MSVSphere Packaging Team
5 months ago
parent
f5e8b16074
commit
94754c362c
@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
|
||||
de143fc38b339d982079517b6f01bcec5246cf5e SOURCES/DBXUpdate-20230509.x64.bin
|
||||
a1a81793c0fbda8685b41ff839a942af5eda280a SOURCES/edk2-ba91d0292e.tar.xz
|
||||
c0518a4102a3909928dcc2e0a2c1784a53a419c6 SOURCES/openssl-rhel-d00c3c5b8a9d6d3ea3dabfcafdf36afd61ba8bcc.tar.xz
|
||||
4b2ed0d355d3ef44e21a72573e17017630b6d33c SOURCES/edk2-8736b8fdca.tar.xz
|
||||
bf431935cb72db4d80c8435a0956abb25ca71185 SOURCES/openssl-rhel-db0287935122edceb91dcda8dfb53b4090734e22.tar.xz
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
|
||||
SOURCES/DBXUpdate-20230509.x64.bin
|
||||
SOURCES/edk2-ba91d0292e.tar.xz
|
||||
SOURCES/openssl-rhel-d00c3c5b8a9d6d3ea3dabfcafdf36afd61ba8bcc.tar.xz
|
||||
SOURCES/edk2-8736b8fdca.tar.xz
|
||||
SOURCES/openssl-rhel-db0287935122edceb91dcda8dfb53b4090734e22.tar.xz
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
|
||||
From 21816395a94558c8e5c97f13adbb5ffb909656b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 21:55:22 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] ignore build artifacts, generated files, session settings etc
|
||||
(RHEL only)
|
||||
|
||||
Notes about the RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] ->
|
||||
RHEL-8.5/20210520-e1999b264f1f [edk2-stable202105] rebase:
|
||||
|
||||
- no changes
|
||||
|
||||
Notes about the RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] ->
|
||||
RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] rebase:
|
||||
|
||||
- refresh against upstream commit 48760409ccc8 (".gitignore: Ignore python
|
||||
compiled files, extdeps, and vscode", 2019-11-11)
|
||||
|
||||
- add ".AutoGenIdFile.txt" to "Conf/.gitignore", in response to upstream
|
||||
commit 373298ca0d60 ("BaseTools: Fixed issue for IgnoreAutoGen",
|
||||
2019-09-10)
|
||||
|
||||
Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] ->
|
||||
RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase:
|
||||
|
||||
- no changes
|
||||
|
||||
Notes about the RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 ->
|
||||
RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd rebase:
|
||||
|
||||
- no changes
|
||||
|
||||
Notes about the RHEL-7.6/ovmf-20180508-2.gitee3198e672e2.el7 ->
|
||||
RHEL-8.0/20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase:
|
||||
|
||||
- reorder the rebase changelog in the commit message so that it reads like
|
||||
a blog: place more recent entries near the top
|
||||
- no changes to the patch body
|
||||
|
||||
Notes about the 20171011-92d07e48907f -> 20180508-ee3198e672e2 rebase:
|
||||
|
||||
- no changes
|
||||
|
||||
Notes about the 20170228-c325e41585e3 -> 20171011-92d07e48907f rebase:
|
||||
|
||||
- Conflict resolution against upstream commit 112f4ada2e6b ("edk2: Add
|
||||
.DS_Store to .gitignore for macOS", 2017-05-04), in the ".gitignore"
|
||||
file.
|
||||
|
||||
Notes about the 20160608b-988715a -> 20170228-c325e41585e3 rebase:
|
||||
|
||||
- no changes
|
||||
|
||||
Notes about the 9ece15a -> c9e5618 rebase:
|
||||
|
||||
- Upstream added .gitignore files in the meanwhile, we just need some
|
||||
light customization. In particular the Conf/ReadMe.txt file should not
|
||||
be ignored, it is not generated.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 3b9c914f2d6bff6274d5ed45fcf4c757ce27031b)
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit b66c3c6d11a834dc7cb3ab326f09c6a21c0b81e8)
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit c94381432988f6137de46772cbd4080d9832c9ad)
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 730cc57005e4908fcee29109672284808b21ec1c)
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 161184bcb55a670f8f7f8c4147825eb360b73794)
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 4eec2bb2176f2deda2b2c44a6f2ea167c5a43433)
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit ea548c8d0c9d4cd5b8b5200eda8ff6ac220a6307)
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 4872f69df8b0460fbbfcd75950d81fdcd213f8c0)
|
||||
---
|
||||
Conf/.gitignore | 7 ++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Conf/.gitignore b/Conf/.gitignore
|
||||
index 5e4debcc10..8601fc0cee 100644
|
||||
--- a/Conf/.gitignore
|
||||
+++ b/Conf/.gitignore
|
||||
@@ -1 +1,6 @@
|
||||
-*
|
||||
+.AutoGenIdFile.txt
|
||||
+.cache/
|
||||
+BuildEnv.sh
|
||||
+build_rule.txt
|
||||
+target.txt
|
||||
+tools_def.txt
|
||||
@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 37e0f9ed6e872224afe70065627de3965689425c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 20:45:26 +0200
|
||||
Subject: recreate / import "redhat/" directory
|
||||
|
||||
This patch now unites the following downstream commits:
|
||||
|
||||
- 18bd1193e7 .distro: simplify WORKSPACE setup
|
||||
- b00f3398c8 fix tpm build options
|
||||
- e032ab1675 spec: Centralize non-firmware %install files at the top
|
||||
- 8501863acc spec: Don't put build output in the top directory
|
||||
- e6ec0363d3 spec: Factor out OVMF_FLAGS and OVMF_SB_FLAGS
|
||||
- 596f34c8b6 spec: Use %make_build macro
|
||||
- 55169e466d spec: Replace RPM_BUILD_ROOT with %{buildroot}
|
||||
- 69c4c60920 spec: Split out build_iso() function
|
||||
- ed67da8c85 spec: Add %{qosb_testing} macro
|
||||
- 44519f5b94 spec: Move %check to between %install and %files
|
||||
- b37b334dc7 spec: Remove extra 'true' at end of %check
|
||||
- dd11149c3a spec: Add %{qemu_package} and %{qemu_binary}
|
||||
- 0f5d4ae0d5 spec: Move -D TPM_ENABLE to common CC_FLAGS
|
||||
- 84b3fd93f9 spec: Replace ifarch+else conditionals with build_XXX variables
|
||||
- e97f79e744 spec: Use %autosetup with our required git config options
|
||||
- 45a347a759 spec: don't conditionalize %package definitions
|
||||
- acfcfaea1e spec: Add BuildRequires: make
|
||||
- d917a93f6f spec: remove Group: and %defattr
|
||||
- f2d3be3ae3 redhat: build UefiShell.iso with xorriso rather than genisoimage
|
||||
- 3fb4a20f30 redhat: narrow the "qemu-kvm" BuildRequires down to "qemu-kvm-core"
|
||||
- bfb89c4ae5 redhat: drop Split tool from the edk2-tools subpackage
|
||||
- ac8be2e0ef redhat: refresh "Makefile.common" for the 8.5 rebase
|
||||
- 2bd2d18864 redhat: filter out jansson submodule removal hunks
|
||||
- f13d7899ed recreate / import "redhat/" directory
|
||||
|
||||
Merged patches (edk2-stable202202):
|
||||
- 1a7b1c3b72 spec: adapt specfile to build option changes, disable tpm1
|
||||
- 96eb388be3 spec: build amdsev variant
|
||||
- ea34352d41 redhat: bump OpenSSL dist-git submodule to a75722161d20 / RHEL-8.5
|
||||
|
||||
Merged patches (edk2-stable202208):
|
||||
- a60bf3fd10 Adding support for CentOS 9 build
|
||||
- d3f25d438c OvmfPkg: Update target machines config
|
||||
- d63f783930 openssl: jump to 8.7.0 branch (2022-07-22)
|
||||
- 39882ce96d qemu-ovmf-secureboot: Do not use submodule
|
||||
- 283ef4a67d ovmf-vars-generator: Use max cpu
|
||||
- b6887ef7e1 Update build target to RHEL 9.2.0
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Merged patches (edk2-stable202305):
|
||||
- 5eef16bd65 remove amd-sev feature flag from secure boot builds (rh only)
|
||||
- cc9e1b6eaa build script update
|
||||
- 046c1f08e6 PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy update
|
||||
- b9dc1b5365 add aarch64 qcow2 images
|
||||
- f4e2d6bf41 update json files
|
||||
- be03b42128 add libvirt version conflict
|
||||
- dce699b61d add dbx update blob (rh only)
|
||||
- d8b2407343 spec: apply dbx update (rh only)
|
||||
- a8a5ef95b5 dbx update, 2023-05-09, black lotus edition
|
||||
- 310e179053 json descriptors: explicitly set mode = split
|
||||
- additionally
|
||||
- update frh.py, add new upstream submodules
|
||||
- replace egrep with grep -E and fgrep with grep -F in downstream
|
||||
scripts
|
||||
- remove git commit sha from package version string
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
drop git sha
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
.distro/.gitignore | 3 +
|
||||
.distro/DBXUpdate-20230314.x64.bin | Bin 0 -> 13922 bytes
|
||||
.distro/DBXUpdate-20230509.x64.bin | Bin 0 -> 21170 bytes
|
||||
.distro/Makefile | 114 +
|
||||
.distro/Makefile.common | 31 +
|
||||
.distro/README | 236 ++
|
||||
.distro/RedHatSecureBootPkKek1.pem | 22 +
|
||||
.distro/TargetRelease | 4 +
|
||||
.distro/edk2-build.py | 391 +++
|
||||
.distro/edk2-build.rhel-9 | 119 +
|
||||
.distro/edk2.spec.template | 1301 +++++++++
|
||||
.../30-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb-enrolled.json | 36 +
|
||||
.distro/metafiles/40-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb.json | 35 +
|
||||
.distro/metafiles/50-edk2-aarch64-qcow2.json | 32 +
|
||||
.distro/metafiles/50-edk2-ovmf-x64-nosb.json | 35 +
|
||||
.distro/metafiles/51-edk2-aarch64-raw.json | 32 +
|
||||
.../52-edk2-aarch64-verbose-qcow2.json | 32 +
|
||||
.../53-edk2-aarch64-verbose-raw.json | 32 +
|
||||
.../metafiles/60-edk2-ovmf-x64-amdsev.json | 31 +
|
||||
.../metafiles/60-edk2-ovmf-x64-inteltdx.json | 29 +
|
||||
.distro/openssl-rhel | 1 +
|
||||
.distro/ovmf-whitepaper-c770f8c.txt | 2422 +++++++++++++++++
|
||||
.distro/qemu-ovmf-secureboot/CONTRIBUTING | 45 +
|
||||
.distro/qemu-ovmf-secureboot/LICENSE | 21 +
|
||||
.distro/qemu-ovmf-secureboot/README.md | 66 +
|
||||
.../qemu-ovmf-secureboot/ovmf-vars-generator | 296 ++
|
||||
.distro/rpmbuild/BUILD/.gitignore | 2 +
|
||||
.distro/rpmbuild/RPMS/.gitignore | 2 +
|
||||
.distro/rpmbuild/SOURCES/.gitignore | 2 +
|
||||
.distro/rpmbuild/SPECS/.gitignore | 2 +
|
||||
.distro/rpmbuild/SRPMS/.gitignore | 2 +
|
||||
.distro/scripts/edk2-guids | 85 +
|
||||
.distro/scripts/frh.py | 51 +
|
||||
.distro/scripts/git-backport-diff | 327 +++
|
||||
.distro/scripts/git-compile-check | 215 ++
|
||||
.distro/scripts/openssl-update | 79 +
|
||||
.distro/scripts/process-patches.sh | 75 +
|
||||
.distro/scripts/tarball_checksum.sh | 3 +
|
||||
.gitattributes | 15 +
|
||||
.gitignore | 16 +-
|
||||
.gitmodules | 4 +
|
||||
sources | 1 +
|
||||
42 files changed, 6240 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/.gitignore
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/DBXUpdate-20230314.x64.bin
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/DBXUpdate-20230509.x64.bin
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/Makefile
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/Makefile.common
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/README
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/RedHatSecureBootPkKek1.pem
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/TargetRelease
|
||||
create mode 100755 .distro/edk2-build.py
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/edk2-build.rhel-9
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/edk2.spec.template
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/metafiles/30-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb-enrolled.json
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/metafiles/40-edk2-ovmf-x64-sb.json
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/metafiles/50-edk2-aarch64-qcow2.json
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/metafiles/50-edk2-ovmf-x64-nosb.json
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/metafiles/51-edk2-aarch64-raw.json
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/metafiles/52-edk2-aarch64-verbose-qcow2.json
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/metafiles/53-edk2-aarch64-verbose-raw.json
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/metafiles/60-edk2-ovmf-x64-amdsev.json
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/metafiles/60-edk2-ovmf-x64-inteltdx.json
|
||||
create mode 160000 .distro/openssl-rhel
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/ovmf-whitepaper-c770f8c.txt
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/qemu-ovmf-secureboot/CONTRIBUTING
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/qemu-ovmf-secureboot/LICENSE
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/qemu-ovmf-secureboot/README.md
|
||||
create mode 100755 .distro/qemu-ovmf-secureboot/ovmf-vars-generator
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/rpmbuild/BUILD/.gitignore
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/rpmbuild/RPMS/.gitignore
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/rpmbuild/SOURCES/.gitignore
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/rpmbuild/SPECS/.gitignore
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/rpmbuild/SRPMS/.gitignore
|
||||
create mode 100755 .distro/scripts/edk2-guids
|
||||
create mode 100644 .distro/scripts/frh.py
|
||||
create mode 100755 .distro/scripts/git-backport-diff
|
||||
create mode 100755 .distro/scripts/git-compile-check
|
||||
create mode 100755 .distro/scripts/openssl-update
|
||||
create mode 100755 .distro/scripts/process-patches.sh
|
||||
create mode 100755 .distro/scripts/tarball_checksum.sh
|
||||
create mode 100644 .gitattributes
|
||||
create mode 100644 sources
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/sources b/sources
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..ea8c8ad50b
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/sources
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
+SHA512 (edk2-ba91d0292e.tar.xz) = 3b21cc39671d28bfeb059da3683751cc5277c63a894b2a05bdfbd2bbe53545c34f04c229becf44f1563f89a738f37ae8f2333076d126a7e94d234bc4bb25454c
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From fb3719378d7ce646c684fc2c8b52806aca0c576a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Sat, 16 Nov 2019 17:11:27 +0100
|
||||
Subject: CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: list RHEL8-specific OpenSSL files in the INFs
|
||||
(RH)
|
||||
|
||||
Notes about the RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] ->
|
||||
RHEL-8.5/20210520-e1999b264f1f [edk2-stable202105] rebase:
|
||||
|
||||
- Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1938257
|
||||
|
||||
- Recreate the patch based on downstream commits:
|
||||
|
||||
- 56c4bb81b311 ("CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: list RHEL8-specific OpenSSL files
|
||||
in the INFs (RH)", 2020-06-05),
|
||||
- e81751a1c303 ("CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: Upgrade OpenSSL to 1.1.1g",
|
||||
2020-11-23),
|
||||
- 3e3fe5e62079 ("redhat: bump OpenSSL dist-git submodule to 1.1.1g+ /
|
||||
RHEL-8.4", 2020-11-23).
|
||||
|
||||
(1) At e81751a1c303, downstream edk2 was in sync with upstream edk2
|
||||
consuming OpenSSL 1.1.1g (upstream edk2 commit 8c30327debb2
|
||||
("CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: Upgrade OpenSSL to 1.1.1g", 2020-07-25)).
|
||||
|
||||
Since commit 8c30327debb2, upstream edk2 modified the OpensslLib INF
|
||||
files, namely
|
||||
|
||||
- CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf
|
||||
- CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf
|
||||
|
||||
in the following commits only:
|
||||
|
||||
- be01087e0780 ("CryptoPkg/Library: Remove the redundant build
|
||||
option", 2020-08-12), which did not affect the source file list at
|
||||
all,
|
||||
|
||||
- b5701a4c7a0f ("CryptoPkg: OpensslLib: Use RngLib to generate
|
||||
entropy in rand_pool", 2020-09-18), which replaced some of the
|
||||
*edk2-specific* "rand_pool_noise" source files with an RngLib
|
||||
dependency.
|
||||
|
||||
This means that the list of required, actual OpenSSL source files
|
||||
has not changed in upstream edk2 since our downstream edk2 commit
|
||||
e81751a1c303.
|
||||
|
||||
(2) At commit 3e3fe5e62079 (the direct child of e81751a1c303),
|
||||
downstream edk2's OpenSSL dependency was satisfied with RHEL-8
|
||||
OpenSSL at dist-git commit bdd048e929dc ("Two fixes that will be
|
||||
shipped in RHEL-8.3.0.z", 2020-10-23).
|
||||
|
||||
Since commit bdd048e929dc, RHEL-8 OpenSSL dist-git advanced
|
||||
(fast-forwarded) to commit a75722161d20 ("Update to version 1.1.1k",
|
||||
2021-05-25), which is the current head of the rhel-8.5.0 branch.
|
||||
(See also <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1938257#c6>.)
|
||||
|
||||
At both dist-git bdd048e929dc and dist-git a75722161d20, I built the
|
||||
respective RHEL-8 OpenSSL *source* RPM, and prepped the respective
|
||||
source tree, with "rpmbuild -bp". Subsequently I compared the
|
||||
prepped source trees recursively.
|
||||
|
||||
- The following files disappeared:
|
||||
|
||||
- 29 backup files created by "patch",
|
||||
|
||||
- the assembly generator perl script called
|
||||
"ecp_nistz256-avx2.pl", which is not used during the build.
|
||||
|
||||
- The following new files appeared:
|
||||
|
||||
- 18 files directly or indirectly under the "test" subdirectory,
|
||||
which are not used during the build,
|
||||
|
||||
- 5 backup files created by "patch",
|
||||
|
||||
- 2 DCL scripts used when building OpenSSL on OpenVMS.
|
||||
|
||||
This means that the total list of RHEL-8 OpenSSL source files has
|
||||
not changed in RHEL-8 OpenSSL dist-git since our downstream edk2
|
||||
commit 3e3fe5e62079.
|
||||
|
||||
As a result, copy the "RHEL8-specific OpenSSL file list" sections
|
||||
verbatim from the INF files, at downstream commit e81751a1c303. (I used
|
||||
the "git checkout -p e81751a1c303 -- Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf
|
||||
CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf" command.)
|
||||
|
||||
Notes about the RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] ->
|
||||
RHEL-8.3/20200603-ca407c7246bf [edk2-stable202005] rebase:
|
||||
|
||||
- "OpensslLib.inf":
|
||||
|
||||
- Automatic leading context refresh against upstream commit c72ca4666886
|
||||
("CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: Add "sort" keyword to header file parsing
|
||||
loop", 2020-03-10).
|
||||
|
||||
- Manual trailing context refresh against upstream commit b49a6c8f80d9
|
||||
("CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: improve INF file consistency", 2019-12-02).
|
||||
|
||||
- "OpensslLibCrypto.inf":
|
||||
|
||||
- Automatic leading context refresh against upstream commits
|
||||
8906f076de35 ("CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: Add missing header files in INF
|
||||
file", 2019-08-16) and 9f4fbd56d430 ("CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: Update
|
||||
process_files.pl to generate .h files", 2019-10-30).
|
||||
|
||||
Notes about the RHEL-8.1/20190308-89910a39dcfd [edk2-stable201903] ->
|
||||
RHEL-8.2/20190904-37eef91017ad [edk2-stable201908] rebase:
|
||||
|
||||
- new patch
|
||||
|
||||
The downstream changes in RHEL8's OpenSSL package, for example in
|
||||
"openssl-1.1.1-evp-kdf.patch", introduce new files, and even move some
|
||||
preexistent code into those new files. In order to avoid undefined
|
||||
references in link editing, we have to list the new files.
|
||||
|
||||
Note: "process_files.pl" is not re-run at this time manually, because
|
||||
|
||||
(a) "process_files.pl" would pollute the file list (and some of the
|
||||
auto-generated header files) with RHEL8-specific FIPS artifacts, which
|
||||
are explicitly unwanted in edk2,
|
||||
|
||||
(b) The RHEL OpenSSL maintainer, Tomas Mraz, identified this specific set
|
||||
of files in <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1749693#c10>,
|
||||
and will help with future changes too.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 57bd3f146590df8757865d8f2cdd1db3cf3f4d40)
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 56c4bb81b311dfcee6a34c81d3e4feeda7f88995)
|
||||
---
|
||||
CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf | 12 ++++++++++++
|
||||
CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf | 12 ++++++++++++
|
||||
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf
|
||||
index 0f64c9fa7e..1641754e4d 100644
|
||||
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf
|
||||
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf
|
||||
@@ -576,6 +576,18 @@
|
||||
$(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/statem/statem.h
|
||||
$(OPENSSL_PATH)/ssl/statem/statem_local.h
|
||||
# Autogenerated files list ends here
|
||||
+# RHEL8-specific OpenSSL file list starts here
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kbkdf.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/krb5kdf.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/sshkdf.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/sskdf.c
|
||||
+# RHEL8-specific OpenSSL file list ends here
|
||||
buildinf.h
|
||||
ossl_store.c
|
||||
rand_pool.c
|
||||
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf
|
||||
index 311cd1e605..7e980a7d03 100644
|
||||
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf
|
||||
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLibCrypto.inf
|
||||
@@ -526,6 +526,18 @@
|
||||
$(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/standard_exts.h
|
||||
$(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/x509v3/v3_admis.h
|
||||
# Autogenerated files list ends here
|
||||
+# RHEL8-specific OpenSSL file list starts here
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/kdf_lib.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/evp/pkey_kdf.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kbkdf.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/krb5kdf.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/sshkdf.c
|
||||
+ $(OPENSSL_PATH)/crypto/kdf/sskdf.c
|
||||
+# RHEL8-specific OpenSSL file list ends here
|
||||
buildinf.h
|
||||
ossl_store.c
|
||||
rand_pool.c
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 218d3b32592bffe5ec7317c4838d29e92b4b86f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2023 12:01:36 +0100
|
||||
Subject: OvmfPkg: disable dynamic mmio window (rhel only)
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c | 3 ++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
index acf90b4e93..86700fc028 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
@@ -679,7 +679,8 @@ PlatformDynamicMmioWindow (
|
||||
AddrSpace = LShiftU64 (1, PlatformInfoHob->PhysMemAddressWidth);
|
||||
MmioSpace = LShiftU64 (1, PlatformInfoHob->PhysMemAddressWidth - 3);
|
||||
|
||||
- if ((PlatformInfoHob->PcdPciMmio64Size < MmioSpace) &&
|
||||
+ if (FALSE /* disable for RHEL-9.2, libvirt is not ready yet */ &&
|
||||
+ (PlatformInfoHob->PcdPciMmio64Size < MmioSpace) &&
|
||||
(PlatformInfoHob->PcdPciMmio64Base + MmioSpace < AddrSpace))
|
||||
{
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: using dynamic mmio window\n", __func__));
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
|
||||
From 771ce5bae1eb03240b04dde05a7a40dcec3c8a10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 20:45:26 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] recreate / import ".distro/" directory
|
||||
|
||||
This patch now unites the following downstream commits:
|
||||
|
||||
- 18bd1193e7 .distro: simplify WORKSPACE setup
|
||||
- b00f3398c8 fix tpm build options
|
||||
- e032ab1675 spec: Centralize non-firmware %install files at the top
|
||||
- 8501863acc spec: Don't put build output in the top directory
|
||||
- e6ec0363d3 spec: Factor out OVMF_FLAGS and OVMF_SB_FLAGS
|
||||
- 596f34c8b6 spec: Use %make_build macro
|
||||
- 55169e466d spec: Replace RPM_BUILD_ROOT with %{buildroot}
|
||||
- 69c4c60920 spec: Split out build_iso() function
|
||||
- ed67da8c85 spec: Add %{qosb_testing} macro
|
||||
- 44519f5b94 spec: Move %check to between %install and %files
|
||||
- b37b334dc7 spec: Remove extra 'true' at end of %check
|
||||
- dd11149c3a spec: Add %{qemu_package} and %{qemu_binary}
|
||||
- 0f5d4ae0d5 spec: Move -D TPM_ENABLE to common CC_FLAGS
|
||||
- 84b3fd93f9 spec: Replace ifarch+else conditionals with build_XXX variables
|
||||
- e97f79e744 spec: Use %autosetup with our required git config options
|
||||
- 45a347a759 spec: don't conditionalize %package definitions
|
||||
- acfcfaea1e spec: Add BuildRequires: make
|
||||
- d917a93f6f spec: remove Group: and %defattr
|
||||
- f2d3be3ae3 redhat: build UefiShell.iso with xorriso rather than genisoimage
|
||||
- 3fb4a20f30 redhat: narrow the "qemu-kvm" BuildRequires down to "qemu-kvm-core"
|
||||
- bfb89c4ae5 redhat: drop Split tool from the edk2-tools subpackage
|
||||
- ac8be2e0ef redhat: refresh "Makefile.common" for the 8.5 rebase
|
||||
- 2bd2d18864 redhat: filter out jansson submodule removal hunks
|
||||
- f13d7899ed recreate / import "redhat/" directory
|
||||
|
||||
Merged patches (edk2-stable202202):
|
||||
- 1a7b1c3b72 spec: adapt specfile to build option changes, disable tpm1
|
||||
- 96eb388be3 spec: build amdsev variant
|
||||
- ea34352d41 redhat: bump OpenSSL dist-git submodule to a75722161d20 / RHEL-8.5
|
||||
|
||||
Merged patches (edk2-stable202208):
|
||||
- a60bf3fd10 Adding support for CentOS 9 build
|
||||
- d3f25d438c OvmfPkg: Update target machines config
|
||||
- d63f783930 openssl: jump to 8.7.0 branch (2022-07-22)
|
||||
- 39882ce96d qemu-ovmf-secureboot: Do not use submodule
|
||||
- 283ef4a67d ovmf-vars-generator: Use max cpu
|
||||
- b6887ef7e1 Update build target to RHEL 9.2.0
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Merged patches (edk2-stable202305):
|
||||
- 5eef16bd65 remove amd-sev feature flag from secure boot builds (rh only)
|
||||
- cc9e1b6eaa build script update
|
||||
- 046c1f08e6 PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy update
|
||||
- b9dc1b5365 add aarch64 qcow2 images
|
||||
- f4e2d6bf41 update json files
|
||||
- be03b42128 add libvirt version conflict
|
||||
- dce699b61d add dbx update blob (rh only)
|
||||
- d8b2407343 spec: apply dbx update (rh only)
|
||||
- a8a5ef95b5 dbx update, 2023-05-09, black lotus edition
|
||||
- 310e179053 json descriptors: explicitly set mode = split
|
||||
- additionally
|
||||
- update frh.py, add new upstream submodules
|
||||
- replace egrep with grep -E and fgrep with grep -F in downstream
|
||||
scripts
|
||||
- remove git commit sha from package version string
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Rebase to edk2-stable202311: squash commits:
|
||||
|
||||
- 5b833f0c8d Update TargetRelease to support 9.4.0
|
||||
- 20024b4cbe Use fixed length for short hash for Makefile
|
||||
- 8618f7367e Updated TargetRelease content to support 9.4.0 only.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
sources | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
create mode 100644 sources
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/sources b/sources
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..ea8c8ad50b
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/sources
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
+SHA512 (edk2-ba91d0292e.tar.xz) = 3b21cc39671d28bfeb059da3683751cc5277c63a894b2a05bdfbd2bbe53545c34f04c229becf44f1563f89a738f37ae8f2333076d126a7e94d234bc4bb25454c
|
||||
@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 5c2e46b64824e5432181507ec0706f7fe74c3fe2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 11:21:52 +0200
|
||||
Subject: ArmPkg: Disable EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL (RH only)
|
||||
|
||||
Recent versions of shim (15.6 and 15.7) crash when the newly added
|
||||
EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL is provided by the firmware. To allow
|
||||
existing installations to boot, provide a workaround in form of a Pcd
|
||||
that allows tuning it off at build time (defaults to 'enabled').
|
||||
Additionally, check the return code of the protocol installation calls.
|
||||
|
||||
Disable the EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL protocol out builds.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
.distro/edk2-build.rhel-9 | 2 ++
|
||||
ArmPkg/ArmPkg.dec | 3 +++
|
||||
ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.c | 13 +++++++++++--
|
||||
ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf | 1 +
|
||||
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/ArmPkg/ArmPkg.dec b/ArmPkg/ArmPkg.dec
|
||||
index 2444457ae5..d9e579b5fa 100644
|
||||
--- a/ArmPkg/ArmPkg.dec
|
||||
+++ b/ArmPkg/ArmPkg.dec
|
||||
@@ -167,6 +167,9 @@
|
||||
gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuVectorBaseAddress|0xffff0000|UINT64|0x00000004
|
||||
gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuResetAddress|0x00000000|UINT32|0x00000005
|
||||
|
||||
+ # Enable/Disable EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL
|
||||
+ gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEnableEfiMemoryAttributeProtocol|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x000000EE
|
||||
+
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ARM Secure Firmware PCDs
|
||||
#
|
||||
diff --git a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.c b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.c
|
||||
index d04958e79e..ff7d735b2b 100644
|
||||
--- a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.c
|
||||
+++ b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.c
|
||||
@@ -244,10 +244,19 @@ CpuDxeInitialize (
|
||||
&mCpuHandle,
|
||||
&gEfiCpuArchProtocolGuid,
|
||||
&mCpu,
|
||||
- &gEfiMemoryAttributeProtocolGuid,
|
||||
- &mMemoryAttribute,
|
||||
NULL
|
||||
);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (PcdGetBool (PcdEnableEfiMemoryAttributeProtocol)) {
|
||||
+ Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
|
||||
+ &mCpuHandle,
|
||||
+ &gEfiMemoryAttributeProtocolGuid,
|
||||
+ &mMemoryAttribute,
|
||||
+ NULL
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Make sure GCD and MMU settings match. This API calls gDS->SetMemorySpaceAttributes ()
|
||||
diff --git a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf
|
||||
index e732e21cb9..1bad4ae160 100644
|
||||
--- a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf
|
||||
+++ b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf
|
||||
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
[Pcd.common]
|
||||
gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdVFPEnabled
|
||||
+ gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEnableEfiMemoryAttributeProtocol
|
||||
|
||||
[FeaturePcd.common]
|
||||
gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebuggerExceptionSupport
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
||||
From c0347206c55c9d4d69b46725e9edbb21448f7494 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 12:11:55 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] distro: apply 'git diff c9s new_c9s' by mirek
|
||||
|
||||
Bring .distro toi latest standards for more automatic support.
|
||||
---
|
||||
CryptoPkg/.gitignore | 1 -
|
||||
sources | 1 -
|
||||
2 files changed, 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
delete mode 100644 CryptoPkg/.gitignore
|
||||
delete mode 100644 sources
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/.gitignore b/CryptoPkg/.gitignore
|
||||
deleted file mode 100644
|
||||
index 68b83272b7..0000000000
|
||||
--- a/CryptoPkg/.gitignore
|
||||
+++ /dev/null
|
||||
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
||||
-Library/OpensslLib/openssl*/
|
||||
diff --git a/sources b/sources
|
||||
deleted file mode 100644
|
||||
index ea8c8ad50b..0000000000
|
||||
--- a/sources
|
||||
+++ /dev/null
|
||||
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
||||
-SHA512 (edk2-ba91d0292e.tar.xz) = 3b21cc39671d28bfeb059da3683751cc5277c63a894b2a05bdfbd2bbe53545c34f04c229becf44f1563f89a738f37ae8f2333076d126a7e94d234bc4bb25454c
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
|
||||
From 192cc2b49dbccc59f5731e2abc120bed3e06cc32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 13:11:02 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] CryptoPkg/CrtLib: add stat.h include file.
|
||||
|
||||
Needed by rhel downstream openssl patches.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/stat.h | 9 +++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
|
||||
create mode 100644 CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/stat.h
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/stat.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/stat.h
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..22247bb2db
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/sys/stat.h
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
+/** @file
|
||||
+ Include file to support building the third-party cryptographic library.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+Copyright (c) 2010 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
||||
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#include <CrtLibSupport.h>
|
||||
@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 8f924bd2691789f6b0d9deae9ddb046677a0610b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 16 May 2023 11:47:58 +0200
|
||||
Subject: OvmfPkg/PciHotPlugInitDxe: Do not reserve IO ports by default.
|
||||
|
||||
Flip the default for IO address space reservations for PCI(e) bridges
|
||||
and root ports with hotplug support from TRUE to FALSE.
|
||||
|
||||
PCI(e) bridges will still get IO address space assigned in case:
|
||||
|
||||
(a) Downstream devices actually need IO address space, or
|
||||
(b) Explicit configuration, using "qemu -device
|
||||
pcie-root-port,io-reserve=<size>".
|
||||
|
||||
In case IO address space is exhausted edk2 will stop assigning resources
|
||||
to PCI(e) bridges. This is not limited to IO resources, the affected
|
||||
bridges will not get any memory resources assigned either.
|
||||
|
||||
This patch solves this issue by not handing out the scarce IO address
|
||||
space, which is not needed in most cases anyway. Result is a more
|
||||
consistent PCI configuration in virtual machine configurations with many
|
||||
PCie root ports.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 27727338b2c0e3f50eb0176a1044e903fcb3c3b1)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/PciHotPlugInitDxe/PciHotPlugInit.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PciHotPlugInitDxe/PciHotPlugInit.c b/OvmfPkg/PciHotPlugInitDxe/PciHotPlugInit.c
|
||||
index 6b2b6797b3..69903a6009 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/PciHotPlugInitDxe/PciHotPlugInit.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PciHotPlugInitDxe/PciHotPlugInit.c
|
||||
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ GetResourcePadding (
|
||||
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- DefaultIo = TRUE;
|
||||
+ DefaultIo = FALSE;
|
||||
DefaultMmio = TRUE;
|
||||
DefaultPrefMmio = TRUE;
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
|
||||
From 09ccd0ffae512d7f0a7548cdfbc60e1482153796 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 13:27:09 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] CryptoPkg/CrtLib: add access/open/read/write/close syscalls
|
||||
|
||||
Needed by rhel downstream openssl patches, they use unix syscalls
|
||||
for file access (instead of fopen + friends like the rest of the
|
||||
code base). No actual file access is needed for edk2, so just
|
||||
add stubs to make linking work.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
.../Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h | 41 +++++++++++++++++
|
||||
2 files changed, 87 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c
|
||||
index 37cdecc9bd..dfdb635536 100644
|
||||
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c
|
||||
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/SysCall/CrtWrapper.c
|
||||
@@ -550,6 +550,52 @@ fread (
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+int
|
||||
+access(
|
||||
+ const char*,
|
||||
+ int
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+int
|
||||
+open (
|
||||
+ const char *,
|
||||
+ int
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ssize_t
|
||||
+read (
|
||||
+ int,
|
||||
+ void*,
|
||||
+ size_t
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ssize_t
|
||||
+write (
|
||||
+ int,
|
||||
+ const void*,
|
||||
+ size_t
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+int
|
||||
+close (
|
||||
+ int
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
uid_t
|
||||
getuid (
|
||||
void
|
||||
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h
|
||||
index f36fe08f0c..7d98496af8 100644
|
||||
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h
|
||||
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/Include/CrtLibSupport.h
|
||||
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Definitions for global constants used by CRT library routines
|
||||
//
|
||||
+#define EINTR 4
|
||||
#define EINVAL 22 /* Invalid argument */
|
||||
#define EAFNOSUPPORT 47 /* Address family not supported by protocol family */
|
||||
#define INT_MAX 0x7FFFFFFF /* Maximum (signed) int value */
|
||||
@@ -102,6 +103,15 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
#define NS_INADDRSZ 4 /*%< IPv4 T_A */
|
||||
#define NS_IN6ADDRSZ 16 /*%< IPv6 T_AAAA */
|
||||
|
||||
+#define O_RDONLY 00000000
|
||||
+#define O_WRONLY 00000001
|
||||
+#define O_RDWR 00000002
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define R_OK 4
|
||||
+#define W_OK 2
|
||||
+#define X_OK 1
|
||||
+#define F_OK 0
|
||||
+
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Basic types mapping
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -324,6 +334,37 @@ fprintf (
|
||||
...
