly necessary, since on first + boot the area is zero-filled anyway. + + The LockBox signature of the area is filled in by the PEI module or DXE + driver that has been linked against OVMF's LockBoxLib and is run first. The + signature is written in LockBoxLibInitialize() + [OvmfPkg/Library/LockBoxLib/LockBoxLib.c]. + + Any module calling SaveLockBox() [OvmfPkg/Library/LockBoxLib/LockBoxLib.c] + will co-populate this area. + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + If S3 is enabled, then InitializeRamRegions() + [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] protects the range as AcpiNVS. + + Otherwise, the range is covered with a BootServicesData memory allocation + HOB. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + If S3 is enabled, then (2b) protects it sufficiently. + + Otherwise the range requires no runtime protection, and the + BootServicesData allocation type from (2b) ensures that the range will be + released to the OS. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + The S3 Resume PEIM restores data from the LockBox, which has been correctly + protected in (2c). + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + InitializeRamRegions() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] zeroes out the + range during PEI, effectively emptying the LockBox. Modules will + re-populate the LockBox as described in (2a). + +(3) SEC's table of GUIDed section handlers + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + The following two library instances are linked into SecMain: + - IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Library/LzmaCustomDecompressLib, + - MdePkg/Library/BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib. + + The first library registers its LZMA decompressor plugin (which is a called + a "section handler") by calling the second library: + + LzmaDecompressLibConstructor() [GuidedSectionExtraction.c] + ExtractGuidedSectionRegisterHandlers() [BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib.c] + + The second library maintains its table of registered "section handlers", to + be indexed by GUID, in this fixed memory area, independently of S3 + enablement. + + (The decompression of FVMAIN_COMPACT's FFS file section that contains the + PEIFV and DXEFV firmware volumes occurs with the LZMA decompressor + registered above. See (6) and (7) below.) + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + There is no need to protect this area from DXE: because nothing else in + OVMF links against BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib, the area loses its + significance as soon as OVMF progresses from SEC to PEI, therefore DXE is + allowed to overwrite the region. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + When S3 is enabled, we cover the range with an AcpiNVS memory allocation + HOB in InitializeRamRegions(). + + When S3 is disabled, the range is not protected. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + The table of registered section handlers is again managed by + BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib linked into SecMain exclusively. Section + handler registrations update the table in-place (based on GUID matches). + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + If S3 is enabled, then the OS won't damage the table (due to (3c)), thus + see (3d). + + If S3 is disabled, then the OS has most probably overwritten the range with + its own data, hence (3a) -- complete reinitialization -- will come into + effect, based on the table signature check in BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib. + +(4) temporary SEC/PEI heap and stack + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + The range is configured in [OvmfPkg/Sec/X64/SecEntry.S] and + SecCoreStartupWithStack() [OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c]. The stack half is read & + written by the CPU transparently. The heap half is used for memory + allocations during PEI. + + Data is migrated out (to permanent PEI stack & memory) in (or soon after) + PublishPeiMemory() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c]. + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + It is not necessary to protect this range during DXE because its use ends + still in PEI. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + If S3 is enabled, then InitializeRamRegions() + [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] reserves it as AcpiNVS. + + If S3 is disabled, then the range doesn't require protection. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + Same as in (4a), except the target area of the migration triggered by + PublishPeiMemory() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] is different -- see + (5). + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + Same as in (4a). The stack and heap halves both may contain garbage, but it + doesn't matter. + +(5) permanent PEI memory for the S3 resume path + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + No particular initialization or use. + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + We don't need to protect this area during DXE. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + When S3 is enabled, InitializeRamRegions() + [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] makes sure the OS stays away by covering + the range with an AcpiNVS memory allocation HOB. + + When S3 is disabled, the range needs no protection. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + PublishPeiMemory() installs the range as permanent RAM for PEI. The range + will serve as stack and will satisfy allocation requests during the rest of + PEI. OS data won't overlap due to (5c). + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + Same as (5a). + +(6) PEIFV -- decompressed firmware volume with PEI modules + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + DecompressMemFvs() [OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c] populates the area, by + decompressing the flash-mapped FVMAIN_COMPACT volume's contents. (Refer to + "Firmware image structure".) + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + When S3 is disabled, PeiFvInitialization() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Fv.c] + covers the range with a BootServicesData memory allocation HOB. + + When S3 is enabled, the same is coverage is ensured, just with the stronger + AcpiNVS memory allocation type. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + When S3 is disabled, it is not necessary to keep the range from the OS. + + Otherwise the AcpiNVS type allocation from (6b) provides coverage. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + Rather than decompressing it again from FVMAIN_COMPACT, GetS3ResumePeiFv() + [OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c] reuses the protected area for parsing / execution + from (6c). + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + Same as (6a). + +(7) DXEFV -- decompressed firmware volume with DXE modules + + (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM + + Same as (6a). + + (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE + + PeiFvInitialization() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Fv.c] covers the range with a + BootServicesData memory allocation HOB. + + (c) how it is protected from the OS + + The OS is allowed to release and reuse this range. + + (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path + + It's not; DXE never runs during S3 resume. + + (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path + + Same as in (7a). + +Known Secure Boot limitations +----------------------------- + +Under "Motivation" we've mentioned that OVMF's Secure Boot implementation is +not suitable for production use yet -- it's only good for development and +testing of standards-conformant, non-malicious guest code (UEFI and operating +system alike). + +Now that we've examined the persistent flash device, the workings of S3, and +the memory map, we can discuss two currently known shortcomings of OVMF's +Secure Boot that in fact make it insecure. (Clearly problems other than these +two might exist; the set of issues considered here is not meant to be +exhaustive.) + +One trait of Secure Boot is tamper-evidence. Secure Boot may not prevent +malicious modification of software components (for example, operating system +drivers), but by being the root of integrity on a platform, it can catch (or +indirectly contribute to catching) unauthorized changes, by way of signature +and certificate checks at the earliest phases of boot. + +If an attacker can tamper with key material stored in authenticated and/or +boot-time only persistent variables (for example, PK, KEK, db, dbt, dbx), then +the intended security of this scheme is compromised. The UEFI 2.4A +specification says + +- in section 28.3.4: + + Platform Keys: + + The public key must be stored in non-volatile storage which is tamper and + delete resistant. + + Key Exchange Keys: + + The public key must be stored in non-volatile storage which is tamper + resistant. + +- in section 28.6.1: + + The signature database variables db, dbt, and dbx must be stored in + tamper-resistant non-volatile storage. + +(1) The combination of QEMU, KVM, and OVMF does not provide this kind of + resistance. The variable store in the emulated flash chip is directly + accessible to, and reprogrammable by, UEFI drivers, applications, and + operating systems. + +(2) Under "S3 (suspend to RAM and resume)" we pointed out that the LockBox + storage must be similarly secure and tamper-resistant. + + On the S3 resume path, the PEIM providing EFI_PEI_S3_RESUME2_PPI + (UefiCpuPkg/Universal/Acpi/S3Resume2Pei) restores and interprets data from + the LockBox that has been saved there during boot. This PEIM, being part of + the firmware, has full access to the platform. If an operating system can + tamper with the contents of the LockBox, then at the next resume the + platform's integrity might be subverted. + + OVMF stores the LockBox in normal guest RAM (refer to the memory map + section above). Operating systems and third party UEFI drivers and UEFI + applications that respect the UEFI memory map will not inadvertently + overwrite the LockBox storage, but there's nothing to prevent eg. a + malicious kernel from modifying the LockBox. + +One means to address these issues is SMM and SMRAM (System Management Mode and +System Management RAM). + +During boot and resume, the firmware can enter and leave SMM and access SMRAM. +Before the DXE phase is left, and control is transferred to the BDS phase (when +third party UEFI drivers and applications can be loaded, and an operating +system can be loaded), SMRAM is locked in hardware, and subsequent modules +cannot access it directly. (See EFI_DXE_SMM_READY_TO_LOCK_PROTOCOL.) + +Once SMRAM has been locked, UEFI drivers and the operating system can enter SMM +by raising a System Management Interrupt (SMI), at which point trusted code +(part of the platform firmware) takes control. SMRAM is also unlocked by +platform reset, at which point the boot firmware takes control again. + +Variable store and LockBox in SMRAM +----------------------------------- + +Edk2 provides almost all components to implement the variable store and the +LockBox in SMRAM. In this section we summarize ideas for utilizing those +facilities. + +The SMRAM and SMM infrastructure in edk2 is built up as follows: + +(1) The platform hardware provides SMM / SMI / SMRAM. + + Qemu/KVM doesn't support these features currently and should implement them + in the longer term. + +(2) The platform vendor (in this case, OVMF developers) implement device + drivers for the platform's System Management Mode: + + - EFI_SMM_CONTROL2_PROTOCOL: for raising a synchronous (and/or) periodic + SMI(s); that is, for entering SMM. + + - EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL: for describing and accessing SMRAM. + + These protocols are documented in the PI Specification, Volume 4. + +(3) The platform DSC file is to include the following platform-independent + modules: + + - MdeModulePkg/Core/PiSmmCore/PiSmmIpl.inf: SMM Initial Program Load + - MdeModulePkg/Core/PiSmmCore/PiSmmCore.inf: SMM Core + +(4) At this point, modules of type DXE_SMM_DRIVER can be loaded. + + Such drivers are privileged. They run in SMM, have access to SMRAM, and are + separated and switched from other drivers through SMIs. Secure + communication between unprivileged (non-SMM) and privileged (SMM) drivers + happens through EFI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL (implemented by the SMM + Core, see (3)). + + DXE_SMM_DRIVER modules must sanitize their input (coming from unprivileged + drivers) carefully. + +(5) The authenticated runtime variable services driver (for Secure Boot builds) + is located under "SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe". OVMF + currently builds the driver (a DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER module) with the + "VariableRuntimeDxe.inf" control file (refer to "OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc"), + which does not use SMM. + + The directory includes two more INF files: + + - VariableSmm.inf -- module type: DXE_SMM_DRIVER. A privileged driver that + runs in SMM and has access to SMRAM. + + - VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.inf -- module type: DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER. A + non-privileged driver that implements the variable runtime services + (replacing the current "VariableRuntimeDxe.inf" file) by communicating + with the above privileged SMM half via EFI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL. + +(6) An SMRAM-based LockBox implementation needs to be discussed in two parts, + because the LockBox is accessed in both PEI and DXE. + + (a) During DXE, drivers save data in the LockBox. A save operation is + layered as follows: + + - The unprivileged driver wishing to store data in the LockBox links + against the "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxDxeLib.inf" + library instance. + + The library allows the unprivileged driver to format requests for the + privileged SMM LockBox driver (see below), and to parse responses. + + - The privileged SMM LockBox driver is built from + "MdeModulePkg/Universal/LockBox/SmmLockBox/SmmLockBox.inf". This + driver has module type DXE_SMM_DRIVER and can access SMRAM. + + The driver delegates command parsing and response formatting to + "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxSmmLib.inf". + + - The above two halves (unprivileged and privileged) mirror what we've + seen in case of the variable service drivers, under (5). + + (b) In PEI, the S3 Resume PEIM (UefiCpuPkg/Universal/Acpi/S3Resume2Pei) + retrieves data from the LockBox. + + Presumably, S3Resume2Pei should be considered an "unprivileged PEIM", + and the SMRAM access should be layered as seen in DXE. Unfortunately, + edk2 does not implement all of the layers in PEI -- the code either + doesn't exist, or it is not open source: + + role | DXE: protocol/module | PEI: PPI/module + -------------+--------------------------------+------------------------------ + unprivileged | any | S3Resume2Pei.inf + driver | | + -------------+--------------------------------+------------------------------ + command | LIBRARY_CLASS = LockBoxLib | LIBRARY_CLASS = LockBoxLib + formatting | | + and response | SmmLockBoxDxeLib.inf | SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf + parsing | | + -------------+--------------------------------+------------------------------ + privilege | EFI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL | EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI + separation | | + | PiSmmCore.inf | missing! + -------------+--------------------------------+------------------------------ + platform SMM | EFI_SMM_CONTROL2_PROTOCOL | PEI_SMM_CONTROL_PPI + and SMRAM | EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL | PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI + access | | + | to be done in OVMF | to be done in OVMF + -------------+--------------------------------+------------------------------ + command | LIBRARY_CLASS = LockBoxLib | LIBRARY_CLASS = LockBoxLib + parsing and | | + response | SmmLockBoxSmmLib.inf | missing! + formatting | | + -------------+--------------------------------+------------------------------ + privileged | SmmLockBox.inf | missing! + LockBox | | + driver | | + + Alternatively, in the future OVMF might be able to provide a LockBoxLib + instance (an SmmLockBoxPeiLib substitute) for S3Resume2Pei that + accesses SMRAM directly, eliminating the need for deeper layers in the + stack (that is, EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI and deeper). + + In fact, a "thin" EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI implementation whose + sole Communicate() member invariably returns EFI_NOT_STARTED would + cause the current SmmLockBoxPeiLib library instance to directly perform + full-depth SMRAM access and LockBox search, obviating the "missing" + cells. (With reference to A Tour Beyond BIOS: Implementing S3 Resume + with EDK2, by Jiewen Yao and Vincent Zimmer, October 2014.) + +Select features +--------------- + +In this section we'll browse the top-level "OvmfPkg" package directory, and +discuss the more interesting drivers and libraries that have not been mentioned +thus far. + +X64-specific reset vector for OVMF +.................................. + +The "OvmfPkg/ResetVector" directory customizes the reset vector (found in +"UefiCpuPkg/ResetVector/Vtf0") for "OvmfPkgX64.fdf", that is, when the SEC/PEI +phases run in 64-bit (ie. long) mode. + +The reset vector's control flow looks roughly like: + + resetVector [Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm] + EarlyBspInitReal16 [Ia16/Init16.asm] + Main16 [Main.asm] + EarlyInit16 [Ia16/Init16.asm] + + ; Transition the processor from + ; 16-bit real mode to 32-bit flat mode + TransitionFromReal16To32BitFlat [Ia16/Real16ToFlat32.asm] + + ; Search for the + ; Boot Firmware Volume (BFV) + Flat32SearchForBfvBase [Ia32/SearchForBfvBase.asm] + + ; Search for the SEC entry point + Flat32SearchForSecEntryPoint [Ia32/SearchForSecEntry.asm] + + %ifdef ARCH_IA32 + ; Jump to the 32-bit SEC entry point + %else + ; Transition the processor + ; from 32-bit flat mode + ; to 64-bit flat mode + Transition32FlatTo64Flat [Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm] + + SetCr3ForPageTables64 [Ia32/PageTables64.asm] + ; set CR3 to page tables + ; built into the ROM image + + ; enable PAE + ; set LME + ; enable paging + + ; Jump to the 64-bit SEC entry point + %endif + +On physical platforms, the initial page tables referenced by +SetCr3ForPageTables64 are built statically into the flash device image, and are +present in ROM at runtime. This is fine on physical platforms because the +pre-built page table entries have the Accessed and Dirty bits set from the +start. + +Accordingly, for OVMF running in long mode on qemu/KVM, the initial page tables +were mapped as a KVM_MEM_READONLY slot, as part of QEMU's pflash device (refer +to "Firmware image structure" above). + +In spite of the Accessed and Dirty bits being pre-set in the read-only, +in-flash PTEs, in a virtual machine attempts are made to update said PTE bits, +differently from physical hardware. The component attempting to update the +read-only PTEs can be one of the following: + +- The processor itself, if it supports nested paging, and the user enables that + processor feature, + +- KVM code implementing shadow paging, otherwise. + +The first case presents no user-visible symptoms, but the second case (KVM, +shadow paging) used to cause a triple fault, prior to Linux commit ba6a354 +("KVM: mmu: allow page tables to be in read-only slots"). + +For compatibility with earlier KVM versions, the OvmfPkg/ResetVector directory +adapts the generic reset vector code as follows: + + Transition32FlatTo64Flat [UefiCpuPkg/.../Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm] + + SetCr3ForPageTables64 [OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm] + + ; dynamically build the initial page tables in RAM, at address + ; PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase (refer to the memory map above), + ; identity-mapping the first 4 GB of address space + + ; set CR3 to PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase + + ; enable PAE + ; set LME + ; enable paging + +This way the PTEs that earlier KVM versions try to update (during shadow +paging) are located in a read-write memory slot, and the write attempts +succeed. + +Client library for QEMU's firmware configuration interface +.......................................................... + +QEMU provides a write-only, 16-bit wide control port, and a read-write, 8-bit +wide data port for exchanging configuration elements with the firmware. + +The firmware writes a selector (a key) to the control port (0x510), and then +reads the corresponding configuration data (produced by QEMU) from the data +port (0x511). + +If the selected entry is writable, the firmware may overwrite it. If QEMU has +associated a callback with the entry, then when the entry is completely +rewritten, QEMU runs the callback. (OVMF does not rewrite any entries at the +moment.) + +A number of selector values (keys) are predefined. In particular, key 0x19 +selects (returns) a directory of { name, selector, size } triplets, roughly +speaking. + +The firmware can request configuration elements by well-known name as well, by +looking up the selector value first in the directory, by name, and then writing +the selector to the control port. The number of bytes to read subsequently from +the data port is known from the directory entry's "size" field. + +By convention, directory entries (well-known symbolic names of configuration +elements) are formatted as POSIX pathnames. For example, the array selected