From 2452231df2155ad8a3ba0e5bd2b30061c6529fa8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: MSVSphere Packaging Team Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2024 03:31:59 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] import bubblewrap-0.4.1-7.el9_4 --- ...d-and-ro-bind-fd-to-let-you-bind-a-O.patch | 120 ++++++++++++++++++ SPECS/bubblewrap.spec | 8 +- 2 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 SOURCES/0001-0.4.0-Add-bind-fd-and-ro-bind-fd-to-let-you-bind-a-O.patch diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-0.4.0-Add-bind-fd-and-ro-bind-fd-to-let-you-bind-a-O.patch b/SOURCES/0001-0.4.0-Add-bind-fd-and-ro-bind-fd-to-let-you-bind-a-O.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a28038 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0001-0.4.0-Add-bind-fd-and-ro-bind-fd-to-let-you-bind-a-O.patch @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +From 10e62a964d465884b972571b258042493259b00b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alexander Larsson +Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 10:20:36 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] [0.4.0] Add --bind-fd and --ro-bind-fd to let you bind a + O_PATH fd. + +This is useful for example if you for some reason don't have the real +path. It is also a way to make bind-mounts race-free (i.e. to have the +mount actually be the thing you wanted to be mounted, avoiding issues +where some other process replaces the target in parallel with the bwrap +launch. + +Unfortunately due to some technical details we can't actually directly +mount the dirfd, as they come from different user namespace which is not +permitted, but at least we can delay resolving the fd to a path as much as +possible, and then validate after mount that we actually mounted the right +thing. + +[@kolyshkin: backport commit a253257cd298892 to v0.4.0] + +Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson +Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin +--- + bubblewrap.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + tests/test-run.sh | 5 +++++ + 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/bubblewrap.c b/bubblewrap.c +index 8d0c5f7..209c1a5 100644 +--- a/bubblewrap.c ++++ b/bubblewrap.c +@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ usage (int ecode, FILE *out) + " --dev-bind-try SRC DEST Equal to --dev-bind but ignores non-existent SRC\n" + " --ro-bind SRC DEST Bind mount the host path SRC readonly on DEST\n" + " --ro-bind-try SRC DEST Equal to --ro-bind but ignores non-existent SRC\n" ++ " --bind-fd FD DEST Bind open directory or path fd on DEST\n" ++ " --ro-bind-fd FD DEST Bind open directory or path fd read-only on DEST\n" + " --remount-ro DEST Remount DEST as readonly; does not recursively remount\n" + " --exec-label LABEL Exec label for the sandbox\n" + " --file-label LABEL File label for temporary sandbox content\n" +@@ -1106,6 +1108,30 @@ setup_newroot (bool unshare_pid, + (op->type == SETUP_RO_BIND_MOUNT ? BIND_READONLY : 0) | + (op->type == SETUP_DEV_BIND_MOUNT ? BIND_DEVICES : 0), + source, dest); ++ ++ if (op->fd >= 0) ++ { ++ struct stat fd_st, mount_st; ++ ++ /* When using bind-fd, there is a race condition between resolving the fd as a magic symlink ++ * and mounting it, where someone could replace what is at the symlink target. Ideally ++ * we would not even resolve the symlink and directly bind-mount from the fd, but unfortunately ++ * we can't do that, because its not permitted to bind mount a fd from another user namespace. ++ * So, we resolve, mount and then compare fstat+stat to detect the race. */ ++ ++ if (fstat(op->fd, &fd_st) != 0) ++ die_with_error("Can't stat fd %d", op->fd); ++ if (lstat(dest, &mount_st) != 0) ++ die_with_error("Can't stat mount at %s", dest); ++ ++ if (fd_st.st_ino != mount_st.st_ino || ++ fd_st.st_dev != mount_st.st_dev) ++ die_with_error("Race condition binding dirfd"); ++ ++ close(op->fd); ++ op->fd = -1; ++ } ++ + break; + + case SETUP_REMOUNT_RO_NO_RECURSIVE: +@@ -1643,6 +1669,30 @@ parse_args_recurse (int *argcp, + if (strcmp(arg, "--dev-bind-try") == 0) + op->flags = ALLOW_NOTEXIST; + ++ argv += 2; ++ argc -= 2; ++ } ++ else if (strcmp (arg, "--bind-fd") == 0 || ++ strcmp (arg, "--ro-bind-fd") == 0) ++ { ++ int src_fd; ++ char *endptr; ++ ++ if (argc < 3) ++ die ("--bind-fd takes two arguments"); ++ ++ src_fd = strtol (argv[1], &endptr, 10); ++ if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || src_fd < 0) ++ die ("Invalid fd: %s", argv[1]); ++ ++ if (strcmp(arg, "--ro-bind-fd") == 0) ++ op = setup_op_new (SETUP_RO_BIND_MOUNT); ++ else ++ op = setup_op_new (SETUP_BIND_MOUNT); ++ op->source = xasprintf ("/proc/self/fd/%d", src_fd); ++ op->fd = src_fd; ++ op->dest = argv[2]; ++ + argv += 2; + argc -= 2; + } +diff --git a/tests/test-run.sh b/tests/test-run.sh +index a01f41c..345db46 100755 +--- a/tests/test-run.sh ++++ b/tests/test-run.sh +@@ -375,5 +375,10 @@ else + echo "ok - Test --pidns" + fi + ++echo "foobar" > file-data ++$RUN --proc /proc --dev /dev --bind / / --bind-fd 100 /tmp cat /tmp/file-data 100< . > stdout ++assert_file_has_content stdout foobar ++ ++echo "ok - bind-fd" + + echo "ok - End of test" +-- +2.46.0 + diff --git a/SPECS/bubblewrap.spec b/SPECS/bubblewrap.spec index d8d7f65..6ce06c3 100644 --- a/SPECS/bubblewrap.spec +++ b/SPECS/bubblewrap.spec @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ Name: bubblewrap Version: 0.4.1 -Release: 6%{?dist} +Release: 7%{?dist} Summary: Core execution tool for unprivileged containers License: LGPLv2+ @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ License: LGPLv2+ URL: https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap Source0: https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap/releases/download/v%{version}/bubblewrap-%{version}.tar.xz Patch0: 0001-Avoid-memory-leak-if-args-is-specified-multiple-time.patch +Patch1: 0001-0.4.0-Add-bind-fd-and-ro-bind-fd-to-let-you-bind-a-O.patch BuildRequires: autoconf automake libtool BuildRequires: gcc @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ containers that works as a setuid binary on kernels without user namespaces. %prep -%autosetup +%autosetup -p1 %build if ! test -x configure; then NOCONFIGURE=1 ./autogen.sh; fi @@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ find %{buildroot} -name '*.la' -delete -print %{_mandir}/man1/* %changelog +* Wed Aug 28 2024 Kir Kolyshkin - 0.4.1-7 +- Add support for --bind-fd and --ro-bind-fd (CVE-2024-42472) + * Mon Aug 09 2021 Mohan Boddu - 0.4.1-6 - Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags Related: rhbz#1991688