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
+int
|
||||
+access(
|
||||
+ const char*,
|
||||
+ int
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+int
|
||||
+open (
|
||||
+ const char *,
|
||||
+ int
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ssize_t
|
||||
+read (
|
||||
+ int,
|
||||
+ void*,
|
||||
+ size_t
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ssize_t
|
||||
+write (
|
||||
+ int,
|
||||
+ const void*,
|
||||
+ size_t
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+int
|
||||
+close (
|
||||
+ int
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
time_t
|
||||
time (
|
||||
time_t *
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
|
||||
From 0120fb7b5877ab40537fd17e64772f53bc89cd07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2023 10:41:08 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] ArmVirtQemu: Allow EFI memory attributes protocol to be
|
||||
disabled
|
||||
|
||||
Shim's PE loader uses the EFI memory attributes protocol in a way that
|
||||
results in an immediate crash when invoking the loaded image, unless the
|
||||
base and size of its executable segment are both aligned to 4k.
|
||||
|
||||
If this is not the case, it will strip the memory allocation of its
|
||||
executable permissions, but fail to add them back for the executable
|
||||
region, resulting in non-executable code. Unfortunately, the PE loader
|
||||
does not even bother invoking the protocol in this case (as it notices
|
||||
the misalignment), making it very hard for system firmware to work
|
||||
around this by attempting to infer the intent of the caller.
|
||||
|
||||
So let's introduce a QEMU command line option to indicate that the
|
||||
protocol should not be exposed at all, and a PCD to set the default for
|
||||
this option when it is omitted.
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Tested-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Link: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1990
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit cee7ba349c0c1ce489001a338a4e28555728b573)
|
||||
---
|
||||
ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtPkg.dec | 6 ++
|
||||
.../PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
.../PlatformBootManagerLib.inf | 3 +
|
||||
3 files changed, 73 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtPkg.dec b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtPkg.dec
|
||||
index 0f2d787327..313aebda90 100644
|
||||
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtPkg.dec
|
||||
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtPkg.dec
|
||||
@@ -68,3 +68,9 @@
|
||||
# Cloud Hypervisor has no other way to pass Rsdp address to the guest except use a PCD.
|
||||
#
|
||||
gArmVirtTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCloudHvAcpiRsdpBaseAddress|0x0|UINT64|0x00000005
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ##
|
||||
+ # Whether the EFI memory attributes protocol should be uninstalled before
|
||||
+ # invoking the OS loader. This may be needed to work around problematic
|
||||
+ # builds of shim that use the protocol incorrectly.
|
||||
+ gArmVirtTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUninstallMemAttrProtocol|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00000006
|
||||
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c
|
||||
index 85c01351b0..8e93f3cfed 100644
|
||||
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c
|
||||
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
|
||||
#include <Library/PcdLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/PlatformBmPrintScLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/QemuBootOrderLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/QemuFwCfgSimpleParserLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/TpmPlatformHierarchyLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/UefiBootManagerLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Protocol/DevicePath.h>
|
||||
@@ -1111,6 +1112,49 @@ PlatformBootManagerBeforeConsole (
|
||||
FilterAndProcess (&gEfiPciIoProtocolGuid, IsVirtioPciSerial, SetupVirtioSerial);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ Uninstall the EFI memory attribute protocol if it exists.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+STATIC
|
||||
+VOID
|
||||
+UninstallEfiMemoryAttributesProtocol (
|
||||
+ VOID
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ EFI_HANDLE Handle;
|
||||
+ UINTN Size;
|
||||
+ VOID *MemoryAttributeProtocol;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Size = sizeof (Handle);
|
||||
+ Status = gBS->LocateHandle (
|
||||
+ ByProtocol,
|
||||
+ &gEfiMemoryAttributeProtocolGuid,
|
||||
+ NULL,
|
||||
+ &Size,
|
||||
+ &Handle
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ ASSERT (Status == EFI_NOT_FOUND);
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (
|
||||
+ Handle,
|
||||
+ &gEfiMemoryAttributeProtocolGuid,
|
||||
+ &MemoryAttributeProtocol
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = gBS->UninstallProtocolInterface (
|
||||
+ Handle,
|
||||
+ &gEfiMemoryAttributeProtocolGuid,
|
||||
+ MemoryAttributeProtocol
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
Do the platform specific action after the console is ready
|
||||
Possible things that can be done in PlatformBootManagerAfterConsole:
|
||||
@@ -1129,12 +1173,32 @@ PlatformBootManagerAfterConsole (
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RETURN_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ BOOLEAN Uninstall;
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Show the splash screen.
|
||||
//
|
||||
BootLogoEnableLogo ();
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Work around shim's terminally broken use of the EFI memory attributes
|
||||
+ // protocol, by uninstalling it if requested on the QEMU command line.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // E.g.,
|
||||
+ // -fw_cfg opt/org.tianocore/UninstallMemAttrProtocol,string=y
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ Uninstall = FixedPcdGetBool (PcdUninstallMemAttrProtocol);
|
||||
+ QemuFwCfgParseBool ("opt/org.tianocore/UninstallMemAttrProtocol", &Uninstall);
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((
|
||||
+ DEBUG_WARN,
|
||||
+ "%a: %auninstalling EFI memory protocol\n",
|
||||
+ __func__,
|
||||
+ Uninstall ? "" : "not "
|
||||
+ ));
|
||||
+ if (Uninstall) {
|
||||
+ UninstallEfiMemoryAttributesProtocol ();
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Process QEMU's -kernel command line option. The kernel booted this way
|
||||
// will receive ACPI tables: in PlatformBootManagerBeforeConsole(), we
|
||||
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBootManagerLib.inf b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBootManagerLib.inf
|
||||
index 997eb1a442..70e4ebf94a 100644
|
||||
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBootManagerLib.inf
|
||||
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBootManagerLib.inf
|
||||
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
|
||||
PcdLib
|
||||
PlatformBmPrintScLib
|
||||
QemuBootOrderLib
|
||||
+ QemuFwCfgSimpleParserLib
|
||||
QemuLoadImageLib
|
||||
ReportStatusCodeLib
|
||||
TpmPlatformHierarchyLib
|
||||
@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@
|
||||
UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib
|
||||
|
||||
[FixedPcd]
|
||||
+ gArmVirtTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUninstallMemAttrProtocol
|
||||
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUartDefaultBaudRate
|
||||
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUartDefaultDataBits
|
||||
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUartDefaultParity
|
||||
@@ -73,5 +75,6 @@
|
||||
[Protocols]
|
||||
gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid
|
||||
gEfiGraphicsOutputProtocolGuid
|
||||
+ gEfiMemoryAttributeProtocolGuid
|
||||
gEfiPciRootBridgeIoProtocolGuid
|
||||
gVirtioDeviceProtocolGuid
|
||||
@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 9572a0fe959277c5b57df05a32503ff83a7e93af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2023 13:57:11 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 02/12] ArmVirt/PlatformBootManagerLib: factor out IsVirtio()
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 39: ArmVirt: add VirtioSerialDxe to ArmVirtQemu builds
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-643
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [2/6] 553a155707eb1c878133c1d13f6422c2b70fb78d (kraxel/centos-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
IsVirtioRng() becomes just a thin wrapper for IsVirtio().
|
||||
This allows to add similar thin wrappers for other virtio
|
||||
devices in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit a196b04926e70880334fcd649837d0ac63b0bfd5)
|
||||
---
|
||||
.../PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----
|
||||
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c
|
||||
index 10c815378c..5eb6f0f9c1 100644
|
||||
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c
|
||||
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c
|
||||
@@ -269,15 +269,16 @@ IsPciDisplay (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
- This FILTER_FUNCTION checks if a handle corresponds to a Virtio RNG device at
|
||||
- the VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL level.
|
||||
+ This function checks if a handle corresponds to the Virtio Device ID given
|
||||
+ at the VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL level.
|
||||
**/
|
||||
STATIC
|
||||
BOOLEAN
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
-IsVirtioRng (
|
||||
+IsVirtio (
|
||||
IN EFI_HANDLE Handle,
|
||||
- IN CONST CHAR16 *ReportText
|
||||
+ IN CONST CHAR16 *ReportText,
|
||||
+ IN UINT16 VirtIoDeviceId
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
@@ -293,7 +294,22 @@ IsVirtioRng (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return (BOOLEAN)(VirtIo->SubSystemDeviceId ==
|
||||
- VIRTIO_SUBSYSTEM_ENTROPY_SOURCE);
|
||||
+ VirtIoDeviceId);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This FILTER_FUNCTION checks if a handle corresponds to a Virtio RNG device at
|
||||
+ the VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL level.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+STATIC
|
||||
+BOOLEAN
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+IsVirtioRng (
|
||||
+ IN EFI_HANDLE Handle,
|
||||
+ IN CONST CHAR16 *ReportText
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return IsVirtio (Handle, ReportText, VIRTIO_SUBSYSTEM_ENTROPY_SOURCE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 8545529f2b6d967946f111d79455ec8896d53311 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2023 13:57:12 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 03/12] ArmVirt/PlatformBootManagerLib: factor out
|
||||
IsVirtioPci()
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 39: ArmVirt: add VirtioSerialDxe to ArmVirtQemu builds
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-643
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [3/6] d0000df1169e1f7b8ce3ad4942460cdc661a0ed9 (kraxel/centos-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
IsVirtioPciRng() becomes just a thin wrapper for IsVirtioPci().
|
||||
This allows to add similar thin wrappers for other virtio
|
||||
devices in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit aaf546879ab71722c36738ccc6f0f0ab4ecf5076)
|
||||
---
|
||||
.../PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c | 30 ++++++++++++++-----
|
||||
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c
|
||||
index 5eb6f0f9c1..ed38c42a43 100644
|
||||
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c
|
||||
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c
|
||||
@@ -313,15 +313,16 @@ IsVirtioRng (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
- This FILTER_FUNCTION checks if a handle corresponds to a Virtio RNG device at
|
||||
- the EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL level.
|
||||
+ This function checks if a handle corresponds to the Virtio Device ID given
|
||||
+ at the EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL level.
|
||||
**/
|
||||
STATIC
|
||||
BOOLEAN
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
-IsVirtioPciRng (
|
||||
+IsVirtioPci (
|
||||
IN EFI_HANDLE Handle,
|
||||
- IN CONST CHAR16 *ReportText
|
||||
+ IN CONST CHAR16 *ReportText,
|
||||
+ IN UINT16 VirtIoDeviceId
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
@@ -387,11 +388,11 @@ IsVirtioPciRng (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// From DeviceId and RevisionId, determine whether the device is a
|
||||
// modern-only Virtio 1.0 device. In case of Virtio 1.0, DeviceId can
|
||||
- // immediately be restricted to VIRTIO_SUBSYSTEM_ENTROPY_SOURCE, and
|
||||
+ // immediately be restricted to VirtIoDeviceId, and
|
||||
// SubsystemId will only play a sanity-check role. Otherwise, DeviceId can
|
||||
// only be sanity-checked, and SubsystemId will decide.
|
||||
//
|
||||
- if ((DeviceId == 0x1040 + VIRTIO_SUBSYSTEM_ENTROPY_SOURCE) &&
|
||||
+ if ((DeviceId == 0x1040 + VirtIoDeviceId) &&
|
||||
(RevisionId >= 0x01))
|
||||
{
|
||||
Virtio10 = TRUE;
|
||||
@@ -419,7 +420,7 @@ IsVirtioPciRng (
|
||||
return TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!Virtio10 && (SubsystemId == VIRTIO_SUBSYSTEM_ENTROPY_SOURCE)) {
|
||||
+ if (!Virtio10 && (SubsystemId == VirtIoDeviceId)) {
|
||||
return TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -430,6 +431,21 @@ PciError:
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This FILTER_FUNCTION checks if a handle corresponds to a Virtio RNG device at
|
||||
+ the EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL level.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+STATIC
|
||||
+BOOLEAN
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+IsVirtioPciRng (
|
||||
+ IN EFI_HANDLE Handle,
|
||||
+ IN CONST CHAR16 *ReportText
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return IsVirtioPci (Handle, ReportText, VIRTIO_SUBSYSTEM_ENTROPY_SOURCE);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
This CALLBACK_FUNCTION attempts to connect a handle non-recursively, asking
|
||||
the matching driver to produce all first-level child handles.
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From ad95ab2b76485458fed60ab20631b62a010c0e4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2023 13:57:13 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 04/12] ArmVirt/PlatformBootManagerLib: set up virtio serial as
|
||||
console
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 39: ArmVirt: add VirtioSerialDxe to ArmVirtQemu builds
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-643
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [4/6] 46540eeb8901cfeef83cffcdcb6e1c23995b391a (kraxel/centos-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
In case a virtio serial device is found in the system register the first
|
||||
console port as EFI console, by updating ConIn, ConOut and ErrOut.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 15f83fa36442eaa272300b31699b3b82ce7e07a9)
|
||||
---
|
||||
.../PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c | 172 ++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 172 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c
|
||||
index ed38c42a43..b92a916f7e 100644
|
||||
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c
|
||||
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBm.c
|
||||
@@ -312,6 +312,21 @@ IsVirtioRng (
|
||||
return IsVirtio (Handle, ReportText, VIRTIO_SUBSYSTEM_ENTROPY_SOURCE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This FILTER_FUNCTION checks if a handle corresponds to a Virtio serial device at
|
||||
+ the VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL level.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+STATIC
|
||||
+BOOLEAN
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+IsVirtioSerial (
|
||||
+ IN EFI_HANDLE Handle,
|
||||
+ IN CONST CHAR16 *ReportText
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return IsVirtio (Handle, ReportText, VIRTIO_SUBSYSTEM_CONSOLE);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
This function checks if a handle corresponds to the Virtio Device ID given
|
||||
at the EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL level.
|
||||
@@ -446,6 +461,21 @@ IsVirtioPciRng (
|
||||
return IsVirtioPci (Handle, ReportText, VIRTIO_SUBSYSTEM_ENTROPY_SOURCE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This FILTER_FUNCTION checks if a handle corresponds to a Virtio serial device at
|
||||
+ the EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL level.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+STATIC
|
||||
+BOOLEAN
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+IsVirtioPciSerial (
|
||||
+ IN EFI_HANDLE Handle,
|
||||
+ IN CONST CHAR16 *ReportText
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return IsVirtioPci (Handle, ReportText, VIRTIO_SUBSYSTEM_CONSOLE);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
This CALLBACK_FUNCTION attempts to connect a handle non-recursively, asking
|
||||
the matching driver to produce all first-level child handles.
|
||||
@@ -534,6 +564,142 @@ AddOutput (
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This CALLBACK_FUNCTION retrieves the EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL from
|
||||
+ the handle, appends serial, uart and terminal nodes, finally updates
|
||||
+ ConIn, ConOut and ErrOut.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+STATIC
|
||||
+VOID
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+SetupVirtioSerial (
|
||||
+ IN EFI_HANDLE Handle,
|
||||
+ IN CONST CHAR16 *ReportText
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ STATIC CONST ACPI_HID_DEVICE_PATH SerialNode = {
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ ACPI_DEVICE_PATH,
|
||||
+ ACPI_DP,
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ (UINT8)(sizeof (ACPI_HID_DEVICE_PATH)),
|
||||
+ (UINT8)((sizeof (ACPI_HID_DEVICE_PATH)) >> 8)
|
||||
+ },
|
||||
+ },
|
||||
+ EISA_PNP_ID (0x0501),
|
||||
+ 0
|
||||
+ };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ STATIC CONST UART_DEVICE_PATH UartNode = {
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
|
||||
+ MSG_UART_DP,
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ (UINT8)(sizeof (UART_DEVICE_PATH)),
|
||||
+ (UINT8)((sizeof (UART_DEVICE_PATH)) >> 8)
|
||||
+ },
|
||||
+ },
|
||||
+ 0,
|
||||
+ 115200,
|
||||
+ 8,
|
||||
+ 1,
|
||||
+ 1
|
||||
+ };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ STATIC CONST VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH TerminalNode = {
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
|
||||
+ MSG_VENDOR_DP,
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ (UINT8)(sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)),
|
||||
+ (UINT8)((sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)) >> 8)
|
||||
+ },
|
||||
+ },
|
||||
+ DEVICE_PATH_MESSAGING_VT_UTF8
|
||||
+ };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath, *OldDevicePath;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DevicePath = DevicePathFromHandle (Handle);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (DevicePath == NULL) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((
|
||||
+ DEBUG_ERROR,
|
||||
+ "%a: %s: handle %p: device path not found\n",
|
||||
+ __func__,
|
||||
+ ReportText,
|
||||
+ Handle
|
||||
+ ));
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DevicePath = AppendDevicePathNode (
|
||||
+ DevicePath,
|
||||
+ &SerialNode.Header
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ OldDevicePath = DevicePath;
|
||||
+ DevicePath = AppendDevicePathNode (
|
||||
+ DevicePath,
|
||||
+ &UartNode.Header
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ FreePool (OldDevicePath);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ OldDevicePath = DevicePath;
|
||||
+ DevicePath = AppendDevicePathNode (
|
||||
+ DevicePath,
|
||||
+ &TerminalNode.Header
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ FreePool (OldDevicePath);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = EfiBootManagerUpdateConsoleVariable (ConIn, DevicePath, NULL);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((
|
||||
+ DEBUG_ERROR,
|
||||
+ "%a: %s: adding to ConIn: %r\n",
|
||||
+ __func__,
|
||||
+ ReportText,
|
||||
+ Status
|
||||
+ ));
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = EfiBootManagerUpdateConsoleVariable (ConOut, DevicePath, NULL);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((
|
||||
+ DEBUG_ERROR,
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ "%a: %s: adding to ConOut: %r\n",
|
||||
+ __func__,
|
||||
+ ReportText,
|
||||
+ Status
|
||||
+ ));
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = EfiBootManagerUpdateConsoleVariable (ErrOut, DevicePath, NULL);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((
|
||||
+ DEBUG_ERROR,
|
||||
+ "%a: %s: adding to ErrOut: %r\n",
|
||||
+ __func__,
|
||||
+ ReportText,
|
||||
+ Status
|
||||
+ ));
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ FreePool (DevicePath);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((
|
||||
+ DEBUG_VERBOSE,
|
||||
+ "%a: %s: added to ConIn, ConOut and ErrOut\n",
|
||||
+ __func__,
|
||||
+ ReportText
|
||||
+ ));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
STATIC
|
||||
VOID
|
||||
PlatformRegisterFvBootOption (
|
||||
@@ -932,6 +1098,12 @@ PlatformBootManagerBeforeConsole (
|
||||
// instances on Virtio PCI RNG devices.
|
||||
//
|
||||
FilterAndProcess (&gEfiPciIoProtocolGuid, IsVirtioPciRng, Connect);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Register Virtio serial devices as console.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ FilterAndProcess (&gVirtioDeviceProtocolGuid, IsVirtioSerial, SetupVirtioSerial);
|
||||
+ FilterAndProcess (&gEfiPciIoProtocolGuid, IsVirtioPciSerial, SetupVirtioSerial);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 262a607fbc608c02fc3c2a87244d033932d564bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2023 13:57:10 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 01/12] ArmVirt: add VirtioSerialDxe to ArmVirtQemu builds
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 39: ArmVirt: add VirtioSerialDxe to ArmVirtQemu builds
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-643
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [1/6] 03b627e1fae7851fa51e6fe67253ff1b64948d0e (kraxel/centos-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 6925150febb3a76d8e40c19babcc578555ca78fe)
|
||||
---
|
||||
ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc | 1 +
|
||||
ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc | 1 +
|
||||
ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc | 1 +
|
||||
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc
|
||||
index b1deefc2fd..5df6a89578 100644
|
||||
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc
|
||||
@@ -453,6 +453,7 @@
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioNetDxe/VirtioNet.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
+ OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# FAT filesystem + GPT/MBR partitioning + UDF filesystem + virtio-fs
|
||||
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc
|
||||
index 4dbb77a6ca..00ec4dd186 100644
|
||||
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc
|
||||
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuFvMain.fdf.inc
|
||||
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioNetDxe/VirtioNet.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
+ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
|
||||
|
||||
INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc
|
||||
index afebc46a04..76b7c128bb 100644
|
||||
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc
|
||||
@@ -353,6 +353,7 @@
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioNetDxe/VirtioNet.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
+ OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# FAT filesystem + GPT/MBR partitioning + UDF filesystem + virtio-fs
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
|
||||
From b8793ffc6a7e7cfe3ecd9bd0da566ffd913a4544 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2024 10:34:52 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] CryptoPkg/Test: call ProcessLibraryConstructorList
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 75: NetworkPkg: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 and CVE-2023-45237
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-40270 RHEL-40272
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [7/8] 7b09b94bfb56f5b81df2ccf1e6dbe21a7354a723
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-40270
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-45237
|
||||
|
||||
commit 94961b8817eec6f8d0434555ac50a7aa51c22201
|
||||
Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jun 14 11:45:49 2024 +0200
|
||||
|
||||
CryptoPkg/Test: call ProcessLibraryConstructorList
|
||||
|
||||
Needed to properly initialize BaseRngLib.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
.../Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c | 7 +++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c b/CryptoPkg/Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c
|
||||
index d0c1c7a4f7..48d463b8ad 100644
|
||||
--- a/CryptoPkg/Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c
|
||||
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Test/UnitTest/Library/BaseCryptLib/UnitTestMain.c
|
||||
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@
|
||||
**/
|
||||
#include "TestBaseCryptLib.h"
|
||||
|
||||
+VOID
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+ProcessLibraryConstructorList (
|
||||
+ VOID
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
Initialize the unit test framework, suite, and unit tests for the
|
||||
sample unit tests and run the unit tests.
|
||||
@@ -76,5 +82,6 @@ main (
|
||||
char *argv[]
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ ProcessLibraryConstructorList ();
|
||||
return UefiTestMain ();
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
|
||||
From f01b34eaeff2ccdd0ee7f2cf6371542efc0b13f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Sat, 6 Apr 2024 11:00:29 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] EmbeddedPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob()
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 69: EmbeddedPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob()
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-30156
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [1/2] 1b851d3ecf23092f7961cd0320221dc56b69adc4
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-30156
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-36765
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit aeaee8944f0eaacbf4cdf39279785b9ba4836bb6
|
||||
Author: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu Jan 11 13:07:50 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
EmbeddedPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob()
|
||||
|
||||
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4166
|
||||
|
||||
Fix integer overflow in various CreateHob instances.
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2022-36765
|
||||
|
||||
The CreateHob() function aligns the requested size to 8
|
||||
performing the following operation:
|
||||
```
|
||||
HobLength = (UINT16)((HobLength + 0x7) & (~0x7));
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
No checks are performed to ensure this value doesn't
|
||||
overflow, and could lead to CreateHob() returning a smaller
|
||||
HOB than requested, which could lead to OOB HOB accesses.
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Marc Beatove <mbeatove@google.com>
|
||||
Cc: Leif Lindholm <quic_llindhol@quicinc.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
|
||||
Cc: Abner Chang <abner.chang@amd.com>
|
||||
Cc: John Mathew <john.mathews@intel.com>
|
||||
Authored-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c
|
||||
index 8eb175aa96..cbc35152cc 100644
|
||||
--- a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c
|
||||
+++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/PrePiHobLib/Hob.c
|
||||
@@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ CreateHob (
|
||||
|
||||
HandOffHob = GetHobList ();
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Check Length to avoid data overflow.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ if (HobLength > MAX_UINT16 - 0x7) {
|
||||
+ return NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
HobLength = (UINT16)((HobLength + 0x7) & (~0x7));
|
||||
|
||||
FreeMemory = HandOffHob->EfiFreeMemoryTop - HandOffHob->EfiFreeMemoryBottom;
|
||||
@@ -160,6 +167,9 @@ BuildResourceDescriptorHob (
|
||||
|
||||
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR, sizeof (EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR));
|
||||
ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
|
||||
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
Hob->ResourceType = ResourceType;
|
||||
Hob->ResourceAttribute = ResourceAttribute;
|
||||
@@ -401,6 +411,10 @@ BuildModuleHob (
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_MODULE));
|
||||
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
|
||||
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
CopyGuid (&(Hob->MemoryAllocationHeader.Name), &gEfiHobMemoryAllocModuleGuid);
|
||||
Hob->MemoryAllocationHeader.MemoryBaseAddress = MemoryAllocationModule;
|
||||
@@ -449,6 +463,11 @@ BuildGuidHob (
|
||||
ASSERT (DataLength <= (0xffff - sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE)));
|
||||
|
||||
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_GUID_EXTENSION, (UINT16)(sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE) + DataLength));
|
||||
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
|
||||
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
CopyGuid (&Hob->Name, Guid);
|
||||
return Hob + 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -512,6 +531,10 @@ BuildFvHob (
|
||||
EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME *Hob;
|
||||
|
||||
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME));
|
||||
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
|
||||
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress;
|
||||
Hob->Length = Length;
|
||||
@@ -543,6 +566,10 @@ BuildFv2Hob (
|
||||
EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME2 *Hob;
|
||||
|
||||
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV2, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME2));
|
||||
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
|
||||
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress;
|
||||
Hob->Length = Length;
|
||||
@@ -584,6 +611,10 @@ BuildFv3Hob (
|
||||
EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME3 *Hob;
|
||||
|
||||
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV3, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME3));
|
||||
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
|
||||
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress;
|
||||
Hob->Length = Length;
|
||||
@@ -639,6 +670,10 @@ BuildCpuHob (
|
||||
EFI_HOB_CPU *Hob;
|
||||
|
||||
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_CPU, sizeof (EFI_HOB_CPU));
|
||||
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
|
||||
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
Hob->SizeOfMemorySpace = SizeOfMemorySpace;
|
||||
Hob->SizeOfIoSpace = SizeOfIoSpace;
|
||||
@@ -676,6 +711,10 @@ BuildStackHob (
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_STACK));
|
||||
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
|
||||
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
CopyGuid (&(Hob->AllocDescriptor.Name), &gEfiHobMemoryAllocStackGuid);
|
||||
Hob->AllocDescriptor.MemoryBaseAddress = BaseAddress;
|
||||
@@ -756,6 +795,10 @@ BuildMemoryAllocationHob (
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION));
|
||||
+ ASSERT (Hob != NULL);
|
||||
+ if (Hob == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
ZeroMem (&(Hob->AllocDescriptor.Name), sizeof (EFI_GUID));
|
||||
Hob->AllocDescriptor.MemoryBaseAddress = BaseAddress;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
||||
From 08fc72d06946ef3adebf110c097ed869ab0ed416 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:04:39 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 7/9] MdePkg/ArchitecturalMsr.h: add #defines for MTRR cache
|
||||
types
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 55: OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process.
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21704
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [2/4] a568bc2793d677462a2971aae9566a9bbc64b063 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-ID: <20240130130441.772484-3-kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h | 7 +++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h b/MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h
|
||||
index 756e7c86ec..08ba949cf7 100644
|
||||
--- a/MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h
|
||||
+++ b/MdePkg/Include/Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h
|
||||
@@ -2103,6 +2103,13 @@ typedef union {
|
||||
#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE9 0x00000212
|
||||
/// @}
|
||||
|
||||
+#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_UNCACHEABLE 0
|
||||
+#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_COMBINING 1
|
||||
+#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_THROUGH 4
|
||||
+#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_PROTECTED 5
|
||||
+#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK 6
|
||||
+#define MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_INVALID_TYPE 7
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
MSR information returned for MSR indexes #MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE0 to
|
||||
#MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE9
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
|
||||
From a0f61781d9d7d816363704823688ba251fe7e0ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2024 10:32:29 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 4/8] MdePkg/BaseRngLib: Add a smoketest for RDRAND and check
|
||||
CPUID
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 75: NetworkPkg: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 and CVE-2023-45237
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-40270 RHEL-40272
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [4/8] 4fe23181254479e4a0f1abd31cedabacaec22944
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-40270
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-45237
|
||||
|
||||
commit c3a8ca7b54a9fd17acdf16c6282a92cc989fa92a
|
||||
Author: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue Nov 22 22:31:03 2022 +0000
|
||||
|
||||
MdePkg/BaseRngLib: Add a smoketest for RDRAND and check CPUID
|
||||
|
||||
RDRAND has notoriously been broken many times over its lifespan.
|
||||
Add a smoketest to RDRAND, in order to better sniff out potential
|
||||
security concerns.
|
||||
|
||||
Also add a proper CPUID test in order to support older CPUs which may
|
||||
not have it; it was previously being tested but then promptly ignored.
|
||||
|
||||
Testing algorithm inspired by linux's arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c
|
||||
:x86_init_rdrand() per commit 049f9ae9..
|
||||
|
||||
Many thanks to Jason Donenfeld for relicensing his linux RDRAND detection
|
||||
code to MIT and the public domain.
|
||||
|
||||
>On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 2:21 PM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:
|
||||
<..>
|
||||
> I (re)wrote that function in Linux. I hereby relicense it as MIT, and
|
||||
> also place it into public domain. Do with it what you will now.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> Jason
|
||||
|
||||
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4163
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
|
||||
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
|
||||
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@gmail.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
|
||||
1 file changed, 91 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c b/MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c
|
||||
index 9bd68352f9..06d2a6f12d 100644
|
||||
--- a/MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c
|
||||
+++ b/MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/Rand/RdRand.c
|
||||
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
|
||||
to provide high-quality random numbers.
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
||||
+Copyright (c) 2022, Pedro Falcato. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2021, NUVIA Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -24,6 +25,88 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
|
||||
STATIC BOOLEAN mRdRandSupported;
|
||||
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Intel SDM says 10 tries is good enough for reliable RDRAND usage.
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+#define RDRAND_RETRIES 10
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define RDRAND_TEST_SAMPLES 8
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define RDRAND_MIN_CHANGE 5
|
||||
+
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Add a define for native-word RDRAND, just for the test.
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+#ifdef MDE_CPU_X64
|
||||
+#define ASM_RDRAND AsmRdRand64
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+#define ASM_RDRAND AsmRdRand32
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ Tests RDRAND for broken implementations.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval TRUE RDRAND is reliable (and hopefully safe).
|
||||
+ @retval FALSE RDRAND is unreliable and should be disabled, despite CPUID.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+STATIC
|
||||
+BOOLEAN
|
||||
+TestRdRand (
|
||||
+ VOID
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Test for notoriously broken rdrand implementations that always return the same
|
||||
+ // value, like the Zen 3 uarch (all-1s) or other several AMD families on suspend/resume (also all-1s).
|
||||
+ // Note that this should be expanded to extensively test for other sorts of possible errata.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Our algorithm samples rdrand $RDRAND_TEST_SAMPLES times and expects
|
||||
+ // a different result $RDRAND_MIN_CHANGE times for reliable RDRAND usage.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ UINTN Prev;
|
||||
+ UINT8 Idx;
|
||||
+ UINT8 TestIteration;
|
||||
+ UINT32 Changed;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Changed = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (TestIteration = 0; TestIteration < RDRAND_TEST_SAMPLES; TestIteration++) {
|
||||
+ UINTN Sample;
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Note: We use a retry loop for rdrand. Normal users get this in BaseRng.c
|
||||
+ // Any failure to get a random number will assume RDRAND does not work.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ for (Idx = 0; Idx < RDRAND_RETRIES; Idx++) {
|
||||
+ if (ASM_RDRAND (&Sample)) {
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (Idx == RDRAND_RETRIES) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "BaseRngLib/x86: CPU BUG: Failed to get an RDRAND random number - disabling\n"));
|
||||
+ return FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (TestIteration != 0) {
|
||||
+ Changed += Sample != Prev;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Prev = Sample;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (Changed < RDRAND_MIN_CHANGE) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "BaseRngLib/x86: CPU BUG: RDRAND not reliable - disabling\n"));
|
||||
+ return FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return TRUE;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#undef ASM_RDRAND
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
The constructor function checks whether or not RDRAND instruction is supported
|
||||
by the host hardware.
|
||||
@@ -48,10 +131,13 @@ BaseRngLibConstructor (
|
||||
// CPUID. A value of 1 indicates that processor support RDRAND instruction.
|
||||
//
|
||||
AsmCpuid (1, 0, 0, &RegEcx, 0);
|
||||
- ASSERT ((RegEcx & RDRAND_MASK) == RDRAND_MASK);
|
||||
|
||||
mRdRandSupported = ((RegEcx & RDRAND_MASK) == RDRAND_MASK);
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (mRdRandSupported) {
|
||||
+ mRdRandSupported = TestRdRand ();
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -70,6 +156,7 @@ ArchGetRandomNumber16 (
|
||||
OUT UINT16 *Rand
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ ASSERT (mRdRandSupported);
|
||||
return AsmRdRand16 (Rand);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -88,6 +175,7 @@ ArchGetRandomNumber32 (
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *Rand
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ ASSERT (mRdRandSupported);
|
||||
return AsmRdRand32 (Rand);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -106,6 +194,7 @@ ArchGetRandomNumber64 (
|
||||
OUT UINT64 *Rand
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ ASSERT (mRdRandSupported);
|
||||
return AsmRdRand64 (Rand);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -122,13 +211,7 @@ ArchIsRngSupported (
|
||||
VOID
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- /*
|
||||
- Existing software depends on this always returning TRUE, so for
|
||||
- now hard-code it.
|
||||
-
|
||||
- return mRdRandSupported;
|
||||
- */
|
||||
- return TRUE;
|
||||
+ return mRdRandSupported;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
|
||||
From 90461020e9b7534dc03baeea7b485045ed5962e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2024 10:35:27 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 8/8] MdePkg/X86UnitTestHost: set rdrand cpuid bit
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 75: NetworkPkg: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 and CVE-2023-45237
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-40270 RHEL-40272
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [8/8] 5bacbf3cf6fadd3362dfd6f31743707e65b4f119
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-40270
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-45237
|
||||
|
||||
commit 5e776299a2604b336a947e68593012ab2cc16eb4
|
||||
Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jun 14 11:45:53 2024 +0200
|
||||
|
||||
MdePkg/X86UnitTestHost: set rdrand cpuid bit
|
||||
|
||||
Set the rdrand feature bit when faking cpuid for host test cases.
|
||||
Needed to make the CryptoPkg test cases work.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c | 11 ++++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c b/MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c
|
||||
index 8ba4f54a38..7f7276f7f4 100644
|
||||
--- a/MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c
|
||||
+++ b/MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X86UnitTestHost.c
|
||||
@@ -66,6 +66,15 @@ UnitTestHostBaseLibAsmCpuid (
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *Edx OPTIONAL
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ UINT32 RetEcx;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ RetEcx = 0;
|
||||
+ switch (Index) {
|
||||
+ case 1:
|
||||
+ RetEcx |= BIT30; /* RdRand */
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (Eax != NULL) {
|
||||
*Eax = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -75,7 +84,7 @@ UnitTestHostBaseLibAsmCpuid (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (Ecx != NULL) {
|
||||
- *Ecx = 0;
|
||||
+ *Ecx = RetEcx;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (Edx != NULL) {
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
|
||||
From 3c1cf95b979cea6b0dee6e107756558a7a71d4ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 14/18] NetworkPkg: : Adds a SecurityFix.yaml file
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 54: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [14/18] dddbcbe14e38dc1bb03acf4622d6285090c4bb02
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21853
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-45235
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit 1d0b95f6457d225c5108302a9da74b4ed7aa5a38
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick via groups.io <dougflick=microsoft.com@groups.io>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:57 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg: : Adds a SecurityFix.yaml file
|
||||
|
||||
This creates / adds a security file that tracks the security fixes
|
||||
found in this package and can be used to find the fixes that were
|
||||
applied.