by +the "etc/system-states" name indicates (among other things) whether the user +enabled S3 support in QEMU. + +The above interface is called "fw_cfg". + +The binary data associated with a symbolic name is called an "fw_cfg file". + +OVMF's fw_cfg client library is found in "OvmfPkg/Library/QemuFwCfgLib". OVMF +discovers many aspects of the virtual system with it; we refer to a few +examples below. + +Guest ACPI tables +................. + +An operating system discovers a good amount of its hardware by parsing ACPI +tables, and by interpreting ACPI objects and methods. On physical hardware, the +platform vendor's firmware installs ACPI tables in memory that match both the +hardware present in the system and the user's firmware configuration ("BIOS +setup"). + +Under qemu/KVM, the owner of the (virtual) hardware configuration is QEMU. +Hardware can easily be reconfigured on the command line. Furthermore, features +like CPU hotplug, PCI hotplug, memory hotplug are continuously developed for +QEMU, and operating systems need direct ACPI support to exploit these features. + +For this reason, QEMU builds its own ACPI tables dynamically, in a +self-descriptive manner, and exports them to the firmware through a complex, +multi-file fw_cfg interface. It is rooted in the "etc/table-loader" fw_cfg +file. (Further details of this interface are out of scope for this report.) + +OVMF's AcpiPlatformDxe driver fetches the ACPI tables, and installs them for +the guest OS with the EFI_ACPI_TABLE_PROTOCOL (which is in turn provided by the +generic "MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/AcpiTableDxe" driver). + +For earlier QEMU versions and machine types (which we generally don't recommend +for OVMF; see "Scope"), the "OvmfPkg/AcpiTables" directory contains a few +static ACPI table templates. When the "etc/table-loader" fw_cfg file is +unavailable, AcpiPlatformDxe installs these default tables (with a little bit +of dynamic patching). + +When OVMF runs in a Xen domU, AcpiTableDxe also installs ACPI tables that +originate from the hypervisor's environment. + +Guest SMBIOS tables +................... + +Quoting the SMBIOS Reference Specification, + + [...] the System Management BIOS Reference Specification addresses how + motherboard and system vendors present management information about their + products in a standard format [...] + +In practice SMBIOS tables are just another set of tables that the platform +vendor's firmware installs in RAM for the operating system, and, importantly, +for management applications running on the OS. Without rehashing the "Guest +ACPI tables" section in full, let's map the OVMF roles seen there from ACPI to +SMBIOS: + + role | ACPI | SMBIOS + -------------------------+-------------------------+------------------------- + fw_cfg file | etc/table-loader | etc/smbios/smbios-tables + -------------------------+-------------------------+------------------------- + OVMF driver | AcpiPlatformDxe | SmbiosPlatformDxe + under "OvmfPkg" | | + -------------------------+-------------------------+------------------------- + Underlying protocol, | EFI_ACPI_TABLE_PROTOCOL | EFI_SMBIOS_PROTOCOL + implemented by generic | | + driver under | Acpi/AcpiTableDxe | SmbiosDxe + "MdeModulePkg/Universal" | | + -------------------------+-------------------------+------------------------- + default tables available | yes | [RHEL] yes, Type0 and + for earlier QEMU machine | | Type1 tables + types, with hot-patching | | + -------------------------+-------------------------+------------------------- + tables fetched in Xen | yes | yes + domUs | | + +Platform-specific boot policy +............................. + +OVMF's BDS (Boot Device Selection) phase is implemented by +IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Universal/BdsDxe. Roughly speaking, this large driver: + +- provides the EFI BDS architectural protocol (which DXE transfers control to + after dispatching all DXE drivers), + +- connects drivers to devices, + +- enumerates boot devices, + +- auto-generates boot options, + +- provides "BIOS setup" screens, such as: + + - Boot Manager, for booting an option, + + - Boot Maintenance Manager, for adding, deleting, and reordering boot + options, changing console properties etc, + + - Device Manager, where devices can register configuration forms, including + + - Secure Boot configuration forms, + + - OVMF's Platform Driver form (see under PlatformDxe). + +Firmware that includes the "IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Universal/BdsDxe" driver +can customize its behavior by providing an instance of the PlatformBdsLib +library class. The driver links against this platform library, and the +platform library can call Intel's BDS utility functions from +"IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Library/GenericBdsLib". + +OVMF's PlatformBdsLib instance can be found in +"OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBdsLib". The main function where the BdsDxe driver +enters the library is PlatformBdsPolicyBehavior(). We mention two OVMF +particulars here. + +(1) OVMF is capable of loading kernel images directly from fw_cfg, matching + QEMU's -kernel, -initrd, and -append command line options. This feature is + useful for rapid, repeated Linux kernel testing, and is implemented in the + following call tree: + + PlatformBdsPolicyBehavior() [OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBdsLib/BdsPlatform.c] + TryRunningQemuKernel() [OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBdsLib/QemuKernel.c] + LoadLinux*() [OvmfPkg/Library/LoadLinuxLib/Linux.c] + + OvmfPkg/Library/LoadLinuxLib ports the efilinux bootloader project into + OvmfPkg. + +(2) OVMF seeks to comply with the boot order specification passed down by QEMU + over fw_cfg. + + (a) About Boot Modes + + During the PEI phase, OVMF determines and stores the Boot Mode in the + PHIT HOB (already mentioned in "S3 (suspend to RAM and resume)"). The + boot mode is supposed to influence the rest of the system, for example it + distinguishes S3 resume (BOOT_ON_S3_RESUME) from a "normal" boot. + + In general, "normal" boots can be further differentiated from each other; + for example for speed reasons. When the firmware can tell during PEI that + the chassis has not been opened since last power-up, then it might want + to save time by not connecting all devices and not enumerating all boot + options from scratch; it could just rely on the stored results of the + last enumeration. The matching BootMode value, to be set during PEI, + would be BOOT_ASSUMING_NO_CONFIGURATION_CHANGES. + + OVMF only sets one of the following two boot modes, based on CMOS + contents: + - BOOT_ON_S3_RESUME, + - BOOT_WITH_FULL_CONFIGURATION. + + For BOOT_ON_S3_RESUME, please refer to "S3 (suspend to RAM and resume)". + The other boot mode supported by OVMF, BOOT_WITH_FULL_CONFIGURATION, is + an appropriate "catch-all" for a virtual machine, where hardware can + easily change from boot to boot. + + (b) Auto-generation of boot options + + Accordingly, when not resuming from S3 sleep (*), OVMF always connects + all devices, and enumerates all bootable devices as new boot options + (non-volatile variables called Boot####). + + (*) During S3 resume, DXE is not reached, hence BDS isn't either. + + The auto-enumerated boot options are stored in the BootOrder non-volatile + variable after any preexistent options. (Boot options may exist before + auto-enumeration eg. because the user added them manually with the Boot + Maintenance Manager or the efibootmgr utility. They could also originate + from an earlier auto-enumeration.) + + PlatformBdsPolicyBehavior() [OvmfPkg/.../BdsPlatform.c] + TryRunningQemuKernel() [OvmfPkg/.../QemuKernel.c] + BdsLibConnectAll() [IntelFrameworkModulePkg/.../BdsConnect.c] + BdsLibEnumerateAllBootOption() [IntelFrameworkModulePkg/.../BdsBoot.c] + BdsLibBuildOptionFromHandle() [IntelFrameworkModulePkg/.../BdsBoot.c] + BdsLibRegisterNewOption() [IntelFrameworkModulePkg/.../BdsMisc.c] + // + // Append the new option number to the original option order + // + + (c) Relative UEFI device paths in boot options + + The handling of relative ("short-form") UEFI device paths is best + demonstrated through an example, and by quoting the UEFI 2.4A + specification. + + A short-form hard drive UEFI device path could be (displaying each device + path node on a separate line for readability): + + HD(1,GPT,14DD1CC5-D576-4BBF-8858-BAF877C8DF61,0x800,0x64000)/ + \EFI\fedora\shim.efi + + This device path lacks prefix nodes (eg. hardware or messaging type + nodes) that would lead to the hard drive. During load option processing, + the above short-form or relative device path could be matched against the + following absolute device path: + + PciRoot(0x0)/ + Pci(0x4,0x0)/ + HD(1,GPT,14DD1CC5-D576-4BBF-8858-BAF877C8DF61,0x800,0x64000)/ + \EFI\fedora\shim.efi + + The motivation for this type of device path matching / completion is to + allow the user to move around the hard drive (for example, to plug a + controller in a different PCI slot, or to expose the block device on a + different iSCSI path) and still enable the firmware to find the hard + drive. + + The UEFI specification says, + + 9.3.6 Media Device Path + 9.3.6.1 Hard Drive + + [...] Section 3.1.2 defines special rules for processing the Hard + Drive Media Device Path. These special rules enable a disk's location + to change and still have the system boot from the disk. [...] + + 3.1.2 Load Option Processing + + [...] The boot manager must [...] support booting from a short-form + device path that starts with the first element being a hard drive + media device path [...]. The boot manager must use the GUID or + signature and partition number in the hard drive device path to match + it to a device in the system. If the drive supports the GPT + partitioning scheme the GUID in the hard drive media device path is + compared with the UniquePartitionGuid field of the GUID Partition + Entry [...]. If the drive supports the PC-AT MBR scheme the signature + in the hard drive media device path is compared with the + UniqueMBRSignature in the Legacy Master Boot Record [...]. If a + signature match is made, then the partition number must also be + matched. The hard drive device path can be appended to the matching + hardware device path and normal boot behavior can then be used. If + more than one device matches the hard drive device path, the boot + manager will pick one arbitrarily. Thus the operating system must + ensure the uniqueness of the signatures on hard drives to guarantee + deterministic boot behavior. + + Edk2 implements and exposes the device path completion logic in the + already referenced "IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Library/GenericBdsLib" + library, in the BdsExpandPartitionPartialDevicePathToFull() function. + + (d) Filtering and reordering the boot options based on fw_cfg + + Once we have an "all-inclusive", partly preexistent, partly freshly + auto-generated boot option list from bullet (b), OVMF loads QEMU's + requested boot order from fw_cfg, and filters and reorders the list from + (b) with it: + + PlatformBdsPolicyBehavior() [OvmfPkg/.../BdsPlatform.c] + TryRunningQemuKernel() [OvmfPkg/.../QemuKernel.c] + BdsLibConnectAll() [IntelFrameworkModulePkg/.../BdsConnect.c] + BdsLibEnumerateAllBootOption() [IntelFrameworkModulePkg/.../BdsBoot.c] + SetBootOrderFromQemu() [OvmfPkg/.../QemuBootOrder.c] + + According to the (preferred) "-device ...,bootindex=N" and the (legacy) + '-boot order=drives' command line options, QEMU requests a boot order + from the firmware through the "bootorder" fw_cfg file. (For a bootindex + example, refer to the "Example qemu invocation" section.) + + This fw_cfg file consists of OpenFirmware (OFW) device paths -- note: not + UEFI device paths! --, one per line. An example list is: + + /pci@i0cf8/scsi@4/disk@0,0 + /pci@i0cf8/ide@1,1/drive@1/disk@0 + /pci@i0cf8/ethernet@3/ethernet-phy@0 + + OVMF filters and reorders the boot option list from bullet (b) with the + following nested loops algorithm: + + new_uefi_order := + for each qemu_ofw_path in QEMU's OpenFirmware device path list: + qemu_uefi_path_prefix := translate(qemu_ofw_path) + + for each boot_option in current_uefi_order: + full_boot_option := complete(boot_option) + + if match(qemu_uefi_path_prefix, full_boot_option): + append(new_uefi_order, boot_option) + break + + for each unmatched boot_option in current_uefi_order: + if survives(boot_option): + append(new_uefi_order, boot_option) + + current_uefi_order := new_uefi_order + + OVMF iterates over QEMU's OFW device paths in order, translates each to a + UEFI device path prefix, tries to match the translated prefix against the + UEFI boot options (which are completed from relative form to absolute + form for the purpose of prefix matching), and if there's a match, the + matching boot option is appended to the new boot order (which starts out + empty). + + (We elaborate on the translate() function under bullet (e). The + complete() function has been explained in bullet (c).) + + In addition, UEFI boot options that remain unmatched after filtering and + reordering are post-processed, and some of them "survive". Due to the + fact that OpenFirmware device paths have less expressive power than their + UEFI counterparts, some UEFI boot options are simply inexpressible (hence + unmatchable) by the nested loops algorithm. + + An important example is the memory-mapped UEFI shell, whose UEFI device + path is inexpressible by QEMU's OFW device paths: + + MemoryMapped(0xB,0x900000,0x10FFFFF)/ + FvFile(7C04A583-9E3E-4F1C-AD65-E05268D0B4D1) + + (Side remark: notice that the address range visible in the MemoryMapped() + node corresponds to DXEFV under "comprehensive memory map of OVMF"! In + addition, the FvFile() node's GUID originates from the FILE_GUID entry of + "ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf".) + + The UEFI shell can be booted by pressing ESC in OVMF on the TianoCore + splash screen, and navigating to Boot Manager | EFI Internal Shell. If + the "survival policy" was not implemented, the UEFI shell's boot option + would always be filtered out. + + The current "survival policy" preserves all boot options that start with + neither PciRoot() nor HD(). + + (e) Translating QEMU's OpenFirmware device paths to UEFI device path + prefixes + + In this section we list the (strictly heuristical) mappings currently + performed by OVMF. + + The "prefix only" nature of the translation output is rooted minimally in + the fact that QEMU's OpenFirmware device paths cannot carry pathnames + within filesystems. There's no way to specify eg. + + \EFI\fedora\shim.efi + + in an OFW device path, therefore a UEFI device path translated from an + OFW device path can at best be a prefix (not a full match) of a UEFI + device path that ends with "\EFI\fedora\shim.efi". + + - IDE disk, IDE CD-ROM: + + OpenFirmware device path: + + /pci@i0cf8/ide@1,1/drive@0/disk@0 + ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ + | | | | master or slave + | | | primary or secondary + | PCI slot & function holding IDE controller + PCI root at system bus port, PIO + + UEFI device path prefix: + + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Ata(Primary,Master,0x0) + ^ + fixed LUN + + - Floppy disk: + + OpenFirmware device path: + + /pci@i0cf8/isa@1/fdc@03f0/floppy@0 + ^ ^ ^ ^ + | | | A: or B: + | | ISA controller io-port (hex) + | PCI slot holding ISA controller + PCI root at system bus port, PIO + + UEFI device path prefix: + + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x0)/Floppy(0x0) + ^ + ACPI UID (A: or B:) + + - Virtio-block disk: + + OpenFirmware device path: + + /pci@i0cf8/scsi@6[,3]/disk@0,0 + ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ + | | | fixed + | | PCI function corresponding to disk (optional) + | PCI slot holding disk + PCI root at system bus port, PIO + + UEFI device path prefixes (dependent on the presence of a nonzero PCI + function in the OFW device path): + + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x6,0x0)/HD( + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x6,0x3)/HD( + + - Virtio-scsi disk and virtio-scsi passthrough: + + OpenFirmware device path: + + /pci@i0cf8/scsi@7[,3]/channel@0/disk@2,3 + ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ + | | | | LUN + | | | target + | | channel (unused, fixed 0) + | PCI slot[, function] holding SCSI controller + PCI root at system bus port, PIO + + UEFI device path prefixes (dependent on the presence of a nonzero PCI + function in the OFW device path): + + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x7,0x0)/Scsi(0x2,0x3) + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x7,0x3)/Scsi(0x2,0x3) + + - Emulated and passed-through (physical) network cards: + + OpenFirmware device path: + + /pci@i0cf8/ethernet@3[,2] + ^ ^ + | PCI slot[, function] holding Ethernet card + PCI root at system bus port, PIO + + UEFI device path prefixes (dependent on the presence of a nonzero PCI + function in the OFW device path): + + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x3,0x0) + PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x3,0x2) + +Virtio drivers +.............. + +UEFI abstracts various types of hardware resources into protocols, and allows +firmware developers to implement those protocols in device drivers. The Virtio +Specification defines various types of virtual hardware for virtual machines. +Connecting the two specifications, OVMF provides UEFI drivers for QEMU's +virtio-block, virtio-scsi, and virtio-net devices. + +The following diagram presents the protocol and driver stack related to Virtio +devices in edk2 and OVMF. Each node in the graph identifies a protocol and/or +the edk2 driver that produces it. Nodes on the top are more abstract. + + EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL + [OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe] [OvmfPkg/VirtioNetDxe] + | | + | EFI_EXT_SCSI_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL | + | [OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe] | + | | | + +------------------------+--------------------------+ + | + VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL + | + +---------------------+---------------------+ + | | + [OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe] [custom platform drivers] + | | + | | + EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL [OvmfPkg/Library/VirtioMmioDeviceLib] + [MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe] direct MMIO register access + +The top three drivers produce standard UEFI abstractions: the Block IO +Protocol, the Extended SCSI Pass Thru Protocol, and the Simple Network +Protocol, for virtio-block, virtio-scsi, and virtio-net devices, respectively. + +Comparing these device-specific virtio drivers to each other, we can determine: + +- They all conform to the UEFI Driver Model. This means that their entry point + functions don't immediately start to search for devices and to drive them, + they only register instances of the EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL. The UEFI + Driver Model then enumerates devices and chains matching drivers + automatically. + +- They are as minimal as possible, while remaining correct (refer to source + code comments for details). For example, VirtioBlkDxe and VirtioScsiDxe both + support only one request in flight. + + In theory, VirtioBlkDxe could implement EFI_BLOCK_IO2_PROTOCOL, which allows + queueing. Similarly, VirtioScsiDxe does not support the non-blocking mode of + EFI_EXT_SCSI_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL.PassThru(). (Which is permitted by the UEFI + specification.) Both VirtioBlkDxe and VirtioScsiDxe delegate synchronous + request handling to "OvmfPkg/Library/VirtioLib". This limitation helps keep + the implementation simple, and testing thus far seems to imply satisfactory + performance, for a virtual boot firmware. + + VirtioNetDxe cannot avoid queueing, because EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL + requires it on the interface level. Consequently, VirtioNetDxe is + significantly more complex than VirtioBlkDxe and VirtioScsiDxe. Technical + notes are provided in "OvmfPkg/VirtioNetDxe/TechNotes.txt". + +- None of these drivers access hardware directly. Instead, the Virtio Device + Protocol (OvmfPkg/Include/Protocol/VirtioDevice.h) collects / extracts virtio + operations defined in the Virtio Specification, and these backend-independent + virtio device drivers go through the abstract VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL. + + IMPORTANT: the VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL is not a standard UEFI protocol. It is + internal to edk2 and not described in the UEFI specification. It should only + be used by drivers and applications that live inside the edk2 source tree. + +Currently two providers exist for VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL: + +- The first one is the "more traditional" virtio-pci backend, implemented by + OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe. This driver also complies with the UEFI Driver + Model. It consumes an instance of the EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL, and, if the PCI + device/function under probing appears to be a virtio device, it produces a + Virtio Device Protocol instance for it. The driver translates abstract virtio + operations to PCI accesses. + +- The second provider, the virtio-mmio backend, is a library, not a driver, + living in OvmfPkg/Library/VirtioMmioDeviceLib. This library translates + abstract virtio operations to MMIO accesses. + + The virtio-mmio backend is only a library -- rather than a standalone, UEFI + Driver Model-compliant driver -- because the type of resource it consumes, an + MMIO register block base address, is not enumerable. + + In other words, while the PCI root