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 123 insertions(+)
|
||||
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..7e900483fe
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
|
||||
+## @file
|
||||
+# Security Fixes for SecurityPkg
|
||||
+#
|
||||
+# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
|
||||
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+##
|
||||
+CVE_2023_45229:
|
||||
+ commit_titles:
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Patch"
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Unit Tests"
|
||||
+ cve: CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
|
||||
+ description: "Bug 01 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Out-of-bounds read when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message"
|
||||
+ note:
|
||||
+ files_impacted:
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg\Dhcp6Dxe\Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg\Dhcp6Dxe\Dhcp6Impl.h
|
||||
+ links:
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4534
|
||||
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
|
||||
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
|
||||
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
|
||||
+CVE_2023_45230:
|
||||
+ commit_titles:
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch"
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Unit Tests"
|
||||
+ cve: CVE-2023-45230
|
||||
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
|
||||
+ description: "Bug 02 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option"
|
||||
+ note:
|
||||
+ files_impacted:
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg\Dhcp6Dxe\Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg\Dhcp6Dxe\Dhcp6Impl.h
|
||||
+ links:
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4535
|
||||
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45230
|
||||
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
|
||||
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
|
||||
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
|
||||
+CVE_2023_45231:
|
||||
+ commit_titles:
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Patch"
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Unit Tests"
|
||||
+ cve: CVE-2023-45231
|
||||
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
|
||||
+ description: "Bug 03 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Out-of-bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated options"
|
||||
+ note:
|
||||
+ files_impacted:
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
|
||||
+ links:
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4536
|
||||
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45231
|
||||
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
|
||||
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
|
||||
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
|
||||
+CVE_2023_45232:
|
||||
+ commit_titles:
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Patch"
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Unit Tests"
|
||||
+ cve: CVE-2023-45232
|
||||
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
|
||||
+ description: "Bug 04 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header"
|
||||
+ note:
|
||||
+ files_impacted:
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h
|
||||
+ links:
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4537
|
||||
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45232
|
||||
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
|
||||
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
|
||||
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
|
||||
+CVE_2023_45233:
|
||||
+ commit_titles:
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Patch"
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Unit Tests"
|
||||
+ cve: CVE-2023-45233
|
||||
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
|
||||
+ description: "Bug 05 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header "
|
||||
+ note: This was fixed along with CVE-2023-45233
|
||||
+ files_impacted:
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h
|
||||
+ links:
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4538
|
||||
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45233
|
||||
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
|
||||
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
|
||||
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
|
||||
+CVE_2023_45234:
|
||||
+ commit_titles:
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234 Patch"
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234 Unit Tests"
|
||||
+ cve: CVE-2023-45234
|
||||
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
|
||||
+ description: "Bug 06 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message"
|
||||
+ note:
|
||||
+ files_impacted:
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c
|
||||
+ links:
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4539
|
||||
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45234
|
||||
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
|
||||
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
|
||||
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
|
||||
+CVE_2023_45235:
|
||||
+ commit_titles:
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Patch"
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Unit Tests"
|
||||
+ cve: CVE-2023-45235
|
||||
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
|
||||
+ description: "Bug 07 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message"
|
||||
+ note:
|
||||
+ files_impacted:
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h
|
||||
+ links:
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4540
|
||||
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45235
|
||||
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
|
||||
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
|
||||
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
|
||||
From 3ab0e3be00cc74b39db482e33bfe923f70768ae4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 17/18] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: Packet-Length is not updated
|
||||
before appending
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 54: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [17/18] c13c96534ecea4c43ca98cecf0789b07680958ca
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21841
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit 75deaf5c3c0d164c61653258c331151241bb69d8
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue Feb 13 10:46:02 2024 -0800
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: Packet-Length is not updated before appending
|
||||
|
||||
In order for Dhcp6AppendIaAddrOption (..) to safely append the IA
|
||||
Address option, the Packet-Length field must be updated before appending
|
||||
the option.
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm <quic_llindhol@quicinc.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c | 10 +++++-----
|
||||
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c
|
||||
index e4e0725622..f38e3ee3fe 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c
|
||||
@@ -924,6 +924,11 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
|
||||
*PacketCursor += sizeof (T2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Update the packet length
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ Packet->Length += BytesNeeded;
|
||||
+
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Fill all the addresses belong to the Ia
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -935,11 +940,6 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- //
|
||||
- // Update the packet length
|
||||
- //
|
||||
- Packet->Length += BytesNeeded;
|
||||
-
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Fill the value of Ia option length
|
||||
//
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
|
||||
From bb9d1831fd53d43889112a2e30a52b2c4504fdae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 16/18] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: Removes duplicate check and
|
||||
replaces with macro
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 54: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [16/18] 61914482aa965883b1ec3f29cf6143b67e88742a
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21841
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit af3fad99d6088881562e50149f414f76a5be0140
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue Feb 13 10:46:01 2024 -0800
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: Removes duplicate check and replaces with macro
|
||||
|
||||
Removes duplicate check after merge
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
> //
|
||||
> // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet
|
||||
> //
|
||||
> if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option)
|
||||
> || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size -
|
||||
sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))))
|
||||
> {
|
||||
> return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
> }
|
||||
>
|
||||
|
||||
Converts the check to a macro and replaces all instances of the check
|
||||
with the macro
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm <quic_llindhol@quicinc.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c | 44 +++++++++++++-----------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c
|
||||
index 705c665c51..e4e0725622 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +10,16 @@
|
||||
|
||||
#include "Dhcp6Impl.h"
|
||||
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Verifies the packet cursor is within the packet
|
||||
+// otherwise it is invalid
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+#define IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR(PacketCursor, Packet) \
|
||||
+ (((*PacketCursor) < (Packet)->Dhcp6.Option) || \
|
||||
+ ((*PacketCursor) >= (Packet)->Dhcp6.Option + ((Packet)->Size - sizeof(EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))) \
|
||||
+ ) \
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
Generate client Duid in the format of Duid-llt.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -638,9 +648,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendOption (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet
|
||||
//
|
||||
- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option)
|
||||
- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))))
|
||||
- {
|
||||
+ if (IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR (PacketCursor, Packet)) {
|
||||
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -657,15 +665,6 @@ Dhcp6AppendOption (
|
||||
return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- //
|
||||
- // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet
|
||||
- //
|
||||
- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option)
|
||||
- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))))
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, OptType);
|
||||
*PacketCursor += DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE;
|
||||
WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, OptLen);
|
||||
@@ -744,9 +743,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaAddrOption (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet
|
||||
//
|
||||
- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option)
|
||||
- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))))
|
||||
- {
|
||||
+ if (IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR (PacketCursor, Packet)) {
|
||||
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -877,9 +874,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet
|
||||
//
|
||||
- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option)
|
||||
- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))))
|
||||
- {
|
||||
+ if (IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR (PacketCursor, Packet)) {
|
||||
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -941,14 +936,14 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
- // Fill the value of Ia option length
|
||||
+ // Update the packet length
|
||||
//
|
||||
- *Len = HTONS ((UINT16)(*PacketCursor - (UINT8 *)Len - 2));
|
||||
+ Packet->Length += BytesNeeded;
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
- // Update the packet length
|
||||
+ // Fill the value of Ia option length
|
||||
//
|
||||
- Packet->Length += BytesNeeded;
|
||||
+ *Len = HTONS ((UINT16)(*PacketCursor - (UINT8 *)Len - 2));
|
||||
|
||||
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -957,6 +952,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
|
||||
Append the appointed Elapsed time option to Buf, and move Buf to the end.
|
||||
|
||||
@param[in, out] Packet A pointer to the packet, on success Packet->Length
|
||||
+ will be updated.
|
||||
@param[in, out] PacketCursor The pointer in the packet, on success PacketCursor
|
||||
will be moved to the end of the option.
|
||||
@param[in] Instance The pointer to the Dhcp6 instance.
|
||||
@@ -1012,9 +1008,7 @@ Dhcp6AppendETOption (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet
|
||||
//
|
||||
- if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option)
|
||||
- || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))))
|
||||
- {
|
||||
+ if (IS_INVALID_PACKET_CURSOR (PacketCursor, Packet)) {
|
||||
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
|
||||
From c1700b34913109cd9600f58f1fa6b82b08ce3795 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2024 17:57:07 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 04/18] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
Patch
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 54: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [4/18] 23b6841dbb01249055b8040d85995c366bd94252
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21841
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit 1dbb10cc52dc8ef49bb700daa1cefc76b26d52e0
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick via groups.io <dougflick=microsoft.com@groups.io>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:46 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Patch
|
||||
|
||||
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4534
|
||||
|
||||
Bug Details:
|
||||
PixieFail Bug #1
|
||||
CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
CVSS 6.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
|
||||
CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read
|
||||
|
||||
Change Overview:
|
||||
|
||||
Introduce Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe which performs checks before seeking
|
||||
the Inner Option from a DHCP6 Option.
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
> EFI_STATUS
|
||||
> Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
> IN UINT16 IaType,
|
||||
> IN UINT8 *Option,
|
||||
> IN UINT32 OptionLen,
|
||||
> OUT UINT8 **IaInnerOpt,
|
||||
> OUT UINT16 *IaInnerLen
|
||||
> );
|
||||
>
|
||||
|
||||
Lots of code cleanup to improve code readability.
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h | 138 +++++++++++++++++++---
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c | 203 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
|
||||
2 files changed, 256 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h
|
||||
index f2422c2f28..220e7c68f1 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h
|
||||
@@ -45,6 +45,20 @@ typedef struct _DHCP6_INSTANCE DHCP6_INSTANCE;
|
||||
#define DHCP6_SERVICE_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32 ('D', 'H', '6', 'S')
|
||||
#define DHCP6_INSTANCE_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32 ('D', 'H', '6', 'I')
|
||||
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_PACKET_ALL 0
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATEFUL 1
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATELESS 2
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE 1024
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_PORT_CLIENT 546
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_PORT_SERVER 547
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define DHCP_CHECK_MEDIA_WAITING_TIME EFI_TIMER_PERIOD_SECONDS(20)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_INSTANCE_FROM_THIS(Instance) CR ((Instance), DHCP6_INSTANCE, Dhcp6, DHCP6_INSTANCE_SIGNATURE)
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_SERVICE_FROM_THIS(Service) CR ((Service), DHCP6_SERVICE, ServiceBinding, DHCP6_SERVICE_SIGNATURE)
|
||||
+
|
||||
//
|
||||
// For more information on DHCP options see RFC 8415, Section 21.1
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -59,12 +73,10 @@ typedef struct _DHCP6_INSTANCE DHCP6_INSTANCE;
|
||||
// | (option-len octets) |
|
||||
// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
//
|
||||
-#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE (sizeof(UINT16))
|
||||
-#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN (sizeof(UINT16))
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE (sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpCode))
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN (sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpLen))
|
||||
|
||||
-//
|
||||
// Combined size of Code and Length
|
||||
-//
|
||||
#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN (DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE + \
|
||||
DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -73,34 +85,122 @@ STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
"Combined size of Code and Length must be 4 per RFC 8415"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
-//
|
||||
// Offset to the length is just past the code
|
||||
-//
|
||||
-#define DHCP6_OPT_LEN_OFFSET(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE)
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE)
|
||||
STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
- DHCP6_OPT_LEN_OFFSET (0) == 2,
|
||||
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (0) == 2,
|
||||
"Offset of length is + 2 past start of option"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
-#define DHCP6_OPT_DATA_OFFSET(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN)
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN)
|
||||
STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
- DHCP6_OPT_DATA_OFFSET (0) == 4,
|
||||
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (0) == 4,
|
||||
"Offset to option data should be +4 from start of option"
|
||||
);
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Identity Association options (both NA (Non-Temporary) and TA (Temporary Association))
|
||||
+// are defined in RFC 8415 and are a deriviation of a TLV stucture
|
||||
+// For more information on IA_NA see Section 21.4
|
||||
+// For more information on IA_TA see Section 21.5
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// The format of IA_NA and IA_TA option:
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+// | OPTION_IA_NA | option-len |
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+// | IAID (4 octets) |
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+// | T1 (only for IA_NA) |
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+// | T2 (only for IA_NA) |
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+// | |
|
||||
+// . IA_NA-options/IA_TA-options .
|
||||
+// . .
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID (sizeof(UINT32))
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL (sizeof(UINT32))
|
||||
|
||||
-#define DHCP6_PACKET_ALL 0
|
||||
-#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATEFUL 1
|
||||
-#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATELESS 2
|
||||
+// Combined size of IAID, T1, and T2
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2 (DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID + \
|
||||
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL + \
|
||||
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL)
|
||||
+STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2 == 12,
|
||||
+ "Combined size of IAID, T1, T2 must be 12 per RFC 8415"
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
|
||||
-#define DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE 1024
|
||||
+// This is the size of IA_TA without options
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA (DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN + \
|
||||
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID)
|
||||
+STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
+ DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA == 8,
|
||||
+ "Minimum combined size of IA_TA per RFC 8415"
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
|
||||
-#define DHCP6_PORT_CLIENT 546
|
||||
-#define DHCP6_PORT_SERVER 547
|
||||
+// Offset to a IA_TA inner option
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT(a) (a + DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA)
|
||||
+STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (0) == 8,
|
||||
+ "Offset of IA_TA Inner option is + 8 past start of option"
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
|
||||
-#define DHCP_CHECK_MEDIA_WAITING_TIME EFI_TIMER_PERIOD_SECONDS(20)
|
||||
+// This is the size of IA_NA without options (16)
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN + \
|
||||
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2
|
||||
+STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
+ DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA == 16,
|
||||
+ "Minimum combined size of IA_TA per RFC 8415"
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
|
||||
-#define DHCP6_INSTANCE_FROM_THIS(Instance) CR ((Instance), DHCP6_INSTANCE, Dhcp6, DHCP6_INSTANCE_SIGNATURE)
|
||||
-#define DHCP6_SERVICE_FROM_THIS(Service) CR ((Service), DHCP6_SERVICE, ServiceBinding, DHCP6_SERVICE_SIGNATURE)
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT(a) (a + DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA)
|
||||
+STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (0) == 16,
|
||||
+ "Offset of IA_NA Inner option is + 16 past start of option"
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1(a) (a + \
|
||||
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN + \
|
||||
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID)
|
||||
+STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1 (0) == 8,
|
||||
+ "Offset of IA_NA Inner option is + 8 past start of option"
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2(a) (a + \
|
||||
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN +\
|
||||
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID + \
|
||||
+ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL)
|
||||
+STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2 (0) == 12,
|
||||
+ "Offset of IA_NA Inner option is + 12 past start of option"
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// For more information see RFC 8415 Section 21.13
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// The format of the Status Code Option:
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// 0 1 2 3
|
||||
+// 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+// | OPTION_STATUS_CODE | option-len |
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+// | status-code | |
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
|
||||
+// . .
|
||||
+// . status-message .
|
||||
+// . .
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN)
|
||||
+STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
+ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (0) == 4,
|
||||
+ "Offset of status is + 4 past start of option"
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
|
||||
extern EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS mAllDhcpRelayAndServersAddress;
|
||||
extern EFI_DHCP6_PROTOCOL gDhcp6ProtocolTemplate;
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
index bf5aa7a769..89d16484a5 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
@@ -598,8 +598,8 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
|
||||
// The inner options still start with 2 bytes option-code and 2 bytes option-len.
|
||||
//
|
||||
if (Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type == Dhcp6OptIana) {
|
||||
- T1 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(Option + 8)));
|
||||
- T2 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(Option + 12)));
|
||||
+ T1 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1 (Option))));
|
||||
+ T2 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2 (Option))));
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Refer to RFC3155 Chapter 22.4. If a client receives an IA_NA with T1 greater than T2,
|
||||
// and both T1 and T2 are greater than 0, the client discards the IA_NA option and processes
|
||||
@@ -609,13 +609,14 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- IaInnerOpt = Option + 16;
|
||||
- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(Option + 2))) - 12);
|
||||
+ IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option);
|
||||
+ IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
- T1 = 0;
|
||||
- T2 = 0;
|
||||
- IaInnerOpt = Option + 8;
|
||||
- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(Option + 2))) - 4);
|
||||
+ T1 = 0;
|
||||
+ T2 = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option);
|
||||
+ IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -641,7 +642,7 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
|
||||
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (IaInnerOpt, IaInnerLen, Dhcp6OptStatusCode);
|
||||
|
||||
if (Option != NULL) {
|
||||
- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(Option + 4)));
|
||||
+ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option))));
|
||||
if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) {
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -661,6 +662,87 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
|
||||
return Status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ Seeks the Inner Options from a DHCP6 Option
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] IaType The type of the IA option.
|
||||
+ @param[in] Option The pointer to the DHCP6 Option.
|
||||
+ @param[in] OptionLen The length of the DHCP6 Option.
|
||||
+ @param[out] IaInnerOpt The pointer to the IA inner option.
|
||||
+ @param[out] IaInnerLen The length of the IA inner option.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Seek the inner option successfully.
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The OptionLen is invalid. On Error,
|
||||
+ the pointers are not modified
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
+ IN UINT16 IaType,
|
||||
+ IN UINT8 *Option,
|
||||
+ IN UINT32 OptionLen,
|
||||
+ OUT UINT8 **IaInnerOpt,
|
||||
+ OUT UINT16 *IaInnerLen
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ UINT16 IaInnerLenTmp;
|
||||
+ UINT8 *IaInnerOptTmp;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (Option == NULL) {
|
||||
+ ASSERT (Option != NULL);
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (IaInnerOpt == NULL) {
|
||||
+ ASSERT (IaInnerOpt != NULL);
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (IaInnerLen == NULL) {
|
||||
+ ASSERT (IaInnerLen != NULL);
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIana) {
|
||||
+ // Verify we have a fully formed IA_NA
|
||||
+ if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Verify the IaInnerLen is valid.
|
||||
+ IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)));
|
||||
+ if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ IaInnerLenTmp -= DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2;
|
||||
+ } else if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIata) {
|
||||
+ // Verify the OptionLen is valid.
|
||||
+ if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Verify the IaInnerLen is valid.
|
||||
+ IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option))));
|
||||
+ if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ IaInnerLenTmp -= DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ *IaInnerOpt = IaInnerOptTmp;
|
||||
+ *IaInnerLen = IaInnerLenTmp;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
Seek StatusCode Option in package. A Status Code option may appear in the
|
||||
options field of a DHCP message and/or in the options field of another option.
|
||||
@@ -684,6 +766,12 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption (
|
||||
UINT8 *IaInnerOpt;
|
||||
UINT16 IaInnerLen;
|
||||
UINT16 StsCode;
|
||||
+ UINT32 OptionLen;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // OptionLen is the length of the Options excluding the DHCP header.
|
||||
+ // Length of the EFI_DHCP6_PACKET from the first byte of the Header field to the last
|
||||
+ // byte of the Option[] field.
|
||||
+ OptionLen = Packet->Length - sizeof (Packet->Dhcp6.Header);
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Seek StatusCode option directly in DHCP message body. That is, search in
|
||||
@@ -691,12 +779,12 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption (
|
||||
//
|
||||
*Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
|
||||
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
|
||||
- Packet->Length - 4,
|
||||
+ OptionLen,
|
||||
Dhcp6OptStatusCode
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
if (*Option != NULL) {
|
||||
- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(*Option + 4)));
|
||||
+ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (*Option))));
|
||||
if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) {
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -707,7 +795,7 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption (
|
||||
//
|
||||
*Option = Dhcp6SeekIaOption (
|
||||
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
|
||||
- Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
|
||||
+ OptionLen,
|
||||
&Instance->Config->IaDescriptor
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (*Option == NULL) {
|
||||
@@ -715,52 +803,35 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
- // The format of the IA_NA option is:
|
||||
+ // Calculate the distance from Packet->Dhcp6.Option to the IA option.
|
||||
//
|
||||
- // 0 1 2 3
|
||||
- // 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
|
||||
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
- // | OPTION_IA_NA | option-len |
|
||||
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
- // | IAID (4 octets) |
|
||||
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
- // | T1 |
|
||||
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
- // | T2 |
|
||||
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
- // | |
|
||||
- // . IA_NA-options .
|
||||
- // . .
|
||||
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+ // Packet->Size and Packet->Length are both UINT32 type, and Packet->Size is
|
||||
+ // the size of the whole packet, including the DHCP header, and Packet->Length
|
||||
+ // is the length of the DHCP message body, excluding the DHCP header.
|
||||
//
|
||||
- // The format of the IA_TA option is:
|
||||
+ // (*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option) is the number of bytes from the start of
|
||||
+ // DHCP6 option area to the start of the IA option.
|
||||
//
|
||||
- // 0 1 2 3
|
||||
- // 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
|
||||
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
- // | OPTION_IA_TA | option-len |
|
||||
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
- // | IAID (4 octets) |
|
||||
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
- // | |
|
||||
- // . IA_TA-options .
|
||||
- // . .
|
||||
- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+ // Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe() is searching starting from the start of the
|
||||
+ // IA option to the end of the DHCP6 option area, thus subtract the space
|
||||
+ // up until this option
|
||||
//
|
||||
+ OptionLen = OptionLen - (*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId) = 8
|
||||
- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1) = 12
|
||||
- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1 + T2) = 16
|
||||
- //
|
||||
- // The inner options still start with 2 bytes option-code and 2 bytes option-len.
|
||||
+ // Seek the inner option
|
||||
//
|
||||
- if (Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type == Dhcp6OptIana) {
|
||||
- IaInnerOpt = *Option + 16;
|
||||
- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(*Option + 2))) - 12);
|
||||
- } else {
|
||||
- IaInnerOpt = *Option + 8;
|
||||
- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(*Option + 2))) - 4);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (
|
||||
+ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
+ Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type,
|
||||
+ *Option,
|
||||
+ OptionLen,
|
||||
+ &IaInnerOpt,
|
||||
+ &IaInnerLen
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ ))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -784,7 +855,7 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption (
|
||||
//
|
||||
*Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (IaInnerOpt, IaInnerLen, Dhcp6OptStatusCode);
|
||||
if (*Option != NULL) {
|
||||
- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(*Option + 4)));
|
||||
+ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)((DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (*Option)))));
|
||||
if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) {
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1105,7 +1176,7 @@ Dhcp6SendRequestMsg (
|
||||
//
|
||||
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
|
||||
Instance->AdSelect->Dhcp6.Option,
|
||||
- Instance->AdSelect->Length - 4,
|
||||
+ Instance->AdSelect->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
|
||||
Dhcp6OptServerId
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (Option == NULL) {
|
||||
@@ -1289,7 +1360,7 @@ Dhcp6SendDeclineMsg (
|
||||
//
|
||||
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
|
||||
LastReply->Dhcp6.Option,
|
||||
- LastReply->Length - 4,
|
||||
+ LastReply->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
|
||||
Dhcp6OptServerId
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (Option == NULL) {
|
||||
@@ -1448,7 +1519,7 @@ Dhcp6SendReleaseMsg (
|
||||
//
|
||||
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
|
||||
LastReply->Dhcp6.Option,
|
||||
- LastReply->Length - 4,
|
||||
+ LastReply->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
|
||||
Dhcp6OptServerId
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (Option == NULL) {
|
||||
@@ -1673,7 +1744,7 @@ Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg (
|
||||
|
||||
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
|
||||
LastReply->Dhcp6.Option,
|
||||
- LastReply->Length - 4,
|
||||
+ LastReply->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
|
||||
Dhcp6OptServerId
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (Option == NULL) {
|
||||
@@ -2208,7 +2279,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg (
|
||||
//
|
||||
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
|
||||
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
|
||||
- Packet->Length - 4,
|
||||
+ Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
|
||||
Dhcp6OptRapidCommit
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2354,7 +2425,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Any error status code option is found.
|
||||
//
|
||||
- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(Option + 4)));
|
||||
+ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)((DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (Option)))));
|
||||
switch (StsCode) {
|
||||
case Dhcp6StsUnspecFail:
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -2487,7 +2558,7 @@ Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg (
|
||||
//
|
||||
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
|
||||
AdSelect->Dhcp6.Option,
|
||||
- AdSelect->Length - 4,
|
||||
+ AdSelect->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
|
||||
Dhcp6OptServerUnicast
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2498,7 +2569,7 @@ Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg (
|
||||
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- CopyMem (Instance->Unicast, Option + 4, sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS));
|
||||
+ CopyMem (Instance->Unicast, DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (Option), sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -2551,7 +2622,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg (
|
||||
//
|
||||
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
|
||||
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
|
||||
- Packet->Length - 4,
|
||||
+ Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
|
||||
Dhcp6OptRapidCommit
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2645,7 +2716,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg (
|
||||
CopyMem (Instance->AdSelect, Packet, Packet->Size);
|
||||
|
||||
if (Option != NULL) {
|
||||
- Instance->AdPref = *(Option + 4);
|
||||
+ Instance->AdPref = *(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (Option));
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -2714,11 +2785,11 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateful (
|
||||
//
|
||||
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
|
||||
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
|
||||
- Packet->Length - 4,
|
||||
+ Packet->Length - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN,
|
||||
Dhcp6OptClientId
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
- if ((Option == NULL) || (CompareMem (Option + 4, ClientId->Duid, ClientId->Length) != 0)) {
|
||||
+ if ((Option == NULL) || (CompareMem (DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (Option), ClientId->Duid, ClientId->Length) != 0)) {
|
||||
goto ON_CONTINUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2727,7 +2798,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateful (
|
||||
//
|
||||
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
|
||||
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
|
||||
- Packet->Length - 4,
|
||||
+ Packet->Length - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN,
|
||||
Dhcp6OptServerId
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2832,7 +2903,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateless (
|
||||
//
|
||||
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (
|
||||
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
|
||||
- Packet->Length - 4,
|
||||
+ Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
|
||||
Dhcp6OptServerId
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
|
||||
From dcfd5b6e28536e5b28fb4c47ec57f8d106b6b181 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 15/18] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
Related Patch
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 54: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [15/18] e2fe2033c2f90145249d9416a539d5b2fc52596a
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21841
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit 1c440a5eceedc64e892877eeac0f1a4938f5abbb
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue Feb 13 10:46:00 2024 -0800
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Related Patch
|
||||
|
||||
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4673
|
||||
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4534
|
||||
|
||||
This was not part of the Quarkslab bugs however the same pattern
|
||||
as CVE-2023-45229 exists in Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo.
|
||||
|
||||
This patch replaces the code in question with the safe function
|
||||
created to patch CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
> if (EFI_ERROR (
|
||||
> Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
> Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type,
|
||||
> Option,
|
||||
> OptionLen,
|
||||
> &IaInnerOpt,
|
||||
> &IaInnerLen
|
||||
> )
|
||||
> ))
|
||||
> {
|
||||
> return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
> }
|
||||
>
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally corrects incorrect usage of macro to read the status
|
||||
|
||||
> - StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN
|
||||
(Option)));
|
||||
> + StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)
|
||||
DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (Option));
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm <quic_llindhol@quicinc.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h | 22 +++++++++++
|
||||
2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
index 3b8feb4a20..a9bffae353 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
@@ -528,13 +528,23 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
|
||||
{
|
||||
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
UINT8 *Option;
|
||||
+ UINT32 OptionLen;
|
||||
UINT8 *IaInnerOpt;
|
||||
UINT16 IaInnerLen;
|
||||
UINT16 StsCode;
|
||||
UINT32 T1;
|
||||
UINT32 T2;
|
||||
|
||||
+ T1 = 0;
|
||||
+ T2 = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
ASSERT (Instance->Config != NULL);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // OptionLen is the length of the Options excluding the DHCP header.
|
||||
+ // Length of the EFI_DHCP6_PACKET from the first byte of the Header field to the last
|
||||
+ // byte of the Option[] field.
|
||||
+ OptionLen = Packet->Length - sizeof (Packet->Dhcp6.Header);
|
||||
+
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If the reply was received in response to a solicit with rapid commit option,
|
||||
// request, renew or rebind message, the client updates the information it has
|
||||
@@ -549,13 +559,29 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
|
||||
//
|
||||
Option = Dhcp6SeekIaOption (
|
||||
Packet->Dhcp6.Option,
|
||||
- Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER),
|
||||
+ OptionLen,
|
||||
&Instance->Config->IaDescriptor
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (Option == NULL) {
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Calculate the distance from Packet->Dhcp6.Option to the IA option.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Packet->Size and Packet->Length are both UINT32 type, and Packet->Size is
|
||||
+ // the size of the whole packet, including the DHCP header, and Packet->Length
|
||||
+ // is the length of the DHCP message body, excluding the DHCP header.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // (*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option) is the number of bytes from the start of
|
||||
+ // DHCP6 option area to the start of the IA option.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe() is searching starting from the start of the
|
||||
+ // IA option to the end of the DHCP6 option area, thus subtract the space
|
||||
+ // up until this option
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ OptionLen = OptionLen - (UINT32)(Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
|
||||
+
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The format of the IA_NA option is:
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -591,32 +617,32 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
|
||||
//
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId) = 8
|
||||
- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1) = 12
|
||||
- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1 + T2) = 16
|
||||
- //
|
||||
- // The inner options still start with 2 bytes option-code and 2 bytes option-len.
|
||||
+ // Seek the inner option
|
||||
//
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (
|
||||
+ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
+ Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type,
|
||||
+ Option,
|
||||
+ OptionLen,
|
||||
+ &IaInnerOpt,
|
||||
+ &IaInnerLen
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ ))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type == Dhcp6OptIana) {
|
||||
T1 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1 (Option))));
|
||||
T2 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2 (Option))));
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Refer to RFC3155 Chapter 22.4. If a client receives an IA_NA with T1 greater than T2,
|
||||
// and both T1 and T2 are greater than 0, the client discards the IA_NA option and processes
|
||||
- // the remainder of the message as though the server had not included the invalid IA_NA option.
|
||||
+ // the remainder of the message as though the server had not included the invalid IA_NA option.
|
||||
//
|
||||
if ((T1 > T2) && (T2 > 0)) {
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
-
|
||||
- IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option);
|
||||
- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2);
|
||||
- } else {
|
||||
- T1 = 0;
|
||||
- T2 = 0;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option);
|
||||
- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -642,7 +668,7 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo (
|
||||
Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (IaInnerOpt, IaInnerLen, Dhcp6OptStatusCode);
|
||||
|
||||
if (Option != NULL) {
|
||||
- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option))));
|
||||
+ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (Option))));
|
||||
if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) {
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -703,15 +729,21 @@ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIana) {
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
// Verify we have a fully formed IA_NA
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA) {
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Get the IA Inner Option and Length
|
||||
//
|
||||
IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option);
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
// Verify the IaInnerLen is valid.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)));
|
||||
if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2) {
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
@@ -719,14 +751,18 @@ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
|
||||
IaInnerLenTmp -= DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2;
|
||||
} else if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIata) {
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
// Verify the OptionLen is valid.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA) {
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option);
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
// Verify the IaInnerLen is valid.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option))));
|
||||
if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID) {
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h
|
||||
index 051a652f2b..ab0e1ac27f 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.h
|
||||
@@ -217,4 +217,26 @@ Dhcp6OnTimerTick (
|
||||
IN VOID *Context
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ Seeks the Inner Options from a DHCP6 Option
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] IaType The type of the IA option.
|
||||
+ @param[in] Option The pointer to the DHCP6 Option.
|
||||
+ @param[in] OptionLen The length of the DHCP6 Option.
|
||||
+ @param[out] IaInnerOpt The pointer to the IA inner option.
|
||||
+ @param[out] IaInnerLen The length of the IA inner option.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Seek the inner option successfully.
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The OptionLen is invalid. On Error,
|
||||
+ the pointers are not modified
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
+ IN UINT16 IaType,
|
||||
+ IN UINT8 *Option,
|
||||
+ IN UINT32 OptionLen,
|
||||
+ OUT UINT8 **IaInnerOpt,
|
||||
+ OUT UINT16 *IaInnerLen
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,565 @@
|
||||
From 76930459d2e3f82e10968ec8904e45c8bac77fd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2024 17:57:07 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 05/18] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
Unit Tests
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 54: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [5/18] 7421b6f8d8e6bc3d8ea4aaf90f65608136b968b2
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21841
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit 07362769ab7a7d74dbea1c7a7a3662c7b5d1f097
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick via groups.io <dougflick=microsoft.com@groups.io>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:47 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Unit Tests
|
||||
|
||||
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4534
|
||||
|
||||
These tests confirm that the report bug...
|
||||
|
||||
"Out-of-bounds read when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a
|
||||
DHCPv6 Advertise message"
|
||||
|
||||
..has been patched.
|
||||
|
||||
The following functions are tested to confirm an out of bounds read is
|
||||
patched and that the correct statuses are returned:
|
||||
|
||||
Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe
|
||||
Dhcp6SeekStsOption
|
||||
|
||||
TCBZ4534
|
||||
CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
CVSS 6.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
|
||||
CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c | 2 +-
|
||||
.../GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf | 1 +
|
||||
.../Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.cpp | 365 +++++++++++++++++-
|
||||
.../Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.h | 58 +++
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc | 1 +
|
||||
5 files changed, 424 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.h
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
index 89d16484a5..3b8feb4a20 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption (
|
||||
// IA option to the end of the DHCP6 option area, thus subtract the space
|
||||
// up until this option
|
||||
//
|
||||
- OptionLen = OptionLen - (*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
|
||||
+ OptionLen = OptionLen - (UINT32)(*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Seek the inner option
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
index 8e9119a371..12532ed30c 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
|
||||
[Sources]
|
||||
Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
+ Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.h
|
||||
../Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
../Dhcp6Utility.c
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
index 7ee40e4af4..7db253a7b8 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ extern "C" {
|
||||
#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
|
||||
#include "../Dhcp6Impl.h"
|
||||
#include "../Dhcp6Utility.h"
|
||||
+ #include "Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.h"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +22,35 @@ extern "C" {
|
||||
|
||||
#define DHCP6_PACKET_MAX_LEN 1500
|
||||
|
||||
+// This definition is used by this test but is also required to compile
|
||||
+// by Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
+#define DHCPV6_OPTION_IA_NA 3
|
||||
+#define DHCPV6_OPTION_IA_TA 4
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define SEARCH_PATTERN 0xDEADC0DE
|
||||
+#define SEARCH_PATTERN_LEN sizeof(SEARCH_PATTERN)
|
||||
+
|
||||
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+// Test structures for IA_NA and IA_TA options
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+typedef struct {
|
||||
+ UINT16 Code;
|
||||
+ UINT16 Len;
|
||||
+ UINT32 IAID;
|
||||
+} DHCPv6_OPTION;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+typedef struct {
|
||||
+ DHCPv6_OPTION Header;
|
||||
+ UINT32 T1;
|
||||
+ UINT32 T2;
|
||||
+ UINT8 InnerOptions[0];
|
||||
+} DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_NA;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+typedef struct {
|
||||
+ DHCPv6_OPTION Header;
|
||||
+ UINT8 InnerOptions[0];
|
||||
+} DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_TA;
|
||||
+
|
||||
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
// Symbol Definitions
|
||||
// These functions are not directly under test - but required to compile
|
||||
@@ -210,7 +239,7 @@ TEST_F (Dhcp6AppendETOptionTest, InvalidDataExpectBufferTooSmall) {
|
||||
Status = Dhcp6AppendETOption (
|
||||
Dhcp6AppendETOptionTest::Packet,
|
||||
&Cursor,
|
||||
- &Instance, // Instance is not used in this function
|
||||
+ &Instance, // Instance is not used in this function
|
||||
&ElapsedTime
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -240,7 +269,7 @@ TEST_F (Dhcp6AppendETOptionTest, ValidDataExpectSuccess) {
|
||||
Status = Dhcp6AppendETOption (
|
||||
Dhcp6AppendETOptionTest::Packet,
|
||||
&Cursor,
|
||||
- &Instance, // Instance is not used in this function
|
||||
+ &Instance, // Instance is not used in this function
|
||||
&ElapsedTime
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -476,3 +505,335 @@ TEST_F (Dhcp6AppendIaOptionTest, IaTaValidDataExpectSuccess) {
|
||||
// verify that the status is EFI_SUCCESS
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+// Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe Tests
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Define a fixture for your tests if needed
|
||||
+class Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafeTest : public ::testing::Test {
|
||||
+protected:
|
||||
+ // Add any setup code if needed
|
||||
+ virtual void
|
||||
+ SetUp (
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ // Initialize any resources or variables
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
|
||||
+ virtual void
|
||||
+ TearDown (
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description:
|
||||
+// This test verifies that Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe returns EFI_SUCCESS when the IANA option is found.