bridge driver and the PCI bus driver + produce instances of EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL automatically, thereby enabling the + UEFI Driver Model to probe devices and stack up drivers automatically, no + such enumeration exists for MMIO register blocks. + + For this reason, VirtioMmioDeviceLib needs to be linked into thin, custom + platform drivers that dispose over this kind of information. As soon as a + driver knows about the MMIO register block base addresses, it can pass each + to the library, and then the VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL will be instantiated + (assuming a valid virtio-mmio register block of course). From that point on + the UEFI Driver Model again takes care of the chaining. + + Typically, such a custom driver does not conform to the UEFI Driver Model + (because that would presuppose auto-enumeration for MMIO register blocks). + Hence it has the following responsibilities: + + - it shall behave as a "wrapper" UEFI driver around the library, + + - it shall know virtio-mmio base addresses, + + - in its entry point function, it shall create a new UEFI handle with an + instance of the EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL for each virtio-mmio device it + knows the base address for, + + - it shall call VirtioMmioInstallDevice() on those handles, with the + corresponding base addresses. + + OVMF itself does not employ VirtioMmioDeviceLib. However, the library is used + (or has been tested as Proof-of-Concept) in the following 64-bit and 32-bit + ARM emulator setups: + + - in "RTSM_VE_FOUNDATIONV8_EFI.fd" and "FVP_AARCH64_EFI.fd", on ARM Holdings' + ARM(R) v8-A Foundation Model and ARM(R) AEMv8-A Base Platform FVP + emulators, respectively: + + EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL + [OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe] + | + VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL + [ArmPlatformPkg/ArmVExpressPkg/ArmVExpressDxe/ArmFvpDxe.inf] + | + [OvmfPkg/Library/VirtioMmioDeviceLib] + direct MMIO register access + + - in "RTSM_VE_CORTEX-A15_EFI.fd" and "RTSM_VE_CORTEX-A15_MPCORE_EFI.fd", on + "qemu-system-arm -M vexpress-a15": + + EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL + [OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe] [OvmfPkg/VirtioNetDxe] + | | + +------------------+---------------+ + | + VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL + [ArmPlatformPkg/ArmVExpressPkg/ArmVExpressDxe/ArmFvpDxe.inf] + | + [OvmfPkg/Library/VirtioMmioDeviceLib] + direct MMIO register access + + In the above ARM / VirtioMmioDeviceLib configurations, VirtioBlkDxe was + tested with booting Linux distributions, while VirtioNetDxe was tested with + pinging public IPv4 addresses from the UEFI shell. + +Platform Driver +............... + +Sometimes, elements of persistent firmware configuration are best exposed to +the user in a friendly way. OVMF's platform driver (OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe) +presents such settings on the "OVMF Platform Configuration" dialog: + +- Press ESC on the TianoCore splash screen, +- Navigate to Device Manager | OVMF Platform Configuration. + +At the moment, OVMF's platform driver handles only one setting: the preferred +graphics resolution. This is useful for two purposes: + +- Some UEFI shell commands, like DRIVERS and DEVICES, benefit from a wide + display. Using the MODE shell command, the user can switch to a larger text + resolution (limited by the graphics resolution), and see the command output + in a more easily consumable way. + + [RHEL] The list of text modes available to the MODE command is also limited + by ConSplitterDxe (found under MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console). + ConSplitterDxe builds an intersection of text modes that are + simultaneously supported by all consoles that ConSplitterDxe + multiplexes console output to. + + In practice, the strongest text mode restriction comes from + TerminalDxe, which provides console I/O on serial ports. TerminalDxe + has a very limited built-in list of text modes, heavily pruning the + intersection built by ConSplitterDxe, and made available to the MODE + command. + + On the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 host, TerminalDxe's list of modes + has been extended with text resolutions that match the Spice QXL GPU's + common graphics resolutions. This way a "full screen" text mode should + always be available in the MODE command. + +- The other advantage of controlling the graphics resolution lies with UEFI + operating systems that don't (yet) have a native driver for QEMU's virtual + video cards -- eg. the Spice QXL GPU. Such OSes may choose to inherit the + properties of OVMF's EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL (provided by + OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe, see later). + + Although the display can be used at runtime in such cases, by direct + framebuffer access, its properties, for example, the resolution, cannot be + modified. The platform driver allows the user to select the preferred GOP + resolution, reboot, and let the guest OS inherit that preferred resolution. + +The platform driver has three access points: the "normal" driver entry point, a +set of HII callbacks, and a GOP installation callback. + +(1) Driver entry point: the PlatformInit() function. + + (a) First, this function loads any available settings, and makes them take + effect. For the preferred graphics resolution in particular, this means + setting the following PCDs: + + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdVideoHorizontalResolution + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdVideoVerticalResolution + + These PCDs influence the GraphicsConsoleDxe driver (located under + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console), which switches to the preferred + graphics mode, and produces EFI_SIMPLE_TEXT_OUTPUT_PROTOCOLs on GOPs: + + EFI_SIMPLE_TEXT_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL + [MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/GraphicsConsoleDxe] + | + EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL + [OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe] + | + EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL + [MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe] + + (b) Second, the driver entry point registers the user interface, including + HII callbacks. + + (c) Third, the driver entry point registers a GOP installation callback. + +(2) HII callbacks and the user interface. + + The Human Interface Infrastructure (HII) "is a set of protocols that allow + a UEFI driver to provide the ability to register user interface and + configuration content with the platform firmware". + + OVMF's platform driver: + + - provides a static, basic, visual form (PlatformForms.vfr), written in the + Visual Forms Representation language, + + - includes a UCS-16 encoded message catalog (Platform.uni), + + - includes source code that dynamically populates parts of the form, with + the help of MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiHiiLib -- this library simplifies + the handling of IFR (Internal Forms Representation) opcodes, + + - processes form actions that the user takes (Callback() function), + + - loads and saves platform configuration in a private, non-volatile + variable (ExtractConfig() and RouteConfig() functions). + + The ExtractConfig() HII callback implements the following stack of + conversions, for loading configuration and presenting it to the user: + + MultiConfigAltResp -- form engine / HII communication + ^ + | + [BlockToConfig] + | + MAIN_FORM_STATE -- binary representation of form/widget + ^ state + | + [PlatformConfigToFormState] + | + PLATFORM_CONFIG -- accessible to DXE and UEFI drivers + ^ + | + [PlatformConfigLoad] + | + UEFI non-volatile variable -- accessible to external utilities + + The layers are very similar for the reverse direction, ie. when taking + input from the user, and saving the configuration (RouteConfig() HII + callback): + + ConfigResp -- form engine / HII communication + | + [ConfigToBlock] + | + v + MAIN_FORM_STATE -- binary representation of form/widget + | state + [FormStateToPlatformConfig] + | + v + PLATFORM_CONFIG -- accessible to DXE and UEFI drivers + | + [PlatformConfigSave] + | + v + UEFI non-volatile variable -- accessible to external utilities + +(3) When the platform driver starts, a GOP may not be available yet. Thus the + driver entry point registers a callback (the GopInstalled() function) for + GOP installations. + + When the first GOP is produced (usually by QemuVideoDxe, or potentially by + a third party video driver), PlatformDxe retrieves the list of graphics + modes the GOP supports, and dynamically populates the drop-down list of + available resolutions on the form. The GOP installation callback is then + removed. + +Video driver +............ + +OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe is OVMF's built-in video driver. We can divide its +services in two parts: graphics output protocol (primary), and Int10h (VBE) +shim (secondary). + +(1) QemuVideoDxe conforms to the UEFI Driver Model; it produces an instance of + the EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL (GOP) on each PCI display that it supports + and is connected to: + + EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL + [OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe] + | + EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL + [MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe] + + It supports the following QEMU video cards: + + - Cirrus 5430 ("-device cirrus-vga"), + - Standard VGA ("-device VGA"), + - QXL VGA ("-device qxl-vga", "-device qxl"). + + For Cirrus the following resolutions and color depths are available: + 640x480x32, 800x600x32, 1024x768x24. On stdvga and QXL a long list of + resolutions is available. The list is filtered against the frame buffer + size during initialization. + + The size of the QXL VGA compatibility framebuffer can be changed with the + + -device qxl-vga,vgamem_mb=$NUM_MB + + QEMU option. If $NUM_MB exceeds 32, then the following is necessary + instead: + + -device qxl-vga,vgamem_mb=$NUM_MB,ram_size_mb=$((NUM_MB*2)) + + because the compatibility framebuffer can't cover more than half of PCI BAR + #0. The latter defaults to 64MB in size, and is controlled by the + "ram_size_mb" property. + +(2) When QemuVideoDxe binds the first Standard VGA or QXL VGA device, and there + is no real VGA BIOS present in the C to F segments (which could originate + from a legacy PCI option ROM -- refer to "Compatibility Support Module + (CSM)"), then QemuVideoDxe installs a minimal, "fake" VGA BIOS -- an Int10h + (VBE) "shim". + + The shim is implemented in 16-bit assembly in + "OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/VbeShim.asm". The "VbeShim.sh" shell script assembles + it and formats it as a C array ("VbeShim.h") with the help of the "nasm" + utility. The driver's InstallVbeShim() function copies the shim in place + (the C segment), and fills in the VBE Info and VBE Mode Info structures. + The real-mode 10h interrupt vector is pointed to the shim's handler. + + The shim is (correctly) irrelevant and invisible for all UEFI operating + systems we know about -- except Windows Server 2008 R2 and other Windows + operating systems in that family. + + Namely, the Windows 2008 R2 SP1 (and Windows 7) UEFI guest's default video + driver dereferences the real mode Int10h vector, loads the pointed-to + handler code, and executes what it thinks to be VGA BIOS services in an + internal real-mode emulator. Consequently, video mode switching used not to + work in Windows 2008 R2 SP1 when it ran on the "pure UEFI" build of OVMF, + making the guest uninstallable. Hence the (otherwise optional, non-default) + Compatibility Support Module (CSM) ended up a requirement for running such + guests. + + The hard dependency on the sophisticated SeaBIOS CSM and the complex + supporting edk2 infrastructure, for enabling this family of guests, was + considered suboptimal by some members of the upstream community, + + [RHEL] and was certainly considered a serious maintenance disadvantage for + Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 hosts. + + Thus, the shim has been collaboratively developed for the Windows 7 / + Windows Server 2008 R2 family. The shim provides a real stdvga / QXL + implementation for the few services that are in fact necessary for the + Windows 2008 R2 SP1 (and Windows 7) UEFI guest, plus some "fakes" that the + guest invokes but whose effect is not important. The only supported mode is + 1024x768x32, which is enough to install the guest and then upgrade its + video driver to the full-featured QXL XDDM one. + + The C segment is not present in the UEFI memory map prepared by OVMF. + Memory space that would cover it is never added (either in PEI, in the form + of memory resource descriptor HOBs, or in DXE, via gDS->AddMemorySpace()). + This way the handler body is invisible to all other UEFI guests, and the + rest of edk2. + + The Int10h real-mode IVT entry is covered with a Boot Services Code page, + making that too inaccessible to the rest of edk2. Due to the allocation + type, UEFI guest OSes different from the Windows Server 2008 family can + reclaim the page at zero. (The Windows 2008 family accesses that page + regardless of the allocation type.) + +Afterword +--------- + +After the bulk of this document was written in July 2014, OVMF development has +not stopped. To name two significant code contributions from the community: in +January 2015, OVMF runs on the "q35" machine type of QEMU, and it features a +driver for Xen paravirtual block devices (and another for the underlying Xen +bus). + +Furthermore, a dedicated virtualization platform has been contributed to +ArmPlatformPkg that plays a role parallel to OvmfPkg's. It targets the "virt" +machine type of qemu-system-arm and qemu-system-aarch64. Parts of OvmfPkg are +being refactored and modularized so they can be reused in +"ArmPlatformPkg/ArmVirtualizationPkg/ArmVirtualizationQemu.dsc". diff --git a/SOURCES/rheldup3.pem b/SOURCES/rheldup3.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000..61cd804 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/rheldup3.pem @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: + df:05:cc:0a:a1:21:9e:3e + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: CN = Red Hat Enterprise Linux Driver Update Program (key 3), emailAddress = secalert@redhat.com + Validity + Not Before: Mar 31 08:40:36 2014 GMT + Not After : Mar 25 08:40:36 2037 GMT + Subject: CN = Red Hat Enterprise Linux Driver Update Program (key 3), emailAddress = secalert@redhat.com + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + Public-Key: (3072 bit) + Modulus: + 00:a6:6a:c6:0a:73:d6:e0:67:ab:09:21:b7:8e:61: + bb:e2:80:96:55:fd:be:35:5c:7a:9f:c8:9e:2a:1f: + 41:b1:54:25:8b:c1:6b:7a:75:83:8d:df:6b:c8:20: + 4d:94:31:f0:c6:ed:d6:66:6e:e5:cc:6e:20:5f:17: + 3f:e0:d4:5a:41:cf:de:ff:31:70:44:a5:fe:79:8d: + 14:d9:04:2e:66:08:ac:cb:14:6e:75:53:38:f5:85: + 44:99:43:f6:b1:03:bc:7c:d6:bd:9d:1b:e2:3c:8d: + a4:f0:1c:97:ff:0e:37:61:cc:a1:c7:51:2a:44:69: + 9f:88:f9:1a:62:d5:dd:f7:bf:04:66:90:57:6e:83: + d8:07:cc:fe:eb:61:99:fb:3b:3e:97:c7:5b:8f:e5: + 8c:eb:01:ab:a1:99:95:5c:1c:cf:8d:2b:6e:74:82: + 80:6c:14:be:bd:81:d8:9a:ba:57:aa:49:26:fd:c8: + 3d:06:8e:35:77:bf:56:f8:53:10:69:1b:da:93:41: + 05:cd:51:65:ca:3b:40:82:f5:4f:dd:df:1d:be:db: + 96:ed:c0:e5:d7:03:f1:39:53:3c:fc:4a:c6:af:3b: + 36:ab:3d:9f:c9:19:c4:67:f5:41:b0:bd:93:98:38: + bc:4f:fe:c6:64:05:ec:a5:cb:9a:fb:c3:72:90:da: + b7:9d:91:68:8b:00:b6:b0:83:62:8c:5b:e0:bd:1c: + b0:a5:3b:49:be:77:37:be:54:37:0a:a5:2b:7a:05: + ef:61:97:68:a3:5d:e1:90:5e:d6:d6:22:bf:50:d1: + 2b:22:be:7d:f2:30:bd:5a:0d:6e:91:6a:8e:89:56: + 97:30:7d:14:93:a4:05:69:e5:0d:8f:be:39:6d:17: + 02:66:7f:a6:05:db:5f:f6:b2:39:43:04:1e:44:fc: + ae:f2:de:12:02:d7:e4:e0:eb:08:a6:1f:b9:cd:d4: + 8b:75:40:b3:bb:4f:92:15:78:a1:2e:4b:c4:8f:2f: + 7d:ad:34:be:6b:2a:29:18:d5:e9 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:FALSE + X509v3 Key Usage: + Digital Signature + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + BF:57:F3:E8:73:62:BC:72:29:D9:F4:65:32:17:73:DF:D1:F7:7A:80 + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + BF:57:F3:E8:73:62:BC:72:29:D9:F4:65:32:17:73:DF:D1:F7:7A:80 + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Signature Value: + 62:a8:a3:1c:39:5a:69:fa:a6:c6:ff:ab:6c:f6:9e:9a:f5:6b: + 84:72:c8:18:6f:15:2d:07:9f:ac:b4:a0:49:fb:20:02:32:b8: + 25:80:98:fb:d7:57:7f:9c:78:a9:19:dd:f5:b8:bd:c7:59:03: + a0:06:85:a9:18:7a:35:df:9f:53:f0:22:61:bf:0a:bb:1c:f3: + a6:9e:db:8e:2c:1c:25:b2:86:a3:0d:97:ce:0d:f4:d0:28:39: + 76:00:38:07:f2:02:f5:e0:a8:01:20:30:a8:18:7c:1f:0e:91: + 41:a6:cc:0a:a7:2e:78:c2:32:de:ae:f6:2d:9d:b1:43:17:31: + f1:ff:74:b1:f5:ef:bd:a2:53:bf:17:20:1a:da:bd:5e:7b:db: + 79:43:c7:7b:79:a7:31:ca:3e:54:28:e4:44:2b:ac:41:b9:c0: + 03:44:ce:e9:56:13:0b:87:f9:82:e6:1e:82:75:23:c2:2c:cf: + 8d:8e:ad:47:40:16:b4:86:82:92:4d:77:8c:02:27:7a:cf:93: + ed:21:4a:fa:d8:fb:e9:30:d4:b9:c8:e2:05:a7:2e:5d:4b:80: + db:ec:aa:4f:e2:4e:5d:94:13:ad:73:65:26:7e:4d:0e:44:49: + 03:8f:42:e5:4e:e8:43:4b:1f:76:fc:18:d1:c1:c1:ac:85:de: + ec:97:13:e1:de:e6:fa:75:c6:f0:fd:c2:15:7e:23:72:f2:28: + fa:b6:6f:a3:96:e5:d4:b5:b2:a5:6b:e3:b6:cf:47:46:6b:a6: + 93:7c:7d:28:5d:ba:ce:da:19:e9:4c:a8:a4:9a:1e:77:fc:5a: + b5:43:ad:9f:f7:bb:be:5f:85:9e:c9:0e:4c:a1:01:54:01:a1: + 6e:ae:67:13:84:ee:ad:e9:20:77:66:be:6d:06:73:80:18:dc: + c8:d5:16:c4:7f:8a:b5:63:b8:37:fa:be:95:8b:5d:46:2d:a9: + 69:71:bc:d4:44:38:68:e4:11:8d:8e:8d:99:a2:9a:4b:07:ae: + 11:cf:05:d8:b7:ff +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIEqjCCAxKgAwIBAgIJAN8FzAqhIZ4+MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMGUxPzA9BgNV +BAMTNlJlZCBIYXQgRW50ZXJwcmlzZSBMaW51eCBEcml2ZXIgVXBkYXRlIFByb2dy +YW0gKGtleSAzKTEiMCAGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYTc2VjYWxlcnRAcmVkaGF0LmNvbTAe 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verification) + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey + Public-Key: (384 bit) + pub: + 04:4f:0e:ef:bf:e2:23:89:91:27:4e:7c:32:a1:d0: + c0:26:92:de:37:8d:b0:5d:ea:7f:d6:27:18:9b:b4: + 62:be:06:85:3d:f9:cc:47:7e:c7:bd:91:54:53:62: + b4:c0:8a:43:48:c2:59:07:2b:88:d7:3d:4b:30:8d: + 6c:32:fb:a5:da:dc:8a:85:e9:61:44:18:fc:d9:8b: + f5:5e:38:c8:85:77:ca:73:68:ce:48:df:af:3d:06: + 43:2f:4b:6c:0c:cd:88 + ASN1 OID: secp384r1 + NIST CURVE: P-384 + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:FALSE + X509v3 Key Usage: critical + Digital Signature + X509v3 Extended Key Usage: critical + Code Signing + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 22:FA:01:DC:0E:A0:26:9F:69:A8:67:E5:CF:E4:9C:FB:D3:32:04:49 + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + FB:31:82:5D:D0:E0:73:68:5B:26:4E:30:38:96:36:73:F7:53:95:9A + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Signature Value: + 1a:1e:c1:2d:65:ad:f0:24:ec:9e:a7:fd:d4:ea:e1:54:dc:31: + 1c:62:8c:29:0b:7a:56:6e:f7:b4:87:92:3e:ff:d5:40:4b:24: + a1:68:6e:ee:9c:35:65:a1:3f:8e:f3:8b:9b:18:b1:03:ed:fb: + 50:2e:a3:23:d1:93:1d:d6:82:0a:10:6f:34:be:d6:3a:bd:76: + 8c:44:0e:ad:a7:2a:c4:8e:8d:c4:e4:8d:51:d8:26:b7:38:89: + d1:23:a0:23:88:76:fa:f1:27:91:57:3e:b2:0f:cf:73:53:db: + 20:40:5d:82:b9:e9:bc:a2:94:09:57:fb:85:0d:56:4b:dc:19: + 65:12:2f:6d:6a:3b:be:35:1f:d4:52:ea:e4:72:36:f9:fe:cb: + d4:1b:0f:e3:0e:88:7c:68:58:28:c3:06:5f:bd:d2:f9:2e:1a: + 30:f0:63:65:2d:55:e1:a4:fd:97:cf:ff:c0:52:22:1c:24:a3: + 6e:de:7a:c9:9d:75:d2:d0:82:b0:7f:6f:db:21:01:69:f0:54: + 76:04:19:68:2c:22:72:dd:3b:0d:04:d5:ad:5a:80:30:68:90: + 6e:c2:27:f4:28:af:1b:78:f6:0a:70:74:5c:3a:61:42:f5:63: + 7c:83:12:5a:1b:43:bc:d4:1b:28:b5:ef:98:c5:14:04:42:80: + dd:54:30:a4 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIC0zCCAbugAwIBAgIJANZ4pOPn08WpMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMFExEjAQBgNV +BAoMCVJILUlNQS1DQTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOUmVkIEhhdCBJTUEgQ0ExIjAgBgkqhkiG +9w0BCQEWE3NlY2FsZXJ0QHJlZGhhdC5jb20wHhcNMjMwNzAxMTYxNDA0WhcNMzgw 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+1,70 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: + d6:78:a4:e3:e7:d3:c5:ab + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: O = RH-IMA-CA, CN = Red Hat IMA CA, emailAddress = secalert@redhat.com + Validity + Not Before: Jul 1 16:14:51 2023 GMT + Not After : Jan 18 16:14:51 2038 GMT + Subject: CN = CentOS IMA release key (for verification) + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey + Public-Key: (384 bit) + pub: + 04:d4:d0:31:08:09:0d:97:d0:5c:c8:49:ff:90:f4: + 3a:16:85:a3:73:a1:d9:c4:28:4c:f7:aa:a8:22:c2: + cf:0e:8b:d7:9a:ed:e6:f0:89:f8:85:95:72:c3:38: + 27:2a:29:97:6a:6b:2b:01:04:a3:32:ba:f4:75:f9: + e4:c8:48:2f:f5:36:69:44:27:f9:35:b3:0c:c3:22: + 24:67:51:06:d3:73:f1:56:94:20:a8:8c:82:34:c0: + 10:ef:ce:f9:b4:7a:42 + ASN1 OID: secp384r1 + NIST CURVE: P-384 + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:FALSE + X509v3 Key Usage: critical + Digital Signature + X509v3 Extended Key Usage: critical + Code Signing + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 54:E5:A3:4F:16:2B:32:B7:77:FF:E3:4F:1E:8B:66:12:7C:43:5B:B5 + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + FB:31:82:5D:D0:E0:73:68:5B:26:4E:30:38:96:36:73:F7:53:95:9A + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Signature Value: + c6:1d:92:0e:92:40:d6:ae:a5:5d:4e:5d:2a:e1:0f:92:42:20: + 89:e1:a9:82:87:35:42:c9:7f:77:dd:19:e3:cf:ef:be:8b:39: + 4f:99:2e:cd:cc:a3:18:23:7f:81:4b:7d:63:5d:71:b4:4b:9c: + ea:dc:2f:1d:16:da:4c:ed:98:bf:df:88:11:d0:8b:af:01:55: + 71:05:fe:d7:ac:78:4e:46:de:48:9f:04:74:42:c2:c8:1a:fc: + c5:46:6a:99:3e:9a:b0:e4:04:07:48:e2:4c:65:e5:01:a8:ad: + 3c:8d:c0:ca:c5:73:23:36:88:27:54:8b:90:f8:ea:55:fc:eb: + b8:69:a5:8b:a0:1d:8b:f1:93:dd:71:9e:e9:88:f0:2d:0e:7d: + 86:a4:8d:0b:fd:00:c9:c0:73:aa:b1:65:b1:60:6e:a4:09:1b: + 3e:30:d9:62:2a:15:d6:50:2a:6a:fd:24:e7:8c:93:78:4a:28: + d5:b1:d9:ba:1b:8d:ef:48:0d:f4:8c:79:90:0f:95:8d:79:39: + 8d:41:a5:fc:6f:e4:ef:5c:ee:3b:f4:c3:2c:c3:a0:b7:61:ac: + 7e:e9:eb:a0:3a:ba:05:2c:bd:aa:a9:1f:c5:b9:ee:72:f6:c4: + 54:1f:71:3b:e1:70:1a:30:f4:04:18:50:60:c4:5a:da:93:cd: + b6:f6:67:c8 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIC0jCCAbqgAwIBAgIJANZ4pOPn08WrMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMFExEjAQBgNV +BAoMCVJILUlNQS1DQTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOUmVkIEhhdCBJTUEgQ0ExIjAgBgkqhkiG +9w0BCQEWE3NlY2FsZXJ0QHJlZGhhdC5jb20wHhcNMjMwNzAxMTYxNDUxWhcNMzgw +MTE4MTYxNDUxWjA0MTIwMAYDVQQDDClDZW50T1MgSU1BIHJlbGVhc2Uga2V5IChm +b3IgdmVyaWZpY2F0aW9uKTB2MBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiA2IABNTQMQgJDZfQ +XMhJ/5D0OhaFo3Oh2cQoTPeqqCLCzw6L15rt5vCJ+IWVcsM4Jyopl2prKwEEozK6 +9HX55MhIL/U2aUQn+TWzDMMiJGdRBtNz8VaUIKiMgjTAEO/O+bR6QqN4MHYwDAYD +VR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwFgYDVR0lAQH/BAwwCgYIKwYBBQUH +AwMwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFTlo08WKzK3d//jTx6LZhJ8Q1u1MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFPsx +gl3Q4HNoWyZOMDiWNnP3U5WaMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQDGHZIOkkDWrqVd +Tl0q4Q+SQiCJ4amChzVCyX933Rnjz+++izlPmS7NzKMYI3+BS31jXXG0S5zq3C8d +FtpM7Zi/34gR0IuvAVVxBf7XrHhORt5InwR0QsLIGvzFRmqZPpqw5AQHSOJMZeUB +qK08jcDKxXMjNognVIuQ+OpV/Ou4aaWLoB2L8ZPdcZ7piPAtDn2GpI0L/QDJwHOq +sWWxYG6kCRs+MNliKhXWUCpq/STnjJN4SijVsdm6G43vSA30jHmQD5WNeTmNQaX8 +b+TvXO479MMsw6C3Yax+6eugOroFLL2qqR/Fue5y9sRUH3E74XAaMPQEGFBgxFra +k8229mfI +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/SOURCES/rhelimaca1.pem b/SOURCES/rhelimaca1.