|
||||
+TEST_F (Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafeTest, IANAValidOptionExpectSuccess) {
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Result;
|
||||
+ UINT8 Option[sizeof (DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_NA) + SEARCH_PATTERN_LEN] = { 0 };
|
||||
+ UINT32 OptionLength = sizeof (Option);
|
||||
+ DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_NA *OptionPtr = (DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_NA *)Option;
|
||||
+ UINT32 SearchPattern = SEARCH_PATTERN;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINTN SearchPatternLength = SEARCH_PATTERN_LEN;
|
||||
+ UINT8 *InnerOptionPtr = NULL;
|
||||
+ UINT16 InnerOptionLength = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.Code = Dhcp6OptIana;
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.Len = HTONS (4 + 12); // Valid length has to be more than 12
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.IAID = 0x12345678;
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->T1 = 0x11111111;
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->T2 = 0x22222222;
|
||||
+ CopyMem (OptionPtr->InnerOptions, &SearchPattern, SearchPatternLength);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Result = Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
+ Dhcp6OptIana,
|
||||
+ Option,
|
||||
+ OptionLength,
|
||||
+ &InnerOptionPtr,
|
||||
+ &InnerOptionLength
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (Result, EFI_SUCCESS);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (InnerOptionLength, 4);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (CompareMem (InnerOptionPtr, &SearchPattern, SearchPatternLength), 0);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description:
|
||||
+// This test verifies that Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe returns EFI_DEIVCE_ERROR when the IANA option size is invalid.
|
||||
+TEST_F (Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafeTest, IANAInvalidSizeExpectFail) {
|
||||
+ // Lets add an inner option of bytes we expect to find
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ UINT8 Option[sizeof (DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_NA) + SEARCH_PATTERN_LEN] = { 0 };
|
||||
+ UINT32 OptionLength = sizeof (Option);
|
||||
+ DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_NA *OptionPtr = (DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_NA *)Option;
|
||||
+ UINT32 SearchPattern = SEARCH_PATTERN;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINTN SearchPatternLength = SEARCH_PATTERN_LEN;
|
||||
+ UINT8 *InnerOptionPtr = NULL;
|
||||
+ UINT16 InnerOptionLength = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.Code = Dhcp6OptIana;
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.Len = HTONS (4); // Set the length to lower than expected (12)
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.IAID = 0x12345678;
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->T1 = 0x11111111;
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->T2 = 0x22222222;
|
||||
+ CopyMem (OptionPtr->InnerOptions, &SearchPattern, SearchPatternLength);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Set the InnerOptionLength to be less than the size of the option
|
||||
+ Status = Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
+ Dhcp6OptIana,
|
||||
+ Option,
|
||||
+ OptionLength,
|
||||
+ &InnerOptionPtr,
|
||||
+ &InnerOptionLength
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Now set the OptionLength to be less than the size of the option
|
||||
+ OptionLength = sizeof (DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_NA) - 1;
|
||||
+ Status = Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
+ Dhcp6OptIana,
|
||||
+ Option,
|
||||
+ OptionLength,
|
||||
+ &InnerOptionPtr,
|
||||
+ &InnerOptionLength
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description:
|
||||
+// This test verifies that Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe returns EFI_SUCCESS when the IATA option is found
|
||||
+TEST_F (Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafeTest, IATAValidOptionExpectSuccess) {
|
||||
+ // Lets add an inner option of bytes we expect to find
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ UINT8 Option[sizeof (DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_TA) + SEARCH_PATTERN_LEN] = { 0 };
|
||||
+ UINT32 OptionLength = sizeof (Option);
|
||||
+ DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_TA *OptionPtr = (DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_TA *)Option;
|
||||
+ UINT32 SearchPattern = SEARCH_PATTERN;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINTN SearchPatternLength = SEARCH_PATTERN_LEN;
|
||||
+ UINT8 *InnerOptionPtr = NULL;
|
||||
+ UINT16 InnerOptionLength = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.Code = Dhcp6OptIata;
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.Len = HTONS (4 + 4); // Valid length has to be more than 4
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.IAID = 0x12345678;
|
||||
+ CopyMem (OptionPtr->InnerOptions, &SearchPattern, SearchPatternLength);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
+ Dhcp6OptIata,
|
||||
+ Option,
|
||||
+ OptionLength,
|
||||
+ &InnerOptionPtr,
|
||||
+ &InnerOptionLength
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (InnerOptionLength, 4);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (CompareMem (InnerOptionPtr, &SearchPattern, SearchPatternLength), 0);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description:
|
||||
+// This test verifies that Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe returns EFI_SUCCESS when the IATA option size is invalid.
|
||||
+TEST_F (Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafeTest, IATAInvalidSizeExpectFail) {
|
||||
+ // Lets add an inner option of bytes we expect to find
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ UINT8 Option[sizeof (DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_TA) + SEARCH_PATTERN_LEN] = { 0 };
|
||||
+ UINT32 OptionLength = sizeof (Option);
|
||||
+ DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_TA *OptionPtr = (DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_TA *)Option;
|
||||
+ UINT32 SearchPattern = SEARCH_PATTERN;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINTN SearchPatternLength = SEARCH_PATTERN_LEN;
|
||||
+ UINT8 *InnerOptionPtr = NULL;
|
||||
+ UINT16 InnerOptionLength = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.Code = Dhcp6OptIata;
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.Len = HTONS (2); // Set the length to lower than expected (4)
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.IAID = 0x12345678;
|
||||
+ CopyMem (OptionPtr->InnerOptions, &SearchPattern, SearchPatternLength);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
+ Dhcp6OptIata,
|
||||
+ Option,
|
||||
+ OptionLength,
|
||||
+ &InnerOptionPtr,
|
||||
+ &InnerOptionLength
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Now lets try modifying the OptionLength to be less than the size of the option
|
||||
+ OptionLength = sizeof (DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_TA) - 1;
|
||||
+ Status = Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
+ Dhcp6OptIata,
|
||||
+ Option,
|
||||
+ OptionLength,
|
||||
+ &InnerOptionPtr,
|
||||
+ &InnerOptionLength
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description:
|
||||
+// This test verifies that any other Option Type fails
|
||||
+TEST_F (Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafeTest, InvalidOption) {
|
||||
+ // Lets add an inner option of bytes we expect to find
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Result;
|
||||
+ UINT8 Option[sizeof (DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_TA) + SEARCH_PATTERN_LEN] = { 0 };
|
||||
+ UINT32 OptionLength = sizeof (Option);
|
||||
+ DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_TA *OptionPtr = (DHCPv6_OPTION_IA_TA *)Option;
|
||||
+ UINT32 SearchPattern = SEARCH_PATTERN;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINTN SearchPatternLength = SEARCH_PATTERN_LEN;
|
||||
+ UINT8 *InnerOptionPtr = NULL;
|
||||
+ UINT16 InnerOptionLength = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.Code = 0xC0DE;
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.Len = HTONS (2); // Set the length to lower than expected (4)
|
||||
+ OptionPtr->Header.IAID = 0x12345678;
|
||||
+ CopyMem (OptionPtr->InnerOptions, &SearchPattern, SearchPatternLength);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Result = Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (0xC0DE, Option, OptionLength, &InnerOptionPtr, &InnerOptionLength);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (Result, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+// Dhcp6SeekStsOption Tests
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define PACKET_SIZE (1500)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+class Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest : public ::testing::Test {
|
||||
+public:
|
||||
+ DHCP6_INSTANCE Instance = { 0 };
|
||||
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet = NULL;
|
||||
+ EFI_DHCP6_CONFIG_DATA Config = { 0 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+protected:
|
||||
+ // Add any setup code if needed
|
||||
+ virtual void
|
||||
+ SetUp (
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ // Allocate a packet
|
||||
+ Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)AllocateZeroPool (PACKET_SIZE);
|
||||
+ ASSERT_NE (Packet, nullptr);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Initialize the packet
|
||||
+ Packet->Size = PACKET_SIZE;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Instance.Config = &Config;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
|
||||
+ virtual void
|
||||
+ TearDown (
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
|
||||
+ FreePool (Packet);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description:
|
||||
+// This test verifies that Dhcp6SeekStsOption returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR when the option is invalid
|
||||
+// This verifies that the calling function is working as expected
|
||||
+TEST_F (Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest, SeekIATAOptionExpectFail) {
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ UINT8 *Option = NULL;
|
||||
+ UINT32 SearchPattern = SEARCH_PATTERN;
|
||||
+ UINT16 SearchPatternLength = SEARCH_PATTERN_LEN;
|
||||
+ UINT16 *Len = NULL;
|
||||
+ EFI_DHCP6_IA Ia = { 0 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Ia.Descriptor.Type = DHCPV6_OPTION_IA_TA;
|
||||
+ Ia.IaAddressCount = 1;
|
||||
+ Ia.IaAddress[0].PreferredLifetime = 0xDEADBEEF;
|
||||
+ Ia.IaAddress[0].ValidLifetime = 0xDEADAAAA;
|
||||
+ Ia.IaAddress[0].IpAddress = mAllDhcpRelayAndServersAddress;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Packet->Length = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Option = Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Let's append the option to the packet
|
||||
+ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption (
|
||||
+ Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest::Packet,
|
||||
+ &Option,
|
||||
+ Dhcp6OptStatusCode,
|
||||
+ SearchPatternLength,
|
||||
+ (UINT8 *)&SearchPattern
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Inner option length - this will be overwritten later
|
||||
+ Len = (UINT16 *)(Option + 2);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Fill in the inner IA option
|
||||
+ Status = Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
|
||||
+ Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest::Packet,
|
||||
+ &Option,
|
||||
+ &Ia,
|
||||
+ 0x12345678,
|
||||
+ 0x11111111,
|
||||
+ 0x22222222
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // overwrite the len of inner Ia option
|
||||
+ *Len = HTONS (3);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest::Instance.Config->IaDescriptor.Type = DHCPV6_OPTION_IA_TA;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Option = NULL;
|
||||
+ Status = Dhcp6SeekStsOption (&(Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest::Instance), Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest::Packet, &Option);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description:
|
||||
+// This test verifies that Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe returns EFI_SUCCESS when the IATA option size is invalid.
|
||||
+TEST_F (Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest, SeekIANAOptionExpectSuccess) {
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
||||
+ UINT8 *Option = NULL;
|
||||
+ UINT32 SearchPattern = SEARCH_PATTERN;
|
||||
+ UINT16 SearchPatternLength = SEARCH_PATTERN_LEN;
|
||||
+ EFI_DHCP6_IA Ia = { 0 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Ia.Descriptor.Type = DHCPV6_OPTION_IA_NA;
|
||||
+ Ia.IaAddressCount = 1;
|
||||
+ Ia.IaAddress[0].PreferredLifetime = 0x11111111;
|
||||
+ Ia.IaAddress[0].ValidLifetime = 0x22222222;
|
||||
+ Ia.IaAddress[0].IpAddress = mAllDhcpRelayAndServersAddress;
|
||||
+ Packet->Length = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Option = Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest::Packet->Dhcp6.Option;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption (
|
||||
+ Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest::Packet,
|
||||
+ &Option,
|
||||
+ Dhcp6OptStatusCode,
|
||||
+ SearchPatternLength,
|
||||
+ (UINT8 *)&SearchPattern
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = Dhcp6AppendIaOption (
|
||||
+ Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest::Packet,
|
||||
+ &Option,
|
||||
+ &Ia,
|
||||
+ 0x12345678,
|
||||
+ 0x11111111,
|
||||
+ 0x22222222
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest::Instance.Config->IaDescriptor.Type = DHCPV6_OPTION_IA_NA;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Option = NULL;
|
||||
+ Status = Dhcp6SeekStsOption (&(Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest::Instance), Dhcp6SeekStsOptionTest::Packet, &Option);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.h b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.h
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..aed3b89082
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6IoGoogleTest.h
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
|
||||
+/** @file
|
||||
+ Acts as header for private functions under test in Dhcp6Io.c
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
|
||||
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#ifndef DHCP6_IO_GOOGLE_TEST_H_
|
||||
+#define DHCP6_IO_GOOGLE_TEST_H_
|
||||
+
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+// These are the functions that are being unit tested
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#include <Uefi.h>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ Seeks the Inner Options from a DHCP6 Option
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] IaType The type of the IA option.
|
||||
+ @param[in] Option The pointer to the DHCP6 Option.
|
||||
+ @param[in] OptionLen The length of the DHCP6 Option.
|
||||
+ @param[out] IaInnerOpt The pointer to the IA inner option.
|
||||
+ @param[out] IaInnerLen The length of the IA inner option.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Seek the inner option successfully.
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The OptionLen is invalid.
|
||||
+*/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe (
|
||||
+ UINT16 IaType,
|
||||
+ UINT8 *Option,
|
||||
+ UINT32 OptionLen,
|
||||
+ UINT8 **IaInnerOpt,
|
||||
+ UINT16 *IaInnerLen
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ Seek StatusCode Option in package. A Status Code option may appear in the
|
||||
+ options field of a DHCP message and/or in the options field of another option.
|
||||
+ See details in section 22.13, RFC3315.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] Instance The pointer to the Dhcp6 instance.
|
||||
+ @param[in] Packet The pointer to reply messages.
|
||||
+ @param[out] Option The pointer to status code option.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Seek status code option successfully.
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR An unexpected error.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+Dhcp6SeekStsOption (
|
||||
+ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance,
|
||||
+ IN EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet,
|
||||
+ OUT UINT8 **Option
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#endif // DHCP6_IO_GOOGLE_TEST_H
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
|
||||
index 20bc90b172..24dee654df 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
|
||||
SKUID_IDENTIFIER = DEFAULT
|
||||
|
||||
!include UnitTestFrameworkPkg/UnitTestFrameworkPkgHost.dsc.inc
|
||||
+
|
||||
[Packages]
|
||||
MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
|
||||
UnitTestFrameworkPkg/UnitTestFrameworkPkg.dec
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
|
||||
From d51f47c8654f44a787d70b675830ebc7a4ea74f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:51:09 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 06/18] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Patch
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 54: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [6/18] 58ad218f1216ac1ea34ca01ef8cc21e207e2eaf2
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21845
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-45231
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit bbfee34f4188ac00371abe1389ae9c9fb989a0cd
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:48 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Patch
|
||||
|
||||
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4536
|
||||
|
||||
Bug Overview:
|
||||
PixieFail Bug #3
|
||||
CVE-2023-45231
|
||||
CVSS 6.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
|
||||
CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read
|
||||
|
||||
Out-of-bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated
|
||||
options
|
||||
|
||||
Change Overview:
|
||||
|
||||
Adds a check to prevent truncated options from being parsed
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Cannot process truncated options.
|
||||
+ // Cannot process options with a length of 0 as there is no Type
|
||||
field.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ if (OptionLen < sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)) {
|
||||
+ return FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c | 8 ++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
|
||||
index 199eea124d..8718d5d875 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
|
||||
@@ -137,6 +137,14 @@ Ip6IsNDOptionValid (
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Cannot process truncated options.
|
||||
+ // Cannot process options with a length of 0 as there is no Type field.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ if (OptionLen < sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)) {
|
||||
+ return FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
Offset = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
|
||||
From a5757e84bd77ad98580c50ba81da2d1daf0f147a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 12:24:44 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 07/18] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Unit
|
||||
Tests
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 54: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [7/18] 57d08b408b30ea98de1e5dfd74f8892b66c0867c
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21845
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-45231
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit 6f77463d72807ec7f4ed6518c3dac29a1040df9f
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:49 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Unit Tests
|
||||
|
||||
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4536
|
||||
|
||||
Validates that the patch for...
|
||||
|
||||
Out-of-bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated
|
||||
options
|
||||
|
||||
.. has been fixed
|
||||
|
||||
Tests the following function to ensure that an out of bounds read does
|
||||
not occur
|
||||
Ip6OptionValidation
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
.../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp | 20 +++
|
||||
.../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf | 42 ++++++
|
||||
.../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp | 129 ++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc | 1 +
|
||||
4 files changed, 192 insertions(+)
|
||||
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..6ebfd5fdfb
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
||||
+/** @file
|
||||
+ Acts as the main entry point for the tests for the Ip6Dxe module.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
|
||||
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+// Run the tests
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+int
|
||||
+main (
|
||||
+ int argc,
|
||||
+ char *argv[]
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ testing::InitGoogleTest (&argc, argv);
|
||||
+ return RUN_ALL_TESTS ();
|
||||
+}
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..6e4de0745f
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
+## @file
|
||||
+# Unit test suite for the Ip6Dxe using Google Test
|
||||
+#
|
||||
+# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
|
||||
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+##
|
||||
+[Defines]
|
||||
+ INF_VERSION = 0x00010017
|
||||
+ BASE_NAME = Ip6DxeUnitTest
|
||||
+ FILE_GUID = 4F05D17D-D3E7-4AAE-820C-576D46D2D34A
|
||||
+ VERSION_STRING = 1.0
|
||||
+ MODULE_TYPE = HOST_APPLICATION
|
||||
+#
|
||||
+# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools.
|
||||
+#
|
||||
+# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 AARCH64
|
||||
+#
|
||||
+[Sources]
|
||||
+ Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
+ Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
+ ../Ip6Option.c
|
||||
+
|
||||
+[Packages]
|
||||
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
|
||||
+ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
|
||||
+ UnitTestFrameworkPkg/UnitTestFrameworkPkg.dec
|
||||
+ NetworkPkg/NetworkPkg.dec
|
||||
+
|
||||
+[LibraryClasses]
|
||||
+ GoogleTestLib
|
||||
+ DebugLib
|
||||
+ NetLib
|
||||
+ PcdLib
|
||||
+
|
||||
+[Protocols]
|
||||
+ gEfiDhcp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid
|
||||
+
|
||||
+[Pcd]
|
||||
+ gEfiNetworkPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDhcp6UidType
|
||||
+
|
||||
+[Guids]
|
||||
+ gZeroGuid
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..f2cd90e1a9
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
|
||||
+/** @file
|
||||
+ Tests for Ip6Option.c.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
|
||||
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+extern "C" {
|
||||
+ #include <Uefi.h>
|
||||
+ #include <Library/BaseLib.h>
|
||||
+ #include <Library/DebugLib.h>
|
||||
+ #include "../Ip6Impl.h"
|
||||
+ #include "../Ip6Option.h"
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+// Defines
|
||||
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define IP6_PREFIX_INFO_OPTION_DATA_LEN 32
|
||||
+#define OPTION_HEADER_IP6_PREFIX_DATA_LEN (sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + IP6_PREFIX_INFO_OPTION_DATA_LEN)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+// Symbol Definitions
|
||||
+// These functions are not directly under test - but required to compile
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+UINT32 mIp6Id;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+Ip6SendIcmpError (
|
||||
+ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb,
|
||||
+ IN NET_BUF *Packet,
|
||||
+ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *SourceAddress OPTIONAL,
|
||||
+ IN EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *DestinationAddress,
|
||||
+ IN UINT8 Type,
|
||||
+ IN UINT8 Code,
|
||||
+ IN UINT32 *Pointer OPTIONAL
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ // ..
|
||||
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+// Ip6OptionValidation Tests
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Define a fixture for your tests if needed
|
||||
+class Ip6OptionValidationTest : public ::testing::Test {
|
||||
+protected:
|
||||
+ // Add any setup code if needed
|
||||
+ virtual void
|
||||
+ SetUp (
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ // Initialize any resources or variables
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
|
||||
+ virtual void
|
||||
+ TearDown (
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description:
|
||||
+// Null option should return false
|
||||
+TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, NullOptionShouldReturnFalse) {
|
||||
+ UINT8 *option = nullptr;
|
||||
+ UINT16 optionLen = 10; // Provide a suitable length
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description:
|
||||
+// Truncated option should return false
|
||||
+TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, TruncatedOptionShouldReturnFalse) {
|
||||
+ UINT8 option[] = { 0x01 }; // Provide a truncated option
|
||||
+ UINT16 optionLen = 1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description:
|
||||
+// Ip6OptionPrefixInfo Option with zero length should return false
|
||||
+TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, OptionWithZeroLengthShouldReturnFalse) {
|
||||
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPrefixInfo;
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 0;
|
||||
+ UINT8 option[sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)];
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CopyMem (option, &optionHeader, sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER));
|
||||
+ UINT16 optionLen = sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description:
|
||||
+// Ip6OptionPrefixInfo Option with valid length should return true
|
||||
+TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, ValidPrefixInfoOptionShouldReturnTrue) {
|
||||
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPrefixInfo;
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 4; // Length 4 * 8 = 32
|
||||
+ UINT8 option[OPTION_HEADER_IP6_PREFIX_DATA_LEN];
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CopyMem (option, &optionHeader, sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, IP6_PREFIX_INFO_OPTION_DATA_LEN));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description:
|
||||
+// Ip6OptionPrefixInfo Option with invalid length should return false
|
||||
+TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, InvalidPrefixInfoOptionLengthShouldReturnFalse) {
|
||||
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPrefixInfo;
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 3; // Length 3 * 8 = 24 (Invalid)
|
||||
+ UINT8 option[sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)];
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CopyMem (option, &optionHeader, sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER));
|
||||
+ UINT16 optionLen = sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
|
||||
index 24dee654df..7fa7b0f9d5 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
|
||||
# Build HOST_APPLICATION that tests NetworkPkg
|
||||
#
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
+ NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
|
||||
# Despite these library classes being listed in [LibraryClasses] below, they are not needed for the host-based unit tests.
|
||||
[LibraryClasses]
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,377 @@
|
||||
From ff4f1d8227c6c4c89060e24df37defec6d7a07e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:51:09 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 08/18] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Patch
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 54: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [8/18] c7bf831954da5b678450f1ba8e34371645959c81
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21847
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-45232
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21849
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-45233
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit 4df0229ef992d4f2721a8508787ebf9dc81fbd6e
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:50 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Patch
|
||||
|
||||
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4537
|
||||
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4538
|
||||
|
||||
Bug Details:
|
||||
PixieFail Bug #4
|
||||
CVE-2023-45232
|
||||
CVSS 7.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
|
||||
CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
|
||||
|
||||
Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options
|
||||
header
|
||||
|
||||
PixieFail Bug #5
|
||||
CVE-2023-45233
|
||||
CVSS 7.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
|
||||
CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
|
||||
|
||||
Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options
|
||||
header
|
||||
|
||||
Change Overview:
|
||||
|
||||
Most importantly this change corrects the following incorrect math
|
||||
and cleans up the code.
|
||||
|
||||
> // It is a PadN option
|
||||
> //
|
||||
> - Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1) + 2);
|
||||
> + OptDataLen = ((EFI_IP6_OPTION *)(Option + Offset))->Length;
|
||||
> + Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen);
|
||||
|
||||
> case Ip6OptionSkip:
|
||||
> - Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1));
|
||||
> OptDataLen = ((EFI_IP6_OPTION *)(Option + Offset))->Length;
|
||||
> Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen);
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally, this change also corrects incorrect math where the calling
|
||||
function was calculating the HDR EXT optionLen as a uint8 instead of a
|
||||
uint16
|
||||
|
||||
> - OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 1) * 8 - 2);
|
||||
> + OptionLen = IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (*Option) -
|
||||
IP6_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_NEXT_HDR_AND_LEN;
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally this check adds additional logic to santize the incoming
|
||||
data
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
3 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h
|
||||
index 860934a167..bf64e9114e 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h
|
||||
@@ -56,13 +56,48 @@ VOID
|
||||
VOID *Context
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Per RFC8200 Section 4.2
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Two of the currently-defined extension headers -- the Hop-by-Hop
|
||||
+// Options header and the Destination Options header -- carry a variable
|
||||
+// number of type-length-value (TLV) encoded "options", of the following
|
||||
+// format:
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - -
|
||||
+// | Option Type | Opt Data Len | Option Data
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - -
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Option Type 8-bit identifier of the type of option.
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Opt Data Len 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the Option
|
||||
+// Data field of this option, in octets.
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Option Data Variable-length field. Option-Type-specific
|
||||
+// data.
|
||||
+//
|
||||
typedef struct _IP6_OPTION_HEADER {
|
||||
+ ///
|
||||
+ /// identifier of the type of option.
|
||||
+ ///
|
||||
UINT8 Type;
|
||||
+ ///
|
||||
+ /// Length of the Option Data field of this option, in octets.
|
||||
+ ///
|
||||
UINT8 Length;
|
||||
+ ///
|
||||
+ /// Option-Type-specific data.
|
||||
+ ///
|
||||
} IP6_OPTION_HEADER;
|
||||
|
||||
STATIC_ASSERT (sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) == 2, "IP6_OPTION_HEADER is expected to be exactly 2 bytes long.");
|
||||
|
||||
+#define IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET(offset, length) (offset + sizeof(IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + length)
|
||||
+STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
+ IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (0, 0) == 2,
|
||||
+ "The next option is minimally the combined size of the option tag and length"
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
typedef struct _IP6_ETHE_ADDR_OPTION {
|
||||
UINT8 Type;
|
||||
UINT8 Length;
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
|
||||
index 8718d5d875..fd97ce116f 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c
|
||||
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@
|
||||
@param[in] IpSb The IP6 service data.
|
||||
@param[in] Packet The to be validated packet.
|
||||
@param[in] Option The first byte of the option.
|
||||
- @param[in] OptionLen The length of the whole option.
|
||||
+ @param[in] OptionLen The length of all options, expressed in byte length of octets.
|
||||
+ Maximum length is 2046 bytes or ((n + 1) * 8) - 2 where n is 255.
|
||||
@param[in] Pointer Identifies the octet offset within
|
||||
the invoking packet where the error was detected.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,12 +32,33 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid (
|
||||
IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb,
|
||||
IN NET_BUF *Packet,
|
||||
IN UINT8 *Option,
|
||||
- IN UINT8 OptionLen,
|
||||
+ IN UINT16 OptionLen,
|
||||
IN UINT32 Pointer
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- UINT8 Offset;
|
||||
- UINT8 OptionType;
|
||||
+ UINT16 Offset;
|
||||
+ UINT8 OptionType;
|
||||
+ UINT8 OptDataLen;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (Option == NULL) {
|
||||
+ ASSERT (Option != NULL);
|
||||
+ return FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((OptionLen <= 0) || (OptionLen > IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH)) {
|
||||
+ ASSERT (OptionLen > 0 && OptionLen <= IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH);
|
||||
+ return FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (Packet == NULL) {
|
||||
+ ASSERT (Packet != NULL);
|
||||
+ return FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (IpSb == NULL) {
|
||||
+ ASSERT (IpSb != NULL);
|
||||
+ return FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
Offset = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -54,7 +76,8 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It is a PadN option
|
||||
//
|
||||
- Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1) + 2);
|
||||
+ OptDataLen = ((IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)(Option + Offset))->Length;
|
||||
+ Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case Ip6OptionRouterAlert:
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -69,7 +92,8 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid (
|
||||
//
|
||||
switch (OptionType & Ip6OptionMask) {
|
||||
case Ip6OptionSkip:
|
||||
- Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1));
|
||||
+ OptDataLen = ((IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)(Option + Offset))->Length;
|
||||
+ Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case Ip6OptionDiscard:
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
@@ -308,7 +332,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid (
|
||||
UINT32 Pointer;
|
||||
UINT32 Offset;
|
||||
UINT8 *Option;
|
||||
- UINT8 OptionLen;
|
||||
+ UINT16 OptionLen;
|
||||
BOOLEAN Flag;
|
||||
UINT8 CountD;
|
||||
UINT8 CountA;
|
||||
@@ -385,6 +409,36 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid (
|
||||
// Fall through
|
||||
//
|
||||
case IP6_DESTINATION:
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // See https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2460#section-4.2 page 23
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+ // | Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | |
|
||||
+ // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
|
||||
+ // | |
|
||||
+ // . .
|
||||
+ // . Options .
|
||||
+ // . .
|
||||
+ // | |
|
||||
+ // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Next Header 8-bit selector. Identifies the type of header
|
||||
+ // immediately following the Destination Options
|
||||
+ // header. Uses the same values as the IPv4
|
||||
+ // Protocol field [RFC-1700 et seq.].
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Hdr Ext Len 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the
|
||||
+ // Destination Options header in 8-octet units, not
|
||||
+ // including the first 8 octets.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Options Variable-length field, of length such that the
|
||||
+ // complete Destination Options header is an
|
||||
+ // integer multiple of 8 octets long. Contains one
|
||||
+ // or more TLV-encoded options, as described in
|
||||
+ // section 4.2.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (*NextHeader == IP6_DESTINATION) {
|
||||
CountD++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -398,7 +452,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid (
|
||||
|
||||
Offset++;
|
||||
Option = ExtHdrs + Offset;
|
||||
- OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 1) * 8 - 2);
|
||||
+ OptionLen = IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (*Option) - sizeof (IP6_EXT_HDR);
|
||||
Option++;
|
||||
Offset++;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -430,7 +484,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Ignore the routing header and proceed to process the next header.
|
||||
//
|
||||
- Offset = Offset + (RoutingHead->HeaderLen + 1) * 8;
|
||||
+ Offset = Offset + IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (RoutingHead->HeaderLen);
|
||||
|
||||
if (UnFragmentLen != NULL) {
|
||||
*UnFragmentLen = Offset;
|
||||
@@ -441,7 +495,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid (
|
||||
// to the packet's source address, pointing to the unrecognized routing
|
||||
// type.
|
||||
//
|
||||
- Pointer = Offset + 2 + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER);
|
||||
+ Pointer = Offset + sizeof (IP6_EXT_HDR) + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER);
|
||||
if ((IpSb != NULL) && (Packet != NULL) &&
|
||||
!IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress))
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -527,7 +581,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// RFC2402, Payload length is specified in 32-bit words, minus "2".
|
||||
//
|
||||
- OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 2) * 4);
|
||||
+ OptionLen = ((UINT16)(*Option + 2) * 4);
|
||||
Offset = Offset + OptionLen;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h
|
||||
index bd8e223c8a..fb07c28f5a 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h
|
||||
@@ -12,6 +12,77 @@
|
||||
|
||||
#define IP6_FRAGMENT_OFFSET_MASK (~0x3)
|
||||
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// For more information see RFC 8200, Section 4.3, 4.4, and 4.6
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// This example format is from section 4.6
|
||||
+// This does not apply to fragment headers
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+// | Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | |
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
|
||||
+// | |
|
||||
+// . .
|
||||
+// . Header-Specific Data .
|
||||
+// . .
|
||||
+// | |
|
||||
+// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Next Header 8-bit selector. Identifies the type of
|
||||
+// header immediately following the extension
|
||||
+// header. Uses the same values as the IPv4
|
||||
+// Protocol field [IANA-PN].
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Hdr Ext Len 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the
|
||||
+// Destination Options header in 8-octet units,
|
||||
+// not including the first 8 octets.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// These defines apply to the following:
|
||||
+// 1. Hop by Hop
|
||||
+// 2. Routing
|
||||
+// 3. Destination
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+typedef struct _IP6_EXT_HDR {
|
||||
+ ///
|
||||
+ /// The Next Header field identifies the type of header immediately
|
||||
+ ///
|
||||
+ UINT8 NextHeader;
|
||||
+ ///
|
||||
+ /// The Hdr Ext Len field specifies the length of the Hop-by-Hop Options
|
||||
+ ///
|
||||
+ UINT8 HdrExtLen;
|
||||
+ ///
|
||||
+ /// Header-Specific Data
|
||||
+ ///
|
||||
+} IP6_EXT_HDR;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
+ sizeof (IP6_EXT_HDR) == 2,
|
||||
+ "The combined size of Next Header and Len is two 8 bit fields"
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// IPv6 extension headers contain an 8-bit length field which describes the size of
|
||||
+// the header. However, the length field only includes the size of the extension
|
||||
+// header options, not the size of the first 8 bytes of the header. Therefore, in
|
||||
+// order to calculate the full size of the extension header, we add 1 (to account
|
||||
+// for the first 8 bytes omitted by the length field reporting) and then multiply
|
||||
+// by 8 (since the size is represented in 8-byte units).
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// a is the length field of the extension header (UINT8)
|
||||
+// The result may be up to 2046 octets (UINT16)
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+#define IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN(a) (((UINT16)((UINT8)(a)) + 1) * 8)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// This is the maxmimum length permissible by a extension header
|
||||
+// Length is UINT8 of 8 octets not including the first 8 octets
|
||||
+#define IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH (IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (MAX_UINT8) - sizeof(IP6_EXT_HDR))
|
||||
+STATIC_ASSERT (
|
||||
+ IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH == 2046,
|
||||
+ "Maximum data length is ((MAX_UINT8 + 1) * 8) - 2"
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
typedef struct _IP6_FRAGMENT_HEADER {
|
||||
UINT8 NextHeader;
|
||||
UINT8 Reserved;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
|
||||
From dab03ad5334af1c93797119f2eeda6ce757461f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 20:25:29 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 09/18] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Unit
|
||||
Tests
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 54: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [9/18] f68829a7f34f5a09a02d28cc5cfd109f90c442da
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21847
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-45232
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit c9c87f08dd6ace36fa843424522c3558a8374cac
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:51 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Unit Tests
|
||||
|
||||
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4537
|
||||
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4538
|
||||
|
||||
Unit tests to confirm that..
|
||||
Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options
|
||||
header
|
||||
|
||||
and
|
||||
|
||||
Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options
|
||||
header
|
||||
|
||||
... have been patched
|
||||
|
||||
This patch tests the following functions:
|
||||
Ip6IsOptionValid
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
.../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf | 10 +-
|
||||
.../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp | 278 ++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
.../Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h | 40 +++
|
||||
3 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
create mode 100644 NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
index 6e4de0745f..ba29dbabad 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
|
||||
## @file
|
||||
-# Unit test suite for the Ip6Dxe using Google Test
|
||||
+# Unit test suite for the Ip6DxeGoogleTest using Google Test
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
|
||||
# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
##
|
||||
[Defines]
|
||||
INF_VERSION = 0x00010017
|
||||
- BASE_NAME = Ip6DxeUnitTest
|
||||
- FILE_GUID = 4F05D17D-D3E7-4AAE-820C-576D46D2D34A
|
||||
+ BASE_NAME = Ip6DxeGoogleTest
|
||||
+ FILE_GUID = AE39981C-B7FE-41A8-A9C2-F41910477CA3
|
||||
VERSION_STRING = 1.0
|
||||
MODULE_TYPE = HOST_APPLICATION
|
||||
#
|
||||
@@ -16,9 +16,11 @@
|
||||
# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 AARCH64
|
||||
#
|
||||
[Sources]
|
||||
+ ../Ip6Option.c
|
||||
+ Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h
|
||||
Ip6DxeGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
- ../Ip6Option.c
|
||||
+ Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h
|
||||
|
||||
[Packages]
|
||||
MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
index f2cd90e1a9..29f8a4a96e 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ extern "C" {
|
||||
#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
|
||||
#include "../Ip6Impl.h"
|
||||
#include "../Ip6Option.h"
|
||||
+ #include "Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
@@ -127,3 +128,280 @@ TEST_F (Ip6OptionValidationTest, InvalidPrefixInfoOptionLengthShouldReturnFalse)
|
||||
|
||||
EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsNDOptionValid (option, optionLen));
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+// Ip6IsOptionValid Tests
|
||||
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Define a fixture for your tests if needed
|
||||
+class Ip6IsOptionValidTest : public ::testing::Test {
|
||||
+protected:
|
||||
+ // Add any setup code if needed
|
||||
+ virtual void
|
||||
+ SetUp (
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ // Initialize any resources or variables
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
|
||||
+ virtual void
|
||||
+ TearDown (
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description
|
||||
+// Verify that a NULL option is Invalid
|
||||
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, NullOptionShouldReturnTrue) {
|
||||
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
|
||||
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
|
||||
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
|
||||
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = NULL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
|
||||
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_FALSE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, NULL, 0, 0));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description
|
||||
+// Verify that an unknown option with a length of 0 and type of <unknown> does not cause an infinite loop
|
||||
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyNoInfiniteLoopOnUnknownOptionLength0) {
|
||||
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
|
||||
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
|
||||
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
|
||||
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
|
||||
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
|
||||
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
|
||||
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Type = 23; // Unknown Option
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 0; // This will cause an infinite loop if the function is not working correctly
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // This should be a valid option even though the length is 0
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description
|
||||
+// Verify that an unknown option with a length of 1 and type of <unknown> does not cause an infinite loop
|
||||
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyNoInfiniteLoopOnUnknownOptionLength1) {
|
||||
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
|
||||
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
|
||||
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
|
||||
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
|
||||
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
|
||||
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
|
||||
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Type = 23; // Unknown Option
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 1; // This will cause an infinite loop if the function is not working correctly
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description
|
||||
+// Verify that an unknown option with a length of 2 and type of <unknown> does not cause an infinite loop
|
||||
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyIpSkipUnknownOption) {
|
||||
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
|
||||
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
|
||||
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
|
||||
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
|
||||
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
|
||||
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
|
||||
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Type = 23; // Unknown Option
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 2; // Valid length for an unknown option
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description
|
||||
+// Verify that Ip6OptionPad1 is valid with a length of 0
|
||||
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyIp6OptionPad1) {
|
||||
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
|
||||
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
|
||||
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
|
||||
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
|
||||
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
|
||||
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
|
||||
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPad1;
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description
|
||||
+// Verify that Ip6OptionPadN doesn't overflow with various lengths
|
||||
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyIp6OptionPadN) {
|
||||
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
|
||||
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
|
||||
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
|
||||
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
|
||||
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
|
||||
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
|
||||
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Type = Ip6OptionPadN;
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFF;
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFE;
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFD;
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFC;
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description
|
||||
+// Verify an unknown option doesn't cause an infinite loop with various lengths
|
||||
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, VerifyNoInfiniteLoopOnUnknownOptionLengthAttemptOverflow) {
|
||||
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
|
||||
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
|
||||
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
|
||||
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
|
||||
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
|
||||
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
|
||||
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER optionHeader;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Type = 23; // Unknown Option
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFF;
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFE;
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFD;
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ optionHeader.Length = 0xFC;
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, (UINT8 *)&optionHeader, sizeof (optionHeader), 0));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description
|
||||
+// Verify that the function supports multiple options
|
||||
+TEST_F (Ip6IsOptionValidTest, MultiOptionSupport) {
|
||||
+ UINT16 HdrLen;
|
||||
+ NET_BUF Packet = { 0 };
|
||||
+ // we need to define enough of the packet to make the function work
|
||||
+ // The function being tested will pass IpSb to Ip6SendIcmpError which is defined above
|
||||
+ UINT32 DeadCode = 0xDeadC0de;
|
||||
+ // Don't actually use this pointer, just pass it to the function, nothing will be done with it
|
||||
+ IP6_SERVICE *IpSb = (IP6_SERVICE *)&DeadCode;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS SourceAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestinationAddress = { 0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, 0x83, 0x29 };
|
||||
+ EFI_IP6_HEADER Ip6Header = { 0 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.SourceAddress = SourceAddress;
|
||||
+ Ip6Header.DestinationAddress = DestinationAddress;
|
||||
+ Packet.Ip.Ip6 = &Ip6Header;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINT8 ExtHdr[1024] = { 0 };
|
||||
+ UINT8 *Cursor = ExtHdr;
|
||||
+ IP6_OPTION_HEADER *Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)ExtHdr;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Let's start chaining options
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Option->Type = 23; // Unknown Option
|
||||
+ Option->Length = 0xFC;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Cursor += sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + 0xFC;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)Cursor;
|
||||
+ Option->Type = Ip6OptionPad1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Cursor += sizeof (1);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Type and length aren't processed, instead it just moves the pointer forward by 4 bytes
|
||||
+ Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)Cursor;
|
||||
+ Option->Type = Ip6OptionRouterAlert;
|
||||
+ Option->Length = 4;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Cursor += sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + 4;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)Cursor;
|
||||
+ Option->Type = Ip6OptionPadN;
|
||||
+ Option->Length = 0xFC;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Cursor += sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + 0xFC;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Option = (IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)Cursor;
|
||||
+ Option->Type = Ip6OptionRouterAlert;
|
||||
+ Option->Length = 4;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Cursor += sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + 4;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Total 524
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ HdrLen = (UINT16)(Cursor - ExtHdr);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_TRUE (Ip6IsOptionValid (IpSb, &Packet, ExtHdr, HdrLen, 0));
|
||||
+}
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..0509b6ae30
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6OptionGoogleTest.h
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
+/** @file
|
||||
+ Exposes the functions needed to test the Ip6Option module.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
|
||||
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#ifndef IP6_OPTION_HEADER_GOOGLE_TEST_H_
|
||||
+#define IP6_OPTION_HEADER_GOOGLE_TEST_H_
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#include <Uefi.h>
|
||||
+#include "../Ip6Impl.h"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ Validate the IP6 option format for both the packets we received
|
||||
+ and that we will transmit. It will compute the ICMPv6 error message fields
|
||||
+ if the option is malformatted.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] IpSb The IP6 service data.
|
||||
+ @param[in] Packet The to be validated packet.
|
||||
+ @param[in] Option The first byte of the option.
|
||||
+ @param[in] OptionLen The length of the whole option.
|
||||
+ @param[in] Pointer Identifies the octet offset within
|
||||
+ the invoking packet where the error was detected.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval TRUE The option is properly formatted.
|
||||
+ @retval FALSE The option is malformatted.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+BOOLEAN
|
||||
+Ip6IsOptionValid (
|
||||
+ IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb,
|
||||
+ IN NET_BUF *Packet,
|
||||
+ IN UINT8 *Option,
|
||||
+ IN UINT16 OptionLen,
|
||||
+ IN UINT32 Pointer
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#endif // __IP6_OPTION_HEADER_GOOGLE_TEST_H__
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -0,0 +1,841 @@
|
||||
From 6f0cf9f14b1abefa62416c1611f01d6fb3353c44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2024 15:20:29 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/8] NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 75: NetworkPkg: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 and CVE-2023-45237
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-40270 RHEL-40272
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [2/8] 18e88b5def6b058ecd4ffa565ef6f3bafe6f03ad
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-40272
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-45236
|
||||
|
||||
commit 1904a64bcc18199738e5be183d28887ac5d837d7
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed May 8 22:56:29 2024 -0700
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236
|
||||
|
||||
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541
|
||||
REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1948.txt
|
||||
REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6528.txt
|
||||
REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.txt
|
||||
|
||||
Bug Overview:
|
||||
PixieFail Bug #8
|
||||
CVE-2023-45236
|
||||
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
|
||||
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
|
||||
|
||||
Updates TCP ISN generation to use a cryptographic hash of the
|
||||
connection's identifying parameters and a secret key.
|
||||
This prevents an attacker from guessing the ISN used for some other
|
||||
connection.
|
||||
|
||||
This is follows the guidance in RFC 1948, RFC 6528, and RFC 9293.
|
||||
|
||||
RFC: 9293 Section 3.4.1. Initial Sequence Number Selection
|
||||
|
||||
A TCP implementation MUST use the above type of "clock" for clock-
|
||||
driven selection of initial sequence numbers (MUST-8), and SHOULD
|
||||
generate its initial sequence numbers with the expression:
|
||||
|
||||
ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey)
|
||||
|
||||
where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom
|
||||
function (PRF) of the connection's identifying parameters ("localip,
|
||||
localport, remoteip, remoteport") and a secret key ("secretkey")
|
||||
(SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the outside (MUST-9), or
|
||||
an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ISN used
|
||||
for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a
|
||||
cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection
|
||||
parameters and some secret data. For discussion of the selection of
|
||||
a specific hash algorithm and management of the secret key data,
|
||||
please see Section 3 of [42].
|
||||
|
||||
For each connection there is a send sequence number and a receive
|
||||
sequence number. The initial send sequence number (ISS) is chosen by
|
||||
the data sending TCP peer, and the initial receive sequence number
|
||||
(IRS) is learned during the connection-establishing procedure.
|
||||
|
||||
For a connection to be established or initialized, the two TCP peers
|
||||
must synchronize on each other's initial sequence numbers. This is
|
||||
done in an exchange of connection-establishing segments carrying a
|
||||
control bit called "SYN" (for synchronize) and the initial sequence
|
||||
numbers. As a shorthand, segments carrying the SYN bit are also
|
||||
called "SYNs". Hence, the solution requires a suitable mechanism for
|
||||
picking an initial sequence number and a slightly involved handshake
|
||||
to exchange the ISNs.
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 22 +++
|
||||
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c | 92 ++++++++++++-
|
||||
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf | 8 +-
|
||||
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h | 23 ++--
|
||||
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c | 13 +-
|
||||
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h | 59 ++++++--
|
||||
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c | 244 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
|
||||
NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c | 3 +-
|
||||
8 files changed, 415 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
index 20a4555019..4305328425 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
@@ -122,6 +122,28 @@ CVE_2023_45235:
|
||||
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
|
||||
- http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
|
||||
- https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
|
||||
+CVE_2023_45236:
|
||||
+ commit_titles:
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 Patch"
|
||||
+ cve: CVE-2023-45236
|
||||
+ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
|
||||
+ description: "Bug 08 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Predictable TCP Initial Sequence Numbers"
|
||||
+ note:
|
||||
+ files_impacted:
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/Include/Library/NetLib.h
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c
|
||||
+ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c
|
||||
+ links:
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541
|
||||
+ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45236
|
||||
+ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2
|
||||
+ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html
|
||||
+ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html
|
||||
CVE_2023_45237:
|
||||
commit_titles:
|
||||
- "NetworkPkg:: SECURITY PATCH CVE 2023-45237"
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c
|
||||
index 8fe6badd68..40bba4080c 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c
|
||||
@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@ EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL gTcpServiceBinding = {
|
||||
TcpServiceBindingDestroyChild
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// This is the handle for the Hash2ServiceBinding Protocol instance this driver produces
|
||||
+// if the platform does not provide one.
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+EFI_HANDLE mHash2ServiceHandle = NULL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
Create and start the heartbeat timer for the TCP driver.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -165,6 +171,23 @@ TcpDriverEntryPoint (
|
||||
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
UINT32 Random;
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Initialize the Secret used for hashing TCP sequence numbers
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Normally this should be regenerated periodically, but since
|
||||
+ // this is only used for UEFI networking and not a general purpose
|
||||
+ // operating system, it is not necessary to regenerate it.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ Status = PseudoRandomU32 (&mTcpGlobalSecret);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a failed to generate random number: %r\n", __func__, Status));
|
||||
+ return Status;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Get a random number used to generate a random port number
|
||||
+ // Intentionally not linking this to mTcpGlobalSecret to avoid leaking information about the secret
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
Status = PseudoRandomU32 (&Random);
|
||||
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a Failed to generate random number: %r\n", __func__, Status));
|
||||
@@ -207,9 +230,8 @@ TcpDriverEntryPoint (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
- // Initialize ISS and random port.
|
||||
+ // Initialize the random port.
|
||||
//
|
||||
- mTcpGlobalIss = Random % mTcpGlobalIss;
|
||||
mTcp4RandomPort = (UINT16)(TCP_PORT_KNOWN + (Random % TCP_PORT_KNOWN));
|
||||
mTcp6RandomPort = mTcp4RandomPort;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -224,6 +246,8 @@ TcpDriverEntryPoint (
|
||||
@param[in] IpVersion IP_VERSION_4 or IP_VERSION_6.
|
||||
|
||||
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to allocate some resources.
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Service Binding Protocols are unavailable.
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_ALREADY_STARTED The TCP driver is already started on the controller.
|
||||
@retval EFI_SUCCESS A new IP6 service binding private was created.
|
||||
|
||||
**/
|
||||
@@ -234,11 +258,13 @@ TcpCreateService (
|
||||
IN UINT8 IpVersion
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
- EFI_GUID *IpServiceBindingGuid;
|
||||
- EFI_GUID *TcpServiceBindingGuid;
|
||||
- TCP_SERVICE_DATA *TcpServiceData;
|
||||
- IP_IO_OPEN_DATA OpenData;
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ EFI_GUID *IpServiceBindingGuid;
|
||||
+ EFI_GUID *TcpServiceBindingGuid;
|
||||
+ TCP_SERVICE_DATA *TcpServiceData;
|
||||
+ IP_IO_OPEN_DATA OpenData;
|
||||
+ EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL *Hash2ServiceBinding;
|
||||
+ EFI_HASH2_PROTOCOL *Hash2Protocol;
|
||||
|
||||
if (IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) {
|
||||
IpServiceBindingGuid = &gEfiIp4ServiceBindingProtocolGuid;
|
||||
@@ -272,6 +298,33 @@ TcpCreateService (
|
||||
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiHash2ProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&Hash2Protocol);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // If we can't find the Hashing protocol, then we need to create one.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Platform is expected to publish the hash service binding protocol to support TCP.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (
|
||||
+ &gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid,
|
||||
+ NULL,
|
||||
+ (VOID **)&Hash2ServiceBinding
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (Hash2ServiceBinding == NULL) || (Hash2ServiceBinding->CreateChild == NULL)) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Create an instance of the hash protocol for this controller.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->CreateChild (Hash2ServiceBinding, &mHash2ServiceHandle);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Create the TCP service data.
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -423,6 +476,7 @@ TcpDestroyService (
|
||||
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
LIST_ENTRY *List;
|
||||
TCP_DESTROY_CHILD_IN_HANDLE_BUF_CONTEXT Context;
|
||||
+ EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL *Hash2ServiceBinding;
|
||||
|
||||
ASSERT ((IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) || (IpVersion == IP_VERSION_6));
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -439,6 +493,30 @@ TcpDestroyService (
|
||||
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Destroy the Hash2ServiceBinding instance if it is created by Tcp driver.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ if (mHash2ServiceHandle != NULL) {
|
||||
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (
|
||||
+ &gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid,
|
||||
+ NULL,
|
||||
+ (VOID **)&Hash2ServiceBinding
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (Hash2ServiceBinding == NULL) || (Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild == NULL)) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Destroy the instance of the hashing protocol for this controller.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild (Hash2ServiceBinding, &mHash2ServiceHandle);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ mHash2ServiceHandle = NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
|
||||
NicHandle,
|
||||
ServiceBindingGuid,
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf
|
||||
index cf5423f4c5..76de4cf9ec 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf
|
||||
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
|
||||
# stack has been loaded in system. This driver supports both IPv4 and IPv6 network stack.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
||||
+# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
#
|
||||
@@ -68,7 +69,6 @@
|
||||
NetLib
|
||||
IpIoLib
|
||||
|
||||
-
|
||||
[Protocols]
|
||||
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
|
||||
## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES
|
||||
@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@
|
||||
gEfiIp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid ## TO_START
|
||||
gEfiTcp6ProtocolGuid ## BY_START
|
||||
gEfiTcp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid ## BY_START
|
||||
+ gEfiHash2ProtocolGuid ## BY_START
|
||||
+ gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid ## BY_START
|
||||
+
|
||||
+[Guids]
|
||||
+ gEfiHashAlgorithmMD5Guid ## CONSUMES
|
||||
+ gEfiHashAlgorithmSha256Guid ## CONSUMES
|
||||
|
||||
[Depex]
|
||||
gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h
|
||||
index a7af01fff2..c707bee3e5 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
Declaration of external functions shared in TCP driver.
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
|
||||
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
|
||||
**/
|
||||
@@ -36,8 +36,11 @@ VOID
|
||||
|
||||
@param[in, out] Tcb Pointer to the TCP_CB of this TCP instance.
|
||||
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully
|
||||
+ @retval others The underlying functions failed and could not complete the operation
|
||||
+
|
||||
**/
|
||||
-VOID
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
TcpInitTcbLocal (
|
||||
IN OUT TCP_CB *Tcb
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -128,17 +131,6 @@ TcpCloneTcb (
|
||||
IN TCP_CB *Tcb
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
-/**
|
||||
- Compute an ISS to be used by a new connection.
|
||||
-
|
||||
- @return The result ISS.
|
||||
-
|
||||
-**/
|
||||
-TCP_SEQNO
|
||||
-TcpGetIss (
|
||||
- VOID
|
||||
- );
|
||||
-
|
||||
/**
|
||||
Get the local mss.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -202,8 +194,11 @@ TcpFormatNetbuf (
|
||||
@param[in, out] Tcb Pointer to the TCP_CB that wants to initiate a
|
||||
connection.
|
||||
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully
|
||||
+ @retval others The underlying functions failed and could not complete the operation
|
||||
+
|
||||
**/
|
||||
-VOID
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
TcpOnAppConnect (
|
||||
IN OUT TCP_CB *Tcb
|
||||
);
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c
|
||||
index 7b329be64d..86dd7c4907 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c
|
||||
@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ TcpInput (
|
||||
TCP_SEQNO Urg;
|
||||
UINT16 Checksum;
|
||||
INT32 Usable;
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
|
||||
ASSERT ((Version == IP_VERSION_4) || (Version == IP_VERSION_6));
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -872,7 +873,17 @@ TcpInput (
|
||||
Tcb->LocalEnd.Port = Head->DstPort;
|
||||
Tcb->RemoteEnd.Port = Head->SrcPort;
|
||||
|
||||
- TcpInitTcbLocal (Tcb);
|
||||
+ Status = TcpInitTcbLocal (Tcb);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG (
|
||||
+ (DEBUG_ERROR,
|
||||
+ "TcpInput: discard a segment because failed to init local end for TCB %p\n",
|
||||
+ Tcb)
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ goto DISCARD;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
TcpInitTcbPeer (Tcb, Seg, &Option);
|
||||
|
||||
TcpSetState (Tcb, TCP_SYN_RCVD);
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h
|
||||
index c0c9b7f46e..4d5566ab93 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
It is the common head file for all Tcp*.c in TCP driver.
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2016, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
|
||||
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
|
||||
**/
|
||||
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
#include <Protocol/ServiceBinding.h>
|
||||
#include <Protocol/DriverBinding.h>
|
||||
+#include <Protocol/Hash2.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/IpIoLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/DevicePathLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/PrintLib.h>
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ extern EFI_UNICODE_STRING_TABLE *gTcpControllerNameTable;
|
||||
|
||||
extern LIST_ENTRY mTcpRunQue;
|
||||
extern LIST_ENTRY mTcpListenQue;
|
||||
-extern TCP_SEQNO mTcpGlobalIss;
|
||||
+extern TCP_SEQNO mTcpGlobalSecret;
|
||||
extern UINT32 mTcpTick;
|
||||
|
||||
///
|
||||
@@ -45,14 +46,6 @@ extern UINT32 mTcpTick;
|
||||
|
||||
#define TCP_EXPIRE_TIME 65535
|
||||
|
||||
-///
|
||||
-/// The implementation selects the initial send sequence number and the unit to
|
||||
-/// be added when it is increased.
|
||||
-///
|
||||
-#define TCP_BASE_ISS 0x4d7e980b
|
||||
-#define TCP_ISS_INCREMENT_1 2048
|
||||
-#define TCP_ISS_INCREMENT_2 100
|
||||
-
|
||||
typedef union {
|
||||
EFI_TCP4_CONFIG_DATA Tcp4CfgData;
|
||||
EFI_TCP6_CONFIG_DATA Tcp6CfgData;
|
||||
@@ -774,4 +767,50 @@ Tcp6Poll (
|
||||
IN EFI_TCP6_PROTOCOL *This
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ Retrieves the Initial Sequence Number (ISN) for a TCP connection identified by local
|
||||
+ and remote IP addresses and ports.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ This method is based on https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9293#section-3.4.1
|
||||
+ Where the ISN is computed as follows:
|
||||
+ ISN = TimeStamp + MD5(LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Secret)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Otherwise:
|
||||
+ ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ "Here M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the
|
||||
+ connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport")
|
||||
+ and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the
|
||||
+ outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the
|
||||
+ ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a
|
||||
+ cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some
|
||||
+ secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and
|
||||
+ management of the secret key data."
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] LocalIp A pointer to the local IP address of the TCP connection.
|
||||
+ @param[in] LocalIpSize The size, in bytes, of the LocalIp buffer.
|
||||
+ @param[in] LocalPort The local port number of the TCP connection.
|
||||
+ @param[in] RemoteIp A pointer to the remote IP address of the TCP connection.
|
||||
+ @param[in] RemoteIpSize The size, in bytes, of the RemoteIp buffer.
|
||||
+ @param[in] RemotePort The remote port number of the TCP connection.
|
||||
+ @param[out] Isn A pointer to the variable that will receive the Initial
|
||||
+ Sequence Number (ISN).
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully, and the ISN was
|
||||
+ retrieved.
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One or more of the input parameters are invalid.
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The operation is not supported.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+TcpGetIsn (
|
||||
+ IN UINT8 *LocalIp,
|
||||
+ IN UINTN LocalIpSize,
|
||||
+ IN UINT16 LocalPort,
|
||||
+ IN UINT8 *RemoteIp,
|
||||
+ IN UINTN RemoteIpSize,
|
||||
+ IN UINT16 RemotePort,
|
||||
+ OUT TCP_SEQNO *Isn
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c
|
||||
index c93212d47d..3310306f63 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
(C) Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
|
||||
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
|
||||
**/
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +20,34 @@ LIST_ENTRY mTcpListenQue = {
|
||||
&mTcpListenQue
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
-TCP_SEQNO mTcpGlobalIss = TCP_BASE_ISS;
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// The Session secret
|
||||
+// This must be initialized to a random value at boot time
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+TCP_SEQNO mTcpGlobalSecret;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Union to hold either an IPv4 or IPv6 address
|
||||
+// This is used to simplify the ISN hash computation
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+typedef union {
|
||||
+ UINT8 IPv4[4];
|
||||
+ UINT8 IPv6[16];
|
||||
+} NETWORK_ADDRESS;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// The ISN is computed by hashing this structure
|
||||
+// It is initialized with the local and remote IP addresses and ports
|
||||
+// and the secret
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+typedef struct {
|
||||
+ UINT16 LocalPort;
|
||||
+ UINT16 RemotePort;
|
||||
+ NETWORK_ADDRESS LocalAddress;
|
||||
+ NETWORK_ADDRESS RemoteAddress;
|
||||
+ TCP_SEQNO Secret;
|
||||
+} ISN_HASH_CTX;
|
||||
|
||||
CHAR16 *mTcpStateName[] = {
|
||||
L"TCP_CLOSED",
|
||||
@@ -41,12 +68,18 @@ CHAR16 *mTcpStateName[] = {
|
||||
|
||||
@param[in, out] Tcb Pointer to the TCP_CB of this TCP instance.
|
||||
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully
|
||||
+ @retval others The underlying functions failed and could not complete the operation
|
||||
+
|
||||
**/
|
||||
-VOID
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
TcpInitTcbLocal (
|
||||
IN OUT TCP_CB *Tcb
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ TCP_SEQNO Isn;
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Compute the checksum of the fixed parts of pseudo header
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -57,6 +90,16 @@ TcpInitTcbLocal (
|
||||
0x06,
|
||||
0
|
||||
);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = TcpGetIsn (
|
||||
+ Tcb->LocalEnd.Ip.v4.Addr,
|
||||
+ sizeof (IPv4_ADDRESS),
|
||||
+ Tcb->LocalEnd.Port,
|
||||
+ Tcb->RemoteEnd.Ip.v4.Addr,
|
||||
+ sizeof (IPv4_ADDRESS),
|
||||
+ Tcb->RemoteEnd.Port,
|
||||
+ &Isn
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Tcb->HeadSum = NetIp6PseudoHeadChecksum (
|
||||
&Tcb->LocalEnd.Ip.v6,
|
||||
@@ -64,9 +107,25 @@ TcpInitTcbLocal (
|
||||
0x06,
|
||||
0
|
||||
);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = TcpGetIsn (
|
||||
+ Tcb->LocalEnd.Ip.v6.Addr,
|
||||
+ sizeof (IPv6_ADDRESS),
|
||||
+ Tcb->LocalEnd.Port,
|
||||
+ Tcb->RemoteEnd.Ip.v6.Addr,
|
||||
+ sizeof (IPv6_ADDRESS),
|
||||
+ Tcb->RemoteEnd.Port,
|
||||
+ &Isn
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TcpInitTcbLocal: failed to get isn\n"));
|
||||
+ ASSERT (FALSE);
|
||||
+ return Status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- Tcb->Iss = TcpGetIss ();
|
||||
+ Tcb->Iss = Isn;
|
||||
Tcb->SndUna = Tcb->Iss;
|
||||
Tcb->SndNxt = Tcb->Iss;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -82,6 +141,8 @@ TcpInitTcbLocal (
|
||||
Tcb->RetxmitSeqMax = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
Tcb->ProbeTimerOn = FALSE;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -506,18 +567,162 @@ TcpCloneTcb (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
- Compute an ISS to be used by a new connection.
|
||||
-
|
||||
- @return The resulting ISS.
|
||||
+ Retrieves the Initial Sequence Number (ISN) for a TCP connection identified by local
|
||||
+ and remote IP addresses and ports.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ This method is based on https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9293#section-3.4.1
|
||||
+ Where the ISN is computed as follows:
|
||||
+ ISN = TimeStamp + MD5(LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Secret)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Otherwise:
|
||||
+ ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ "Here M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the
|
||||
+ connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport")
|
||||
+ and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the
|
||||
+ outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the
|
||||
+ ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a
|
||||
+ cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some
|
||||
+ secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and
|
||||
+ management of the secret key data."
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] LocalIp A pointer to the local IP address of the TCP connection.
|
||||
+ @param[in] LocalIpSize The size, in bytes, of the LocalIp buffer.
|
||||
+ @param[in] LocalPort The local port number of the TCP connection.
|
||||
+ @param[in] RemoteIp A pointer to the remote IP address of the TCP connection.
|
||||
+ @param[in] RemoteIpSize The size, in bytes, of the RemoteIp buffer.
|
||||
+ @param[in] RemotePort The remote port number of the TCP connection.
|
||||
+ @param[out] Isn A pointer to the variable that will receive the Initial
|
||||
+ Sequence Number (ISN).
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully, and the ISN was
|
||||
+ retrieved.
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One or more of the input parameters are invalid.
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The operation is not supported.
|
||||
|
||||
**/
|
||||
-TCP_SEQNO
|
||||
-TcpGetIss (
|
||||
- VOID
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+TcpGetIsn (
|
||||
+ IN UINT8 *LocalIp,
|
||||
+ IN UINTN LocalIpSize,
|
||||
+ IN UINT16 LocalPort,
|
||||
+ IN UINT8 *RemoteIp,
|
||||
+ IN UINTN RemoteIpSize,
|
||||
+ IN UINT16 RemotePort,
|
||||
+ OUT TCP_SEQNO *Isn
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- mTcpGlobalIss += TCP_ISS_INCREMENT_1;
|
||||
- return mTcpGlobalIss;
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ EFI_HASH2_PROTOCOL *Hash2Protocol;
|
||||
+ EFI_HASH2_OUTPUT HashResult;
|
||||
+ ISN_HASH_CTX IsnHashCtx;
|
||||
+ EFI_TIME TimeStamp;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Check that the ISN pointer is valid
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ if (Isn == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // The local ip may be a v4 or v6 address and may not be NULL
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ if ((LocalIp == NULL) || (LocalIpSize == 0) || (RemoteIp == NULL) || (RemoteIpSize == 0)) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // the local ip may be a v4 or v6 address
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ if ((LocalIpSize != sizeof (EFI_IPv4_ADDRESS)) && (LocalIpSize != sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS))) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Locate the Hash Protocol
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiHash2ProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&Hash2Protocol);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_NET, "Failed to locate Hash Protocol: %r\n", Status));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // TcpCreateService(..) is expected to be called prior to this function
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
+ return Status;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Initialize the hash algorithm
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ Status = Hash2Protocol->HashInit (Hash2Protocol, &gEfiHashAlgorithmSha256Guid);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_NET, "Failed to initialize sha256 hash algorithm: %r\n", Status));
|
||||
+ return Status;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ IsnHashCtx.LocalPort = LocalPort;
|
||||
+ IsnHashCtx.RemotePort = RemotePort;
|
||||
+ IsnHashCtx.Secret = mTcpGlobalSecret;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Check the IP address family and copy accordingly
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ if (LocalIpSize == sizeof (EFI_IPv4_ADDRESS)) {
|
||||
+ CopyMem (&IsnHashCtx.LocalAddress.IPv4, LocalIp, LocalIpSize);
|
||||
+ } else if (LocalIpSize == sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)) {
|
||||
+ CopyMem (&IsnHashCtx.LocalAddress.IPv6, LocalIp, LocalIpSize);
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; // Unsupported address size
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Repeat the process for the remote IP address
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ if (RemoteIpSize == sizeof (EFI_IPv4_ADDRESS)) {
|
||||
+ CopyMem (&IsnHashCtx.RemoteAddress.IPv4, RemoteIp, RemoteIpSize);
|
||||
+ } else if (RemoteIpSize == sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)) {
|
||||
+ CopyMem (&IsnHashCtx.RemoteAddress.IPv6, RemoteIp, RemoteIpSize);
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; // Unsupported address size
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Compute the hash
|
||||
+ // Update the hash with the data
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ Status = Hash2Protocol->HashUpdate (Hash2Protocol, (UINT8 *)&IsnHashCtx, sizeof (IsnHashCtx));
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_NET, "Failed to update hash: %r\n", Status));
|
||||
+ return Status;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Finalize the hash and retrieve the result
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ Status = Hash2Protocol->HashFinal (Hash2Protocol, &HashResult);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_NET, "Failed to finalize hash: %r\n", Status));
|
||||
+ return Status;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = gRT->GetTime (&TimeStamp, NULL);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ return Status;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // copy the first 4 bytes of the hash result into the ISN
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ CopyMem (Isn, HashResult.Md5Hash, sizeof (*Isn));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // now add the timestamp to the ISN as 4 microseconds units (1000 / 4 = 250)
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ *Isn += (TCP_SEQNO)TimeStamp.Nanosecond * 250;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return Status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -721,17 +926,28 @@ TcpFormatNetbuf (
|
||||
@param[in, out] Tcb Pointer to the TCP_CB that wants to initiate a
|
||||
connection.
|
||||
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully
|
||||
+ @retval others The underlying functions failed and could not complete the operation
|
||||
+
|
||||
**/
|
||||
-VOID
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
TcpOnAppConnect (
|
||||
IN OUT TCP_CB *Tcb
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- TcpInitTcbLocal (Tcb);
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = TcpInitTcbLocal (Tcb);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ return Status;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
TcpSetState (Tcb, TCP_SYN_SENT);
|
||||
|
||||
TcpSetTimer (Tcb, TCP_TIMER_CONNECT, Tcb->ConnectTimeout);
|
||||
TcpToSendData (Tcb, 1);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c
|
||||
index 5d2e124977..065b1bdf5f 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
TCP timer related functions.
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2010, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
|
||||
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
|
||||
**/
|
||||
@@ -483,7 +483,6 @@ TcpTickingDpc (
|
||||
INT16 Index;
|
||||
|
||||
mTcpTick++;
|
||||
- mTcpGlobalIss += TCP_ISS_INCREMENT_2;
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Don't use LIST_FOR_EACH, which isn't delete safe.
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
|
||||
From b57bd437db8cff7b7a206e3cd694b7821014ba53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 12/18] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235
|
||||
Patch
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 54: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [12/18] 310a770792d1a81dbf54ee372f926541309492e8
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21853
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-45235
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit fac297724e6cc343430cd0104e55cd7a96d1151e
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:55 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Patch
|
||||
|
||||
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4540
|
||||
|
||||
Bug Details:
|
||||
PixieFail Bug #7
|
||||
CVE-2023-45235
|
||||
CVSS 8.3 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H
|
||||
CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of
|
||||
a Memory Buffer
|
||||
|
||||
Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy
|
||||
Advertise message
|
||||
|
||||
Change Overview:
|
||||
|
||||
Performs two checks
|
||||
|
||||
1. Checks that the length of the duid is accurate
|
||||
> + //
|
||||
> + // Check that the minimum and maximum requirements are met
|
||||
> + //
|
||||
> + if ((OpLen < PXEBC_MIN_SIZE_OF_DUID) ||
|
||||
(OpLen > PXEBC_MAX_SIZE_OF_DUID)) {
|
||||
> + Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
> + goto ON_ERROR;
|
||||
> + }
|
||||
|
||||
2. Ensures that the amount of data written to the buffer is tracked and
|
||||
never exceeds that
|
||||
> + //
|
||||
> + // Check that the option length is valid.
|
||||
> + //
|
||||
> + if ((DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN)
|
||||
> DiscoverLenNeeded) {
|
||||
> + Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
|
||||
> + goto ON_ERROR;
|
||||
> + }
|
||||
|
||||
Additional code clean up and fix for memory leak in case Option was NULL
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
|
||||
NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h | 17 ++++++
|
||||
2 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c
|
||||
index 2b2d372889..7fd1281c11 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c
|
||||
@@ -887,6 +887,7 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService (
|
||||
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *IndexOffer;
|
||||
UINT8 *Option;
|
||||
+ UINTN DiscoverLenNeeded;
|
||||
|
||||
PxeBc = &Private->PxeBc;
|
||||
Request = Private->Dhcp6Request;
|
||||
@@ -899,7 +900,8 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService (
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- Discover = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET));
|
||||
+ DiscoverLenNeeded = sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET);
|
||||
+ Discover = AllocateZeroPool (DiscoverLenNeeded);
|
||||
if (Discover == NULL) {
|
||||
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -924,16 +926,34 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService (
|
||||
DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (Option == NULL) {
|
||||
- return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
||||
+ Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
||||
+ goto ON_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Add Server ID Option.
|
||||
//
|
||||
OpLen = NTOHS (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)Option)->OpLen);
|
||||
- CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, Option, OpLen + 4);
|
||||
- DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + 4);
|
||||
- DiscoverLen += (OpLen + 4);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Check that the minimum and maximum requirements are met
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ if ((OpLen < PXEBC_MIN_SIZE_OF_DUID) || (OpLen > PXEBC_MAX_SIZE_OF_DUID)) {
|
||||
+ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
+ goto ON_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Check that the option length is valid.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ if ((DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN) > DiscoverLenNeeded) {
|
||||
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
|
||||
+ goto ON_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, Option, OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
|
||||
+ DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
|
||||
+ DiscoverLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while (RequestLen < Request->Length) {
|
||||
@@ -944,16 +964,24 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService (
|
||||
(OpCode != DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID)
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Check that the option length is valid.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ if (DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN > DiscoverLenNeeded) {
|
||||
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
|
||||
+ goto ON_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Copy all the options except IA option and Server ID
|
||||
//
|
||||
- CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + 4);
|
||||
- DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + 4);
|
||||
- DiscoverLen += (OpLen + 4);
|
||||
+ CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
|
||||
+ DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
|
||||
+ DiscoverLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- RequestOpt += (OpLen + 4);
|
||||
- RequestLen += (OpLen + 4);
|
||||
+ RequestOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
|
||||
+ RequestLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -2154,6 +2182,7 @@ PxeBcDhcp6Discover (
|
||||
UINT16 OpLen;
|
||||
UINT32 Xid;
|
||||
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ UINTN DiscoverLenNeeded;
|
||||
|
||||
PxeBc = &Private->PxeBc;
|
||||
Mode = PxeBc->Mode;
|
||||
@@ -2169,7 +2198,8 @@ PxeBcDhcp6Discover (
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- Discover = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET));
|
||||
+ DiscoverLenNeeded = sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET);
|
||||
+ Discover = AllocateZeroPool (DiscoverLenNeeded);
|
||||
if (Discover == NULL) {
|
||||
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2185,22 +2215,37 @@ PxeBcDhcp6Discover (
|
||||
DiscoverLen = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER);
|
||||
RequestLen = DiscoverLen;
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // The request packet is generated by the UEFI network stack. In the DHCP4 DORA and DHCP6 SARR sequence,
|
||||
+ // the first (discover in DHCP4 and solicit in DHCP6) and third (request in both DHCP4 and DHCP6) are
|
||||
+ // generated by the DHCP client (the UEFI network stack in this case). By the time this function executes,
|
||||
+ // the DHCP sequence already has been executed once (see UEFI Specification Figures 24.2 and 24.3), with
|
||||
+ // Private->Dhcp6Request being a cached copy of the DHCP6 request packet that UEFI network stack previously
|
||||
+ // generated and sent.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Therefore while this code looks like it could overflow, in practice it's not possible.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
while (RequestLen < Request->Length) {
|
||||
OpCode = NTOHS (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)RequestOpt)->OpCode);
|
||||
OpLen = NTOHS (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)RequestOpt)->OpLen);
|
||||
if ((OpCode != EFI_DHCP6_IA_TYPE_NA) &&
|
||||
(OpCode != EFI_DHCP6_IA_TYPE_TA))
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ if (DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN > DiscoverLenNeeded) {
|
||||
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
|
||||
+ goto ON_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Copy all the options except IA option.
|
||||
//
|
||||
- CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + 4);
|
||||
- DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + 4);
|
||||
- DiscoverLen += (OpLen + 4);
|
||||
+ CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
|
||||
+ DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
|
||||
+ DiscoverLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- RequestOpt += (OpLen + 4);
|
||||
- RequestLen += (OpLen + 4);
|
||||
+ RequestOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
|
||||
+ RequestLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Status = PxeBc->UdpWrite (
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h
|
||||
index c86f6d391b..6357d27fae 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h
|
||||
@@ -34,6 +34,23 @@
|
||||
#define PXEBC_ADDR_START_DELIMITER '['
|
||||
#define PXEBC_ADDR_END_DELIMITER ']'
|
||||
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// A DUID consists of a 2-octet type code represented in network byte
|
||||
+// order, followed by a variable number of octets that make up the
|
||||
+// actual identifier. The length of the DUID (not including the type
|
||||
+// code) is at least 1 octet and at most 128 octets.