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000..704553d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/rhelimaca1.pem @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: + aa:05:bd:59:88:e4:fe:ba + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: O = RH-IMA-CA, CN = Red Hat IMA CA, emailAddress = secalert@redhat.com + Validity + Not Before: Jul 1 15:22:50 2023 GMT + Not After : Jan 18 15:22:50 2038 GMT + Subject: O = RH-IMA-CA, CN = Red Hat IMA CA, emailAddress = secalert@redhat.com + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + Public-Key: (2048 bit) + Modulus: + 00:ca:74:5e:05:ee:bd:00:33:4a:49:92:6d:b9:2e: + 4b:1a:b5:3d:05:49:68:50:70:9e:39:28:a0:58:87: + 55:b7:b0:54:8e:21:cc:1a:b3:0f:1c:bc:11:76:1c: + 9a:0f:de:56:97:79:41:83:2d:5d:c6:b8:32:36:dd: + 20:f4:0f:b1:28:9a:e7:fd:ff:27:cd:f6:57:30:0d: + b1:dd:4c:2f:71:be:49:d1:57:06:5a:6d:4b:59:ca: + 87:fb:25:0d:ac:f1:41:c7:8e:10:e8:18:8b:40:ae: + c3:fe:1f:9a:0d:da:ee:4f:6d:da:f2:c0:27:f8:cb: + ae:6e:84:bb:49:b8:9a:e2:c2:9d:de:81:e9:e2:d6: + 03:6f:ee:eb:17:b3:2d:da:50:51:1e:da:f6:12:54: + f7:89:c3:bc:5a:90:fb:1d:ba:21:a4:25:07:87:3e: + d4:12:c1:d6:f8:3f:c1:80:65:c0:15:81:6a:51:92: + 36:af:63:39:7a:83:4e:48:3e:19:5d:a5:a3:48:e1: + 7c:5c:ff:e3:ed:bb:59:7b:c3:93:5d:d5:1f:c2:97: + df:6d:c5:ff:73:c3:66:64:4b:0f:6c:72:43:e2:65: + 60:03:38:b8:c0:51:b6:ae:5a:f8:8e:f9:c2:8f:55: + 9c:d0:d2:db:94:ac:75:c8:0f:85:49:b1:96:82:01: + 4b:67 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:TRUE + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + FB:31:82:5D:D0:E0:73:68:5B:26:4E:30:38:96:36:73:F7:53:95:9A + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + FB:31:82:5D:D0:E0:73:68:5B:26:4E:30:38:96:36:73:F7:53:95:9A + X509v3 Key Usage: critical + Certificate Sign, CRL Sign + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Signature Value: + 52:71:86:bc:05:f4:08:dc:0b:8b:b2:b6:95:a9:04:a3:f8:19: + e9:0a:a9:6d:4b:b7:1e:f5:7d:ff:d8:1a:0b:4f:1e:cb:07:94: + 09:b0:93:16:3d:20:61:03:5b:15:b9:60:f0:c1:5f:28:70:59: + b5:59:de:c1:1e:76:92:1c:bb:43:d9:53:ae:2b:ad:7c:09:20: + 7a:ac:29:b8:1e:17:48:b6:54:d4:11:60:72:2b:44:3e:2e:f2: + 48:35:73:05:81:51:5e:b5:0c:a5:cc:35:15:de:29:1b:f0:75: + 4e:af:b8:46:51:96:98:6a:ac:75:08:d8:90:5d:d0:1a:eb:a3: + 95:58:d2:8b:03:bf:f2:37:fc:85:20:49:7c:f6:16:67:31:eb: + 40:11:65:94:1a:cf:9e:6e:6d:f0:83:17:84:63:05:e5:08:97: + 31:dc:e2:75:46:52:8b:a9:57:95:0f:41:df:37:1e:fa:18:35: + 19:57:23:0a:c1:fa:79:da:62:85:85:7c:68:c1:bb:6f:78:96: + 02:8c:0e:be:53:fb:97:15:d3:bb:d7:fe:90:99:6f:0e:c1:5d: + 3a:ec:ac:07:b5:69:e9:86:04:25:29:36:9f:48:e0:3d:a1:aa: + 8c:71:66:85:30:f3:2e:e6:cb:91:8e:76:24:ab:4e:3e:2d:de: + 5a:d1:43:c6 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDiDCCAnCgAwIBAgIJAKoFvVmI5P66MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMFExEjAQBgNV +BAoMCVJILUlNQS1DQTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOUmVkIEhhdCBJTUEgQ0ExIjAgBgkqhkiG +9w0BCQEWE3NlY2FsZXJ0QHJlZGhhdC5jb20wHhcNMjMwNzAxMTUyMjUwWhcNMzgw +MTE4MTUyMjUwWjBRMRIwEAYDVQQKDAlSSC1JTUEtQ0ExFzAVBgNVBAMMDlJlZCBI +YXQgSU1BIENBMSIwIAYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhNzZWNhbGVydEByZWRoYXQuY29tMIIB +IjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAynReBe69ADNKSZJtuS5LGrU9 +BUloUHCeOSigWIdVt7BUjiHMGrMPHLwRdhyaD95Wl3lBgy1dxrgyNt0g9A+xKJrn +/f8nzfZXMA2x3Uwvcb5J0VcGWm1LWcqH+yUNrPFBx44Q6BiLQK7D/h+aDdruT23a +8sAn+MuuboS7Sbia4sKd3oHp4tYDb+7rF7Mt2lBRHtr2ElT3icO8WpD7HbohpCUH +hz7UEsHW+D/BgGXAFYFqUZI2r2M5eoNOSD4ZXaWjSOF8XP/j7btZe8OTXdUfwpff +bcX/c8NmZEsPbHJD4mVgAzi4wFG2rlr4jvnCj1Wc0NLblKx1yA+FSbGWggFLZwID +AQABo2MwYTAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQWBBT7MYJd0OBzaFsmTjA4 +ljZz91OVmjAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBT7MYJd0OBzaFsmTjA4ljZz91OVmjAOBgNVHQ8B +Af8EBAMCAQYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAFJxhrwF9AjcC4uytpWpBKP4GekK +qW1Ltx71ff/YGgtPHssHlAmwkxY9IGEDWxW5YPDBXyhwWbVZ3sEedpIcu0PZU64r +rXwJIHqsKbgeF0i2VNQRYHIrRD4u8kg1cwWBUV61DKXMNRXeKRvwdU6vuEZRlphq +rHUI2JBd0Brro5VY0osDv/I3/IUgSXz2Fmcx60ARZZQaz55ubfCDF4RjBeUIlzHc +4nVGUoupV5UPQd83HvoYNRlXIwrB+nnaYoWFfGjBu294lgKMDr5T+5cV07vX/pCZ +bw7BXTrsrAe1aemGBCUpNp9I4D2hqoxxZoUw8y7my5GOdiSrTj4t3lrRQ8Y= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/SOURCES/rhelkpatch1.pem b/SOURCES/rhelkpatch1.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71f2837 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/rhelkpatch1.pem @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: + 91:5d:16:42:f6:60:09:e4 + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: CN = Red Hat Enterprise Linux kpatch signing key, emailAddress = secalert@redhat.com + Validity + Not Before: Mar 31 08:34:47 2014 GMT + Not After : Mar 25 08:34:47 2037 GMT + Subject: CN = Red Hat Enterprise Linux kpatch signing key, emailAddress = secalert@redhat.com + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + Public-Key: (3072 bit) + Modulus: + 00:a6:ad:de:2d:77:ee:76:a9:29:30:fc:f2:b7:11: + ac:41:94:72:68:52:6b:08:54:68:8a:c7:0a:a5:b2: + 10:b6:b4:83:6f:3c:ff:4f:fe:9b:1e:a6:e4:a7:78: + 78:7a:d1:06:30:b2:2c:f5:b3:68:1a:1d:28:b9:24: + 4f:75:aa:e2:76:00:8b:dd:06:e3:24:52:a5:14:e2: + 42:17:17:4f:01:5a:6a:97:bf:60:08:ad:e0:17:60: + 20:bc:59:11:e2:87:3d:6c:c7:b8:8a:f1:44:87:09: + 13:71:fd:76:7d:ef:e5:2b:ca:78:61:4d:16:8e:68: + e0:0a:85:d2:e3:de:37:e1:d1:e6:d8:a0:f7:30:d3: + 62:fa:c4:20:81:97:9a:d7:c2:4e:a2:49:80:00:d0: + 6d:ac:c6:3e:99:5a:48:70:cf:5b:52:e5:8c:88:51: + 02:89:0f:0a:3f:b8:12:85:1a:cb:2f:72:32:97:ce: + fa:fe:04:47:f6:1d:81:4a:01:65:8f:17:20:20:6d: + c5:16:91:be:cb:92:cc:ad:1f:a6:d6:2c:8e:d9:48: + 58:7d:8d:fe:08:a7:54:f4:c3:a5:e6:ae:25:da:e7: + 7b:b1:20:06:3b:6c:b7:91:e5:93:41:95:95:bf:9a: + cc:5c:20:4f:0b:96:55:90:fe:40:5c:99:59:fe:0e: + 1b:fa:b7:78:b5:dd:b7:ff:d0:49:97:e8:bf:5a:34: + d2:02:05:90:36:c5:c9:2e:8d:27:1d:5c:7b:97:fc: + ca:22:b4:01:00:36:7c:6d:0f:a6:35:0e:34:3f:07: + 59:8a:39:09:77:47:09:6f:0a:45:e4:e2:e6:0c:99: + f3:01:c8:3d:d8:f9:2e:f5:fa:2c:61:a1:6a:58:43: + 06:72:84:b0:a4:bb:5a:8c:2c:27:b6:2d:e2:b8:13: + f0:15:69:f7:23:05:4f:23:5c:df:95:7a:06:a4:98: + bb:39:34:c7:eb:01:61:a8:c4:7c:cc:0d:fb:56:8d: + 1a:da:e1:94:c5:a7:e9:28:1a:35 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:FALSE + X509v3 Key Usage: + Digital Signature + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 4D:38:FD:86:4E:BE:18:C5:F0:B7:2E:38:52:E2:01:4C:3A:67:6F:C8 + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + 4D:38:FD:86:4E:BE:18:C5:F0:B7:2E:38:52:E2:01:4C:3A:67:6F:C8 + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Signature Value: + 17:d2:03:8c:49:cd:13:e9:2b:99:91:c9:0f:46:1d:91:5c:a9: + ef:17:46:3f:ee:d1:05:10:72:90:09:55:1b:94:a6:c8:34:8d: + 89:fb:96:cf:b5:7b:08:38:ba:77:6b:e5:69:d7:1e:71:ea:ad: + 34:e5:b3:1f:1d:cb:d7:c7:6d:f6:45:a8:c0:74:79:2d:ca:e5: + 06:af:3e:b7:40:af:66:98:81:e0:45:d5:04:f3:a6:2b:ff:55: + b1:4e:6d:29:da:ea:a5:ab:27:82:9c:d7:78:6e:56:4d:82:b0: + 6d:de:bf:60:e9:5a:a7:c4:8d:8b:c3:6a:f0:c5:8c:f3:ce:2f: + 6e:3f:d9:7f:8d:ce:9e:8e:6f:9c:95:79:dc:95:9f:b2:10:97: + 57:ae:3b:6b:e0:72:18:32:cb:b2:08:8b:34:cb:f0:51:db:ea: + 07:96:32:a0:0b:79:d4:f7:63:99:c9:77:58:71:6e:77:03:e9: + 7d:52:90:d2:26:a2:6d:0a:11:32:29:84:b0:2c:52:d9:fe:6b: + d9:6a:9c:aa:49:4c:87:6a:8b:5b:84:51:f7:9f:23:2a:b9:f8: + 9c:eb:ff:9d:ff:8d:23:09:00:df:77:f8:e3:17:8d:06:35:bc: + 7e:8f:bf:a6:23:b5:51:2b:c7:5f:2d:77:13:43:47:8f:62:40: + a7:9c:9f:ab:34:3a:87:96:83:de:00:a7:60:4b:09:60:49:ab: + 39:f1:d5:a2:3f:ce:77:5e:19:d5:19:81:8b:0c:71:01:5d:e7: + 2f:99:d4:16:b4:05:3d:56:c1:90:cb:de:4b:0d:c7:d5:0b:9e: + 4b:95:74:35:cb:6b:1e:0e:1f:15:39:74:f8:6c:25:e5:de:d6: + f4:e6:6f:98:a5:df:83:44:97:ee:2e:f6:f8:fc:ba:43:69:9c: + 03:2d:96:ff:c6:5a:32:1c:b1:99:fe:aa:ec:e6:04:5e:21:c5: + ef:10:e4:bd:95:d7:0b:42:5d:90:d0:56:1e:32:f3:44:16:be: + ad:9a:f8:c9:0c:b6 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIElDCCAvygAwIBAgIJAJFdFkL2YAnkMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMFoxNDAyBgNV +BAMTK1JlZCBIYXQgRW50ZXJwcmlzZSBMaW51eCBrcGF0Y2ggc2lnbmluZyBrZXkx +IjAgBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWE3NlY2FsZXJ0QHJlZGhhdC5jb20wHhcNMTQwMzMxMDgz +NDQ3WhcNMzcwMzI1MDgzNDQ3WjBaMTQwMgYDVQQDEytSZWQgSGF0IEVudGVycHJp +c2UgTGludXgga3BhdGNoIHNpZ25pbmcga2V5MSIwIAYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhNzZWNh +bGVydEByZWRoYXQuY29tMIIBojANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAY8AMIIBigKCAYEA +pq3eLXfudqkpMPzytxGsQZRyaFJrCFRoiscKpbIQtrSDbzz/T/6bHqbkp3h4etEG +MLIs9bNoGh0ouSRPdaridgCL3QbjJFKlFOJCFxdPAVpql79gCK3gF2AgvFkR4oc9 +bMe4ivFEhwkTcf12fe/lK8p4YU0WjmjgCoXS49434dHm2KD3MNNi+sQggZea18JO +okmAANBtrMY+mVpIcM9bUuWMiFECiQ8KP7gShRrLL3Iyl876/gRH9h2BSgFljxcg +IG3FFpG+y5LMrR+m1iyO2UhYfY3+CKdU9MOl5q4l2ud7sSAGO2y3keWTQZWVv5rM +XCBPC5ZVkP5AXJlZ/g4b+rd4td23/9BJl+i/WjTSAgWQNsXJLo0nHVx7l/zKIrQB +ADZ8bQ+mNQ40PwdZijkJd0cJbwpF5OLmDJnzAcg92Pku9fosYaFqWEMGcoSwpLta +jCwnti3iuBPwFWn3IwVPI1zflXoGpJi7OTTH6wFhqMR8zA37Vo0a2uGUxafpKBo1 +AgMBAAGjXTBbMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwCwYDVR0PBAQDAgeAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRN +OP2GTr4YxfC3LjhS4gFMOmdvyDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRNOP2GTr4YxfC3LjhS4gFM +OmdvyDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAYEAF9IDjEnNE+krmZHJD0YdkVyp7xdGP+7R +BRBykAlVG5SmyDSNifuWz7V7CDi6d2vladceceqtNOWzHx3L18dt9kWowHR5Lcrl +Bq8+t0CvZpiB4EXVBPOmK/9VsU5tKdrqpasngpzXeG5WTYKwbd6/YOlap8SNi8Nq +8MWM884vbj/Zf43Ono5vnJV53JWfshCXV647a+ByGDLLsgiLNMvwUdvqB5YyoAt5 +1Pdjmcl3WHFudwPpfVKQ0iaibQoRMimEsCxS2f5r2WqcqklMh2qLW4RR958jKrn4 +nOv/nf+NIwkA33f44xeNBjW8fo+/piO1USvHXy13E0NHj2JAp5yfqzQ6h5aD3gCn +YEsJYEmrOfHVoj/Od14Z1RmBiwxxAV3nL5nUFrQFPVbBkMveSw3H1QueS5V0Nctr +Hg4fFTl0+Gwl5d7W9OZvmKXfg0SX7i72+Py6Q2mcAy2W/8ZaMhyxmf6q7OYEXiHF +7xDkvZXXC0JdkNBWHjLzRBa+rZr4yQy2 +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/SOURCES/spheresecureboot001.pem b/SOURCES/spheresecureboot001.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be2ee29 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/spheresecureboot001.pem @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: + 08:60:56:42:47:85:4c:fe:ba:bd:cb:99:d3:6b:c4:a8 + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: OU = MSVSphere Certification Authority, emailAddress = security@msvsphere.ru, L = Moscow, ST = Moscow, C = RU, O = NCSD LLC, CN = MSVSphere Secure Boot CA + Validity + Not Before: Mar 22 16:42:54 2023 GMT + Not After : Mar 22 16:42:54 2053 GMT + Subject: OU = MSVSphere Certification Authority, emailAddress = security@msvsphere.ru, L = Moscow, ST = Moscow, C = RU, O = NCSD LLC, CN = MSVSphere Secure Boot Signing + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + Public-Key: (2048 bit) + Modulus: + 00:d4:66:e0:18:8a:79:c1:61:3b:f7:48:c6:41:86: + 21:82:a4:00:59:e7:61:10:75:c5:fd:34:14:e1:44: + 86:bc:12:87:6d:9e:5c:f6:54:65:8f:31:c4:a3:62: + 65:15:40:70:f5:f2:cf:09:52:ca:c7:94:51:62:d0: + fb:fc:1e:3d:21:7e:a8:10:40:9d:c1:8c:f9:0b:89: + 41:0c:5a:7e:2c:bd:cc:15:aa:6c:28:4b:94:03:a0: + 3f:16:5b:e5:b3:c7:05:3a:a7:f4:08:3f:18:d5:2d: + a5:13:57:97:e7:0a:00:7e:59:43:73:c5:9c:e4:4d: + dc:c6:ad:8b:37:6b:b9:78:62:4c:11:49:4e:ad:30: + 9c:3d:89:59:0e:a4:41:12:d8:fb:31:22:3c:57:75: + ee:a5:45:55:d6:dc:4b:96:1c:f5:a9:95:9d:09:76: + 48:3b:15:5a:02:e6:23:2b:62:d7:51:f5:67:3a:32: + d4:b8:21:b5:3c:34:82:5c:2b:70:52:32:cd:17:39: + 78:fd:a0:d8:99:d0:62:68:4b:b9:b3:8d:fd:f4:2e: + 34:5f:d8:48:c9:66:f5:91:cf:ee:34:87:68:a8:ca: + ae:da:35:45:5c:4c:a9:40:f0:e1:a2:bd:33:88:8c: + 53:8a:cd:63:95:05:5d:48:1d:ce:ce:cb:cb:bb:7e: + cb:5d + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + 49:59:67:B5:13:6C:C8:DF:7E:64:B9:22:E3:A9:35:50:6B:95:84:D5 + X509v3 Extended Key Usage: + Code Signing + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:FALSE + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + E9:5A:22:76:4E:CE:34:C9:69:BD:42:5C:7C:6A:9F:5A:BE:AC:97:50 + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Signature Value: + 4b:5a:c8:7a:83:75:c0:02:e0:08:15:dd:e0:f6:0f:33:3c:8f: + 84:d7:04:39:13:05:99:3d:5b:da:c3:45:d2:1d:2c:7a:1f:fd: + 8c:ae:75:71:23:0a:11:43:a1:1c:90:83:70:a3:02:93:c9:27: + 6b:dd:eb:2b:56:c5:7c:fb:8c:71:b3:e9:83:c8:a3:99:9d:9c: + d2:c1:2b:15:f3:c5:6e:22:30:e6:63:4f:50:1b:d0:f8:3b:e8: + c1:3f:9c:d0:a7:59:f5:5c:68:ce:2e:ae:79:94:8f:14:47:1c: + 92:0c:72:3a:7f:fa:85:39:a1:9a:19:32:ab:7a:0a:4f:fe:ae: + bc:af:0c:5a:f0:0d:f2:ea:49:f6:53:4d:e1:aa:d7:2e:1e:aa: + e6:c8:5e:3c:91:b0:59:6d:e8:60:f7:af:34:47:c6:50:5b:90: + 92:46:15:02:c4:d3:ed:3f:d2:c3:05:6e:78:cd:9b:84:b1:43: + 84:d2:4a:9d:8e:db:d4:a9:90:5c:b8:8e:78:a0:5f:00:dd:b3: + f5:98:29:72:58:ab:99:5e:c8:ba:7f:21:72:ba:a3:c4:31:aa: + e7:b3:cd:02:aa:ae:54:77:4f:9c:73:68:60:a6:af:c4:b3:7a: + 6e:64:94:9e:01:1b:c0:f9:b8:f1:5c:fd:de:cb:00:d7:ed:4d: + 46:a9:4c:1f +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIEZjCCA06gAwIBAgIQCGBWQkeFTP66vcuZ02vEqDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCB +tzEqMCgGA1UECxMhTVNWU3BoZXJlIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MSQw +IgYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhVzZWN1cml0eUBtc3ZzcGhlcmUucnUxDzANBgNVBAcTBk1v +c2NvdzEPMA0GA1UECBMGTW9zY293MQswCQYDVQQGEwJSVTERMA8GA1UEChMITkNT +RCBMTEMxITAfBgNVBAMTGE1TVlNwaGVyZSBTZWN1cmUgQm9vdCBDQTAgFw0yMzAz +MjIxNjQyNTRaGA8yMDUzMDMyMjE2NDI1NFowgbwxKjAoBgNVBAsTIU1TVlNwaGVy +ZSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTEkMCIGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYVc2VjdXJp +dHlAbXN2c3BoZXJlLnJ1MQ8wDQYDVQQHEwZNb3Njb3cxDzANBgNVBAgTBk1vc2Nv +dzELMAkGA1UEBhMCUlUxETAPBgNVBAoTCE5DU0QgTExDMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1NU1ZT +cGhlcmUgU2VjdXJlIEJvb3QgU2lnbmluZzCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEP +ADCCAQoCggEBANRm4BiKecFhO/dIxkGGIYKkAFnnYRB1xf00FOFEhrwSh22eXPZU +ZY8xxKNiZRVAcPXyzwlSyseUUWLQ+/wePSF+qBBAncGM+QuJQQxafiy9zBWqbChL +lAOgPxZb5bPHBTqn9Ag/GNUtpRNXl+cKAH5ZQ3PFnORN3MatizdruXhiTBFJTq0w +nD2JWQ6kQRLY+zEiPFd17qVFVdbcS5Yc9amVnQl2SDsVWgLmIyti11H1Zzoy1Lgh +tTw0glwrcFIyzRc5eP2g2JnQYmhLubON/fQuNF/YSMlm9ZHP7jSHaKjKrto1RVxM +qUDw4aK9M4iMU4rNY5UFXUgdzs7Ly7t+y10CAwEAAaNlMGMwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU +SVlntRNsyN9+ZLki46k1UGuVhNUwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwMwDAYDVR0T +AQH/BAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU6Voidk7ONMlpvUJcfGqfWr6sl1AwDQYJKoZIhvcN +AQELBQADggEBAEtayHqDdcAC4AgV3eD2DzM8j4TXBDkTBZk9W9rDRdIdLHof/Yyu +dXEjChFDoRyQg3CjApPJJ2vd6ytWxXz7jHGz6YPIo5mdnNLBKxXzxW4iMOZjT1Ab +0Pg76ME/nNCnWfVcaM4urnmUjxRHHJIMcjp/+oU5oZoZMqt6Ck/+rryvDFrwDfLq +SfZTTeGq1y4equbIXjyRsFlt6GD3rzRHxlBbkJJGFQLE0+0/0sMFbnjNm4SxQ4TS +Sp2O29SpkFy4jnigXwDds/WYKXJYq5leyLp/IXK6o8QxquezzQKqrlR3T5xzaGCm +r8Szem5klJ4BG8D5uPFc/d7LANftTUapTB8= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/SOURCES/spheresecurebootca.pem b/SOURCES/spheresecurebootca.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ad9f486 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/spheresecurebootca.pem @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: + 86:2f:3e:4c:b2:26:42:00:b8:3a:f1:25:79:9e:4e:41 + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: OU = MSVSphere Certification Authority, emailAddress = security@msvsphere.ru, L = Moscow, ST = Moscow, C = RU, O = NCSD LLC, CN = MSVSphere Secure Boot CA + Validity + Not Before: Mar 22 16:42:54 2023 GMT + Not After : Mar 22 16:42:54 2053 GMT + Subject: OU = MSVSphere Certification Authority, emailAddress = security@msvsphere.ru, L = Moscow, ST = Moscow, C = RU, O = NCSD LLC, CN = MSVSphere Secure Boot CA + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + Public-Key: (2048 bit) + Modulus: + 00:cc:19:da:af:e7:7c:fa:a6:b7:3e:9d:83:8c:70: + 30:53:96:9c:94:94:2f:92:0d:b7:d0:ae:ee:6a:2e: + 06:0b:2f:0a:43:a9:a2:ba:63:1d:f7:7d:7b:8e:b2: + cd:f4:4b:1f:e7:8a:41:b2:4c:82:cb:b0:40:aa:fa: + 03:71:63:5a:b7:5b:d0:01:37:4f:88:4d:6e:a4:dd: + af:e0:87:ce:95:86:6e:5f:a9:cf:90:23:7c:1e:b4: + 73:28:13:40:4d:95:07:ef:46:cf:c5:41:e6:5d:a7: + e1:56:6f:30:8d:73:a6:4b:f7:57:09:01:af:98:c4: + ee:d8:62:b0:aa:d9:be:6b:d3:58:17:9d:01:14:e8: + 7c:59:f1:64:de:4b:b9:e1:71:0c:ef:13:0e:9e:d9: + f8:f9:60:62:96:0e:4c:fa:5f:0b:5c:e2:f4:9d:7f: + 49:24:3c:f4:c8:0d:14:2b:cb:1f:b1:92:dc:88:a8: + e2:c7:86:21:c9:50:a9:9b:12:3f:dc:17:06:42:56: + c0:6f:98:26:06:e1:19:3d:de:cf:a2:c8:b1:f7:80: + 86:3e:f7:33:d1:ca:f8:98:fd:3f:e0:03:10:25:b8: + 7f:5e:7c:cb:16:ed:e7:29:6d:9b:55:75:6d:aa:8f: + 95:19:ca:86:49:41:e1:ba:22:c1:86:a2:28:72:f8: + 9a:79 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + 49:59:67:B5:13:6C:C8:DF:7E:64:B9:22:E3:A9:35:50:6B:95:84:D5 + X509v3 Key Usage: critical + Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:TRUE + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 49:59:67:B5:13:6C:C8:DF:7E:64:B9:22:E3:A9:35:50:6B:95:84:D5 + Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption + Signature Value: + 7b:50:33:73:3e:5f:6c:b9:1c:27:4f:68:cb:57:38:7a:f7:57: + c3:6c:cb:c1:5e:7a:3b:a6:d0:b1:b1:c9:7d:19:f1:40:3f:09: + 24:fb:f2:08:a7:bb:94:40:4d:5d:cd:70:26:1f:d9:9f:9d:b7: + 6e:7d:8c:bc:aa:7f:8a:be:42:c0:8c:db:82:6b:ad:08:38:2b: + b1:a1:c4:8c:f4:08:b9:eb:7d:e8:a1:df:03:47:e5:1e:4b:95: + 4f:4f:a4:05:42:bd:9c:6f:f0:bd:ed:4f:bf:f7:d4:ad:a5:ef: + 6e:1c:ad:9e:66:dd:4d:eb:3e:b4:d0:e0:39:2b:9d:72:8c:c0: + a8:8e:82:cd:23:f4:47:63:51:78:4a:cd:e8:54:47:09:a1:cd: + ef:b7:bf:c5:30:e6:24:0e:c3:f5:65:4b:59:ff:74:86:13:06: + a9:2a:2a:38:bd:05:4a:f7:12:eb:da:ed:e1:a1:7b:24:b2:53: + 22:c9:49:a5:57:e0:2c:89:fe:62:95:b2:8c:4a:07:8d:c8:b1: + d2:22:8f:09:bd:a9:4e:01:88:cd:54:93:7c:22:98:51:a2:c4: + d5:f9:60:8d:2f:b8:b3:0d:01:47:c0:b0:34:01:12:c0:c3:46: + 6b:4a:fc:6a:71:97:73:64:80:f9:82:ee:bd:6e:00:8d:cf:55: + f7:7d:d2:e6 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIEYDCCA0igAwIBAgIRAIYvPkyyJkIAuDrxJXmeTkEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw +gbcxKjAoBgNVBAsTIU1TVlNwaGVyZSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTEk +MCIGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYVc2VjdXJpdHlAbXN2c3BoZXJlLnJ1MQ8wDQYDVQQHEwZN +b3Njb3cxDzANBgNVBAgTBk1vc2NvdzELMAkGA1UEBhMCUlUxETAPBgNVBAoTCE5D +U0QgTExDMSEwHwYDVQQDExhNU1ZTcGhlcmUgU2VjdXJlIEJvb3QgQ0EwIBcNMjMw +MzIyMTY0MjU0WhgPMjA1MzAzMjIxNjQyNTRaMIG3MSowKAYDVQQLEyFNU1ZTcGhl +cmUgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkxJDAiBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWFXNlY3Vy +aXR5QG1zdnNwaGVyZS5ydTEPMA0GA1UEBxMGTW9zY293MQ8wDQYDVQQIEwZNb3Nj +b3cxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlJVMREwDwYDVQQKEwhOQ1NEIExMQzEhMB8GA1UEAxMYTVNW +U3BoZXJlIFNlY3VyZSBCb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIB +CgKCAQEAzBnar+d8+qa3Pp2DjHAwU5aclJQvkg230K7uai4GCy8KQ6miumMd9317 +jrLN9Esf54pBskyCy7BAqvoDcWNat1vQATdPiE1upN2v4IfOlYZuX6nPkCN8HrRz +KBNATZUH70bPxUHmXafhVm8wjXOmS/dXCQGvmMTu2GKwqtm+a9NYF50BFOh8WfFk +3ku54XEM7xMOntn4+WBilg5M+l8LXOL0nX9JJDz0yA0UK8sfsZLciKjix4YhyVCp +mxI/3BcGQlbAb5gmBuEZPd7Posix94CGPvcz0cr4mP0/4AMQJbh/XnzLFu3nKW2b +VXVtqo+VGcqGSUHhuiLBhqIocviaeQIDAQABo2MwYTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRJWWe1 +E2zI335kuSLjqTVQa5WE1TAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAYYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB +/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUSVlntRNsyN9+ZLki46k1UGuVhNUwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAD +ggEBAHtQM3M+X2y5HCdPaMtXOHr3V8Nsy8Feejum0LGxyX0Z8UA/CST78ginu5RA +TV3NcCYf2Z+dt259jLyqf4q+QsCM24JrrQg4K7GhxIz0CLnrfeih3wNH5R5LlU9P +pAVCvZxv8L3tT7/31K2l724crZ5m3U3rPrTQ4DkrnXKMwKiOgs0j9EdjUXhKzehU +Rwmhze+3v8Uw5iQOw/VlS1n/dIYTBqkqKji9BUr3Euva7eGheySyUyLJSaVX4CyJ +/mKVsoxKB43IsdIijwm9qU4BiM1Uk3wimFGixNX5YI0vuLMNAUfAsDQBEsDDRmtK +/Gpxl3NkgPmC7r1uAI3PVfd90uY= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/SPECS/edk2.spec b/SPECS/edk2.spec new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ecdc4a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/SPECS/edk2.spec @@ -0,0 +1,1559 @@ +ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64 + +# edk2-stable202405 +%define GITDATE 20240524 +%define GITCOMMIT 3e722403cd +%define TOOLCHAIN GCC + +%define OPENSSL_VER 3.0.7 +%define OPENSSL_HASH 8e5beb77088bfec064d60506b1e76ddb0ac417fe + +%define DBXDATE 20230509 + +%define build_ovmf 0 +%define build_aarch64 0 +%ifarch x86_64 + %define build_ovmf 1 +%endif +%ifarch aarch64 + %define build_aarch64 1 +%endif + +Name: edk2 +Version: %{GITDATE} +Release: 5%{?dist}.inferit.1 +Summary: UEFI firmware for 64-bit virtual machines +License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent and Apache-2.0 and MIT +URL: http://www.tianocore.org + +# The source tarball is created using following commands: +# COMMIT=ba91d0292e +# git archive --format=tar --prefix=edk2-$COMMIT/ $COMMIT \ +# | xz -9ev >/tmp/edk2-$COMMIT.tar.xz +Source0: edk2-%{GITCOMMIT}.tar.xz +Source1: ovmf-whitepaper-c770f8c.txt +Source2: openssl-rhel-%{OPENSSL_HASH}.tar.xz + +# json description files +Source10: 50-edk2-aarch64-qcow2.json +Source11: 51-edk2-aarch64-raw.json +Source12: 52-edk2-aarch64-verbose-qcow2.json +Source13: 53-edk2-aarch64-verbose-raw.json + +Source40: 30-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb-enrolled.json +Source41: 40-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb.json +Source43: 50-edk2-ovmf-x64-nosb.json +Source44: 60-edk2-ovmf-x64-amdsev.json +Source45: 60-edk2-ovmf-x64-inteltdx.json + +# https://gitlab.com/kraxel/edk2-build-config +Source80: edk2-build.py +Source82: edk2-build.rhel-9 + +Source90: DBXUpdate-%{DBXDATE}.x64.bin + +Source100: msvsphereca1.pem +Source101: msvsphereima.pem +Source102: nvidiagpuoot001.pem +Source103: rhelimaca1.pem +Source104: rhelima.pem +Source105: spheresecureboot001.pem +Source106: msvspheredup1.pem +Source107: msvspherepatch1.pem +Source108: rheldup3.pem +Source109: rhelima_centos.pem +Source110: rhelkpatch1.pem +Source111: spheresecurebootca.pem +Source112: certs_add.sh + +Patch1: 0003-Remove-paths-leading-to-submodules.patch +Patch2: 0004-MdeModulePkg-TerminalDxe-set-xterm-resolution-on-mod.patch +Patch3: 0005-OvmfPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command-li.patch +Patch4: 0006-ArmVirtPkg-take-PcdResizeXterm-from-the-QEMU-command.patch +Patch5: 0007-OvmfPkg-enable-DEBUG_VERBOSE-RHEL-only.patch +Patch6: 0008-OvmfPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuVide.patch +Patch7: 0009-ArmVirtPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuR.patch +Patch8: 0010-OvmfPkg-QemuRamfbDxe-Do-not-report-DXE-failure-on-Aa.patch +Patch9: 0011-OvmfPkg-silence-EFI_D_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-NvmExpre.patch +Patch10: 0012-OvmfPkg-QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe-suppress-error-on-no-k.patch +Patch11: 0013-SecurityPkg-Tcg2Dxe-suppress-error-on-no-swtpm-in-si.patch +Patch12: 0014-OvmfPkg-Remove-EbcDxe-RHEL-only.patch +Patch13: 0015-OvmfPkg-Remove-VirtioGpu-device-driver-RHEL-only.patch +Patch14: 0016-OvmfPkg-Remove-VirtioFsDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-on.patch +Patch15: 0017-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-VirtioFsDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL.patch +Patch16: 0018-OvmfPkg-Remove-UdfDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-only.patch +Patch17: 0019-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-UdfDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-only.patch +Patch18: 0020-OvmfPkg-Remove-TftpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL-on.patch +Patch19: 0021-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-TftpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL.patch +Patch20: 0022-OvmfPkg-Remove-HttpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL-on.patch +Patch21: 0023-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-HttpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL.patch +Patch22: 0024-OvmfPkg-Remove-LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand-RHEL-o.patch +Patch23: 0025-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand-RHE.patch +Patch24: 0026-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-fix-apic-mode-for-cpu-hotplug.patch +Patch25: 0027-OvmfPkg-AmdSevDxe-Shim-Reboot-workaround-RHEL-only.patch +Patch26: 0028-CryptoPkg-CrtLib-add-stat.h-include-file.patch +Patch27: 0029-CryptoPkg-CrtLib-add-access-open-read-write-close-sy.patch +Patch28: 0030-OvmfPkg-Sec-Setup-MTRR-early-in-the-boot-process.patch +Patch29: 0031-MdePkg-ArchitecturalMsr.h-add-defines-for-MTRR-cache.patch +Patch30: 0032-UefiCpuPkg-MtrrLib.h-use-cache-type-defines-from-Arc.patch +Patch31: 0033-OvmfPkg-Sec-use-cache-type-defines-from-Architectura.patch +Patch32: 0034-NetworkPkg-TcpDxe-Fixed-system-stuck-on-PXE-boot-flo.patch +Patch33: 0035-OvmfPkg-add-morlock-support.patch +Patch34: 0036-MdePkg-BaseRngLib-Add-a-smoketest-for-RDRAND-and-che.patch +Patch35: 0037-SecurityPkg-RngDxe-add-rng-test.patch +Patch36: 0038-OvmfPkg-wire-up-RngDxe.patch +Patch37: 0039-CryptoPkg-Test-call-ProcessLibraryConstructorList.patch +Patch38: 0040-MdePkg-X86UnitTestHost-set-rdrand-cpuid-bit.patch +# For RHEL-43442 - edk2 disconnects abnormally before loading the kernel +Patch39: edk2-MdeModulePkg-Warn-if-out-of-flash-space-when-writing.patch +# For RHEL-45899 - [RHEL-9.5.0] edk2 hit Failed to generate random data +Patch40: edk2-NetworkPkg-DxeNetLib-adjust-PseudoRandom-error-loggi.patch +# For RHEL-45899 - [RHEL-9.5.0] edk2 hit Failed to generate random data +Patch41: edk2-NetworkPkg-DxeNetLib-Reword-PseudoRandom-error-loggi.patch +# For RHEL-56081 - [EDK2] Shim fallback reboot workaround might not work on SNP +Patch42: edk2-AmdSevDxe-Fix-the-shim-fallback-reboot-workaround-fo.patch +# For RHEL-45847 - [RHEL9.5] Hotplug vcpu to a guest cause guest kernel panic +Patch43: edk2-UefiCpuPkg-PiSmmCpuDxeSmm-skip-PatchInstructionX86-c.patch + +# python3-devel and libuuid-devel are required for building tools. +# python3-devel is also needed for varstore template generation and +# verification with "ovmf-vars-generator". +BuildRequires: python3-devel +BuildRequires: libuuid-devel +BuildRequires: /usr/bin/iasl +BuildRequires: binutils gcc git gcc-c++ make +BuildRequires: perl perl(JSON) +BuildRequires: qemu-img + +%if %{build_ovmf} +# Only OVMF includes 80x86 assembly files (*.nasm*). +BuildRequires: nasm + +# Only OVMF includes the Secure Boot feature, for which we need to separate out +# the UEFI shell. +BuildRequires: dosfstools +BuildRequires: mtools +BuildRequires: xorriso + +# secure boot enrollment +BuildRequires: python3dist(virt-firmware) >= 23.4 + +# endif build_ovmf +%endif + + +%package ovmf +Summary: UEFI firmware for x86_64 virtual machines +BuildArch: noarch +Provides: OVMF = %{version}-%{release} +Obsoletes: OVMF < 20180508-100.gitee3198e672e2.el7 + +# OVMF includes the Secure Boot and IPv6 features; it has a builtin OpenSSL +# library. +Provides: bundled(openssl) = %{OPENSSL_VER} +License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent and Apache-2.0 + +# URL taken from the Maintainers.txt file. +URL: http://www.tianocore.org/ovmf/ + +%description ovmf +OVMF (Open Virtual Machine Firmware) is a project to enable UEFI support for +Virtual Machines. This package contains a sample 64-bit UEFI firmware for QEMU +and KVM. + + +%package aarch64 +Summary: UEFI firmware for aarch64 virtual machines +BuildArch: noarch +Provides: AAVMF = %{version}-%{release} +Obsoletes: AAVMF < 20180508-100.gitee3198e672e2.el7 + +# need libvirt version with qcow2 support +Conflicts: libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu < 9.2.0 + +# No Secure Boot for AAVMF yet, but we include OpenSSL for the IPv6 stack. +Provides: bundled(openssl) = %{OPENSSL_VER} +License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent and Apache-2.0 + +# URL taken from the Maintainers.txt file. +URL: https://github.com/tianocore/tianocore.github.io/wiki/ArmVirtPkg + +%description aarch64 +AAVMF (ARM Architecture Virtual Machine Firmware) is an EFI Development Kit II +platform that enables UEFI support for QEMU/KVM ARM Virtual Machines. This +package contains a 64-bit build. + + +%package tools +Summary: EFI Development Kit II Tools +License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +URL: https://github.com/tianocore/tianocore.github.io/wiki/BaseTools +%description tools +This package provides tools that are needed to +build EFI executables and ROMs using the GNU tools. + +%package tools-doc +Summary: Documentation for EFI Development Kit II Tools +BuildArch: noarch +License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +URL: https://github.com/tianocore/tianocore.github.io/wiki/BaseTools +%description tools-doc +This package documents the tools that are needed to +build EFI executables and ROMs using the GNU tools. + +%description +EDK II is a modern, feature-rich, cross-platform firmware development +environment for the UEFI and PI specifications. This package contains sample +64-bit UEFI firmware builds for QEMU and KVM. + +%prep +# We needs some special git config options that %%autosetup won't give us. +# We init the git dir ourselves, then tell %%autosetup not to blow it away. +%setup -q -n edk2-%{GITCOMMIT} +git init -q +git config core.whitespace cr-at-eol +git config am.keepcr true +# -T is passed to %%setup to not re-extract the archive +# -D is passed to %%setup to not delete the existing archive dir +%autosetup -T -D -n edk2-%{GITCOMMIT} -S git_am + +cp -a -- %{SOURCE1} . +cp -a -- %{SOURCE10} %{SOURCE11} %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} . +cp -a -- %{SOURCE40} %{SOURCE41} %{SOURCE43} %{SOURCE44} %{SOURCE45} . +cp -a -- %{SOURCE80} %{SOURCE82} . +cp -a -- %{SOURCE90} . +cp -a -- %{SOURCE100} %{SOURCE101} %{SOURCE102} %{SOURCE103} %{SOURCE104} %{SOURCE105} %{SOURCE106} %{SOURCE107} %{SOURCE108} %{SOURCE109} %{SOURCE110} %{SOURCE111} %{SOURCE112} . +tar -C CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib -a -f %{SOURCE2} -x + +# Done by %setup, but we do not use it for the auxiliary tarballs +chmod -Rf a+rX,u+w,g-w,o-w . + +%build + +build_iso() { + dir="$1" + UEFI_SHELL_BINARY=${dir}/Shell.efi + ENROLLER_BINARY=${dir}/EnrollDefaultKeys.efi + UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE=uefi_shell.img + ISO_IMAGE=${dir}/UefiShell.iso + + UEFI_SHELL_BINARY_BNAME=$(basename -- "$UEFI_SHELL_BINARY") + UEFI_SHELL_SIZE=$(stat --format=%s -- "$UEFI_SHELL_BINARY") + ENROLLER_SIZE=$(stat --format=%s -- "$ENROLLER_BINARY") + + # add 1MB then 10% for metadata + UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE_KB=$(( + (UEFI_SHELL_SIZE + ENROLLER_SIZE + 1 * 1024 * 1024) * 11 / 10 / 1024 + )) + + # create non-partitioned FAT image + rm -f -- "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" + mkdosfs -C "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" -n UEFI_SHELL -- "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE_KB" + + # copy the shell binary into the FAT image + export MTOOLS_SKIP_CHECK=1 + mmd -i "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" ::efi + mmd -i "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" ::efi/boot + mcopy -i "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" "$UEFI_SHELL_BINARY" ::efi/boot/bootx64.efi + mcopy -i "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" "$ENROLLER_BINARY" :: + mdir -i "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" -/ :: + + # build ISO with FAT image file as El Torito EFI boot image + mkisofs -input-charset ASCII -J -rational-rock \ + -e "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" -no-emul-boot \ + -o "$ISO_IMAGE" "$UEFI_SHELL_IMAGE" +} + +export EXTRA_OPTFLAGS="%{optflags}" +export EXTRA_LDFLAGS="%{__global_ldflags}" +export RELEASE_DATE="$(echo %{GITDATE} | sed -e 's|\(....\)\(..\)\(..\)|\2/\3/\1|')" + +touch OvmfPkg/AmdSev/Grub/grub.efi # dummy +python3 CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/configure.py + +# include dirs of unused submodules +mkdir -p CryptoPkg/Library/MbedTlsLib/mbedtls/include +mkdir -p CryptoPkg/Library/MbedTlsLib/mbedtls/include/mbedtls +mkdir -p CryptoPkg/Library/MbedTlsLib/mbedtls/library +mkdir -p SecurityPkg/DeviceSecurity/SpdmLib/libspdm/include + +%if %{build_ovmf} +./edk2-build.py --config edk2-build.rhel-9 -m ovmf --release-date "$RELEASE_DATE" +build_iso RHEL-9/ovmf +cp DBXUpdate-%{DBXDATE}.x64.bin RHEL-9/ovmf +virt-fw-vars --input RHEL-9/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd \ + --output RHEL-9/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd \ + --set-dbx DBXUpdate-%{DBXDATE}.x64.bin \ + --enroll-redhat --secure-boot +virt-fw-vars --input RHEL-9/ovmf/OVMF.inteltdx.fd \ + --output RHEL-9/ovmf/OVMF.inteltdx.secboot.fd \ + --set-dbx DBXUpdate-%{DBXDATE}.x64.bin \ + --enroll-redhat --secure-boot \ + --set-fallback-no-reboot +./certs_add.sh RHEL-9/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd +%endif + +%if %{build_aarch64} +./edk2-build.py --config edk2-build.rhel-9 -m armvirt --release-date "$RELEASE_DATE" +for raw in */aarch64/*.raw; do + qcow2="${raw%.raw}.qcow2" + qemu-img convert -f raw -O qcow2 -o cluster_size=4096 -S 4096 "$raw" "$qcow2" +done +%endif + +%install + +cp -a OvmfPkg/License.txt License.OvmfPkg.txt +cp -a CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/LICENSE.txt LICENSE.openssl +mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware + +# install the tools +mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_bindir} \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/%{name}/Conf \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/%{name}/Scripts +install BaseTools/Source/C/bin/* \ + %{buildroot}%{_bindir} +install BaseTools/BinWrappers/PosixLike/LzmaF86Compress \ + %{buildroot}%{_bindir} +install BaseTools/BuildEnv \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/%{name} +install BaseTools/Conf/*.template \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/%{name}/Conf +install BaseTools/Scripts/GccBase.lds \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/%{name}/Scripts + +mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/%{name} +cp -av RHEL-9/* %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/%{name} + +%if %{build_ovmf} +mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/OVMF + +ln -s ../%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/OVMF/ +ln -s ../%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/OVMF/ +ln -s ../%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/OVMF/ +ln -s ../%{name}/ovmf/UefiShell.iso %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/OVMF/ +ln -s OVMF_CODE.fd %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.cc.fd + +install -m 0644 \ + 30-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb-enrolled.json \ + 40-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb.json \ + 50-edk2-ovmf-x64-nosb.json \ + 60-edk2-ovmf-x64-amdsev.json \ + 60-edk2-ovmf-x64-inteltdx.json \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware + +# endif build_ovmf +%endif + +%if %{build_aarch64} +mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/AAVMF + +ln -s ../%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-pflash.raw \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/AAVMF/AAVMF_CODE.verbose.fd +ln -s ../%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-silent-pflash.raw \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/AAVMF/AAVMF_CODE.fd +ln -s ../%{name}/aarch64/vars-template-pflash.raw \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/AAVMF/AAVMF_VARS.fd + +install -m 0644 \ + 50-edk2-aarch64-qcow2.json \ + 51-edk2-aarch64-raw.json \ + 52-edk2-aarch64-verbose-qcow2.json \ + 53-edk2-aarch64-verbose-raw.json \ + %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware + +# endif build_aarch64 +%endif + +%check + +%global common_files \ + %%license License.txt License.OvmfPkg.txt License-History.txt LICENSE.openssl \ + %%dir %%{_datadir}/%%{name}/ \ + %%dir %%{_datadir}/qemu \ + %%dir %%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware + +%if %{build_ovmf} +%files ovmf +%common_files +%doc OvmfPkg/README +%doc ovmf-whitepaper-c770f8c.txt +%dir %{_datadir}/OVMF/ +%dir %{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/ +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.cc.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF.amdsev.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF.inteltdx.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/OVMF.inteltdx.secboot.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/DBXUpdate*.bin +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/UefiShell.iso +%{_datadir}/OVMF/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd +%{_datadir}/OVMF/OVMF_VARS.fd +%{_datadir}/OVMF/OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd +%{_datadir}/OVMF/UefiShell.iso +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/Shell.efi +%{_datadir}/%{name}/ovmf/EnrollDefaultKeys.efi +%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/30-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb-enrolled.json +%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/40-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb.json +%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/50-edk2-ovmf-x64-nosb.json +%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/60-edk2-ovmf-x64-amdsev.json +%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/60-edk2-ovmf-x64-inteltdx.json +# endif build_ovmf +%endif + +%if %{build_aarch64} +%files aarch64 +%common_files +%dir %{_datadir}/AAVMF/ +%dir %{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/ +%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-pflash.* +%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI-silent-pflash.* +%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/vars-template-pflash.* +%{_datadir}/AAVMF/AAVMF_CODE.verbose.fd +%{_datadir}/AAVMF/AAVMF_CODE.fd +%{_datadir}/AAVMF/AAVMF_VARS.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_EFI.silent.fd +%{_datadir}/%{name}/aarch64/QEMU_VARS.fd +%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/50-edk2-aarch64-qcow2.json +%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/51-edk2-aarch64-raw.json +%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/52-edk2-aarch64-verbose-qcow2.json +%{_datadir}/qemu/firmware/53-edk2-aarch64-verbose-raw.json +# endif build_aarch64 +%endif + +%files tools +%license License.txt +%license License-History.txt +%{_bindir}/DevicePath +%{_bindir}/EfiRom +%{_bindir}/GenCrc32 +%{_bindir}/GenFfs +%{_bindir}/GenFv +%{_bindir}/GenFw +%{_bindir}/GenSec +%{_bindir}/LzmaCompress +%{_bindir}/LzmaF86Compress +%{_bindir}/TianoCompress +%{_bindir}/VfrCompile +%{_bindir}/VolInfo +%dir %{_datadir}/%{name} +%{_datadir}/%{name}/BuildEnv +%{_datadir}/%{name}/Conf +%{_datadir}/%{name}/Scripts + +%files tools-doc +%doc BaseTools/UserManuals/*.rtf + + +%changelog +* Sun Nov 10 2024 Dmitriy Samoylik - 20240524-5.inferit.1 +- Added msvsphere certificates for secure boot + +* Tue Nov 05 2024 Arkady L. Shane - 20240524-5.inferit +- Rebuilt. No changes + +* Mon Sep 09 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20240524-5 +- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-PiSmmCpuDxeSmm-skip-PatchInstructionX86-c.patch [RHEL-45847] +- Resolves: RHEL-45847 + ([RHEL9.5] Hotplug vcpu to a guest cause guest kernel panic) + +* Mon Sep 02 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20240524-4 +- edk2-AmdSevDxe-Fix-the-shim-fallback-reboot-workaround-fo.patch [RHEL-56081] +- Resolves: RHEL-56081 + ([EDK2] Shim fallback reboot workaround might not work on SNP) + +* Tue Aug 20 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20240524-3 +- edk2-NetworkPkg-DxeNetLib-adjust-PseudoRandom-error-loggi.patch [RHEL-45899] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-DxeNetLib-Reword-PseudoRandom-error-loggi.patch [RHEL-45899] +- Resolves: RHEL-45899 + ([RHEL-9.5.0] edk2 hit Failed to generate random data) + +* Thu Jul 25 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20240524-2 +- edk2-MdeModulePkg-Warn-if-out-of-flash-space-when-writing.patch [RHEL-43442] +- Resolves: RHEL-43442 + (edk2 disconnects abnormally before loading the kernel) + +* Thu Jun 20 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20240524-1 +- Rebase to edk2-stable202405 +- Bumo openssl to 8e5beb77088b +- Resolves: RHEL-32486 + (rebase to edk2-stable202405 [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: RHEL-36446 + (edk2: enable MOR [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21653 + (CVE-2023-6237 edk2: openssl: Excessive time spent checking invalid RSA public keys [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21150 + (CVE-2023-6129 edk2: mysql: openssl: POLY1305 MAC implementation corrupts vector registers on PowerPC) +- Resolves: RHEL-22490 + (CVE-2024-0727 edk2: openssl: denial of service via null dereference [rhel-9]) + +* Mon Apr 08 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20240214-2 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-log-a-warning-when-memory-is-tig.patch [RHEL-22202] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-consider-AP-stacks-for-pei-memor.patch [RHEL-22202] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-rewrite-page-table-calculation.patch [RHEL-22202] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-log-pei-memory-cap-details.patch [RHEL-22202] +- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-Add-support-for-multiple-HOBs-t.patch [RHEL-22202] +- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-Add-support-for-multiple-HOBs-t.p2.patch [RHEL-22202] +- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-Add-support-for-multiple-HOBs-t.p3.patch [RHEL-22202] +- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-Add-support-for-multiple-HOBs-t.p4.patch [RHEL-22202] +- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-Add-support-for-multiple-HOBs-t.p5.patch [RHEL-22202] +- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-return-early-in-GetBspNumber.patch [RHEL-22202] +- Resolves: RHEL-22202 + ([EDK2] Support booting with 4096 vcpus) + +* Tue Feb 27 2024 Gerd Hoffmann - 20240214-1 +- Rebase to edk2-stable202302 +- Resolves: RHEL-26879 + +* Thu Feb 22 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20231122-6 +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Pa.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Add-Unit-tests-to-CI-and-create-Host-Test.