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+#define PXEBC_MIN_SIZE_OF_DUID (sizeof(UINT16) + 1)
|
||||
+#define PXEBC_MAX_SIZE_OF_DUID (sizeof(UINT16) + 128)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// This define represents the combineds code and length field from
|
||||
+// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3315#section-22.1
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+#define PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN \
|
||||
+ (sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpCode) + \
|
||||
+ sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpLen))
|
||||
+
|
||||
#define GET_NEXT_DHCP6_OPTION(Opt) \
|
||||
(EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *) ((UINT8 *) (Opt) + \
|
||||
sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION) + (NTOHS ((Opt)->OpLen)) - 1)
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
|
||||
From 59b9d468ebf6be2a5c53d7979c12040f9b41c2c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 13/18] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235
|
||||
Unit Tests
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 54: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [13/18] 074410155526b2ee2a74cf161ea46385932da059
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21853
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-45235
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit ff2986358f75d8f58ef08a66fe673539c9c48f41
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 26 05:54:56 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Unit Tests
|
||||
|
||||
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4540
|
||||
|
||||
Unit tests to confirm that the bug..
|
||||
|
||||
Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy
|
||||
Advertise message
|
||||
|
||||
..has been patched.
|
||||
|
||||
This patch contains unit tests for the following functions:
|
||||
PxeBcRequestBootService
|
||||
PxeBcDhcp6Discover
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc | 5 +-
|
||||
.../GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp | 278 +++++++++++++++++-
|
||||
.../GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h | 18 ++
|
||||
3 files changed, 298 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
|
||||
index a0273c4310..fa301a7a52 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/Test/NetworkPkgHostTest.dsc
|
||||
@@ -27,7 +27,10 @@
|
||||
#
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/GoogleTest/Dhcp6DxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/GoogleTest/Ip6DxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
- NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf
|
||||
+ NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/UefiPxeBcDxeGoogleTest.inf {
|
||||
+ <LibraryClasses>
|
||||
+ UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib|MdePkg/Test/Mock/Library/GoogleTest/MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib/MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.inf
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
# Despite these library classes being listed in [LibraryClasses] below, they are not needed for the host-based unit tests.
|
||||
[LibraryClasses]
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
index 8260eeee50..bd423ebadf 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.cpp
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
|
||||
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
|
||||
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
**/
|
||||
-#include <gtest/gtest.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/GoogleTestLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <GoogleTest/Library/MockUefiLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <GoogleTest/Library/MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.h>
|
||||
|
||||
extern "C" {
|
||||
#include <Uefi.h>
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +21,8 @@ extern "C" {
|
||||
// Definitions
|
||||
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
|
||||
-#define PACKET_SIZE (1500)
|
||||
+#define PACKET_SIZE (1500)
|
||||
+#define REQUEST_OPTION_LENGTH (120)
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
UINT16 OptionCode; // The option code for DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID (e.g., 0x03)
|
||||
@@ -76,6 +79,26 @@ MockConfigure (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Needed by PxeBcSupport
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+PxeBcDns6 (
|
||||
+ IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,
|
||||
+ IN CHAR16 *HostName,
|
||||
+ OUT EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS *IpAddress
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+UINT32
|
||||
+PxeBcBuildDhcp6Options (
|
||||
+ IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,
|
||||
+ OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION **OptList,
|
||||
+ IN UINT8 *Buffer
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
QueueDpc (
|
||||
@@ -159,6 +182,10 @@ TEST_F (PxeBcHandleDhcp6OfferTest, BasicUsageTest) {
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcHandleDhcp6Offer (&(PxeBcHandleDhcp6OfferTest::Private)), EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+// PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses Tests
|
||||
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+
|
||||
class PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest : public ::testing::Test {
|
||||
public:
|
||||
PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA Private = { 0 };
|
||||
@@ -298,3 +325,250 @@ TEST_F (PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddressesTest, MultipleDnsEntries) {
|
||||
FreePool (Private.DnsServer);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+// PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest Test Cases
|
||||
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+
|
||||
+class PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest : public ::testing::Test {
|
||||
+public:
|
||||
+ PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA Private = { 0 };
|
||||
+ EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL Udp6Read;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+protected:
|
||||
+ // Add any setup code if needed
|
||||
+ virtual void
|
||||
+ SetUp (
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ Private.Dhcp6Request = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)AllocateZeroPool (PACKET_SIZE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Need to setup the EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_PROTOCOL
|
||||
+ // The function under test really only needs the following:
|
||||
+ // UdpWrite
|
||||
+ // UdpRead
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Private.PxeBc.UdpWrite = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_WRITE)MockUdpWrite;
|
||||
+ Private.PxeBc.UdpRead = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_READ)MockUdpRead;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Need to setup EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL
|
||||
+ // The function under test really only needs the following:
|
||||
+ // Configure
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Udp6Read.Configure = (EFI_UDP6_CONFIGURE)MockConfigure;
|
||||
+ Private.Udp6Read = &Udp6Read;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
|
||||
+ virtual void
|
||||
+ TearDown (
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ if (Private.Dhcp6Request != NULL) {
|
||||
+ FreePool (Private.Dhcp6Request);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+TEST_F (PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest, ServerDiscoverBasicUsageTest) {
|
||||
+ PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private.OfferBuffer[0].Dhcp6.OfferType = PxeOfferTypeProxyBinl;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DHCP6_OPTION_SERVER_ID Server = { 0 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Server.OptionCode = HTONS (DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID);
|
||||
+ Server.OptionLen = HTONS (16); // valid length
|
||||
+ UINT8 Index = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)&Private.OfferBuffer[Index].Dhcp6.Packet.Offer;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CopyMem (Cursor, &Server, sizeof (Server));
|
||||
+ Cursor += sizeof (Server);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Update the packet length
|
||||
+ Packet->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Packet);
|
||||
+ Packet->Size = PACKET_SIZE;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcRequestBootService (&(PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private), Index), EFI_SUCCESS);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+TEST_F (PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest, AttemptDiscoverOverFlowExpectFailure) {
|
||||
+ PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private.OfferBuffer[0].Dhcp6.OfferType = PxeOfferTypeProxyBinl;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DHCP6_OPTION_SERVER_ID Server = { 0 };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Server.OptionCode = HTONS (DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID);
|
||||
+ Server.OptionLen = HTONS (1500); // This length would overflow without a check
|
||||
+ UINT8 Index = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)&Private.OfferBuffer[Index].Dhcp6.Packet.Offer;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CopyMem (Cursor, &Server, sizeof (Server));
|
||||
+ Cursor += sizeof (Server);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Update the packet length
|
||||
+ Packet->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Packet);
|
||||
+ Packet->Size = PACKET_SIZE;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // This is going to be stopped by the duid overflow check
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcRequestBootService (&(PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private), Index), EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+TEST_F (PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest, RequestBasicUsageTest) {
|
||||
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION RequestOpt = { 0 }; // the data section doesn't really matter
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ RequestOpt.OpCode = HTONS (0x1337);
|
||||
+ RequestOpt.OpLen = 0; // valid length
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINT8 Index = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)&Private.Dhcp6Request[Index];
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CopyMem (Cursor, &RequestOpt, sizeof (RequestOpt));
|
||||
+ Cursor += sizeof (RequestOpt);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Update the packet length
|
||||
+ Packet->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Packet);
|
||||
+ Packet->Size = PACKET_SIZE;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcRequestBootService (&(PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private), Index), EFI_SUCCESS);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+TEST_F (PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest, AttemptRequestOverFlowExpectFailure) {
|
||||
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION RequestOpt = { 0 }; // the data section doesn't really matter
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ RequestOpt.OpCode = HTONS (0x1337);
|
||||
+ RequestOpt.OpLen = 1500; // this length would overflow without a check
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINT8 Index = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)&Private.Dhcp6Request[Index];
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Packet->Dhcp6.Option);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CopyMem (Cursor, &RequestOpt, sizeof (RequestOpt));
|
||||
+ Cursor += sizeof (RequestOpt);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Update the packet length
|
||||
+ Packet->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Packet);
|
||||
+ Packet->Size = PACKET_SIZE;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (PxeBcRequestBootService (&(PxeBcRequestBootServiceTest::Private), Index), EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+// PxeBcDhcp6Discover Test
|
||||
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
+
|
||||
+class PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest : public ::testing::Test {
|
||||
+public:
|
||||
+ PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA Private = { 0 };
|
||||
+ EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL Udp6Read;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+protected:
|
||||
+ MockUefiRuntimeServicesTableLib RtServicesMock;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Add any setup code if needed
|
||||
+ virtual void
|
||||
+ SetUp (
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ Private.Dhcp6Request = (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *)AllocateZeroPool (PACKET_SIZE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Need to setup the EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_PROTOCOL
|
||||
+ // The function under test really only needs the following:
|
||||
+ // UdpWrite
|
||||
+ // UdpRead
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Private.PxeBc.UdpWrite = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_WRITE)MockUdpWrite;
|
||||
+ Private.PxeBc.UdpRead = (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_UDP_READ)MockUdpRead;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Need to setup EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL
|
||||
+ // The function under test really only needs the following:
|
||||
+ // Configure
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Udp6Read.Configure = (EFI_UDP6_CONFIGURE)MockConfigure;
|
||||
+ Private.Udp6Read = &Udp6Read;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Add any cleanup code if needed
|
||||
+ virtual void
|
||||
+ TearDown (
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ if (Private.Dhcp6Request != NULL) {
|
||||
+ FreePool (Private.Dhcp6Request);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Clean up any resources or variables
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description
|
||||
+// This will cause an overflow by an untrusted packet during the option parsing
|
||||
+TEST_F (PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest, BasicOverflowTest) {
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestIp = { 0 };
|
||||
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION RequestOpt = { 0 }; // the data section doesn't really matter
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ RequestOpt.OpCode = HTONS (0x1337);
|
||||
+ RequestOpt.OpLen = HTONS (0xFFFF); // overflow
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Private.Dhcp6Request->Dhcp6.Option);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CopyMem (Cursor, &RequestOpt, sizeof (RequestOpt));
|
||||
+ Cursor += sizeof (RequestOpt);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Private.Dhcp6Request->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Private.Dhcp6Request);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_CALL (RtServicesMock, gRT_GetTime)
|
||||
+ .WillOnce (::testing::Return (0));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (
|
||||
+ PxeBcDhcp6Discover (
|
||||
+ &(PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest::Private),
|
||||
+ 0,
|
||||
+ NULL,
|
||||
+ FALSE,
|
||||
+ (EFI_IP_ADDRESS *)&DestIp
|
||||
+ ),
|
||||
+ EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// Test Description
|
||||
+// This will test that we can handle a packet with a valid option length
|
||||
+TEST_F (PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest, BasicUsageTest) {
|
||||
+ EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS DestIp = { 0 };
|
||||
+ EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION RequestOpt = { 0 }; // the data section doesn't really matter
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ RequestOpt.OpCode = HTONS (0x1337);
|
||||
+ RequestOpt.OpLen = HTONS (0x30);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ UINT8 *Cursor = (UINT8 *)(Private.Dhcp6Request->Dhcp6.Option);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ CopyMem (Cursor, &RequestOpt, sizeof (RequestOpt));
|
||||
+ Cursor += sizeof (RequestOpt);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Private.Dhcp6Request->Length = (UINT16)(Cursor - (UINT8 *)Private.Dhcp6Request);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EXPECT_CALL (RtServicesMock, gRT_GetTime)
|
||||
+ .WillOnce (::testing::Return (0));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ASSERT_EQ (
|
||||
+ PxeBcDhcp6Discover (
|
||||
+ &(PxeBcDhcp6DiscoverTest::Private),
|
||||
+ 0,
|
||||
+ NULL,
|
||||
+ FALSE,
|
||||
+ (EFI_IP_ADDRESS *)&DestIp
|
||||
+ ),
|
||||
+ EFI_SUCCESS
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+}
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h
|
||||
index b17c314791..0d825e4425 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/GoogleTest/PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest.h
|
||||
@@ -47,4 +47,22 @@ PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses (
|
||||
IN PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE *Cache6
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ Build and send out the request packet for the bootfile, and parse the reply.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] Private The pointer to PxeBc private data.
|
||||
+ @param[in] Index PxeBc option boot item type.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully discovered the boot file.
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to allocate resources.
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't get the PXE reply packet.
|
||||
+ @retval Others Failed to discover the boot file.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+PxeBcRequestBootService (
|
||||
+ IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,
|
||||
+ IN UINT32 Index
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
#endif // PXE_BC_DHCP6_GOOGLE_TEST_H_
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
|
||||
From ababd8837103d4e504cc5d044a13fb9516543795 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 10:48:05 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 18/18] NetworkPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 54: NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21841 RHEL-21843 RHEL-21845 RHEL-21847 RHEL-21849 RHEL-21851 RHEL-21853
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [18/18] e77d4ea79359b99e7d1073251d67909c2bfdb879
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21841
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit 5fd3078a2e08f607dc86a16c1b184b6e30a34a49
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue Feb 13 10:46:03 2024 -0800
|
||||
|
||||
NetworkPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
|
||||
This captures the related security change for Dhcp6Dxe that is related
|
||||
to CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm <quic_llindhol@quicinc.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
index 7e900483fe..fa42025e0d 100644
|
||||
--- a/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
+++ b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ CVE_2023_45229:
|
||||
commit_titles:
|
||||
- "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Patch"
|
||||
- "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Unit Tests"
|
||||
+ - "NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Related Patch"
|
||||
cve: CVE-2023-45229
|
||||
date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC
|
||||
description: "Bug 01 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Out-of-bounds read when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a DHCPv6 Advertise message"
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 673ed284a598bf94d39f01f118158e55e5c04645 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2023 15:11:45 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: fix BdsPlatform.c assertion failure
|
||||
during boot
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 44: OvmfPkg/AmdSev: fix BdsPlatform.c assertion failure during boot
|
||||
RH-Bugzilla: 2190244
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [1/1] 44f18b2324cbd4aa1840613d9a8d19f0fbec7b1b (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Booting an SEV guest with AmdSev OVMF package currently triggers the
|
||||
following assertion with QEMU:
|
||||
|
||||
InstallQemuFwCfgTables: installed 7 tables
|
||||
PcRtc: Write 0x20 to CMOS location 0x32
|
||||
[Variable]END_OF_DXE is signaled
|
||||
Initialize variable error flag (FF)
|
||||
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status = Not Found)
|
||||
ASSERT [BdsDxe] /home/VT_BUILD/ovmf/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/BdsPlatform.c(1711): !(((INTN)(RETURN_STATUS)(Status)) < 0)
|
||||
|
||||
This seems to be due to commit 81dc0d8b4c, which switched to using
|
||||
PlatformBootManagerLib instead of PlatformBootManagerLibGrub. That
|
||||
pulls in a dependency on gEfiS3SaveStateProtocolGuid provider being
|
||||
available (which is asserted for in
|
||||
BdsPlatform.c:PlatformBootManagerBeforeConsole()/SaveS3BootScript()),
|
||||
but the libraries that provide it aren't currently included in the
|
||||
build. Add them similarly to what's done for OvmfPkg.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: 81dc0d8b4c ("OvmfPkg/AmdSev: stop using PlatformBootManagerLibGrub")
|
||||
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
|
||||
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-ID: <20230816201146.1634348-2-michael.roth@amd.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
List-Archive: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/107806
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 3 +++
|
||||
OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf | 2 ++
|
||||
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
|
||||
index 427df673f3..8d165ed05a 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
|
||||
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
SmbusLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseSmbusLibNull/BaseSmbusLibNull.inf
|
||||
OrderedCollectionLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseOrderedCollectionRedBlackTreeLib/BaseOrderedCollectionRedBlackTreeLib.inf
|
||||
+ S3BootScriptLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/DxeS3BootScriptLib.inf
|
||||
|
||||
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfTpmLibs.dsc.inc
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -715,6 +716,8 @@
|
||||
#
|
||||
MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/AcpiTableDxe/AcpiTableDxe.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/AcpiPlatformDxe/AcpiPlatformDxe.inf
|
||||
+ MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/S3SaveStateDxe/S3SaveStateDxe.inf
|
||||
+ MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootScriptExecutorDxe/BootScriptExecutorDxe.inf
|
||||
MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe.inf
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf
|
||||
index a48c93e2a5..3e6ee61823 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf
|
||||
@@ -269,6 +269,8 @@ INF OvmfPkg/SmbiosPlatformDxe/SmbiosPlatformDxe.inf
|
||||
|
||||
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/AcpiTableDxe/AcpiTableDxe.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/AcpiPlatformDxe/AcpiPlatformDxe.inf
|
||||
+INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/S3SaveStateDxe/S3SaveStateDxe.inf
|
||||
+INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootScriptExecutorDxe/BootScriptExecutorDxe.inf
|
||||
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe.inf
|
||||
|
||||
INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 7f3f6e3088655e33600aacd886aa51d19c01c59a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 18:31:29 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe: add locking to
|
||||
IoMmuAllocateBounceBuffer
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 45: OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe: add locking to IoMmuAllocateBounceBuffer
|
||||
RH-Bugzilla: 2211060
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [1/1] c4998c57651df23342a0cd6e8982bf59f306da83 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Searching for an unused bounce buffer in mReservedMemBitmap and
|
||||
reserving the buffer by flipping the bit is a critical section
|
||||
which must not be interrupted. Raise the TPL level to ensure
|
||||
that.
|
||||
|
||||
Without this fix it can happen that IoMmuDxe hands out the same
|
||||
bounce buffer twice, causing trouble down the road. Seen happening
|
||||
in practice with VirtioNetDxe setting up the network interface (and
|
||||
calling into IoMmuDxe from a polling timer callback) in parallel with
|
||||
Boot Manager doing some disk I/O. An ASSERT() in VirtioNet caught
|
||||
the buffer inconsistency.
|
||||
|
||||
Full story with lots of details and discussions is available here:
|
||||
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2211060
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit a52044a9e602bc168cdf5d73a48952bfc9edb521)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuBuffer.c | 7 +++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuBuffer.c b/OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuBuffer.c
|
||||
index c8f6cf4818..103003cae3 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuBuffer.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuBuffer.c
|
||||
@@ -367,7 +367,9 @@ IoMmuAllocateBounceBuffer (
|
||||
{
|
||||
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
UINT32 ReservedMemBitmap;
|
||||
+ EFI_TPL OldTpl;
|
||||
|
||||
+ OldTpl = gBS->RaiseTPL (TPL_NOTIFY);
|
||||
ReservedMemBitmap = 0;
|
||||
Status = InternalAllocateBuffer (
|
||||
Type,
|
||||
@@ -378,6 +380,7 @@ IoMmuAllocateBounceBuffer (
|
||||
);
|
||||
MapInfo->ReservedMemBitmap = ReservedMemBitmap;
|
||||
mReservedMemBitmap |= ReservedMemBitmap;
|
||||
+ gBS->RestoreTPL (OldTpl);
|
||||
|
||||
ASSERT (Status == EFI_SUCCESS);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -395,6 +398,8 @@ IoMmuFreeBounceBuffer (
|
||||
IN OUT MAP_INFO *MapInfo
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ EFI_TPL OldTpl;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (MapInfo->ReservedMemBitmap == 0) {
|
||||
gBS->FreePages (MapInfo->PlainTextAddress, MapInfo->NumberOfPages);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
@@ -407,9 +412,11 @@ IoMmuFreeBounceBuffer (
|
||||
mReservedMemBitmap,
|
||||
mReservedMemBitmap & ((UINT32)(~MapInfo->ReservedMemBitmap))
|
||||
));
|
||||
+ OldTpl = gBS->RaiseTPL (TPL_NOTIFY);
|
||||
MapInfo->PlainTextAddress = 0;
|
||||
mReservedMemBitmap &= (UINT32)(~MapInfo->ReservedMemBitmap);
|
||||
MapInfo->ReservedMemBitmap = 0;
|
||||
+ gBS->RestoreTPL (OldTpl);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From db07792f9eb095a1f7570b23b1e9dad6edca17a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 17 May 2023 12:24:49 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 12/12] OvmfPkg/MicrovmX64: enable 1G pages
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 40: enable use of gigabyte pages
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-644
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [3/3] 369373082e4dd0be9a4f257e5be9c827cc7de3c5 (kraxel/centos-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Reduces the memory footprint and speeds up booting.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 04c5b3023e49c35d291f41d2c39b4d12a62b8f9c)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc | 3 +++
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc
|
||||
index 49d1d7ef5c..cc8e3abc45 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc
|
||||
@@ -544,6 +544,9 @@
|
||||
gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMemoryTypeEfiRuntimeServicesCode|0x100
|
||||
gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMemoryTypeEfiRuntimeServicesData|0x100
|
||||
|
||||
+ # use 1G pages
|
||||
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUse1GPageTable|TRUE
|
||||
+
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Network Pcds
|
||||
#
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 943b4994942d550bef98685d13ffb26d4b5dd665 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 17 May 2023 12:24:48 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 11/12] OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64: enable 1G pages
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 40: enable use of gigabyte pages
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-644
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [2/3] 7385647b30e5096b356a13085a8081de79c916f8 (kraxel/centos-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Reduces the memory footprint and speeds up booting.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit b63e17d746aa6bab2b1101711395725005e71a02)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 3 +++
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
|
||||
index a41bc32454..a6714cea91 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
|
||||
@@ -557,6 +557,9 @@
|
||||
# never lets the RAM below 4 GB exceed 2816 MB.
|
||||
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciExpressBaseAddress|0xE0000000
|
||||
|
||||
+ # use 1G pages
|
||||
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUse1GPageTable|TRUE
|
||||
+
|
||||
!if $(SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
gEfiSourceLevelDebugPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDebugLoadImageMethod|0x2
|
||||
!endif
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From f24768ae482651073db9050fdaad49afe930b127 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 17 May 2023 12:24:47 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 10/12] OvmfPkg/PlatformInitLib: check PcdUse1GPageTable
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 40: enable use of gigabyte pages
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-644
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [1/3] 5d8b87d3b6a6b8af4d1a4aabedd8f69c512bf01c (kraxel/centos-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
If PcdUse1GPageTable is not enabled restrict the physical address space
|
||||
used to 1TB, to limit the amount of memory needed for identity mapping
|
||||
page tables.
|
||||
|
||||
The same already happens in case the processor has no support for
|
||||
gigabyte pages.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit d4d24001f78bcee965d8854fba6f08f48b4ec446)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c | 5 +++++
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/PlatformInitLib.inf | 1 +
|
||||
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
index 0482d8906d..662e7e85bb 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
@@ -666,6 +666,11 @@ PlatformAddressWidthFromCpuid (
|
||||
PhysBits = 40;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (!FixedPcdGetBool (PcdUse1GPageTable) && (PhysBits > 40)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: limit PhysBits to 40 (PcdUse1GPageTable is false)\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ PhysBits = 40;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
PlatformInfoHob->PhysMemAddressWidth = PhysBits;
|
||||
PlatformInfoHob->FirstNonAddress = LShiftU64 (1, PlatformInfoHob->PhysMemAddressWidth);
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/PlatformInitLib.inf b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/PlatformInitLib.inf
|
||||
index 86a82ad3e0..5a79d95b68 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/PlatformInitLib.inf
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/PlatformInitLib.inf
|
||||
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
[Pcd]
|
||||
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciExpressBaseAddress
|
||||
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUse1GPageTable
|
||||
|
||||
[FixedPcd]
|
||||
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfWorkAreaBase
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From b1643b16a4a70ea576b5f90476fd9c59750eafe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2023 09:57:31 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 07/12] OvmfPkg/PlatformInitLib: limit phys-bits to 46.
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 41: enable dynamic mmio window
|
||||
RH-Bugzilla: 2174749
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [1/2] d08a95b72276cba504176b3837714db67122ed66 (kraxel/centos-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Older linux kernels have problems with phys-bits larger than 46,
|
||||
ubuntu 18.04 (kernel 4.15) has been reported to be affected.
|
||||
|
||||
Reduce phys-bits limit from 47 to 46.
|
||||
|
||||
Reported-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit c1e853769046b322690ad336fdb98966757e7414)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c | 9 ++++++---
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
index 86700fc028..aab266399f 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
@@ -646,16 +646,19 @@ PlatformAddressWidthFromCpuid (
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
if (Valid) {
|
||||
- if (PhysBits > 47) {
|
||||
+ if (PhysBits > 46) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Avoid 5-level paging altogether for now, which limits
|
||||
* PhysBits to 48. Also avoid using address bit 48, due to sign
|
||||
* extension we can't identity-map these addresses (and lots of
|
||||
* places in edk2 assume we have everything identity-mapped).
|
||||
* So the actual limit is 47.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * Also some older linux kernels apparently have problems handling
|
||||
+ * phys-bits > 46 correctly, so use that as limit.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: limit PhysBits to 47 (avoid 5-level paging)\n", __func__));
|
||||
- PhysBits = 47;
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: limit PhysBits to 46 (avoid 5-level paging)\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ PhysBits = 46;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!Page1GSupport && (PhysBits > 40)) {
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From bcc2e81950016f6cda6f3c125bfa7c88a5f8ca8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2023 15:28:26 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Fix assembler bit test flag check
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 47: OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Fix assembler bit test flag check
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-9943
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [1/1] 4565e2863391eb63d598991bc1b394cabd96a466 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Commit 63c50d3ff2854a76432b752af4f2a76f33ff1974 changed the check that is
|
||||
used to determine if SEV-ES is active. Originally, a CMP instruction with
|
||||
a supporting JZ instruction was used for the check. It was changed to use
|
||||
the BT instruction but not JZ instruction. The result of a BT instruction
|
||||
changes the the carry flag (CF) and not the zero flag (ZF). As a result,
|
||||
the wrong condition is being checked. Update the JZ to a JNC to properly
|
||||
detect if SEV-ES is active.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: 63c50d3ff285 ("OvmfPkg/ResetVector: cache the SEV status MSR...")
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit e674096accc8e57cd0dd84679905e1222423251e)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm
|
||||
index c5c683ebed..429a58c5ef 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm
|
||||
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Transition32FlatTo64Flat:
|
||||
|
||||
mov ecx, 1
|
||||
bt [SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_STATUS_MSR], ecx
|
||||
- jz EnablePaging
|
||||
+ jnc EnablePaging
|
||||
|
||||
;
|
||||
; SEV-ES is active, perform a quick sanity check against the reported
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
|
||||
From 390efa52b8c2b61bcc6f24cc9f3b805798150b6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 12:29:00 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] OvmfPkg/RiscVVirt: use gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid
|
||||
unconditionally
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
ArmVirt and OVMF are doing the same.
|
||||
|
||||
See commit d92eaabefbe0 ("OvmfPkg: simplify VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER
|
||||
generation") for details.
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested-by: László Érsek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-Id: <20240109112902.30002-2-kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 3b1ddbddeee64cee5aba4f0170fbf5e4781d4879)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/RiscVVirt/VarStore.fdf.inc | 9 +--------
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/RiscVVirt/VarStore.fdf.inc b/OvmfPkg/RiscVVirt/VarStore.fdf.inc
|
||||
index aba32315cc..6679c246b3 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/RiscVVirt/VarStore.fdf.inc
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/RiscVVirt/VarStore.fdf.inc
|
||||
@@ -36,19 +36,12 @@ DATA = {
|
||||
# Blockmap[1]: End
|
||||
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
||||
## This is the VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER
|
||||
-!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
+ # It is compatible with SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE == FALSE as well.
|
||||
# Signature: gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid =
|
||||
# { 0xaaf32c78, 0x947b, 0x439a,
|
||||
# { 0xa1, 0x80, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x77, 0x92 }}
|
||||
0x78, 0x2c, 0xf3, 0xaa, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x9a, 0x43,
|
||||
0xa1, 0x80, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x77, 0x92,
|
||||
-!else
|
||||
- # Signature: gEfiVariableGuid =
|
||||
- # { 0xddcf3616, 0x3275, 0x4164,
|
||||
- # { 0x98, 0xb6, 0xfe, 0x85, 0x70, 0x7f, 0xfe, 0x7d }}
|
||||
- 0x16, 0x36, 0xcf, 0xdd, 0x75, 0x32, 0x64, 0x41,
|
||||
- 0x98, 0xb6, 0xfe, 0x85, 0x70, 0x7f, 0xfe, 0x7d,
|
||||
-!endif
|
||||
# Size: 0x40000 (gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize) -
|
||||
# 0x48 (size of EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER) = 0x3FFB8
|
||||
# This can speed up the Variable Dispatch a bit.
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
|
||||
From 7b1298045185749369115719317dc92f58af92d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:04:38 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 6/9] OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process.
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 55: OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process.
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21704
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [1/4] c4061788d34f409944898b48642d610c259161f3 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Specifically before running lzma uncompress of the main firmware volume.
|
||||
This is needed to make sure caching is enabled, otherwise the uncompress
|
||||
can be extremely slow.
|
||||
|
||||
Adapt the ASSERTs and MTRR setup in PlatformInitLib to the changes.
|
||||
|
||||
Background: Depending on virtual machine configuration kvm may uses EPT
|
||||
memory types to apply guest MTRR settings. In case MTRRs are disabled
|
||||
kvm will use the uncachable memory type for all mappings. The
|
||||
vmx_get_mt_mask() function in the linux kernel handles this and can be
|
||||
found here:
|
||||
|
||||
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c?h=v6.7.1#n7580
|
||||
|
||||
In most VM configurations kvm uses MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK unconditionally. In
|
||||
case the VM has a mdev device assigned that is not the case though.
|
||||
|
||||
Before commit e8aa4c6546ad ("UefiCpuPkg/ResetVector: Cache Disable
|
||||
should not be set by default in CR0") kvm also ended up using
|
||||
MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK due to KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED. After that commit
|
||||
kvm evaluates guest mtrr settings, which why setting up MTRRs early is
|
||||
important now.
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-ID: <20240130130441.772484-2-kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
[ kraxel: Downstream-only for now. Timely upstream merge is unlikely
|
||||
due to chinese holidays and rhel-9.4 deadlines are close.
|
||||
QE regression testing passed. So go with upstream posted
|
||||
series v3 ]
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c | 10 +++----
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c
|
||||
index 42a587adfa..0daddac0a0 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
|
||||
#include <Library/TdxHelperLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/CcProbeLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/PeilessStartupLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h>
|
||||
+#include <Register/Intel/Cpuid.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#define SEC_IDT_ENTRY_COUNT 34
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -48,6 +50,31 @@ IA32_IDT_GATE_DESCRIPTOR mIdtEntryTemplate = {
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Enable MTRR early, set default type to write back.
|
||||
+// Needed to make sure caching is enabled,
|
||||
+// without this lzma decompress can be very slow.
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+STATIC
|
||||
+VOID
|
||||
+SecMtrrSetup (
|
||||
+ VOID
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ CPUID_VERSION_INFO_EDX Edx;
|
||||
+ MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE_REGISTER DefType;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ AsmCpuid (CPUID_VERSION_INFO, NULL, NULL, NULL, &Edx.Uint32);
|
||||
+ if (!Edx.Bits.MTRR) {
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DefType.Uint64 = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE);
|
||||
+ DefType.Bits.Type = 6; /* write back */
|
||||
+ DefType.Bits.E = 1; /* enable */
|
||||
+ AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE, DefType.Uint64);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
VOID
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
SecCoreStartupWithStack (
|
||||
@@ -204,6 +231,11 @@ SecCoreStartupWithStack (
|
||||
InitializeApicTimer (0, MAX_UINT32, TRUE, 5);
|
||||
DisableApicTimerInterrupt ();
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Initialize MTRR
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ SecMtrrSetup ();
|
||||
+
|
||||
PeilessStartup (&SecCoreData);
|
||||
|
||||
ASSERT (FALSE);
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
index 662e7e85bb..f8d7f5bf1c 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
@@ -1035,18 +1035,18 @@ PlatformQemuInitializeRam (
|
||||
MtrrGetAllMtrrs (&MtrrSettings);
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
- // MTRRs disabled, fixed MTRRs disabled, default type is uncached
|
||||
+ // See SecMtrrSetup(), default type should be write back
|
||||
//
|
||||
- ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & BIT11) == 0);
|
||||
+ ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & BIT11) != 0);
|
||||
ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & BIT10) == 0);
|
||||
- ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & 0xFF) == 0);
|
||||
+ ASSERT ((MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType & 0xFF) == MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK);
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
// flip default type to writeback
|
||||
//
|
||||
- SetMem (&MtrrSettings.Fixed, sizeof MtrrSettings.Fixed, 0x06);
|
||||
+ SetMem (&MtrrSettings.Fixed, sizeof MtrrSettings.Fixed, MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK);
|
||||
ZeroMem (&MtrrSettings.Variables, sizeof MtrrSettings.Variables);
|
||||
- MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType |= BIT11 | BIT10 | 6;
|
||||
+ MtrrSettings.MtrrDefType |= BIT10;
|
||||
MtrrSetAllMtrrs (&MtrrSettings);
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
|
||||
index 31da5d0ace..3b7dc7205d 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
|
||||
#include <Ppi/MpInitLibDep.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/TdxHelperLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/CcProbeLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <Register/Intel/ArchitecturalMsr.h>
|
||||
+#include <Register/Intel/Cpuid.h>
|
||||
#include "AmdSev.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#define SEC_IDT_ENTRY_COUNT 34
|
||||
@@ -744,6 +746,31 @@ FindAndReportEntryPoints (
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+// Enable MTRR early, set default type to write back.
|
||||
+// Needed to make sure caching is enabled,
|
||||
+// without this lzma decompress can be very slow.
|
||||
+//
|
||||
+STATIC
|
||||
+VOID
|
||||
+SecMtrrSetup (
|
||||
+ VOID
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ CPUID_VERSION_INFO_EDX Edx;
|
||||
+ MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE_REGISTER DefType;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ AsmCpuid (CPUID_VERSION_INFO, NULL, NULL, NULL, &Edx.Uint32);
|
||||
+ if (!Edx.Bits.MTRR) {
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DefType.Uint64 = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE);
|
||||
+ DefType.Bits.Type = 6; /* write back */
|
||||
+ DefType.Bits.E = 1; /* enable */
|
||||
+ AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE, DefType.Uint64);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
VOID
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
SecCoreStartupWithStack (
|
||||
@@ -942,6 +969,11 @@ SecCoreStartupWithStack (
|
||||
InitializeApicTimer (0, MAX_UINT32, TRUE, 5);
|
||||
DisableApicTimerInterrupt ();
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Initialize MTRR
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ SecMtrrSetup ();
|
||||
+
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Initialize Debug Agent to support source level debug in SEC/PEI phases before memory ready.
|
||||
//
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
|
||||
From 0e2a3df10d784fd38ceee2f6a733032d1333281f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:04:41 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 9/9] OvmfPkg/Sec: use cache type #defines from
|
||||
ArchitecturalMsr.h
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 55: OvmfPkg/Sec: Setup MTRR early in the boot process.
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21704
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [4/4] 55f00e3e153ca945ca458e7abc26780a8d83ac85 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-ID: <20240130130441.772484-5-kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c | 2 +-
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 2 +-
|
||||
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c
|
||||
index 0daddac0a0..c00b852f0e 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/Sec/SecMain.c
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ SecMtrrSetup (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
DefType.Uint64 = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE);
|
||||
- DefType.Bits.Type = 6; /* write back */
|
||||
+ DefType.Bits.Type = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK;
|
||||
DefType.Bits.E = 1; /* enable */
|
||||
AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE, DefType.Uint64);
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
|
||||
index 3b7dc7205d..aa0fa1b1ec 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
|
||||
@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ SecMtrrSetup (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
DefType.Uint64 = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE);
|
||||
- DefType.Bits.Type = 6; /* write back */
|
||||
+ DefType.Bits.Type = MSR_IA32_MTRR_CACHE_WRITE_BACK;
|
||||
DefType.Bits.E = 1; /* enable */
|
||||
AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE, DefType.Uint64);
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
||||
From cfcef96bb3c63342d4fb87cf0cda8e9dcaef9b2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:04 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 5/6] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: ValidateFvHeader: unwritten
|
||||
state is EOL too
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 52: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: backport more fixes.
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-20963
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [5/6] 24a9f2d03eeaf61ea8f0ea5a40f0921994b08688 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
It is possible to find variable entries with State being 0xff, i.e. not
|
||||
updated since flash block erase. This indicates the variable driver
|
||||
could not complete the header write while appending a new entry, and
|
||||
therefore State was not set to VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY.
|
||||
|
||||
This can only happen at the end of the variable list, so treat this as
|
||||
additional "end of variable list" condition.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-6-kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 735d0a5e2e25c1577bf9bea7826da937ca38169d)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c | 5 +++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
|
||||
index 8fcd999ac6..c8b5e0be13 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
|
||||
@@ -302,6 +302,11 @@ ValidateFvHeader (
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (VarHeader->State == 0xff) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: end of var list (unwritten state)\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
VarName = NULL;
|
||||
switch (VarHeader->State) {
|
||||
// usage: State = VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
|
||||
From a82176278e664c3955197d1e076188471d88a422 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:02 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: add a loop for
|
||||
NorFlashWriteBuffer calls.
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 52: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: backport more fixes.
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-20963
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [3/6] 993426855451252f1126348e107e386b07314bfd (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Replace the two NorFlashWriteBuffer() calls with a loop containing a
|
||||
single NorFlashWriteBuffer() call.
|
||||
|
||||
With the changes in place the code is able to handle updates larger
|
||||
than two P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES blocks, even though the patch
|
||||
does not actually change the size limit.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-4-kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 28ffd726894f11a587a6ac7f71a4c4af341e24d2)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 21 ++++++++-------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
index 88a4d2c23f..3d1343b381 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
@@ -521,6 +521,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
|
||||
UINTN BlockAddress;
|
||||
UINT8 *OrigData;
|
||||
UINTN Start, End;
|
||||
+ UINT32 Index, Count;
|
||||
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock(Parameters: Lba=%ld, Offset=0x%x, *NumBytes=0x%x, Buffer @ 0x%08x)\n", Lba, Offset, *NumBytes, Buffer));
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -621,23 +622,17 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
|
||||
goto Exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer (
|
||||
- Instance,
|
||||
- BlockAddress + Start,
|
||||
- P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
|
||||
- Instance->ShadowBuffer
|
||||
- );
|
||||
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
- goto Exit;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if ((End - Start) > P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES) {
|
||||
+ Count = (End - Start) / P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES;
|
||||
+ for (Index = 0; Index < Count; Index++) {
|
||||
Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer (
|
||||
Instance,
|
||||
- BlockAddress + Start + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
|
||||
+ BlockAddress + Start + Index * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
|
||||
P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
|
||||
- Instance->ShadowBuffer + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES
|
||||
+ Instance->ShadowBuffer + Index * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES
|
||||
);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ goto Exit;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Exit:
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
|
||||
From 74d2d4b58efe72b931bd2979254cb0fa02a38276 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:00 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: add casts to UINTN and UINT32
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 52: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: backport more fixes.
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-20963
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [1/6] ad54e96a5f20907ac591fcfcc0961d353953c4f1 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
This is needed to avoid bit operations being applied to signed integers.
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested-by: László Érsek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-2-kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 0395045ae307c43a41f72ca9a8bf4eb8f16b2fe0)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 2 +-
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h | 2 +-
|
||||
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
index 1afd60ce66..7f4743b003 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
|
||||
// contents, while checking whether the old version had any bits cleared
|
||||
// that we want to set. In that case, we will need to erase the block first.
|
||||
for (CurOffset = 0; CurOffset < *NumBytes; CurOffset++) {
|
||||
- if (~OrigData[CurOffset] & Buffer[CurOffset]) {
|
||||
+ if (~(UINT32)OrigData[CurOffset] & (UINT32)Buffer[CurOffset]) {
|
||||
goto DoErase;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h
|
||||
index b7f5d208b2..455eafacc2 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.h
|
||||
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
|
||||
#define P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES ((UINTN)128)
|
||||
#define P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_WORDS (P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES/((UINTN)4))
|
||||
#define MAX_BUFFERED_PROG_ITERATIONS 10000000
|
||||
-#define BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS 0x7F
|
||||
+#define BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS ((UINTN)0x7F)
|
||||
|
||||
// CFI Addresses
|
||||
#define P30_CFI_ADDR_QUERY_UNIQUE_QRY 0x10
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
|
||||
From 75774a03a6e0d2f5ca8103bab8d7d31e40624edd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:03 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: allow larger writes without
|
||||
block erase
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 52: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: backport more fixes.
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-20963
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [4/6] 4bc6828b395ef708201a49001348bb61a0108339 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Raise the limit for writes without block erase from two to four
|
||||
P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES blocks. With this in place almost all efi
|
||||
variable updates are handled without block erase. With the old limit
|
||||
some variable updates (with device paths) took the block erase code
|
||||
path.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-5-kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit b25733c97442513890ae6bb8e10fd340f13844a7)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
|
||||
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
index 3d1343b381..3d1d20daa1 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
@@ -550,13 +550,15 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
|
||||
return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- // Pick P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES (== 128 bytes) as a good start for word
|
||||
- // operations as opposed to erasing the block and writing the data regardless
|
||||
- // if an erase is really needed. It looks like most individual NV variable
|
||||
- // writes are smaller than 128 bytes.
|
||||
- // To avoid pathological cases were a 2 byte write is disregarded because it
|
||||
- // occurs right at a 128 byte buffered write alignment boundary, permit up to
|
||||
- // twice the max buffer size, and perform two writes if needed.
|
||||
+ // Pick 4 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES (== 512 bytes) as a good
|
||||
+ // start for word operations as opposed to erasing the block and
|
||||
+ // writing the data regardless if an erase is really needed.
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Many NV variable updates are small enough for a a single
|
||||
+ // P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES block write. In case the update is
|
||||
+ // larger than a single block, or the update crosses a
|
||||
+ // P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES boundary (as shown in the diagram
|
||||
+ // below), or both, we might have to write two or more blocks.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 0 128 256
|
||||
// [----------------|----------------]
|
||||
@@ -578,7 +580,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
|
||||
Start = Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS;
|
||||
End = ALIGN_VALUE (Offset + *NumBytes, P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
|
||||
|
||||
- if ((End - Start) <= (2 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) {
|
||||
+ if ((End - Start) <= (4 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) {
|
||||
// Check to see if we need to erase before programming the data into NOR.
|
||||
// If the destination bits are only changing from 1s to 0s we can just write.
|
||||
// After a block is erased all bits in the block is set to 1.
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
|
||||
From ef99dec08d51bad7be0f84942443a8a0e1412c87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:01 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: clarify block write logic & fix
|
||||
shadowbuffer reads
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 52: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: backport more fixes.
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-20963
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [2/6] e2f2231fd1b7b702aa5372e790c1d2c06ca79f74 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Introduce 'Start' and 'End' variables to make it easier to follow the
|
||||
logic and code flow. Also add a ascii art diagram (based on a
|
||||
suggestion by Laszlo).
|
||||
|
||||
This also fixes the 'Size' calculation for the NorFlashRead() call.
|
||||
Without this patch the code will read only one instead of two
|
||||
P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES blocks in case '*NumBytes' is smaller than
|
||||
P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES but 'Offset + *NumBytes' is not, i.e. the
|
||||
update range crosses a P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-3-kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 35d8ea8097794b522149688b5cfaf8364bc44d54)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++------
|
||||
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
index 7f4743b003..88a4d2c23f 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
@@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
|
||||
UINTN BlockSize;
|
||||
UINTN BlockAddress;
|
||||
UINT8 *OrigData;
|
||||
+ UINTN Start, End;
|
||||
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_BLKIO, "NorFlashWriteSingleBlock(Parameters: Lba=%ld, Offset=0x%x, *NumBytes=0x%x, Buffer @ 0x%08x)\n", Lba, Offset, *NumBytes, Buffer));
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -555,7 +556,28 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
|
||||
// To avoid pathological cases were a 2 byte write is disregarded because it
|
||||
// occurs right at a 128 byte buffered write alignment boundary, permit up to
|
||||
// twice the max buffer size, and perform two writes if needed.
|
||||
- if ((*NumBytes + (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS)) <= (2 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) {
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // 0 128 256
|
||||
+ // [----------------|----------------]
|
||||
+ // ^ ^ ^ ^
|
||||
+ // | | | |
|
||||
+ // | | | End, the next "word" boundary beyond
|
||||
+ // | | | the (logical) update
|
||||
+ // | | |
|
||||
+ // | | (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS) + NumBytes;
|
||||
+ // | | i.e., the relative offset inside (or just past)
|
||||
+ // | | the *double-word* such that it is the
|
||||
+ // | | *exclusive* end of the (logical) update.
|
||||
+ // | |
|
||||
+ // | Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS; i.e., Offset within the "word";
|
||||
+ // | this is where the (logical) update is supposed to start
|
||||
+ // |
|
||||
+ // Start = Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS; i.e., Offset truncated to "word" boundary
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Start = Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS;
|
||||
+ End = ALIGN_VALUE (Offset + *NumBytes, P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((End - Start) <= (2 * P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES)) {
|
||||
// Check to see if we need to erase before programming the data into NOR.
|
||||
// If the destination bits are only changing from 1s to 0s we can just write.
|
||||
// After a block is erased all bits in the block is set to 1.
|
||||
@@ -565,8 +587,8 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
|
||||
Status = NorFlashRead (
|
||||
Instance,
|
||||
Lba,
|
||||
- Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS,
|
||||
- (*NumBytes | BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS) + 1,
|
||||
+ Start,
|
||||
+ End - Start,
|
||||
Instance->ShadowBuffer
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
@@ -601,7 +623,7 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
|
||||
|
||||
Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer (
|
||||
Instance,
|
||||
- BlockAddress + (Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS),
|
||||
+ BlockAddress + Start,
|
||||
P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
|
||||
Instance->ShadowBuffer
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -609,12 +631,10 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
|
||||
goto Exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if ((*NumBytes + (Offset & BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS)) > P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES) {
|
||||
- BlockAddress += P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES;
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ if ((End - Start) > P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES) {
|
||||
Status = NorFlashWriteBuffer (
|
||||
Instance,
|
||||
- BlockAddress + (Offset & ~BOUNDARY_OF_32_WORDS),
|
||||
+ BlockAddress + Start + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
|
||||
P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES,
|
||||
Instance->ShadowBuffer + P30_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE_IN_BYTES
|
||||
);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
|
||||
From 0429352edb21bd20b8192aec3f484361f4dc3b33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:11:05 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: move DoErase code block into new
|
||||
function
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 52: OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: backport more fixes.
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-20963
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [6/6] 9a25dbbd0d9881664f8ce30efb95c63099785204 (kraxel.rh/centos-src-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Move the DoErase code block into a separate function, call the function
|
||||
instead of jumping around with goto.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-Id: <20240116171105.37831-7-kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit b481b00f593ef37695ee14271453320ed02a1256)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++--------
|
||||
1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
index 3d1d20daa1..e6aaed27ce 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlash.c
|
||||
@@ -502,6 +502,38 @@ NorFlashRead (
|
||||
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+STATIC
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+NorFlashWriteSingleBlockWithErase (
|
||||
+ IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance,
|
||||
+ IN EFI_LBA Lba,
|
||||
+ IN UINTN Offset,
|
||||
+ IN OUT UINTN *NumBytes,
|
||||
+ IN UINT8 *Buffer
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Read NOR Flash data into shadow buffer
|
||||
+ Status = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, Instance->BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Put the data at the appropriate location inside the buffer area
|
||||
+ CopyMem ((VOID *)((UINTN)Instance->ShadowBuffer + Offset), Buffer, *NumBytes);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Write the modified buffer back to the NorFlash
|
||||
+ Status = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, Instance->BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
Write a full or portion of a block. It must not span block boundaries; that is,
|
||||
Offset + *NumBytes <= Instance->BlockSize.
|
||||
@@ -607,7 +639,14 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
|
||||
// that we want to set. In that case, we will need to erase the block first.
|
||||
for (CurOffset = 0; CurOffset < *NumBytes; CurOffset++) {
|
||||
if (~(UINT32)OrigData[CurOffset] & (UINT32)Buffer[CurOffset]) {
|
||||
- goto DoErase;
|
||||
+ Status = NorFlashWriteSingleBlockWithErase (
|
||||
+ Instance,
|
||||
+ Lba,
|
||||
+ Offset,
|
||||
+ NumBytes,
|
||||
+ Buffer
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ return Status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
OrigData[CurOffset] = Buffer[CurOffset];
|
||||
@@ -636,33 +675,22 @@ NorFlashWriteSingleBlock (
|
||||
goto Exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
-
|
||||
-Exit:
|
||||
- // Put device back into Read Array mode
|
||||
- SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY);
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ Status = NorFlashWriteSingleBlockWithErase (
|
||||
+ Instance,
|
||||
+ Lba,
|
||||
+ Offset,
|
||||
+ NumBytes,
|
||||
+ Buffer
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
return Status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-DoErase:
|
||||
- // Read NOR Flash data into shadow buffer
|
||||
- Status = NorFlashReadBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer);
|
||||
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
- // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses
|
||||
- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
- // Put the data at the appropriate location inside the buffer area
|
||||
- CopyMem ((VOID *)((UINTN)Instance->ShadowBuffer + Offset), Buffer, *NumBytes);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- // Write the modified buffer back to the NorFlash
|
||||
- Status = NorFlashWriteBlocks (Instance, Lba, BlockSize, Instance->ShadowBuffer);
|
||||
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
- // Return one of the pre-approved error statuses
|
||||
- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+Exit:
|
||||
+ // Put device back into Read Array mode
|
||||
+ SEND_NOR_COMMAND (Instance->DeviceBaseAddress, 0, P30_CMD_READ_ARRAY);
|
||||
|
||||
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+ return Status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
|
||||
From d557e973e4a400325f68014e463201a5b48c1547 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 12:29:02 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: sanity-check variables
|
||||
|
||||
Extend the ValidateFvHeader function, additionally to the header checks
|
||||
walk over the list of variables and sanity check them.
|
||||
|
||||
In case we find inconsistencies indicating variable store corruption
|
||||
return EFI_NOT_FOUND so the variable store will be re-initialized.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-Id: <20240109112902.30002-4-kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
[lersek@redhat.com: fix StartId initialization/assignment coding style]
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 4a443f73fd67ca8caaf0a3e1a01f8231b330d2e0)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf | 1 +
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c | 149 +++++++++++++++++++-
|
||||
2 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
|
||||
index 2a3d4a218e..f549400280 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashDxe.inf
|
||||
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
|
||||
DxeServicesTableLib
|
||||
HobLib
|
||||
IoLib
|
||||
+ SafeIntLib
|
||||
UefiBootServicesTableLib
|
||||
UefiDriverEntryPoint
|
||||
UefiLib
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
|
||||
index 9a614ae4b2..8fcd999ac6 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
|
||||
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
|
||||
#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/PcdLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/SafeIntLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/UefiLib.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <Guid/NvVarStoreFormatted.h>
|
||||
@@ -185,11 +186,12 @@ ValidateFvHeader (
|
||||
IN NOR_FLASH_INSTANCE *Instance
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- UINT16 Checksum;
|
||||
- EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *FwVolHeader;
|
||||
- VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *VariableStoreHeader;
|
||||
- UINTN VariableStoreLength;
|
||||
- UINTN FvLength;
|
||||
+ UINT16 Checksum;
|
||||
+ CONST EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *FwVolHeader;
|
||||
+ CONST VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *VariableStoreHeader;
|
||||
+ UINTN VarOffset;
|
||||
+ UINTN VariableStoreLength;
|
||||
+ UINTN FvLength;
|
||||
|
||||
FwVolHeader = (EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *)Instance->RegionBaseAddress;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -258,6 +260,143 @@ ValidateFvHeader (
|
||||
return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // check variables
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: checking variables\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ VarOffset = sizeof (*VariableStoreHeader);
|
||||
+ for ( ; ;) {
|
||||
+ UINTN VarHeaderEnd;
|
||||
+ UINTN VarNameEnd;
|
||||
+ UINTN VarEnd;
|
||||
+ UINTN VarPadding;
|
||||
+ CONST AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_HEADER *VarHeader;
|
||||
+ CONST CHAR16 *VarName;
|
||||
+ CONST CHAR8 *VarState;
|
||||
+ RETURN_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarOffset, sizeof (*VarHeader), &VarHeaderEnd);
|
||||
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (VarHeaderEnd >= VariableStoreHeader->Size) {
|
||||
+ if (VarOffset <= VariableStoreHeader->Size - sizeof (UINT16)) {
|
||||
+ CONST UINT16 *StartId;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ StartId = (VOID *)((UINTN)VariableStoreHeader + VarOffset);
|
||||
+ if (*StartId == 0x55aa) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: startid at invalid location\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: end of var list (no space left)\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ VarHeader = (VOID *)((UINTN)VariableStoreHeader + VarOffset);
|
||||
+ if (VarHeader->StartId != 0x55aa) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: end of var list (no startid)\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ VarName = NULL;
|
||||
+ switch (VarHeader->State) {
|
||||
+ // usage: State = VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY
|
||||
+ case VAR_HEADER_VALID_ONLY:
|
||||
+ VarState = "header-ok";
|
||||
+ VarName = L"<unknown>";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // usage: State = VAR_ADDED
|
||||
+ case VAR_ADDED:
|
||||
+ VarState = "ok";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // usage: State &= VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION
|
||||
+ case VAR_ADDED &VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION:
|
||||
+ VarState = "del-in-transition";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // usage: State &= VAR_DELETED
|
||||
+ case VAR_ADDED &VAR_DELETED:
|
||||
+ case VAR_ADDED &VAR_DELETED &VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION:
|
||||
+ VarState = "deleted";
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((
|
||||
+ DEBUG_ERROR,
|
||||
+ "%a: invalid variable state: 0x%x\n",
|
||||
+ __func__,
|
||||
+ VarHeader->State
|
||||
+ ));
|
||||
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarHeaderEnd, VarHeader->NameSize, &VarNameEnd);
|
||||
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarNameEnd, VarHeader->DataSize, &VarEnd);
|
||||
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (VarEnd > VariableStoreHeader->Size) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((
|
||||
+ DEBUG_ERROR,
|
||||
+ "%a: invalid variable size: 0x%Lx + 0x%Lx + 0x%x + 0x%x > 0x%x\n",
|
||||
+ __func__,
|
||||
+ (UINT64)VarOffset,
|
||||
+ (UINT64)(sizeof (*VarHeader)),
|
||||
+ VarHeader->NameSize,
|
||||
+ VarHeader->DataSize,
|
||||
+ VariableStoreHeader->Size
|
||||
+ ));
|
||||
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (((VarHeader->NameSize & 1) != 0) ||
|
||||
+ (VarHeader->NameSize < 4))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: invalid name size\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (VarName == NULL) {
|
||||
+ VarName = (VOID *)((UINTN)VariableStoreHeader + VarHeaderEnd);
|
||||
+ if (VarName[VarHeader->NameSize / 2 - 1] != L'\0') {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: name is not null terminated\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((
|
||||
+ DEBUG_VERBOSE,
|
||||
+ "%a: +0x%04Lx: name=0x%x data=0x%x guid=%g '%s' (%a)\n",
|
||||
+ __func__,
|
||||
+ (UINT64)VarOffset,
|
||||
+ VarHeader->NameSize,
|
||||
+ VarHeader->DataSize,
|
||||
+ &VarHeader->VendorGuid,
|
||||
+ VarName,
|
||||
+ VarState
|
||||
+ ));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ VarPadding = (4 - (VarEnd & 3)) & 3;
|
||||
+ Status = SafeUintnAdd (VarEnd, VarPadding, &VarOffset);
|
||||
+ if (RETURN_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: integer overflow\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
From 77047a56601aaa955a12030343bdee973b9d393d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 12:29:01 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe: stop accepting gEfiVariableGuid
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
Only accept gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid when checking the variable
|
||||
store header in ValidateFvHeader().
|
||||
|
||||
The edk2 code base has been switched to use the authenticated varstore
|
||||
format unconditionally (even in case secure boot is not used or
|
||||
supported) a few years ago.
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested-by: László Érsek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-Id: <20240109112902.30002-3-kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit ae22b2f136bcbd27135a5f4dd76d3a68a172d00e)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c | 4 +---
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
|
||||
index 5ee98e9b59..9a614ae4b2 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtNorFlashDxe/VirtNorFlashFvb.c
|
||||
@@ -239,9 +239,7 @@ ValidateFvHeader (
|
||||
VariableStoreHeader = (VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *)((UINTN)FwVolHeader + FwVolHeader->HeaderLength);
|
||||
|
||||
// Check the Variable Store Guid
|
||||
- if (!CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiVariableGuid) &&
|
||||
- !CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid))
|
||||
- {
|
||||
+ if (!CompareGuid (&VariableStoreHeader->Signature, &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid)) {
|
||||
DEBUG ((
|
||||
DEBUG_INFO,
|
||||
"%a: Variable Store Guid non-compatible\n",
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 60a5604388fa73872d67e9ed46a29c7fd0e4fc32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 13:14:06 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 06/12] OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe: Remove noisy debug print on
|
||||
supported() call
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 39: ArmVirt: add VirtioSerialDxe to ArmVirtQemu builds
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-643
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [6/6] 62b611c1d82f1b87cac2a07655ca37117d438989 (kraxel/centos-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
The UEFI driver model invokes the supported() method on every driver
|
||||
every time a connection attempt is made on any handle, and so doing an
|
||||
unconditional DEBUG() print inside this method produced a lot of noise.
|
||||
|
||||
So let's drop this DEBUG() call from the VirtioSerial driver's
|
||||
Supported() method.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
|
||||
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit ea7a3015a2404e1358218463dd25df5ae7615352)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.c | 2 --
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.c
|
||||
index bfb2b324ea..9e27a519f4 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.c
|
||||
@@ -510,8 +510,6 @@ VirtioSerialDriverBindingSupported (
|
||||
Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a:%d: subsystem %d -> %r\n", __func__, __LINE__, VirtIo->SubSystemDeviceId, Status));
|
||||
-
|
||||
//
|
||||
// We needed VirtIo access only transitorily, to see whether we support the
|
||||
// device or not.
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 2ab130462062bfcd66d3047eaa6947a151296a21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 16:23:06 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 05/12] OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe: use TPL_NOTIFY
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 39: ArmVirt: add VirtioSerialDxe to ArmVirtQemu builds
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-643
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [5/6] 08998538804a8d62903e44e716bcafd9674d208f (kraxel/centos-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
Apparently TPL_CALLBACK is too low, code runs into an ASSERT
|
||||
complaining the new TPL is lower than the old TPL.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 4e5a804222415ec7b2bec90ea0300b8a9f60f131)
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerialPort.c | 4 ++--
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerialPort.c b/OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerialPort.c
|
||||
index 522b25e969..e4a58deff1 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerialPort.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerialPort.c
|
||||
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ VirtioSerialIoWrite (
|
||||
|
||||
VirtioSerialRingClearTx (SerialIo->Dev, PortTx (SerialIo->PortId));
|
||||
|
||||
- OldTpl = gBS->RaiseTPL (TPL_CALLBACK);
|
||||
+ OldTpl = gBS->RaiseTPL (TPL_NOTIFY);
|
||||
if (SerialIo->WriteOffset &&
|
||||
(SerialIo->WriteOffset + *BufferSize > PORT_TX_BUFSIZE))
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ VirtioSerialIoRead (
|
||||
goto NoData;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- OldTpl = gBS->RaiseTPL (TPL_CALLBACK);
|
||||
+ OldTpl = gBS->RaiseTPL (TPL_NOTIFY);
|
||||
if (SerialIo->WriteOffset) {
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%a:%d: WriteFlush %d\n", __func__, __LINE__, SerialIo->WriteOffset));
|
||||
VirtioSerialRingSendBuffer (
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
|
||||
From e22e11cc37c3bf3530ea8db1d18371c47c9e4440 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2024 10:34:22 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 6/8] OvmfPkg: wire up RngDxe
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 75: NetworkPkg: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 and CVE-2023-45237
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-40270 RHEL-40272
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [6/8] 4adf88888386923ee824469cf836b4f63117807d
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-40270
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-45237
|
||||
Conflicts: Cherry pick wanted to add include files from the
|
||||
missing 'add ShellComponents' (commit 2cb466cc2cbf...)
|
||||
series. This had to be handled manually.
|
||||
|
||||
commit 712797cf19acd292bf203522a79e40e7e13d268b
|
||||
Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri May 24 12:51:17 2024 +0200
|
||||
|
||||
OvmfPkg: wire up RngDxe
|
||||
|
||||
Add OvmfRng include snippets with the random number generator
|
||||
configuration for OVMF. Include RngDxe, build with BaseRngLib,
|
||||
so the rdrand instruction is used (if available).
|
||||
|
||||
Also move VirtioRng to the include snippets.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the new include snippets for OVMF builds.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 2 +-
|
||||
OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf | 3 ++-
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc | 9 +++++++++
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc | 6 ++++++
|
||||
OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc | 2 +-
|
||||
OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf | 3 ++-
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc | 2 +-
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf | 3 ++-
|
||||
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 2 +-
|
||||
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf | 3 ++-
|
||||
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 2 +-
|
||||
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf | 3 ++-
|
||||
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 2 +-
|
||||
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 3 ++-
|
||||
14 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
|
||||
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
|
||||
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
|
||||
index 7bb6ffb3f0..5d50e77002 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
|
||||
@@ -651,7 +651,6 @@
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
|
||||
!endif
|
||||
@@ -763,6 +762,7 @@
|
||||
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize|8000
|
||||
}
|
||||
!endif
|
||||
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
|
||||
|
||||
OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf {
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf
|
||||
index 0e3d7bea2b..c94f2d34ee 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf
|
||||
@@ -220,7 +220,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
|
||||
!endif
|
||||
@@ -316,6 +315,8 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
|
||||
#
|
||||
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmDxe.fdf.inc
|
||||
|
||||
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
|
||||
+
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
|
||||
[FV.FVMAIN_COMPACT]
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..68839a0caa
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
+##
|
||||
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+##
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxe.inf {
|
||||
+ <LibraryClasses>
|
||||
+ RngLib|MdePkg/Library/BaseRngLib/BaseRngLib.inf
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..99cb4a32b1
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
+##
|
||||
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+##
|
||||
+
|
||||
+INF SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxe.inf
|
||||
+INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc
|
||||
index fd6722499a..d38fed2171 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.dsc
|
||||
@@ -641,7 +641,6 @@
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
|
||||
!endif
|
||||
@@ -752,6 +751,7 @@
|
||||
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize|8000
|
||||
}
|
||||
!endif
|
||||
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
|
||||
|
||||
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf
|
||||
index 69ed7a9bc6..077a5c8637 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxX64.fdf
|
||||
@@ -285,7 +285,6 @@ READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
|
||||
#
|
||||
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
|
||||
!endif
|
||||
@@ -333,6 +332,8 @@ INF OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf
|
||||
|
||||
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
|
||||
+
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
|
||||
[FV.FVMAIN_COMPACT]
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc
|
||||
index 79f14b5c05..ca6902971f 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.dsc
|
||||
@@ -754,7 +754,6 @@
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
|
||||
MdeModulePkg/Universal/WatchdogTimerDxe/WatchdogTimer.inf
|
||||
MdeModulePkg/Universal/MonotonicCounterRuntimeDxe/MonotonicCounterRuntimeDxe.inf
|
||||
@@ -880,6 +879,7 @@
|
||||
gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize|FALSE
|
||||
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize|8000
|
||||
}
|
||||
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
|
||||
|
||||
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf
|
||||
index eda24a3ec9..767ee4b338 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Microvm/MicrovmX64.fdf
|
||||
@@ -204,7 +204,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
|
||||
|
||||
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
@@ -303,6 +302,8 @@ INF OvmfPkg/EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe/Fvb.inf
|
||||
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteDxe.inf
|
||||
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
|
||||
|
||||
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
|
||||
+
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
|
||||
[FV.FVMAIN_COMPACT]
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
|
||||
index 83adecc374..4074aa382d 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
|
||||
@@ -804,7 +804,6 @@
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
|
||||
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
|
||||
@@ -942,6 +941,7 @@
|
||||
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize|8000
|
||||
}
|
||||
!endif
|
||||
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
|
||||
|
||||
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf
|
||||
index 88c57ff5ff..20cfd2788e 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf
|
||||
@@ -236,7 +236,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
|
||||
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
|
||||
@@ -367,6 +366,8 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
|
||||
#
|
||||
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmDxe.fdf.inc
|
||||
|
||||
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
|
||||
+
|
||||
!if $(LOAD_X64_ON_IA32_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/CompatImageLoaderDxe/CompatImageLoaderDxe.inf
|
||||
!endif
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
|
||||
index b47cdf63e7..75ef19bc85 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
|
||||
@@ -822,7 +822,6 @@
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
|
||||
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
|
||||
@@ -960,6 +959,7 @@
|
||||
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize|8000
|
||||
}
|
||||
!endif
|
||||
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
|
||||
|
||||
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf
|
||||
index ab5a9bc306..8517c79ba2 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf
|
||||
@@ -237,7 +237,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
|
||||
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
|
||||
@@ -374,6 +373,8 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
|
||||
#
|
||||
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmDxe.fdf.inc
|
||||
|
||||
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
|
||||
+
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
|
||||
[FV.FVMAIN_COMPACT]
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
|
||||
index be3824ec1e..631ff0c788 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
|
||||
@@ -890,7 +890,6 @@
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
- OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
|
||||
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
|
||||
@@ -1028,6 +1027,7 @@
|
||||
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize|8000
|
||||
}
|
||||
!endif
|
||||
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Dsc/OvmfRngComponents.dsc.inc
|
||||
|
||||
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
|
||||
index 851399888f..7ecde357ce 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
|
||||
@@ -262,7 +262,6 @@ INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
|
||||
-INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
|
||||
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
|
||||
INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
|
||||
@@ -408,6 +407,8 @@ INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/TdTcg2Dxe/TdTcg2Dxe.inf
|
||||
#
|
||||
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmDxe.fdf.inc
|
||||
|
||||
+!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
|
||||
+
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
|
||||
[FV.FVMAIN_COMPACT]
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From e4fe4b80159b7df136f419da69251f45b62f36ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2023 13:37:33 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 08/12] Revert "OvmfPkg: disable dynamic mmio window (rhel
|
||||
only)"
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 41: enable dynamic mmio window
|
||||
RH-Bugzilla: 2174749
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [2/2] 10ace0e012602153f82fccee3c555be40b3c6753 (kraxel/centos-edk2)
|
||||
|
||||
This reverts commit 218d3b32592bffe5ec7317c4838d29e92b4b86f0.
|
||||
---
|
||||
OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c | 3 +--
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
index aab266399f..0482d8906d 100644
|
||||
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformInitLib/MemDetect.c
|
||||
@@ -682,8 +682,7 @@ PlatformDynamicMmioWindow (
|
||||
AddrSpace = LShiftU64 (1, PlatformInfoHob->PhysMemAddressWidth);
|
||||
MmioSpace = LShiftU64 (1, PlatformInfoHob->PhysMemAddressWidth - 3);
|
||||
|
||||
- if (FALSE /* disable for RHEL-9.2, libvirt is not ready yet */ &&
|
||||
- (PlatformInfoHob->PcdPciMmio64Size < MmioSpace) &&
|
||||
+ if ((PlatformInfoHob->PcdPciMmio64Size < MmioSpace) &&
|
||||
(PlatformInfoHob->PcdPciMmio64Base + MmioSpace < AddrSpace))
|
||||
{
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: using dynamic mmio window\n", __func__));
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
||||
From b3a9b8a85e2782600b4fd26d08a4d15826cadcf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:20:52 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36763 to
|
||||
SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 51: SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21155
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [3/3] 0763dad29bb6b9b3832b166bbabe15e84ed7208c
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21155
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-36763
|
||||
|
||||
commit 1ddcb9fc6b4164e882687b031e8beacfcf7df29e
|
||||
Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:03 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36763 to SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
|
||||
This creates / adds a security file that tracks the security fixes
|
||||
found in this package and can be used to find the fixes that were
|
||||
applied.
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
|
||||
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..f9e3e7be74
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
+## @file
|
||||
+# Security Fixes for SecurityPkg
|
||||
+#
|
||||
+# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
|
||||
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+##
|
||||
+CVE_2022_36763:
|
||||
+ commit_titles:
|
||||
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2Measurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763"
|
||||
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763"
|
||||
+ - "SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36763 to SecurityFixes.yaml"
|
||||
+ cve: CVE-2022-36763
|
||||
+ date_reported: 2022-10-25 11:31 UTC
|
||||
+ description: (CVE-2022-36763) - Heap Buffer Overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
|
||||
+ note: This patch is related to and supersedes TCBZ2168
|
||||
+ files_impacted:
|
||||
+ - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
+ - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
+ links:
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4117
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2168
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1990
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
|
||||
From 31ebaa021650c9b23c27f3a7954d33c1ef1e1502 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 3/9] SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH
|
||||
4117/4118 symbol rename
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 53: SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21157
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [3/5] d18f14e0a7df36223dab179bf7e9556db43f4c55
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21157
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-36764
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit 40adbb7f628dee79156c679fb0857968b61b7620
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed Jan 17 14:47:20 2024 -0800
|
||||
|
||||
SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename
|
||||
|
||||
Updates the sanitation function names to be lib unique names
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Message-Id: <7b18434c8a8b561654efd40ced3becb8b378c8f1.1705529990.git.doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 8 +++---
|
||||
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 8 +++---
|
||||
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 8 +++---
|
||||
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 26 +++++++++----------
|
||||
4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
index 714cc8e03e..73719f3b96 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable (
|
||||
BlockIo->Media->BlockSize,
|
||||
(UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader
|
||||
);
|
||||
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) {
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) {
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to read Partition Table Header or invalid Partition Table Header!\n"));
|
||||
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Read the partition entry.
|
||||
//
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize);
|
||||
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
|
||||
return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
|
||||
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Prepare Data for Measurement (CcProtocol and Tcg2Protocol)
|
||||
//
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &TcgEventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &TcgEventSize);
|
||||
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
|
||||
FreePool (EntryPtr);
|
||||
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
|
||||
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
index 2a4d52c6d5..809a3bfd89 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
+Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
+Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
+Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
IN UINTN NumberOfPartition,
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
-SanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
+Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
)
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
index 8f72ba4240..8526bc7537 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
+Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
+Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
+Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
IN UINTN NumberOfPartition,
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
-SanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
+Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
);
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
index 820e99aeb9..50a68e1076 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
@@ -84,27 +84,27 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.Header.CRC32 = CalculateCrc32 ((UINT8 *)&PrimaryHeader, PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
|
||||
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that when number of partition entries is 0, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
|
||||
// Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!""
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 0;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that when the header size is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
|
||||
// Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header Size!"
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = 0;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that when the SizeOfPartitionEntry is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
|
||||
// should print: "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!"
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 1;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
|
||||
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
|
||||
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that the allocation size is correct compared to the existing logic
|
||||
@@ -146,19 +146,19 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
// Test that an overflow is detected
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 5;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test the inverse
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test the worst case scenario
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
|
||||
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
NumberOfPartition = 13;
|
||||
|
||||
// that the primary event size is correct
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
// Calculate the existing logic event size
|
||||
@@ -207,12 +207,12 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (EventSize, ExistingLogicEventSize);
|
||||
|
||||
// Tests that the primary event size may not overflow
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that the size of partition entries may not overflow
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
|
||||
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
FilePathSize = 255;
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that a normal PE image passes validation
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic
|
||||
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that the event size may not overflow
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = Tpm2SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
|
||||
From 808551c1cb2ac9dc9a6287cbc85b167aa9eb2d7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 15:43:10 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/9] SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 -
|
||||
CVE 2022-36764
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 53: SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21157
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [1/5] 50edfd997d089549ac41b9592131ac1212fc3431
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21157
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-36764
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit c7b27944218130cca3bbb20314ba5b88b5de4aa4
|
||||
Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:04 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764
|
||||
|
||||
This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib
|
||||
CVE 2022-36764.