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45230-Un.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Pa.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Un.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Patc.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45231-Unit.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Patc.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Ip6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45232-Unit.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p2.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p3.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-4523p4.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Adds-a-SecurityFix.yaml-file.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-SECURITY-PATCH-CVE-2023-45229-Re.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Removes-duplicate-check-and-repl.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Dhcp6Dxe-Packet-Length-is-not-updated-bef.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml.patch [RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853] +- Resolves: RHEL-21841 + (CVE-2023-45229 edk2: Integer underflow when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21843 + (CVE-2023-45230 edk2: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21845 + (CVE-2023-45231 edk2: Out of Bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21847 + (CVE-2023-45232 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21849 + (TRIAGE CVE-2023-45233 edk2: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21851 + (CVE-2023-45234 edk2: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21853 + (TRIAGE CVE-2023-45235 edk2: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message [rhel-9]) + +* Mon Feb 19 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20231122-5 +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch [RHEL-21157] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4118.patch [RHEL-21157] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411-2.patch [RHEL-21157] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411-3.patch [RHEL-21157] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-Updating-SecurityFixes.yaml-after-symbol.patch [RHEL-21157] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-Setup-MTRR-early-in-the-boot-process.patch [RHEL-21704] +- edk2-MdePkg-ArchitecturalMsr.h-add-defines-for-MTRR-cache.patch [RHEL-21704] +- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MtrrLib.h-use-cache-type-defines-from-Arc.patch [RHEL-21704] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Sec-use-cache-type-defines-from-Architectura.patch [RHEL-21704] +- Resolves: RHEL-21157 + (CVE-2022-36764 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage() [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: RHEL-21704 + (vGPU VM take several minutes to show tianocore logo if firmware is ovmf) + +* Wed Jan 31 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20231122-4 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-casts-to-UINTN-and-UINT3.patch [RHEL-20963] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-clarify-block-write-logic-fi.patch [RHEL-20963] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-add-a-loop-for-NorFlashWrite.patch [RHEL-20963] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-allow-larger-writes-without-.patch [RHEL-20963] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-ValidateFvHeader-unwritten-s.patch [RHEL-20963] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-move-DoErase-code-block-into.patch [RHEL-20963] +- Resolves: RHEL-20963 + ([rhel9] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error) + +* Mon Jan 22 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20231122-3 +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-411.patch [RHEL-21155] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeTpmMeasureBootLib-SECURITY-PATCH-4117.patch [RHEL-21155] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-Adding-CVE-2022-36763-to-SecurityFixes.y.patch [RHEL-21155] +- Resolves: RHEL-21155 + (CVE-2022-36763 edk2: heap buffer overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable() [rhel-9]) + +* Mon Jan 15 2024 Miroslav Rezanina - 20231122-2 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-RiscVVirt-use-gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid-.patch [RHEL-20963] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-stop-accepting-gEfiVariableG.patch [RHEL-20963] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-sanity-check-variables.patch [RHEL-20963] +- Resolves: RHEL-20963 + ([rhel9] guest fails to boot due to ASSERT error) + +* Fri Dec 15 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20231122-1 +- Rebase to edk2-stable202311 [RHEL-12323] +- Switch to OpenSSL 3.0 [RHEL-49] +- Resolves: RHEL-12323 + (Rebase EDK2 for RHEL 9.4) +- Resolves: RHEL-49 + (consume / bundle RHEL-9 OpenSSL (version 3.0.x) in RHEL-9 edk2) + +* Mon Oct 09 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20230524-4 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-ResetVector-Fix-assembler-bit-test-flag-chec.patch [RHEL-9943] +- Resolves: RHEL-9943 + ([EDK2][AMDSERVER Bug] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Fix assembler bit test flag check [rhel-9.3.0.z]) + +* Thu Aug 24 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20230524-3 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-AmdSev-fix-BdsPlatform.c-assertion-failure-d.patch [bz#2190244] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-IoMmuDxe-add-locking-to-IoMmuAllocateBounceB.patch [bz#2211060] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-AmdSevDxe-Shim-Reboot-workaround-RHEL-only.patch [bz#2218196] +- Resolves: bz#2190244 + ([EDK2] [AMDSERVER 9.3 Bug] OVMF AP Creation Fixes) +- Resolves: bz#2211060 + (SEV-es guest randomly stuck at boot to hard drive screen from powerdown and boot again) +- Resolves: bz#2218196 + (Add vtpm devices with OVMF.amdsev.fd causes VM reset) + +* Mon Jul 10 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20230524-2 +- edk2-ArmVirt-add-VirtioSerialDxe-to-ArmVirtQemu-builds.patch [RHEL-643] +- edk2-ArmVirt-PlatformBootManagerLib-factor-out-IsVirtio.patch [RHEL-643] +- edk2-ArmVirt-PlatformBootManagerLib-factor-out-IsVirtioPc.patch [RHEL-643] +- edk2-ArmVirt-PlatformBootManagerLib-set-up-virtio-serial-.patch [RHEL-643] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtioSerialDxe-use-TPL_NOTIFY.patch [RHEL-643] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtioSerialDxe-Remove-noisy-debug-print-on-.patch [RHEL-643] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-PlatformInitLib-limit-phys-bits-to-46.patch [bz#2174749] +- edk2-Revert-OvmfPkg-disable-dynamic-mmio-window-rhel-only.patch [bz#2174749] +- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-MpInitLib-fix-apic-mode-for-cpu-hotplug.patch [bz#2124143] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-PlatformInitLib-check-PcdUse1GPageTable.patch [RHEL-644] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-OvmfPkgIa32X64-enable-1G-pages.patch [RHEL-644] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-MicrovmX64-enable-1G-pages.patch [RHEL-644] +- Resolves: RHEL-643 + (add virtio serial support to armvirt) +- Resolves: bz#2174749 + ([edk2] re-enable dynamic mmio window) +- Resolves: bz#2124143 + (ovmf must consider max cpu count not boot cpu count for apic mode [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: RHEL-644 + (enable gigabyte pages) + +* Tue Jun 27 2023 Oliver Steffen - 20230524-1 +- Rebase to edk2-stable202305 tag [RHEL-585] + Resolves: RHEL-585 + ([rhel-9.3] rebase EDK2 to edk2-stable202305) + +* Mon May 22 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20230301gitf80f052277c8-5 +- edk2-dbx-update-2023-05-09-black-lotus-edition.patch [RHEL-470] +- edk2-json-descriptors-explicitly-set-mode-split.patch [RHEL-469] +- Resolves: RHEL-470 + (edk2: update variable store with latest dbx updates (may 9, black lotus edition)) +- Resolves: RHEL-469 + (explicitly set mode = split in firmware json description files) + +* Tue May 16 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20230301gitf80f052277c8-4 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Clarify-invariants-for-NestedInterruptTplLib.patch [bz#2189136] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Relax-assertion-that-interrupts-do-not-occur.patch [bz#2189136] +- Resolves: bz#2189136 + (windows 11 installation broken with edk2-20230301gitf80f052277c8-1.el9) + +* Mon May 08 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20230301gitf80f052277c8-3 +- edk2-add-aarch64-qcow2-images.patch [bz#2186754] +- edk2-update-json-files.patch [bz#2186754] +- edk2-add-libvirt-version-conflict.patch [bz#2186754] +- edk2-add-dbx-update-blob-rh-only.patch [RHEL-377] +- edk2-spec-apply-dbx-update-rh-only.patch [RHEL-377] +- Resolves: bz#2186754 + (edk2: Add firmware images in qcow2 format) +- Resolves: RHEL-377 + (edk2: ship secure build variable store with latest dbx updates) + +* Fri Apr 14 2023 MSVSphere Packaging Team - 20230301gitf80f052277c8-2 +- Rebuilt for MSVSphere 9.2 beta + +* Wed Apr 05 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20230301gitf80f052277c8-2 +- edk2-build-script-update.patch [bz#2183230] +- edk2-PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy-update.patch [bz#2183230] +- Resolves: bz#2183230 + ([edk2] Instruction abort exception when booting a VM) + +* Wed Mar 22 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20230301gitf80f052277c8-1 +- Rebase to edk2-stable202302 [RHEL-266] +- Resolves: RHEL-266 + (rebase edk2 to 2023-02 stable tag) + +* Fri Mar 17 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20221207gitfff6d81270b5-9 +- edk2-remove-amd-sev-feature-flag-from-secure-boot-builds-.patch [bz#2169247] +- Resolves: bz#2169247 + ([edk2] Install a sev guest with enrolled secure boot failed) + +* Fri Mar 10 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20221207gitfff6d81270b5-8 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-disable-dynamic-mmio-window-rhel-only.patch [bz#2174605] +- Resolves: bz#2174605 + ([EDK2] disable dynamic mmio window) + +* Tue Feb 21 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20221207gitfff6d81270b5-7 +- edk2-Revert-MdeModulePkg-TerminalDxe-add-other-text-resol.patch [bz#2162307] +- Resolves: bz#2162307 + (Broken GRUB output on a serial console) + +* Mon Feb 13 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20221207gitfff6d81270b5-6 +- edk2-update-build-script-rhel-only.patch [bz#2168046] +- edk2-update-build-config-rhel-only.patch [bz#2168046] +- edk2-add-release-date-to-builds-rh-only.patch [bz#2168046] +- edk2-openssl-update.patch [bz#2164534 bz#2164550 bz#2164565 bz#2164583] +- edk2-rh-openssl-add-crypto-bn-rsa_sup_mul.c-to-file-list.patch [bz#2164534 bz#2164550 bz#2164565 bz#2164583] +- Resolves: bz#2168046 + ([SVVP] job 'Check SMBIOS Table Specific Requirements' failed on win2022) +- Resolves: bz#2164534 + (CVE-2023-0286 edk2: openssl: X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: bz#2164550 + (CVE-2022-4304 edk2: openssl: timing attack in RSA Decryption implementation [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: bz#2164565 + (CVE-2023-0215 edk2: openssl: use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF [rhel-9]) +- Resolves: bz#2164583 + (CVE-2022-4450 edk2: openssl: double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex [rhel-9]) + +* Mon Feb 06 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20221207gitfff6d81270b5-5 +- edk2-Revert-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-enable-initial-ID-map-.patch [bz#2157656] +- Resolves: bz#2157656 + ([edk2] [aarch64] Unable to initialize EFI firmware when using edk2-aarch64-20221207gitfff6d81270b5-1.el9 in some hardwares) + +* Wed Jan 18 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20221207gitfff6d81270b5-4 +- edk2-ArmVirt-don-t-use-unaligned-CopyMem-on-NOR-flash.patch [bz#2158173] +- Resolves: bz#2158173 + ([aarch64][numa] Failed to create 2 numa nodes in some hardwares) + +* Mon Jan 16 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20221207gitfff6d81270b5-3 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-VirtNorFlashDxe-map-flash-memory-as-uncachea.patch [bz#2158173] +- edk2-MdePkg-Remove-Itanium-leftover-data-structure-RH-onl.patch [bz#1983086] +- Resolves: bz#2158173 + ([aarch64][numa] Failed to create 2 numa nodes in some hardwares) +- Resolves: bz#1983086 + (Assertion failure when creating 1024 VCPU VM: [...]UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuBist.c(186): !EFI_ERROR (Status)) + +* Thu Jan 05 2023 Miroslav Rezanina - 20221207gitfff6d81270b5-2 +- edk2-use-rpm-build-flags-rh-only.patch [RHEL-177] +- Resolves: RHEL-177 + (Enable GNU_RELRO security protection) + +* Thu Dec 15 2022 Camilla Conte - 20221207gitfff6d81270b5-1 +- Rebase to edk2-stable202211 tag + Resolves: RHEL-119 + (rebase edk2 to edk2-stable202211) +- Resolves: RHEL-75 + (edk2 builds should show the build version) +- Resolves: bz#2132951 + (edk2: Sort traditional virtualization builds before Confidential Computing builds) + +* Mon Nov 21 2022 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220826gitba0e0e4c6a-2 +- edk2-MdeModulePkg-PiSmmCore-SmmEntryPoint-underflow-CVE-2.patch [bz#1989857] +- Resolves: bz#1989857 + (CVE-2021-38578 edk2: integer underflow in SmmEntryPoint function leads to potential SMM privilege escalation [rhel-9.0]) + +* Tue Oct 11 2022 Miroslav Rezanina - 0220826gitba0e0e4c6a-1 +- Rebase to edk2-stable202208 tag [RHELX-59] + Resolves: RHELX-59 + (rebase edk2 to 2022-08 stable tag) + +* Fri Sep 16 2022 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220526git16779ede2d36-4 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-fix-bochs-mode-init.patch [RHELX-58] +- Resolves: RHELX-58 + (Guest console turns black with uefi rhel guests and stdvga) + +* Mon Aug 01 2022 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220526git16779ede2d36-3 +- edk2-openssl-jump-to-8.7.0-branch-2022-07-22.patch [bz#2074843] +- edk2-ovmf-vars-generator-Use-max-cpu.patch [bz#2111567] +- Resolves: bz#2074843 + (edk2: sync openssl sources with rhel openssl rpm) +- Resolves: bz#2111567 + (EDK2 build stuck with qemu-kvm-7.0.0-8.el9 or newer) + +* Fri Jun 24 2022 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220526git16779ede2d36-2 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Update-target-machines-config.patch [bz#2090752] +- Resolves: bz#2090752 + (Add RHEL 8.5, 8,6 and 9.x machine types to firmware descriptor files 50-edk2-ovmf-{amdsev,cc}.json) + +* Mon Jun 13 2022 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220526git16779ede2d36-1 +- Rebase to edk2-stable-202205 [bz#2074831] +- Resolves: bz#2074831 + (rebase edk2 to May 2022 release (edk2-stable202205)) + +* Thu May 26 2022 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220221gitb24306f15d-2 +- edk2-Revert-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-QemuRamfbDxe-display-device.patch [bz#2087220] +- edk2-Revert-OvmfPkg-Remove-QemuRamfbDxe-display-device-dr.patch [bz#2087220] +- Resolves: bz#2087220 + (VNC display show "Guest has not initialized the display" when using ramfb + ovmf) + +* Thu Mar 31 2022 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220221gitb24306f15d-1 +- Rebae to edk-stable-202202 [bz#2056910] +- Resolves: bz#2056910 + ([rebase] update edk2 to feb '22 release (edk2-stable202202xx)) + +* Wed Mar 23 2022 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-4 +- edk2-Revert-OvmfPkg-Remove-NvmExpressDxe-device-driver-RH.patch [bz#2044196] +- edk2-Revert-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-NvmExpressDxe-device-driver.patch [bz#2044196] +- Resolves: bz#2044196 + (RFE: [nvme-vfio] The virt-install interface throws info "Failed to set new efi boot target" when install a vm on a hostdev nvme disk) + +* Wed Feb 23 2022 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-3 +- edk2-spec-build-amdsev-variant.patch [bz#2054661] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-AmdSev-SecretPei-Mark-SEV-launch-secret-area.patch [bz#2041755] +- Resolves: bz#2054661 + (RFE: Support measured AMD SEV boot with kernel/initrd/cmdline in OVMF) +- Resolves: bz#2041755 + (Mark SEV launch secret area as reserved) + +* Tue Feb 08 2022 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-2 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-remove-unused-TPM-options-from-MicrovmX64.ds.patch [bz#1935497] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-move-tcg-configuration-to-dsc-and-fdf-includ.patch [bz#1935497] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-drop-TPM_CONFIG_ENABLE.patch [bz#1935497] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-create-Tcg12ConfigPei.inf.patch [bz#1935497] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-rework-TPM-configuration.patch [bz#1935497] +- edk2-spec-adapt-specfile-to-build-option-changes-disable-.patch [bz#1935497] +- Resolves: bz#1935497 + (edk2 implements and/or uses the deprecated MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms by default) + +* Tue Feb 01 2022 Miroslav Rezanina - 20220126gitbb1bba3d77-1 +- Rebase to latest upstream release [bz#2018388] +- Resolves: bz#2018388 + ([rebase] update edk2 to nov '21 release (edk2-stable202111xx)) + +* Fri Jan 14 2022 Miroslav Rezanina - 20210527gite1999b264f1f-8 +- edk2-Revert-advertise-OpenSSL-on-TianoCore-splash-screen-.patch [bz#2027286] +- Resolves: bz#2027286 + (Remove the customized boot splash logo patch) + +* Mon Nov 01 2021 Miroslav Rezanina - 20210527gite1999b264f1f-7 +- edk2-fix-tpm-build-options.patch [bz#2000396] +- Resolves: bz#2000396 + ([aarch64][RHEL9] The lack of TPMFinalLog in efi causes the tpm self-test in the guest to fail) + +* Mon Aug 09 2021 Mohan Boddu - 20210527gite1999b264f1f-6 +- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags + Related: rhbz#1991688 + +* Fri Aug 06 2021 Miroslav Rezanina - 20210527gite1999b264f1f-5 +- edk2-MdeModulePkg-PartitionDxe-Ignore-PMBR-BootIndicator-.patch [bz#1988760] +- Resolves: bz#1988760 + (edk2 does not ignore PMBR protective record BootIndicator as required by UEFI spec) + +* Fri Jul 30 2021 Miroslav Rezanina - 20210527gite1999b264f1f-4 +- edk2-spec-remove-Group-and-defattr.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Add-BuildRequires-make.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-don-t-conditionalize-package-definitions.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Use-autosetup-with-our-required-git-config-opti.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Replace-ifarch-else-conditionals-with-build_XXX.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Move-D-TPM_ENABLE-to-common-CC_FLAGS.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Add-qemu_package-and-qemu_binary.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Remove-extra-true-at-end-of-check.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Move-check-to-between-install-and-files.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Add-qosb_testing-macro.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Split-out-build_iso-function.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Replace-RPM_BUILD_ROOT-with-buildroot.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Use-make_build-macro.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Factor-out-OVMF_FLAGS-and-OVMF_SB_FLAGS.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Don-t-put-build-output-in-the-top-directory.patch [bz#1983789] +- edk2-spec-Centralize-non-firmware-install-files-at-the-to.patch [bz#1983789] +- Resolves: bz#1983789 + (Make spec easier to share with Fedora) + +* Mon Jul 12 2021 Miroslav Rezanina - 20210527gite1999b264f1f-3 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Remove-PrintDxe-RHEL-only.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Remove-EbcDxe-RHEL-only.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-EbcDxe-RHEL-only.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Remove-VirtioGpu-device-driver-RHEL-only.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Remove-QemuRamfbDxe-display-device-driver-RH.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-QemuRamfbDxe-display-device-driver.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Remove-NvmExpressDxe-device-driver-RHEL-only.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-NvmExpressDxe-device-driver-RHEL-o.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Remove-VirtioFsDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-on.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-VirtioFsDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Remove-UdfDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-only.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-UdfDxe-filesystem-driver-RHEL-only.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Remove-TftpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL-on.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-TftpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Remove-HttpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL-on.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-HttpDynamicCommand-from-shell-RHEL.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Remove-LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand-RHEL-o.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-Remove-LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand-RHE.patch [bz#1967747] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-Remove-Xen-Drivers-RHEL-only.patch [bz#1967747] +- Resolves: bz#1967747 + (edk2: review features and drivers shipped in RHEL) + +* Fri Jul 02 2021 Miroslav Rezanina - 20210527gite1999b264f1f-2 +- edk2-NetworkPkg-IScsiDxe-wrap-IScsiCHAP-source-files-to-8.patch [bz#1961100] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-IScsiDxe-simplify-ISCSI_CHAP_AUTH_DATA.In.patch [bz#1961100] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-IScsiDxe-clean-up-ISCSI_CHAP_AUTH_DATA.Ou.patch [bz#1961100] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-IScsiDxe-clean-up-library-class-dependenc.patch [bz#1961100] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-IScsiDxe-fix-potential-integer-overflow-i.patch [bz#1961100] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-IScsiDxe-assert-that-IScsiBinToHex-always.patch [bz#1961100] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-IScsiDxe-reformat-IScsiHexToBin-leading-c.patch [bz#1961100] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-IScsiDxe-fix-IScsiHexToBin-hex-parsing.patch [bz#1961100] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-IScsiDxe-fix-IScsiHexToBin-buffer-overflo.patch [bz#1961100] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-IScsiDxe-check-IScsiHexToBin-return-value.patch [bz#1961100] +- edk2-redhat-build-UefiShell.iso-with-xorriso-rather-than-.patch [bz#1971840] +- Resolves: bz#1961100 + (edk2: remote buffer overflow in IScsiHexToBin function in NetworkPkg/IScsiDxe [rhel-9.0]) +- Resolves: bz#1971840 + (Please replace genisoimage with xorriso) + +* Wed Jun 23 2021 Miroslav Rezanina - 20210527gite1999b264f1f-1 +- Rebase to edk2-stable202105 [bz#1938254] +- Sync edk2-MdeModulePkg-LzmaCustomDecompressLib-catch-4GB-uncom.patch from RHEL-8 +- Sync edk2-redhat-add-OVMF-binary-that-will-support-SEV-ES.patch from RHEL-8 +- Resolves: bz#1938254 + ((edk2-rebase-rhel-9.0) - rebase edk2 to edk2-stable202105 for RHEL-9-Beta) + +* Fri Jan 08 2021 Miroslav Rezanina - 20200602gitca407c7246bf-1.el9 +- Include fixes to build in RHEL 9 environment (bz#1906468) +- Resolves: bz#1906468 + ([RHEL9][FTBFS] edk2 FTBFS on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0.0 Alpha) + +* Mon Nov 23 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20200602gitca407c7246bf-4.el8 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-SmmControl2Dxe-negotiate-ICH9_LPC_SMI_F_CPU_.patch [bz#1849177] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-CpuHotplugSmm-fix-CPU-hotplug-race-just-befo.patch [bz#1849177] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-CpuHotplugSmm-fix-CPU-hotplug-race-just-afte.patch [bz#1849177] +- edk2-CryptoPkg-OpensslLib-Upgrade-OpenSSL-to-1.1.1g.patch [bz#1893806] +- edk2-redhat-bump-OpenSSL-dist-git-submodule-to-1.1.1g-RHE.patch [bz#1893806] +- Resolves: bz#1849177 + (OVMF: negotiate "SMI on VCPU hotplug" with QEMU) +- Resolves: bz#1893806 + (attempt advancing RHEL8 edk2's OpenSSL submodule to RHEL8 OpenSSL 1.1.1g (or later)) + +* Mon Aug 10 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20200602gitca407c7246bf-3.el8 +- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-PiSmmCpuDxeSmm-pause-in-WaitForSemaphore-.patch [bz#1861718] +- Resolves: bz#1861718 + (Very slow boot when overcommitting CPU) + +* Wed Jun 24 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20200602gitca407c7246bf-2.el8 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe-suppress-error-on-no-k.patch [bz#1844682] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-GenericQemuLoadImageLib-log-Not-Found-at-INF.patch [bz#1844682] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-Tcg2Dxe-suppress-error-on-no-swtpm-in-si.patch [bz#1844682] +- Resolves: bz#1844682 + (silent build of edk2-aarch64 logs DEBUG_ERROR messages that don't actually report serious errors) + +* Sat Jun 13 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20200602gitca407c7246bf-1.el8 +- Rebase to edk2-stable202005 [bz#1817035] +- Resolves: bz#1817035 + ((edk2-rebase-rhel-8.3) - rebase edk2 to upstream tag edk2-stable202005 for RHEL-8.3) + +* Fri Mar 27 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-9.el8 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-unbreak-secondary-vga-and-bochs.patch [bz#1806359] +- Resolves: bz#1806359 + (bochs-display cannot show graphic wihout driver attach) + +* Tue Feb 18 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-8.el8 +- edk2-MdeModulePkg-Enable-Disable-S3BootScript-dynamically.patch [bz#1801274] +- edk2-MdeModulePkg-PiDxeS3BootScriptLib-Fix-potential-nume.patch [bz#1801274] +- Resolves: bz#1801274 + (CVE-2019-14563 edk2: numeric truncation in MdeModulePkg/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib [rhel-8]) + +* Tue Feb 11 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-7.el8 +- edk2-SecurityPkg-Fix-spelling-errors-PARTIAL-PICK.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-simplify-Ver.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-remove-else-.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-keep-PE-COFF.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-narrow-down-.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-retval-o.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-remove-super.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-unnest-AddIm.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-eliminate-St.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-retval-f.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-imgexec-.patch [bz#1751993] +- edk2-SecurityPkg-DxeImageVerificationHandler-fix-defer-vs.patch [bz#1751993] +- Resolves: bz#1751993 + (DxeImageVerificationLib handles "DENY execute on security violation" like "DEFER execute on security violation" [rhel8]) + +* Tue Jan 21 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-6.el8 +- edk2-UefiCpuPkg-PiSmmCpuDxeSmm-fix-2M-4K-page-splitting-r.patch [bz#1789335] +- Resolves: bz#1789335 + (VM with edk2 can't boot when setting memory with '-m 2001') + +* Thu Jan 16 2020 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-5.el8 +- edk2-MdeModulePkg-UefiBootManagerLib-log-reserved-mem-all.patch [bz#1789797] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-HttpDxe-fix-32-bit-truncation-in-HTTPS-do.patch [bz#1789797] +- Resolves: bz#1789797 + (Backport upstream patch series: "UefiBootManagerLib, HttpDxe: tweaks for large HTTP(S) downloads" to improve HTTP(S) Boot experience with large (4GiB+) files) + +* Wed Dec 11 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-4.el8 +- edk2-redhat-set-guest-RAM-size-to-768M-for-SB-varstore-te.patch [bz#1778301] +- edk2-redhat-re-enable-Secure-Boot-varstore-template-verif.patch [bz#1778301] +- Resolves: bz#1778301 + (re-enable Secure Boot (varstore template) verification in %check) + +* Thu Dec 05 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-3.el8 +- Update used openssl version [bz#1616029] +- Resolves: bz#1616029 + (rebuild edk2 against the final RHEL-8.2.0 version of OpenSSL-1.1.1) + +* Mon Dec 02 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-2.el8 +- edk2-MdePkg-Include-Protocol-Tls.h-Add-the-data-type-of-E.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-CryptoPkg-TlsLib-Add-the-new-API-TlsSetVerifyHost-CV.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-turn-strchr-into-a-function-CVE-2019-1.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-satisfy-inet_pton.c-dependencies-CVE-2.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-CryptoPkg-Crt-import-inet_pton.c-CVE-2019-14553.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-CryptoPkg-TlsLib-TlsSetVerifyHost-parse-IP-address-l.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-TlsDxe-Add-the-support-of-host-validation.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-NetworkPkg-HttpDxe-Set-the-HostName-for-the-verifica.patch [bz#1536624] +- edk2-redhat-enable-HTTPS-Boot.patch [bz#1536624] +- Resolves: bz#1536624 + (HTTPS enablement in OVMF) + +* Fri Nov 29 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190829git37eef91017ad-1.el8 +- Rebase to edk2-stable201908 [bz#1748180] +- Resolves: bz#1748180 + ((edk2-rebase-rhel-8.2) - rebase edk2 to upstream tag edk2-stable201908 for RHEL-8.2) + +* Mon Aug 05 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190308git89910a39dcfd-6.el8 +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-silence-DEBUG_VERBOSE-masking-0x00400000-.patch [bz#1714446] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-QemuRamfbDxe-Do-not-report-DXE-failure-on-Aa.patch [bz#1714446] +- edk2-ArmPkg-DebugPeCoffExtraActionLib-debugger-commands-a.patch [bz#1714446] +- Resolves: bz#1714446 + (edk2-aarch64 silent build is not silent enough) + +* Tue Jul 02 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190308git89910a39dcfd-5.el8 +- edk2-redhat-add-D-TPM2_ENABLE-to-the-edk2-ovmf-build-flag.patch [bz#1693205] +- Resolves: bz#1693205 + (edk2: Enable TPM2 support) + +* Tue Jun 11 2019 Miroslav Rezanina - 20190308git89910a39dcfd-4.el8 +- edk2-OvmfPkg-raise-the-PCIEXBAR-base-to-2816-MB-on-Q35.patch [bz#1666941] +- edk2-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-set-32-bit-UC-area-at-PciBase-Pc.patch [bz#1666941] +- Resolves: bz#1666941 + (UEFI guest cannot boot into os when setting some special memory size) + +* Tue Apr 09 2019 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20190308git89910a39dcfd-2.el8 +- edk2-redhat-provide-firmware-descriptor-meta-files.patch [bz#1600230] +- Resolves: bz#1600230 + ([RHEL 8.1] RFE: provide firmware descriptor meta-files for the edk2-ovmf and edk2-aarch64 firmware images) + +* Mon Apr 08 2019 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20190308git89910a39dcfd-1.el8 +- Rebase to edk2-20190308git89910a39dcfd + +* Mon Jan 21 2019 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-9.el8 +- edk2-BaseTools-Fix-UEFI-and-Tiano-Decompression-logic-iss.patch [bz#1662184] +- edk2-MdePkg-BaseUefiDecompressLib-Fix-UEFI-Decompression-.patch [bz#1662184] +- edk2-IntelFrameworkModulePkg-Fix-UEFI-and-Tiano-Decompres.patch [bz#1662184] +- edk2-git-Use-HTTPS-support.patch [] +- Resolves: bz#1662184 + (backport fix for (theoretical?) regression introduced by earlier CVE fixes) + +* Wed Nov 21 2018 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-8.el8 +- edk2-NetworkPkg-UefiPxeBcDxe-Add-EXCLUSIVE-attribute-when.patch [bz#1643377] +- Resolves: bz#1643377 + (Exception when grubx64.efi used for UEFI netboot) + +* Tue Nov 06 2018 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-5.el8 +- edk2-MdeModulePkg-Variable-Fix-Timestamp-zeroing-issue-on.patch [bz#1641436] +- edk2-MdePkg-Add-more-checker-in-UefiDecompressLib-to-acce.patch [bz#1641449 bz#1641453 bz#1641464 bz#1641469] +- edk2-IntelFrameworkModulePkg-Add-more-checker-in-UefiTian.patch [bz#1641453 bz#1641464 bz#1641469] +- edk2-BaseTools-Add-more-checker-in-Decompress-algorithm-t.patch [bz#1641445 bz#1641453 bz#1641464 bz#1641469] +- Resolves: bz#1641436 + (CVE-2018-3613 edk2: Logic error in MdeModulePkg in EDK II firmware allows for privilege escalation by authenticated users [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: bz#1641445 + (CVE-2017-5731 edk2: Privilege escalation via processing of malformed files in TianoCompress.c [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: bz#1641449 + (CVE-2017-5732 edk2: Privilege escalation via processing of malformed files in BaseUefiDecompressLib.c [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: bz#1641453 + (CVE-2017-5733 edk2: Privilege escalation via heap-based buffer overflow in MakeTable() function [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: bz#1641464 + (CVE-2017-5734 edk2: Privilege escalation via stack-based buffer overflow in MakeTable() function [rhel-8]) +- Resolves: bz#1641469 + (CVE-2017-5735 edk2: Privilege escalation via heap-based buffer overflow in Decode() function [rhel-8]) + +* Tue Sep 04 2018 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-5.el8 +- edk2-BaseTools-footer.makefile-expand-BUILD_CFLAGS-last-f.patch [bz#1607906] +- edk2-BaseTools-header.makefile-remove-c-from-BUILD_CFLAGS.patch [bz#1607906] +- edk2-BaseTools-Source-C-split-O2-to-BUILD_OPTFLAGS.patch [bz#1607906] +- edk2-BaseTools-Source-C-take-EXTRA_OPTFLAGS-from-the-call.patch [bz#1607906] +- edk2-BaseTools-Source-C-take-EXTRA_LDFLAGS-from-the-calle.patch [bz#1607906] +- edk2-BaseTools-VfrCompile-honor-EXTRA_LDFLAGS.patch [bz#1607906] +- edk2-redhat-inject-the-RPM-compile-and-link-options-to-th.patch [bz#1607906] +- Resolves: bz#1607906 + (edk2-tools: Does not use RPM build flags) + +* Wed Aug 08 2018 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-4.el8 +- edk2-redhat-provide-virtual-bundled-OpenSSL-in-edk2-ovmf-.patch [bz#1607801] +- Resolves: bz#1607801 + (add 'Provides: bundled(openssl) = 1.1.0h' to the spec file) + +* Tue Jul 24 2018 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-3.el8 +- edk2-redhat-Provide-and-Obsolete-OVMF-and-AAVMF.patch [bz#1596148] +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-unify-HttpLib-resolutions-in-ArmVirt.dsc..patch [bz#1536627] +- edk2-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-enable-the-IPv6-stack.patch [bz#1536627] +- edk2-advertise-OpenSSL-due-to-IPv6-enablement-too-RHEL-on.patch [bz#1536627] +- edk2-redhat-add-D-NETWORK_IP6_ENABLE-to-the-build-flags.patch [bz#1536627] +- edk2-redhat-update-license-fields-and-files-in-the-spec-f.patch [bz#1536627] +- Resolves: bz#1536627 + (IPv6 enablement in OVMF) +- Resolves: bz#1596148 + (restore Provides/Obsoletes macros for OVMF and AAVMF, from RHEL-8 Alpha) + +* Tue Jul 10 2018 Danilo C. L. de Paula - 20180508gitee3198e672e2-2.el8 +- Rebase edk2 on top of 20180508gitee3198e672e2 + +* Fri Jun 08 2018 Miroslav Rezanina - 20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2 +- OvmfPkg/PlatformBootManagerLib: connect consoles unconditionally [bz#1577546] +- build OVMF varstore template with SB enabled / certs enrolled [bz#1561128] +- connect Virtio RNG devices again [bz#1579518] +- Resolves: bz#1577546 + (no input consoles connected under certain circumstances) +- Resolves: bz#1561128 + (OVMF Secure boot enablement (enrollment of default keys)) +- Resolves: bz#1579518 + (EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL no longer produced for virtio-rng) +* Wed Dec 06 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20171011-4.git92d07e48907f.el7 +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-Core-Dxe-log-informative-memprotect-msg.patch [bz#1520485] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-BdsDxe-fall-back-to-a-Boot-Manager-Menu.patch [bz#1515418] +- Resolves: bz#1515418 + (RFE: Provide diagnostics for failed boot) +- Resolves: bz#1520485 + (AAVMF: two new messages with silent build) + +* Fri Dec 01 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20171011-3.git92d07e48907f.el7 +- ovmf-UefiCpuPkg-CpuDxe-Fix-multiple-entries-of-RT_CODE-in.patch [bz#1518308] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-DxeCore-Filter-out-all-paging-capabilit.patch [bz#1518308] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-Core-Merge-memory-map-after-filtering-p.patch [bz#1518308] +- Resolves: bz#1518308 + (UEFI memory map regression (runtime code entry splitting) introduced by c1cab54ce57c) + +* Mon Nov 27 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20171011-2.git92d07e48907f.el7 +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-Bds-Remove-assertion-in-BmCharToUint.patch [bz#1513632] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-Bds-Check-variable-name-even-if-OptionN.patch [bz#1513632] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-PciBus-Fix-bug-that-PCI-BUS-claims-too-.patch [bz#1514105] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-make-it-a-proper-BASE-library.patch [bz#1488247] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-create-a-separate-PlatformDebugLibIoPort-ins.patch [bz#1488247] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-save-on-I-O-port-accesses-when-the-debug-por.patch [bz#1488247] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-enable-DEBUG_VERBOSE-RHEL-only.patch [bz#1488247] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-silence-EFI_D_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-QemuVide.patch [bz#1488247] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-silence-EFI_D_VERBOSE-0x00400000-in-NvmExpre.patch [bz#1488247] +- ovmf-Revert-redhat-introduce-separate-silent-and-verbose-.patch [bz#1488247] +- Resolves: bz#1488247 + (make debug logging no-op unless a debug console is active) +- Resolves: bz#1513632 + ([RHEL-ALT 7.5] AAVMF fails to boot after setting BootNext) +- Resolves: bz#1514105 + (backport edk2 commit 6e3287442774 so that PciBusDxe not over-claim resources) + +* Wed Oct 18 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20171011-1.git92d07e48907f.el7 +- Rebase to 92d07e48907f [bz#1469787] +- Resolves: bz#1469787 + ((ovmf-rebase-rhel-7.5) Rebase OVMF for RHEL-7.5) +- Resolves: bz#1434740 + (OvmfPkg/PciHotPlugInitDxe: don't reserve IO space when IO support is disabled) +- Resolves: bz#1434747 + ([Q35] code12 error when hotplug x710 device in win2016) +- Resolves: bz#1447027 + (Guest cannot boot with 240 or above vcpus when using ovmf) +- Resolves: bz#1458192 + ([Q35] recognize "usb-storage" devices in XHCI ports) +- Resolves: bz#1468526 + (>1TB RAM support) +- Resolves: bz#1488247 + (provide "OVMF_CODE.secboot.verbose.fd" for log capturing; silence "OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd") +- Resolves: bz#1496170 + (Inconsistent MOR control variables exposed by OVMF, breaks Windows Device Guard) + +* Fri May 12 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20170228-5.gitc325e41585e3.el7 +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-update-SignatureOwner-GUID.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-expose-CertType-parameter-.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-blacklist-empty-file-in-db.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-introduce-the-FD_SIZE_IN_KB-macro-build-flag.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-OvmfPkg.fdf.inc-extract-VARS_LIVE_SIZE-and-V.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-introduce-4MB-flash-image-mainly-for-Windows.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-raise-max-variable-size-auth-non-auth-to-33K.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-handle-non-power-of-two-spare-si.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-redhat-update-local-build-instructions-with-D-FD_SIZ.patch [bz#1443351] +- ovmf-redhat-update-OVMF-build-commands-with-D-FD_SIZE_4MB.patch [bz#1443351] +- Resolves: bz#1443351 + ([svvp][ovmf] job "Secure Boot Logo Test" failed with q35&ovmf) + +* Fri Apr 28 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20170228-4.gitc325e41585e3.el7 +- ovmf-ShellPkg-Shell-clean-up-bogus-member-types-in-SPLIT_.patch [bz#1442908] +- ovmf-ShellPkg-Shell-eliminate-double-free-in-RunSplitComm.patch [bz#1442908] +- Resolves: bz#1442908 + (Guest hang when running a wrong command in Uefishell) + +* Tue Apr 04 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20170228-3.gitc325e41585e3.el7 +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-FdtClientDxe-supplement-missing-EFIAPI-ca.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtPL031FdtClientLib-unconditionally-.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-RamDiskDxe-fix-C-string-literal-catenat.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-EmbeddedPkg-introduce-EDKII-Platform-Has-ACPI-GUID.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-EmbeddedPkg-introduce-PlatformHasAcpiLib.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-EmbeddedPkg-introduce-EDKII-Platform-Has-Device-Tree.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-add-PlatformHasAcpiDtDxe.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-enable-AcpiTableDxe-and-EFI_ACPI_TABLE_PR.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-FdtClientDxe-install-DT-as-sysconfig-tabl.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-PlatformHasAcpiDtDxe-don-t-expose-DT-if-Q.patch [bz#1430262] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-remove-PURE_ACPI_BOOT_ENABLE-and-PcdPureA.patch [bz#1430262] +- Resolves: bz#1430262 + (AAVMF: forward QEMU's DT to the guest OS only if ACPI payload is unavailable) + +* Mon Mar 27 2017 Miroslav Rezanina - 20170228-2.gitc325e41585e3.el7 +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-Core-Dxe-downgrade-CodeSegmentCount-is-.patch [bz#1433428] +- Resolves: bz#1433428 + (AAVMF: Fix error message during ARM guest VM installation) + +* Wed Mar 08 2017 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20170228-1.gitc325e41585e3.el7 +- Rebase to upstream c325e41585e3 [bz#1416919] +- Resolves: bz#1373812 + (guest boot from network even set 'boot order=1' for virtio disk with OVMF) +- Resolves: bz#1380282 + (Update OVMF to openssl-1.0.2k-hobbled) +- Resolves: bz#1412313 + (select broadcast SMI if available) +- Resolves: bz#1416919 + (Rebase OVMF for RHEL-7.4) +- Resolves: bz#1426330 + (disable libssl in CryptoPkg) + +* Mon Sep 12 2016 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20160608b-1.git988715a.el7 +- rework downstream-only commit dde83a75b566 "setup the tree for the secure + boot feature (RHEL only)", excluding patent-encumbered files from the + upstream OpenSSL 1.0.2g tarball [bz#1374710] +- rework downstream-only commit dfc3ca1ee509 "CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: Upgrade + OpenSSL version to 1.0.2h", excluding patent-encumbered files from the + upstream OpenSSL 1.0.2h tarball [bz#1374710] + +* Thu Aug 04 2016 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20160608-3.git988715a.el7 +- ovmf-MdePkg-PCI-Add-missing-PCI-PCIE-definitions.patch [bz#1332408] +- ovmf-ArmPlatformPkg-NorFlashDxe-accept-both-non-secure-an.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-switch-secure-boot-build-to-N.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmPlatformPkg-NorFlashAuthenticatedDxe-remove-this-.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-add-FDF-definition-for-empty-varstore.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-redhat-package-the-varstore-template-produced-by-the.