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 12 ++--
|
||||
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 46 +++++++++++++-
|
||||
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 28 ++++++++-
|
||||
.../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++---
|
||||
4 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
index 0475103d6e..714cc8e03e 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
@@ -378,7 +378,6 @@ Exit:
|
||||
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure image.
|
||||
@retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED ImageType is unsupported or PE image is mal-format.
|
||||
@retval other error value
|
||||
-
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
@@ -405,6 +404,7 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage (
|
||||
Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
|
||||
ImageLoad = NULL;
|
||||
EventPtr = NULL;
|
||||
+ Tcg2Event = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
Tcg2Protocol = MeasureBootProtocols->Tcg2Protocol;
|
||||
CcProtocol = MeasureBootProtocols->CcProtocol;
|
||||
@@ -420,18 +420,22 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy
|
||||
//
|
||||
- EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
|
||||
- EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event));
|
||||
+ // from a malicious GPT disk partition
|
||||
+ EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize);
|
||||
if (EventPtr == NULL) {
|
||||
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *)EventPtr;
|
||||
- Tcg2Event->Size = EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event);
|
||||
+ Tcg2Event->Size = EventSize;
|
||||
Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER);
|
||||
Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderVersion = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION;
|
||||
ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *)Tcg2Event->Event;
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
index e2309655d3..2a4d52c6d5 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
- This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane
|
||||
+ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane
|
||||
It will check the following:
|
||||
- AllocationSize does not overflow
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -273,3 +273,47 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
|
||||
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane
|
||||
+ It will check the following:
|
||||
+ - EventSize does not overflow
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path.
|
||||
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
|
||||
+ The event size is valid.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
|
||||
+ Overflow would have occurred.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
|
||||
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+SanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
+ IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
|
||||
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Replacing logic:
|
||||
+ // sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
|
||||
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath), FilePathSize, EventSize);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Replacing logic:
|
||||
+ // EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)
|
||||
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (*EventSize, OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event), EventSize);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
index 048b738987..8f72ba4240 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
|
||||
Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse
|
||||
partition data carefully.
|
||||
|
||||
+ Tcg2MeasurePeImage() function will accept untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its
|
||||
+ data structure within this image buffer before use.
|
||||
+
|
||||
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
|
||||
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -110,4 +113,27 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
-#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_SANITATION_
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane
|
||||
+ It will check the following:
|
||||
+ - EventSize does not overflow
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path.
|
||||
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
|
||||
+ The event size is valid.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
|
||||
+ Overflow would have occurred.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
|
||||
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+SanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
+ IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
|
||||
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
index 3eb9763e3c..820e99aeb9 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
@@ -72,10 +72,10 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.Header.Revision = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION;
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER);
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.MyLBA = 1;
|
||||
- PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 2;
|
||||
- PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 3;
|
||||
- PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 4;
|
||||
- PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 5;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 2;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 3;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 4;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 5;
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES;
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryArrayCRC32 = 0; // Purposely invalid
|
||||
@@ -187,11 +187,6 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader;
|
||||
UINTN NumberOfPartition;
|
||||
- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;
|
||||
- EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- Tcg2Event = NULL;
|
||||
- GptData = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
|
||||
@@ -225,6 +220,52 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function tests the SanitizePeImageEventSize function.
|
||||
+ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a file path when generating a
|
||||
+ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT structure will not cause an overflow when calculating
|
||||
+ the event size when allocating space
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] Context The unit test context.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed.
|
||||
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+UNIT_TEST_STATUS
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
+ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ UINT32 EventSize;
|
||||
+ UINTN ExistingLogicEventSize;
|
||||
+ UINT32 FilePathSize;
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ FilePathSize = 255;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that a normal PE image passes validation
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_SUCCESS);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic
|
||||
+ ExistingLogicEventSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
|
||||
+ ExistingLogicEventSize += OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (EventSize != ExistingLogicEventSize) {
|
||||
+ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize returned an incorrect event size. Expected %u, got %u\n", ExistingLogicEventSize, EventSize);
|
||||
+ return UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that the event size may not overflow
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
|
||||
// * Unit Test Code Main Function
|
||||
// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
|
||||
@@ -267,6 +308,7 @@ UefiTestMain (
|
||||
AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
+ AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests PE Image and FileSize checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePeImageEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework);
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
|
||||
From bf371de652c1132667666a9534ec2d91f9ea111d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 4/9] SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH
|
||||
4117/4118 symbol rename
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 53: SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21157
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [4/5] bf00b368887b50b1ff5578a4491550b5741e3e34
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21157
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-36764
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit 326db0c9072004dea89427ea3a44393a84966f2b
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed Jan 17 14:47:21 2024 -0800
|
||||
|
||||
SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename
|
||||
|
||||
Updates the sanitation function names to be lib unique names
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Message-Id: <355aa846a99ca6ac0f7574cf5982661da0d9fea6.1705529990.git.doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 8 +++---
|
||||
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 10 +++----
|
||||
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 8 +++---
|
||||
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 26 +++++++++----------
|
||||
4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
index a9fc440a09..ac855b8fbb 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
|
||||
BlockIo->Media->BlockSize,
|
||||
(UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader
|
||||
);
|
||||
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) {
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) {
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to read Partition Table Header or invalid Partition Table Header!\n"));
|
||||
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Read the partition entry.
|
||||
//
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize);
|
||||
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Prepare Data for Measurement
|
||||
//
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
|
||||
TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *)AllocateZeroPool (EventSize);
|
||||
if (TcgEvent == NULL) {
|
||||
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
|
||||
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
|
||||
|
||||
// Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy
|
||||
//
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
|
||||
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
index c989851cec..070e4a2c1c 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/** @file
|
||||
- The library instance provides security service of TPM2 measure boot and
|
||||
+ The library instance provides security service of TPM measure boot and
|
||||
Confidential Computing (CC) measure boot.
|
||||
|
||||
Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
+TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
+TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
+TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
IN UINTN NumberOfPartition,
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
-SanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
+TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
)
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
index 2248495813..db6e9c3752 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
-SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
+TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
+TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
-SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
+TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
IN UINTN NumberOfPartition,
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
**/
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
-SanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
+TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
);
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
index c41498be45..de1740af41 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
@@ -83,27 +83,27 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.Header.CRC32 = CalculateCrc32 ((UINT8 *)&PrimaryHeader, PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
|
||||
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that when number of partition entries is 0, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
|
||||
// Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!""
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 0;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that when the header size is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
|
||||
// Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header Size!"
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = 0;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that when the SizeOfPartitionEntry is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
|
||||
// should print: "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!"
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 1;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
|
||||
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
|
||||
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that the allocation size is correct compared to the existing logic
|
||||
@@ -145,19 +145,19 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
// Test that an overflow is detected
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 5;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test the inverse
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test the worst case scenario
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
|
||||
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
NumberOfPartition = 13;
|
||||
|
||||
// that the primary event size is correct
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
// Calculate the existing logic event size
|
||||
@@ -206,12 +206,12 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (EventSize, ExistingLogicEventSize);
|
||||
|
||||
// Tests that the primary event size may not overflow
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that the size of partition entries may not overflow
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
|
||||
UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
|
||||
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
FilePathSize = 255;
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that a normal PE image passes validation
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
|
||||
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize failed with %r\n", Status);
|
||||
goto Exit;
|
||||
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that the event size may not overflow
|
||||
- Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ Status = TpmSanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
|
||||
if (Status != EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE) {
|
||||
UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize succeded when it was supposed to fail with %r\n", Status);
|
||||
goto Exit;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,914 @@
|
||||
From 8876f4f55b37e84f918282aba190fdd36eeb5f2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:20:52 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117 -
|
||||
CVE 2022-36763
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 51: SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21155
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [2/3] 50a9b8392352266a5f0b7af2d6c82f829da8983b
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21155
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-36763
|
||||
|
||||
commit 4776a1b39ee08fc45c70c1eab5a0195f325000d3
|
||||
Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:02 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763
|
||||
|
||||
This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpmMeasureBootLib
|
||||
CVE 2022-36763.
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 40 ++-
|
||||
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf | 4 +-
|
||||
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 241 ++++++++++++++
|
||||
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 114 +++++++
|
||||
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 301 ++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
...eTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf | 28 ++
|
||||
SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml | 1 +
|
||||
SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc | 1 +
|
||||
8 files changed, 716 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
|
||||
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
index 220393dd2b..669ab19134 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
||||
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
|
||||
+Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
|
||||
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
**/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <PiDxe.h>
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +42,8 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
#include <Library/SecurityManagementLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/HobLib.h>
|
||||
|
||||
+#include "DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h"
|
||||
+
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Flag to check GPT partition. It only need be measured once.
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -136,6 +140,9 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
|
||||
UINT32 EventSize;
|
||||
UINT32 EventNumber;
|
||||
EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;
|
||||
+ UINT32 AllocSize;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ GptData = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (mMeasureGptCount > 0) {
|
||||
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
@@ -166,8 +173,8 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
|
||||
BlockIo->Media->BlockSize,
|
||||
(UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader
|
||||
);
|
||||
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to Read Partition Table Header!\n"));
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to read Partition Table Header or invalid Partition Table Header!\n"));
|
||||
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -175,7 +182,13 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Read the partition entry.
|
||||
//
|
||||
- EntryPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocatePool (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EntryPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocatePool (AllocSize);
|
||||
if (EntryPtr == NULL) {
|
||||
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
|
||||
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
|
||||
@@ -185,7 +198,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
|
||||
DiskIo,
|
||||
BlockIo->Media->MediaId,
|
||||
MultU64x32 (PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize),
|
||||
- PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry,
|
||||
+ AllocSize,
|
||||
EntryPtr
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
@@ -210,9 +223,8 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Prepare Data for Measurement
|
||||
//
|
||||
- EventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions)
|
||||
- + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);
|
||||
- TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *)AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR));
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *)AllocateZeroPool (EventSize);
|
||||
if (TcgEvent == NULL) {
|
||||
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
|
||||
FreePool (EntryPtr);
|
||||
@@ -221,7 +233,7 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
|
||||
|
||||
TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 5;
|
||||
TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT;
|
||||
- TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize;
|
||||
+ TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize - sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR);
|
||||
GptData = (EFI_GPT_DATA *)TcgEvent->Event;
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
@@ -361,11 +373,13 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
|
||||
TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 2;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
- DEBUG ((
|
||||
- DEBUG_ERROR,
|
||||
- "TcgMeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d",
|
||||
- ImageType
|
||||
- ));
|
||||
+ DEBUG (
|
||||
+ (
|
||||
+ DEBUG_ERROR,
|
||||
+ "TcgMeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d",
|
||||
+ ImageType
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
goto Finish;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf
|
||||
index ebab6f7c1e..414c654d15 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
|
||||
|
||||
[Sources]
|
||||
DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
|
||||
[Packages]
|
||||
MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
|
||||
@@ -41,6 +43,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
[LibraryClasses]
|
||||
BaseMemoryLib
|
||||
+ SafeIntLib
|
||||
DebugLib
|
||||
MemoryAllocationLib
|
||||
DevicePathLib
|
||||
@@ -59,4 +62,3 @@
|
||||
gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
|
||||
gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
|
||||
gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
|
||||
-
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..a3fa46f5e6
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
|
||||
+/** @file
|
||||
+ The library instance provides security service of TPM2 measure boot and
|
||||
+ Confidential Computing (CC) measure boot.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.
|
||||
+ This library will have external input - PE/COFF image and GPT partition.
|
||||
+ This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like
|
||||
+ buffer overflow, integer overflow.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ This file will pull out the validation logic from the following functions, in an
|
||||
+ attempt to validate the untrusted input in the form of unit tests
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ These are those functions:
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content
|
||||
+ read is within the image buffer.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse
|
||||
+ partition data carefully.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
|
||||
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+#include <Uefi.h>
|
||||
+#include <Uefi/UefiSpec.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/SafeIntLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/UefiLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <IndustryStandard/UefiTcgPlatform.h>
|
||||
+#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#include "DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1 0x00010000
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function will validate the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is safe to parse
|
||||
+ However this function will not attempt to verify the validity of the GPT partition
|
||||
+ It will check the following:
|
||||
+ - Signature
|
||||
+ - Revision
|
||||
+ - AlternateLBA
|
||||
+ - FirstUsableLBA
|
||||
+ - LastUsableLBA
|
||||
+ - PartitionEntryLBA
|
||||
+ - NumberOfPartitionEntries
|
||||
+ - SizeOfPartitionEntry
|
||||
+ - BlockIo
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] PrimaryHeader
|
||||
+ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] BlockIo
|
||||
+ Pointer to the EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL structure.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
|
||||
+ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is valid.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
|
||||
+ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is invalid.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
+ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
+ IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ // Verify that the input parameters are safe to use
|
||||
+ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((BlockIo == NULL) || (BlockIo->Media == NULL)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid BlockIo!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // The signature must be EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID ("EFI PART" in ASCII)
|
||||
+ if (PrimaryHeader->Header.Signature != EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // The version must be GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1 (0x00010000)
|
||||
+ if (PrimaryHeader->Header.Revision != GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header Revision!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // The HeaderSize must be greater than or equal to 92 and must be less than or equal to the logical block size
|
||||
+ if ((PrimaryHeader->Header.HeaderSize < sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER)) || (PrimaryHeader->Header.HeaderSize > BlockIo->Media->BlockSize)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header HeaderSize!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // check that the PartitionEntryLBA greater than the Max LBA
|
||||
+ // This will be used later for multiplication
|
||||
+ if (PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA > DivU64x32 (MAX_UINT64, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header PartitionEntryLBA!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Check that the number of partition entries is greater than zero
|
||||
+ if (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries == 0) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // SizeOfPartitionEntry must be 128, 256, 512... improper size may lead to accessing uninitialized memory
|
||||
+ if ((PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry < 128) || ((PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry & (PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry - 1)) != 0)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // This check is to prevent overflow when calculating the allocation size for the partition entries
|
||||
+ // This check will be used later for multiplication
|
||||
+ if (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries > DivU64x32 (MAX_UINT64, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane
|
||||
+ It will check the following:
|
||||
+ - AllocationSize does not overflow
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] PrimaryHeader
|
||||
+ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[out] AllocationSize
|
||||
+ Pointer to the allocation size.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
|
||||
+ The allocation size is valid.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
|
||||
+ The allocation size is invalid.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
+ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
+ OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (AllocationSize == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Replacing logic:
|
||||
+ // PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry;
|
||||
+ Status = SafeUint32Mult (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry, AllocationSize);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Allocation Size would have overflowed!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function will validate that the Gpt Event Size calculated from the primary header is sane
|
||||
+ It will check the following:
|
||||
+ - EventSize does not overflow
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Important: This function includes the entire length of the allocated space, including the
|
||||
+ TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR. When hashing the buffer allocated with this size, the caller must subtract
|
||||
+ the size of the TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR from the size of the buffer before hashing.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] PrimaryHeader - Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure.
|
||||
+ @param[in] NumberOfPartition - Number of partitions.
|
||||
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
|
||||
+ The event size is valid.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
|
||||
+ Overflow would have occurred.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
|
||||
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
+ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
+ IN UINTN NumberOfPartition,
|
||||
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ UINT32 SafeNumberOfPartitions;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (EventSize == NULL) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // We shouldn't even attempt to perform the multiplication if the number of partitions is greater than the maximum value of UINT32
|
||||
+ Status = SafeUintnToUint32 (NumberOfPartition, &SafeNumberOfPartitions);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NumberOfPartition would have overflowed!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Replacing logic:
|
||||
+ // (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions) + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR));
|
||||
+ Status = SafeUint32Mult (SafeNumberOfPartitions, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry, EventSize);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Event Size would have overflowed!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (
|
||||
+ sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR) +
|
||||
+ OFFSET_OF (EFI_GPT_DATA, Partitions),
|
||||
+ *EventSize,
|
||||
+ EventSize
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Event Size would have overflowed because of GPTData!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..0d9d00c281
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
|
||||
+/** @file
|
||||
+ This file includes the function prototypes for the sanitization functions.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ These are those functions:
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content
|
||||
+ read is within the image buffer.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ TcgMeasurePeImage() function will accept untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its
|
||||
+ data structure within this image buffer before use.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ TcgMeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse
|
||||
+ partition data carefully.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
|
||||
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#ifndef DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_
|
||||
+#define DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#include <Uefi.h>
|
||||
+#include <Uefi/UefiSpec.h>
|
||||
+#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>
|
||||
+#include <IndustryStandard/UefiTcgPlatform.h>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function will validate the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is safe to parse
|
||||
+ However this function will not attempt to verify the validity of the GPT partition
|
||||
+ It will check the following:
|
||||
+ - Signature
|
||||
+ - Revision
|
||||
+ - AlternateLBA
|
||||
+ - FirstUsableLBA
|
||||
+ - LastUsableLBA
|
||||
+ - PartitionEntryLBA
|
||||
+ - NumberOfPartitionEntries
|
||||
+ - SizeOfPartitionEntry
|
||||
+ - BlockIo
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] PrimaryHeader
|
||||
+ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] BlockIo
|
||||
+ Pointer to the EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL structure.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
|
||||
+ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is valid.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
|
||||
+ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is invalid.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
+ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
+ IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane
|
||||
+ It will check the following:
|
||||
+ - AllocationSize does not overflow
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] PrimaryHeader
|
||||
+ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[out] AllocationSize
|
||||
+ Pointer to the allocation size.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
|
||||
+ The allocation size is valid.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
|
||||
+ The allocation size is invalid.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
+ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
+ OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function will validate that the Gpt Event Size calculated from the primary header is sane
|
||||
+ It will check the following:
|
||||
+ - EventSize does not overflow
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Important: This function includes the entire length of the allocated space, including the
|
||||
+ TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR. When hashing the buffer allocated with this size, the caller must subtract
|
||||
+ the size of the TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR from the size of the buffer before hashing.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] PrimaryHeader - Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure.
|
||||
+ @param[in] NumberOfPartition - Number of partitions.
|
||||
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
|
||||
+ The event size is valid.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
|
||||
+ Overflow would have occurred.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
|
||||
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
+ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader,
|
||||
+ IN UINTN NumberOfPartition,
|
||||
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#endif // DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..eeb928cdb0
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
|
||||
+/** @file
|
||||
+This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
|
||||
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#include <Uefi.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/UefiLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/UnitTestLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <IndustryStandard/UefiTcgPlatform.h>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#include "../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define UNIT_TEST_NAME "DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest"
|
||||
+#define UNIT_TEST_VERSION "1.0"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION 0x00010000
|
||||
+#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES 1
|
||||
+#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY 128
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function tests the SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader function.
|
||||
+ It's intent is to test that a malicious EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER
|
||||
+ structure will not cause undefined or unexpected behavior.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ In general the TPM should still be able to measure the data, but
|
||||
+ be the header should be sanitized to prevent any unexpected behavior.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] Context The unit test context.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed.
|
||||
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+UNIT_TEST_STATUS
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (
|
||||
+ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader;
|
||||
+ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL BlockIo;
|
||||
+ EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA BlockMedia;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Generate EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA test data
|
||||
+ BlockMedia.MediaId = 1;
|
||||
+ BlockMedia.RemovableMedia = FALSE;
|
||||
+ BlockMedia.MediaPresent = TRUE;
|
||||
+ BlockMedia.LogicalPartition = FALSE;
|
||||
+ BlockMedia.ReadOnly = FALSE;
|
||||
+ BlockMedia.WriteCaching = FALSE;
|
||||
+ BlockMedia.BlockSize = 512;
|
||||
+ BlockMedia.IoAlign = 1;
|
||||
+ BlockMedia.LastBlock = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Generate EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL test data
|
||||
+ BlockIo.Revision = 1;
|
||||
+ BlockIo.Media = &BlockMedia;
|
||||
+ BlockIo.Reset = NULL;
|
||||
+ BlockIo.ReadBlocks = NULL;
|
||||
+ BlockIo.WriteBlocks = NULL;
|
||||
+ BlockIo.FlushBlocks = NULL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Geneate EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER test data
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.Header.Signature = EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.Header.Revision = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER);
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.MyLBA = 1;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 2;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 3;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 4;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 5;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryArrayCRC32 = 0; // Purposely invalid
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Calculate the CRC32 of the PrimaryHeader
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.Header.CRC32 = CalculateCrc32 ((UINT8 *)&PrimaryHeader, PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that when number of partition entries is 0, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
|
||||
+ // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!""
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 0;
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that when the header size is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
|
||||
+ // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header Size!"
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = 0;
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that when the SizeOfPartitionEntry is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
|
||||
+ // should print: "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!"
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 1;
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo);
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function tests the SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize function.
|
||||
+ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER
|
||||
+ structure will not cause an overflow when calculating the allocation size.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] Context The unit test context.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed.
|
||||
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+UNIT_TEST_STATUS
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (
|
||||
+ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ UINT32 AllocationSize;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that the allocation size is correct compared to the existing logic
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (AllocationSize, PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that an overflow is detected
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 5;
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test the inverse
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test the worst case scenario
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize);
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function tests the SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize function.
|
||||
+ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a EFI_GPT_DATA structure
|
||||
+ will not cause an overflow when calculating the event size.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] Context The unit test context.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed.
|
||||
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+UNIT_TEST_STATUS
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
+ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ UINT32 EventSize;
|
||||
+ UINT32 ExistingLogicEventSize;
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader;
|
||||
+ UINTN NumberOfPartition;
|
||||
+ EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ GptData = NULL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // set the number of partitions
|
||||
+ NumberOfPartition = 13;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // that the primary event size is correct
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Calculate the existing logic event size
|
||||
+ ExistingLogicEventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR) + OFFSET_OF (EFI_GPT_DATA, Partitions)
|
||||
+ + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Check that the event size is correct
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (EventSize, ExistingLogicEventSize);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Tests that the primary event size may not overflow
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that the size of partition entries may not overflow
|
||||
+ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32;
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
|
||||
+// * Unit Test Code Main Function
|
||||
+// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function acts as the entry point for the unit tests.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param argc - The number of command line arguments
|
||||
+ @param argv - The command line arguments
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @return int - The status of the test
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+UefiTestMain (
|
||||
+ VOID
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ UNIT_TEST_FRAMEWORK_HANDLE Framework;
|
||||
+ UNIT_TEST_SUITE_HANDLE TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Framework = NULL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: TestMain() - Start\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = InitUnitTestFramework (&Framework, UNIT_TEST_NAME, gEfiCallerBaseName, UNIT_TEST_VERSION);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Failed in InitUnitTestFramework. Status = %r\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME, Status));
|
||||
+ goto EXIT;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = CreateUnitTestSuite (&TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, Framework, "TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", NULL, NULL);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%s: Failed in CreateUnitTestSuite for TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME));
|
||||
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
|
||||
+ goto EXIT;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // -----------Suite---------------------------------Description----------------------------Class----------------------------------Test Function------------------------Pre---Clean-Context
|
||||
+ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
+ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
+ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+EXIT:
|
||||
+ if (Framework != NULL) {
|
||||
+ FreeUnitTestFramework (Framework);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: TestMain() - End\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME));
|
||||
+ return Status;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+///
|
||||
+/// Avoid ECC error for function name that starts with lower case letter
|
||||
+///
|
||||
+#define DxeTpmMeasureBootLibUnitTestMain main
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ Standard POSIX C entry point for host based unit test execution.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] Argc Number of arguments
|
||||
+ @param[in] Argv Array of pointers to arguments
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval 0 Success
|
||||
+ @retval other Error
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+INT32
|
||||
+DxeTpmMeasureBootLibUnitTestMain (
|
||||
+ IN INT32 Argc,
|
||||
+ IN CHAR8 *Argv[]
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return (INT32)UefiTestMain ();
|
||||
+}
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf
|
||||
new file mode 100644
|
||||
index 0000000000..47b0811b00
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
|
||||
+## @file
|
||||
+# This file builds the unit tests for DxeTpmMeasureBootLib
|
||||
+#
|
||||
+# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
|
||||
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+##
|
||||
+
|
||||
+[Defines]
|
||||
+ INF_VERSION = 0x00010006
|
||||
+ BASE_NAME = DxeTpmMeasuredBootLibTest
|
||||
+ FILE_GUID = eb01bc38-309c-4d3e-967e-9f078c90772f
|
||||
+ MODULE_TYPE = HOST_APPLICATION
|
||||
+ VERSION_STRING = 1.0
|
||||
+ ENTRY_POINT = main
|
||||
+
|
||||
+[Sources]
|
||||
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
+ ../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
+
|
||||
+[Packages]
|
||||
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
|
||||
+
|
||||
+[LibraryClasses]
|
||||
+ BaseLib
|
||||
+ DebugLib
|
||||
+ UnitTestLib
|
||||
+ PrintLib
|
||||
+ SafeIntLib
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml
|
||||
index 24389531af..53e5b1fd8e 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml
|
||||
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
|
||||
"ExceptionList": [
|
||||
"8005", "gRT",
|
||||
"8001", "DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibUnitTestMain",
|
||||
+ "8001", "DxeTpmMeasureBootLibUnitTestMain"
|
||||
],
|
||||
## Both file path and directory path are accepted.
|
||||
"IgnoreFiles": [
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc b/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc
|
||||
index 788c1ab6fe..1655e573ea 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Test/SecurityPkgHostTest.dsc
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
|
||||
SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/UnitTest/MockUefiLib.inf
|
||||
SecurityPkg/Test/Mock/Library/GoogleTest/MockPlatformPKProtectionLib/MockPlatformPKProtectionLib.inf
|
||||
SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf
|
||||
+ SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Build SecurityPkg HOST_APPLICATION Tests
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
|
||||
From c5580cd68acf14c9e8660f6ee2842654479089ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 15:43:10 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/9] SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 -
|
||||
CVE 2022-36764
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 53: SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21157
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [2/5] 3945cfd0838c822a3b2cc4b4e315c39a779a7344
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21157
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-36764
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit 0d341c01eeabe0ab5e76693b36e728b8f538a40e
|
||||
Author: Douglas Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jan 12 02:16:05 2024 +0800
|
||||
|
||||
SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764
|
||||
|
||||
This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpmMeasureBootLib
|
||||
CVE 2022-36764.
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c | 13 ++-
|
||||
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 44 +++++++++
|
||||
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 23 +++++
|
||||
.../DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++--
|
||||
4 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
index 669ab19134..a9fc440a09 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
|
||||
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
|
||||
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
@@ -345,18 +346,22 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
|
||||
ImageLoad = NULL;
|
||||
SectionHeader = NULL;
|
||||
Sha1Ctx = NULL;
|
||||
+ TcgEvent = NULL;
|
||||
FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
|
||||
|
||||
- //
|
||||
// Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy
|
||||
//
|
||||
- EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
|
||||
- TcgEvent = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT));
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ TcgEvent = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize);
|
||||
if (TcgEvent == NULL) {
|
||||
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize;
|
||||
+ TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize - sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR);
|
||||
ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *)TcgEvent->Event;
|
||||
|
||||
switch (ImageType) {
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
index a3fa46f5e6..c989851cec 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.c
|
||||
@@ -239,3 +239,47 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
|
||||
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane
|
||||
+ It will check the following:
|
||||
+ - EventSize does not overflow
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path.
|
||||
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
|
||||
+ The event size is valid.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
|
||||
+ Overflow would have occurred.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
|
||||
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+SanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
+ IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
|
||||
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Replacing logic:
|
||||
+ // sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
|
||||
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath), FilePathSize, EventSize);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Replacing logic:
|
||||
+ // EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR)
|
||||
+ Status = SafeUint32Add (*EventSize, sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR), EventSize);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n"));
|
||||
+ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
index 0d9d00c281..2248495813 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitization.h
|
||||
@@ -111,4 +111,27 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane
|
||||
+ It will check the following:
|
||||
+ - EventSize does not overflow
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path.
|
||||
+ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS
|
||||
+ The event size is valid.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
|
||||
+ Overflow would have occurred.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
|
||||
+ One of the passed parameters was invalid.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+EFI_STATUS
|
||||
+SanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
+ IN UINT32 FilePathSize,
|
||||
+ OUT UINT32 *EventSize
|
||||
+ );
|
||||
+
|
||||
#endif // DXE_TPM_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
index eeb928cdb0..c41498be45 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
||||
/** @file
|
||||
-This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c.
|
||||
+ This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpmMeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c.
|
||||
|
||||
-Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
|
||||
-SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
+ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>
|
||||
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
|
||||
**/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <Uefi.h>
|
||||
@@ -186,9 +186,6 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader;
|
||||
UINTN NumberOfPartition;
|
||||
- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- GptData = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation
|
||||
PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5;
|
||||
@@ -222,6 +219,94 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (
|
||||
return UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/**
|
||||
+ This function tests the SanitizePeImageEventSize function.
|
||||
+ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a file path for an
|
||||
+ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT structure will not cause an overflow when calculating
|
||||
+ the event size when allocating space.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @param[in] Context The unit test context.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed.
|
||||
+ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed.
|
||||
+**/
|
||||
+UNIT_TEST_STATUS
|
||||
+EFIAPI
|
||||
+TestSanitizePeImageEventSize (
|
||||
+ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context
|
||||
+ )
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ UINT32 EventSize;
|
||||
+ UINTN ExistingLogicEventSize;
|
||||
+ UINT32 FilePathSize;
|
||||
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL DevicePath;
|
||||
+ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoadEvent;
|
||||
+ UNIT_TEST_STATUS TestStatus;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ TestStatus = UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Generate EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL test data
|
||||
+ DevicePath.Type = 0;
|
||||
+ DevicePath.SubType = 0;
|
||||
+ DevicePath.Length[0] = 0;
|
||||
+ DevicePath.Length[1] = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Generate EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT test data
|
||||
+ ImageLoadEvent = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT) + sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL));
|
||||
+ if (ImageLoadEvent == NULL) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: AllocateZeroPool failed\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ goto Exit;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Populate EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT54 test data
|
||||
+ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLocationInMemory = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)0x12345678;
|
||||
+ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLengthInMemory = 0x1000;
|
||||
+ ImageLoadEvent->ImageLinkTimeAddress = (UINTN)ImageLoadEvent;
|
||||
+ ImageLoadEvent->LengthOfDevicePath = sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL);
|
||||
+ CopyMem (ImageLoadEvent->DevicePath, &DevicePath, sizeof (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ FilePathSize = 255;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that a normal PE image passes validation
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
+ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize failed with %r\n", Status);
|
||||
+ goto Exit;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic
|
||||
+ ExistingLogicEventSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
|
||||
+ ExistingLogicEventSize += sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (EventSize != ExistingLogicEventSize) {
|
||||
+ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize returned an incorrect event size. Expected %u, got %u\n", ExistingLogicEventSize, EventSize);
|
||||
+ goto Exit;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Test that the event size may not overflow
|
||||
+ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize);
|
||||
+ if (Status != EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE) {
|
||||
+ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize succeded when it was supposed to fail with %r\n", Status);
|
||||
+ goto Exit;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ TestStatus = UNIT_TEST_PASSED;
|
||||
+Exit:
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (ImageLoadEvent != NULL) {
|
||||
+ FreePool (ImageLoadEvent);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (TestStatus == UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Test failed\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__));
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return TestStatus;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
|
||||
// * Unit Test Code Main Function
|
||||
// *--------------------------------------------------------------------*
|
||||
@@ -265,6 +350,7 @@ UefiTestMain (
|
||||
AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
+ AddTestCase (TcgMeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests PE Image and FileSize checks for overflow", "Common.TcgMeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePeImageEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework);
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
||||
From 7719d41979ef6e376d183c70cd47951ff5bf6ef1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2024 10:33:43 -0400
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 5/8] SecurityPkg/RngDxe: add rng test
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 75: NetworkPkg: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 and CVE-2023-45237
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-40270 RHEL-40272
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [5/8] 84a58daaed0ee81ebed501392be33338da575df6
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-40270
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2023-45237
|
||||
|
||||
commit a61bc0accb8a76edba4f073fdc7bafc908df045d
|
||||
Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri May 31 09:49:13 2024 +0200
|
||||
|
||||
SecurityPkg/RngDxe: add rng test
|
||||
|
||||
Check whenever RngLib actually returns random numbers, only return
|
||||
a non-zero number of Algorithms if that is the case.
|
||||
|
||||
This has the effect that RndDxe loads and installs EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL
|
||||
only in case it can actually deliver random numbers.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Check whenever RngLib actually returns random numbers, only return
|
||||
a non-zero number of Algorithms if that is the case.
|
||||
|
||||
This has the effect that RndDxe loads and installs EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL
|
||||
only in case it can actually deliver random numbers.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c | 8 +++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c
|
||||
index 7e06e16e4b..285b5f46e7 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/Rand/RngDxe.c
|
||||
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
|
||||
#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
|
||||
+#include <Library/RngLib.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "RngDxeInternals.h"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -43,7 +44,12 @@ GetAvailableAlgorithms (
|
||||
VOID
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- mAvailableAlgoArrayCount = RNG_ALGORITHM_COUNT;
|
||||
+ UINT64 RngTest;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (GetRandomNumber64 (&RngTest)) {
|
||||
+ mAvailableAlgoArrayCount = RNG_ALGORITHM_COUNT;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
|
||||
From 95697612d2f1953c691b0914a1669e0fcf179767 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:30:10 -0500
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 5/9] SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol
|
||||
rename
|
||||
|
||||
RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-MergeRequest: 53: SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764
|
||||
RH-Jira: RHEL-21157
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
|
||||
RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <None>
|
||||
RH-Commit: [5/5] 8e0c9c8c6b6ad05454f138397036954fe36c778c
|
||||
|
||||
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-21157
|
||||
CVE: CVE-2022-36764
|
||||
Upstream: Merged
|
||||
|
||||
commit 264636d8e6983e0f6dc6be2fca9d84ec81315954
|
||||
Author: Doug Flick <dougflick@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed Jan 17 14:47:22 2024 -0800
|
||||
|
||||
SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol rename
|
||||
|
||||
Adding the new commit titles for the symbol renames
|
||||
|
||||
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Message-Id: <5e0e851e97459e183420178888d4fcdadc2f1ae1.1705529990.git.doug.edk2@gmail.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
|
||||
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
index f9e3e7be74..dc1bb83489 100644
|
||||
--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
+++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml
|
||||
@@ -9,14 +9,35 @@ CVE_2022_36763:
|
||||
- "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2Measurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763"
|
||||
- "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasurement: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE 2022-36763"
|
||||
- "SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36763 to SecurityFixes.yaml"
|
||||
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename"
|
||||
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename"
|
||||
+ - "SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol rename"
|
||||
cve: CVE-2022-36763
|
||||
date_reported: 2022-10-25 11:31 UTC
|
||||
description: (CVE-2022-36763) - Heap Buffer Overflow in Tcg2MeasureGptTable()
|
||||
note: This patch is related to and supersedes TCBZ2168
|
||||
files_impacted:
|
||||
- - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
- - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
+ - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
+ - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
links:
|
||||
- - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4117
|
||||
- - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2168
|
||||
- - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1990
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4117
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2168
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1990
|
||||
+CVE_2022_36764:
|
||||
+ commit_titles:
|
||||
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764"
|
||||
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE 2022-36764"
|
||||
+ - "SecurityPkg: : Adding CVE 2022-36764 to SecurityFixes.yaml"
|
||||
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename"
|
||||
+ - "SecurityPkg: DxeTpmMeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117/4118 symbol rename"
|
||||
+ - "SecurityPkg: : Updating SecurityFixes.yaml after symbol rename"
|
||||
+ cve: CVE-2022-36764
|
||||
+ date_reported: 2022-10-25 12:23 UTC
|
||||
+ description: Heap Buffer Overflow in Tcg2MeasurePeImage()
|
||||
+ note:
|
||||
+ files_impacted:
|
||||
+ - Library\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib\DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
+ - Library\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib\DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
|
||||
+ links:
|
||||
+ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4118
|
||||
+
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.39.3
|
||||
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Loading…
Reference in new issue