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-Re-add-the-Driver-Health-Manager.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-HighMemDxe-allow-patchable-PCD-for-PcdSys.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemuKernel-make-ACPI-support-AARCH.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-align-ArmVirtQemuKernel-with-ArmVirtQemu.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-ArmVirtQemu-factor-out-shared-FV.FvMain-d.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-factor-out-Rules-FDF-section.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-add-name-GUIDs-to-FvMain-instances.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-add-a-Name-GUID-to-each-Firmware-Volume.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-PlatformBootManagerLib-remove-stale-FvFile-b.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-MdePkg-IndustryStandard-introduce-EFI_PCI_CAPABILITY.patch [bz#1332408] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-PciBusDxe-look-for-the-right-capability.patch [bz#1332408] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-PciBusDxe-recognize-hotplug-capable-PCI.patch [bz#1332408] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-add-PciHotPlugInitDxe.patch [bz#1332408] +- ovmf-ArmPkg-ArmGicLib-manage-GICv3-SPI-state-at-the-distr.patch [bz#1356655] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-PlatformBootManagerLib-remove-stale-FvFil.patch [bz#1353494] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-assign-Status-before-readi.patch [bz#1356913] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-silence-VS2015x86-warning-.patch [bz#1356913] +- ovmf-CryptoPkg-update-openssl-to-ignore-RVCT-3079.patch [bz#1356184] +- ovmf-CryptoPkg-Fix-typos-in-comments.patch [bz#1356184] +- ovmf-CryptoPkg-BaseCryptLib-Avoid-passing-NULL-ptr-to-fun.patch [bz#1356184] +- ovmf-CryptoPkg-BaseCryptLib-Init-the-content-of-struct-Ce.patch [bz#1356184] +- ovmf-CryptoPkg-OpensslLib-Upgrade-OpenSSL-version-to-1.0..patch [bz#1356184] +- Resolves: bz#1332408 + (Q35 machine can not hot-plug scsi controller under switch) +- Resolves: bz#1353494 + ([OVMF] "EFI Internal Shell" should be removed from "Boot Manager") +- Resolves: bz#1356184 + (refresh embedded OpenSSL to 1.0.2h) +- Resolves: bz#1356655 + (AAVMF: stop accessing unmapped gicv3 registers) +- Resolves: bz#1356913 + (fix use-without-initialization in EnrollDefaultKeys.efi) + +* Tue Jul 12 2016 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20160608-2.git988715a.el7 +- ovmf-ArmPkg-ArmGicV3Dxe-configure-all-interrupts-as-non-s.patch [bz#1349407] +- ovmf-ArmVirtPkg-PlatformBootManagerLib-Postpone-the-shell.patch [bz#1353689] +- Resolves: bz#1349407 + (AArch64: backport fix to run over gicv3 emulation) +- Resolves: bz#1353689 + (AAVMF: Drops to shell with uninitialized NVRAM file) + +* Thu Jun 9 2016 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20160608-1.git988715a.el7 +- Resolves: bz#1341733 + (prevent SMM stack overflow in OVMF while enrolling certificates in "db") +- Resolves: bz#1257882 + (FEAT: support to boot from virtio 1.0 modern devices) +- Resolves: bz#1333238 + (Q35 machine can not boot up successfully with more than 3 virtio-scsi + storage controller under switch) +- Resolves: bz#1330955 + (VM can not be booted up from hard disk successfully when with a passthrough + USB stick) + +* Thu May 19 2016 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20160419-2.git90bb4c5.el7 +- Submit scratch builds from the exploded tree again to + supp-rhel-7.3-candidate, despite FatPkg being OSS at this point; see + bz#1329559. + +* Wed Apr 20 2016 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20160419-1.git90bb4c5.el7 +- FatPkg is under the 2-clause BSDL now; "ovmf" has become OSS +- upgrade to openssl-1.0.2g +- Resolves: bz#1323363 + (remove "-D SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE" from AAVMF) +- Resolves: bz#1257882 + (FEAT: support to boot from virtio 1.0 modern devices) +- Resolves: bz#1308678 + (clearly separate SB-less, SMM-less OVMF binary from SB+SMM OVMF binary) + +* Fri Feb 19 2016 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20160202-2.gitd7c0dfa.el7 +- ovmf-restore-TianoCore-splash-logo-without-OpenSSL-advert.patch [bz#1308678] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-ArmVirtPkg-show-OpenSSL-less-logo-without-Se.patch [bz#1308678] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-simplify-VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER-generation.patch [bz#1308678] +- ovmf-redhat-bring-back-OVMF_CODE.fd-but-without-SB-and-wi.patch [bz#1308678] +- ovmf-redhat-rename-OVMF_CODE.smm.fd-to-OVMF_CODE.secboot..patch [bz#1308678] + +* Tue Feb 2 2016 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20160202-1.gitd7c0dfa.el7 +- rebase to upstream d7c0dfa +- update OpenSSL to 1.0.2e (upstream) +- update FatPkg to SVN r97 (upstream) +- drive NVMe devices (upstream) +- resize xterm on serial console mode change, when requested with + -fw_cfg name=opt/(ovmf|aavmf)/PcdResizeXterm,string=y + (downstream) +- Resolves: bz#1259395 + (revert / roll back AAVMF fix for BZ 1188054) +- Resolves: bz#1202819 + (OVMF: secure boot limitations) +- Resolves: bz#1182495 + (OVMF rejects iPXE oprom when Secure Boot is enabled) + +* Thu Nov 5 2015 Laszlo Ersek - ovmf-20151104-1.gitb9ffeab.el7 +- rebase to upstream b9ffeab +- Resolves: bz#1207554 + ([AAVMF] AArch64: populate SMBIOS) +- Resolves: bz#1270279 + (AAVMF: output improvements) + +* Thu Jun 25 2015 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20150414-2.gitc9e5618.el7 +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-PlatformPei-set-SMBIOS-entry-point-version-d.patch [bz#1232876] +- Resolves: bz#1232876 + (OVMF should install a version 2.8 SMBIOS entry point) + +* Sat Apr 18 2015 Laszlo Ersek - 20150414-1.gitc9e5618.el7 +- rebase from upstream 9ece15a to c9e5618 +- adapt .gitignore files +- update to openssl-0.9.8zf +- create Logo-OpenSSL.bmp rather than modifying Logo.bmp in-place +- update to FatPkg SVN r93 (git 8ff136aa) +- drop the following downstream-only patches (obviated by upstream + counterparts): + "tools_def.template: use forward slash with --add-gnu-debuglink (RHEL only)" + "tools_def.template: take GCC48 prefixes from environment (RHEL only)" + "OvmfPkg: set video resolution of text setup to 640x480 (RHEL only)" + "OvmfPkg: resolve OrderedCollectionLib with base red-black tree instance" + "OvmfPkg: AcpiPlatformDxe: actualize QemuLoader.h comments" + "OvmfPkg: AcpiPlatformDxe: remove current ACPI table loader" + "OvmfPkg: AcpiPlatformDxe: implement QEMU's full ACPI table loader interface" + "OvmfPkg: QemuVideoDxe: fix querying of QXL's drawable buffer size" + "OvmfPkg: disable stale fork of SecureBootConfigDxe" + "OvmfPkg: SecureBootConfigDxe: remove stale fork" + "Try to read key strike even when ..." + "OvmfPkg: BDS: remove dead call to PlatformBdsEnterFrontPage()" + "OvmfPkg: BDS: drop useless return statement" + "OvmfPkg: BDS: don't overwrite the BDS Front Page timeout" + "OvmfPkg: BDS: optimize second argument in PlatformBdsEnterFrontPage() call" + 'OvmfPkg: BDS: drop superfluous "connect first boot option" logic' + "OvmfPkg: BDS: drop custom boot timeout, revert to IntelFrameworkModulePkg's" + "Add comments to clarify mPubKeyStore buffer MemCopy. ..." + "MdeModulePkg/SecurityPkg Variable: Add boundary check..." + "OvmfPkg: AcpiPlatformDxe: make dependency on PCI enumeration explicit" + "MdePkg: UefiScsiLib: do not encode LUN in CDB for READ and WRITE" + "MdePkg: UefiScsiLib: do not encode LUN in CDB for other SCSI commands" +- merge downstream AAVMF patch "adapt packaging to Arm64", which forces us to + rename the main package from "OVMF" to "ovmf" +- drop the following ARM BDS specific tweaks (we'll only build the Intel BDS): + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: generate ESP Image boot option if user pref is unset + (Acadia)" + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: check for other defaults too if user pref is unset + (Acadia)" + "ArmPlatformPkg/ArmVirtualizationPkg: auto-detect boot path (Acadia)" + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: initialize ConIn/ConOut/ErrOut before connecting + terminals" + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: let FindCandidate() search all filesystems" + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: FindCandidateOnHandle(): log full device path" + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: fall back to Boot Menu when no default option was found" + "ArmPlatformPkg/Bds: always connect drivers before looking at boot options" +- drop patch "ArmPlatformPkg/ArmVirtualizationPkg: enable DEBUG_VERBOSE (Acadia + only)", obsoleted by fixed bug 1197141 +- tweak patch "write up build instructions (for interactive, local development) + (RHELSA)". The defaults in "BaseTools/Conf/target.template", ie. + ACTIVE_PLATFORM and TARGET_ARCH, are set for OVMF / X64. The AAVMF build + instructions now spell out the necessary override options (-p and -a, + respectively). +- extend patch "build FAT driver from source (RHELSA)" to the Xen build as well + (only for consistency; we don't build for Xen). +- drop the following downstream-only AAVMF patches, due to the 77d5dac -> + c9e5618 AAVMF rebase & join: + "redhat/process-rh-specific.sh: fix check for hunk-less filtered patches" + "redhat/process-rh-specific.sh: suppress missing files in final 'rm'" + "ArmVirtualizationQemu: build UEFI shell from source (Acadia only)" + "MdePkg: UefiScsiLib: do not encode LUN in CDB for READ and WRITE" + "MdePkg: UefiScsiLib: do not encode LUN in CDB for other SCSI commands" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: work around cache incoherence on KVM affecting DTB" + "Changed build target to supp-rhel-7.1-candidate" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: VirtFdtDxe: forward FwCfg addresses from DTB to PCDs" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: introduce QemuFwCfgLib instance for DXE drivers" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: clone PlatformIntelBdsLib from ArmPlatformPkg" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: PlatformIntelBdsLib: add basic policy" + "OvmfPkg: extract QemuBootOrderLib" + "OvmfPkg: QemuBootOrderLib: featurize PCI-like device path translation" + "OvmfPkg: introduce VIRTIO_MMIO_TRANSPORT_GUID" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: VirtFdtDxe: use dedicated VIRTIO_MMIO_TRANSPORT_GUID" + "OvmfPkg: QemuBootOrderLib: widen ParseUnitAddressHexList() to UINT64" + "OvmfPkg: QemuBootOrderLib: OFW-to-UEFI translation for virtio-mmio" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: PlatformIntelBdsLib: adhere to QEMU's boot order" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: identify "new shell" as builtin shell for Intel BDS" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: Intel BDS: load EFI-stubbed Linux kernel from fw_cfg" + 'Revert "ArmVirtualizationPkg: work around cache incoherence on KVM affecting + DTB"' + "OvmfPkg: QemuBootOrderLib: expose QEMU's "-boot menu=on[, splash-time=N]"" + "OvmfPkg: PlatformBdsLib: get front page timeout from QEMU" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: PlatformIntelBdsLib: get front page timeout from QEMU" + "ArmPkg: ArmArchTimerLib: clean up comments" + "ArmPkg: ArmArchTimerLib: use edk2-conformant (UINT64 * UINT32) / UINT32" + "ArmPkg: ArmArchTimerLib: conditionally rebase to actual timer frequency" + "ArmVirtualizationQemu: ask the hardware for the timer frequency" + "ArmPkg: DebugPeCoffExtraActionLib: debugger commands are not errors" + "ArmPlatformPkg: PEIM startup is not an error" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: PlatformIntelBdsLib: lack of QEMU kernel is no error" + "ArmVirtualizationPkg: expose debug message bitmask on build command line" +- tweak patch "rebase to upstream 77d5dac (Acadia only)": update spec changelog + only +- tweak patch "spec: build AAVMF with the Intel BDS driver (RHELSA only)": + apply "-D INTEL_BDS" to manual build instructions in redhat/README too +- tweak patch "spec: build and install verbose and silent (default) AAVMF + binaries": apply DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR_LEVEL setting to interactive build + instructions in redhat/README too +- install OVMF whitepaper as part of the OVMF build's documentation +- Resolves: bz#1211337 + (merge AAVMF into OVMF) +- Resolves: bz#1206523 + ([AAVMF] fix missing cache maintenance) + +* Fri Mar 06 2015 Miroslav Rezanina - AAVMF-20141113-5.git77d5dac.el7_1 +- aavmf-ArmPkg-DebugPeCoffExtraActionLib-debugger-commands-a.patch [bz#1197141] +- aavmf-ArmPlatformPkg-PEIM-startup-is-not-an-error.patch [bz#1197141] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-PlatformIntelBdsLib-lack-of-QEM.patch [bz#1197141] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-expose-debug-message-bitmask-on.patch [bz#1197141] +- aavmf-spec-build-and-install-verbose-and-silent-default-AA.patch [bz#1197141] +- Resolves: bz#1197141 + (create silent & verbose builds) + +* Tue Feb 10 2015 Miroslav Rezanina - AAVMF-20141113-4.git77d5dac.el7 +- aavmf-ArmPkg-ArmArchTimerLib-clean-up-comments.patch [bz#1188247] +- aavmf-ArmPkg-ArmArchTimerLib-use-edk2-conformant-UINT64-UI.patch [bz#1188247] +- aavmf-ArmPkg-ArmArchTimerLib-conditionally-rebase-to-actua.patch [bz#1188247] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationQemu-ask-the-hardware-for-the-timer.patch [bz#1188247] +- aavmf-ArmPkg-TimerDxe-smack-down-spurious-timer-interrupt-.patch [bz#1188054] +- Resolves: bz#1188054 + (guest reboot (asked from within AAVMF) regressed in 3.19.0-0.rc5.58.aa7a host kernel) +- Resolves: bz#1188247 + (backport "fix gBS->Stall()" series) + +* Mon Jan 19 2015 Miroslav Rezanina - AAVMF-20141113-3.git77d5dac.el7 +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-QemuBootOrderLib-expose-QEMU-s-boot-menu-on-.patch [bz#1172756] +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-PlatformBdsLib-get-front-page-timeout-from-Q.patch [bz#1172756] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-PlatformIntelBdsLib-get-front-p.patch [bz#1172756] +- Resolves: bz#1172756 + ([RFE]Expose boot-menu shortcut to domain via AAVMF) + +* Wed Jan 14 2015 Miroslav Rezanina - AAVMF-20141113-2.git77d5dac.el7 +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-VirtFdtDxe-forward-FwCfg-addres.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-introduce-QemuFwCfgLib-instance.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-clone-PlatformIntelBdsLib-from-.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-PlatformIntelBdsLib-add-basic-p.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-extract-QemuBootOrderLib.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-QemuBootOrderLib-featurize-PCI-like-device-p.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-introduce-VIRTIO_MMIO_TRANSPORT_GUID.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-VirtFdtDxe-use-dedicated-VIRTIO.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-QemuBootOrderLib-widen-ParseUnitAddressHexLi.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-OvmfPkg-QemuBootOrderLib-OFW-to-UEFI-translation-for.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-PlatformIntelBdsLib-adhere-to-Q.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-identify-new-shell-as-builtin-s.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-ArmVirtualizationPkg-Intel-BDS-load-EFI-stubbed-Linu.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-spec-build-AAVMF-with-the-Intel-BDS-driver-RHELSA-on.patch [bz#1172749] +- aavmf-Revert-ArmVirtualizationPkg-work-around-cache-incohe.patch [bz#1172910] +- Resolves: bz#1172749 + (implement fw_cfg, boot order handling, and -kernel booting in ArmVirtualizationQemu) +- Resolves: bz#1172910 + (revert Acadia-only workaround (commit df7bca4e) once Acadia host kernel (KVM) is fixed) + +* Fri Dec 05 2014 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20140822-7.git9ece15a.el7 +- ovmf-MdePkg-UefiScsiLib-do-not-encode-LUN-in-CDB-for-READ.patch [bz#1166971] +- ovmf-MdePkg-UefiScsiLib-do-not-encode-LUN-in-CDB-for-othe.patch [bz#1166971] +- Resolves: bz#1166971 + (virtio-scsi disks and cd-roms with nonzero LUN are rejected with errors) + +* Tue Nov 25 2014 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20140822-6.git9ece15a.el7 +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-make-dependency-on-PCI-enume.patch [bz#1166027] +- Resolves: bz#1166027 + (backport "OvmfPkg: AcpiPlatformDxe: make dependency on PCI enumeration explicit") + +* Tue Nov 18 2014 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20140822-4.git9ece15a.el7 +- ovmf-Add-comments-to-clarify-mPubKeyStore-buffer-MemCopy.patch [bz#1162314] +- ovmf-MdeModulePkg-SecurityPkg-Variable-Add-boundary-check.patch [bz#1162314] +- Resolves: bz#1162314 + (EMBARGOED OVMF: uefi: INTEL-TA-201410-001 && INTEL-TA-201410-002 [rhel-7.1]) + +* Thu Nov 13 2014 Laszlo Ersek - AAVMF-20141113-1.git77d5dac +- rebased to upstream 77d5dac + +- patch "ArmVirtualizationPkg: FdtPL011SerialPortLib: support UEFI_APPLICATION" + is now upstream (SVN r16219, git edb5073) + +* Thu Nov 13 2014 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20140822-3.git9ece15a.el7 +- ovmf-Revert-OvmfPkg-set-video-resolution-of-text-setup-to.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-Try-to-read-key-strike-even-when-the-TimeOuts-value-.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-BDS-remove-dead-call-to-PlatformBdsEnterFron.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-BDS-drop-useless-return-statement.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-BDS-don-t-overwrite-the-BDS-Front-Page-timeo.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-BDS-optimize-second-argument-in-PlatformBdsE.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-BDS-drop-superfluous-connect-first-boot-opti.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-BDS-drop-custom-boot-timeout-revert-to-Intel.patch [bz#1153927] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-set-video-resolution-of-text-setup-to-640x48.patch [bz#1153927] +- Resolves: bz#1153927 + (set NEXTBOOT to uefi setting failed from Windows Recovery console) + +* Tue Nov 11 2014 Miroslav Rezanina - OVMF-20140822-2.git9ece15a +- ovmf-redhat-process-rh-specific.sh-suppress-missing-files.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-Revert-RH-only-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-fix-querying-of-.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-Revert-RH-only-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-implement-QEM.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-Revert-RH-only-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-remove-curren.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-Revert-RH-only-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-actualize-Qem.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-Revert-RH-only-OvmfPkg-resolve-OrderedCollectionLib-.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-QemuVideoDxe-work-around-misreported-QXL-fra.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-resolve-OrderedCollectionLib-with-base-red-b.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-actualize-QemuLoader.h-comme.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-remove-current-ACPI-table-lo.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-AcpiPlatformDxe-implement-QEMU-s-full-ACPI-t.patch [bz#1145784] +- ovmf-spec-build-small-bootable-ISO-with-standalone-UEFI-s.patch [bz#1147592] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-allow-exclusion-of-the-shell-from-the-firmwa.patch [bz#1147592] +- ovmf-spec-exclude-the-UEFI-shell-from-the-SecureBoot-enab.patch [bz#1147592] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-application-for-enrolling-.patch [bz#1148296] +- ovmf-spec-package-EnrollDefaultKeys.efi-on-UefiShell.iso-.patch [bz#1148296] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-disable-stale-fork-of-SecureBootConfigDxe.patch [bz#1148294] +- ovmf-OvmfPkg-SecureBootConfigDxe-remove-stale-fork.patch [bz#1148294] +- Resolves: bz#1145784 + (OVMF sync with QXL and ACPI patches up to edk2 7a9612ce) +- Resolves: bz#1147592 + (the binary RPM should include a small ISO file with a directly bootable UEFI shell binary) +- Resolves: bz#1148294 + (drop OvmfPkg's stale fork of SecureBootConfigDxe) +- Resolves: bz#1148296 + (provide a non-interactive way to auto-enroll important SecureBoot certificates) + +* Wed Oct 15 2014 Laszlo Ersek - AAVMF-20141015-1.gitc373687 +- ported packaging to aarch64 / AAVMF + +* Fri Aug 22 2014 Laszlo Ersek - 20140822-1.git9ece15a.el7 +- rebase from upstream 3facc08 to 9ece15a +- update to openssl-0.9.8zb +- update to FatPkg SVN r86 (git 2355ea2c) +- the following patches of Paolo Bonzini have been merged in upstream; drop the + downstream-only copies: + 7bc1421 edksetup.sh: Look for BuildEnv under EDK_TOOLS_PATH + d549344 edksetup.sh: Ensure that WORKSPACE points to the top of an edk2 + checkout + 1c023eb BuildEnv: remove useless check before setting $WORKSPACE +- include the following patches that have been pending review on the upstream + list for a long time: + [PATCH 0/4] OvmfPkg: complete client for QEMU's ACPI loader interface + http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.bios.tianocore.devel/8369 + [PATCH] OvmfPkg: QemuVideoDxe: fix querying of QXL's drawable buffer size + http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.bios.tianocore.devel/8515 +- nasm is a build-time dependency now because upstream BuildTools has started + to call it directly + +* Wed Jul 23 2014 Laszlo Ersek - 20140723-1.git3facc08.el7 +- rebase from upstream a618eaa to 3facc08 +- update to openssl-0.9.8za +- drop downstream-only split varstore patch, rely on upstream's + +* Tue Jun 24 2014 Miroslav Rezanina - 20140619-1.gita618eaa.el7 +- Initial version